AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT BRIDGE FAILURES IN THE UNITED STATES

(2000-2012)

A Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master of Science of

Civil Engineering in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

MICHAEL ROBERT TARICSKA, B.S.C.E

Graduate Program in Civil Engineering

The Ohio State University

2014

Thesis Committee:

Dr. Fabian Tan, Advisor

Dr. Halil Sezen

Dr. Frank Croft

 Copyright by

Michael Robert Taricska

2014
 ABSTRACT

When discussing the infrastructure in America, and more specifically, the problems

facing America’s infrastructure, bridge failures have been one of the leading

problems facing America’s infrastructure. Bridge failures often are costly in the

commerce foregone, lives lost, and replacement funds required to rebuild the failed

bridge. More than 8,000 bridges are categorized as structurally deficient, and

almost 25% of all bridges are categorized as functionally obsolete, resulting in a

bridge rating of a C+ given by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) in

2013. Ongoing studies of following trends and patterns in bridge failures has been

an important undertaking, which can greatly enhance the ability for engineers to

predict and avoid the great costs associated with a bridge failure. Previous studies

to compile and analyze bridge failure data were conducted over the timeframe of

1977 to 1981, 1981 to 1989, and 1989 to 2000. The aim of this study was to

continue these studies by compiling a comprehensive database to display the

findings of this study, both graphically and in tabular form. Finally, a model was

needed in order to help the end user visualize and interpret the data in light of

preventing future bridge failures; to that end, fuzzy logic was applied to the data in

order to create a user-friendly and intuitive model for preventing future bridge

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failures. In all, it was also found that the most vulnerable sections in a bridge with

regard to bridge failure were scouring and the bridge’s age, resulting in

unmaintained and crippling bridges.

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank my parents, Joe and Polly Taricska, my

brother, Brian Taricska, and my fiancé, Emmalee O’Donnell, for their

encouragement through my formal educational endeavors.

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Fabian Tan, for his guidance during

my education at the Ohio State University, as well as Dr. Croft and Dr. Sezen.

I would also like to thank my employer, Burgess and Niple, as well as the

roadway design section for their continual support of my academic advancement

throughout the graduate program at Ohio State.

I would also like to thank Amani Bu-Qammaz and David Imbrogno for

their input on this thesis, as well as the rest of the graduate students under Dr. Tan’s

leadership.

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 Special thanks to the New York Department of Transportation for their help

in locating bridge failure data in this study.

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 VITA

2007

 Graduated from Bay High School in Bay Village, OH and entered the Ohio

State University as an undergraduate student in Civil Engineering

2010-2011

 Worked for the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a student

intern for the Surface Water Modeling and Assessment group

2011

 Undergraduate Student Aid for Civil Engineering Materials laboratory

section and lecture

 Worked as a college intern for the Ohio Department of Transportation

(ODOT) Office of Jobs and Commerce

 Passed the Ohio Fundamentals of Engineering (FE) exam

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 2012

 Entered the Graduate School at Ohio State University as a Master’s

candidate for Civil Engineering, Construction Engineering and

Management focus

 Began work as a transportation engineer for Burgess & Niple, Inc. in the

Roadway Design section in Columbus, OH

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Civil Engineering

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...............................................................................................................ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................iv

VITA .........................................................................................................................vi

FIELDS OF STUDY................................................................................................vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................... viii

LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................xi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 1

1.1 General Introduction ........................................................................................ 1

1.2 Intent of Study.................................................................................................. 4

1.3 Objectives ........................................................................................................ 5

1.4 Scope ................................................................................................................ 5

1.5 Research Benefits................................................................................................. 6

1.6 Limitations of This Study .................................................................................... 6

1.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 7

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ................................................... 8

2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 8

2.2 Principal Causes of Failure ......................................................................... 9

2.3 Enabling Causes of Failure ............................................................................ 10

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2.4 Triggering Causes of Failure ............................................................................. 11

2.5 Collapse.............................................................................................................. 12

2.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 13

CHAPTER 3: COMPILATION OF BRIDGE FAILURE DATA ........................... 14

3.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 14

3.1 Research Methodology ...................................................................................... 15

3.2 Bridge Failures by Location............................................................................... 16

3.3 Bridge Failures by Year ..................................................................................... 22

3.4 Bridge Failures by Cause ................................................................................... 27

3.5 Bridge Failures by Bridge Specifications .......................................................... 31

3.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 43

CHAPTER 4: BRIDGE FAILURE CASE STUDIES ............................................. 44

4.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 44

4.1 Kinzua Viaduct Bridge Failure .......................................................................... 45

4.2 Lake View Drive Bridge Failure........................................................................ 48

4.3 Paseo Suspension Bridge Failure ....................................................................... 50

4.4 I-35 W Bridge Failure ........................................................................................ 54

4.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 57

CHAPTER 5: FUZZY LOGIC ANALYSIS OF BRIDGE FAILURE ................... 59

5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 59

5.2 Enabling and Triggering Causes ........................................................................ 60

5.3 Bridge Condition Assessment ............................................................................ 61

5.4 Fuzzy Sets .......................................................................................................... 77

5.5 Fuzzy Relation ................................................................................................... 79

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5.6 Fuzzy Logic Analysis Computer Program Model ............................................. 81

5.7 Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 101

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................ 102

6.1 Summary and Conclusions .............................................................................. 102

6.2 Recommendation ............................................................................................. 105

6.3 Continuing Studies ........................................................................................... 105

REFERENCES ...................................................................................................... 106

APPENDIX A – FIGURES CREATED BY AUTHOR........................................ 109

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 LIST OF FIGURES
Table 2-1: Enabling Causes ..................................................................................... 11
Table 2-2: Triggering Causes................................................................................... 12

Figure 3-1: Bridge Failure Occurrences per State, 2000 to 2012 ............................ 19
Figure 3-2: Serviceable Bridges per State ............................................................... 20
Figure 3-3: Percent of Bridges Failed, per State ...................................................... 21
Figure 3-4: Bridges Failed, Per Year ....................................................................... 23
Table 3-1: Bridge Failures by Year and Cause ........................................................ 25
Figure 3-5: Major Emergencies Declared by FEMA per Year (FEMA 2013) ........ 26
Figure 3-6: Bridge Failures By Cause ..................................................................... 28
Figure 3-7: Bridge Failures By Collapse Type ........................................................ 31
Figure 3-8: Bridge Ages at Failure .......................................................................... 34
Figure 3-9: Bridge Failures by Material Used ......................................................... 35
Figure 3-10: Percent of Bridges Failed, by Material ............................................... 38
Figure 3-11: Bridge Failures by Bridge Type .......................................................... 41
Figure 3-12: Percent of Bridges Failed, by Bridge Type ......................................... 42

Figure 4-1: Paseo Suspension Bridge, Profile View (Chen et al. 2005: pp. 1) ........ 51
Figure 4-2: Paseo Suspension Bridge, Finite Element Analysis of Stresses on Failed
Strut (Chen et al 2005: pp. 20) ................................................................................. 52
Figure 4-3: Photograph of Fractured Strut Immediately after Failure (Chen et al.
2005: pp.4) ............................................................................................................... 53
Table 4-1: Enabling and Triggering Causes for Bridge Failure Cases .................... 58

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Figure 5-1: Enabling Cause Occurrences ................................................................ 63
Table 5-1: Priority Relationships Between Bridge Performance and Consequence 65
Table 5-2: Priority Ranges for both Enabling and Triggering Causes ..................... 67
Table 5-3: Enabling Cause Priorities ....................................................................... 68
Table 5-4: Bridge Performance and Consequence Relationships ............................ 69
Figure 5-2: Triggering Cause Occurrences .............................................................. 71
Table 5-5: Priority Relationships for Triggering Causes ......................................... 73
Table 5-6: Triggering Cause Priorities .................................................................... 75
Table 5-7: Triggering Causes and Consequence Relationships ............................... 76
Table 5-8: Fuzzy Membership Set Functions .......................................................... 78
Figure 5- 3: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Welcome Screen ............... 84
Figure 5- 4: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Membership Sets.... 86
Figure 5- 5: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Enabling Causes User
Interface ................................................................................................................... 87
Figure 5- 6: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Triggering Causes User
Interface ................................................................................................................... 89
Figure 5- 7: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Enabling Causes Solutions90
Figure 5- 8: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Triggering Causes Solutions
.................................................................................................................................. 91
Figure 5- 9: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Set Matrix, Enabling
Causes ...................................................................................................................... 93
Figure 5- 10: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Set Matrix,
Triggering Causes .................................................................................................... 94
Figure 5- 11: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Set Matrix, Total
Fuzzy Matrix ............................................................................................................ 96
Figure 5- 12: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Set Matrix, Fuzzy
Set Graph ................................................................................................................. 97
Figure 5- 13: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Set Matrix, Fuzzy
Graph - Very Poor Case ........................................................................................... 99

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Figure 5- 14: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Set Matrix, Fuzzy
Set Graph - Very Good Case ................................................................................. 100

xiii
 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 General Introduction

Bridge failures and collapses are almost always accompanied by many

catastrophic consequences; loss of life, restricted commerce, unnecessary depletion

of both state and federal Department of Transportation (DOT) funds, and forensic

studies of the collapse. However, the findings from these failures often prove to be

of great value, expanding the knowledge base of the civil engineering community

at large through understanding and addressing the cause of failure. By studying and

evaluating the cause of failure of these bridges, similar mistakes can be avoided in

the future by learning from the past. According to the American Society of Civil

Engineers (ASCE), nearly 67,000 structurally deficient bridges are currently in

service in the United States as of the year 2012 (ASCE 2013), and predicting their

failure is now consequently relevant, and nearly one bridge of nine can be

categorized as structurally deficient, of which the ASCE defines as “bridges that

require sufficient maintenance, rehabilitation, or replacement. These bridges must

be inspected at least every other year since crucial load carrying elements were

found to be in poor condition due to deterioration or damage” (ASCE 2013). The

ASCE also notes that almost 25% of all bridges serving the traveling public can be

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labeled as functionally obsolete, which it states are “bridges that no longer meet the

standards that are used today. Examples are narrow lanes or low load-carrying

capacity” (ASCE 2013). The ASCE published its most recent evaluation of

America’s infrastructure in the 2013 Report Card For America’s Infrastructure,

detailing their ratings on the various types of infrastructure in America and why

they rated each as they did.

Catastrophic bridge failures, such as the I-35 bridge collapse in

Minnesota in 2007, become a temporary focal point in media attention surrounding

these bridges’ demise, yet often fade from focus and discussion all too quickly. All

too often, the structural problem with the bridge is found too late.

Recent bridge inspection techniques and tactics have been developed

through the tragic loss of infrastructure, commerce, and most importantly, lives.

Bridge inspection professionals attempt to use the information from previous

failures to make accurate assessments of a bridge’s structural health. A bridge

which is structurally deficient has at least one critical component which has been

rated as ‘poor’ by a licensed professional engineer or bridge inspector. Keeping

bridge failure information current and relevant is of the utmost importance to

bridge inspections, bridge maintenance, and subsequently, users of this

infrastructure. Save Our Bridges, a non-profit organization aimed at educating the

public on America’s infrastructure problems and raising awareness of the need for

more funds to rehabilitate failing bridges, built a database of structurally deficient

bridges in America.

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 For the purposes of this study, the term ‘bridge’ shall be defined according

to the New York State Department of Transportation’s (NYSDOT) definition of

bridge, which is

“A structure, including supports, erected over a depression or an obstruction

such as water, highway, or railway and having a track or passageway for

carrying traffic or other moving loads, and having an opening measured

along the center of the roadway of more than 20 ft between undercopings of

abutments or spring lines of arches, or extreme ends of openings for

multiple boxes. Multiple pipe configurations will qualify as bridges where

the clear distance between openings are less than half of the smaller,

adjacent opening, and the total length along the center of the roadway is

greater than 20 ft” (Bridge Inventory Manual 2006: pp. 11).

It should be noted that this definition includes railroad bridges but

does not include pedestrian bridges or culverts. Pedestrian bridges were

found to have experienced failure in the timeframe studied, however, were

not included in the results of this study, due to the definition of the term

‘bridge’ used. Minimizing costs while improving the safety and quality of

America’s bridges is of great importance and relevance; as of this writing,

the ASCE has estimated a total of $76 billion would be required to

sufficiently repair, maintain, or replace all of the nation’s crippling bridges

(ASCE 2013).

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1.2 Intent of Study

The sole focus of the study was to determine relationships of causation and

the resulting consequences of a bridge’s structural instability; using the data

obtained from research and study, models of predicting a bridge’s future demise

were developed. By increasing the accuracy with which bridge failures can be

predicted, bridge issues can be addressed, repaired, and the overall resulting costs

can be drastically minimized.

The timeframe studied, years 2000 to 2012, was chosen as a continuation of

the work performed by Wardhana and Hadipriono in 2003, from the publication

Analysis of Recent Bridge Failures in the United States, in which the time period

studied was the years 1989 to 2000. Previous studies to this included timeframes of

1977 to 1981 and 1982 to 1988 with similar scope of study (Wardhana 2003:

pp.144). Because a time period of 13 years was chosen in the Hadipriono and

Wardhana study, a similar timeframe studied of 13 years was selected for this

continuing study that will allow the findings of both studies to be able to be

compared similarly. This timeframe also serves to use the most current data

available and produce the most accurate predictions of bridge failures in the

domestic infrastructure of the United States. For purposes of this study, the

FHWA’s definitions of failure and collapse will be used. Failure, according to the

FHWA, is defined as “the inability of a bridge or one of its primary load-carrying

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components to no longer perform its intended function” (FHWA 2013). A bridge

collapse is defined as “the failure of all or a substantial part of the bridge where full

or partial replacement may be required” (FHWA 2013).

1.3 Objectives

The objectives of this project will be to find failures of bridges over the 12

year timeframe and compile the data, looking for trends and features which

dramatically increase the probability of a bridge failing. This study will be

conducted to help analyze why bridges fail, what signs should be observed when a

bridge is near failure and action must be taken to either prohibit or greatly reduce

the chance that this bridge will fail. Fuzzy models and statistical analysis will be

used to help analyze the findings in the dataset of previous, actual cases of bridge

failure over the years 2000 to 2012 in the United States.

1.4 Scope

The scope of the study is to investigate the causes of failure of bridges and

factors that greatly increase the probability of these bridges failing by compiling a

bridge failure database of bridges within the United States (not including territories

occupied by the United States) between the years 2000 to 2012, analyzing patterns

and trends in these bridge failure events. An in-depth, user-friendly program will be
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written in the computer programming language C Sharp (C#), using Microsoft

Visual C Sharp 2010 Studio, to allow the user to describe a certain bridge based off

of selectable features using Fuzzy models and statistical analysis. The interface will

then numerically return the safety of the bridge in question, using trends and

patterns of recent data. Bridges studied will include only those that failed in the

United States between the years of 2000 to 2012. This thesis will also discuss

trends and patterns observed from these bridge failures and the lessons that can be

learned as a result of them.

1.5 Research Benefits

The findings of this study will help better understand which precautions

should be taken when designing, constructing, and maintaining a bridge, as well as

the factors that can help contribute to bridge failure, both distress and collapse. As

a direct result, the engineering community at large can help produce more reliable

infrastructure to the general public through investigation, study and application of

the lessons learned through these failures.

1.6 Limitations of This Study

The intent of this study is to analyze and interpret the data collected for

bridge failures over the 13 year timeframe studied in the United States; to this end,

bridges failed outside of this 13 year timeframe or that were located outside of the

geographical boundaries of the United States will not be included in this research

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and any analysis performed as a result of this study. Also, the analysis performed is

done without consideration as to whether a bridge should have or should not have

failed; no finite element analysis, load rating calculations, or general structural

analysis was performed in this study to measure whether the failed structures

should have failed in the environment studied.

1.7 Conclusion

In summary, this study aims to address the issue of bridge failures in terms

of predicting the performance and safety of bridges using both fuzzy logic and a

collection of bridge failures in the United States from the years 2000 to 2012.

Using recent bridge failure data allows for the most accurate explanation as to why

near-future bridges may fail and what vulnerabilities are found in modern bridge

structures. Bridge failure data will be tabulated, patterns in the data will be

examined and discussed, and the results from these recent failures will be analyzed

and displayed using fuzzy logic techniques using a program written in C#. This

study is of particular importance due to the significant costs incurred from bridge

failures and their difficulty to predict. The findings of this study will investigate

patterns and trends in recent bridge failures and model these using fuzzy logic and

compute application.

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 CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

2.1 Introduction

Engineers have studied many bridge failures, seeking to learn from them and

the reasons for the structure’s demise, hoping to gain insight and avoid costly

mistakes in the future. Ongoing studies of compiling the data of bridge failures

while analyzing the trends and patterns in these failures have been continuing,

though the last study concluded in 2000 with a study conducted by Hadipriono and

Wardhana (2003) observing bridge failures until the year 2000, and was published

in 2003. This study is aimed at the intent of continuing the research done by

previous reports on the state of bridges in the United States, current patterns of their

failure, and lessons learned from actual casualties of America’s bridges. While

historical data (pre-2000) will not be analyzed in this report, conclusions and

analysis from these previous studies can help better predict and be compared

against recent bridge failure data.

When a bridge experiences failure, a cause of failure is usually reported as

to why the bridge failed, which is a principal cause; of this principal cause, there

are two subcategories of failure causes which are enabling and triggering causes. In

this study, theses causes will be analyzed and interpreted using the database of

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bridge failures collected between the years 2000 and 2012. From these causes, a

bridge may experience either partial collapse or total collapse, which are both

forms of bridge failure.

A principal cause can be broken into two distinctly different causes of failure;

enabling causes and triggering causes. These are both subcategories of failure.

2.2 Principal Causes of Failure

Principal causes, for the purposes of this study, are defined as: “errors in

design, detailing, or construction; unanticipated effects of stress concentrations;

lack of proper maintenance; the use of improper materials or foundation type; or

the insufficient consideration of an extreme event” (Chavel and Yadlosky 2011: pp.

4). Extreme events, in this case, generally refer to either severe partial collapse of a

bridge, which would require total or partial replacement, and total collapse of the

bridge. Causes of failure can be any, all, or a combination of the above list of

principal causes, which could bring the bridge down catastrophically or induce

distress into the structure. Distress and collapse both fall under the category of

‘failure’ by the FHWA working definition in the study. Any of these principal

causes listed, when experienced by a bridge, may have the unintended consequence

of the bridge failing or possibly collapsing. Of all principal causes of failure,

Wardhana and Hadipriono (2003) found that unintended external events were found

to contribute the highest amount of bridge failures in past analysis of bridge

failures, overall, followed secondly by maintenance issues, which will both be

9
addressed in this report pertaining to precast, prestressed bridges in the United

States. The study found external causes to lead to the most collapses, followed by

maintenance, with a total of 166 bridge failures studied.

2.3 Enabling Causes of Failure

Hadipriono and Wardhana defined an enabling cause as any issue with the

bridge that can be identified as an internal weakness or deficiency that leaves the

structure vulnerable to failure in their most recent study on bridge failures

(Wardhana and Hadipriono 2003:pp. 145). This can range from design defects,

construction faults, material deficiencies, or anything internal to the structure which

can lead to failure. Enabling causes can often be prevented, but may be overlooked

and hard to catch before the problem has been made known through observed

defects during construction or in service. Enabling causes also are generally

confined to attributes of the bridge that relate solely to the structure itself, such as

design, materials, construction, etc. Better standards, careful construction

procedures, or increased care and diligence in both the design and construction

phases can often help decrease the likelihood of an enabling cause. An enabling

cause may or may not be the same as the principal cause, but may make conditions

for bridge failure probable. The enabling causes investigated in this study are

design mistakes, construction issues, maintenance problems, and material

problems, listed as E1, E2, E3, and E4, respectively, as shown in table 2-1 below.

Although more than four enabling causes were found to be experienced by bridges

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in America between 2000 and 2012, these four were the most common and most

detrimental to the bridges studied.

Symbol Enabling Cause

E1 Design Issues
E2 Construction Issues
E3 Maintenance Issues
E4 Material Issues

Table 2-1: Enabling Causes

2.4 Triggering Causes of Failure

Wardhana and Hadipriono had also defined triggering causes to be those

which are external to the bridge. These are usually hard to predict and are much

more wide-ranging than enabling causes, and can include: wind, hurricanes,

flooding, terrorism, and any other external cause (Wardhana and Hadipriono

2003:pp.145). Triggering causes of failure are much more difficult to predict and

are much more likely to result in collapse, as depicted in figure 2-1, which shows

that external (triggering) causes are by far the highest in terms of failures in

bridges. Triggering causes are often harder to predict due to the fact that they are

external to the controlled and engineered aspects of a bridge’s performance, but

must be accounted for during the design phase as accurately as possible, using

factors of safety while avoiding overdesign of the bridge. The triggering causes

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investigated in the study are deterioration, hydraulic, collision and overload, listed

as T1, T2, T3, and T4, respectively, as shown in table 2-2 below. While more than

four triggering causes were experienced by bridges in the timeframe studied, these

four were seen as the most common triggering causes. Four causes were chosen for

simplicity in terms of the fuzzy logic modeling; selecting more than four would

make the fuzzy logic analysis far too complicated.

Symbol Triggering Cause

T1 Deterioration
T2 Hydraulic - Scour or Flood
T3 Collision
T4 Overload

Table 2-2: Triggering Causes

2.5 Collapse

In a bridge’s service to the traveling public, collapse is often an engineer’s

greatest fear, but needs to be discussed when studying failure. Two types of

collapse will be investigated in the study; total collapse and partial collapse. Partial

collapse refers to an incident where the bridge undergoes some deformation or

section loss but still can remain serviceable, whereas total collapse refers to an

incident where the bridge is unable to service traffic flows. An example for each

would be locked bearings and pier collapse, respectfully (Sharma and Mohan 2011:

pp.6).

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2.6 Conclusion

Principal causes of bridge failures are the primary cause of a bridge’s

failure, but often are the result of the two subcategories (enabling and triggering

causes) of failure experienced concurrently. Enabling and triggering causes are the

means by which a bridge can fail, where enabling causes are generally internal to

the bridge structure and triggering causes are external to the bridge; for example, an

enabling cause and a triggering cause could be inspection errors and tornado

damage, respectively. These causes can create a situation where either a total

collapse or a partial collapse is probable; a total collapse where traffic is no longer

serviceable. A partial collapse is an event where the bridge is still serviceable to

traffic, though the structural integrity of the bridge has been compromised; a total

collapse may occur after a partial collapse has occurred. The results of this study

will be compared to the results of the most recent study of similar intent, which was

the Wardhana and Hadipriono (2003) study investigating bridge failures from the

years 1989 to 2000.

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 CHAPTER 3: COMPILATION OF BRIDGE FAILURE DATA

3.0 Introduction

Studying relevant, current bridge failures allows for the findings to present

practical and reliable observations. Over the 13 year timeframe studied (years 2000

to 2012), bridge failure events were compiled and tabulated in a comprehensive

database, where trends and patterns could be observed to produce results and

findings for this study. As engineering practices and standards evolve with

increased knowledge of bridge performance, current data becomes necessary to

understand how and why bridges fail. Unfortunately, the knowledge gained from

this study often comes at a dramatically high price. Though studies of bridge

failures have been previously conducted, updating these studies for recent failures

yields more thorough understanding with the hopes of decreasing bridge failures,

both catastrophic and partial. Continuing the work of previous bridge failure

studies also serves the purpose of studying how these previous studies have

impacted current bridge design, maintenance and construction practices. Analysis

was performed in three different categories in order to understand recent bridge

failures holistically; bridge failures by location, year, failure cause, and bridge

specifications. Also, studying these bridge failures by percent of standing bridges

14
can help better understand the magnitude of these failures. All analysis performed

in this section was done by the author of this study using the database built from

the bridge failure events collected during the course of this study.

3.1 Research Methodology

The database used to support the findings and conclusions of this study was

compiled primarily with support from the New York (State) Department of

Transportation (NYSDOT). NYSDOT is currently running an ongoing study of

bridge failures, reaching out to all other state Department of Transportations (DOT)

to update their database. It should be of note that not all state DOTs participate in

furnishing current bridge failure information; where gaps in data were evident,

research from Civil Engineering (published by ASCE), Bridge Engineering

(published by ASCE), publications by FHWA and National Transportation Safety

Board and other bridge engineering related journals, news sources (such as

Engineering News Record), and publications were referenced to find and add

missing bridge failure events to the database. Using these sources along with the

NYSDOT database, the data has been cross-referenced with similar studies and

found that the database used is sufficient enough to draw statistically significant

conclusions. Data obtained for each bridge failure occurrence included location (by

road connected), type of feature the bridge spanned, location (by state in the United

States), type of bridge, composing material of bridge, year built, year failed, fail

type, and fail cause. In total, 341 bridge failures between the years 2000 to 2012 in

the United States were recorded, examined and used to draw all conclusions and

15
findings in this study. The database used to support the findings from this study

details all 341 bridge failures recorded and was used to produce all charts and

visualize patterns and trends in recent bridge failures in the United States. This

accounts for roughly 0.09% of all bridges in America, or roughly one bridge failed

in every 1,100 bridges standing.

To perform much of the statistical analysis, existing numbers of bridges

were needed when comparing failed bridges to existing. In order to compare

against existing bridges standing, a similar database was compiled of existing

bridges that did not fail. These bridges were standing as of the year 2012 when

compiled, and were found using the FHWA’s National Bridge Inventory (NBI)

website (http://nationalbridges.com/index.php). About 310,000 bridges were found

in the United States as of the year 2012. This database attributes included state,

year built, age of structure (as of the year 2012), material of bridge, and type of

bridge.

3.2 Bridge Failures by Location

To study locations of bridge failures and observe the areas of significant

numbers of bridge failures, state boundaries were chosen as the means to quantify

bridge failures by location. Bridge failures were found to occur in almost every

state in the United States over the timeframe studied. However, bridge failure

locations followed obvious patterns and had significant above-average occurrences

of failures in particular states. Location of bridge failures makes sense when the

16
considering weather patterns in a particular area, number of load cycles

experienced by a bridge through the average daily traffic (ADT) experienced on the

bridge, as well as maintenance and inspection costs each DOT has budgeted to

spend on costs associated with bridge maintenance per year.

Figure 3-1 displays the total number of bridge failures that had occurred in

each of the 50 states during the time period studied. As shown, New York (NY)

and Missouri (MO) clearly experienced the most bridge failures over the time

period, greatly surpassing the next two highest locations of bridge failures;

Louisiana (LA) and Mississippi (MS).

As shown below in Figure 3-1, bridge failures occurred in almost every one

of the 50 states in the US, though some states saw significantly more bridge failures

than others in the timeframe studied. Because bridge failures are known to occur in

almost every state, and observed due to the fact that bridge failures are oftentimes

hard to predict, making the need for a way to adequately predict their occurrences

all the more important. Finding this trend shows that knowing where bridges fail

most often can help spearhead the task of anticipating where bridge failures may

occur in the future. The findings that bridge failures were experienced all over the

country also speaks to the crippling health of America’s infrastructure; DOTs all

over the nation are operating on tight or insufficient budgets and more than not,

bridge and infrastructure maintenance expenses are inadequate. Without

sufficiently repairing bridges, failure can be sure to occur. The ASCE found that, in

their 2013 report of America’s infrastructure, by state, Pennsylvania had the highest

17
percentage of structurally deficient bridges compared to the state’s total number of

bridges (24.4%), followed by Iowa (roughly 21%) and Oklahoma (slightly less that

21%) (ASCE 2013).

Finally, the total number of bridges in each state could help explain the

number of failures; the relationship between number of failures and total number of

bridges in each state would expected to be a direct relationship. The total number of

bridges standing, as of the August 2013, can be seen in Figure 3-2. Seven states

were found to not have experienced bridge failures over the course of this study:

Alaska, Delaware, Kansas, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Wyoming.

Because New York and Missouri clearly do not have one of the higher

numbers of serviceable bridges in existence, the finding that they represent the

highest number of bridge failures by location is significant. The number of bridges

failed compared to the total number of bridges in service is of interest in the study,

and would be of great value. One would expect that the more bridges standing in a

state, the higher the risk of failure, using the assumption that bridge failures occur

randomly by location. Showing the number of bridges failed per number existing

would rule out the possibility of randomness of bridge failures per location, should

the results show that other states have higher rates of bridges failing. Using the data

presented in the two charts above in this section, the number of bridges failed was

divided by the number of bridges standing (multiplied by 100) to find the percent

of bridges in service that fail per state. Figure 3-3 displays the number of bridges

found to fail per bridges in service, or the percent of bridges that failed per state.

18
19
Figure 3-1: Bridge Failure Occurrences per State,
2000 to 2012
20
Figure 3-2: Serviceable Bridges per State
21
Figure 3-3: Percent of Bridges Failed, per
State
 While observing the chart, it is obvious that certain states have far greater

fail rates than others. New York (NY), Washington DC (DC) Arkansas (AR), New

Mexico (NM), Mississippi (MI), and Louisiana (LA) had far greater fail rates than

all other states. Of course, it should be noted that these findings only represent the

13 year timeframe studied in this report. As shown above, bridges have a higher

chance of failure in specific location. If there was no statistical significance of

bridge failures by location (i.e. all states had equal rates of failure), the notion that

bridges fail completely at random could be upheld. However, the findings of the

chart above show that location is significant while trying to predict bridge failures.

3.3 Bridge Failures by Year

Definitely one of the more predominating questions when addressing the

problem of predicting bridge failures is when we can expect one to occur. Bridge

failures were found to exist all over the country, and certainly were found in each

of the years studied (2000 to 2012). While bridge failures by location showed

obvious patterns and trends, the findings of bridge failures by state was a little more

subtle, and appeared to be more randomized. Below displays the findings of bridge

failures by year, from 2000 to 2012 in Figure 3-4.

22
 80

70

60

50
Occurences

40

30

20

10

0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year

Figure 3-4: Bridges Failed, Per Year

As shown in the chart above, the highest occurrence of bridge failures over the time

period studied was found in the year 2005. The years 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2007

and 2011 had roughly the same number of bridge failure events, and the years

2009, 2010, and 2012 were found to have had the least number of bridge failure

events.

One can speculate as to why certain years had higher or lower numbers of

bridge failures, but it would be of greatest help to break out each year by the failure

causes. Data were tabulated to show which years experienced failure based on

cause, and is displayed in Table 3-1. Although this chart does not explain these

trends perfectly, additional research as to natural disasters can be traced to these

causes in each year. According to the Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological

23
Laboratory (2014), the year 2005 holds the record for most storms, hurricanes

reaching landfall, and named hurricane events compared to all other years on

record (from 1851 to 2012) (Atlantic Oceanographic & Meteorological Laboratory

2013).

The spike seen in the year 2011, which was the second highest year for

bridge failure, also experienced a high number of bridges failing due to flooding.

The number of failed bridges as a result from flooding alone in 2011 was even

higher than three of the other years except 2005. Almost all other bridge failures in

2011 was as a direct result of scouring, another cause due to hydraulics. These

findings are also confirmed by the weather patterns of the year; Hurricane Irene

was a highly devastating hurricane that cost the U.S billions of dollars in

infrastructure maintenance, repair, and replacement. In addition, the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reported that in the year 2011, almost

100 major disaster declarations were made, more than any other single year

between years 2000 to 2012, which can be seen in Figure 3-5, as shown below.

24
 Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Hydraulic - Flood 2 5 1 5 2 8 4 7 7 1 1 21 1
Hydraulic - Scour 0 3 3 5 6 20 4 7 10 0 0 17 1
Hurricane 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Overload 5 6 3 4 5 5 2 5 3 0 0 1 2
Collision 11 7 5 4 3 7 0 5 1 0 1 1 1
Construction 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0
Maintenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Fire 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0
Misc - Bearings 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

25
Deterioration 2 2 1 4 4 2 4 4 1 0 0 0 0
Steel - gusset plates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Steel - Fatigue 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nature - Wind 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Earthquake 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Foundation 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Concrete - Corrosion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Table 3-1: Bridge Failures by Year and Cause

 120

100
Major Emergencies
80

60

40

20

0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year

Figure 3-5: Major Emergencies Declared by FEMA per Year (FEMA 2013)

The findings from this chart are compelling in that they also correlate quite

reasonably with Figure 3-4 which diagrams the number of bridge failures per year.

However, some discrepancy can be seen between these two charts, which can be

identified in the fact that many bridge failures are not caused as a result of natural

disasters. The causes of bridge failure will be further covered in the subsequent

section. According to FEMA’s website, primary factors considered include the

amount of damage to the impacted area’s infrastructure, capabilities of the local

authorities to remedy the damage, and frequency of disasters to the impacted region

(FEMA). The large number of bridge failure events in the years 2005 and 2011 can

safely be said to have been as a result of the large number of hurricane and natural

disaster activity in each of those years, which is confirmed by the fact that

26
scouring, flooding, and hurricanes contributed to the overwhelming majority of

failures for each of these two years.

3.4 Bridge Failures by Cause

Although the location and time are important when studying bridge failures

and their patterns and trends are important, possibly the most crucial element in

studying actual, physical occurrences of bridge failure is the cause of the bridge’s

demise; understanding why these bridges fail is the key component to

understanding what made these bridges fail and how to prevent future bridge

failures. This is also an important consideration in that if bridge failures are to be

predicted, knowing what made them fail in the past can unlock doors to

understanding what might allow future bridges to experience failure, both

catastrophically and partial collapse. This section will serve to display the causes of

bridge failure, analyze which causes are most likely, and provide working

definitions to bridge failure causes. Figure 3-6 displays the number of bridge

failures by cause.

27
 90
80
70
Occurences 60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Fire
Construction

Miscellaneous

Steel - Fatigue

Nature - Wind
Overload

Maintenance

Deterioration
Hydraulic - Scour

Concrete - Corosion
Collision

Earthquake

Foundation
Steel - gusset plates
Hydraulic - Flood

Misc - Bearings
Cause of Failure

Figure 3-6: Bridge Failures By Cause

Clearly, hydraulic issues presented the greatest problems for bridges over

the timeframe studied. Both scour and flood individually were higher than any

other single cause of failure, and together, combined for nearly 50 percent of all

bridge failures over the timeframe studied. These both referred to hydraulic issues

of the bridge, mostly caused by a storm event. Flooding is the result of unusually

high water levels of the river spanned by the bridge, and usually fails from water

levels applying too great of a force on the structure. A similar cause, and one that

contributed the most to bridge failures over the timeframe studied, was scouring of

the bridge. According to FHWA (2009) in the Bridge Scour and Stream Instability

Countermeasures: Experience, Selection, and Design Guidance manual, scour is

defined as “erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water; often

28
considered as being localized” (FHWA 2009). Oftentimes, scour can occur from

increased flow of the spanned river as a direct result of increased rainfall from a

storm event. It should be of great interest to the reader to note that the findings of

Hadipriono and Wardhana (2003) displayed similar findings; although the causes

of failure for the Hadipriono and Wardhana study (2003) were not organized to use

the terms scour or flooding, the general cause of ‘external’ used by the study would

surely include scour and flooding. This study also found that external causes were

the most predominant cause of bridge failure over the timeframe studied; consistent

with the findings in this study. Despite the nearly 20 year time difference in the

Hadipriono and Wardhana study (2003) and the findings in this study, the results of

external forced contributed to the highest number of bridge failures in the United

States; therefore, ignoring the effects of weather patterns and hydraulic issues on

America’s infrastructure could be catastrophic.

Following scouring and flooding, collision was found to be a major cause to

bridge failures in the America’s bridges. Collision causes include any type of

collision event to the bridge, whether that be a car, oil tanker, or barge, and all three

resulted in failures of bridges over the timeframe studied. This cause would also

fall under the category of ‘external’ in the Hadipriono and Wardhana study (2003).

Collisions are often hard to predict and design against, as they introduce an

unexpected lateral force to the structure. Bridges are designed primarily to support

vertical loads, and when an object, such as a vehicle, collides with a bridge, the

unexpected lateral load can deform the bridge until failure occurs, often

29
catastrophically. Collisions also usually occur as a result of reckless operation of a

vehicle with little blame to be placed on the bridge engineer, designer, or contractor

who built the bridge.

Over the 13 year timeframe studied, many bridges experienced significant

damage as a result of the failures experienced, many resulting in total collapse. The

distinction to remember in addressing partial and total collapse is that in a partial

collapse, the bridge may still be able to service traffic (though substantial load

carrying capacity has been lost, and total collapse is probable) whereas a bridge that

has experienced a total collapse is no longer able to service traffic. Over the past 13

years, 184 bridges experienced total collapse and 147 bridge failures resulted in a

partial collapse. A bridge that has experienced total collapse will need removal and

replacement, whereas a bridge that has experienced partial collapse will need

repair, maintenance, and possible replacement if the maintenance costs are greater

than the cost to simply replace the bridge entirely. Below in Figure 3-7, results are

displayed to show partial and total collapses experienced by the bridges.

30
 200

180

160

140

Occurrences
120

100

80

60

40

20

0
Total Collapse Partial Collapse

Figure 3-7: Bridge Failures By Collapse Type

Total collapses were more common in bridge failures than partial collapse failures,

which could be as a result of numerous factors, but nonetheless display that bridge

failures are often catastrophic, and limiting them should be of utmost concern.

Potential reasons for higher number of total collapse is that they are far more

obvious than partial collapses and that partial collapses often result in total

collapses.

3.5 Bridge Failures by Bridge Specifications

Investigating the specifications of the bridges that failed and addressing the

observable patterns in their years of service before failure, material, and type of

bridge is of high concern when discussing bridge failures in that its intent is to

31
address some of the triggering causes that can lead to both partial and total

collapses of America’s bridges. These three categories were chosen because they

can be easily compared and will offer a different approach in viewing these failures

and help identify potential problems with these bridges.

In the case of bridge failure events, it should also be of great interest to the

reader to know the distribution of the ages of the bridges which experienced failure.

Viewing failures with their ages in mind will help better identify why these bridges

failed when they did, as well as identify potential problems during the lifespan of a

bridge. Logically, as a bridge ages and does not receive adequate maintenance, the

more likely it is to experience failure. The findings show that the average age of a

failed bridge (which failed between the years 2000 and 2012) was approximately

58 years, with a standard deviation of 31.6 years. It is interesting to compare this

result to the Hadipriono and Wardhana study (2003), which found that the average

age of a failed bridge was 50.7 years (which failed between the years 1989 to

2000). The difference of seven years between the serviceable years before failure

from the Hadipriono and Wardhana study (2003) to this study could be an

indication that bridge construction, inspection, and maintenance techniques have

been improving. Bridges were aged from zero years of service (failed either during

construction or within one year of service) to 201 years of service. Figure 3-8

displays the findings of the ages of the failed bridges during the timeframe studied.

Interestingly as well, compared against the average age of a bridge in America, the

failed age was significantly higher than the average age of a bridge in America,

32
which was about 39.2 years. This is a telling picture of the fact that aging structures

are being replaced by newer bridges before they reach ages where structural

obsolescence and instability can be assured.

33
34
Figure 3-8: Bridge Ages at Failure
 Viewing bridge failures through the lens of their ages allows for the failure

causes to be better understood. Similarly, observing the material used in the

construction of theses bridges helped address the issue of the design triggering

cause; knowing which type of material will fail easiest should be of great concern

for the designer when selecting a material to use in the construction of a future

bridge. Bridge materials were broken up into to the categories of wood, steel,

concrete, and stone. While most bridges are composed of a combination of any of

these materials, the material listed per bridge was shown as the material that

contributed the greatest structural strength to the bridge, and was used in key

structural elements in each bridge. Each bridge material shown had at least one

bridge failure, and is depicted below in Figure 3-9.

250

200
Occurances

150

100

50

0
Concrete Steel Stone Wood
Material

Figure 3-9: Bridge Failures by Material Used

35
 The most common material to fail as shown above was most obviously

steel, which can be explained by a combination of contributing factors.

Understanding the history of steel’s use in bridges helps give a sound backdrop into

the discussion of failed bridge materials. In the 1840’s, steel was discovered in the

Great Lakes region and was a main contributor into unleashing the Industrial

Revolution in America. Cast iron had been the most popular material used in

bridges until the Brooklyn Bridge was built in Brooklyn, NY, the first steel bridge

constructed. At this point, the designers and builders of America’s bridges began to

realize its strength in bridge construction, and as the Industrial Revolution had been

nearly a half century underway, prices of steel began to drop significantly, making

it a strong, yet affordable, material, thanks to steel mogul Andrew Carnegie.

Looking back to the service lives of bridge before collapse earlier in this section,

every bridge (with the exception of one outlier at 201 years of service life) had

failed before 150 years of service. This timeframe would put the bridge’s

construction at around the decade of the 1850’s, for which steel had begun to gain

momentum yet no steel bridge had been constructed. This may explain why other

materials, such as wood and timber, experienced significant numbers of failure, yet

steel clearly had the most. The popularity of steel and the fact that the bulk of

construction years for bridges which failed over the studied timeframe of the years

2000 to 2012 show that steel’s failure is not due to it potentially being a weak

36
material but that it is a popular material used in most of the United States’ bridges,

and statistically, would exhibit the most failure.

Although presenting the total number of bridge failures per material is

beneficial in understanding which bridges are more likely to fail, studying the

number of bridges that failed per bridges standing (or the percent of bridges failed

per material) can be an equally beneficial observation. Using the National Bridge

Inventory database (2013), percent of bridges failed per material were found by

dividing the number of bridges failed (by material) divided by the number of

bridges standing by material. By grouping failures by percent failed, the fact that

certain types of material are more common in use than others can be ruled out as an

influence on the number of bridges failed by material. These percentages display

the percent of bridges that failed by material in the U.S. by material, shown in

Figure 3-10. Four materials were compared; concrete, steel, stone and wood, by the

material which contributed the most to the structural performance of the bridge.

37
 0.25

0.2

Percent (%)
0.15

0.1

0.05

0
Concrete Steel Stone Wood
Material

Figure 3-10: Percent of Bridges Failed, by Material

From the data obtained using the bridge failure information in the years 2000 to

2012 compared against the existing bridges in America, significant and meaningful

conclusions can be drawn on the structural stability of bride materials. As shown in

Figure 3-10, in terms of percentage, very few bridges failed per standing bridges.

Stone had the highest percentage of failures, which was around 0.2%, followed

closely by wood and steel, where wood had the second highest percentage and

steel, the third. Concrete had roughly 0.15% less failures than stone, steel or wood,

and was found to be the most reliable material in bridge construction, using the

database of failed bridges over the timeframe studied. Respectively, concrete, steel,

stone and wood experienced failures of 0.030%, 0.170%, 0.204% and 0.200% of

their existing structures. From the existing bridge database, it was found that,

respectively, concrete, steel, stone and wood had 202348, 121245, 977, and 14975

bridges standing as of the year 2012. Clearly, concrete and steel had far more

38
bridges the United States than wood or stone, yet comparing the percentages of

bridge failures to standing helped to truly compare materials and show which

materials were more susceptible to failure.

Finally, the last attribute, and a key component when studying bridge

failures by bridge attribute, is the type of bridge that failed. By grouping bridge

failures by bridge type, the most common and susceptible bridges to failure were

observed. The types of bridges that experienced failure over the 13 year timeframe

studied were tee beam, stringer/multi-beam or girder, thru truss, box beam/girder,

girder and floorbeam, slab, channel beam, arch, orthotropic, other, deck truss,

frame, Draw Bridge, and suspension. It should be noted that the definition used of a

bridge through this study excludes culverts and pedestrian bridges from study.

Because the NYSDOT bridge failure data was used primarily in the findings of this

study, their definitions of bridge types will be used to give well defined

descriptions of the types of each bridge found to have experienced failure. The

NYSDOT defines a Stringer/Multi-Beam or Girder Multiple bridge to consist of

“longitudinal members which directly support the structural deck. Steel members

may be either rolled beams or plate girders, depending on span” (NYSDOT Bridge

Inventory Manual 2006: pp. 55-57). The NYSDOT defines a Girder and Floorbeam

System bridge to be one where “the structural deck is supported by floorbeams

transverse to the main members, with smaller section stringers spanning between

the floorbeams. Usually, there are only two main member sections, but three are

sometimes seen on wide bridges. The main girders are almost always riveted or

39
welded plate girders” (NYSDOT Bridge Inventory Manual 2006: pp. 55-57). The

NYSDOT defines a Tee Beam bridge to be a bridge that features a “concrete

monolithic deck and beam system formed in the shape of the letter T. Tee beams

may have the shape of bulb tee, double tee, quad tee and rib tee” (NYSDOT Bridge

Inventory Manual 2006: pp. 55-57). The NYSDOT defines a bridge that is

classified as being constructed of box beams or box girders to consist of “multiple,

longitudinal, voided, prestressed concrete longitudinal beams are placed directly

adjacent to each other, and are then post-tensioned together with transverse

tendons. Distinct joints separating members can be seen from below” (NYSDOT

Bridge Inventory Manual 2006: pp. 55-57). The NYSDOT defines a frame bridge

to have “the horizontal and vertical/inclined units of a frame are a rigidly connected

unit, which resists moment and shear. Frames may have either vertical or slanted

legs. The top of a frame is parallel to the roadway surface and there will usually be

no backfill over the structure” (NYSDOT Bridge Inventory Manual 2006: pp. 55-

57). The NYSDOT defines an orthotropic bridge to consist of a “steel plate deck

stiffened by longitudinal ribs and supported by floorbeams and main beams,

generally with asphalt wearing surface” (NYSDOT Bridge Inventory Manual 2006:

pp. 55-57). The NYSDOT defines a suspension bridge to be that where “two cables

on either side of the roadway provide the support system for suspension bridges.

These cables are draped over towers and anchored into concrete blocks embedded

into rock at each end” (NYSDOT Bridge Inventory Manual 2006: pp. 55-57).

Figure 3-11, shown below, displays the findings of these bridge failures, grouped

by bridge type.
40
 160
140
120
Occurences

100
80
60
40
20
0

Other
Truss - Thru

Slab

Channel Beam

Draw Bridge
Truss - Deck
Tee Beam

Arch
Stringer/Multi-beam or Girder

Box Beam/Girder

Girder and Floorbeam System

Frame (except frame culverts)

Orthotropic

Suspension
Bridge Type

Figure 3-11: Bridge Failures by Bridge Type

Although the findings from the study showed that the bridge type with the

most failures was the Stringer/ I-beam bridge, an equally important statistic to

consider is the type of bridges failed by percentage of total bridges standing of each

type. A strong argument as to why stringer/girder bridges experienced the most

failures is that there are more I-beam bridges in the U.S. than any other type of

bridge; in fact, there are more than three times as many I-beam bridges than the

next most common type of bridge in the United States. The total number of bridges

standing per type was found from the National Bridge Inventory database, as each

41
bridge listed in the database also displayed the type of bridge standing. Therefore,

the percentage of bridges failed was found from dividing the number of failed

bridges by the number of standing bridges for each bridge type. The types used

mirror the bridge types above and use the same definitions for each bridge. The

percentage of bridge types failed is shown in Figure 3-12.

4
3.5
3
Percent (%)

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

Other
Truss - Thru

Slab

Channel Beam

Truss - Deck

Draw Bridge
Stringer/Multi-beam or Girder

Arch
Tee Beam

Box Beam/Girder

Girder and Floorbeam System

Orthotropic

Frame (except frame culverts)

Bridge Type Suspension

Figure 3-12: Percent of Bridges Failed, by Bridge Type

Breaking the failures down by percentage of standing bridges showed

which types of bridges truly were more susceptible to bridge failure as opposed to

number of occurrences of failure, although both are equally helpful in

understanding bridge failure. While the stringer/I-girder bridge type experienced

the most number of bridges, percentage-wise, the suspension bridge was most
42
susceptible to failure, experiencing a failure percentage rate of about 3.8%. Despite

the fact that the stringer/I-girder bridge experienced the most failures by number,

accounting for the fact that I-girder bridges are the most common, the I-girder was

one of the least susceptible to bridge failure by examining bridge failure by

percentage. By accounting for the number of bridges standing, the data can be

normalized so that the bridge types can be compared without bias. In summary, the

bridges studied failed at around 58 years of service, and bridges made of stone and

suspension bridges experienced the greatest susceptibility to failure.

3.6 Conclusion
Bridge failure data between the years 2000 to 2012 was tabulated and

analyzed in a database using Microsoft Excel. The findings were grouped by

numerous categories to determine the trends found in the study; grouped by year,

by cause, by material, by collapse, by bridge type and by location. From the study,

it can be concluded that the year 2005 experienced the most failures due to the high

number of hurricane activity; hydraulic causes were the chief triggering cause to

bridge failures, and suspension bridges were found to be most susceptible to bridge

failure. Grouping the bridge failure data into subcategories displays the trends and

patterns of recent bridge failure into meaningful patterns and conclusions.

43
 CHAPTER 4: BRIDGE FAILURE CASE STUDIES

4.0 Introduction

Over the 13 year time period studied, many bridge failures received

substantial local and national media coverage, and can serve as important case

studies while discussing bridge failures in the years 2000 to 2012. These failures

created a considerable amount of discussion over the state of America’s

infrastructure in news outlets, political realms and especially the civil engineering

community at large, as all aimed at addressing the common issue of preventing

future catastrophes as these failures. However, despite the significant financial

losses and causalities endured from these failures, much can be gained from them.

Intensive and definitive studies have been conducted on these significant bridge

failures to better understand why each of them failed and what can be done to

prevent similar bridge failures. The bridge failures explained in the section were

chosen because they exhibit interesting and eventful failure causes and are

important monuments in the bridge forensics community.

The intent of this section is to examine select bridge failures in detail to

better illustrate the various causes of bridge failure and draw connections between

actual bridge failures and the patterns of bridge failure described above in previous

44
chapters. Although the purpose of this study is to find trends and describe them

through statistics and fuzzy logic, studying case studies will help verify the dataset

used in the study, as well as the methodology to classify and group similar bridge

failure events. A second reason for this section is to also help describe bridge

failure causes and illustrate them through more tangible examples of how these

causes play out in actual bridge failures. While this section partially serves as a

literature search involving some of the failures experienced during the study, its

focus is to connect these failures to the enabling and triggering causes discussed in

Chapter 2, detailing where each of these two causes are derived from. Discussion of

the enabling and triggering causes foe each of these bridge failure cases is the

author’s (of this thesis) interpretation of these bridge failures. Because the fuzzy

logic analysis portion of this thesis relies heavily on the discernment of enabling

and triggering causes, showing examples of specific bridge failure cases was the

chosen method to help illustrate how these two causes work together to lead to a

bridge failure.

4.1 Kinzua Viaduct Bridge Failure

At its heyday, the Kinzua Viaduct, a bridge which was once the United

States’ tallest structure, boasting a peak height of 301 feet, consisting of 20 tower

spans of 38.5 feet each, and built entirely of wrought iron, stood as a proud

landmark of engineering excellence in the early 1900’s. Originally constructed in

1882 of wrought iron, it was rebuilt in the early 1900’s with the same dimensions,

only the second version consisted of steel. In its second construction phase, it was
45
built using a gantry crane and in a total of 94 days. In that time, the bridge was a

marvel in and of itself, supporting most of the rail traffic through Pennsylvania. As

the popularity of rail traffic declined with the advent of quicker, more reliable

means of transporting goods through the 1900’s, the bridge was eventually

decommissioned from use in 1959. Declared a national landmark due to its

historical significance, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania received the bridge by

donation and pledged to inspect and maintain the structure (Leech et al. 2005:

pp.56-57).

On July 21, 2003, the Kinzua Viaduct, the 103 year old rail bridge in

Northwestern Pennsylvania, experienced catastrophic failure resulting in total

collapse of nearly the entire structure, despite ongoing efforts of thorough

inspection of the bridge by engineers. On the day that it failed, the National

Weather Service reported an F-1 tornado touched down within proximity of the

bridge, where wind speeds surged between 73 and 112 miles per hour (mph). The

vortex produced by the tornado extended as much as a quarter of a mile wide and

twisted in a counterclockwise direction, meeting the structure from the east. In a

near-instantaneous 30-second timeframe, the tornado devastated the structure,

bringing down 23 of the 41 spans in a progressive failure.

Forensic investigation of the collapse revealed many important findings

from this failure which could be applied to future design, construction, and

maintenance of rail bridges. Because the structure was very tall and also built of

relatively lightweight material, it was deemed to be “wind susceptible”. This means

46
that bridges with greater height to base ratios experience a greater need to address

lateral loads. Wind loads exhibited by an F-1 tornado would certainly produce high

lateral loads on any structure. Furthermore, these high lateral loads coupled with

the height of the structure produced significant bending moments on the foundation

of the bridge, as the moment on a member increases as either distance or load

increases (Leech et al 2005: pp. 58-60).

While observing the damage sustained to the foundation of the Kinzua

Bridge after failure, it was discovered that the foundation from the 1882

construction was reused when the bridge was rebuilt in the 1900s. The foundation

consisted of a sandstone block acting as a counterweight, and an anchor bolt system

at each leg for each tower of the bridge. Within each foundation, an anchor bolt

was used to hold each leg in place, and surrounded by washers and a collar-

coupling assembly.

For classification purposes, the bridge’s failure was a direct result of

maintenance issues. Had inspection crews been able to see the deterioration and

deformation of the couplings in the foundation, the result would have been

profoundly different. Any competent inspector who observed these couplings

would have called for replacement or at very least significant rehabilitation to the

bridge’s stone foundations. Despite the tornado present at the time of collapse, this

bridge would not have failed if given anchor bolts and couplings with adequate

tensile strength, which would have been the case had it been properly maintained

and inspected (Leech et al 2005: pp. 58-61).

47
 However, during the frequent and routine inspections to the bridge, the

anchor bolt was not visible to inspectors as it was covered by the collar-coupling

assembly. Years of service of these bolts had led them to deteriorate and visible

fatigue cracks from the wear of service were noticeable only after they were

completely torn away from the foundation. Cyclic lateral loads experienced on the

structure had resulted in plastic deformation of the couplings, reducing their

effective tensile strength to nearly zero at the time of the bridge’s failure. These

couplings became the weak point in the bridge and were the primary reason why

the bridge had experienced catastrophic failure (Leech et al 2005: pp. 60-61).

It is the author’s (of this thesis) belief that, due to improper inspection and

maintenance to the bridge’s foundation, as well as the adjacent tornado recorded

nearby at the time of failure, the bridge collapsed. Because inspectors could not see

the deteriorated anchor bolts as a result of the collar obstructing their view, proper

maintenance could not be taken to repair the corroded anchor bolts. From this case,

it is the author’s interpretation that maintenance errors were the enabling cause of

this bridge collapse, and the triggering cause acting was wind loads from the

nearby tornado.

4.2 Lake View Drive Bridge Failure

The Lake View Drive Bridge was a four-span adjacent box girder

prestressed concrete bridge carrying Lake View Drive traffic over Interstate Route

48
70 in Washington County, Pennsylvania. The bridge consisted of eight girders

which supported the main span, where all girders were 48 inches wide. All exterior

girders were 42 inches deep, and the north side interior girders were 27 inches

deep, whereas the south side interior girders were 21 inches deep. During

inspection, it was noted that the bridge had sustained some prestressing strand

section loss. The plan and cross-sectional views of the bridge are given in Figures

4-4 and 4-5, respectively, which depict the description above. On the evening of

December 27, 2005, the 45 year old prestressed concrete bridge experienced total

collapse of its main span under a dead load mechanism (Naito et al. 2010: pp.408-

410).

Forensic investigation of the bridge showed that the girder’s load carrying

capacity was lower than the weight of the bridge, which meant that, left

unmaintained, the bridge would eventually collapse under its own weight alone;

making its collapse inevitable should maintenance be neglected. Despite ongoing

investigations of the bridge’s structural stability, effectively rating the condition of

the prestressing strands was very difficult or impossible due to the difficulty to

view the strands, though forensic examination of the strands after failure showed

that they were significantly deteriorated. Based on chemical compositions of the

prestressing steel used, the prestressing strands would have poor resistivity to

corrosion had it begun to set, which would also initiate spalling of the concrete and

greater exposure of the strands, also greatly accelerating corrosion of the strands.

49
 Evidence of the effective strength losses of the presstress strands was

observable in the presence of transverse cracking along the girders and the loss of

camber in the bridge (Naito et al 2010:pp. 410-411). Finally, significant damage

occurred to the shear keys from deterioration of the concrete bridge to the extent

that most shear keys were non-existent, which would imply that transverse forces

would produce live-load moments about 66% greater than if the bridge had

functioning, non-deteriorated shear keys. In is essence, the failure of the Lake View

Bridge under the action of dead load can be attributed to the deterioration of the

prestressing strands and concrete structural members (Naito et al/ 2010: pp.412-

415).

It is the author’s analysis of this bridge failure that the enabling cause to this

bridge’s collapse was improper maintenance as a result of failure to properly

inspect prestressing strands. This would fall under the category of maintenance

issues for the enabling cause of bridge failure. The triggering cause was

deterioration of the prestressing strands, which could not effectively support even

the bridge’s weight alone from the amount of damage sustained by deterioration.

4.3 Paseo Suspension Bridge Failure

Built in 1952 in Kansas City, Missouri, the Paseo Suspension Bridge

spanned the Missouri River and carried an average daily traffic of 89,000 vehicles

per day in the year 2003, with a total length of 1232 feet. On January 22, 2003, the

50
bridge was quickly closed due to fears of the bridge’s structural integrity after a

significant gap was noticed between sections of the bridge deck, and it was known

that substantial and immediate maintenance was required to prevent further damage

to the structure. Subsequent investigation of the bridge led bridge investigators to

find a significant fracture to one of the bridge’s vertical struts from freezing of its

connecting pin. Temperatures were recorded to have dropped to minus nine degrees

Fahrenheit, below average for that time of the year. Finite Element Modeling

(FEM) of the pin-strut mechanism showed that, had the strut been free to rotate,

fracture of the strut as observed would not have occurred (Chen et al. 2005:pp.1-6).

Figure 4-1: Paseo Suspension Bridge, Profile View (Chen et al. 2005: pp. 1)

51
 Two months prior to the failure, Parsons Engineering Group conducted an

inspection of the bridge, and noted that longitudinal motion of the suspension

members was observable, inferring that the pins which were used to connect the

tension members in the suspended section, were in working order at this time. No

section loss was mentioned in the bridge inspection report, though minor rust was

noted to be present around the pins. The rust described above and fracture to the

frozen vertical strut is shown in Figure 4-2 (Chen et al. 2005: pp. 1- 20).

Figure 4-2: Paseo Suspension Bridge, Finite Element Analysis of Stresses on

Failed Strut (Chen et al 2005: pp. 20)

52
Figure 4-3: Photograph of Fractured Strut Immediately after Failure (Chen et
al. 2005: pp.4)
The findings based on the studies of Chen et al. concluded from

experimentation that “the lack of access to the lower link pin, connecting the

fractured strut to the bridge foundation, for proper preventative maintenance is the

root cause of the failure of the Southeastern vertical strut of the Paseo Bridge”

(Chen et al. 2005: pp. 54). This cause created a condition which left the connecting

pin completely locked, inhibiting the needed free motion of the vertical strut;

eventually fracturing the strut from its lack of mobility. The frozen position of the

strut produced load induced moments and thermal induced moments on the strut,

which was not designed to ever carry. The strut was designed solely to carry axial

forced of compression and tension only, and not torsional forces from the moments.

This overloading from the moments caused the strut to fracture; unable to carry the

53
moments applied from being frozen in position. The freezing of the pin can be

attributed to salt, sand, and debris accumulation around the pin in the pin housing.

The lack of cleaning the pin housing, which caused the strut to fracture was

classified as a maintenance cause in the classification of bridge failures during the

study of bridge failures from the years 2000 to 2012. Parsons Engineering, who

conducted the inspection two months before failure of the strut, had reported that

debris accumulation had accumulated in the pin housing and could cause future

problems (Chen et al. 2005: pp.11-20).

The author believes that the enabling cause which created a situation

suitable for the partial collapse of the Paseo Suspension Bridge was a maintenance

issue from improper cleaning of the pin housing. Likewise, the author’s analysis of

this bridge failure is that the triggering cause was temperature related from the sub-

zero temperature recorded on the day of this partial collapse.

4.4 I-35 W Bridge Failure

On August 1, 2007 at around six o’clock at night, the I-35 W Bridge near

Minneapolis, Minnesota, experienced catastrophic failure, in which the entire main

span of the deck truss of the bridge collapsed into the Mississippi river, which it

had been spanning. A total of 111 vehicles were stated to be on the bridge at the

time of collapse, of which 25 were construction related vehicles, and 17 had been

found to have fallen off the bridge at collapse.

54
 The count of 111 vehicles represents near maximum vehicle capacity the

bridge could carry at the time of collapse. Four of the eight travel lanes of the

bridge were closed due to construction which was to be commenced later in the

day, and construction equipment was placed on the closed lanes as well as

aggregates for the concrete pour during construction. The construction equipment

and materials had been placed on the bridge earlier that afternoon, and construction

activities included removing about two inches of depth from the concrete bridge

deck and replacing with a fresh 2.0 inches of the concrete wearing surface on the

deck. Staging the concrete materials was deemed to be necessary due to the speed

at which construction had to be completed. An estimated live load of 578,000

pounds was applied to the bridge, which was composed of the construction vehicles

parked on the bridge, personal vehicles of construction workers parked on the

bridge, traveling traffic, aggregates and other materials for the concrete pour staged

on the bridge, and construction equipment (National Transportation Safety Board

2008: pp. 20-30).

Construction on the I-35W Bridge began in 1964, and had been opened to

traffic in 1967. The bridge consisted of 14 total spans at a length of 1,907 ft long

and carried a total of eight lanes of traffic, of which four were northbound and four

were southbound. The piers that supported the bridge were all made of reinforced

concrete. The superstructure of the bridge consisted of a deck truss which

supported the eleven of the fourteen spans, and the remaining spans (the approach

spans) were supported by continuous welded steel plate girders. Expansion and

55
roller bearings were used to connect the superstructure to the supporting piers,

which would help reduce the impact on expansion and contraction from climate

changes. The superstructure, a deck girder used to support the loads imposed by

traffic and dead loads, were composed of two parallel Warren trusses, running

underneath the bridge along the edges of the bridge’s deck, spaced approximately

72 feet apart (National Transportation Safety Board 2008: pp. 20-35).

During the collapse of the I-35W Bridge, a motion activated surveillance

camera recorded the failure, which, combined with forensic investigation of the

bridge after its collapse, allowed structural forensic engineers to produce

conclusions as to why the bridge had collapsed. In the surveillance video, the

southern end of the bridge at span seven dropped slightly from its pre-collapse

position, and the connecting stringer separated from the deck it had been

supporting. Immediately after, the entire center span came crashing down into the

river. The collapse had separated the bridge into three distinct sections; the

southern approach, which landed on the ground below, the center span, which

landed in the Mississippi River, and the northern approach, which also landed on

the ground it had spanned below (National Transportation Safety Board 2008:

pp.60-80).

During the year 1999, a routine bridge inspection occurred for the I-35W

Bridge where photos were taken of all structural elements of the bridge.

Documented photographs show bowing on some of the bridge’s gusset plates, yet

no mention of this was found in the corresponding bridge inspection report. It was

56
thought, at the time, to be a design or construction flaw, and inspectors were told to

look only for deterioration or maintenance issues in the bridge. After collapse, all

gusset plates at the fracture point of the bridge were also found to be fractured.

Because structural support was lost when the gusset plates fractured, the entire

truss’ structural integrity was compromised and was not able to carry the loads

imparted on it (National Transportation Safety Board 2008: pp. 62-80).

Visual inspection of the gusset plates was determined to be a method of

inspection that was not adequate to effectively determine the structural integrity of

the gusset plates. Ultimately, a poor design of the gusset plates, coupled with the

inability to effectively inspect the gusset plates using the prescribed method of

visual inspection, and the added loads from routine bridge maintenance

construction, created a situation that collapsed the I-35W Bridge in Minnesota in

catastrophic fashion (National Transportation Safety Board 2008: pp. 70-100).

It is this the author of this study’s belief that the enabling cause which led to

the collapse of the I-35 W Bridge was a design error in the gusset plates in that they

were too thin to support reasonably anticipated loads on the bridge, while the

triggering cause was overloading the under-designed gusset plates.

4.5 Conclusion
Bridge failures were described in detail to better illustrate the classification

methods of bridge failure causes throughout the study. The Kinzua Viaduct, Paseo

Suspension Bridge, Lake View Drive Bridge, and I-35W Bridge in Minnesota were

57
examined in detail and their construction, history, maintenance, and failure cause

were discussed at length to illustrate how they were categorized in the database

used to support the findings of this study. Table 4-1 presents the enabling and

triggering causes discussed in this section for the four bridge failure cases, analyzed

by the author of this thesis.

Bridge Enabling Cause Triggering Cause

Maintenance
Kinzua Viaduct Issues Wind
Maintenance
Lake Drive Bridge Issues Overload
Maintenance
Paseo Suspension Bridge Issues Temperature
I-35 W Bridge Design Issues Overload

Table 4-1: Enabling and Triggering Causes for Bridge Failure Cases

58
 CHAPTER 5: FUZZY LOGIC ANALYSIS OF BRIDGE
FAILURE

5.1 Introduction

Fuzzy logic was chosen as the means to analyze and interpret the data

collected on bridge failures from the years 2000 to 2012 in the United States due to

the fact that it can effectively treat uncertainties and unknowns which are found

commonly in linguistic variables. Linguistic variables are defined by an observer,

and are qualitative in nature; an example for this would be describing a bridge as

‘safe’ or ‘unsafe’. By applying fuzzy logic to the dataset in the analysis,

uncertainties as well can be better accounted for in order to produce a model that

more effectively describes the safety and performance of bridges in America, using

the dataset of bridge failures as the backbone to support these conclusions. This

approach of analyzing bridge performance using fuzzy logic deduction also

eliminates the need for sorting the variables as independent or dependent, as fuzzy

logic already accounts for these. When observing bridge failures, they often have

many contributing factors alongside the main cause of the failure, so assigning a

single probabilistic value to the performance of the bridge fails to account for the

other contributing factors to the bridge’s performance, either bad or good.

Furthermore, bridge performance often cannot be classified simply as ‘absolutely

59
good’ or ‘absolutely poor’, but rather, most are rated somewhere in between. That

classification can also vary depending on whom you ask and on what criteria they

were to base their judgment on their analysis of the bridge’s performance.

Uncertainties also can arise, as seen in the discussion of the Kinzua Bridge Failure

in Chapter 4, where critical anchor bolts were unable to be effectively inspected,

leading to a severe lack of structural integrity of the bridge’s foundation. However,

applying fuzzy logic to analyze the dataset compiled of the bridge failures from the

years 2000 to 2012 can help eliminate the uncertainties and technical issues when

compared to analyzing the dataset using the classical probability method. The

translational model will be used to depict and quantify linguistic assessments of

bridge conditions with respect to the possibility of bridge failure.

5.2 Enabling and Triggering Causes

When discussing the performance of a bridge, enabling causes and

triggering causes must also be accounted for, which were discussed above in

Chapter 2. If a bridge is able to withstand and is free from both enabling causes and

triggering causes, then it will also be a structurally stable bridge. However, outside

of this perfect scenario, the bridge’s structural stability may be compromised,

which may or may not lead to failure of the bridge. Here, fuzzy logic was applied to

the data of bridge failures to analyze bridge performance and the ability to be free

of failure. Procedural causes will not be accounted for in the model as they fall

outside of the scope of study and were not collected in the dataset used to support

60
the findings. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 in Chapter 2 listed the enabling and triggering

causes studied, which are design problems, construction problems, maintenance

issues, and material issues for enabling causes (E1, E2, E3 and E4, respectively)

and deterioration, hydraulic, collision, and overload for triggering causes (T1, T2,

T3, and T4, respectively). Connection between individual bridge failures and the

data for enabling and triggering causes can be seen from Chapter 2 whereby

individual bridge failures were analyzed to describe their enabling and triggering

causes. Similar analysis was performed for every bridge failure in the study to

compile enabling and triggering cause data.

5.3 Bridge Condition Assessment

As previously discussed, bridge condition ratings are often subjectively

based, where conditions of the bridge rely heavily on the experience of a trusted

and credible bridge inspector/engineer. These ratings often are said to be

subjective, in the fact that the inspector rates a bridge based on his or her opinion of

the condition of the bridge from experience and differing to previous examples.

These assessments of bridges lie heavily on the individual, and can vary based on

inspector or engineer opinions. By using fuzzy sets and defuzzification, subjective

analysis can be analyzed mathematically using the database collected in this study

as the knowledge base behind the analysis. The consequence, whether that be a

partial or total collapse, was deemed to be the most crucial consideration in the

outcome of a bridge’s structural stability. Relationships could be determined

between the enabling causes and the consequence, and the triggering cause

61
frequency and the consequence. Defuzzification, which is the process by which

fuzzy analysis is made to produce a meaningful result, and fuzzy sets are the means

to integrate these two separate relationships into one single analysis. Applying this

analysis to currently standing bridges also comes with the added assumption that

standing bridges will behave in the same manner as studied over the past 13 years.

Bridge performance and triggering frequency were measured against the

consequence of these events. Further, if a certain enabling cause was found, like a

design issue, and a triggering event were to occur, the consequence of these causes

would be analyzed. The consequence of these causes can be anything from a bridge

bearing failing to work properly, which would be considered a less severe

consequence, all the way to a total collapse, which would be a very severe

consequence. However, before this could be performed, relationships between

performance and consequence, and triggering event frequency and consequence

had to be established. The relations of performance and consequence were found

from the database collected in this study, by checking the number of occurrences

for each enabling cause, and further breaking these down into partial collapse or

total collapse. Although the relationships between performance (from enabling

events) and consequence inherently carry a level of subjectivity, these relationships

were based primarily on the data collected and the author’s judgment of the

findings to set these relationships. Figure 5-1 shows the enabling causes broken

down by partial collapse and total collapse, which was used to set the relationships

between performance and consequence. Oftentimes, numerous causes lead to a

62
bridge collapse, so pinning an issue to one single cause is not completely accurate

in terms of real-world application.

18

16

14

12
Occurrances

10
Partial Collapse
8
Total Collapse
6

0
Design Issues Construction Maintenance Material
Issues Issues Issues

Figure 5-1: Enabling Cause Occurrences

The enabling events analyzed were design issues, construction issues,

maintenance issues, and material issues and were chosen from this study as the

most common cause of bridge failures. Relationships between the enabling causes

and the consequence of these causes were set in order to effectively inspect a

structures’ stability. Performance of a bridge is directly correlated to the enabling

causes of the bridge in that if no enabling causes are found to be present, the bridge

is said to have a very good performance (i.e. neither partial collapse nor total

collapse is observable). Inversely, a bridge is said to have a very poor performance

63
if an enabling cause is present, leading to either partial collapse or total collapse of

the structure.

Using the data obtained over the course of this study, relationships between

performance and consequence were set using objective, statistical analysis, from

predetermined relationships between consequence and performance. A total of 15

predetermined relationships, named as priorities in this study, were set before

analysis on these relationships began. The total number of 15 was chosen because

this is the total number of combinations of relationships based on five performance

levels (i.e. very poor, poor, etc.) and five consequence levels (i.e. very severe,

severe, etc.). These were set to account for all combinations of performance and

consequence relationships. Priority 1 was defined to be the most severe case, where

regardless of the performance rating, a very severe consequence could be expected.

Contrary to this, a priority 15 was defined to return a consequence of very light

regardless of the performance observed. Priorities between 1 and 15 were defined

as intermediate values, where the lower priorities were more severe. The total set of

predefined priorities can be seen in Table 5-1 below.

64
 Bridge Performance
Consequence Very High (VH) High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) Very Low (VL)
Very Severe (VS) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1, 2 1 1 1

65
Severe (S) 6, 7, 8, 9 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 2, 3, 6 2, 6 2, 6
Moderate (M) 10, 11, 12 8, 9, 10, 11 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 3, 4, 7, 10 3, 7, 10
Light (L) 13, 14 12, 13, 14 11, 12, 13, 14 5, 8, 9, 11, 13 4, 8, 11, 13
Very Light (VL) 15 15 15 12, 14, 15 5, 9, 12, 14, 15

Table 5-1: Priority Relationships Between Bridge

Performance and Consequence
 These preset values show relationships from more serious relationships in

the lower number priorities versus less serious relationships in higher values of

priorities, as priority 1 represents the most serious case and priority 15 represents

the least serious. All intermediate priorities increased in seriousness as the priority

number increased. The seriousness measure of each enabling cause was found by

dividing each enabling cause’s total collapses by the total number of failures

experienced for each enabling cause; therefore, an enabling cause which resulted

completely in total collapse(s) was deemed to be more serious than an enabling

cause that resulted in more partial collapse. This analysis, of course, comes with the

understanding that a total collapse is much more devastating to a bridge’s structural

integrity than a partial collapse.

Each priority was given percentage range to categorize each enabling cause,

relating the priorities to each enabling cause. The upper bound value for each range

was found by dividing 100 over the priority’s value; for example, the upper bound

for priority 15 was found by dividing 100 over 15, which is 6.66 and the lower

bound was 0, meaning that if any enabling cause’s seriousness measure (total

collapse divided by all failures for that enabling cause) fell between 0 and 6.67

percent, it would be categorized as a priority 15. The ranges for all priorities can be

seen below in Table 5-2. These upper level of each priority was found by dividing

100 over the priority number (i.e. priority 15 has an upper level range of 6.67 =

66
100/15), and the lower level of that range was simply equal to the upper level of the

previous priority.

Priority Percentage Range

15 0.00 to 6.67
14 6.67 to 7.14
13 7.14 to 7.69
12 7.69 to 8.33
11 8.33 to 9.09
10 9.09 to 10.00
9 10.00 to 11.11
8 11.11 to 12.50
7 12.50 to 14.29
6 14.29 to 16.67
5 16.67 to 20.00
4 20.00 to 25.00
3 25.00 to 33.33
2 33.33 to 50.00
1 50.00 to 100.00

Table 5-2: Priority Ranges for both Enabling and Triggering

Causes

As shown above in Table 5-2, priority 1 has the greatest seriousness to the

enabling cause and priority 15 was the least serious in nature. By dividing the

number of failures for each enabling cause, a seriousness measure was found which

was categorized by a priority number from a given range. For example, E1, or the

enabling cause of design issues, was found to have experienced 6 total collapses
67
and 13 total bridge failures over the course of the 12 year study timeframe in the

United States. The seriousness measure was found by dividing 6 by 13, equating to

approximately 46 percent. This measure related to a priority 2 as found from Table

5-2 above. The preset priority and consequence relationships then would dictate

where the variable E1 would be placed on the consequence and performance

relationship table. These relations for each enabling cause can be seen below in

Table 5-3.

Total
Total Collapse/Total
Variable Collapses Total Failures Failure Priority
E1 6 13 46.15 2
E2 5 13 38.46 2
E3 2 4 50.00 1
E4 8 25 32.00 3

Table 5-3: Enabling Cause Priorities

Finally, using the priority numbers derived above and Table 5-1, which was

the predetermined relationships for each priority, the relationship between bridge

performance and consequence was found based on the results of this study. These

relationships between performance and consequence are shown below in Table 5-4.

68
 Bridge Performance
Consequence Very Poor (VP) Poor (P) Fair (F) Good (G) Very Good (VG)
Very Severe (VS) E1, E2, E3,E4 E1, E2, E3 E3 E3 E3
Severe (S) E4 E1, E2, E4 E1, E2 E1, E2
Moderate (M) E4
Light (L) E4

69
Very Light (VL)
* Where E1 = Design Issues, E2 = Construction Issues, E3 = Maintenance Issues, E4 = Material Issues

Table 5-4: Bridge Performance and Consequence Relationships

 Five linguistic variables were set at “very poor”, “poor”, “fair”, “good”, and

“very good” for both the performance-consequence relationships and frequency-

consequence relationships. These values were chosen in that they allow for great

enough differentiation to produce meaningful results. More than five linguistic

variables was felt to create situation where the results of these relationships would

become too complicated to be interpreted properly. Too few linguistic variables

can produce results without much meaning, whereas too many variables can create

a situation where the analysis is too complicated to produced meaningful results; it

is believed that five linguistic variables is just enough to effectively analyze the

data. Finally, Hadipriono (1985) used the same five linguistic variables as in this

study, and effectively communicated the fuzzy logic analysis.

When discussing triggering causes, frequency of these causes is the most

crucial factor to the consequence of the bridge’s structural stability, as discussed in

chapter 3. Therefore, the frequency of the relationship of the triggering causes and

the consequence was developed. Five linguistic variables were used again primarily

because it allows for the greatest balance of accuracy and complexity in the

analysis. To describe the frequency of triggering events, “very high”, “high”,

“medium”, “low”, and “very low” were used as the linguistic variables, for similar

reasons described as above in enabling cause analysis. The relationships between

consequence and frequency were determined from the database collected in this

study. The four triggering events chosen, deterioration, hydraulic, collision, and

overload, were chosen because they showed the most severe consequences in the

70
bridge failure study because they were also the most frequent. The relationship

between triggering event frequency and consequence was determined based on the

number of occurrences for each cause as well as the outcome, whether that be a

partial collapse or a total collapse. The findings of these triggering causes are

shown below in figure 5-2 and were used to determine the relationships.

100
90
80
70
Occurrences

60
50 Partial Collapse
40 Total Collapse
30
20
10
0
Deterioration Hydraulic - Collision Overload
Scour or Flood

Figure 5-2: Triggering Cause Occurrences

The triggering causes and the corresponding counts of partial collapses and

total collapses were used to develop the relationships between frequencies of

triggering causes and consequences. Inherently, as was the case when determining

the performance-consequence relationship, the determination of the frequency-

consequence relationship carries a degree of subjectivity. To make the relationship

71
as objective as possible, the chart above was used to help determine the

frequency/consequence relationships by equating the dataset in terms of priorities

as was done for enabling causes above. As was done for the enabling cause section

of this analysis, 15 priorities were preset in total which amounted to all

combinations of frequency and consequence, where priority 1 related to the most

serious scenario of triggering cause and a priority 15 related to the least serious

scenario of triggering causes. However, to figure the frequency measure of each

triggering causes, the total number of each triggering cause was divided by the

number of total collapses experienced by all bridges. The priority relationships set

before analysis of triggering causes is shown below in Table 5-6.

72
 Frequency of Triggering Events
Consequence Very High (VH) High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) Very Low (VL)
Very Severe (VS) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1, 2 1 1 1
Severe (S) 6, 7, 8, 9 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 2, 3, 6 2, 6 2, 6
Moderate (M) 10, 11, 12 8, 9, 10, 11 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 3, 4, 7, 10 3, 7, 10

73
Light (L) 13, 14 12, 13, 14 11, 12, 13, 14 5, 8, 9, 11, 13 4, 8, 11, 13
Very Light (VL) 15 15 15 12, 14, 15 5, 9, 12, 14, 15

Table 5-5: Priority Relationships for Triggering Causes

 In the enabling cause analysis, the total collapses for each enabling cause

were divided by only the total number of failures for each enabling cause, which is

different in the case of triggering causes. This is because the frequency measure

should be compared to all bridges that experienced failure to determine how

frequent each triggering cause was, because triggering causes are defined to be

external to the bridge. Enabling causes, by their nature, are inherent to the bridge

and should only be compared within each enabling cause and not against the entire

bridge failure dataset collected over the course of study. However, this is not the

case for triggering causes, as the relative frequency of these events should be

normalized through comparison against all other types of failure. To find this

relative frequency of triggering events, for illustrative purposes, the frequency

measure of deterioration was found by dividing the number of total collapses

experienced by deterioration, 7, by the grand total of total collapses experienced by

all bridges over the course of this study, which was 184. The result of that example

would be 7 divided by 184 or approximately 3.80 percent. This frequency measure

was then related to a priority number in the same manner as enabling causes were.

The ranges for priority numbers were exactly the same ranges as used above for

enabling causes and displayed in Table 5-2 above. So, in the example for

deterioration, a frequency measure would correspond to a priority of 15. These

calculations of equating the dataset found in this study to the preset priorities can

be seen below in Table 5-6.

74
 Total Total Failures,
Variable Collapses All Bridges Percent Priority
T1 7 184 3.80 15
T2 93 184 50.54 1
T3 18 184 9.78 10
T4 26 184 14.13 7

Table 5-6: Triggering Cause Priorities

Using the preset priority relationships between triggering cause frequency

and consequence in Table 5-5 above, the relationships between frequency and

consequence could then be found using the data collected over the course of this

study. The relationships between consequence and frequency, derived from the

frequency measures and preset priority relationships is shown below in Table 5-7.

As mentioned earlier, T1, T2, T3, and T4 refer to deterioration, hydraulic - scour or

flood, collision, and overload, respectively.

75
 Frequency of Triggering Events
Consequence Very High (VH) High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) Very Low (VL)
Very Severe (VS) T2, T4 T2 T2 T2 T2
Severe (S) T4 T4
Moderate (M) T3 T3 T3, T4 T3, T4 T3, T4
Light (L)

76
Very Light (VL) T1 T1 T1 T1 T1
* Where T1 = Deterioration, T2 = Hydraulic - Scour or Flood, T3 = Collision, T4 = Overload

Table 5-7: Triggering Causes and Consequence Relationships

 The relationships between performance to consequence and frequency to

consequence help fully describe the structural stability and susceptibility to failure

of a bridge structure. Using fuzzy logic to analyze the relationships developed

allow for subjective assessments of bridges to become objective (Hadipriono 1985:

pp. 47-51).

5.4 Fuzzy Sets

In Section 5.3, relationships between performance and consequence as well

as frequency and consequence were set based on data collected for bridge failures

in the United States from the years 2000 to 2012. Four enabling causes and four

triggering causes were analyzed based on five linguistic variables; fuzzy sets allow

for the subjective linguistic variables to become objective based on the dataset

collected in this study. The fuzzy sets created based on the relationships developed

earlier and are displayed in Tables 5-8, where performance, frequency, and

consequence are all related. The values for poor, fair, and good were all set

subjectively based on the triggering/consequence and performance/consequence

relationship tables above. The value after the delimeter represents the numerical

fuzzy value of performance and the first value represented the degree of certainty,

which was subjectively found by the number of enabling and triggering variables in

each location.

77
 Fuzzy Set
Performance Frequency Consequence Values (f)
Very Severe
Very Poor (VP) Very High (VH) (VS) 1|0, 0.81|0.1, 0.49|0.2
Poor (P) High (H) Severe (S) 1|0, 0.9|0.1, 0.7|0.2
0.5|0.3, 0.4|0.4, 0.3|0.5,
Fair (F) Medium (M) Moderate (M)
0.5|0.6, 0.7|0.7
Good (G) Low (L) Light (L) 0.7|0.8, 0.9|0.9, 1|1
Very Good (VG) Very Low (VL) Very Light (VL) 0.81|0.8, 0.81|0.9, 1|1

Table 5-8: Fuzzy Membership Set Functions

For illustration purposes in reading the above table, take the case where the

bridge’s structural performance can be rated as “poor”. This would be represented

as Poor = [fp (x) = 1.0 | x = 0.0, fp (x) = 0.9 | x = 0.1, fp (x) = 0.7 | x = 0.2], where the

symbol “|” represents the delimeter. The universe of discourse for performance

level is all ratings of the bridge structure’s performance (i.e. all linguistic variables

for performance), and “poor” is a subset of the universe of discourse, such that x ϵ

X, where 0 < x < 1.0 is the performance level. A performance level, x, of 0 would

represent a total collapse (i.e. complete loss of structural stability) and a

performance level, x, of 1.0 would represent complete structural integrity of a

bridge. The corresponding membership values, fp (x), represent the degree of belief

for which that performance level was assigned. Where the linguistic variables

include the term “very”, such as the case of “very poor” to describe the structural

performance, the membership values were assigned by using f very poor (x) = [f poor

(x)]2. The other universe of discourse exists for frequency of triggering causes, so a

78
fuzzy relation is required to correlate performance and frequency (Hadipriono

1985: pp. 47-52).

5.5 Fuzzy Relation

Because the enabling causes and triggering causes exist in two separate

universes of discourse, a fuzzy relation is required in order to create relationship

which satisfies both. This relation involves associating the enabling-consequence

relationship to the triggering-consequence relationship, which displays the

consequence related to the degree of certainty, Ft(x). The fuzzy relation which

equates all enabling events to the consequence was found using Equation 1, where

the performance is denoted as “poor” and the consequence is “severe”, and could

be applied to all Ei where E denotes the enabling cause and i=1,2,3,4 as well as all

Ti, where T denotes triggering causes.

𝑓𝑅𝐸1 = 𝑓𝑆 𝑥 𝑃 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗 ) = ʌ [𝑓𝑃 (𝑥𝑖 ), 𝑓𝑆 (𝑦𝑗 )] [1]

The symbol “ʌ”, shown above in Equation 1, means to take the conjunction in the

above operation, which is displayed with the symbol “∩” in classic set theory. To

relate all enabling causes, REi, Equation 2 is employed, which is to find the

disjunction of all enabling causes. The symbol used to represent the disjunction in

Equation 2 is shown as the symbol “V” (Hadipriono 1985: pp.52-53).

𝑓𝑅𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗 ) = 𝑉 [𝑓𝑅𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗) ] [2]

79
where i = 1,2,3,4 and j = 1,2,3,4. Equation 2 applies to both enabling causes as well

as triggering causes to find the relation among all given triggering causes to

consequence, and the membership values in Table 5-1 are also used to find the

degree of certainty for each value of consequence on the spectrum, from 0

(consequence of very severe) to 1 (consequence of very light). Finally, in order to

associate triggering causes and enabling causes together in relation to consequence,

Equation 3 is used, shown below (Hadipriono 1985: pp. 52-53).

𝑓𝑅𝑇 𝑥 𝑅𝐸 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑘 ) = 𝑉 [[𝑓𝑅𝑇 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘 )] ʌ [𝑓𝑅𝐸 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘 ]] [3]

Equation 3 represents the disjunction of the conjunctions for all triggering and

enabling causes; in other words, the conjunction was found for all enabling and

triggering causes, and then the disjunction was employed for all triggering and all

enabling causes. From Equation 1, RT is a member of the set Z x Y and RE is a

member of the set Y x X; therefore, a fuzzy relation was needed as the RT and RE

are not in the same space. RT and RE are related in the same space of X x Y x Z

and were able to be related using fuzzy logic analysis. Finally, to relate all

consequence and degrees of certainty into one membership function, fTx, Equation 4

is used, which is to take the projection of the entire performance-frequency space

and displays the overall bridge performance in relation to consequence and degree

of certainty.

𝑓𝑇𝑥 (𝑥𝑖 ) = 𝑉 𝑓𝑅𝑇 𝑥 𝑅𝐸 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑘 ) [4]

80
Equation 4 takes the disjunction for all performance values in the entire space and

equates them into one single function, where the consequence is given as a range

from 0 (very severe) to 1 (very light) and the degree of certainty for each value on

the spectrum of consequence values. A degree of certainty of 1 is absolutely

positive and a degree of certainty value of 0 is absolutely negative (Hadipriono

1985: pp.52-56).

5.6 Fuzzy Logic Analysis Computer Program Model

To display the fuzzy logic analysis data and create a dynamic model of this

analysis, a computer program was developed to model the data and fuzzy logic

using the computer programming language C#, using the program Microsoft Visual

C# 2010 to build the model. The model can be used to assess the structural

consequences should numerous enabling and triggering causes be apparent. This

software allows for an intuitive and user-friendly interface to be employed, where

data fields for the end user and restrictive enough to be easily understood. The

program displays eight different screens on the interface, where each is its own

separate screen: a welcome screen, a screen displaying all membership values

displayed in Table 5-9, enabling-consequence relationships, triggering-consequence

relationships, enabling-consequence fuzzy logic analysis matrix, triggering-

consequence analysis matrix, total fuzzy matrix, and the total membership function

displayed in graph format. The program allows the end user to select any one of the

five linguistic variable for each enabling and triggering cause, and then processes

all of these inputs to create a fuzzy matrix for enabling causes, triggering causes,
81
enabling and triggering (total), and then relates these two types of causes into a

total consequence matrix and outputs this relationship in graphical form. All

analysis performed is supported by bridge data collected in this study and analyzed

using the same method as shown in Sections 5.3 through 5.6 above. This tool is

intended to be diagnostic as opposed to prognostic, as it would have to carry the

assumption that specific bridges behave with the same characteristics as the bridge

failures observed in this study.

When starting the bridge failure fuzzy logic analysis program, a welcome

screen is displayed, as shown below in Figure 5-3. Screens can be toggled through

using the tabs at the top of the program interface. Clicking over to the next adjacent

tab, labeled as ‘Membership Functions’, displays the membership values used in

the fuzzy logic analysis. This table is the same table shown above as Table 5-9. The

next tab, ‘Enabling Knowledge Base’, displays the relationships between each

enabling cause to the corresponding consequence. This screen also allows the user

to input the performance assignments to each enabling cause by selecting one of the

five linguistic variables for each enabling cause. Each enabling cause must be

selected. Similar to the enabling knowledge base tab, the triggering knowledge base

tab displays the relationships between triggering cause frequencies and

consequences. This screen also allows users to select the frequency for each

triggering cause using a drop-down menu next to each triggering cause. Clicking

the ‘run’ button on the right of the screen compiles all selected enabling and

triggering causes and computes fuzzy set relationships and analysis in the

82
subsequent screens. The enabling fuzzy matrix screen displays the fuzzy matrix for

all enabling causes selected, and uses Equation 1 and the membership values in

Table 5-8 to complete the matrix. As was the case for the enabling fuzzy matrix,

the triggering fuzzy matrix compiles all selected triggering cause frequencies into

the triggering fuzzy matrix, using Equation 1 and the membership values above.

The total fuzzy matrix screen compute the fuzzy relationship between triggering

causes and enabling causes to create one fuzzy matrix, using Equation 3 and the

fuzzy matrices created in the enabling fuzzy matrix and triggering fuzzy matrix.

The bottom of this screens shows Tx, which is the total fuzzy relation using

Equation 4. Finally, the graph tab displays the Tx function in graphical form.

To illustrate how the program works, the program was run with pre-selected

values for all enabling and triggering causes. When started, the program displays a

welcome screen, as shown below in figure 5-3.

83
84
Figure 5- 3: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Welcome Screen
 The subsequent screen displays all membership values which will be used

to build the enabling and triggering cause matrices. These membership functions

and values shown match those used throughout this study when discussing the

fuzzy logic model, as shown in Table 5-3. These values represent the consequences

numerically, from 0 to 1 where a value of 1 represents an absolutely severe

consequence, and the degree of certainty for each of these numerical consequence

values derived from the findings of this study.

Following the membership function screen, the user is allowed to select one

linguistic value for each enabling cause: “Very Poor (VP)”, “Poor (P)”, “Fair (F)”,

“Good (G)” and “Very Good (VG)”. In this example, E1 was selected to be “Poor

(P)”, E2 was “Very Poor (VP)”, E3 was “Good (G)”, and E4 was “Fair (F)”. The

values selected were for example only. The enabling knowledge base screen is

shown below in Figure 5-6. When used by the end user, hypothetical assessments

of these enabling causes would be replaced with the assessments of a competent

engineer assessing the damage and structural stability of a bridge. Consequences

for an inputted enabling cause is derived from the table as shown in the same

screen. Pressing the ‘DISPLAY ENABLING CAUSE DATA’ button on the screen

displays the same graph as shown in Figure 5-1.

85
86
Figure 5- 4: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Membership Sets
87
Figure 5- 5: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Enabling Causes User Interface
 The following screen, the triggering knowledge base, allows the user to

select the frequency of each triggering cause using one of the five linguistic

variables: “Very Rarely (VR)”, “Rarely (R)”, “Average (A)”, “Often (O)” and

“Very Often (VO)”. In this example, T1 was selected to be “Often (O)”, T2 was

selected as “Rarely (R)”, T3 was selected to be “Very Rarely (VR)” and T4 was

selected to be “Average (A)”. The linguistic variables selected were for example

only, and displayed in Figure 5-7 below. Pressing the ‘DISPLAY TRIGGERING

CAUSE DATA’ button displays the same graph as shown in Figure 5-2.

In this screen, selecting the ‘run’ button fills in values for the consequences

as well as all matrices based on the linguistic variables selected. Figures 5-8 and 5-

9 display the consequences displayed based on the linguistic variables selected, for

both enabling and triggering causes, respectively. The consequences are found

using the tables in the respective triggering and enabling causes knowledge base

tabs. Selecting this button also populates all fields for the proceeding screens as

well in the program.

88
89
Figure 5- 6: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Triggering Causes User Interface
90
Figure 5- 7: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Enabling Causes Solutions
91
Figure 5- 8: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Triggering Causes Solutions
 Based on the linguistic variables selected, the enabling fuzzy matrix is

populated with values using the membership values set, using Equation 1. In this

example, the four enabling cause consequences were first related back to their

corresponding membership values. So, for E1, an enabling cause of “poor” was

chosen, which returned a consequence of “very severe”. Using Table 5-2, the

matrix of 0, 1; 0.1, 0.81, and 0.2, 0.49 was generated, along with the other three

matrices. The maximum of these four matrices were found to produce the matrix as

shown in Figure 5-9 below.

Similarly, the triggering fuzzy matrix was set using Equation 1 and the

membership values already set to populate values within, as shown below in Figure

5-10. Fuzzy membership values were found to produce matrices for each of the

triggering causes, and the maximum of each of these matrices was found to

produce the matrix shown in Figure 5-10. The maximum values were found from

each smaller matrix as produced by each of the triggering values selected by the

end user.

92
93
Figure 5- 9: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Set Matrix, Enabling Causes
94
Figure 5- 10: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Set Matrix, Triggering Causes
 Using Equation 2, the total matrix was found based on the enabling and

triggering fuzzy matrices created and shown above in Figures 5-9 and 5-10. The

minimum of the enabling and triggering matrices were found to produce the matrix

as shown below in Figure 5-11. This also produced the matrix for Tx, by taking the

minimum for each column in the frequency-performance matrix.

Finally, a graph was displayed on the final screen of the program to

graphically display the findings from the linguistic values selected. Because values

were selected that resulted in consequences from very severe to very light, a graph

was produced that varied and could not give a definitive answer as to the

consequence which could be expected, as shown below in Figure 5-12.

95
96
Figure 5- 11: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Set Matrix, Total Fuzzy Matrix
97
Figure 5- 12: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Set Matrix, Fuzzy Set Graph
 The X-axis displays values from 0 to 1, where 0 represents a consequence

of very severe and 1 represents a consequence of very light. Values in between

represent the spectrum of consequences between very severe and very light. The Y-

axis, labeled as Ftx, represents the degree of certainty of these corresponding

consequences, where 0 is uncertain and 1 is certain. Along the right side of the

graph tab, the centroid for the area under the graph is found, labeled as the

‘consequence value’ (or the x-value of the centroid) and the ‘degree’ of belief (or

the y-value of this shape on the graph). These two values are an average for the

graph and allow for further defuzzification. In this case, a consequence value of

0.35 is returned along with a degree of certainty of 0.33.

The worst-case scenario for a bridge’s structural stability would be where

all linguistic variables for enabling causes would be selected to be “Very Poor

(VP)” and the linguistic variables selected for triggering causes would be “Very

Often (VO)”. This case was ran and the graph of such case is displayed below in

Figure 5-13.

The best-case scenario for a bridge’s structural stability would be where all

linguistic variables for enabling causes would be selected to be “Very Good (VG)”

and the linguistic variables selected for triggering causes would be “Very Rarely

(VR)”. This case was run and the graph of such case is displayed in Figure 5-14.

98
99
Figure 5- 13: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Set Matrix, Fuzzy Graph - Very Poor Case
100
Figure 5- 14: Analysis of Bridge Performance Program Fuzzy Set Matrix, Fuzzy Set Graph - Very
Good Case
5.7 Conclusions

After collecting bridge failure data over the 13 year timeframe study and

compiling it into a comprehensive database, results were produced and modeled

using fuzzy logic methodology to deduce critical points and vulnerability of

America’s bridge structures. Using the database compiled over the course of the

study, relationships between enabling/consequence and frequency/consequence

were developed for each of the enabling and triggering causes, respectively. Fuzzy

logic allowed for consequence of bridge performance to be measured on a

continuous scale from very severe to very light, as well as to analyze areas

anywhere in between, creating an environment where bridge inspections could be

analyzed using an unbiased comparison on the same playing field, in a sense. This

methodology was then applied using Microsoft Visual C# 2010 computing

software to develop a user-friendly interface which could be used to comprehend

user inputs regarding the most common and devastating enabling and triggering

causes of bridge failures identified in the study. The computer program model

developed allows users to identify the condition and frequency of enabling and

triggering causes, produces implied consequences, and develops a fuzzy set

analysis to depict the severity of these causes, both graphically and mathematically

in matrix form. All inferences of the model were based solely on the data collected

over the course of this study, using actual events of bridge failure to assume future

causes of bridge failure.

101
 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Summary and Conclusions

Bridge failure and crippling infrastructure proves to be a huge problem in

terms of its devastating impact on commerce, economic growth, logistics, and, of

highest importance, casualties. In fact, the American Society of Civil Engineers

(ASCE) rated America’s bridges a C+ in terms of conditions and capacity, on an A

to F grading scale. Whenever a bridge fails, millions of dollars, time, and man

hours are spent investigating the cause of failure, clearing the site of failed bridge

components, redesigning and rebuilding the bridge, and opening the new bridge to

traffic. Due to insufficient funds to create a bridge network which would satisfy the

ASCE’s rating and create a situation where bridge failures were nearly unheard of

events, maintaining existing bridge structures and designing low-maintenance

structures needs to become a priority in terms of America’s expenses. Ignoring the

need to build resilient bridges and increase the knowledge base of bridge inspectors

and engineers is simply not an option, as the risks are far too great. This was

proven true in the Kinzua Viaduct bridge failure, the I-35W bridge failure in

Minnesota, Lake View Drive bridge failure, and the Paseo Suspension bridge

failure, of which all were examined at length from forensic analysis reporting. All

102
of these bridge failures occurred during the years 2000 to 2012 and, although

similar studies have been conducted in the past, prove a need to update the

information bridge engineers have as to what makes bridges fail, and, more

importantly, how they can be stopped, predicted, or the consequences mitigated.

For these reasons, the need to update the information on bridge failures was proven

to be evident, as the most recent study of this nature was conducted over the years

1989 to 2000.

To build a comprehensive database which could be used to identify critical

areas where bridge failures were shown to be above average, data of bridge failures

observing their location, year built, year failed, type of structural material used,

type of bridge and cause of failure were compiled from a study conducted by the

New York State Department of Transportation, bridge failure forensic reports, and

journal entries for bridges which had failed in the United States between the years

2000 to 2012. Similarly, another database was compiled which listed every bridge

standing in the United States in the year 2012 in order to make comparisons

between the types and materials of bridges which had experienced failure. Tables

and charts were built to compare the results graphically and numerically. When

failures were compiled by year, it was shown that the year 2005 produced the most

failures than any other single year between 2000 and 2012, of which was also

found to have had the most storm activity that any other single year in that

timeframe. To expand on that finding, hydraulic failures, primarily scour and

flooding, were found to be the most common cause of failure than any other single

103
type – almost double the next most common cause. Of all the types of bridges

found to experience failure, the suspension bridge was found to be the most

susceptible to failure, when analyzed by percentage. This percentage of bridge

failure was found by dividing the number of failed suspension bridges by the

number of standing and failed suspension bridges. However, when analyzed by

material, it was found that bridges made of stone were most likely to experience

failure, which could be due to the fact that, typically, stone bridges are much older

than their steel or concrete counterparts. The state of New York was found to have

had the most bridges fail in the timeframe studied as well. Finally, it was also found

that the average age of a bridge at failure, during the timeframe studied was around

57 years, which was about six years greater than the average age found during the

Wardhana study (Wardhana and Hadipriono 2003: pp. 147).

After analyzing the failure data collected during this study, a translational

model was built using fuzzy logic and programed using C# to apply patterns found

in the study to potential and future bridge failures. This model accounted for the

major enabling and triggering causes found in this study, and allowed users to input

the severity and frequency of these enabling and triggering causes, respectively.

Using subjective interpretations on the relationships between enabling causes and

failure consequence, and triggering causes and failure consequences, the inputs

from the model could be analyzed to determine the likelihood and consequence of a

bridge failure occurrence.

104
6.2 Recommendation

Using the data collected and model developed from this study, it is the

author’s opinion that better, more cost-effective techniques and equipment are

necessary for more thorough bridge inspections and more cost-effective repairs to

existing infrastructure. Many bridge catastrophes were a result of ineffective

maintenance and inspections. By creating more cost-effective methods of repair

and inspection, bridges would then be able to receive the proper treatment that they

would require in order to maintain complete structural integrity.

Furthermore, many bridges also collapsed as a result of hydraulic events –

both flooding and scouring. The author believes that more research would be

desirable to create a means by which hydraulic damage to bridges and substructures

could be mitigated more efficiently. Decreasing the damage to bridges as a result of

flooding and scouring would ensure safer, more structurally stable bridges.

6.3 Continuing Studies

The scope of this study was limited to the collection and reporting on bridge

failures between 2000 and 2012; certainly as time passes, a similar study would be

necessary to compile and report on bridge failures beyond the year 2012. Also, the

scope of this study did not account for whether or not a bridge should have failed. It

would be interesting to study the load ratings and designs of these bridges to

determine whether or not the bridges in the study should have failed based on

applied loads and the load ratings of each bridge.

105
 REFERENCES
[1] "2013 Report Card for America's Infrastructure." 2013 Report Card for
America's Infrastructure. American Society of Civil Engineers. Web. 13 Dec.
2013.

[2] Borello, D., Bassem, A., Hajjar, J., Olson, S., Hansen J., and Buenker, J.
Forensic Collapse Investigation of a Concrete Bridge with Timber Pier. Rep.
Springfield, IL: Illinois Department of Transportation, 2009. Print.

[3] Collapse of I-35W Highway Bridge Minneapolis, Minnesota August 1, 2007.

New York City: National Transportation Safety Board, 2008. Print.

[4] Chen, G., Courtright, C., Dharani, R., and Xu B. Failure Investigation of the
Steel Strut on the Paseo Suspension Bridge. Rep. Jefferson City, MO: Missouri
Department of Transportation, 2005. Print.

[5] Harries, K. "Structural Testing of Prestressed Concrete Girders from the Lake
View Drive Bridge." Journal of Bridge Engineering (2009): 78-92. Web.

[6] Leech, Thomas, Jonathan McHugh, and George Dicantonio. "Lessons From the
Kinzua." Civil Engineer (2005): 57-61. Web.

[7] "National Bridge Inventory." National Bridge Inventory Database Search.

FHWA. Web. 15 Dec. 2013.

106
[8] Sause, R., Hodgson, I., Pessiki. S., and Macioce, T.. Forensic Examination of a
Noncomposite Adjacent Precast Prestressed Concrete Box Beam Bridge. Rep.:
American Society of Civil Engineers, 2010. Print.

[9] Sharma, S., and Mohan, S.. Status of Bridge Failures in the United States
(1800-2009) (2011): Web.

[10] New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) Bridge Failure

Database, 2012

[11] Hadipriono, F. C. "Assessment of Falsework Performance Using Fuzzy Set

Concepts." Structural Safety 47-57 3 (1985): 47-57. Print.

[12] Wardhana, K., and Hadipriono, F.C. PE, F.ASCE. "Analysis of Recent Bridge
Failures in the United States." Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities
(2003): 144-50. Print.

[13] FHWA, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/, 2012

[14] American Society of Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO),

www.transportation.org, 2012.

[15] Bridge Inventory Manual. New York, NY: New York Department of
Transportation, 2006. Print.

[16] Chavel, Brandon W., and Yadlosky, J.M.. Framework for Improving
Resilience of Bridge Design. Tech. no. FHWA-IF-11-016. Washington, DC: Office
of Bridge Technology, Federal Highway Administration, 2011. Print.

107
[17] United States of America. Federal Highway Administration. Hydraulic
Engineering. Bridge Scour and Stream Instability Countermeasures: Experience,
Selection, and Design Guidance. FHWA, Sept. 2009. Web.
<http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/engineering/hydraulics/pubs/09111/page00.cfm>.

[18] Atlantic Oceanographic & Meteorological Laboratory. N.p., n.d. Web.

<http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/E11.html>.

[18] "Disaster Declarations by Year." Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA). Web. 13 Dec. 2013.

[19] Kinzua Bridge Foundation, Inc.,

http://www.kinzuabridgefoundation.com/home.html, 2013

[20] Naito et al. "Forensic Examination of a Noncomposite Adjacent Precast

Prestressed Concrete Box Girder Bridge" Journal of Bridge Engineering (2010):
408-17. Print.

All figures, table, and photos not developed by the author of this thesis used with
permission.

108
 APPENDIX A – FIGURES CREATED BY AUTHOR

Failure By State
80
70
60
Occurences

50
40
30
20
10
0
LA

TN

VA
OH
OR
PA

TX

VT
WA
OK
HI

RI

WI
CT

IA
ID
IN
CA

IL
KY
CO
DC

MA

MN
MD
ME
MI

UT
GA

MO
MS
AL
AR
AZ

ND
NE
NJ
NM
NY
FL

NC

SC
State

Failure By Cause
90
80
70
Occurences

60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Cause of Failure

109
 Bridge Failures by Year
80
70
60
Occurences

50
40
30
20
10
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year

110
111
112
 Major Emergencies Declared by FEMA by Year
120

100
Major Emergencies

80

60

40

20

0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year

113
 Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Hydraulic - Flood 2 5 1 5 2 8 4 7 7 1 1 21 1
Hydraulic - Scour 0 3 3 5 6 20 4 7 10 0 0 17 1
Hurricane 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Overload 5 6 3 4 5 5 2 5 3 0 0 1 2
Collision 11 7 5 4 3 7 0 5 1 0 1 1 1
Construction 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0
Maintenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Fire 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0
Misc - Bearings 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Deterioration 2 2 1 4 4 2 4 4 1 0 0 0 0

114
Steel - gusset plates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Steel - Fatigue 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nature - Wind 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Earthquake 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Foundation 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Concrete - Corrosion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
115
 Bridge Failures By Collapse Type
200
180
160
140
Occurrences

120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Total Collapse Partial Collapse

Percent of Bridges Failed, By Material

0.25

0.2
Percent (%)

0.15

0.1

0.05

0
Concrete Steel Stone Wood
Material

116
 Percent of Bridges Failed, By Bridge Type
4
3.5
3
Percent (%)

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

Bridge Type

Failures By Material
250

200
Occurances

150

100

50

0
Concrete Steel Stone Wood
Material

117
Symbol Enabling Cause
E1 Design Issues
E2 Construction Issues
E3 Maintenance Issues
E4 Material Issues

Symbol Triggering Cause

T1 Deterioration
T2 Hydraulic - Scour or Flood
T3 Collision
T4 Overload

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 Bridge Performance
Consequence Very Poor (VP) Poor (P) Fair (F) Good (G) Very Good (VG)
Very Severe (VS) E1, E2, E3,E4 E1, E2, E3 E3 E3 E3
Severe (S) E4 E1, E2, E4 E1, E2 E1, E2

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Moderate (M) E4
Light (L) E4
Very Light (VL)
* Where E1 = Design Issues, E2 = Construction Issues, E3 = Maintenance Issues, E4 = Material Issues
 Frequency of Triggering Events
Consequence Very High (VH) High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) Very Low (VL)
Very Severe (VS) T2, T4 T2 T2 T2 T2
Severe (S) T4 T4
Moderate (M) T3 T3 T3, T4 T3, T4 T3, T4
Light (L)
Very Light (VL) T1 T1 T1 T1 T1
* Where T1 = Deterioration, T2 = Hydraulic - Scour or Flood, T3 = Collision, T4 = Overload

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Fuzzy Set
Performance Frequency Consequence Values (f)
Very Severe
Very Poor (VP) Very High (VH) (VS) 1|0, 0.81|0.1, 0.49|0.2
Poor (P) High (H) Severe (S) 1|0, 0.9|0.1, 0.7|0.2
0.5|0.3, 0.4|0.4, 0.3|0.5,
Fair (F) Medium (M) Moderate (M) 0.5|0.6, 0.7|0.7
Good (G) Low (L) Light (L) 0.7|0.8, 0.9|0.9, 1|1
Very Good (VG) Very Low (VL) Very Light (VL) 0.81|0.8, 0.81|0.9, 1|1

Enabling Cause Occurences

18
16
14
12
Occurrances

10
Partial Collapse
8
6 Total Collapse

4
2
0
Design Issues Construction Maintenance Material
Issues Issues Issues

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 Triggering Event Occurences
100
90
80
70
Occurrences

60
50 Partial Collapse
40
Total Collapse
30
20
10
0
Deterioration Hydraulic - Collision Overload
Scour or Flood

Number of Bridge
Failures, 2000 to
Failure by State 2012
AL 5
AR 19
AZ 1
CA 5
CO 2
CT 3
DC 1
FL 6
GA 1
HI 1
IA 13
ID 1
IL 1
IN 2
KY 2
LA 31
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MA 1
MD 2
ME 5
MI 1
MN 3
MO 56
MS 20
NC 2
ND 1
NE 1
NJ 12
NM 10
NY 74
OH 1
OK 1
OR 7
PA 4
RI 1
SC 2
TN 11
TX 3
UT 1
VA 16
VT 1
WA 9
WI 1

Number of
Year Bridge Failures
2000 28
2001 28

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2002 21
2003 29
2004 32
2005 70
2006 16
2007 35
2008 26
2009 4
2010 5
2011 40
2012 6

Number of Total Partial

Type of Failure Bridge Failures Collapse Collapse
Hydraulic - Flood 71 47 24
Hydraulic - Scour 82 46 31
Overload 41 26 12
Collision 50 18 32
Construction 13 5 8
Maintenance 1 0 1
Fire 10 6 3
Miscellaneous 11 4 4
Misc. - Bearings 2 1 1
Deterioration 25 7 17
Steel - gusset plates 1 1 0
Steel - Fatigue 1 0 1
Nature - Wind 5 3 0
Earthquake 1 1 0

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Foundation 2 0 2
Concrete - Corrosion 1 1 0

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 Bridge Performance
Consequence Very High (VH) High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) Very Low (VL)
Very Severe (VS) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1, 2 1 1 1
Severe (S) 6, 7, 8, 9 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 2, 3, 6 2, 6 2, 6
Moderate (M) 10, 11, 12 8, 9, 10, 11 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 3, 4, 7, 10 3, 7, 10

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Light (L) 13, 14 12, 13, 14 11, 12, 13, 14 5, 8, 9, 11, 13 4, 8, 11, 13
Very Light (VL) 15 15 15 12, 14, 15 5, 9, 12, 14, 15
 Frequency of Triggering Events
Consequence Very High (VH) High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) Very Low (VL)
Very Severe (VS) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1, 2 1 1 1
Severe (S) 6, 7, 8, 9 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 2, 3, 6 2, 6 2, 6

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Moderate (M) 10, 11, 12 8, 9, 10, 11 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 3, 4, 7, 10 3, 7, 10
Light (L) 13, 14 12, 13, 14 11, 12, 13, 14 5, 8, 9, 11, 13 4, 8, 11, 13
Very Light (VL) 15 15 15 12, 14, 15 5, 9, 12, 14, 15
Priority Percentage Range

15 0.00 to 6.67
14 6.67 to 7.14
13 7.14 to 7.69
12 7.69 to 8.33
11 8.33 to 9.09
10 9.09 to 10.00
9 10.00 to 11.11
8 11.11 to 12.50
7 12.50 to 14.29
6 14.29 to 16.67
5 16.67 to 20.00
4 20.00 to 25.00
3 25.00 to 33.33
2 33.33 to 50.00
1 50.00 to 100.00

Total
Total Collapse/Total
Variable Collapses Total Failures Failure Priority
E1 6 13 46.15 2
E2 5 13 38.46 2
E3 0 2 0.00 15
E4 8 25 32.00 3

Total Total Failures,

Variable Collapses All Bridges Percent Priority
T1 7 184 3.80 15
T2 93 184 50.54 1
T3 18 184 9.78 10
T4 26 184 14.13 7

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