448luftwaffe Marine Vs Uk

War in History
http://wih.sagepub.com
Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe Co-operation in the War against

Britain, 1939-1945
Sönke Neitzel
War In History 2003; 10; 448
DOI: 10.1191/0968344503wh285oa
The online version of this article can be found at:

http://wih.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/448
Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
Additional services and information for War in History can be found at:
Email Alerts: http://wih.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts
Subscriptions: http://wih.sagepub.com/subscriptions
Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
Downloaded from http://wih.sagepub.com by yud kantor on May 17, 2008

© 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized
distribution.
Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe
Co-operation in the War
against Britain, 1939–1945
Sönke Neitzel
The German contribution to the air war over the sea in the Second World
War is associated with the great air–sea battles in the Mediterranean in
1941/42 and the Arctic in 1942. But hardly anything is known about the
participation of the Luftwaffe in the battle in the Atlantic from the German
perspective. This article illustrates the roots and the course of this important
campaign and discusses the fundamental problems in the co-operation of
the Luftwaffe with the navy. It shows that in peacetime the navy and during
the war the Luftwaffe failed to recognize the importance of a well-planned
inter-service co-operation in a theatre of war, where improvisation was
hardly possible.
I t is well known that disputes between political and military au-

thorities in the Third Reich led to many military failures. These cir-
cumstances were also of grave consequence in the air war over the sea.
The Luftwaffe and the navy attacked one another in endless disputes,
which made serious planning as well as meaningful success at the front
impossible. Hence the operations of the Luftwaffe over the sea never
left their infancy. This article illustrates the background, reasons and
results in the western theatre of operations.
The origins of the German naval air force date back to a cabinet
order from the Emperor in 1913. Although German authorities were
interested in the use of aircraft for naval purposes, naval aviation was
actually regarded more as a sport than a serious weapon. It was the
stepchild of the navy, which for sea-reconnaissance missions expected
everything from airships and nothing from aircraft. In August 1914 the
German navy had only 20 pilots and a handful of low-performance
seaplanes. British and French naval aviation was far better developed
in technical equipment and training.1
1
G.P. Neumann, Die deutschen Luftstreitkräfte im Weltkriege (Berlin, 1920), p. 118.
War in History 2003 10 (4) 448–463 10.1191/0968344503wh285oa Ó
distribution. 2003 Arnold
Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe Co-operation in the War against Britain 449
During the next years the navy was able to recover lost ground.
Although the army controlled airframe and engine production, and
although the army was reluctant to give the navy adequate technical
support, it was possible to develop a number of very ef cient seaplanes.
The Allied advantages were cancelled out when the German naval air
arm won air superiority over the North Sea and the narrow reaches of
the Channel in 1917/18. The W-12, W-19 and W-29 oatplane ghters
by the Hansa-Brandenburg Company had a much better performance
than their Allied counterparts.2 In total the German naval air arm shot
down 270 Allied seaplanes for a loss of 170 of their own number in
the First World War. Under superior ghter cover German seaplane
patrol craft were able to y their reconnaissance missions up to the
British coast. Besides, the German naval air arm attacked Allied ship-
ping successfully. In 1917 and 1918 it sank four merchant vessels, four
patrol boats, three submarines, twelve other ships and a Russian
destroyer.3
By 1918 the German naval air arm had grown from a modest begin-
ning into a sizeable branch of the service. At the time of the armistice
it comprised about 16 000 men (of whom 2100 were aircrew) and
nearly 1500 sea- and land-aircraft.4 It had realized the importance of
achieving aerial superiority over key areas, had developed aerial tor-
pedoes and a special torpedo plane, and had used them more exten-
sively than the Royal Navy. The German naval air arm was the pioneer
of aerial mine laying, developed wireless-guided aerial navigation 5 and
recognized the importance of building not only seaplane tenders but
also a true eet aircraft carrier. The rebuilding of the 11 300-ton pass-
enger ship Austonia into the rst German carrier for about twenty air-
craft got top priority in the naval building programme in 1918 but the
ship was still under construction in November. 6
The naval air arm could draw a positive balance from the First World
War. Even so, like the navy as a whole or the army airforce, it had not
been able to alter the course of the war. It was condemned to a stra-
tegic impotence, although it performed well on a tactical level.
The successes of 1917/18 might have been an ideal basis for further
development of naval air doctrine in the inter-war period. And indeed,
shortly after the implementation of limitations imposed by the Ver-
sailles treaty, the navy started a secret reorganization of its naval avi-
ation. But it did not follow the promising path of the First World War.
2
J.H. Morrow, German Air Power in World War I (Lincoln, NE, and London, 1982),
pp. 53, 88; J.H. Morrow, The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from 1909 to 1921
(Washington and London, 1993), pp. 156, 304; Neumann, Die deutschen
Luftstreitkräfte, p. 125.
3
J.S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940 (Kansas, 1997),
p. 44.
4
G. Hümmelchen, Die deutschen Seeieger, 1935–1945 (München, 1976), p. 10.
5
R.D. Layman, Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact and Inuence (London,
1996), p. 39.
6
Corum, Luftwaffe, p. 45. See also Layman, Naval Aviation, pp. 106–07.
distribution. War in History 2003 10 (4)
450 Sönke Neitzel
Both the Cs-in-C Navy, Admiral Hans Zenker and his successor Admiral
Erich Raeder, were battleship-minded. They degraded naval aviation
to a mere reconnaissance force for the battle eet and did not see the
great potential of aircraft operating over sea.
The navy was primarily interested in getting its own naval air arm
in the future. This was its rst priority, not the development of new
tactical and strategic doctrines. Totally concentrated on its own affairs,
it was very wary of any army–navy air operation in the inter-war period
because it feared that this might be the rst step in losing the naval
air arm to a new air force as a third service.7 The old rivalry continued
and a debate developed about the future of German military aviation.
Should it be a naval and army air force or an independent air force
as a third service? In the end Hermann Göring was able to enforce his
conception of a powerful, homogeneous air force. However, the out-
come of this power struggle between the leadership of the navy and
Göring was not certain for several years. The War Minister, General
Werner von Blomberg, inclined to the attitude of the navy and its
Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Raeder.8 Nevertheless Göring was –
with the support of Hitler and several high-ranking of cers of the army
(including Colonel Walter von Reichenau, General Blomberg’s Chief
of Staff) – successful. In 1933 he was promoted from the rank of cap-
tain, which he had held in 1920, to full general, a unique proceeding
in modern military history. Two years later he was given the high com-
mand of the new German Luftwaffe.
II
As with every other air force the German Luftwaffe included from the
very beginning a naval aviation element. In time of war the specially
equipped seaplane squadrons (Küstenieger Staffeln) would come under
the tactical command of the navy. In peacetime the navy had no in u-
ence on supply, training or any other matter of importance. Because
80% of the of cer corps from these Küstenieger Staffeln was recruited
from the navy, Raeder hoped that his demands would somehow be
taken into consideration.9 Although during the following years Raeder
did not give up his attempts to get a proper naval air force, he was
not successful. On the contrary – from autumn 1938 on, Göring was
able to reduce permanently the in uence of the navy on matters relat-
ing to ying units. This development is closely linked to the impact
made by the Sudeten crisis in September 1938. From now on the air
war over the sea played an important role in operational plans. Accord-
7
Corum, Luftwaffe, pp. 78–81, 109–112.
8
A. Kube, Pour le mérite und Hakenkreuz: Hermann Göring im Dritten Reich (München and
Wien, 1986), p. 51.
9
Der Chef der Marineleitung, B.Nr. Ava 57/35 GKdos, 11. Januar 1935, Bundesarchiv-
Militärarchiv, Freiburg (BA/MA), RM 48/42.
War in History 2003 10 (4) distribution.
ingly, the Luftwaffe’s leadership became convinced that it was their

exclusive preserve. This was the beginning of the permanent reduction
of naval aviation. In an agreement in January 1939 between Göring
and Raeder the future strength of the Seeieger was reduced from 62
to 41 squadrons (500 aircraft) which would be available by the end of
1941.10 At the outbreak of war in September 1939 only 19 squadrons
were available. By the end of 1941 the naval air force comprised only
two weak squadrons – the rest was transferred to the Luftwaffe or
was disbanded.
The question is, was this development unavoidable under the exist-
ing circumstances? Was it inevitable that the air force should sooner or
later absorb all naval squadrons? The navy had – without any doubt – a
hard time given the powerful position of the Luftwaffe. Nevertheless
the navy had to share in the responsibility for allowing Göring to
expand his power on such a large scale. It singularly failed to convince
the leadership of the Wehrmacht of the paramount role of the aircraft
in any future war at sea. The admirals still thought in terms of First
World War gunnery combats between battleships. The aircraft as an
auxiliary weapon for the battle eet had in their conception an
important but nevertheless only secondary role. Naval bomber units
were nothing more than a ‘toy’ for them, a former of cer of the naval
air arm said after the war.11 The sceptical view of carriers as ‘swimming
petrol-boxes’ underlines this very clearly.12
The slow and dragging development of the aerial torpedo (which
until the end of 1941 remained under the responsibility of the navy)
and the fact that the importance of air support for warship operations
was never emphasized until the sinking of the Bismarck were conse-
quences of the antiquated attitude of the navy high command. For a
layman like Hitler or for the generals in the high command of the
Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe with its global and ambitious plans had to
be the service with the most promising outlook. In several studies Luft-
waffe staff of cers of medium rank laid the foundations of an effective
sea–air war. In contrast to the navy they realized the decisive role of
aircraft in a war against Britain. Air mining campaigns, and air attacks
on British ports and on the supply lines in the Western Approaches,
were regarded as adequate measures to force Britain to its knees.13
10
Entwurf für Protokoll, pp. 8f., BA/MA, RM 7/v. 3080; Der Reichsminister der
Luftfahrt, Min. AI Nr. 88/39 GKdos, 13.2.39, BA/MA, RM 7/257; Aktennotiz
‘Betrifft: Besprechung ObdL – ObdM’, BA/MA, RM 7/v. 3080.
11
Lieutenant-Commander Stockmann, in: ‘Der Luftkrieg über See: Studie A-23 der
Studiengruppe Geschichte des Luftkrieges’, undated, p. 10, BA/MA, LW 107/164.
12
See U. Israel, Graf Zeppelin: einziger deutscher Flugzeugträger (Herford, 1994), pp. 7–10,
153.
13
See: Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Genst. 1
Abt. Nr. 144/38 g.K. (M), 20.5.1938, BA/MA, RM 7/v. 2079; Unterrichtung des
Amtschef A am 22.7.1938, BA/MA, RM 48/28; Luft ottenkdo. 2, Führungsabteilung,
B.Nr. 7093/39 GKdos Chefs., 13.5.1939: Schlußbesprechung des Planspieles 1939,
S. 1, BA/MA, RL 7/42; General z.b.V. L .Kdo 2, Der Chef des Stabes B.Nr. 100/39
GKdos, 12. August 1939, BA/MA, RL 7/29.
452 Sönke Neitzel
III
If the Luftwaffe recognized the signi cance of aircraft in a sea war in
peacetime, why was the co-operation between the two services during
the Second World War such a failure? Why were German aircraft
unable to attain their perceived role in the air–sea campaign? The navy
argued that this was due to the unfortunate form of organization that
did not allow for an independent naval air force as in Japan or the
USA.14 However, Great Britain’s Coastal Command was organized
along similar lines and – problems15 notwithstanding – did reasonably
well. Why wasn’t this also possible in Germany?
Without doubt the ultimate reason for this sorry state of affairs was
the lack of adequate leadership in the upper echelons of the Luftwaffe
high command. There was no quali ed personality with inuence who
was able to stand up for the interests of the navy after the war broke
out and the Luftwaffe had to accomplish numerous other tasks. The
military ‘breeding’ of Göring and most of his higher staff of cers made
them terrestrial- rather than maritime-minded. The Luftwaffe claimed
responsibility for the air war over the sea but did nothing to extend
the promising beginnings of the pre-war period during the war years.
From September 1939 on, there were only improvisation and a lack of
accurate planning. Therefore, countless ascos were predestined, and
most important strategic decisions came either too late or not at all.
The Chief of Staff, General Hans Jeschonnek, was very sceptical about
the effectiveness of the torpedo as a useful weapon for aircraft. He
liked to argue that bombs were much cheaper than torpedoes!16
Consequently he denied the Küstenieger-Staffeln modern aircraft such
as the He-111 to use with the rst aerial torpedoes. In autumn 1940,
however, after the effectiveness of this weapon had been demon-
strated, Jeschonnek changed his mind. He tried to take away all aerial
torpedoes from the navy-attached units to give his ‘proper’ Luftwaffe
the exclusive right to use them. The navy put up erce resistance and
an absurd altercation about some dozen torpedoes ensued. On
account of this dispute the German aerial torpedo was not used in
appreciable numbers until spring 1942.17
A comparable difference of opinion existed about the mining cam-
paign in British waters. The navy would have liked to use the till-then-
unknown acoustic mines in a mass offensive to achieve a knockout
14
With a detailed statement of Raeder on this matter: ‘Entwicklung der deutschen
Marinepolitik, 1933–1945’, 4.8.1945, BA/MA, RM 6/104.
15
See C. Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s Anti-Shipping
Campaign, 1940–45 (London, 1995), pp. 143–46, 204f.
16
Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe, Nr. 6010/40 GK. Chefs. V. 8.12.1940, BA/MA,
RM 7/160.
17
See ‘Gründe für die Führung im Einsatz des Lufttorpedos durch die Luftwaffe’,
6.12.1940, BA/MA, RM 7/168; War Diary Naval Staff Part A, 13.12.1940: see W.
Rahn and G. Schreiber, eds, Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung, 1939–1945 (Herford,
1988–97), pp. 165f.; Niederschrift C/Skl über die Besprechung mit Chef des
Generalstabes der Luftwaffe General Jeschonnek am 4.1.1941, BA/MA, RM 7/170.
blow against British merchant traf c. The Luftwaffe used the new mine
type for the rst time in August 1940. However, the rst mass offensive
against the Thames estuary did not occur before mid-December when
weather conditions were poor. As a result of this haphazard employ-
ment, the Royal Navy was able to recover some mines and develop
suitable counter-measures. Raeder was not able to convince the general
staff of the Luftwaffe of his opinion that new mines, if they were used,
must be employed in high numbers. The Luftwaffe was deaf to the
proposals of the navy and even used 35% of the aerial mines against
land targets (because of their high explosive force).18
In addition the Luftwaffe failed to recognize the importance of
British yards and harbours. Neither warship nor merchant shipyards
were attacked on a scale suf cient to achieve an appreciable result.
Additionally opportunities were missed in air attacks on British ship-
ping in the Western Approaches. In 1940/41 most merchant ships
were either poorly defended or completely defenceless. Half a dozen
FW-200 (Condor) long-range aircraft of I/KG-40 were able to sink 52
ships (217 464 GRT) from August 1940 until February 1941 for the loss
of only four of their own number. Although it would have been pos-
sible from a technical point of view to support the Condors on their
patrols in the Western Approaches (He-111 H-6 medium bombers were
able to y around the British Isles from Stavanger in Norway to Vannes
in France with a bomb load of 1000 kg), this never came to pass. Even
from February 1941 on, when Hitler’s directive no. 23 ordered the
Luftwaffe to concentrate on interdicting British imports, not more
than 8% of the Luftwaffe’s effort was used for mining or the campaign
against British shipping.19
A further consequence of the unwillingness to deal with naval mat-
ters was the poor training of the Luftwaffe’s aircrews for operations
over the sea. The training of land-aircraft crew (i.e., He-111, Ju-88, FW-
200) was particularly unsatisfactory. An instruction group for missions
over the sea was not set up before autumn 1941 and even then had
only an improvised character.20 Operations with torpedoes and mines
were taught in a three-week course in Großenbrode (northern
Germany) and later in Grosseto (Italy) or Riga. In this period it was
impossible to drill for all kinds of attack to a suf cient standard. Com-
bined training-attacks by torpedo- and dive-bombers never took place.
To judge the quality of the training of sea- ying personnel it is
important to take a look at the training of the German U-boat arm.
18
War Diary Naval Staff, Part A: Rahn and Schreiber, Kriegstagebuch, 31.8.40, pp. 376f;
2.9.40, p. 20; 2.10.40, p. 16; Seekriegsleitung B.Nr. 1/Skl 15230/40 GKdos. IE,
24.10.1940, BA/MA, RM 7/172; G. Wagner, ed., Die Lagevorträge des Oberfehlshabers der
Kriegsmarine vor Hitler, 1939–1945 (München, 1972), 26.9.40, p. 144; 14.10.40, p. 146.
19
See K. Maier, ‘The Battle of Britain’, in: Germany and the Second World War, ed.
Research Institute for Military History, vol. ii (Oxford, 1991), p. 406.
20
War Diary Naval Staff, Part A: Rahn and Schreiber, Kriegstagebuch, 25.8.41, p. 400. See
also: Letter Admiral Hansen, Chef des Luftwaffenlehrstabes der Kriegsmarine, 6.5.43,
BA/MA, RM 6/23.
454 Sönke Neitzel
During a four-month course these crews learned everything that they

might need at the front, not only about ring torpedoes but also about
attacking a convoy. Nothing comparable existed for the Luftwaffe’s
crews. At the end of 1943 the Ausbildungs iegerführer Baltic was set up
to improve training, but it was not able to supply the front units with
well-trained personnel.21 The only result of this organization was a
sporadic improvement. The crews at the front, however, had to foot
the bill for this striking failure of leadership. Confronted with increas-
ingly hazardous missions they had only a small chance of survival.
The co-operation between the German U-boat arm and reconnais-
sance aircraft was probably one of the most depressing chapters in
naval–air warfare. After the fall of France and Norway, the navy had
an ideal base for the battle in the Atlantic, a base the admirals had
dreamed of since 1914. The British lifelines were just off the Biscay
ports: therefore Admiral Dönitz could deploy more U-boats for a
longer time in the operations area. But in summer and autumn 1940
there were only two dozen U-boats available to take advantage of the
favourable geographic position. Moreover, the German U-boats were
very bad scouts. There was no radar available, and their binocular look-
outs could detect a convoy from a maximum distance of about 20 km.
Thus Dönitz had to face the problem of how to nd any targets in the
vast area of the Western Approaches. Of course, it was most probable
that a U-boat would sooner or later detect a convoy when it patrolled
several weeks off the North Channel. But clearly it wasn’t very ef cient
if they had to nd their targets by themselves. In autumn 1940 Dönitz
realized, more or less by chance, that some FW-200s were deployed in
Bordeaux and that they ew sorties around the British Isles to
Stavanger and on the next day followed the same way back. Obviously
it would have been very useful for Dönitz to co-operate with this FW-
200 unit, but the Luftwaffe insisted that these aeroplanes be used as
bombers, not as reconnaissance aircraft. Therefore Dönitz only
occasionally received reports of sightings of convoys in the Western
Approaches. The transfer route of the reports was most complicated:
the Condor reported its sighting to its home base in Bordeaux-Meri-
gnac; from there it was transferred to Fliegerkorps IV, from there to
Air Fleet 3 in Paris, from there to Marinegruppe West, also in Paris,
and from there to the C-in-C U-boats in Lorient; and he nally trans-
mitted it to his U-boats. Sometimes the report took more than one
day: therefore it was hardly possible to operate on the Condor sight-
ings.22 But they gave Dönitz at least some information on the rhythm
of convoy traf c. All demands by the navy for closer co-operation with
the FW-200 unit and for improved communications were in vain. The
general staff of the Luftwaffe was not willing to transfer any aircraft to
21
BA/MA, RL II/161.
22
S. Neitzel, Der Einsatz der deutschen Luftwaffe über dem Atlantik und der Nordsee, 1939–
1945 (Bonn, 1995), pp. 76–77.
the command of the navy. The only success achieved was the sinking
of the passenger liner Empress of Britain on 28 October 1940 by U-32,
after it was bombed by an FW-200.23
But then, in December 1940, a new chance beckoned: disgusted with
the problems of the battle of Britain, Göring went on a long hunting
holiday from late November 1940 until the end of January 1941. Now
the navy was able to arrange via Alfred Jodl – Chief of the Wehrmacht-
führungsstab – a meeting between Dönitz and Hitler. On 6 January,
Dönitz persuaded Hitler to put the FW-200 unit under his command.24
This was the rst ‘victory’ of the navy in the permanent quarrel with
the air force. But it didn’t last long. Back in Berlin, Göring was able
to overturn Hitler’s decision. At the end of February all ying units
came under the command of a new Fliegerführer Atlantic. Although the
navy lost direct control of the FW-200, this new organization was
reasonably effective. The routes for communications were short now:
C-in-C U-boats and the Fliegerführer Atlantic both had their headquarters
in Lorient.25
And, indeed, from January 1941 onwards there were more attempts
at close co-operation. On 16 January a Condor sighted the convoy OB-
274 west of the Hebrides. Dönitz deployed four U-boats against it, but
they couldn’t nd it on the next day.26 He realized that the order of
battle was not the most serious impediment to smooth co-operation:
it was rather the lack of navigational accuracy of aircraft ying over
the sea. Even if a crew made no mistakes they weren’t able to pinpoint
their position when they were more than 1500 km away from their
home base. Limitations in the navigation equipment meant they could
x their position only within a square 84´140 km. This phenomenon
was already known from manoeuvres in spring 1939. Despite these
navigation problems, FW-200s were able to direct a wolf pack to a con-
voy in late February 1941 more or less by chance, and in the same
month U-47 directed some FW-200s to a convoy which enabled the
aircraft to sink ve merchantmen. However, to solve the navigation
problem, Dönitz decided that FW-200s should not report the convoy
position, which must be more or less wrong anyway, but should instead
send direction signals which the U-boats should home in on. In prac-
tice that didn’t work very well. Not until 1 July 1941 was a direction
signal from a reconnaissance aircraft successfully homed in on for the
rst time. Nevertheless the U-boats didn’t nd the convoy because the
pilot reported a totally wrong course.27 The Luftwaffe never succeeded
in solving the problems of navigational inaccuracy before March 1944,
when the wolf pack attacks on the Atlantic convoys were stopped.
23
See PRO, Kew, ADM 1/11180.
24
OKW/Wehrmachtführungsstab Abt. I Nr. 047/41 g. K. 6.1.1941, BA/MA, RM 7/170.
25
OKM 1. Skl 3490/41 GKdos v. 27.2.1941, MAP, WF-04/36387 (Militärarchiv Potsdam,
now Freiburg).
26
See Neitzel, Einsatz der deutschen Luftwaffe, p. 87.
27
See op. cit., pp. 90–92.
456 Sönke Neitzel
Therefore close and successful co-operation between U-boats and

reconnaissance aircraft was hardly possible even if there had been
more FW-200s available. The fact remains that German radio intelli-
gence was the only reliable source with which to detect British convoys,
apart from sightings by U-boats themselves.
To summarize: without doubt there were a lot of ‘missed opportun-

ities’ in the air–sea war against Britain. If the Luftwaffe and the navy
had agreed on a common strategy it could have weakened Great Bri-
tain to a considerable extent in 1940/41 when the Luftwaffe still had
large resources available. In view of the petty jealousy between the Luft-
waffe and the navy this state of affairs was virtually unavoidable. Hence
an independent naval air force with a homogeneous armament organi-
zation 28 would have been more effective. To be sure, this would only
have been a redeployment, as a genuine naval air force would not by
its very existence have increased the number of available aircraft. But
the units, which were used over the sea anyway, would have been
employed much more effectively. If so, what could have been the
results? In my view it is most improbable that they would have brought
about a decisive success, such as the surrender of Britain. After the
successful evacuation of Dunkirk, the UK rested on a strong foun-
dation, was led by a resolute leadership and had in the USA a very
important ally.
However, it is not right to maintain that the Luftwaffe and the navy
always acted at cross purposes. There were of course numerous high-
ranking of cers who were aware of naval demands and acted in corre-
spondence with the wishes of the naval staff. Unfortunately this seldom
happened above the level of commanding general. Of cers such as
Lieutenant Commander Martin Harlinghausen and General Lieuten-
ant Ulrich Kessler (both Fliegerführer Atlantic),29 to mention only two,
were dependent on the basic rulings of the high command of the Luft-
waffe. Far too often these rulings were grounded not on conscientious
staff work but on arrogance, overestimation of one’s own capacities
and so on. In this atmosphere of ‘infallibility’ most of the proposals
of the navy had to be regarded as dilettante attempts at interference.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the demands of the navy for an
increase in the few units under its command, or the continual
requesting, or rather begging, for air reconnaissance, went unheeded.
Göring commanded his Luftwaffe in a hip-shooting fashion and always
took time off for long vacations. He was far from being ‘the pro-
fessional soldier’ who should have been in command of a young and
highly technical arm such as the Luftwaffe. He was a successful and
28
As, for example, it was set up in the Bundeswehr in 1956.
29
The Fliegerführer Atlantic was set up in March 1941 and put up under the command
of Air Fleet 3. With its units (seldom more than 50 aircraft available) Lieutenant
Commander Martin Harlinghausen had to support the navy with reconnaissance
operations and attacks on shipping.
in uential politician of the Nazi Party without the real quali cation
for the post of commander-in-chief. He was ultimately responsible for
this undesirable development. His soft and indulgent character, which
led him to avoid quarrels with Hitler, and his tendency to a gorgeous
lifestyle without too much work, had fatal consequences for the highly
demanding operations over the sea.
IV
With the beginning of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 the air war
against Britain became a secondary theatre of war. After the failure of
Hitler’s strategic concept in the winter of 1941/42 in front of Moscow,
it became evident that all the plans to reinforce the Luftwaffe in the
west after a successful campaign in the east would have to be shelved.
With the weak forces available it could show only that it, like the navy,
could die with good breeding, to use Raeder’s words. Certainly there
were many missed opportunities in the waters around the British Isles
from mid-1941 on as well. The absence of operations with aerial tor-
pedoes is one example. The only sortie own against shipping in Brit-
ish coastal waters after mid-1941 was an unsuccessful attack by Ju-88s
from III/KG-26 on a convoy in the Bristol channel on the night of 3/4
August 1942. Afterwards the anti-shipping strike units were deployed
against the Arctic convoys or against shipping in the Mediterranean,
but never again were they used in British waters.30
From April 1942 on, Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to attack cultural
centres in small British towns in retaliation for RAF attacks on Rostock
and Lübeck in March 1942.31 The so-called ‘Baedeker attacks’ had no
military effect except the dissipation of forces. Air Fleet 3 was able to
prevent the total stop of the air-mining campaign but the sorties were
reduced to such a scale that the small numbers of mines dropped had
no appreciable successes.32 A letter written by Lieutenant-General
Kessler, C-in-C Fliegerführer Atlantic, to General Jeschonnek conveys the
full hopelessness of the situation. Kessler asked him to disband his
command because of the prevalent lack of means:
My impression is that in the majority of cases, the aim of our sorties
at present is more to placate the High Command than to cause any
serious discomfort to the enemy. Of, for example, bombs dropped
on English country houses where dances are taking place, there is
little possibility of killing anyone of importance, since Churchill
30
Neitzel, Einsatz der deutschen Luftwaffe, p. 197.
31
H. Boog, ‘“Baedeker-Angriffe” und Fernst ugzeugprojekte 1942: Die strategische
Ohnmacht der Luftwaffe’, in: Militärgeschichtliches Beiheft zur Europäischen
Wehrkunde/Wehrwissenschaftlichen Rundschau v (1990), 4, p. 2.
32
War Diary Naval Staff, Part A: Rahn and Schreiber, Kriegstagebuch, 16.4.42, p. 282;
18.4.42, p. 324.
458 Sönke Neitzel
doesn’t dance, and other prominent personalities are generally

beyond the age for such relaxation.33
Kessler had no success with his proposal. He commanded the Luftwaffe
units at the Atlantic front until March 1944. Jeschonnek must have
known that Kessler’s accusations were true. But neither he nor Dönitz
was able to convince Göring and Hitler of the absurdity of attacking
land targets such as Bath or Canterbury.
However, bearing in mind the strength available to Air Fleet 3 from
mid-1941 on, it is fair to assume that it would have been too weak to
achieve any decisive successes, even if it had made the most of the
chances available to it.
Of cers of the Luftwaffe leadership advanced unrealistic plans in
1942 too. In this year proposals of the staff of the Generalluftzeugmeister,
Field Marshal Erhard Milch, that the American east coast be attacked
with very long range bombers assumed concrete form. But after a short
while it became clear that the Me-264, of which a prototype was under
construction, would not reach the range for an attack on the USA in
the coming years. Therefore another plan was prepared: one or two
six-engine BV-222 ying boats would land at a point 1000 km off New
York, where they would be refuelled by two type IX-C-U-boats. After-
wards they would attack the city at night and return to the supply point.
Dönitz thought that this operation was practicable. He made two
U-boats available, although this would save the Allies 60 000 to 80000 GRT
shipping tonnage. But Jeschonnek turned the plan down and Milch
was unable to convince him to the contrary. Hence an air attack on
New York never took place.34
V
When Dönitz succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief Navy on 30
January 1943 he was able to obtain a most important concession during
two conferences with Hitler and Göring: the Luftwaffe promised to try
everything to give the navy adequate air-support.35 Raeder had been
unable to achieve such a concession during the 15 years of his tenure
of of ce. This remarkable fact stressed that circumstances had changed
in January 1943. Göring’s authority dwindled more and more,
especially since the promised air supply of the 6th Army in Stalingrad
had failed. Hitler’s obvious preference for Dönitz permitted the navy
to impose its interests for the rst time. In March 1943 the staff of the
33
BA/MA, RM 35 II/78. English translation, which has the wrong date (5.9.43), in:
PRO, AIR 20/1101.
34
War Diary Naval Staff, Part A: Rahn and Schreiber, Kriegstagebuch, 16.7.42, pp. 310f.;
17.7.42, p. 337; 28.7.42, p. 526; 1/Skl B.Nr. 1369/42 g.K. Chefs., 22.7.42, BA/MA,
RM 7/v. 2868; GL/C-E 2 Nr. 303/42, 28.7.42, BA/MA, RM 7/v. 2868; GL-
Conference 7.8.42, pp. 1810–14, BA/MA, RL 3/34.
35
Besprechung mit Reichsmarschall Göring am 25. Februar 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/847;
Wagner, Lagevorträge, p. 470 (Vortrag 26.2.1943).
Luftwaffe started an extensive ‘Atlantic planning’. The new long-range

bomber He-177, which had been expected since autumn 1941, was due
to be delivered in considerable numbers from autumn 1943 on. This
aircraft seemed to be an adequate weapon to attack Allied convoys far
out in the Atlantic, with both the new glider bombs and with
torpedoes. New long-range reconnaissance aircraft, Ju-290s, and the
six-engine ying boats, BV-222s, would support two He-177 wings. Both
reconnaissance types should tide over the period until the very long
range Atlantic reconnaissance aircraft Ju-390 and/or Me-264 would be
serviceable. The general staff of the Luftwaffe hoped that these would
come into service in 1944 and y reconnaissance patrols up to New-
foundland. One wing of long-range heavy ghters should secure the
passage of the U-boats through the Bay of Biscay. There were also plans
to use the He-177 as a very long range ghter to attack the Allied anti-
submarine aircraft over the Atlantic convoys.36
Depots of new Hs-293 glider bombs (which were released out of ak
range and could be directed to the target) had been set up from Banak
in north Norway to Athens in Greece. The anti-shipping units would
be used, exploiting the ‘inner line’, in fast succession against shipping
in all theatres. This would make it more dif cult for the enemy to
mount an adequate defence. The Luftwaffe undeniably tried to do
everything possible to support the navy, especially the U-boat arm, in
the fourth year of the war. But the optimistic planning on the one
hand and the arming and the technical reality on the other were two
different things. The Luftwaffe was never able to make the planned
amount of long-range bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and ghters
available to Air Fleet 3. Three BV-222 ying boats were deployed near
Bordeaux in September. Six weeks later half a dozen Ju-290s and one
Gruppe of He-177s followed. Additionally the FW-200s from III/KG-
40 were re tted for glider bomb operations. At the end of December
Fliegerführer Atlantic had at its disposal 21 FW-200s, 7 Ju-290s, 1 BV-222,
2 Ju-88s, 16 He-177s, 47 Ju-88 ghters and 5 FW-190 ghters.37
Although these aircraft were partly equipped with radar and glider
bombs, they were not for a moment able to achieve any meaningful
successes.
In December 1943 the naval staff expected two blockade runners
from east Asia with a highly valuable load of raw material. Everything
possible was supposed to be done to escort both ships through the Bay
of Biscay. The Fliegerführer Atlantic had to give air support against Allied
warships and air attacks. Although the British Admiralty was warned
by information received from ULTRA, the rst ship, the Osorno,
reached the Gironde safely. The second ship followed a few days later
and was not so lucky. A Liberator sank it before the escort of German
36
Besprechung beim Reichsmarschall am 26.6.43, S. 5585f., BA/MA, RL 3/60; ‘Auszug
aus der Planung für den Einsatz der Luftwaffe im Kampf gegen England’, 26.8.43,
BA/MA, RL 2 II/33.
37
Fliegerführer Atlantik Ia Br.B.Nr. 1950/44 GKdos, 20.1.44, BA/MA, RM 54/56.
460 Sönke Neitzel
destroyers and T-boats was able to reach it. Afterwards the escort was
attacked by two British cruisers, which sank Z-27, T-25 and T-26. The
aircraft of the Fliegerführer Atlantic proved unable to prevent the
disaster. They both failed to detect the British cruisers early enough
to attack them successfully.38 Hence the effect of the Luftwaffe’s oper-
ations was close to nil.
The results of the planned attacks on Allied Gibraltar convoys were
comparable. On 21 November 1943, 25 He-177s of the II/KG-40
attacked the MKS-30 west of the Bay of Biscay. They sank the steamer
Marsa (4404 GRT) and damaged the steamer Delius for the loss of
three of their own number.39 The second attack on a convoy occurred
ve days later, off the Algerian coast in the Mediterranean. This time
the II/KG-40 came up against strong ghter defence and lost eight
He-177s for sinking the troopship Rohna.40 In January 1944 the unit
was deployed against the landing operation in Anzio–Nettuno. In Feb-
ruary it continued its attacks on Atlantic convoys. After the bloody
engagements in daylight they tried to attack during the hours of dark-
ness. On 12 February 1944 nine He-177s (II/KG-40) and nine FW-200s
(III/KG-40) were employed against the convoy OS-47/KMS-41 in the
Atlantic. Seven He-177s reached the target one hour after sunset; how-
ever, the escort carrier Pursuer was nevertheless able to put up her
ghters. The attackers failed to achieve any success but two of them
were shot down.41
These poor results were just about all the Luftwaffe obtained with
its offensive ‘Atlantic planning’ from spring 1943. They illustrate that
boastful demands, planning and promises were a far cry from reality.
One further example may help to illustrate the problems involved. The
He-177 was a very complicated aircraft. A routine 25-hour check-up
lasted up to three days because of the poorly trained mechanics and
the complicated double engines. The technical complexity meant a
very low rate of serviceable aircraft resulted.
In addition the use of glider bombs – the offensive weapons of the
He-177 – called for a minimum cloud ceiling of 800 m. The bad
weather conditions prevailing in the Bay of Biscay therefore imposed
a natural limit on operations. Torpedoes, a possible alternative, should
have been used by the next units in line. But this plan was never real-
ized.42
38
For this operation see with all details: BA/MA, RM 54/46. See also: Der Marineofzier
als Führer im Gefecht, ed. Deutsches Marine-Institut (Herford, 1984), pp. 31–69, 90–97.
39
Erster Einsatz He-177 A-3 mit Kehl 3, Technischer Außendienst Ernst Heinkel AB,
29.11.1943, Archiv Heinkel, German Museum, Munich; J. Rohwer and G.
Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945 (London, 1992), p. 246.
40
Rohwer and Hümmelchen, Chronology, p. 248; Zweiter Einsatz der II./KG 40 am
26.11.1943, Technischer Außendienst Ernst Heinkel AG, 3.12.43, Archiv Heinkel.
41
K. Poolman, Allied Escort Carriers of World War Two in Action (Annapolis, 1988), pp.
96f.; War Diary Naval Staff, Part D1d, 13.2.44, BA/MA, RM 7/300.
42
GL-Conference 25.2.44, p. 5847, BA/MA, RL 3/41; M. Griehl, Heinkel: He 177, 277,
274 (Stuttgart, 1993), pp. 105f.
The co-operation with the U-boats also made a less than satisfactory
impression. Since the FW-200s of III/KG-40 had been re tted for
glider-bomb operations they were only available for reconnaissance
operations in exceptional cases. Consequently the normal reconnais-
sance for the U-boat operations rested on the handful of Ju-290s of
the
Fernaufklärungsgruppe 5 and some Ju-88s of 3(F)/123. Since 1940 co-
operation had demonstrated that a minimum of 12 reconnaissance
aircraft had to be serviceable every day to achieve the necessary results.
Therefore it was no wonder that most of the U-boat operations relying
on air reconnaissance failed.43
The situation of German ghter operations over the Bay of Biscay
was even worse. The long-range ghter Ju-88 H-2, which should have
been used up to 20° west, never came into service because of serious
technical problems. In the summer of 1943 the RLM recognized that
the plans to use the He-177 as a very long range ghter were illusory.
Accordingly German ghter support was never able to reach the region
of Allied convoys. But the protection of the U-boats in the Bay turned
out to be insoluble, too. The latest modern heavy ghter type, the
Me-410, ew only one sortie over the Bay in July 1943. Thereafter the
unit concerned was diverted to the Reich. The low-performance Ju-88
C-6 and R-2 soldiered on, but they were only a minor irritation to the
activities of Coastal Command.44
Dönitz’s demand of early 1943, to support the U-boat war with a
eet of modern long-range bombers, ghters and reconnaissance air-
craft, was – from his point of view – intelligible. On the other hand
its realization considerably overtaxed the German air industry. In view
of the situation at the front lines, the concentration on ghter pro-
duction, the limitation of offensive operations to ghter-bombers and
the exible employment of a few but well-trained anti-shipping units
(i.e., KG-26, 30, 40, 100) would have been a much more sensible strat-
egy to adopt. That such a decision was not reached before June 1944,
by which time the backbone of the German day- ghter force had been
broken, was due to the leadership, especially of Göring and Hitler,
who closed their eyes to reality. The proposal to reduce the bomber
force would hardly have been taken seriously in spring 1943. Instead,
the Luftwaffe accepted the demands of the navy, planned long-distance
battles over the Atlantic and wasted a considerable amount of its dwin-
dling resources. About 800 He-177s were built but only a small number
saw active service. This, if nothing else, shows that by then the Luftwaf-
fe’s ‘position at court’ had deteriorated to an extent that left it with
little choice at all when it came to thrashing out a common policy with
43
See: War Diary Naval Staff, Part A: Rahn and Schreiber, Kriegstagebuch, 18.12.43, pp.
288f.; War Diary of FO U-boats, 11.1.44, BA/MA, RM 87/35.
44
Kpt. z.S. Mössel, Übersicht über die Lage Anfang, September 1943, 12.9.43, BA/MA,
RM 8/1290.
462 Sönke Neitzel
the navy. Göring’s capitulation to Dönitz’s demands was certainly a far

cry from his service’s halcyon days in 1940/41.
VI
During the invasion in summer 1944 the Luftwaffe concentrated its
anti-shipping units for the last time and ew a higher number of sorties
than had been achieved for several years. But the overwhelming super-
iority of the Allies enabled them to parry each German thrust. On this
occasion the Luftwaffe played its last trump card in the anti-shipping
campaign: the employment of the pressure mine. These mines,
although serviceable since August 1943, had not been used because
Dönitz feared that they could be recovered and employed by the RAF
in the Baltic. At rst Dönitz planned to use them in a mass offensive
in autumn 1944 together with the new U-boat types XXI and XXIII.45
Now the pressure mines were to be dropped in the Seine Bight to
in ict heavy losses on the invasion eet. The mine offensive started in
front of the Normandy beachheads on 16 June. By 26 July, 4407 mines
had been dropped, of which 2866 were pressure mines.46 Although
the Royal Navy had been familiar with the ignition system of the pres-
sure mines from 1943 on, there was no sweeping method. The only
chance of countering these ground mines was a strict speed limitation
in shallow waters. In total about 50 ships were sunk by mines during
the Normandy campaign. These comparatively small losses were due
to two happy circumstances. At rst half of the pressure mines
employed had a faulty fuse, so that they were easily sweepable.
Secondly the Luftwaffe did not drop the mines in the shallow waters
near the coast for fear that a mine could fall on land and be recovered
by the enemy. So, the rst real mass offensive with aerial mines was –
although a new effective fuse became serviceable in time – a failure.47
After Operation Overlord the German anti-shipping units were
annihilated. For the high command of the navy and the Luftwaffe,
however, this was not the end of the air war around England and the
Atlantic. Since 1943 Dönitz had been asking for air reconnaissance for
the fresh U-boat campaign that would start in autumn 1944 with new
electro-U-boats. 48 After the fall of France, Dönitz feared that his U-
boats, in which he placed many hopes, would not have any air
reconnaissance. Indeed these U-boat types were nearly blind because
they operated exclusively under water. Besides, Dönitz had long since
45
Niederschrift über die Dienstreise ins Führerhauptquartier v. 10.–13.3.1944, S. 24,
BA/MA, RM 7/261. See Wagner, Lagevorträge, pp. 519, 524.
46
War Diary Gruppe West 28.7.44, p. 6738, BA/MA, RM 35 II/64.
47
Bemerkungen IE Skl zum KTB Gruppe West vom 28.–30. September 1944, MAP,
WF-04/35148; Review of the German Mining Campaign in the British Assault Area,
16.10.44, PRO, ADM 219/392.
48
Wagner, Lagevorträge, p. 518; War Diary Naval Staff, Part A: Rahn and Schreiber,
Kriegstagebuch, 6.2.44, p. 109.
lost insight into Allied convoy rhythms, so that he did not know exactly
where to deploy the U-boats. Even as the rst operations of the new
boats were being delayed by Allied bombing Dönitz increased his
demands for reconnaissance. Although the situation of the Luftwaffe
by now bordered on sheer desperation it complied with Dönitz’s
demands. Do-335 heavy ghters and Ar-234 jet planes were to
reconnoitre the British east coast.49 Atlantic reconnaissance would be
carried out by a twin version of the Do-335, the Do-635. This type, fast,
with a long-range capability, would operate from Norway (Trondheim)
and south Germany from summer 1945 onwards.50 These plans show
that by then the Luftwaffe lived in a dream world from which it would
not wake up until 8 May 1945. These plans had nothing to do with
reality. Not one of the Do-635 planes was ever built.
The Luftwaffe crews certainly tried to do their best to accomplish their

tasks in the missions over the sea. The basic fault of the way in which
Germany conducted the war was its policy in making appointments to
the highest leadership. What resulted was inexcusable blunders on the
part of the high command, which showed clearly the futility of their
actions. The air war over the sea, more than the war in any other
theatres, required long-term planning and exemplary inter-service co-
operation. As improvisation on such a scale was hardly possible, the
successes achieved could not but remain below expectations. From the
very beginning the few units which operated over the sea were over-
taxed to an even greater degree than the rest of the Luftwaffe.
49
1/Skl IL 33643/44 gK, 10.11.44, BA/MA, RM 7/171.
50
Letter Ia/KM to General der Aufklärungs ieger, 23.10.44, BA/MA, RL 4/528.

448luftwaffe Marine Vs Uk

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

448luftwaffe Marine Vs Uk

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

War in History

Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe Co-operation in the War against

The online version of this article can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://wih.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Downloaded from http://wih.sagepub.com by yud kantor on May 17, 2008

I t is well known that disputes between political and military au-

ingly, the Luftwaffe’s leadership became convinced that it was their

During a four-month course these crews learned everything that they

Therefore close and successful co-operation between U-boats and

To summarize: without doubt there were a lot of ‘missed opportun-

doesn’t dance, and other prominent personalities are generally

Luftwaffe started an extensive ‘Atlantic planning’. The new long-range

the navy. Göring’s capitulation to Dönitz’s demands was certainly a far

The Luftwaffe crews certainly tried to do their best to accomplish their

You might also like