Republic v Rayala

Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced superiority which is enough to dampen an employees

spirit and her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life. [1]

Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the October 18, 2002
Resolution of the CAs Former Ninth Division[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026. The Resolution modified the
December 14, 2001 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals Eleventh Division, which had affirmed the
Decision of the Office of the President (OP) dismissing from the service then National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala) for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.

On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at
the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido
Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual
harassment complained of, thus:

xxxx

4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman Rayala ng mga salitang

Lot, gumaganda ka yata?

5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at hahawakan ang aking

balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito habang ako ay nagta-type at habang nagbibigay
siya ng diktasyon. Sa mga pagkakataong ito, kinakabahan ako. Natatakot na
baka mangyari sa akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na nangyari na noon
tungkol sa mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw gawa ng mga mahahalay na
panghihipo ni Chairman.

6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa 8th Floor, may nagsabi sa akin
na kailangan akong bumaba sa 7th Floor kung nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa
may koreksyon daw na gagawin sa mga papel na tinayp ko. Bumaba naman ako
para gawin ito. Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman Rayala sa silid ni
Mr. Alex Lopez. Inutusan ako ni Chairman na sumunod sa kaniyang silid.Nang
nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:

Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.

At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga personal na bagay sa aking
buhay. Ang ilan dito ay tungkol sa aking mga magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may
boyfriend na raw ba ako.

Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?

Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.
Chairman: Nasaan na siya?
Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?
Lourdes: Nainip po.
Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka ng Law at ako ang
bahala sa iyo, hanggang ako pa ang Chairman dito.

Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at inaabot sa akin.

Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.

Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.
Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang dapat ayusin.

Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan. Natatakot at kinakabahan na kapag

hindi ko tinanggap ang pera ay baka siya magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa
akin kung saan-saan opisina o kaya ay tanggalin ako sa posisyon.

Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko ng may makaka-

alam nito. Just the two of us.
Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?
Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas. But I dont give
them a damn. Hindi ako mamatay sa kanila.

Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8th Floor at pumunta ako sa officemate
ko na si Agnes Magdaet. Ikinwento ko ang nangyari sa akin sa opisina ni
Chairman. Habang kinikwento ko ito kay Agnes ay binilang namin ang pera na
nagkakahalaga ng tatlong libong piso (PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na isauli ko raw ang
pera, pero ang sabi ko ay natatakot ako baka magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC
Perlita Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang nangyari. Sinabi niya na isauli ko ang pera at noong
araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong isauli na nga ito ngunit hindi ako nagkaroon ng
pagkakataon dahil marami siyang naging bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong Lunes,
Setyembre 14, 1998.
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din sa akin si Chairman
Rayala na hindi ko masikmura, at sa aking palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa akin.

Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?

Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka live-in.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.

8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni Chairman Rayala. Ito ay sa
kadahilanang ang fax machine ay nasa loob ng kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-aasikaso nito,
si Riza Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya ako ang nag-asikaso nito noong araw na
iyon. Nang mabigyan ko na ng fax tone yung kausap ko, pagharap ko sa kanan ay
nakaharang sa dadaanan ko si Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako sa mata at ang titig
niya ay umuusad mula ulo hanggang dibdib tapos ay ngumiti na may mahalay na
pakahulugan.

9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-aapply na sekretarya sa

opisina, sinabi ko ito kay Chairman Rayala:

Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, mag-papainterview po yata sa

inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya
Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex Lopez, Chief of Staff).

10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman Rayala sa kaniyang opisina
upang kuhanin ko ang diktasyon niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami
nakakatapos ng unang talata, may pumasok na bisita si Chairman, si Baby Pangilinan
na sinamahan ni Riza Ocampo. Pinalabas muna ako ni Chairman. Nang maka-alis na si
Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa likuran ko si
Chairman, hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil ng kanang kamay niya at
sinabi:

Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?

 Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta. Huminto siya pagkatapos, at
nilagay niya ang kanang kamay niya sa aking kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito
pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya ito sa kanang bahagi ng aking leeg, at pinagapang
hanggang kanang tenga at saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa
pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay. At saka ko sinabi:

Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!

Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi ko na maintindihan ang
na-isulat ko dahil sa takot at inis na nararamdaman ko.[4]

After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be immediately
transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative
Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and
Employment.

Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the OP, Rayala
being a presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered
Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such
purpose. On December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 280,
Series of 1998,[5] constituting a Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in accordance
with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.[6]

The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. On March 2, 2000, the
Committee submitted its report and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of
the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250,
which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months.

The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and
Recommendation to the OP, but with the recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six
(6) months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.

On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119, [7] the pertinent
portions of which read:

Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, I concur with the findings of
the Committee as to the culpability of the respondent [Rayala], the same having been
established by clear and convincing evidence. However, I disagree with the
recommendation that respondent be meted only the penalty of suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day considering the circumstances of the case.
 What aggravates respondents situation is the undeniable circumstance that he
took advantage of his position as the superior of the complainant. Respondent occupies
the highest position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. As head of said office, it was
incumbent upon respondent to set an example to the others as to how they should
conduct themselves in public office, to see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in
accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and to provide them with healthy
working atmosphere wherein co-workers treat each other with respect, courtesy and
cooperation, so that in the end the public interest will be benefited (City Mayor of
Zamboanga vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).

What is more, public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline
(Gano vs. Leonen, 232 SCRA 99 [1994]). Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times
the highest sense of honesty and integrity, and utmost devotion and dedication to duty
(Sec. 4 (g), RA 6713), respect the rights of others and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, and good morals (Sec. 4(c)). No less than the Constitution sanctifies the
principle that a public office is a public trust, and enjoins all public officers and
employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution).

Given these established standards, I see respondents acts not just [as] a failure
to give due courtesy and respect to his co-employees (subordinates) or to maintain good
conduct and behavior but defiance of the basic norms or virtues which a government
official must at all times uphold, one that is contrary to law and public sense of morality.
Otherwise stated, respondent to whom stricter standards must apply being the highest
official [of] the NLRC had shown an attitude, a frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct,
which renders him unfit to remain in the service.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Rogelio I. Rayala, Chairman,

National Labor Relations Commission, is found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful
and immoral conduct and is hereby DISMISSED from the service effective upon receipt
of this Order.

SO ORDER[ED].

Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution[8] dated May 24, 2000.
He then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure before this Court on June 14, 2000. [9] However, the
same was dismissed in a Resolution dated June 26, 2000 for
[10]
disregarding the hierarchy of courts. Rayala filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[11] on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution[12] dated September 4, 2000, the Court
recalled its June 26 Resolution and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate
action.
 The CA rendered its Decision[13] on December 14, 2001. It held that there was sufficient
evidence on record to create moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with. It
said:

The complainant narrated her story complete with details. Her straightforward and
uninhibited testimony was not emasculated by the declarations of Commissioner Rayala
or his witnesses. x x x

Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven any vicious motive for Domingo
and her witnesses to invent their stories. It is very unlikely that they would perjure
themselves only to accommodate the alleged conspiracy to oust petitioner from office.
Save for his empty conjectures and speculations, Rayala failed to substantiate his
contrived conspiracy. It is a hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by
positive and convincing evidence (People v. Noroa, 329 SCRA 502 [2000]). Besides, it is
improbable that the complainant would concoct a story of sexual harassment against the
highest official of the NLRC and thereby expose herself to the possibility of losing her
job, or be the subject of reprisal from her superiors and perhaps public ridicule if she was
not telling the truth.

It also held that Rayalas dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out that Rayala was dismissed
for disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. It held that the OP was correct in concluding that
Rayalas acts violated RA 6713:

Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship of the National
Labor Relations Commission, entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice.
Occupying as he does such an exalted position, Commissioner Rayala must pay a high
price for the honor bestowed upon him. He must comport himself at all times in such a
manner that the conduct of his everyday life should be beyond reproach and free from
any impropriety. That the acts complained of were committed within the sanctuary of
[his] office compounded the objectionable nature of his wrongdoing. By daring to violate
the complainant within the solitude of his chambers, Commissioner Rayala placed the
integrity of his office in disrepute. His disgraceful and immoral conduct warrants his
removal from office.[14]

Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED

and Administrative Order No. 119 as well [as] the Resolution of the Office of the
President in O.P. Case No. 00-E-9118 dated May 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No cost.
 SO ORDERED.[15]

Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices Vasquez and Tolentino voted to affirm
the December 14 Decision. However, Justice Reyes dissented mainly because AO 250 states that the
penalty imposable is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day. [16] Pursuant to the internal rules of
the CA, a Special Division of Five was constituted.[17] In its October 18, 2002 Resolution, the CA
modified its earlier Decision:

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December [14], 2001 is MODIFIED to the

effect that the penalty of dismissal is DELETED and instead the penalty of suspension
from service for the maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY IMPOSED upon the
petitioner. The rest of the challenged decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

Domingo filed a Petition for Review[18] before this Court, which we denied in our February 19,
2003 Resolution for having a defective verification. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the
Court granted; hence, the petition was reinstated.

Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review[19] with this Court essentially arguing that he is not
guilty of any act of sexual harassment.

Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs October 18, 2002
Resolution. The CA denied the same in its June 3, 2003 Resolution, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents Motion for

Reconsideration, (sic) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.[20]

On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3) petitions.
G.R. No. 155831

Domingo assails the CAs resolution modifying the penalty imposed by the Office of the
President. She raises this issue:

The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the respondent from dismissal to
suspension from service for the maximum period of one year. The President has the
prerogative to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on an erring Presidential
appointee. The President was well within his power when he fittingly used that
prerogative in deciding to dismiss the respondent from the service.[21]

She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with the
President who has control of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OPs
decision was arrived at after affording Rayala due process. Hence, his dismissal from the service is a
prerogative that is entirely with the President.[22]

As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the same was not intended to cover cases
against presidential appointees. AO No. 250 refers only to the instances wherein the DOLE Secretary is
the disciplining authority, and thus, the AO does not circumscribe the power of the President to dismiss
an erring presidential appointee.

G.R. No. 155840

In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:

I. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE

ACTS OF HEREIN PETITIONER DO NOT CONSTITUTE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AS LAID DOWN BY THE En Banc RULING IN THE CASE
OF AQUINO vs. ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS IN THE APPLICATION OF
EXISTING LAWS.

II. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN A CASE FOR
SEXUAL HARASSMENT. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING
THAT IT IS AN OFFENSE THAT IS MALUM PROHIBITUM.

III. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

AND NOW, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HAS MISAPPLIED
AND EXPANDED THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No. 7877, BY APPLYING DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH
 RUNS COUNTER TO THE RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.[23]

Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,[24] Rayala argues that the case is the definitive ruling on what
constitutes sexual harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877,
there must be: (a) demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-
condition to hiring, re-employment, or continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in
discrimination against the employee.

Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor, demand, or
request from petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion. According to
Rayala, the acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingos
perception of malice in his alleged acts a product of her own imagination[25] that led her to file the sexual
harassment complaint.

Likewise, Rayala assails the OPs interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is malum
prohibitum such that the defense of absence of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment
is considered an offense against a particular person, not against society as a whole. Thus, he claims
that intent is an essential element of the offense because the law requires as a conditio sine qua
non that a sexual favor be first sought by the offender in order to achieve certain specific results.
Sexual harassment is committed with the perpetrators deliberate intent to commit the offense. [26]

Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In particular, he
assails the definition of the forms of sexual harassment:

Rule IV

FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. Sexual harassment may be

committed in any of the following forms:

a) Overt sexual advances;

b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;

c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on
dates, outings or the like for the same purpose;
 d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual
gratification which is generally annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.[27]

He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or requirement do not
constitute sexual harassment as contemplated by the law.[28] He alleges that the rule-making power
granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to procedural matters. The law did
not delegate to the employer the power to promulgate rules which would provide other or additional
forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with its own definition of sexual harassment. [29]

G.R. No. 158700

The Republic raises this issue:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss respondent
Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts of sexual harassment.[30]

The Republic argues that Rayalas acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His acts
constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature,
which are generally annoying or offensive to the victim.[31]

It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CAs reduction of the penalty imposed by the
OP. Rayalas dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the
NLRC Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by the requirements under the law and
the due process clause.

The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one (1) year suspension, it
will not prevent the OP from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even
though Rayala is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under the Civil
Service Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave misconduct
punishable by dismissal from the service.[32] The Republic adds that Rayalas position is invested with
public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, he should be dismissed from the service.

This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article 215 of the Labor Code,
which states that the Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during
good behavior.[33] Since Rayalas security of tenure is conditioned upon his good behavior, he may be
removed from office if it is proven that he has failed to live up to this standard.

All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions, namely:
 (1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?

Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by Rayala. He accuses the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the Republic, of forum shopping because it filed a motion
for reconsideration of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 and then filed a comment in G.R. No.
155840 before this Court.

We do not agree.

Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other
than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.[34] It consists of filing multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining
a favorable judgment.[35]

There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at
least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted
and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two
preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.[36]

Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we note that the CA rendered the
assailed Resolution on October 18, 2002. The Republic filed its Motion for Reconsideration on
November 22, 2002. On the other hand, Rayala filed his petition before this Court on November 21,
2002. While the Republics Motion for Reconsideration was pending resolution before the CA, on
December 2, 2002, it was directed by this Court to file its Comment on Rayalas petition, which it
submitted on June 16, 2003.

When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Republic filed its own Petition for
Review with this Court on July 3, 2003. It cited in its Certification and Verification of a Non-Forum
Shopping (sic), that there was a case involving the same facts pending before this Court denominated
as G.R. No. 155840. With respect to Domingos petition, the same had already been dismissed on
February 19, 2003. Domingos petition was reinstated on June 16, 2003 but the resolution was received
by the OSG only on July 25, 2003, or after it had filed its own petition.[37]

Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty of forum shopping. We must
point out that it was Rayala who filed the petition in the CA, with the Republic as the adverse party.
Rayala himself filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs December 21, 2001 Decision, which led to
a more favorable ruling, i.e., the lowering of the penalty from dismissal to one-year suspension. The
parties adversely affected by this ruling (Domingo and the Republic) had the right to question the same
on motion for reconsideration. But Domingo directly filed a Petition for Review with this Court, as did
Rayala. When the Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was merely exercising a
right. That Rayala and Domingo had by then already filed cases before the SC did not take away this
right. Thus, when this Court directed the Republic to file its Comment on Rayalas petition, it had to
comply, even if it had an unresolved motion for reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for
contempt.

Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG file[d] multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment.

We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.

It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were unanimous in
upholding the findings of the Committee and the OP. They found the assessment made by the
Committee and the OP to be a meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the
complainant (Domingo), the respondent (Rayala), and their respective witnesses. [38] They differed only
on the appropriate imposable penalty.

That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual harassment is,
therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the
OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings
made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the
courts.[39] The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.[40]

Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no valid ground for this Court
to review the factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the Investigating Committee. These findings are
now conclusive on the Court. And quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed some
of the acts imputed to him.

He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did
not allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a
condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position.[41] Rayala urges us to
apply to his case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.[42]

We find respondents insistence unconvincing.

Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful
acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action
for each can proceed independently of the others.[43] This rule applies with full force to sexual
harassment.
 The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines
work-related sexual harassment in this wise:

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work,

education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager,
supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any
other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement
for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is

committed when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to
grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which
in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee;

(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under existing
labor laws; or

(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

environment for the employee.

This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of
sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an
independent civil action for damages and other affirmative relief.

Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases, viz.:

Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or

Training Environment. It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-
related, educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the
commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the
resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the
employer or head of office shall:
 (a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in
consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or
students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedure for the
investigation or sexual harassment cases and the
administrative sanctions therefor.

Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to

prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual
harassment.

The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to

this section (a) shall include, among others, guidelines on
proper decorum in the workplace and educational or
training institutions.

(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of

cases on sexual harassment. The committee shall conduct
meetings, as the case may be, with other officers and
employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches,
trainors and students or trainees to increase understanding
and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also
conduct the investigation of the alleged cases constituting
sexual harassment.

In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of

at least one (1) representative each from the management, the union, if any, the
employees from the supervisory rank, and from the rank and file employees.

In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be

composed of at least one (1) representative from the administration, the trainors,
teachers, instructors, professors or coaches and students or trainees, as the case
maybe.

The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall

disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the information of all concerned.

The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis
of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal
infraction, of sexual harassment.[44] It should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating
Committee and the Office of the President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative
charge.
 Yet, even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he
would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal
certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers
across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money
allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with
unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken
request for a sexual favor.

Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement
be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough
that the respondents acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee.[45] That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is
clearly shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that
Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence
and requested transfer to another unit.

Rayalas invocation of Aquino v. Acosta[46] is misplaced, because the factual setting in that case
is different from that in the case at bench. In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and
Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now Presiding
Justice) Ernesto Acosta of sexual harassment. She complained of several incidents when Judge
Acosta allegedly kissed her, embraced her, and put his arm around her shoulder. The case was
referred to CA Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation. In her report, Justice Salonga found that
the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her
with a kiss on the cheek, in a `beso-beso fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or
were motivated by malice or ill motive. It is clear from the circumstances that most of the kissing
incidents were done on festive and special occasions, and they took place in the presence of other
people and the same was by reason of the exaltation or happiness of the moment. Thus, Justice
Salonga concluded:

In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the
complainant should be understood in the context of having been done on the occasion of
some festivities, and not the assertion of the latter that she was singled out by Judge
Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and
innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design. The fact that respondent judge kisses other
people on the cheeks in the 'beso-beso' fashion, without malice, was corroborated by
Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine Adalem and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who stated
that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or kissing on the cheeks, as a form of greeting on
occasions when they meet each other, like birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day and
even Valentine's Day, and it does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's birthday or
their birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who belongs to complainant's
department, further attested that on occasions like birthdays, respondent judge would
likewise greet her with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in one
of several festive occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked respondent judge on
the cheek where Atty. Aquino was one of Judge Acosta's well wishers.
 In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six occasions.
Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of
greetings, casual and customary in nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass
complainant was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given
malicious connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did not even relate to anyone
what happened to her. Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those
incidents.[47]

This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was exonerated.

To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the case at bench. While in Aquino, the Court
interpreted the acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done during
festive or special occasions and with other people present, in the instant case, Rayalas acts of holding
and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and the
inappropriate comments, were all made in the confines of Rayalas office when no other members of his
staff were around.More importantly, and a circumstance absent in Aquino, Rayalas acts, as already
adverted to above, produced a hostile work environment for Domingo, as shown by her having reported
the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a leave of absence and requesting
transfer to another unit.

Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he argues that AO 250 does not
cover the NLRC, which, at the time of the incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of program
and policy coordination. Second, he posits that even assuming AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is
not within its coverage because he is a presidential appointee.

We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala is of no real
consequence. The events of this case unmistakably show that the administrative charges against
Rayala were for violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed jurisdiction over the administrative
case; that the participation of the DOLE, through the Committee created by the Secretary, was limited
to initiating the investigation process, reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of the
investigation report, and recommending the appropriate action to be taken by the OP. AO 250 had
never really been applied to Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely as an auxiliary
procedural guide to aid the Committee in the orderly conduct of the investigation.

Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum
prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts
imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him.

We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus,
whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
 We also reject Rayalas allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get
him out of office and thus constitute merely political harassment. A conspiracy must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. His bare assertions cannot stand against the evidence presented by
Domingo. As we have already ruled, the acts imputed to Rayala have been proven as fact. Moreover,
he has not proven any ill motive on the part of Domingo and her witnesses which would be ample
reason for her to conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill motive is belied by the fact that Domingo
and her witnesses all employees of the NLRC at that time stood to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant
consequences for coming forward and charging their boss with sexual harassment.

Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process. He accuses the
Committee on Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OPs decision
finding him guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code and not
for violation of RA 7877. Considering that he was not tried for disgraceful and immoral conduct, he
argues that the verdict is a sham and total nullity.

We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases, this Court held
that:

[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings
which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally
or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and
to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted
as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as
well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected.[48]

The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due process
safeguards. Although in the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him, [49] he
appeared, personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings.

On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the designation of the
offense is not controlling, thus:

What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged
in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
 determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense.[50]

It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral
conduct.[51] Thus, any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for
disgraceful and immoral conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala committed sexual harassment,
we now determine the proper penalty to be imposed.

Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the pertinent Civil Service
Rules, disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is charged administratively, aggravating or
mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.

Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year, while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal.[52]On the other hand, Section
22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 [53] and
Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service[54] both
provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.

Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good behavior until
he or she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for causeas provided by law or
becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.[55]

In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would
determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power,
however, is qualified by the phrase for cause as provided by law. Thus, when the President found that
Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have
unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As
cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual
harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to
one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty
of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second
offense.

Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high government
position, it still could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[56] taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance[57] and where only aggravating and no mitigating
circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.[58] Hence, the maximum penalty
that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.

Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA Justice.
Thus, it is not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v.
Judge Arceo,[59] this Court, in upholding the liability of therein respondent Judge, said:

The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one
of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the
executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his
lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate
employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his
superior position.

In yet another case, this Court declared:

As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work ethics. He

failed to live up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral
perversity. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he
provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the
right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect its employees from oversexed
superiors.[60]

It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how his employees should conduct
themselves in public office, so that they may work efficiently in a healthy working atmosphere. Courtesy
demands that he should set a good example.[61]

Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to effect his exoneration. He even
puts Domingos character in question and casts doubt on the morality of the former President who
ordered, albeit erroneously, his dismissal from the service. Unfortunately for him, these are not
significant factors in the disposition of the case. It is his character that is in question here and sadly, the
inquiry showed that he has been found wanting. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
October 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026
is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840, and 158700 are DENIED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Phil Automotive v NLRC

This petition seeks to set aside the Decision of 15 February 1996 and the Resolution of 28 March 1996
of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 009753-95 (NLRC
NCR Case No. 00-12-08759-94) which modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding petitioners not
guilty of illegal dismissal.
Petitioner Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation (PAAUC) is a corporation duly organized
and existing under Philippine laws, petitioner Francis Chua is its President while private respondent
Rosalinda C. Cortez was a company nurse[1] of petitioner corporation until her termination on 7
November 1994. Jlexj
On 5 October 1994 a memorandum was issued by Ms. Myrna Palomares, Personnel Manager of
petitioner corporation, addressed to private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez requiring her to explain
within forty-eight (48) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her (a) for throwing a
stapler at Plant Manager William Chua, her superior, and uttering invectives against him on 2 August
1994; (b) for losing the amount of P1,488.00 entrusted to her by Plant Manager Chua to be given to Mr.
Fang of the CLMC Department on 23 August 1994; and, (c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in her
time card thus making it appear that she was in the office in the morning of 6 September 1994 when in
fact she was not. The memorandum however was refused by private respondent although it was read
to her and discussed with her by a co-employee. She did not also submit the required explanation, so
that while her case was pending investigation the company placed her under preventive suspension for
thirty (30) days effective 9 October 1994 to 7 November 1994. Lexjuris
On 20 October 1994, while Cortez was still under preventive suspension, another memorandum was
issued by petitioner corporation giving her seventy-two (72) hours to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her for allegedly failing to process the ATM applications of her nine (9) co-
employees with the Allied Banking Corporation. On 21 October 1994 private respondent also refused to
receive the second memorandum although it was read to her by a co-employee. A copy of the
memorandum was also sent by the Personnel Manager to private respondent at her last known
address by registered mail. Jurismis
Meanwhile, private respondent submitted a written explanation with respect to the loss of the P1,488.00
and the punching-in of her time card by a co-employee.
On 3 November 1994 a third memorandum was issued to private respondent, this time informing her of
her termination from the service effective 7 November 1994 on grounds of gross and habitual neglect of
duties, serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust.[2]
On 6 December 1994 private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal,
non-payment of annual service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and damages against PAAUC and
its president Francis Chua.[3]
On 10 July 1995 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding the termination of Cortez as valid and
legal, at the same time dismissing her claim for damages for lack of merit.[4]
On appeal to the NLRC, public respondent reversed on 15 February 1996 the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and found petitioner corporation guilty of illegal dismissal of private respondent Cortez. The
NLRC ordered petitioner PAAUC to reinstate respondent Cortez to her former position with back wages
computed from the time of dismissal up to her actual reinstatement.[5]
On 11 March 1996 petitioners moved for reconsideration. On 28 March 1996 the motion was
denied;[6] hence, this petition for certiorari challenging the NLRC Decision and Resolution.
The crux of the controversy may be narrowed down to two (2) main issues: whether the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in holding as illegal the dismissal of private respondent, and whether she is
entitled to damages in the event that the illegality of her dismissal is sustained. Jjjuris
The Labor Code as amended provides specific grounds by which an employer may validly terminate
the services of an employee,[7] which grounds should be strictly construed since a persons employment
constitutes "property" under the context of the constitutional protection that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law" and, as such, the burden of proving that
there exists a valid ground for termination of employment rests upon the employer. [8] Likewise, in light
of the employee's right to security of tenure, where a penalty less punitive than dismissal will suffice,
whatever missteps may have been committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so
severe.[9]
A perusal of the termination letter indicates that private respondent was discharged from employment
for "serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and fraud or willful breach of trust."
Specifically -justice
1. On August 2, 1994, you committed acts constituting gross disrespect to your superior Mr. William
Chua, the Plant Manager.
2. On August 23, 1994, the Plant Manager entrusted you the amount of P1,488.00 to be sent to CLMC
for Mr. Fang but the money was allegedly lost in your possession and was not recovered.
3. On September 6, 1994, you caused someone else to punch-in your time card to show that you were
at work when in fact you were doing a personal errand for Richard Tan. As per time card you were in at
8:02 A.M. but you only arrived at 12:35 P.M.
4. On July 28, 1994, you received an amount of P900.00 from Miss Lucy Lao to open an ATM card of
nine (9) employees. On September 24, 1994, one of the employees complained by the name of Tirso
Aquino about the status of his ATM Card and upon query from the bank it was found out that no
application and no deposit for said person has been made. Likewise, it was found out that you did not
open the ATM Card and deposit the P800.00 for the 8 other employees. It turned out that said deposit
was made after a month later.[10]
As to the first charge, respondent Cortez claims that as early as her first year of employment her Plant
Manager, William Chua, already manifested a special liking for her, so much so that she was receiving
special treatment from him who would oftentimes invite her "for a date," which she would as often
refuse. On many occasions, he would make sexual advances - touching her hands, putting his arms
around her shoulders, running his fingers on her arms and telling her she looked beautiful. The special
treatment and sexual advances continued during her employment for four (4) years but she never
reciprocated his flirtations, until finally, she noticed that his attitude towards her changed. He made her
understand that if she would not give in to his sexual advances he would cause her termination from
the service; and he made good his threat when he started harassing her. She just found out one day
that her table which was equipped with telephone and intercom units and containing her personal
belongings was transferred without her knowledge to a place with neither telephone nor intercom, for
which reason, an argument ensued when she confronted William Chua resulting in her being charged
with gross disrespect.[11]
Respondent Cortez explains, as regards the second charge, that the money entrusted to her for
transmittal was not lost; instead, she gave it to the company personnel in-charge for proper transmittal
as evidenced by a receipt duly signed by the latter.[12]
With respect to the third imputation, private respondent admits that she asked someone to punch-in her
time card because at that time she was doing an errand for one of the company's officers, Richard Tan,
and that was with the permission of William Chua. She maintains that she did it in good faith believing
that she was anyway only accommodating the request of a company executive and done for the benefit
of the company with the acquiescence of her boss, William Chua. Besides, the practice was apparently
tolerated as the employees were not getting any reprimand for doing so.[13]
As to the fourth charge regarding her alleged failure to process the ATM cards of her co-employees,
private respondent claims that she has no knowledge thereof and therefore denies it. After all, she was
employed as a company nurse and not to process ATM cards for her co-employees. Jksm
The Supreme Court, in a litany of decisions on serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an
employee, has ruled that for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal (a) it
must be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the employees duties; and, (c) must show that
the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. [14] The act of private respondent
in throwing a stapler and uttering abusive language upon the person of the plant manager may be
considered, from a lay man's perspective, as a serious misconduct. However, in order to consider it a
serious misconduct that would justify dismissal under the law, it must have been done in relation to the
performance of her duties as would show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. The acts
complained of, under the circumstances they were done, did not in any way pertain to her duties as a
nurse. Her employment identification card discloses the nature of her employment as a nurse and no
other.[15] Also, the memorandum informing her that she was being preventively suspended pending
investigation of her case was addressed to her as a nurse.[16]
As regards the third alleged infraction, i.e., the act of private respondent in asking a co-employee to
punch-in her time card, although a violation of company rules, likewise
does not constituteserious misconduct. Firstly, it was done by her in good faith considering that she
was asked by an officer to perform a task outside the office, which was for the benefit of the company,
with the consent of the plant manager. Secondly, it was her first time to commit such infraction during
her five (5)-year service in the company. Finally, the company did not lose anything by reason thereof
as the offense was immediately known and corrected. Es m
On alleged infraction No. 4, as may be gleaned from and admitted in the memorandum of petitioners to
private respondent dated 20 October 1994[17] and the notice of termination dated 3 November 1994, the
money entrusted to her was in fact deposited in the respective accounts of the employees concerned,
although belatedly. We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that -Es msc
The mere delay/failure to open an ATM account for nine employees is not sufficient, by itself, to support
a conclusion that Rosalinda is guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duties. First, petitioner did not
show that opening an ATM is one of her primary duties as company nurse. Second, petitioner failed to
show that Rosalinda intentionally, knowingly, and purposely delayed the opening of ATM accounts for
petitioners employees. It is of common knowledge that a bank imposes upon an applicant certain
requirements before an ATM account can be opened, i.e. properly filled up application forms,
identification cards, minimum deposit etc. In the instant case, petitioner did not prove that the delay was
caused by Rosalindas neglect or willful act (emphasis supplied).[18]
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the
entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort
to avoid them.[19] The negligence, to warrant removal from service, should not merely be gross but
also habitual. Likewise, the ground "willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer" must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly
prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee
may fairly be made to rest.[20] All these requirements prescribed by law and jurisprudence are wanting
in the case at bar.
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, the NLRC ruled that private respondent was not
entitled to recover such damages for her failure to prove that petitioner corporation had been motivated
by malice or bad faith or that it acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner in terminating her
services. In disbelieving the explanation proffered by private respondent that the transfer of her table
was the response of a spurned lothario, public respondent quoted the Labor Arbiter -
Complainants assertion that the cause of the altercation between her and the Plant Manager where she
threw a stapler to him and uttered invectives against him was her refusal to submit to his advances to
her which started from her early days of employment and lasted for almost four years, is hardly
believable. For indeed, if there was such harassment, why was there no complaints (sic) from her
during that period? Why did she stay there for so long? Besides, it could not have taken that period for
the Plant Manager to react. This assertion of the complainant deserves no credence at all.[21]
Public respondent in thus concluding appears baffled why it took private respondent more than four (4)
years to expose William Chua's alleged sexual harassment. It reasons out that it would have been
more prepared to support her position if her act of throwing the stapler and uttering invectives on
William Chua were her immediate reaction to his amorous overtures. In that case, according to public
respondent, she would have been justified for such outburst because she would have been merely
protecting her womanhood, her person and her rights. Esmm is
We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the
employee's sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may
rightfully cry "foul" provided the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no time period
within which he or she is expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may
vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the emotional threshold of the
employee. Esmso
Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out with her
employer's sexual impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff that
can endure the agony and trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. If petitioner corporation had not
issued the third memorandum that terminated the services of private respondent, we could only
speculate how much longer she would keep her silence. Moreover, few persons are privileged indeed
to transfer from one employer to another. The dearth of quality employment has become a daily
"monster" roaming the streets that one may not be expected to give up one's employment easily but to
hang on to it, so to speak, by all tolerable means. Perhaps, to private respondent's mind, for as long as
she could outwit her employer's ploys she would continue on her job and consider them as mere
occupational hazards. This uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for
four (4) years, and one could only imagine the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that
beset her all that time. But William Chua faced reality soon enough. Since he had no place in private
respondent's heart, so must she have no place in his office. So, he provoked her, harassed her, and
finally dislodged her; and for finally venting her pent-up anger for years, he "found" the perfect reason
to terminate her. Mse sm
In determining entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, we restate the bases therefor. In moral
damages, it suffices to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act complained of. [22] Exemplary damages, on the
other hand, are granted in addition to, inter alia, moral damages "by way of example or correction for
the public good"[23] if the employer "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner."[24]
Anxiety was gradual in private respondent's five (5)-year employment. It began when her plant
manager showed an obvious partiality for her which went out of hand when he started to make it clear
that he would terminate her services if she would not give in to his sexual advances. Sexual
harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an employee's spirit
in her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life. If for this alone
private respondent should be adequately compensated. Thus, for the anxiety, the seen and unseen
hurt that she suffered, petitioners should also be made to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary
damages, for the oppressive manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the service, and
to serve as a forewarning to lecherous officers and employers who take undue advantage of their
ascendancy over their employees. Ex sm
All told, the penalty of dismissal is too excessive and not proportionate to the alleged infractions
committed considering that it does not appear that private respondent was an incorrigible offender or
that she inflicted serious damage to the company, nor would her continuance in the service be patently
inimical to her employers interest.[25] Even the suspension imposed upon her while her case was
pending investigation appears to be unjustified and uncalled for.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commssion finding the
dismissal of private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez to be without just cause and ordering petitioners
Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation and/or Francis Chua to pay her back wages
computed from the time of her dismissal, which should be full back wages, is AFFIRMED. However, in
view of the strained relations between the adverse parties, instead of reinstatement ordered by public
respondent, petitioners should pay private respondent separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
salary for every year of service until finality of this judgment. In addition, petitioners are ordered to pay
private respondent P25,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. Costs
against petitioners. Kyle
Digitel vs Soriano

In issue in the present Petition for Review[1] is whether respondent, Mariquit Soriano (Mariquit),
was forced to resign, due to professional and sexual harassment, thus amounting to constructive
dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) held in the
negative. The Court of Appeals held otherwise.

From the records of the case, the following antecedent facts are culled:

In the third quarter of 1998, petitioner Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) hired
Mariquit, then of 48 summers, a Bachelor of Science in Nutrition graduate from the University of the
Philippines and a graduate school student of De La Salle University (she had not submitted her thesis),
as Director for Market and Communications effective August 15, 1998.

Digitels co-petitioners Senior Vice President for Business Division Eric J. Severino (Severino)
and Senior Executive Vice President Johnson Robert L. Go (Go) were Mariquits immediate superior
and next higher superior, respectively.

Working under Mariquit were Evelyn P. Inductivo (Evelyn), Manager of the Promotion Section,
Andrea S. Arnedo (Andrea), Manager of the Corporate and Planning Information Section, and Joselito
Macachor (Macachor), Ad and Promo Manager.[2]

In the Performance Review conducted by Digitel for the period of August 17, 1998 up
to February 15, 1999,[3] Mariquit obtained for her first six months of work a rating of 92% (Above
Average).

Mariquit later had a rift with Macachor regarding an advertisement error. She thus sought his
termination through petitioner Severino. To her dismay, Severino merely arranged for the transfer of
Macachor to another department.
 Mariquits performance soon began to deteriorate. The Performance Review[4] for the period
of April 1, 1999 up to April 1, 2000 showed that she obtained a rating of 60% (Average) with the
following notes from petitioner Severino:

REVIEW OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE:

(Special comments on performance in particular work areas, overall performance and

development under the covered period.)

Clearly, Ms. Soriano possesses the requisite traits to be successful in her responsibility
areas. The overall performance of the department assigned to her in both quantitative
and qualitative aspects, will increase significantly with Ms. Sorianos commitment to
focus on output expectations.

TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT:

(Please comment on the staff members training and development needs in the year to
come, taking into consideration his/her strengths and areas for improvement.)

Ms. Soriano should endeavor to overcome whatever residual effects the P. Macachor
situation caused. She should return to her overall sunny and cheerful disposition. This
will significantly contribute to the positive department work atmosphere with improved
performance as a result.[5] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Apparently in an attempt to shift the blame on the unfavorable evaluation made on her, Mariquit
gave unfavorable evaluation of her two remaining managers, Evelyn and Andrea.

In a Memorandum of June 27, 2000[6] addressed to Severino, Evelyn questioned the basis of
her rating and charged Mariquit of harassing and framing-up her very own managers. And she also
charged Mariquit of violating company rules and regulations.[7]

For her part Andrea, in a Memorandum of May 15, 2000[8] also addressed to Severino,
challenged the factual basis of her poor performance rating and appealed for a new evaluation, she
attributing as possible motive of Mariquit her hatred, prejudice, revenge and a desire to get rid of her. [9]

Mariquits personal conflicts with her two managers continued, prompting her to also demand the
termination of their services.[10] As in the case of Macachor, the management retained them, however.
 Mariquit later filed on June 27, 2000 a letter of resignation bearing the date June 28, 2000, to
take effect at the closing of office hours on June 30, 2000.[11] Severino acknowledged receipt of the
letter of resignation which Mariquit left in his office.[12] Severino thereafter forwarded the letter to the
Human Resources Department where it was stamped received on June 28, 2000.[13]

On August 22, 2000, Mariquit executed a Deed of Quitclaim and Release[14] acknowledging
receipt from Digitel of the sum of P97,560.02, and declaring therein that her resignation on June 30,
2000 was of her own free will and that in consideration of the said amount, she was releasing and
forever discharging Digitel, its officers, managers or representatives or successors from all claims or
cause in connection with her employment therewith.

About five months after her execution of the Deed of Quitclaim and Release or in January 2001,
on the intercession of Mariquits friend Emma Teodoro (Emma), Go and Mariquit, together with Emma,
met during which Mariquit is said to have pleaded for financial assistance. Go thus referred her to
Digitel Executive Vice President Policarpio B. Pau, Jr. (Pau).[15] Pau was to later relate what transpired
when Mariquit went to see him.

Eleven months after her resignation letter was filed or on May 28, 2001, Mariquit filed criminal
complaints against petitioners Go and Severino,[16] for violation of R.A. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment
Law) and/or Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (Acts of Lasciviousness), before the Quezon City
Prosecutors Office which referred the complaints to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

The NBI recommended to the City Prosecutor the filing of a case for sexual harassment against
petitioner Go. The City Prosecutor later dismissed Mariquits complaints but, on her motion for
reconsideration, it issued a Resolution finding probable cause to hale Go to court for acts of
lasciviousness.[17] Go appealed the Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ).

In Paus affidavit dated July 6, 2001 which Go submitted in connection with Mariquits criminal
complaint against him, Pau gave the following account of what transpired during his meeting with
Mariquit after Go had, as stated above, referred her to him.

xxxx

14. Sometime in January 2001 Ms. Soriano and her son went to my office; She
told me that she had dinner with Mr. Johnson [Go] and a common friend and that Mr.
Johnson [Go] told her to see me;
15. On my part, I was already expecting that this was what Mr. Johnson [Go] and
I had agreed in principle earlier to extend financial assistance, for humanitarians [sic], to
Ms. Soriano;

16. To my surprise, Ms. Soriano told me that she was advised by her lawyer to
explore means in settling her case with Mr. Johnson [Go]. She then told me that she
needs money to: (a) send her children abroad, (b) to start a business of her own and (c)
 to pay the fees of her lawyers; Based on her insinuations I had the impression that she
wanted millions of pesos;

17. Clearly, she had a wrong impression and it appeared to me that she is
extorting money from the company; To end our conversation, I told her that if that is what
she wanted I have no authority to grant the same, what the company intended was to
give her a separation pay, even though she is not entitled to it; I also told her that maybe
she has misunderstood the humanitarian gesture taken by the company; Thereafter, she
already left the office.

x x x x[18] (Underscoring supplied)

About one and a half years after she filed her letter of resignation or on December 20, 2001,
Mariquit filed a complaint[19] for illegal dismissal against petitioners Digitel, Go and Severino before the
NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 12-06571-2001. During the initial mandatory conference
which took place on January 23, 2002, she clarified that her cause of action was
for constructive dismissal,[20] alleging that she was harassed by herein individual petitioners to thus
compel her to resign from Digitel.

By Decision of April 24, 2003,[21] the Labor Arbiter, finding insufficient Mariquits evidence to
support her claim that she was forced to resign, held that she voluntarily resigned:

The factual background of this case clearly shows that complainant voluntarily
resigned from her employment. We sympathize with her but we cannot sustain her
contention that she was constructively dismissed. With complainants educational and
professional background, it would be absurd to assume that she did not understand the
import of her own words and the consequences of her own acts of voluntary resignation.

Complainants submission that she was forced to resign because of the way she
was sexually and professionally harassed by respondents Eric J. Severino and Johnson
Robert L. Go were not sufficiently established by substantial, concrete and credible
evidence.

The affidavit of Ms. Sta. Clara [submitted by Mariquit] is purely hearsay evidence.
Her statements do not even qualify as part of the res gestae. Ms. Sta. Clara was not
personally present during the times that respondent Go allegedly poked, several times,
at complainants private parts. Neither was she physically present when respondent
Severino was allegedly staring at complainants crotch and made suggestive remarks to
the latter. She, therefore, could not concretely, credibly nor substantially testify as to
those facts or circumstances that she acquired through her own perception or organs of
sense. Her affidavit does not establish the truth of the facts stated therein.
 The affidavit of Mr. Frank Wenceslao [also submitted by Mariquit] is not only
telling, so to speak; it is also highly suspect. It is likewise hearsay, as that of Ms. Sta.
Claras. It must be taken with utmost precaution. It should be carefully scrutinized. Mr.
Wenceslao knew that respondent Go and his brother Henry were reputed to be
womanizers. Why then would he (Wenceslao) encourage the mother of his own love
child to apply and accept a job offered by respondent company knowing fully well that
she, with whom he was again sleeping together at that time, would be working with and
for Mr. Go who has a questionable reputation with women? Why would he have
prevailed upon complainant who already wanted to resign from her job during those
periods that she was being allegedly professionally and sexually harassed? His
testimony is that of an interested person and should thus be rejected.

Complainants own allegation, although they are so detailed, appear incredible if

not downright puny. An analysis of her statements shows that her own conclusion that
she was being sexually and professionally harassed was on the basis of her own
suppositions, conjectures, and surmises. Some of her statements are inconsistent. She
could not satisfactorily explain her allegation that she was consistently professionally
harassed by respondent Severino. The latters alleged words: How come you claim you
know so much yet nothing ever gets done in your department? do not jurisprudentially
constitute nor clearly establish professional harassment. Aside from these words, the
complainant could only venture to allege instances in general and vague terms.

As to the facts allegedly constituting sexual harassment advanced by Go and

Severino, after an objective analysis over their assertions as stated in their respective
counter-affidavits and further considering the other supporting documents attached to
the respondents pleadings, it is found that these far out weigh the complainants own
evidence.[22] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The Labor Arbiter also observed:

One last note: During the initial mandatory conference on January 23, 2003,
while the respective parties counsels and the undersigned were discussing on some
matters, complainant who was seated opposite respondent Severino discreetly showed
him her middle finger (the dirty finger sign) and later, took his cellular phone which he
placed on the table and banged it on the table. Mr. Severino then asked the undersigned
if it would be possible, at the next hearing, to have someone officially record and take
note of the deportment of the parties during the hearings. When the undersigned asked
what for, respondent Severino narrated what had just transpired between him and the
complainant. When the undersigned asked if this was true, the complainant, looking at
respondent Go, rudely replied: Because you are not my boss anymore!

The conduct displayed by the complainant in the presence not only of the
undersigned, the parties respective legal counsels but also with complainants own
daughter around shows much of her character.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
 The Labor Arbiter thus disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered

DISMISSING this complaint for constructive dismissal for lack of merit.

The counterclaim of the respondents is likewise dismissed for lack of merit.

All other claims herein sought and prayed for are hereby denied for lack of legal
and factual bases.[24]

On appeal, the NLRC referred the case to Labor Arbiter Thelma M. Concepcion for review,
hearing when necessary with power to cite the parties for contempt under Article 218(d), Labor Code
and submission of report for the Commissions deliberation.[25]

Finding Labor Arbiter Concepcions July 30, 2003 REPORT with recommendation[26] for the
dismissal of Mariquits appeal to be supported by facts on record and the law on the matter, the NLRC
adopted it as its own. It accordingly dismissed Mariquits appeal.

In holding that Mariquit voluntarily resigned and accordingly dismissing her appeal, the NLRC,
by Decision dated August 18, 2003,[27] observed, among other things:

xxxx

With such tendency to threaten resignation everytime higher management would

refuse her demand to transfer subordinates who had administrative differences with her,
we therefore have no doubt that complainant voluntarily resigned when respondent
Severino refused to heed her demand that Ms. Arnedo and Ms. Inductivo, her
subordinates, be transferred to other departments. We also have no doubt that such
resignation does not constitute constructive dismissal, much less an illegal one.

x x x x[28] (Underscoring supplied)

Her motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC by Order of January 30,
2004,[29] Mariquit filed a Petition for Certiorari[30] before the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court, by Decision of August 20, 2004,[31] taking exception to the doctrine of
finality of factual findings of labor tribunals,[32] reversed the NLRC decision, disposing as follows:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE
COURSE and the questioned Decision and Resolution of the NLRC dated August 18,
2003 and January 30, 2004, respectively, are hereby both ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby declared liable for illegal dismissal and are
consequently ordered to pay petitioner jointly and severally the back wages due to her
computed from July 1, 2000 based on her latest salary as of that date up to the time of
the finality of this judgment. As reinstatement is no longer feasible, private respondents
are hereby also ordered to pay petitioner separation pay equivalent to one (1) months
salary for every year of service, as prayed for by petitioner in her complaint.

Further, private respondents are hereby ordered to pay petitioner the sums of
P200,000.00 and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively, as well
as attorneys fees in the amount equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.

No pronouncement as to costs.[33]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of November 10,
2004,[34] they lodged the present petition faulting the appellate court as follows:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DUE COURSE, THERE BEING NO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION EITHER BY THE NLRC OR THE LABOR ARBITER AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF

LAW IN REVERSING AND DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY WHICH ARE SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

A. THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE NLRC ARE CONSISTENT

WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER, AND BOTH ARE DULY
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
 B. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAVING
THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRIMARILY APPRECIATE THE FACTS ARE GIVEN
GREAT WEIGHT AND PREFERENCE.
C. THE FINDINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY MAY BE REVERSED
ONLY ON CLEAR SHOWING OF PALPABLE ERROR.

III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND PETITIONERS GUILTY OF
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL CONSIDERING THAT THE HONORABLE COURT MADE
SEVERAL FINDINGS OF FACT WITH ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT
OR BASIS ON RECORD, AND RULED ON SOME ISSUES WHICH NEITHER
RESPONDENT NOR PETITIONERS RAISED IN THE PRESENT CASE.

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS GAVE UNDUE AND UNDESERVED CREDENCE

TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION REPORT SUBMITTED BY DR.
MAGNO.

B. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT SEXUAL

HARASSMENT DID OCCUR.

C. PETITIONERS SHOWED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BY WAY OF AFFIDAVITS

TO DISPUTE THE ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL. THESE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SIMPLY
BRUSHED ASIDE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.

D. THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE OTHER FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT

LACKED COHERENCE OR BASIS, DEFIED LOGIC, OR WERE OTHERWISE
IMMATERIAL TO THE REOLUTION OF THE CASE, AND DISREGARDED
OTHER ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS.

E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING BACKWAGES,

SEPARATION PAY, AND DAMAGES, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

and pleading that

IV

JUSTIFIABLE REASONS REQUIRE THE SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW THE

FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.[35] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
 The first two errors assigned by petitioners, along with their plea for a review of the appellate
courts findings of fact, being interrelated, shall be discussed simultaneously.

Petitioners contend that in certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as
evaluating the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had based their
conclusion, and while the Court of Appeals concluded that the factual findings of the NLRC are arbitrary
and unfair, it failed to show the basis thereof.

Further, petitioners contend that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are based on
misapprehension of facts and speculations, surmises, or conjectures.

It is settled that factual findings of labor administrative officials, if supported by substantial

evidence, are accorded not only great respect but even finality, unless there is a showing that they
arbitrarily disregarded the evidence before them or had misapprehended evidence of such nature as to
compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated.[36]

Judicial review of decisions of the NLRC via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is confined only to
issues of lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC.[37] Thus Danzas Intercontinental, Inc. v. Daguman[38] teaches:

x x x As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

under which the petition was brought to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court does not
assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the labor arbiter and the NLRC
based their conclusions, the query being limited to the determination of whether or not the
NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering its resolution, except if the findings of the NLRC are not supported by
substantial evidence.[39] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

In her petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, Mariquit attributed to the NLRC the commission
of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint for
illegal dismissal[,] ignoring clear and convincing proof of sexual harassment.[40] (Underscoring supplied)

It was thus incumbent for Mariquit to prove before the appellate court grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC.[41]

Mariquit failed to discharge the burden, however.

Contrary to Mariquits submission, the NLRC did not disregard the evidence she proffered to prove that
sexual harassment forced her to resign. Thus the NLRC observed:
 Indeed, the record is replete with substantial evidence showing that the complainant
was not forced to resign through any act of sexual harassment. Rather, as reported by
Arbiter Concepcion and as admitted in complainants position paper [dated April 26, 2002],
she voluntarily resigned when her repeated requests for the transfer to some other
department of two of her key personnel, Ms. Andrea Arnedo and Ms. Evelyn Inductivo
were refused by respondent Severino.[42] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners third assigned error which bears on her claim of sexual harassment calls for a
determination of the weight of Mariquits evidence of forced resignation.
Significantly, after the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 20, 2004 its assailed Decision
finding Mariquit to have been forced to resign, and on November 10, 2004 its Resolution denying herein
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the DOJ, through Undersecretary Ernesto Pineda, acting on
petitioner Gos petition for review of the earlier-mentioned Quezon City Prosecutors Resolution adverse
to Go, issued a Resolution of April 4, 2005 reversing the Prosecutors Resolution.

Held the DOJ:

Under the circumstances, it is improbable for respondent Go to have committed the

alleged acts of lasciviousness. In the company party held [on November 19, 1999] in
Quezon City, more or less sixty (60) people were present occupying the living room and
lanai area of the residence of Policarpio B. Pau, Jr. It is highly unthinkable that
respondent Go would make any sexual advances in the presence of so many people
and no one would notice. Aside from complainants allegations, there is nothing on
record to corroborate the same. In fact, not one of the sixty (60) guests supported her
claims. On the other hand, respondent Go submitted the affidavit of the partys host,
Policarpio B. Pau, Jr., stating that he never saw respondent Go make advances to
complainant. Moreover, according to another guest, Ms. Purisima Y. Velasco,
respondent Go talked to complainant for a while and proceeded to join the other guests.

The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost
importance so as to establish the truth or falsity of the charge for acts of
lasciviousness. Complainants deportment seemed unnatural for someone who allegedly
went through a harrowing experience. For evidence to be believed it must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the
common experiences and observation of mankind can approve under the
circumstances. In the instant case after the alleged sexual advances, complainant
continued working for Digitel until her resignation effective on June 30, 2000. During her
employment with Digitel, she never initiated or filed any case for sexual harassment or
acts of lasciviousness against respondents. Further, when she eventually resigned, she
did not even state in her resignation letter that her resignation was due to sexual
harassment or sexual abuse. Finally, it took complainant almost two (2) years before
filing her complaint.
 Indeed, complainants uncorroborated testimony is not sufficient to sustain a finding of
probable cause for acts of lasciviousness against respondent Go.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED

and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is directed to cause the withdrawal
of the Information for acts of lasciviousness against respondent Robert Johnson L. Go
and report to this Office the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.[43] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

At this juncture, this Court could stop and refrain from calibrating the evidence on whether sexual
harassment indeed forced Mariquit to resign. For Pono v. National Labor Relations
Commission[44] instructs:

x x x The Court takes cognizance of the fact that a criminal complaint for attempted rape
or acts of lasciviousness filed by Pono against Castillo before the Prosecutors Office in
Makati was eventually dismissed due to lack of merit, which dismissal was affirmed by
the Department of Justice. Indisputably, an investigating fiscal is under no obligation to
file a criminal information where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of
evidence at hand to support the averments.

Thus, the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the
prosecutor who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this
function. The courts should give credence, in the absence of a clear showing of
arbitrariness, to the findings and determination of probable cause by prosecutors in a
preliminary investigation.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Absent any showing that the DOJ acted with arbitrariness, this Court is bound to accept its findings as it
is this department which has control and supervision over public prosecutors.

Nonetheless, this Court has given the evidence a hard look if only to put to rest any nagging doubts on
the correctness of the assessment thereof by the lower tribunals.

To prove that she was sexually harassed to thus force her to resign, Mariquit submitted before the
Labor Arbiter the following documents as part of her Position Paper dated April 26,
2002: her Affidavit dated April 25, 2002;[46] Affidavit dated April 25, 2002 of her friend Grace J. Sta.
Clara;[47] and Affidavit dated April 25, 2002 of Francisco C. Wenceslao.[48]

In her April 25, 2002 Affidavit, Mariquit gave the following pertinent statements as regards petitioner
Go:
xxxx
8. Sometime in May 1999, during a cocktail party for the sales department of Digitel held
at the Summit Lounge of the Manila Galleria Suites, Go, after noticing that I was wearing
a short skirt, insisted that I sit down so that he could take a better look at my legs.

9. On 20 August 1999, in a company-wide sales conference at Manila Midtown Hotel in

Ermita Manila, Go while purportedly asking questions about my work, deliberately
dropped his hand on my lap and repeatedly stroked my thighs. I was shocked and
deeply offended by Gos indecent display of behavior;

10. After the sales conference, Go became more attentive to me and began to drop by at
my office to start a conversation with me. Such sudden display of affection disturbed me
as well as made me feel awkward whenever Go approached me;

11. In October 1999, during a farewell party for departing Digitel officers held at the
residence of Digitel employee Matet Ruiz, Go insisted that I dance with him. Fearful of
causing a scene at a public gathering, I agreed to dance a few steps with him and when
I attempted to sit down, Go blocked my way and pinched my waist;

12. On 19 November 1999, during another party given by an officer of Digitel, Mr.
Policarpio B. Pau at his residence in Quezon City, I could no longer elude Gos advances
because he cornered me on a sofa by sitting so close and in such a way that I was
virtually pinned against the side of the sofa. Go held my hand and started massaging it
in the guise of looking at the ring that I was then wearing. Because I felt uncomfortable
and uneasy with Gos repulsive actions, I took off the ring and gave it to him. To date, Go
has not yet returned the ring to me.

13. Go then crept his hand under the throw pillow which I had placed to separate me
from Go to reach for my vagina and to poke it several times. I could not escape because
I was hemmed in by the arm of the sofa.

14. When I was finally able to extricate myself from Gos clutches, I stood up, but Go
pulled me to the dance floor, pressed me close to him and moved his hand across my
back to feel my body. I tried to move away from him and at the same time tried not to
attract anyone [sic] attention nor to cause a scene. Go then whispered in my ears, Do
not push me, I could make life in Digitel easy for you. I can take care of your promotion
and give you rewards.

15. In order to break free from Gos holds, I maneuvered to turn to the beat of the
music. Go then reached out his hand and groped my breast, caressed my back and
reached inside my blouse to rub me from up my brassieres down to my buttocks. As I
was trying to resist Gos sexual advances, Go again hinted that my promotion would be
accelerated if I would only be nice to him.
 16. On 11 February 2000, during a dinner party for Digitels sales force held at
the Manila Galleria Suites, Go called for me to start the line for the buffet and again
rubbed his hand across my back to feel my brassiere.

x x x x[49] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As regards petitioner Severino, Mariquit stated:

xxxx
18. I also caught Severino looking at my legs up to the back of my thighs on several
occasions, to wit: (a) in January 1999 when he intentionally pointed to my legs to a
fellow company officer who also looked at them; (b) in the NEAX Training Room in
February 1999 when I picked up things I dropped on the floor, where Severino even
walked behind me to get a better view of my thighs; and (c) during our out-of-town
strategic planning session in September 1999 at the Princess Urduja Hotel in
Pangasinan.

19. Whenever Severino presided over meetings where I was asked to attend, he always
tilted his head to look at my legs and peek in between my thighs thereby making me feel
awkward and uncomfortable such that I preferred to sit with my back facing him.

20. During my last few months in Digitel, specifically March to June 2000, Severino
purposely sat near me during meetings and intentionally brushed his legs on my legs;

21. After the 19 November 1999 incident with Go at the party of Mr. Policarpio B. Pau, I
reported my disgrace and outrage over the sexual advances inflicted upon me by Go, to
Severino to which he replied, I saw what happened. I have eyes too.

x x x x (Italics in the original).[50]

Grace J. Sta. Clara, a licensed broker of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and, as stated above, a
friend of Mariquit, declared in her affidavit:

xxxx

7. That Ms. Soriano told me she often caught Severino staring at her crotch and made
suggestive remarks, for instance, he asked her to wear shorts during out of town trips.
8. That the real shock to me was when Ms. Soriano told me of the incident at a party
given by one of Digitel officials when she was harassed by Johnson Go, a brother of Mr.
 John Gokongwei and Digitels Senior EVP, which in her words ran, more or less, as
follows: Hinipuan ako sa boobs at dinukot yon pipi ko.

9. That I asked Ms. Soriano to sue Johnson Go for his dastardly act but she hesitated
understandably because, as a single parent with four children, she did not want to lose
her job and decided to just avoid Go.

10. That after the incident and Go must have felt that Ms. Soriano was avoiding him,
which he said so according to her, Severino suddenly changed his attitude toward her
and, in Ms. Sorianos words, began making impossible demands she could not possibly
comply with.

11. That Ms. Soriano told me Severino must have been under pressure from Go to make
her give in to his advances because he (Go) knew she was a single parent who could
not afford to lose her job, which was a usual technique of a sexual predator like Go who
reportedly used it in the past with female employees.[51]

x x x x (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

For his part, Francisco C. Wenceslao, father of one of Mariquits four children, stated in his Affidavit:

xxxx

6. That I knew, with due respect to the memory of Mr. Henry Go, that he and his brother
(Respondent Go) were reputed to be womanizers as, in fact, Henry while married
impregnated his secretary but who he married eventually after reportedly divorcing his
wife.
7. That even before I met Ms. Soriano and her joining Digitel, I already knew about
Respondent Gos said reputation that reportedly led to his separation from his wife and the
resignation of lady employees not only from Digitel but also from other companies he was
connected with.
8. That it was no surprise therefore when Ms. Soriano complained to me that Go made
undeniable advances to her on at least two (2) occasions, to wit:

8.1 Sometime in late August 1999, Ms. Soriano confided to me that in a company
sales conference at Manila Midtown Hotel, Respondent Go, who she barely knew
then, sat close to her and began a conversation. He immediately and repeatedly
dropped his hand on her lap and touched her thighs. She was naturally outraged
by such brazenness from which she excused herself and moved away to join
other Digitel employees on the dance floor.
 8.2 In a party given by a company official, Mr. Policarpio Pau, in November 1999
at his residence in Loyola Heights, Quezon City, obviously with malicious
forethought suddenly sat on the sofas side while massaging her hand and
pretending to be interested in her ring. She removed the ring and gave it to him
so he would release her hand. Worse, Go suddenly put his hand under her thigh
and moved it as far as he could with clear intention to touch her private
parts. According to Ms. Soriano, she was so embarrassed and would have
melted if she were a candle because she sensed that Go was speaking in
Chinese and telling other guests what he was doing to her.

9. That Ms. Soriano angrily related to me the above incidents immediately upon arriving
home from each of the said occasions because during the time in question, Ms. Soriano
and I were again sleeping together.

10. That Ms. Soriano was very angry and outraged on both occasions for the humiliation
she suffered because Go treated her so cheaply in front of her fellow Digitel executives.[52]

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Wenceslao added:

xxxx

12. That Ms. Soriano told me about subsequent events in their office such as when Go
visited her in the office to ask why she had been eluding him as if she did not like him at
all.

13. That, according to Ms. Soriano, it was during that time when she began avoiding Go
that she noticed a big change in Mr. Eric Severinos attitude towards her as though he
wanted to make her job as miserable and unbearable as he could possibly do because
of the following incidents:

13.1 He raised his voice and was virtually shouting at Ms. Soriano during staff
meetings with no apparent reason except to embarrass her in front of
her colleagues and subordinates. As a result, two members of her staff, namely:
Ms. Andrea Arnedo and Ms. Evelyn Indu[c]tivo, became defiant and
uncooperative and refused to do the work Ms. Soriano assigned to them;
 13.2 Severino refused Ms. Sorianos repeated requests to transfer the two ladies
to another department despite her imploring him to understand that the hostility
of the two to her made it impossible to accomplish the work she assigned to
them;

13.3 Severino became more demanding in imposing work deadlines while

denying Ms. Sorianos requests for approval of programs and projects that would
enhance the work of her department, for instance, Severino cavalierly
disapproved Digitels Web Magazine that would have been an effective marketing
tool;

13.4 Severino denied outright Ms. Sorianos recommendation to promote Ms.

Lorraine Javier from a senior supervisory to managerial position without any
explanation despite Ms. Sorianos belief that the promotion was not only well
deserved but would also improve her staffs morale;

13.5 Their relationship became worse when Severino gave Ms. Sorianos
performance a rating of only 60% from 90% a year earlier.[53] (Underscoring
supplied)

On the other hand, petitioners submitted the affidavits of Grace D. Rallos-Bakunawa,[54] Ma. Lourdes B.
Claveria,[55] Pau,[56] and Ma. Purisima Y. Velasco,[57] all executed in 2001 and which were priorly
presented before the Office of the City Prosecutor. Also submitted were the affidavits
of Andrea[58] and Evelyn.[59]
Grace D. Rallos-Bakunawa, former Vice President for Human Resource Division of Digitel, stated the
following:

xxxx

5. I have never seen Mr. Johnson [Go] shower any female employee, moreso Mariquit
with unusual attention or gaze for that matter that would make anyone believe Mariquits
allegations that Mr. Johnson [Go] is interested in her sexually. I couldnt really imagine
that, considering Mariquits age and her being already a grandmother.

6. Owing to the character of Mr. Johnson, I wouldnt have entertained the idea that he
would harass her nor anyone sexually notwithstanding her claim that she is physically
attractive. Further, someone of Mariquits age and stature would know how to conduct
herself to avoid incidents, as she is claiming, unless the provocation would actually
come from her.

xxxx
 20. I was present during the sales conference at Manila Midtown Hotel in Ermita Manila
on August 1999. During this occasion, she was never seated as she described, with Mr.
Johnson Go. There were other male executives seated beside her and that I saw her
disappear after dinner. I know that being the organizer of the conference, she had a
room with her staff at the Midtown. I presumed she slept after that tiring day.

21. I was also present at the birthday party of Mr. Jun Pau on 19 November 1999. As my
usual behavior in Digitel parties, I would go around to check if people are interacting with
each other. It has been more than a month since I left the company, hence, I was
excited to chat with most of the people there. I noticed Mariquit somewhat feeling out-of-
place with other executives, as usual with her distant affect.I never detected any unusual
happenings between Mr. Johnson and her during said party. I even sat in-between Mr[.]
Johnson [Go] and Mariquit owing to the space between them in the sofa, while Reby
Magtuto was in the single armchair perpendicular to the sofa.

22. My farewell party in Digitel, for clarification was on September 4, 1999 and
not October 1, 1999 as Mariquit claims. Mr. Johnson [Go] was seated in the middle of
the party beside Camilo Tierro, Jun Pau, Isa Alejandrino, Reby Magtuto and myself who
would stand up to sing.

23. I never saw Mr. Johnson [Go] being seated beside Mariquit. Further, that farewell
party was exclusively tendered for me as it was my advance birthday party, which was
supposedly planned for October 3. Since I would be in Cebu for a PMAP Conference, I
decided to hold it in advance and coincide it with my farewell party.[60]

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Pau, Executive Vice President of Digitel, stated:

xxxx
2. As an executive officer of Digitel I have been invited to both official as well as social
functions/gathering of company officers and employees;
3. On 19 November 1999 I organized a party at my residence at Argentina St., Loyola
Grand Villas, Quezon City to commemorate my birthday;
4. The party was held in the living room, lanai and swimming pool area; However, since
it rained during the party; my guests stayed at the living room and lanai area for most of
the time; The lanai area and the living room [are] separated by a door which was left
open during the party since the piano is located inside the living room; The said rooms
are also well lighted since I have two chandeliers in the living room;
 5. I approximately had sixty guests all officers and employees of Digitel; The party
started from 7:30 PM until 12 midnight of the following day;
6. Since I am the host of the party, I was all over the place entertaining and seeing to the
convenience of everybody specially the senior executive officer, Mr. Johnson Robert Go;
7. I did not see any unusual event which took place during the party including the
preposterous allegations made by Ms. Mariquit E. Soriano on the alleged indecent
advances made against her by Mr. Johnson Go;
8. Since the party area is small, anyone can see everyones activity, any incident activity
will definitely be noticed by everybody in the house;

9. On May 1999 I was present at the cocktail party held by Digitel on the Summit Lounge
of Manila Galleria Suites (MGS); This was organized by the company for reaching its sales
target; The function room of MGS can only accommodate 50-60 persons and there were
30-40 persons who attended the said cocktail party; Thus, we could all see each other in
the room; As far as I can remember I did not notice any indecent or lascivious act
committed by Mr. Johnson Go against Ms. Mariquit Soriano;
10. Furthermore, the department of Ms. Soriano is in charge of these functions. She is
always busy preparing, organizing and coordinating these functions, hence, she could
not have the luxury of socializing with the guests;
11. I was also present during the October 1999 party which was held at the residence of
Matet Ruiz; I am very familiar with Matets house since it is very near Digitels office and
we always hold parties there;The area is approximately 40 sq. meters big; Since there
were more or less 20-30 persons present, every body was literally very close with each
other so everybody can see and notice the activity of the other guests; Again there was
no unusual or indecent incident which took place during the said party;

x x x x[61] (Underscoring supplied)

From the above-quoted statements of affiants Wenceslao and Sta. Clara, it is readily gathered that they
are hearsay. The Labor Arbiter thus correctly discredited them as such, as it did correctly observe that
Mariquit failed to present a single witness to corroborate her charges. At any rate, why Mariquit, for the
first time raised the issue of sexual harassment which was, in the case of Go, allegedly committed on
five occasions from May 1999 to February 11, 2000 only on May 28, 2001 when she filed criminal
complaints against herein individual petitioners, about 11 months after her resignation or two years
after the first alleged occurrence, she did not even proffer the reason therefor.

In her Comment,[62] however, Mariquit argues that there is no prescription that would bar the filing of
cases involving sexual harassment [as] the period varies depending on the needs, circumstances, and
emotional threshold of the employee. She cites Philippine Aelous Automotive United Corporation v.
NLRC[63] wherein the complainant therein cried sexual harassment after four years and this Court held:
 x x x Strictly speaking, there is no time period within which he or she [alleged victim of
sexual harassment] is expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to do
so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the
emotional threshold of the employee.
Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out
with her employers sexual impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are
made of the stuff that can endure the agony and trauma of a public, even corporate,
scandal. x x x[64]

The Labor Arbiter before which Mariquit also cited Philippine Aelous brushed aside the same in this
wise:

The ruling in the above-cited case does not squarely apply to the present case. In that
[case], the complainant thereat, Ms. Rosalinda C. Cortez, did not resign from her job;
she did not undergo psychological treatment; and she was not an executive of the
company she worked with.[65]

In Philippine Aelous, the therein complainant employee Rosalinda raised the issue of sexual
harassment as soon as she had the opportunity to do so. Thus, after the company issued a
memorandum terminating her employment in November 1994, she filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter on December 6, 1994, raising the issue of sexual harassment committed four years earlier by
her superior who had charged her of committing gross acts of disrespect. The earliest opportunity for
her to cry foul thus came only after she was terminated in November 1994.

It bears noting that in Philippine Aelous, this Court observed: If petitioner [Philippine Aelous] had not
issued the third memorandum that terminated the services of private respondent, we could only
speculate how much longer she would keep her silence.[66]

If Rosalinda kept her silence, she must have done so out of fear of losing her job. When, however, she
was fired, she immediately broke her silence.

The case of Mariquit is different. She voluntarily submitted on June 27, 2000 a letter of resignation
dated June 28, 2000, to become effective on June 30, 2000. She subsequently executed a Deed of
Quitclaim and Release on August 22, 2000. There was no reason for her to be afraid of losing her job
or not getting anything from Digitel. Still, she waited for about 11 months, counted from the date of filing
of her letter of resignation or about nine months counted from the day she executed the Deed of
Quitclaim and Release before she, for the first time, charged herein individual petitioners with sexual
harassment.

While, as this Court stated in Philippine Aelous, there is, strictly speaking, no fixed period within which
an alleged victim of sexual harassment may file a complaint, it does not mean that she or he is at liberty
to file one anytime she or he wants to. Surely, any delay in filing a complaint must be justifiable or
reasonable as not to cast doubt on its merits.

At all events, it is settled that the only test of whether an alleged fact or circumstance is worthy of
credence is the common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men.

As New Jersey Vice Chancellor Van Fleet stated in the often-cited case of Daggers v. Van
Dyck:[67] Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.[68]

From the earlier-quoted narration of alleged facts by Mariquit, this Court finds that it does not pass the
test of credibility.

Mariquit claimed that as regards petitioner Severino, she often caught him looking at her legs up to the
back of her thighs on several occasions. If to her the acts amounted to sexual harassment, why did she
not bring the matter to the attention of any company official to make sure that they wont happen again
and she be spared of any disgrace or vexation?

Following Mariquits narration, it would appear that the earliest harassment committed by Severino took
place in January 1999 when he intentionally pointed to [her] legs to a fellow company officer who also
looked at them, while the earliest committed by Go occurred in May 1999 during a cocktail party at the
Manila Galleria Suites. Yet, she claimed to have reported and expressed to, oddly enough, Severino,
who was the first to allegedly harass her, her disgrace and outrage over the sexual advances made by
Go, and only during the party of Pau on November 19, 1999, a claim denied by Severino.

As regards the five incidents of sexual harassment attributed to Go, a discussion of even only one of
them betrays its non-conformity to human experience.

In paragraphs 12 to 15 of her April 25, 2002 Affidavit which were quoted earlier, Mariquit, narrating the
November 19, 1999 incident which allegedly took place at the residence of Pau, claimed that she was
cornered by Go on a sofa in such a way that she was virtually pinned against its side, making it
impossible for her to elude his advances. It is not disputed that it was raining at the time and that the
about 60 guests had no choice but to stay in the living room and covered lanai of Paus
residence. Could not have at least one noticed the incident? She presented no one, however. On the
other hand, Pau belied her claim.

Mariquit went on to claim that Go crept his hand under a throw pillow and poked her vagina several
times. She justified her failure to flee by claiming that she was hemmed in by the arm of the sofa. But if
indeed Go did such condemnable act, could she not have slapped him or stood up and/or left?
Yet still, by her claim, Mariquit danced on the same occasion with Go, albeit allegedly thru force, during
which he pressed her close to him and moved his hand across her back to feel her body. Any woman in
her right mind, whose vagina had earlier been poked several times without her consent and against her
will, would, after liberating herself from the clutches of the person who offended her, raise hell. But
Mariquit did not.

Mariquit claimed that while dancing, in order to free herself from Gos hold, she maneuvered to turn to
the beat of the music. It was at this time, according to her, that Go reached out his hand and groped
[her] breast, caressed [her] back and reached inside [her] blouse to rub [her] from up [her] brassieres
down to [her] buttocks. Since this alleged incident occurred while Mariquit and Go were dancing, and
surely there were a lot of people around in the well lighted small area as stated by house owner Pau,
would Go be that maniacal to forego the respect accorded to him by virtue of his high position? To be
sure, a person who holds a very exalted position would normally behave at social gatherings, unless he
is a proven maniac, to deserve that respect.

Petitioners Go and Severino, on the other hand, presented affidavits of persons who were present
during the time when alleged incidents took place and who declared in effect that no such incidents did
take place and could have taken place. The appellate court dismissed the claim of these affiants,
however, as obviously biased in favor of [petitioners], their superior and employer.[69]

In Lufthansa German Airlines v. CA,[70] this Court, citing the earlier case of Santos v. Concepcion and
Santos[71], ruled that the presence of an employer-employee relationship where a witness is an
employee of a party is not or itself sufficient to discredit his testimony.

While it may be true, as the trial court opines[,] that testimony of employees of a party is of
course open to the criticism that they would naturally testify, as far as they possibly could
in favor of their employers, and in weighing testimony such a relation between a witness
and a party is frequently noticed by the court, it is equally true that the witness is an
employee or an overseer of a party is not of itself sufficient to discredit his
testimony.[72] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Justifying her failure to present an eyewitness, Mariquit claimed that they (eyewitnesses) were warned
by Digitel of being dismissed from their jobs should they testify in her favor. In support thereof, she
presented the affidavit[73] dated June 12, 2002 of Grace L. Murphy, a former classmate at St. Theresas
College in Manila.

A reading of the affidavit of Grace, who was never an employee nor present at the party of Digitel,
reveals, however, that she merely concluded that the employees of Digitel were instructed or harassed
not to testify in favor of Mariquit when they failed to meet one Matet Ruiz, a Digitel employee who kept
avoiding to meet [Mariquit].

As petitioners put it: It is always easy to say that no one is willing to testify to corroborate the accusers
allegations against an employer for fear of retaliation on ones livelihood. But courts should also not
close their eyes to the possibility that the failure to present a witness could only mean that the act
complained of did not actually happen.[74]

If indeed Mariquit was sexually harassed, her resignation would have been an effective vehicle for her
to raise it. Instead, however, of raising it in her resignation letter, [75] she even thanked petitioner
Severino for the opportunity of working with [him]. Again, this is contrary to human nature and
experience. For if indeed petitioner Severino was her sexual harasser, she would have refrained from
being cordial to him on her resignation. Not only that. By her claim (in her Affidavit),[76] she had an
altercation with Severino on June 27, 2000, the day she filed her resignation letter postdated June 28,
2000. So why such cordiality?

Again, after submitting her resignation letter, why would she, by her claim, want to withdraw the
same. Even if it would mean working again with her alleged sexual harassers?[77]Given her educational
background and her work experiences, it would not be difficult for her to land on another job, free from
any harassment.[78] To be sure, she would not wish to stay in Digitel any longer if she was really
harassed, sexually and professionally.

Parenthetically, a resignation once accepted by the employer cannot be withdrawn without the consent
of the employer.[79] As Intertrod Maritime, Inc. v. NLRC[80] emphasized:

Once an employee resigns and his resignation is accepted, he no longer has any right to
the job. If the employee later changes his mind, he must ask for approval of the withdrawal
of his resignation from his employer, as if he were re-applying for the job. It will then be up
to the employer to determine whether or not his service would be continued. If the employer
accepts said withdrawal, the employee retains his job. x x x[81]

Petitioners fault the appellate courts giving undue credence to the Psychological Evaluation Report
made by Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno, PhD dated December 14, 2000 (Magno Report) as it (the
appellate court) noted what to it was the NLRCs omission of the conclusion in said report that Mariquits
behavioral problems stemmed from the trauma she experienced confirming that indeed she was a
victim of sexual harassment.[82] They claim that the appellate court selectively seized upon portions of
the Magno Report and only highlighted the following statements from the Report in its assailed
decision:

Summary and Conclusion

She is a good, generous and hardworking person, there is no doubt about this, and she has
done her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are
remarkable and praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of
human situations in surprisingly shallow (gullibility is her greatest weakness) for a person of her
intelligence and life experience. This explains how she can be easily victimized by an abusive
employer.
Diagnosis for MES:

Axis I Major Depression

Axis II Narcissistic/Borderline Personality
with compulsive and histrionic features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors: Sexual Harassment and
Job loss
Severity: severe[83] (Emphasis by the Court of Appeals).

In crediting the Magno Report, the appellate court described Dr. Magnos experience in the
field of psychology as extensive and specialized, whereas it found petitioners witness-affiant Bakunawa
to have just a degree in psychology and human resource management background.[84]

The only indication on record of Dr. Magnos extensive and specialized experience, however, is
that appearing on the top page of the Magno Report-Annex G[85] of Mariquits Reply-Position Paper
wherein Dr. Magno is referred to as Clinical Psychologist.

And, while sexual harassment is, in the Magno Report, mentioned as a psychological stressor
under the Summary and Conclusion portion, nothing therein, as correctly pointed out by petitioners,
mentions or discusses how Mariquit was alleged to have been sexually harassed basis of the appellate
court to hold that:

x x x Worse, the NLRC completely disregarded the findings of the Clinical Psychologist who
examined petitioner, Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno, and selected only those portions of her
evaluation report that showed petitioners emotional dysfunction and omitting Dr. Magnos
conclusion that her behavioral problems stemmed from the trauma she experienced confirming
that indeed she was a victim of sexual harassment x x x[86] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Any employee, male or female, may charge an employer or superior with sexual harassment,
but the claim must be well substantiated.[87] As reflected above, however, Mariquits claim does not pass
the test of credibility.
The findings of the NLRC, which adopted those of the Labor Arbiter, being in accordance with the
evidence on record, and, as earlier stated, Mariquit failed to discharge the onus of proving that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion, it was error for the appellate court to give due course to
Mariquits petition for certiorari.
In fine, Mariquit having failed to prove that she was constructively dismissed, a discussion of the award
of backwages, separation pay and damages is rendered unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Court of Appeals Decision of August
20, 2004 and Resolution of November 10, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated August 18, 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission, which affirmed that of the Labor
Arbiter, is REINSTATED

Jacutin v People
That sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court pursuant to the provisions of RA 7975, the accused, a public officer, being then
the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City with salary grade 26 but a high ranking official by
express provision of RA 7975, committing the offense in relation to his official functions and taking
advantage of his position, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, demand, solicit,
request sexual favors from Ms. Juliet Q. Yee, a young 22 year-old woman, single and fresh graduate in
Bachelor of Science in Nursing who was seeking employment in the office of the accused, namely: by
demanding from Ms. Yee that she should, expose her body and allow her private parts to be mashed
and stimulated by the accused, which sexual favor was made as a condition for the employment of Ms.
Yee in the Family Program of the Office of the accused, thus constituting sexual harassment. [1]
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged; hence, trial proceeded.
Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that on 28 November 1995 her
father accompanied her to the office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment. Juliets
father and petitioner were childhood friends. Juliet was informed by the doctor that the City Health
Office had just then filled up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he might be
able to help her.
The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned to the City Health Office, and
they were informed by petitioner that a medical group from Texas, U.S.A., was coming to town in
December to look into putting up a clinic in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, where she might be
considered. On 01 December 1995, around nine oclock in the morning, she and her father went back to
the office of petitioner. The latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family planning project for
the city and that, if she were interested, he could interview her for the job. Petitioner then started putting
up to her a number of questions. When asked at one point whether or not she already had a boyfriend,
she said no. Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her father were not around, she could afford to be
honest in her answers to the doctor. The father, taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner then
inquired whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her his theory on the various aspects of
virginity. He hypothetically asked whether she would tell her family or friends if a male friend happened
to intimately touch her. Petitioner later offered her the job where she would be the subject of a research
program. She was requested to be back after lunch.
Before proceeding to petitioners office that afternoon, Juliet dropped by at the nearby church to
seek divine guidance as she felt so confused. When she got to the office, petitioner made several
telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether there was any available opening for her. Not
finding any, petitioner again offered her a job in the family planning research undertaking. She
expressed hesitation if a physical examination would include hugging her but petitioner assured her that
he was only kidding about it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told her to meet him at
Borja Street so that people would not see them on board the same car together. Soon, at the
designated place, a white car driven by petitioner stopped. She got in. Petitioner held her pulse and told
her not to be scared. After dropping by at his house to put on his bowling attire, petitioner got back to
the car.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath, and she said she was so
in a hurry that she did not find time for it. Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and
she said no. Petitioner told her to raise her foot and lower her pants so that he might confirm it. She felt
assured that it was all part of the research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held
her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair. Surprised, she
exclaimed hala ka! and instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his
right hand saying words of endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her
to raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while but, eventually,
raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered
her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that she was through with the
research. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before she alighted from
the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for
her expenses.
Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr. Jacutin and the money he gave her
but she did not give the rest of the story. Her mother scolded her for accepting the money and
instructed her to return it.In the morning of 04 December 1994, Juliet repaired to the clinic to return the
money to petitioner but she was not able to see him until about one oclock in the afternoon. She tried to
give back the money but petitioner refused to accept it.
A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On 16 December 1995, she attempted to
slash her wrist with a fastener right after relating the incident to her mother. Noticing that Juliet was
suffering from some psychological problem, the family referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for
counseling. Dr. Adaza would later testify that Juliet, together with her sister, came to see her on 21
December 1995, and that Juliet appeared to be emotionally disturbed, blaming herself for being so
stupid as to allow Dr. Jacutin to molest her. Dr. Adaza concluded that Juliets frustration was due to post
trauma stress.
Petitioner contradicted the testimony of Juliet Yee. He claimed that on 28 November 1995 he had a
couple of people who went to see him in his office, among them, Juliet and her father, Pat. Justin Yee,
who was a boyhood friend. When it was their turn to talk to petitioner, Pat. Yee introduced his daughter
Juliet who expressed her wish to join the City Health Office. Petitioner replied that there was no
vacancy in his office, adding that only the City Mayor really had the power to appoint city personnel. On
01 December 1995, the afternoon when the alleged incident happened, he was in a meeting with the
Committee on Awards in the Office of the City Mayor. On 04 December 1995, when Juliet said she
went to his office to return the P300.00, he did not report to the office for he was scheduled to leave for
Davao at 2:35 p.m. to attend a hearing before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. He
submitted in evidence a photocopy of his plane ticket. He asserted that the complaint for sexual
harassment, as well as all the other cases filed against him by Vivian Yu, Iryn Salcedo, Mellie
Villanueva and Pamela Rodis, were but forms of political harassment directed at him.
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, dated 05 November 1999,
penned by Mr. Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, finding the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of
Sexual Harassment under Republic Act No. 7877. The Sandiganbayan concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, convicting the accused RICO JACUTIN Y SALCEDO of
the crime of Sexual Harassment, defined and punished under R.A. No. 7877, particularly Secs. 3 and 7
of the same Act, properly known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Accused is further ordered to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos, by way
of moral damages; Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos, by way of Exemplary damages and
to pay the cost of suit.[2]
In the instant recourse, it is contended that -
I. Petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in view of the inapplicability of
Republic Act No. 7877 to the case at bar.
II. Petitioner [has been] denied x x x his constitutional right to due process of law and presumption of
innocence on account of the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.[3]
The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:
SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-
related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand,
request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.
Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held when
complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her desire to gain employment. He
did try to show an interest in her plight, her father being a boyhood friend, but finding no opening
suitable for her in his office, he asked her about accepting a job in a family planning research project. It
all started from there; the Sandiganbayan recited the rest of the story:
x x x. Succeeding in convincing the complainant that her physical examination would be a part of a
research, accused asked complainant if she would agree that her private parts (bolts) would be
seen. Accused assured her that with her cooperation in the research, she would gain knowledge from
it. As complainant looked upon the accused with utmost reverence, respect, and paternal guidance, she
agreed to undergo the physical examination.At this juncture, accused abruptly stopped the interview
and told the complainant to go home and be back at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day,
December 1, 1995. Complainant returned at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, but did not proceed
immediately to the office of the accused, as she dropped by a nearby church to ask divine guidance, as
she was confused and at a loss on how to resolve her present predicament. At 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon, she went back to the office of the accused. And once inside, accused called up a certain
Madonna, inquiring if there was a vacancy, but he was told that she would only accept a registered
nurse.Complainant was about to leave the office of the accused when the latter prevailed upon her to
stay because he would call one more hospital. In her presence, a call was made. But again accused
told her that there was no vacancy. As all efforts to look for a job in other hospitals failed, accused
renewed the offer to the complainant to be a part of the research in the Family Planning Program where
there would be physical examination.Thereafter, accused motioned his two (2) secretaries to go out of
the room. Upon moving closer to the complainant, accused asked her if she would agree to the
offer. Complainant told him she would not agree because the research included hugging. He then
assured her that he was just kidding and that a pre-schooler and high schooler have already been
subjected to such examination. With assurance given, complainant changed her mind and agreed to
the research, for she is now convinced that she would be of help to the research and would gain
knowledge from it. At this point, accused asked her if she was a tomboy, she answered in the
negative. He then instructed her to go with him but he would first play bowling, and later proceed with
the research (physical examination). On the understanding of the complainant that they will proceed to
the clinic where the research will be conducted, she agreed to go with the accused. But accused
instructed her to proceed to Borja St. where she will just wait for him, as it was not good for people to
see them riding in a car together. She walked from the office of the accused and proceeded to Borja St.
as instructed. And after a while, a white car arrived. The door was opened to her and she was
instructed by the accused to come inside. Inside the car, he called her attention why she was in a
pensive mood. She retorted she was not. As they were seated side by side, the accused held her pulse
and told her not to be scared. He informed her that he would go home for a while to put on his bowling
attire. After a short while, he came back inside the car and asked her if she has taken a bath. She
explained that she was not able to do so because she left the house hurriedly. Still while inside the car,
accused directed her to raise her foot so he could see whether she has varicose veins on her
legs. Thinking that it was part of the research, she did as instructed. He told her to raise it higher, but
she protested. He then instructed her to lower her pants instead. She did lower her pants, exposing half
of her legs. But then the accused pushed it forward down to her knees and grabbed her legs. He told
her to raise her shirt. Feeling as if she had lost control of the situation, she raised her shirt as
instructed. Shocked, she exclaimed, hala ka! because he tried to insert his hand into her
panty. Accused then held her abdomen, saying, you are like my daughter, Day! (Visayan word of
endearment), and let the back of his palm touch her forehead, indicating the traditional way of making
the young respect their elders. He again told her to raise her shirt. Feeling embarrassed and
uncomfortable, yet unsure whether she was entertaining malice, she raised her shirt up to her
breast. He then fondled her breast. Reacting, she impulsively lower her shirt and embraced her bar
while silently asking God what was happening to her and asking the courage to resist accuseds
physical advances. After a short while, she asked him if there could be a right place for physical
examination where there would be many doctors. He just exclaimed, so you like that there are many
doctors! Then he asked her if she has tooth decay. Thinking that he was planning to kiss her, she
answered that she has lots of decayed teeth. He advised her then to have them treated. Finally, she
informed him that she would not continue with the research. The accused retorted that complainant was
entertaining malice and reminded her of what she earlier agreed; that she would not tell anybody about
what happened. He then promised to give her P15,000.00 so that she could take the examination. She
was about to open the door of the car when he suddenly grabbed her thigh, but this time, complainant
instantly parried his hand with her bag.[4]
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it should stand to
reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the
municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have
conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliets employment. Indeed,
petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for
his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the Sandiganbayan
were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioners secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago
Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were
said to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered by petitioner, i.e., that he was at
a meeting of the Committee on Awards; the court a quo said:
There are some observations which the Court would like to point out on the evidence adduced by the
defense, particularly in the Minutes of the meeting of the Awards Committee, as testified to by witness
Myrna Maagad on September 8, 1998.
First, admitted, Teresita I. Rozabal was the immediate supervisor of witness Myrna Maagad. The
Notices to hold the meeting (Exh. 3-A and 3-B) were signed by Teresita Rozabal. But the Minutes of the
meeting, Exh. 5, was signed by Myrna Maagad and not by Teresita Rozabal. The documents, Exhs. 3-
A and 3-B certify that the officially designated secretary of the Awards Committee was Teresita
Rozabal.
Second, why was Myrna Maagad in possession of the attendance logbook and how was she able to
personally bring the same in court when she testified on September 8, 1998, when in fact, she admitted
during her testimony that she retired from the government service on December 1, 1997? Surely,
Myrna Maagad could not still be the custodian of the logbook when she testified.
And finally, in the logbook, under the sub-heading, Others Present, the attendance of those who
attended was individually handwritten by the persons concerned who wrote and signed their
names. But in the case of Dr. Tiro and Dr. Rico Jacutin, their names were handwritten by clerk Sylvia
Tan-Nerry, not by Dr. Tiro and Dr. Jacutin. However, Myrna Maagad testified that the logbook was
passed around to attending individuals inside the conference room.[5]
Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal, [6] no cogent reasons
having been sufficiently shown to now hold otherwise. The assessment on the credibility of witnesses is
a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of being able to observe that elusive
and incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses at the stand, an opportunity that is
denied the appellate court.[7]
Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary damages by the
Sandiganbayan must be tempered to reasonable levels. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a
complainant but are awarded only to enable an injured party obtain some means that would help
obviate the sufferings sustained on account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award must not
appear to be the result of passion or undue prejudice,[8] and it must always reasonably approximate the
extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should be recompensed for
her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological counseling expert, has found Juliet to be
emotionally and psychologically disturbed and suffering from post trauma stress following her
unpleasant experience with petitioner. The Court finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee
P30,000.00 moral damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00 exemplary damages to
serve as a deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions.[9]
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23799, finding
Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY of the crime of Sexual Harassment defined and punished under
Republic Act No. 7877, particularly Sections 3 and 7 thereof, and penalizing him with imprisonment of
six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED. The Sandiganbayans award of moral and exemplary damages are
MODIFIED; instead, petitioner is ordered to indemnify the offended party, Juliet Yee, in the amount of
P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 by way of, respectively, moral damages and exemplary damages. Costs
against petitioner.

Bacsin v Wahiman

Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School, Pandan,

Mambajao, Camiguin Province. Respondent Eduardo O. Wahiman
is the father of AAA, an elementary school student of the petitioner.

AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his office to do an errand. [2] Once
inside, she saw him get a folder from one of the cartons on the floor near his table, and place it on his
table. He then asked her to come closer, and when she did, held her hand, then touched and fondled
her breast. She stated that he fondled her breast five times, and that she felt afraid.[3] A classmate of
hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to have witnessed the incident, testified that the fondling
incident did happen just as AAA related it.[4]

Petitioner was charged with Misconduct in a Formal Charge dated February 12, 1996 by
Regional Director Vivencio N. Muego, Jr. of the CSC.[5]

In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened by accident, just as he was
handing AAA a lesson book.[6] He further stated that the incident happened in about two or three
seconds, and that the girl left his office without any complaint.[7]

Resolution of the CSC

In Resolution No. 98-0521 dated March 11, 1998, the CSC found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct
(Acts of Sexual Harassment), and dismissed him from the service.[8]Specifically, the CSC found the
petitioner to have committed an act constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in Resolution No. 99-0273
dated January 28, 1999.

Decision of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner then brought the matter to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51900.

Petitioner raised the following issues before the CA:

1. Whether or not there were efforts by [AAA], her parents and the Honorable
Civil Service Commission to magnify the accidental touching incident on August
16, 1995;

2. Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was supported by the evidence on
record; and
 3. Whether or not there was irregularity in the imposition of the penalty of
removal.[9]

In resolving the case, the CA determined that the issue revolved around petitioners right to due
process, and based on its finding that petitioner had the opportunity to be heard, found that there was
no violation of that right. The CA ruled that, even if petitioner was formally charged with disgraceful and
immoral conduct and misconduct, the CSC found that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved
petitioners guilt of grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.

The Issues Before Us

The petitioner now raises the following issues in the present petition:

1. Whether or not the petitioner could be guilty of acts of sexual harassment,

grave misconduct, which was different from or an offense not alleged in the
formal charge filed against him at the inception of the administrative case.

2. Assuming petitioner was guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and

misconduct as charged by complainant, whether or not the penalty of dismissal
from the service imposed by the Civil Service Commission and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals is in accord with Rule XIV, Section (23) of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and applicable rulings.

3. Whether or not the charge of Misconduct, a lesser offense, includes the

offense of Grave Misconduct; a greater offense.

The petition is without merit.

Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of an offense, such as Grave
Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), different from that specified in the formal charge which was
Misconduct. He further argues that the offense of Misconduct does not include the graver offense of
Grave Misconduct.

This argument is unavailing.

As Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission teaches:

The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted
with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is
 apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation
of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense.[10]

It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against him, which
was his act of improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he defended himself from such
charge. The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this
administrative case.

The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual Harassment
Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law.Contrary to the
argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v.
Rayala,[11] it was held, It is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from
the acts of the offender. The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from
petitioner his act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual
harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or
training environment is committed (w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt fear at the
time petitioner touched her.[12] It cannot then be said that the CSC lacked basis for its ruling, when it
had both the facts and the law. The CSC found the evidence presented by the complainant sufficient
to support a finding of grave misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of administrative agencies,
when supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon the Court.

Leaving aside the discrepancy of the designation of the offense in the formal charge, it must be
discussed whether or not petitioner is indeed guilty, as found by the CA and CSC, of Grave
Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct. From the findings of fact of the CSC, it is clear
that there is misconduct on the part of petitioner. The term misconduct denotes intentional wrongdoing
or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior.[13]

We agree with the rulings of the CSC and the CA.

In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule must be manifest.[14] The act of petitioner of fondling one of his students
is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner cannot in any
way be construed as a case of simple misconduct. Sexually molesting a child is, by any norm, a
revolting act that it cannot but be categorized as a grave offense. Parents entrust the care and
molding of their children to teachers, and expect them to be their guardians while in school. Petitioner
has violated that trust. The charge of grave misconduct proven against petitioner demonstrates his
unfitness to remain as a teacher and continue to discharge the functions of his office.
Petitioners second argument need not be discussed further, as he was rightly found guilty of
grave misconduct. Under Rule IV, Section 52 of the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases,
Grave Misconduct carries with it the penalty of dismissal for the first offense. Thus, the penalty
imposed on petitioner is in accordance with the Rules.
 Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[15] These elements are present in this case, where petitioner was properly informed of
the charge and had a chance to refute it, but failed.

A teacher who perverts his position by sexually harassing a student should not be allowed,
under any circumstance, to practice this noble profession. So it must be here.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision of
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 51900 is hereby AFFIRMED