Functionalism in Sociology
differentiated and heterogeneity gave rise to conflicting
concerns among different sectors of the population. As
the paradigm expanded further, new charges were
made that functionalism could not accommodate the
analysis of power.
4. Conclusion
The radical antipositivism of the 1960s put function-
alism on trial. Functional anthropologists who de-
clined to commit anthropology to the scrap heap
argued ethnography’s value as social history. Others
argued its continued relevance for specific subfields
such as ecological and applied anthropology.
It is not likely that future theoretical and research
problems will follow the trends set by functionalism
except, perhaps, in re-evaluations of problems in
Foucault’s adoption of functional terminology in his
conceptualization of ‘discourse’; in the work of an-
thropologists who holistically find instances of cultural
resistance to what they perceive to be Gramscian style
‘hegemony’; and in the relationship of anthropological
functionalism to other modernisms (Webster, in
Manganaro 1990).
The main thrust is likely to be the further under-
cutting of the two pluralized concepts integral to
functionalism: ‘cultures’ and ‘societies’ (Wolf 1988,
Barth 1992). This new emergent paradigm, ‘New
Critical Theory,’ retains functionalism on its agenda,
albeit in a literary and historical mode. It promises to
further problematics addressed by anthropological
historical realism (sometimes in the guise of political
economy) and postinterpretive cultural critique. In
both instances, functionalism, in anthropology, lingers
on (just as evolutionism and diffusionism linger on)
not just as situated knowledge ever in the making but
as historical ethnography of the operations of culture.
See also: Anthropology, History of; Functionalism,
History of; Functionalism in Sociology; Malinowski,
Bronislaw (1884–1942); Parsons, Talcott (1902–79)
Bibliography
Barth F 1992 Towards greater naturalism in conceptualizing
societies. In: Kuper A (ed.) Conceptualizing Society. Rout-
ledge, London and New York
Fox R G (ed.) 1991 Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the
Present. School of American Research Press, Santa Fe, NM
Gellner E 1987 The Zeno of Cracow, or revolution at Nemi, or
the Polish revenge. In: Culture, Identity and Politics. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Malinowski B 1944 A Scientific Theory of Culture, and Other
Essays. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC
Manganaro M (ed.) 1990 Modernist Anthropology: From Field-
work to Text. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
Mead M (ed.) 1937 Cooperation and Competition among Primi-
ti
e Peoples. McGraw-Hill, New York
Mintz S W (ed.) 1985 History, E
olution, and the Concept of
Culture: Selected Papers by Alexander Lesser. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK
Radcliffe-Brown A R 1935 On the concept of function in social
science. American Anthropologist 37: 394–402 (reprinted 1952
in Structure and Function in Primiti
e Society. Free Press,
Glencoe, IL, pp. 178–87)
Sahlins M D 1976 Culture and Practical Reason. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago
Sanjek R (ed.) 1990 Fieldnotes: The Makings of Anthropology.
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY
Stocking G W Jr. (ed.) 1991 Colonial Situations: Essays on the
Contextualization of Ethrographic Knowledge. History of
Anthropology. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI,
Vol. 7
Stocking G W Jr. 1992 The Ethnographer’s Magic and Other
Essays in the History of Anthropology. University of Wisconsin
Press, Madison, WI
Stocking G W Jr. (ed.) 1996 Volksgeist as Method and Ethic:
Essays on Boasian Ethnography and the German Anthro-
pological Tradition. History of Anthropology, Vol. 8. Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI
Thornton R 1985 Imagine yourself set down …: Mach, Frazer,
Conrad, Malinowski and the role of imagination in eth-
nography. Anthropology Today 1(5): 7–14
Thornton R J, Skalnik P (eds.) 1993 The Early Writings of
Bronislaw Malinowski. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, UK
Urry J 1993 Before Social Anthropology. Essays on the History of
British Anthropology. Harwood, Chur, Switzerland
Vincent J 1986 Functionalism revisited: An unsettled science.
Re
iews in Anthropology 13: 331–9
Vincent J 1991 Engaging historicism. In: Fox R G (ed.)
Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present. School of
American Research Press, Santa Fe, NM
Wolf E 1988 Inventing society. American Ethnologist 15(4):
752–61
J. Vincent
Functionalism in Sociology
Functionalism is a sociological research program of
historical and systematic significance. Sociological
explanations in terms of functions are teleological:
social phenomena are to be explained by their effects
and consequences—chiefly of a beneficial, morally
desired or non-intended character—and\or by a cir-
cuit of equilibration (a homeostatic loop) which is
maintaining a certain state of proper functioning. The
notion of (mono-)functionally specialized subsystems
of society can be seen as the most important precipitate
of functionalist thinking in sociology.
1. Basic Extra-disciplinary Orientations of
Sociological Functionalism
Beginning with the renaissance, the quest for a truly
empirical analysis in the natural sciences has given the
concept of function a crucial leverage in replacing the
metaphysical notion of substance (Cassirer 1980).
Substance has been recast as the functional inter-
dependence of (minimally two) related variables. In
5847
Functionalism in Sociology
sociology functionalist thinking has spread with the
works of Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and E; mile
Durkheim, who drew on contemporary physiology
and evolutionary biology as the disciplines that offered
the most sophisticated notions of functional inter-
dependence so far.
Of crucial significance for the development of
sociological functionalism is the work of Harvard
University’s biochemist and physiologist Lawrence
Joseph Henderson, who played the role of a mediator
between physiology and sociology as regards equili-
brating processes. In his famous seminar ‘Pareto and
the Methods of Scientific Investigation’ (1932–42)
Henderson exerted considerable influence on several
generations of Harvard sociologists, among them
Robert K. Merton and Talcott Parsons, who became
leading figures in the movement of functionalist
thinking in the USA. The basic ideas of a refined
sociological functionalism originate within this con-
text.
1.1 System, Interdependence, Equilibrium
A mixture of ice, soda water, and whisky in a tightly
stoppered thermos bottle can serve as an example for
an isolated system of different components: water,
alcohol, and carbon dioxide are its main components.
There are three phases: a solid phase (ice), a liquid
phase, and a gaseous phase. All three components
exist in the liquid and the gaseous phase in this system.
Concentration, pressure, and temperature form a set
of related variables. If one thrusts the stopper more
deeply into the neck of the bottle the pressure will
increase and there will be a movement of components
from the gaseous phase to the liquid phase; there will
also be a change in concentration and temperature. All
variables that characterize the system stand in a
relation of mutual dependency with one another and
make up an equilibrated state (Henderson 1935). If
the system exhibits a minimal complexity, its internal
process cannot be conceptualized as a temporal
succession of single cause–effect chains any more. The
alternative is the simultaneous variation of interd-
ependent, but relatively autonomous, variables. The
two single most important sources of Henderson’s
analysis of systems are Claude Bernard’s experimental
physiology—which deeply impressed Durkheim as
well—and Josiah Willard Gibbs’ research On the
Equilibrium of Heterogeneous Substances (Gibbs
1948), which decisively extends the applicability of the
laws of thermodynamics. On the basis of Gibbs’
insights, the biochemical equilibrium of a milieu in-
teT rieur—of the circulation of blood, for example—
can now be given a description in terms of functional
equations (Russett 1966). This ‘homeostatic process,’
as it has been called by Henderson’s colleague Walter
B. Cannon, provides the systematic starting point for
functionalist thinking in sociology. The conceptual
5848
scheme of the social system involves the variation of
heterogeneous, interdependent components that can
be accounted for in a model of equilibrium—in the
ideal case, in the form of a system of functional
equations. The facts, that the variables of a social
system are not easily quantifiable, and that the system
cannot be experimentally isolated, do not detract
from the value and applicability of this conceptual
scheme.
1.2 The Problem of Teleology
Equilibrating processes are not random processes.
They are not the result of deterministic causal mech-
anisms, and they do not issue from a deterministic
process of natural selection, from a ‘survival of the
fittest.’ The internal integration of an organism and its
adaptation to external conditions are based on reci-
procal relations with the environment: as the organism
is adapted to the environment, the environment is
adapted to the organism; there is something like the
‘fitness of environment’ which is based on the inter-
nalization of the environment’s properties within the
organism—water and carbon dioxide, for example,
play a very important role for the organism in both
milieus: the external and the internal (Henderson
1913).
At least ex post factum the world seems to be a world
of interdependent functional systems and can be
described as a process of ‘negentropy’; a process of
organization. This is the basic assumption on which
the teleological character of functionalism is grou-
nded. But commitment to this assumption is not a
necessary condition to make use of equilibrium models
in sociological functionalism.
2. Structural Functionalism
Structural functionalism marks the phase of domi-
nance of functionalism in sociology, especially in the
USA from the 1940s to the 1960s. Structural function-
alism does not constitute a single and unified research
program. There are simpler versions of functionalism
than the refined functionalism already characterized
above by its extradisciplinary grounding in equilib-
rium models. A paradigmatic version of the simpler
forms of structural functionalism can be found in the
work of British anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown
(1952). The anthropological study of institutions in
the context of a social totality can be seen as a
blueprint for the procedure of functionalist research:
the careful description of structural patterns, i.e., of
non-random interrelations between components of a
society or a social system that is at the core of this
procedure.The functioning of these structural patterns
secures the adaptation and\or integration, i.e., the
persistence of the social unit in question. The structural

patterns are explained in terms of their consequences.
Such a structural pattern would be, for example, the
repressive law in archaic societies which Durkheim
saw as indicative of a mechanical solidarity. Re-
pressive law contributes to the integration of society.
Retributive acts revive the feelings on which mech-
anical solidarity is based. All sociological research
tends to exhibit the formal characteristics of function-
alism in so far as it is pursued carefully (Davis 1959).
2.1 Simple Functional Explanation
A simple functional explanation follows the following
sequence:
(a) A system S is adapted to its environment\is
integrated, if the corresponding functional prerequi-
site P is fulfilled;
(b) If the functional prerequisite P is fulfilled,
pattern A or its functional equivalents B, C … exist;
(c) Patterns B, C … do not exist in the system;
(d) System S is adapted to its environment\is
integrated, because pattern A exists in the system. This
type of explanation does not imply an equilibrium
model or a system of variables in the sense of
Gibbs\Henderson.
Two questions have to be asked here. First, how can
one explain historically that pattern A contributes to
the fulfillment of the functional prerequisite? The
functional explanation has to be linked to a theory
adequate to ground the claim that pattern A would
not exist at all if it did not make a difference in the
fulfillment of the functional prerequisite P or in the
adaptation\integration of system S, respectively
(Runciman 1990). Second, what is the origin of func-
tional prerequisites? Either all consequences of action
are functional prerequisites, or a limited set of
functional prerequisites has to be justified theoretically
and\or empirically. In the latter case a more refined
version of functional explanation is called for, which
will be taken up in the next step. In the first case an
encompassing functional unity of society cannot be
presupposed. Here, functionalism advances on an
inductive basis. Such a middle-range approach to
functionalism is presented by Robert K. Merton, who
distinguishes between manifest functions on the basis
of intended and recognized consequences of action
on the one hand, and latent functions on the
basis of non-intended and non-recognized conseq-
uences of action on the other (Merton 1963).
Since Merton, functionalism has become associ-
ated with a concept of (mono-)functional systems that
are the product of an interweaving of non-intended
consequences of action and have gained substantial
autonomy as against the intentions of actors. The
discrepancy between actors’ intentions when acting in
economic systems and the actual outcome of market
processes as an aggregated result of these intentional
actions may serve here as an illustration. As Merton
demonstrates, the definition of functions on the basis
Functionalism in Sociology
of consequences of action does not imply any pref-
erence towards an existing social order. It is impossible
to make the disruption of social order the center of a
functional perspective. Merton’s repudiation of the
commonplace critique of conservatism proves him to
be one of the liberal representatives of functionalism.
2.2 Refined Functional Explanation
The greatest danger for functional explanation lies in
the arbitrary selection of consequences of action as
defining a function—this holds true for both simple
and refined functional explanations. A limited set of
functional prerequisites could be gained inductively
from the empirical comparison of singular societies.
The alternative is to justify a limited set of functional
prerequisites on theoretical grounds. It has to be
clarified, in which sense functions such as adaptation
or integration make sense, not only for the organisms
of biology and physiology, but for social systems as
well.
In particular, the question has to be answered,
how an essential change of the system can be
distinguished from mere surface variations in its
operations. What is missing is a clear analogon
in sociological functionalism for the concept of the
‘death of an organism’ (Do$ bert 1973).
In his version of structural functionalism Talcott
Parsons has provided a theoretical, normativistic
account of functional prerequisites: a cultural system
of values that is shared by all members of a society
constitutes the central criterion for the adaptation and
integration of society. The processes of society are
functional in so far as they help to realize this common
system of values. Parsons cannot introduce this system
of values independently from an analysis of con-
temporary society that makes his theoretical ground-
ing of functional problems a mere affirmation of
consequences. At the same time he has to admit, that
he is not able to conceive the equilibrating process of
society in terms of a system of functional variables, in
terms of a Gibbs\Henderson system. In particular, it
does not seem possible to explain the change of action
systems in terms of a functionalist analysis of equili-
brating processes, especially processes of a moving or
even a dynamic equilibrium.
That leaves Parsons with static, normative stru-
ctural categories and little difference compared with
the ‘no frills’ strategy of simple functional explanation.
The concept of function serves for him as a means for
the dynamic interpretation of static categories that
can eventually explain no more than a static equili-
brium—the boundary maintenance of society and
social systems, as they already exist. Parsons sees the
concept of function as a logical, but not really
satisfactory, equivalent for a system of simultaneous
functional equations; structural functionalism there-
fore is only the ‘second best type of theory,’ biased for
a normatively defined static equilibrium (Parsons
5849
Functionalism in Sociology
1954, 1959). Since an existing system of values is used
here as the grounding interpretation for a limited set of
functional prerequisites, the charge of conservatism
that has been brought against Parsons is difficult to
repudiate. However, it should be clear that the reasons
for these shortcomings of Parsons’ theory are not
political or ideological in character, but due to
theoretical deficiencies. Finally, Parsons’ normative
version of structural functionalism has to be put into
the historical context: it is a reaffirmation of the
cultural identity of American society during the
dramatic developments on the eve of World War II,
when the identity of American society indeed seemed
to be at risk (Parsons 1973).
The guiding ideal of a Gibbs\Henderson system
certainly is an admonition for Parsons to avoid simple
analogies and to search thoroughly for a system of
interdependent functional equations. This clearly dis-
tinguishes Parsons’ effort from simple forms of func-
tional explanation, but it is not the only difference.
Formally the essential difference is marked by Parsons’
use of an equilibrium model (Nagel 1957, 1961). A
state of equilibrium E is dependent on the variable
contributions of several functions—a case of hier-
archical or vertical organization of equilibrium: E is a
system’s overriding concern. The range of variation of
these functional contributions is large enough to
endanger the stability of E. If the stability of E is
endangered, certain mechanisms intervene to start a
process of re-equilibration. A state of equilibrium E
can be brought about by several different combina-
tions of the values of the functional variables, but
there are also combinations that characterize a dis-
equilibrium: the loss of stability. In contrast to the
hierarchical, vertical organization stands the hori-
zontal organization of equilibrium: in a horizontally
organized equilibrium functional variables are on a
par with each other and constitute a mutual equi-
librium.
Of crucial importance for equilibrium models and
for the development of functionalist thinking are the
mechanisms that regulate the processes of (re)equili-
bration. There are three different mechanisms:
(a) Compensatory mechanisms. The interdependence
of the functional variables is based on direct relations
between them: a decreasing contribution of the func-
tional variable A directly causes the compensating,
increased contribution of the functional variable B.
The limits of compensation are given in the functional
variables’ range of variation. Increasing the pressure
in the thermos bottle illustrates a process of re-equili-
bration on the basis of compensatory relations be-
tween pressure, concentration, and temperature.
(b) Mechanisms of a central control of equilibrium.
The cybernetic self-regulation of machines can provide
an example for this kind of re-equilibrating mechanism.
The thermostat of a refrigerator is an instance of a
central re-equilibrating control.
(c) Mechanisms of reflexi
e control. In this case the
5850
system must be able to observe its own operations and
to decide on re-equilibration on the basis of a ‘con-
scious’ or self-referential act of taking these observed
operations into account.
3. Systemic Functionalism
Parsons’ systemic functionalism exemplifies an equi-
librium model characterized by a central control.
Systemic functionalism replaces the deficient struc-
tural functionalism and develops an equivalent to the
Gibbs\Henderson system. This theory claims to be
able to explain the change of action systems in terms of
a model of a moving or even a dynamic equilibrium.
Parsons makes temporal process a constituent of his
functional variables. The standard reproach directed
against this type of functionalism concerns its de-
ductive character. It may be deductive, but the theory
is nevertheless empirically grounded in the empirical
studies of small groups and interaction processes by
Robert F. Bales, who collaborated with Parsons in
developing the so-called ‘four-function scheme’ (ad-
aptation, goal attainment, integration, latent pattern
maintenance: AGIL). These four basic functions of
social systems are derived from the analyses of
processes of problem solution in small groups (Bales
1950, Parsons et al. 1981).
Parsons conceives of society as a functionally
differentiated unity consisting of four subsystems:
economy, polity, societal community and the cultural,
fiduciary subsystem. Parsons reconstructs the inter-
dependence of these functional subsystems in terms of
communication or interchange.
Each subsystem has a specialized language of
communication at its disposal—generalized media of
communication or interchange: money, power, infl-
uence and moral appeals (see Fig. 1). In this scheme of
Figure 1
Parsons’ four-function scheme, the functional
subsystems of society, and the societal media of
interchange

interchange relations between the subsystems in terms
of these media, Parsons has constructed his final
equivalent to a system of functional equations in the
sense of Gibbs and Henderson. Moving and even
dynamic equilibrium now can be explained in terms of
this communicative interchange. An empirical appli-
cation of this scheme can be found in the study of
Parsons and Gerald Platt on the system of higher
education in the USA (Parsons and Platt 1973).
All functional processes are regulated in the final
instance by a central control mechanism: the top system
of a cybernetic hierarchy which Parsons has integrated
into his four-function scheme since the 1960s. This top
system is culture or—on the level of societal sub-
systems—the fiduciary subsystem. This is a theoretical
assumption that perpetuates the ‘cultural determin-
ism’ of Parsonian theory.
4. Functional Structuralism
The theory of German sociologist Niklas Luhmann
offers an outstanding example for the ‘reflexive con-
trol’ of the equilibrium process. Although Luhmann’s
theory has been referred to as a ‘second encoding’ of
Parsons’ functionalism, it is really an inversion of
Parsons’ structural functionalism. Therefore it may be
called functional structuralism: Luhmann is not—as is
Parsons—primarily interested in the function of given
structures. His inverted theoretical perspective is
characterized by the search for equivalent solutions of
problems, i.e., for equivalent structures that fulfill
given functional prerequisites. The basic assumption
of his theory is that for almost all problems there are
also other solutions than the ones already selected;
every solution is a contingent one. This perspective
brings ever-new potentialities and the continuing
change of systems into view. The basic functional
problem is not the boundary maintenance of systems
but the functioning of systems in the face of con-
tingency. There is no culturally defined structure, no
program, no code that has to be maintained, executed,
or realized to preserve the identity of the system.
Luhmann shifts Parsons’ problem of the boundary
maintenance of systems radically into the dimension
of time, shaking off all the normative connotations of
Parsonian theory. This leaves only the continuity of
the system over time as a problem—and as a radically
purged understanding of persistence in an overly
complex world of other possibilities, of other equiva-
lent solutions (Luhmann 1970).
From the 1980s on, Luhmann began to rethink the
distinction between system and environment, drawing
on the works of Argentinian biologists F. J. Varela
and Humberto Maturana and on the so-called ‘second
cybernetics’ developed by researchers such as Heinrich
von Foerster and Ernst von Glasersfeld. At the core of
this process of rethinking stands the concept of the
autopoiesis (self-creation) of systems. Even before this
rearrangement of theoretical concepts, Luhmann de-
Functionalism in Sociology
veloped the notion of a self-referential system. Self-
referentiality took the strategically important place
which the top system of the cybernetic hierarchy,
culture, held in Parsons’ theory. This was a first step to
introduce a reflexive control of equilibrium process.
Even more significant is the concept of autopoietic
systems. Autopoietic systems repeat the difference of
system and environment internally, within the system.
Autopoietic systems use this difference to observe (and
to regulate, to condition) their own operations. The
distinction between system and environment is trans-
formed, the difference of identity (what belongs
rightfully to the system makes up its identity), and
difference (what does not belong to the system, what is
foreign to it) forms the basis for the system’s opera-
tions.
Autopoietic systems produce the typical ele-
ments they consist of on their own by observing
themselves in the process of production, by using the
difference of identity and difference—in a metaphor-
ical sense one could call this the self-consciousness of
the system. Autopoietic systems are closed, and
operate only under the condition of self-contact,
whereas Parsons postulated open systems engaged in
processes of mutual interchange. The only way for
autopoietic systems to influence each other is in a
manner that Luhmann calls the ‘structural coupling’
of systems: mutual irritations and resonance effects
which the operations of one system have in the other.
In a sense, autopoietic systems discover their own
functionality and internalize the process of the search
for equivalent solutions (Luhmann 1984). Luhmann’s
theory can eschew Anthony Giddens’ criticism that
equilibrium process, the self-regulation of systems,
eludes an analysis in terms of reflexi
ity (Giddens
1977).
For Luhmann, social systems consist of communi-
cations as elements. The differentiation of society
into (mono-)functionally specialized subsystems—the
economic system, the political system, science, art,
religion, love, etc.—is based on the development of
generalized media of communication. These spec-
ialized types of communications form the elements
which autopoietic systems have to reproduce endl-
essly. The economy, for example, is made up of money
communications: payments.
It is observing itself in terms of the difference
payment\non-payment (or liquid\broke). The main-
tenance of liquidity is the single most important
functional prerequisite which has to be fulfilled to
secure the continuity of the economic system’s
operations (Luhmann 1988).
5. Neofunctionalism
Neofunctionalism is a research program that has been
founded on the basis of a thorough critique of
Parsonian theory, in particular by Jeffrey C. Alexander
(Alexander 1985, 1998). Although the name suggests a
5851
Functionalism in Sociology
close relationship with other forms of functionalism,
the central criterion for belonging to the class of
functionalist approaches is clearly not satisfied: neo-
functionalism does not provide simple or refined
functional explanations in terms of the teleological
interpretation of consequences of action or in terms of
equilibrium models. The only reason that the label
‘neofunctionalism’ is justified at all can be seen in its
renewal of Davis’ assertion, that all careful socio-
logical analysis is (neo)functional analysis. As a
movement of theory and empirical research, neofunc-
tionalism is a reorientation of sociological analysis
from systems and equilibrium to concrete actors and
interpretative processes.
See also: Control: Social; Differentiation: Social;
Integration: Social; Labor, Division of; Luhmann,
Niklas (1927–98); Parsons, Talcott (1902–79); System:
Social; Values, Sociology of
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Alexander J C 1998 Neofunctionalism and after. Blackwell,
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Cassirer E 1980 Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. Untersu-
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Deutungssysteme. Zur Logik des sozialwissenschaftlichen
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Gibbs J W 1948 The Collected Works of J Willard Gibbs. Yale
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Giddens A 1977 Studies in Social and Political Theory. Hutchin-
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Henderson L J 1935 Pareto’s General Sociology. A Physiologist’s
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Theorie der Gesellschaft. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen,
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Luhmann N 1984 Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen
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Parsons T 1993 Talcott Parsons on National Socialism. Aldine
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H. Wenzel
Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd.
All rights reserved.
Fundamental Rights and Constitutional
Guarantees
‘Fundamental rights’ are typically the protections of
individual (and sometimes group) liberties in modern
constitutions. International human rights law provides
a baseline of minimum protections that all members of
the international community ought to observe. Many
constitutional orders supplement these minimum
protections with additional guarantees.
1. Types of Fundamental Rights
Fundamental rights developed in three stages. Initially
governments committed themselves to protect a set of
basic civil and political rights, and later began to treat
social welfare rights as fundamental. In the later part
of the twentieth century, rights to cultural and en-
vironmental protection came to be understood as
fundamental as well.
The idea that people have constitutional rights
makes sense only in the context of accounting for why
some exercises of power are arbitrary and unjustified.
Postmedieval Western political theory abandoned
accounts in which sovereign power was by definition
unlimited, and replaced them with accounts of sov-
ereign power—usually the power of governments, but
sometimes the power of individuals over others—
according to which there were limits on the justified
exercise of power. Initially, the accounts defined a set
of rights, which came to be described as ‘civil’ rights,
that people had simply by virtue of the fact that they
lived in an organized society (rather than in a state of
nature). At the core of this set were the right to own
property, the right to dispose of one’s property
ISBN: 0-08-043076-7