#71

EPZA v Dulay
148 SCRA 305
GR No. 59603. April 29, 1987

Nature of Action:

Petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order.

Related Facts:

The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan
Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent in
which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent
Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the
just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to private
respondent would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending
that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair
market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the
assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. Thus, the
petitioner filed this petition.

Issue:

Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in

P.D. No. 1533 valid and constitutional.

Ruling:

This Court is constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just

compensation unconstitutional and void and accordingly dismissed.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The

temporary restraining order issued on February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio Decidendi:

The Court is convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the
valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of "just
compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or
the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings.

#80

Lladoc vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue

14 SCRA 292
GR No. L- 19201. June 16, 1965

Nature of Action:
Appeal on the judgment rendered by the Court of Tax Appeals.

Related Facts:
Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash
to Rev. Fr. Ruiz, then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein
petitioner for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was
actually spent for the purpose intended. The donor M.B. Estate, filed the donor's gift tax
return. The respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee's
gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax
amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges and interests from May 15, 1958 to June 15,
1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest to the
assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for
reconsideration presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The
petitioner appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals wherein the petitioner, Rev. Fr. Lladoc
claimed, among others, that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest in
Victorias; that there is no legal entity or juridical person known as the "Catholic Parish Priest
of Victorias," and, therefore, he should not be liable for the donee's gift tax. It was also
asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church, would
not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the provisions of the Constitution.

Issues:
1. Whether the assessment of the gift tax a violation of the Constitution.
2. Whether the petitioner is liable for the tax.

Ruling:
The imposition of the tax is not a violation of the constitutional provision exempting
churches, parsonages or convents, etc. (Art VI, sec. 22 [3], Constitution). The decision
appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed; it is modified, in the sense that petitioner
herein is not personally liable for the said gift tax, and that the Head of the Diocese, herein
substitute petitioner, should pay, as he is presently ordered to pay, the said gift tax, without
special, pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi:
A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property
by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious
purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by the
learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed in the
Constitution (supra) should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes.
And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of
petitioner, the exemption herein must be denied.

The next issue which readily presents itself, in view of petitioner's thesis, petitioner
postulates that he should not be liable, because at the time of the donation he was not the
priest of Victorias. We note the merit of the above claim, this Court, in its Resolution of March
15, 1965, ordered the parties to show cause why the Head of the Diocese to which the parish
of Victorias pertains, should not be substituted in lieu of petitioner, it appearing that the Head
of such Diocese is the real party in interest. The Solicitor General, in representation of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, interposed no objection to such a substitution. Counsel
for the petitioner did not also offer objection thereto.

#98
Tañada v Tuvera
146 SCRA 446
December 29, 1986

Nature of Action:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.

Related Facts:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number
of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees.

Issue:
Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication.

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date
specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. SO ORDERED.

Ratio Decidendi:
 This Court holds that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. “Laws” should refer
to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to
the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole. We agree that publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.