Valeroso vs People, G.R. No.

164815, 22 February, 2008

Retroactive Effect of Laws on Penal Character

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court Ruling
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, Petitioner
vs.
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, Respondent

FACTS:

On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of kidnapping for
ransom was released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily searched and after
which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was
later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person.

The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched (without a
search warrant) in the boarding house of his children. They pointed their guns on him and tied
him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and
ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the room exclaiming that he has found a
gun inside. The firearm according to the petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a
Memorandum Receipt.

Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally
possessing a revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the necessary
license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit and valid

HELD/DECISION:

Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person who was
arrested lawfully may be searched so that the officer may remove any weapons that the
accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare of the officers and to make
sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed
by the accused. Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on
the person or within the area of his immediate control. Based on the statement of the
petitioner, the petitioner did not resist arrest, He was tied and placed outside the room where
the gun was found; therefore the room where the gun was found could not be “in his
immediate control.” Incidental searches without a warrant states that officers are permitted to
seize any weapon that they can inadvertently found during the arrest under the “plain view
doctrine.” However, the firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched and
therefore not incidental. Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained is inadmissible to court and
cannot be used against him.

PNB vs Office of the President, G.R. No. 104528, 18 January 1996

Effect of Retroactive Laws of Curative and Remedial in Nature

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court Ruling
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
Philippine National Bank, Petitioner
Office of the President, et.al, Respondent

FACTS:

Private respondents are buyers on installment of subdivision. However, the subdivision

developer mortgaged the lands in favor of the petitioner even though the sale of land was
already executed. Unaware of the foregoing facts, the private respondents continued to comply
with their obligation as buyers. The subdivision developer later on defaulted and PNB
foreclosed on the mortgage and became the owner of the lots. A decision by the HLURB and
OAALA ruled that PNB may collect from private respondents only the remaining amortization
payment and cannot compel them to pay again for the lots they had already bought from the
subdivision developer. The Office of the President affirmed this decision by declaring
Presidential Decree 957*.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Presidential Decree 957 applies to sale of land prior to its enactment

HELD/DECISION:
Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, there shall be no retroactive effect of the law unless the
contrary is provided. PD 957, though implied, intended to include real estate mortgages
executed prior to its enactment and therefore must take effect to protect the innocent
purchasers from swindling and fraudulent manipulations and illegal scheme of subdivision
developers. The court ascertained that they will not follow the letter of the statue if it will not
reflect the intent and purpose of the legislature, which is to uphold social justice and the
protection of human rights. It would also be illogical if PD 957 which seeks to oust the
fraudulent practices would not be applied to existing mortgage contract due to some a
technicality.

*Section 18: Mortgages. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or
developer without prior written approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted
unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of
the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure
such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined
and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at
his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the
payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit
being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly
after full payment thereto;

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., G.R. No. 168129,
24 April 2007

FACTS:
On 1987, CIR issued VAT Ruling No. 231-88 stating that Philhealth, as a provider of medical
services, is exempt from the VAT coverage. When RA 8424 or the new Tax Code was
implemented it adopted the provisions of VAT and E-VAT. On 1999, the BIR sent Philhealth an
assessment notice for deficiency VAT and documentary stamp taxes for taxable years 1996 and
1997. After CIR did not act on it, Philhealth filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA
withdrew the VAT assessment. The CIR then filed an appeal with the CA which was denied.

ISSUES:
Whether Philhealth is subject to VAT.
Whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting Philhealth from payment of VAT has retroactive
application.

RULING:
YES. Section 103 of the NIRC exempts taxpayers engaged in the performance of medical, dental,
hospital, and veterinary services from VAT. But, in Philhealth's letter requesting of its
VAT-exempt status, it was held that it showed Philhealth provides medical service only between
their members and their accredited hospitals, that it only provides for the provision of pre-need
health care services, it contracts the services of medical practitioners and establishments for
their members in the delivery of health services.
Thus, Philhealth does not fall under the exemptions provided in Section 103, but merely
arranges for such, making Philhealth not VAT-exempt. YES. Generally, the NIRC has no
retroactive application except when:
where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any
document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially
different from the facts on which the ruling is based, or
where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.

The Court held that Philhealth acted in good faith. The term health maintenance organization
was first recorded in the Philippine statute books in 1995. It is apparent that when VAT Ruling
No. 231-88 was issued in Philhealth's favor, the term health maintenance organization was
unknown and had no significance for taxation purposes. Philhealth, therefore, believed in good
faith that it was VAT exempt for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 on the basis of VAT Ruling No.
231-88. The rule is that the BIR rulings have no retroactive effect where a grossly unfair deal
would result to the prejudice of the taxpayer.

Consunji v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS: Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and
performing work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of
the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but
without a safety lock.1
Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among
other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal
of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the
death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

HELD: Yes. The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code.
As a general rule a claimant has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action
against the tort fees or for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously. But There is an exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis
of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. The choice
of the first remedy based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice.
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private
respondent was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages using
the police investigation report to support her complaint may just be an afterthought after
receiving a copy of the Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal
complaint for insufficiency of evidence. This court is more inclined to believe appellee’s
allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and received
the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the exception
Payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted
therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Cui vs Arellano University

TITLE: Emetrio Cui v Arellano University
CITATION: GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135

FACTS:
Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its
College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these
years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of
P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos
University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from
Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the
P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without
Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.
On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all
heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the
amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be
subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer
to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students
in a school”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant
provided by Arellano University.

HELD:
The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set
therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question,
asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is
contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the
security of individual rights and hence, null and void.

The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at
the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and
dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.

MECANO vs. COA

G.R. No. 103982
December 11, 1992

FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of which he
incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from
the COA.
In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his expenses
on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC, the pertinent
provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. —
When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or
municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual
physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any
period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months,
and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medical attendance,
necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the
case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line
of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary
hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding petitioner’s
illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of
Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioner’s claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioner’s claim to Director Lim,
having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA to the effect that the RAC being
relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of
then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not
operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the
particular Section 699 of the latter”.
Director Lim transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable
consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner’s claim to the COA Chairman,
recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied petitioner’s claim on the
ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987,
solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the
Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the
Employees’ Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano
occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro to
Director Lim with the advice that petitioner “elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so
desires”.
Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC

HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due
course to petitioner’s claim for benefits
NO
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a
matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein
a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and
portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its
repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed
is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it
was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on
the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book
VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions
thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause?
It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or
acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision.
It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict
must be found in existing and prior acts. This latter situation falls under the category of an
implied repeal.
There are two categories of repeal by implication.
Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict,
the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to
cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old
Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave
law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section
699, and still others.
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent
to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and
procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government
structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of
the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because
the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been
restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication
are not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature
is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes.

NOTES:
1. the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the
Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. The COA
anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code
which incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles and rules of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code — the Administrative Code of
1987. This contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier
statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new
statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a
manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.
2. Regarding COA contention that recovery under this subject section (699) shall bar the
recovery of benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld.
The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees’ Compensation
and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly
provides that “the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits
are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.”

LINGKOD MANGGAGAWA SA RUBBERWORLD v. RUBBERWORLD, GR NO. 153882, 2007-01-29

Facts:
On August 26, 1994, Rubberworld filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
a Notice of Temporary Partial Shutdown due to severe financial crisis, therein announcing the
formal actual company shutdown to take effect on September 26, 1994. A copy of said... notice
was served on the recognized labor union of Rubberworld, the Bisig Pagkakaisa-NAFLU, the
union with which the corporation had a collective bargaining agreement.
On September 1, 1994, Bisig Pagkakaisa-NAFLU staged a strike. It set up a picket line in front of
the premises of Rubberworld and even welded its gate. As a result, Rubberworld's premises
closed prematurely even before the date set for the start of its temporary... partial shutdown.
On September 9, 1994, herein petitioner union, the Lingkod Manggagawa Sa Rubberworld,
Adidas-Anglo (Lingkod, for brevity), represented by its President, Sonia Esperanza, filed a
complaint against Rubberworld and its Vice Chairperson, Mr. Antonio Yang, for unfair... labor
practice (ULP), illegal shutdown, and non-payment of salaries and separation pay. In its
complaint... petitioner union alleged that it had filed a petition for certification... election
during the freedom period, which petition was granted by the DOLE Regional Director. In the
same complaint, petitioner union claimed that the strike staged by Bisig Pagkakaisa-NAFLU was
company-instigated/supported.
On November 22, 1994
Rubberworld filed with the SEC a Petition for Declaration of a State of Suspension of Payments
with Proposed Rehabilitation Plan. The petition... was granted by the SEC... in its Order[3] dated
December 28, 1994, to wit:
Accordingly, with the creation of the Management Committee, all actions for claims against
Rubberworld Philippines, Inc. pending before any court, tribunal, office, board, body,
Commission or sheriff are hereby deemed SUSPENDED.
Notwithstanding the SEC's aforementioned suspension order and despite Rubberworld's
submission on January 10, 1995 of a Motion to Suspend Proceedings,[4] Labor Arbiter Dinopol
went ahead with the ULP case and rendered his decision[5] thereon on August 16, 1995,... thus:
denying respondents motion to suspend proceedings;
declaring respondent Rubberworld Phils., Inc. to have committed unfair labor practice;
ordering respondent Rubberworld Phils., Inc. to reinstate complainant-Union's members
ordering respondent Rubberworld Phils., Inc. to pay the members of the complainant-Union
their backwages
On September 21, 1995, Rubberworld went on appeal to the NLRC, posting therefor a
temporary appeal bond in the amount of P500,000.00 as tentatively fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
Meanwhile, on October 10, 1995, Ricardo Atienza of the NLRC's Research and Information Unit
submitted... his report on the computation of the monetary awards, as ordered by the Labor
Arbiter. He came out with the total amount of Twenty Seven Million Five Hundred Six Thousand
and Two Hundred Fifty-Five Pesos and 70/100 (P27,506,255.70). Despite Rubberworld's
vigorous opposition, the
First Division of the NLRC, in its Order[6] of January 22, 1996, required the corporation to post
an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to Mr. Atienza's computation, with a warning that
failure to do so shall result in the... dismissal of its appeal for non-perfection... on account of
Rubberworld's failure to upgrade or complete its appeal bond as indicated in the NLRC's
January 22, 1996 Order, the Commission, in a decision[9] dated June 28, 1996, did dismiss
Rubberworld's appeal. Owing to this development,... Rubberworld filed with the Court a
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari,[10] therein incorporating its challenge to the said
dismissal order of the NLRC, contending that the labor tribunal acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
On April 22, 1998, the SEC issued an Order[11] declaring Rubberworld as dissolved and lifting its
earlier suspension order
On August 18, 1995, a writ of execution[12] was issued by the NLRC in favor of the petitioner
union with a copy thereof served on the respondent corporation.
On February 8, 1999, Rubberworld filed with the Court a Motion to Admit its Amended Petition
for Certiorari[13] and its Supplement,[14] alleging therein that pursuant to the SEC Order dated
December 28, 1994,... supra, the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter should have been
suspended. Hence, since the Labor Arbiter disregarded the SEC's suspension order, the
subsequent proceedings before it were null and void.
Consistent with its ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC,[15] the Court, in its Resolution of
February 29, 1999, referred Rubberworld's amended petition for certiorari and its supplement
to the CA for appropriate action... the CA, in its Resolution[16] of May 11, 2000, over the
vehement opposition of the petitioner union, resolved to admit Rubberworld's aforementioned
amended petition and the supplement thereto "in the interest of justice."
Eventually, in the herein assailed Decision[17] dated January 18, 2002, the CA granted
Rubberworld's petition in CA G.R. SP. No. 53356 on the finding that the Labor Arbiter had
indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded with... the ULP case despite the
SEC's suspension order of December 28, 1994, and accordingly declared the proceedings before
it, including the subsequent orders by the NLRC dismissing Rubberworld's appeal and the writ
of execution, null and void.

Issues:
Whether the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
an excess in the exercise thereof when it gave due course to the petition filed by Rubberworld
(Phils.), Inc. and annulled and set aside the decisions rendered by the labor... arbiter a quo and
the NLRC, when the said decisions had become final and executory warranting the outright
dismissal of the aforesaid petition;
Whether the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion and reversible error when it applied
Section 5(d) and Section 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, to the case at bar;
Whether the CA had committed reversible error when it adopted and applied the rulings in the
cases of Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc., or Julie Yap Ong v. NLRC, Marilyn F. Arellano, et. al.[19] and
Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. and Julie Y.
Ong v. NLRC, Aquino Magsalin, et. al.[20] to the case at bar.

Ruling:
Given the factual milieu obtaining in this case, it cannot be said that the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, or the decision/dismissal order and writ of execution issued by the NLRC, could ever
attain final and executory status. The Labor Arbiter completely disregarded and... violated
Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended, which categorically mandates the
suspension of all actions for claims against a corporation placed under a management
committee by the SEC. Thus, the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the order and writ...
subsequently issued by the NLRC are all null and void for having been undertaken or issued in
violation of the SEC suspension Order dated December 28, 1994. As such, the Labor Arbiter's
decision, including the dismissal by the NLRC of Rubberworl's appeal, could not have achieved...
a final and executory status.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the issue of applicability in labor cases of the aforequoted
provisions of PD 902-A, as amended, had already been resolved by this Court in its earlier
decisions in Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc., or Julie Yap Ong v. NLRC, Marilyn F. Arellano, et.
al.[27] and Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. and Julie Y. Ong v. NLRC, Aquino, Magsalin, et. al,[28]
supra.
In the first Rubberworld case, the Court upheld the applicability of PD 902-A to labor cases
pursuant to Section 5(d) and Section 6(c) thereof
The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a
rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions "shall be suspended accordingly." No exception in
favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. Since the law... makes no distinction or
exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
In Chua v. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that labor claims cannot proceed
independently of a bankruptcy liquidation proceeding, since these claims "would spawn
needless controversy, delays, and confusion."[31] With more... reason, allowing labor claims to
continue in spite of a SEC suspension order in a rehabilitation case would merely lead to such
results.

TAN CHONG vs SECRETARY OF LABOR

JOSE TAN CHONG, petitioner-appellee
SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondent-appellant
G.R. No. 47616. October 15, 1941. EN BANC.

FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Tan Chong, was born in San Pablo, Laguna, in July 1915 of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother, who were legally married. Sometime in 1925 when Chong was about ten years
old he was taken by his parents to China. On January 25, 1940, he arrived at the port of Manila
and sought entry as a native born citizen. The Board of Special Inquiry assigned to hear his case,
denied him admission on the alleged ground that he is a Chinese citizen. On appeal, the
Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the Board and ordered the deportation of Chong to
the port from whence he came. Chong sued for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance of Manila which was granted.

ISSUE: WON Chong is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
Yes, Chong having been born in the Philippines before the approval of our Constitution, of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a Filipino citizen. His sojourn in China did not adversely
affect his Philippine citizenship, it appearing that ever since he was twelve years old he wanted
to return to the Philippines but his father would not allow him to come, and he did not have the
means to pay for his transportation back to the Philippines until the date of his return. Animus
revertendi existed here.
G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.

Facts: This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August
14, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro convicting him of the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We reverse
the judgment of conviction, for the reasons hereunder stated.
On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint,
subscribed and sworn to by him, with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging
Rafael Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August 13,
1966 the municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged,
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one day to six years
and eight months of imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Mindoro.
In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal
possession of firearm and another case, likewise filed against Licera with the municipal court
but already forwarded to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person
in authority, the two offenses having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by
the Chief of Police and a patrolman of Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the
Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor.
On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of
assault upon an agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of
firearm, sentencing him to suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of the
Winchester rifle in favor of the Government.
Licera’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as
involving only one question of law.
Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his
appointment as secret agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas.
He claims that as secret agent, he was a “peace officer” and, thus, pursuant to People vs.
Macarandang, 1 was exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to
possess firearms. He alleges that the court a quo erred in relying on the later case of People vs.
Mapa 2 which held that section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption
for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating
to firearm licenses.

Issue: The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be
applied to the case at bar that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.
Held: The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date “December 11,
1961” includes a grant of authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: “In
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23,
1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm … for use in connection with the performance of
your duties.” Under the rule then prevailing, enunciated in Macarandang, 3the appointment of
a civilian as a “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a “peace officer” equivalent
even to a member of the municipal police” whom section 879 of the Revised Administrative
Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.

CHU JAN vs. BERNAS

G.R. No. L-10010 August 1, 1916

Facts:
On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the municipality of
Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendant respectively.
Each of said persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the referee of the cockpit had declared
the defendant’s cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in
the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, asking that his own rooster be declared the
winner. The justice of the peace court decided that the bout was a draw. From this judgment
the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province. For the purposes of the
appeal, the plaintiff filed his complaint and prayed this court to render judgment ordering the
defendant to abide by and comply with the rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay
the stipulated wager of P160; to return the other like amount (both sums of wager being held
for safe-keeping by the cockpit owner, Tomas Almonte) and to assess the costs of both
instances against the defendant.
The defendant denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint and moved to dismiss
with the costs against the plaintiff. On September 11, 1913, the said Court of First Instance
rendered judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as to costs. The defendant
excepted to this judgment as well as to an order dictated by the same court on November 8th
of the same year, on the plaintiff’s motion, ordering the provincial treasurer of Albay and, if
necessary, the municipal treasurer of Tabaco of the same province, to release the deposit of
P160 and return it to its owner, the plaintiff Chinaman, Chu Jan. These proceedings have come
before us on appeal by means of the proper bill of exceptions.
The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgment appealed from
ere that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the
rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that he does not know where to
find the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of no law whatever that governs the
rights to the plaintiff and the defendant in questions concerning cockfights.

ISSUE:
Can the court or judge dismiss a case if there is no law that governs it?

HELD:
No.The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case
submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a
certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not
knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the
court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such an
excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law would
be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the
customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of
law.
Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, herein before mentioned, are reversed
and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from whence they came for due
trial and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made with regard to costs.***

People of the Philippines v. Purisima

G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)

FACTS:
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal
possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the
information because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9.
It failed to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the
residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the
occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the
prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum
prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.

ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities.

HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for
and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor.
Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to
inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

FOR ARTICLE 11-12

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79

FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of
the street when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was
attached came along the street in the opposite direction at great speed. The horses ran into
the carromata and wounded Martinez servely. The defendant presented evidence that the
cochero was a good servant and a reliable and safe cochero. And that he was delivering stuff so
he tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and went inside
the wagon to unload the stuff to be delivered. But while unloading, another vehicle drove by
whose driver cracked a whip and made some noises which frightened the horses and which
made it ran away. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon and was unable to
stop the horses. The horses collided with the carromata.

ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero

HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It
has been a custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to
leave horses in the manner which the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in
all cities. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.

Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Chun Yen, petitioners, versus​ ​Aida​ ​Sy-Gonzales,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, Rodolfo Sy, and​ ​Honorable​ ​Court of​ ​Appeals, respondents.
No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00
more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition
alleging among others that:
a) They are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;
b) To their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate;
c) They do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him;
and
d) They nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratriz of the intestate estate of
the deceased.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged
that:
a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat who he married on January 19, 1931 in China;
b) The other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased Yao Kee; and
c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become
the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that
she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to
agree upon the bethrotal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who
contracted or entered into an agreement with the parents of her husband; that she and her
husband have been living in Fookien, China before he went to the Philippines; that in China, the
custom is that there is a go-between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties
who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their
son-in-law, then they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on the wedding day, the
document would be signed by the parents of both parties but there is no solemnizing officer as
is known in the Philippines; that the parties do not sign the document themselves; and that she
and Sy Kiat were married for 46 years already and the document was left in China and she
doubt if that document can still be found now.
The testimony of Gan Ching, the younger brother of Yao Kee, that he attended the marriage of
his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a
document signed by the parents and elders of the parties being sufficient. Statements were
made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified that a) Sy Kiat was married to Yao Kee according
to a Chinese custom.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China is valid.
Held:
The law requires that a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A
local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom
is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact.
Article 71 of the Civil Code states that: “All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous or incestuous marriages
as determined by Philippine law.
The testimonies of Yao Kee and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China’s law or
custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly,
there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. The marriage of
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact.
As petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of
China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only of acknowledged
natural children.

FOR ARTICLE 13
COMMISSIONER​ ​OF INTERNAL REVENUE and​ ​ARTURO​ ​V. PARCERO, petitioners,vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162155. August 28,2007.
Facts:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, the Vice President of Primetown (respondent), applied for
refund of the income tax which they have paid on 1997. According to Yap, the company
accrued losses amounting to P/ 71,879,228. These losses enabled them to be exempt from
paying income tax, which respondent paid diligently. Respondent was therefore claiming a
refund. Respondents submitted requirements but the petitioners ignored their claim. On April
14, 2000, respondents filed a review in the Court of Tax Appeals. The said Court, however,
denied the petition stating that the petition was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for
filing judicial claim for tax refund.
According to Sec 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code, “no suit or proceedings shall be
filed after the expiration of 2-yearsfrom the date of the payment of the tax regardless of any
supervening cause that may arise after payment. Respondents paid the last income tax return
on April 14, 1998. Article 13 of the New Civil Code states that a year is considered 365 days;
months 30 days; days 24-hours; and night from sunset to sunrise. Therefore, according to CTA,
the date of filing a petition fell on the 731st day, which is beyond the prescriptive period.
Issues:
Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive period ends on April 13, 2000 or April 14, 2000
considering that the last payment of tax was on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap
year.
Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 Chap 8 Book 1 of
the Administrative Code of 1987.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that when a subsequent law impliedly repeals a prior law, the new law shall
apply. In the case at bar, Art 13 of the New Civil Code, which states that a year shall compose
365 days, shall be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, which states
that a year shall be composed of 12 months regardless of the number of days in a month.
Therefore, the two-year prescriptive period ends on April 14, 2000. Respondents filed petition
on April 14, 2000 (which is the last day prescribed to file a petition.

Garvida vs. Sales G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997 Election Law
NOVEMBER 28, 2017
FACTS:

Petitioner Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
of a certain barangay. However the Board of election tellers denied her application on the
ground that she is already 21 years and 10 months old. She already exceeded the age limit for
membership as laid down in Sec 3(b) of COMELEC resolution no. 2824.

The municipal circuit trial court found her to be qualified and ordered her registration as
member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the
RTC, but the presiding judge inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close
association with petitioner.

However, private respondent Sales a rival candidate, filed with the COMELEC en banc a
“Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” against Garvida for falsely
representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. He claimed that Garvida is
disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason that she will be more
than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was born on June 11, 1974 as can
be gleaned from her birth certificate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Garvida can assume office as the elected SK official

RULING:

In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she
registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and
nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old.
When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and
was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for
elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2824.

Thus, she is ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.

FOR ARTICLE 15-17

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator,​ petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO,​ opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3)
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the
approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of
transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this
cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery
of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in
reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code
which, among other things, provides the following:
 Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession
as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point;
so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the
scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws
on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an
error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor
was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the
record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with
and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant
as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken
into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will,
which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality
and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the
Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess,
it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this,
my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine
islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons
who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the
laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it,
as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of
the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the
civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as
not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law
when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is
the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and
the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even
as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it,
and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly
valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this
estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all
other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

ALICE​ ​REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND RICHARD UPTON,
respondents.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.
Facts:
Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton
is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced
in Nevada, United States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right
to manage the conjugalproperty. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before Nevada Court
where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property. The lower court
denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce
Decree abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.
Held:
As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered
married to private respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, v. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, HON LUIS C.

VICTOR AND ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.
Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and respondent
and respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at Federal Republic of
Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The local
court in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouse.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila.
After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for adultery
before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair William Chia and Jesus
Chua while they were still married.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed against
her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the
dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.
Issue:
Is the action tenable?
Ruling:
Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted
except upon sworn written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the
criminal action for adultery. This is logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision
of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable that the status
and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, such
status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. Thus, the divorce
decree is valid not only in his country, may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned – in view of the nationality principle under the Civil Code on the
matter of civil status of persons. Private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and
has no legal standing to commence the adultery case. The criminal case filed against petitioner
is dismissed.

THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK

G. R. No. 2935
March 23, 1909
FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered into a contract for a period of 2
years with the Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a salary as a stenographer in the service
of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in
traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of
travel.

Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of Frank,
he should become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the one-half salary paid during such
period.

Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was paid half-salary from the date
until the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.

Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance with
the terms of the contract.

The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover from Frank the sum of money,
which amount the Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred in traveling
from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the period consumed in travel.
It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224
should constitute a part of said contract.

The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his special defense that

(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had
thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that

(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible
under the law.

the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of
265. 90 dollars

ISSUE​:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the contract entered into between
Plaintiff and Defendant?

2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?

HELD​: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed

1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department of the Government of
the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts No. 643 and No. 1040
did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the Plaintiff and
the Defendant. The legislative department of the Government is expressly prohibited by section
5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right
which the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed
in any respect by the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms
of the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in favor of the
Defendant.

2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the
contract could not be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract
was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had
full authority to contract. Frank claims that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the
Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made persons in said Islands did not reach
their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract,
contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.

It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that at the time and place of the
making of the contract in question the Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is
better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity
of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of
performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of
evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is
brought.

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN v. MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN ​+

DECISION

106 Phil. 997

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose,
presiding, dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward
Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project.
On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding,
admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23,
1944 in Manila. In the said order, the court made the following findings:

"According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a
citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located.
This contention is untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the
Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he continued and remained to be a citizen
of the United States and of the state of his particular choice, which is Nevada, as stated in his
will. He had planned to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent residence or
domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected
Nevada as his domicile and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state.
Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive personal
right.

Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen
of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit
A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.
Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of the will, is hereby
appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters
testamentary be issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution
and performance of its trust." (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.)
It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questioned on appeal. The
executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the
provisions of the will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the
Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the
benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of P90,819.67 in cash
and one-half in shares of stock of several mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary
estate to the testator's brother, F. L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and
share alike. This consists in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to
those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward
Gilbert Bohanan, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments;
(4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah
Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;

It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration
expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all
shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To
his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.

The wife Magdalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary
provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been
deprived of the legitime that the laws of the forum concede to them.

The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan,
should be entitled to receive. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the
testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce
secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce
should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction, citing the cases of Querubin ​vs.​Querubin, 87
Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz ​vs​. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, Ramirez ​vs​. Gmur,
42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb ​vs​. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The court below refused to recognize the
claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen,
allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his
estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:

"Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his
or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's
debts."
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the
testator's estate had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June 18,
1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol. II Records, Court of First Instance), which had become final, as
Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its validity. On
December 16, 1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000 from
the funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297,
Vol. I, Record, Court of First Instance), and the court in its said order found that there exists no
community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of
divorce was issued. As already adverted to, the decision of the court had become final and
Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained therein, i.e. that there was
no community property acquired by the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their
coverture.

Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were
married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that
sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting
at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a
divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that
there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can
now have no legal claim to any portion of the estate left by the testator.

The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who
had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given
their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds
of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure of the testator to give his children two-thirds of
the estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of the forum valid?

The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly
provides that successional rights to personal property are to be governed by the national law of
the person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:

"Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well
as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be
the nature of the property and the country in which it is found." (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code,
which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the
testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and
his permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, ​supra)​ . So the question at issue is
whether the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the
legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the
laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Compiled
Nevada Laws of 1925, ​supra​). It does not appear that at the time of the hearing of the project of
partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duty
to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law, can only be proved in our courts in the form and
manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:

"Sec. 41. ​Proof of public or official record​. An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody." * * * (Rule 123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found
that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for
withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada
Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79,
Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by
the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the
case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol.
1). .

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are
constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, specially Section 9905 of the Compiled
Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having
been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions
are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not
disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated
above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case
at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the
testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo,​ and ​Endencia, JJ.,​ concur.

Barrera, J.,​ concurs in the result.

TESTATE​ ​ESTATE​ ​OF​ ​AMOS​ ​G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE’S

BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,​ ​executor. MARIA​ ​CRISTINA
BELLIS AND MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS,​ ​ET AL., heirs-appellees.
No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.
FACTS:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the state of Texas of the United States. In his first wife whom he
divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second wife, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties
and the other disposing his Philippine Properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not
given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been
deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled if Philippine law were to apply.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the sucessional rights of the
illegitimate children.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitims. Under the
Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitims. Further, even if the
deceased had given them share, such would be invalid because the law governing the deceased
does not allow such.

AZNAR VS. GARCIA 7 S 95

Facts:

Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he

resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913.
He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However,
during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a
citizen of California.

In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural

daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared
as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of
the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of
domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased
in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand,
counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code,
the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the
matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should
dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

Issue:

Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:

The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen
Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.

1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California, and

2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.

 The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that “if
there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.”

Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is
ought to be followed.

Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court
with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR v. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, GR No. 142820, 2003-06-20

Facts:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their
marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.[4] Out of
their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25,
1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition[5] for declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss,[6] but it was... denied by the trial court in its order[7] dated May 28, 1997.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997

]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van
Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of
Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.

The parental custody for the children

Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981

Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987... is granted to the father.

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a
decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and...
private respondent.

Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner's motion to dismiss

Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case
proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the... distribution
of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.

n Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the
ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between
petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had... already been
severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg,
Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce had already
been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the implementation... of the
mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code... espondent judge issued the assailed order partially
setting aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property
relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children

Issues:

There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets
alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody
of the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr

There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets
alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody
of the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of

Hamburg, Germany.

In Garcia v. Recio,[19] Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,[20] and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[21] we
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our...
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[22] where this Court specifically
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German... citizen in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of... persons.

Ruling:

In Garcia v. Recio,[19] Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,[20] and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[21] we
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our...
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[22] where this Court specifically
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German... citizen in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of... persons.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not
been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the
trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private...
respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award
of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children,
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts.[23] Before... our courts can give the effect of res
judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court,
it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity
to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,... Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,... collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order
for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules
of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam,... as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.[

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment
as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of... their two
children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of
private respondent's participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain
unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the...
proceedings[25] nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.[26] Unlike
petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist
her in said proceedings.[27] More... importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner
by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately
for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the
issue as to who the offending... spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit
to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to
determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best
interests of the children.

This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child's
welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
[28]

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the
custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent.

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the
issue between the parties as to who has... parental custody, including the care, support and
education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of
this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings.