PROPERTY CASES

Salvador H. Laurel vs. Ramon Garcia, et. Al.

G. R. No. 92013. July 25, 1990.

Gutierrez, J.

Doctrine: A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership
until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.

Facts: The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under
the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956, the other lots being the Nampeidai Property (site of
Philippine Embassy Chancery), the Kobe Commercial Property (Commercial lot used as warehouse and parking lot of
consulate staff), and the Kobe Residential Property (a vacant residential lot).

The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development
projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering
during World War II.

The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in 20 years in accordance
with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2, Reparations
Agreement).

The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule and listed under
the heading “Government Sector”, through Reparations Contract 300 dated 27 June 1958. The Roponggi property
consists of the land and building “for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy.” As intended, it became the site of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi building needed
major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained
undeveloped since that time.

During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J.
Valdez, to lease the subject property to Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm, in exchange of the construction of 2
buildings in Roppongi, 1 building in Nampeidai, and the renovation of the Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The
Government did not act favorably to said proposal, but instead, on 11 August 1986, President Aquino created a
committee to study the disposition or utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe though AO-3,
and AO 3-A to 3-D. On 25 July 1987, the President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
reparations’ capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including
the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first “Whereas” clause. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the
Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties
starting with the Roppongi lot.

Two petitions for prohibition were filed seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from
proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 sq. m. of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan
scheduled on 21 February 1990; the temporary restaining order of which was granted by the court on 20 February 1990.
In G.R. No. 92047, a writ of mandamus was prayed for to compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the basis
of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property inspite of strong public opposition and to
explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding
process.

Issues: Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?

Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
Held: No. The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation agreements. They
were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property was specifically designated under the
agreement to house the Philippine embassy. It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has
become patrimonial. The respondents have failed to do so.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership
is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and
resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is intended for
the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service doesn’t automatically
convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a
formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.

Benjamin Rabuco, et. al. vs. Hon. Antonio Villegas

G.R. No. L-24661. February 28, 1974.

Teehankee, J.

Doctrine: When a property is owned by a political subdivision in its public and governmental capacity, the Congress has
absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it
could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation.

Facts: In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of undetermined origin gutted the Malate area including the lot
on which petitioners had built their homes and dwellings. Respondents city officials then took over the lot and kept
petitioners from reconstructing or repairing their burned dwellings. At petitioners’ instance, the Court issued on June 17,
1970 a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents city officials “from performing any act constituting an
interference in or disturbance of herein petitioners’ possession of Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610, of the Cadastral Survey of
the City of Manila” as safeguarded them under the Court’s subsisting preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965 pursuant
to RA 3120.

Issue: Whether RA 3120 is unconstitutional as it infringes the right to due process.

Held: No. The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on the strength of the established doctrine
that the subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in the name of the municipal corporation) and
conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional
authorization and disposition does not constitute infringements of the due process clause or the eminent domain
provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of the legislature’s right of control and power to
deal with State property.
 Levy D. Macasiano vs. Honorable Roberto C. Diokno

G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992

Medialdea, J.:

Doctrine: Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the
absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of
public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Facts: On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the
closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque,
Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon, pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979,
authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan
Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions..

On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque Mayor Walfrido N.
Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and
management of flea markets and/or vending areas.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement
whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the
obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque. Consequently, market stalls were
put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.

On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command,
ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later
returned to respondent Palanyag.

Issue: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease and
use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.

Held: No. The ordinance or resolution authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for a flea
market is invalid. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by
this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for
public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local
government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress.
Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless
specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the
same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority
due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the
ordinance.

Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people, houses and traffic brought
about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market
along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the
problem of congestion. Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations
laid down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be
subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community. Every local
government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety and
convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based
on this objective, the local government should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely
affect the general welfare.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 100709. November 14, 1997.

Panganiban, J.

Doctrine: When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land
and passed the realm of the public domain and accordingly cannot be a subject of a free patent.

Facts: Josefina Morato, private respondent, applied sometime in 1972 a free patent on a parcel of land situated at
Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon. On January 16, 1974, the patent was approved and the Register of Deeds issued an
Original Certificate of Title in favor of Morato on February 4, 1974. Both the free patent and the title specifically required
that the land shall not be alienated or encumbered within five years from the date of the issuance of the patent. Upon
reports that Morato encumbered the said land, violating the 5-year prohibition of the patent, the District Land Officer in
Lucena City conducted an investigation. The officer found out that Morato mortgaged the said property to Nenita Co
and Antonio Quilatan on October 24, 1974, who subsequently built a house on it. Two years later, or on February 2,
1976, part of the property was also leased by Morato to Perfecto Advincula where a warehouse was thereafter
constructed. Moreover it was found out that the said property was a portion of the Calauag Bay, five to six feet deep
under water during high tide and two feet deep at low tide, and not suitable to vegetation. Petitioner then filed a
complaint for the cancellation of the title and reversion of the parcel of land to the public domain on the grounds that
the land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased within the five-year prohibitory period. The lower court
dismissed the complaint ruling that there was no violation of the five-year ban since Morato did not encumber nor
alienate the land as it was merely leased, and the mortgage the latter entered into with Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan
covered only the improvement and not the land itself. Upon appeal, CA affirmed in toto the court’s decision. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether the questioned land is a foreshore land and thus must be reverted to the public domain.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court defined a foreshore land as “that parcel of land which is between high and low water and
left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides”; it is that “strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide”. From the factual findings of the lower court, it was
found out that years before the issuance of the free patent to private respondent, the questioned land was subjected to
several natural calamities like earthquakes and typhoons that caused severe erosion of the land. Then private
respondent introduced improvements and developments to the land. At the time then of the issuance of free patent of
land to Morato, it was not covered by water but due to the gradual sinking of the land caused by natural calamities, the
sea advances had permanently invaded a portion of subject land. During high tide, at least half of the land is 6 feet deep
under water and three feet deep during low tide. The Calauag Bay has extended up to a portion of the land. Thus,
uncontestedly, the land has become a foreshore land and is now a part of the public domain pursuant to Article 420 of
the New Civil Code – being part of the “shores” defined therein. Accordingly, it cannot be disposed of by the
government and appropriated by a private individual, i.e. be a subject of a free patent.
 Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga

G.R. No. L-2440. March 28, 1964

Bengzon, J:

Doctrine: In the case of state properties, properties for public service are of public dominion; this is not so in the case of
provinces, cities, etc., said properties for public service are patrimonial since they are not for public use.

Facts: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of
the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality
of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City.

Sec. 50 of the said Act also provided that —Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer
of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the
Auditor General.

The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City
of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province.

It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog. Subsequently, Republic Act 286
was approved. creating the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province.

Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga
del Sur.

The Auditor General, apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga as follows: 54.39%
for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur.

The Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right
as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is
entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution conveying
all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital
of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.

Issue: Whether all the properties concerned are patrimonial properties.

Held: There are two conflicting applicable laws in the case at bar. Applying the New Civil Code, if the property is owned
by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and
Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and
payment of just compensation. Under the said law, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High
School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital
site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public
use. They would fall under the phrase “public works for public service” for it has been held that under the ejusdem
generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated
properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.

On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all
those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain
patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for
governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc. Under the aforementioned law,
Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and
leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since these were held by the former
Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress.

The records do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga.
Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39
was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings such as those
in the case at bar at their own expense, 14 it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National
Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it
did with the lots in question.

But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere accessories to the lands, which are
public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public. Moreover, said buildings, though located in the
city, will not be for the exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial
residents. The province then — and its successors-in-interest — are not really deprived of the benefits thereof.

But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26
remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes.

The fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature. On the other
hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance since registration cannot
convert public property to private.

In fine, the Court ordered herein defendant Zamboanga City to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the
amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the
latter. Secondly, the defendants were ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of
plaintiff’s 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis
of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of
quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Francisco I. Chavez vs. Public Estate Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation

G.R. No. 133250. May 6, 2003

Carpio, J.

Doctrine: In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.

Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with
the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road.
CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084
tasked PEA “to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas,” and “to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands.” On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay” under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA
“the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project. On April 9, 1988, the
Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands
known as the “Freedom Islands” located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. On
April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
Islands.

Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.

On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the
President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.

Several motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s July 9, 2002 decision which declared the amended JVA null
and void ab initio were filed. The conclusions of said decision were summarized by the Court as follows:

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name
of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to
the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until
classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only
then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.

Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged
areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them
no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI
will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Issue: Whether or not the July 9, 2002 ruling of the Supreme Court should be reversed.

Held: No. Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999,
petitioner had already filed the instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to acquire
the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this petition, two Senate Committees had already approved on September
16, 1997 Senate Committee Report No. 560 which concluded that the Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the
public domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and assuming all the attendant risks, including the
annulment of the Amended JVA. Amari has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in
reclaiming the Freedom Islands. Moreover, Amari does not claim to have even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have started to construct any permanent infrastructure
on the Freedom Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to have introduced any physical improvement or development
on the reclamation project that is the subject of the Amended JVA.

PEA cannot claim that it is “similarly situated” as the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) which under R.A.
No. 7227 is tasked to sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and other military reservations is incorrect. PEA
took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain.
The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes
of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified
private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked
and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private
lands.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross
violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. PEA will simply turn around and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be
reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the
constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

TEOFILO C. VILLARICO, petitioner, vs. VIVENCIO SARMIENTO, SPOUSES BESSIE SARMIENTO-DEL MUNDO & BETH DEL
MUNDO, ANDOKS LITSON CORPORATION and MARITES CARINDERIA, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated December 7, 1998 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 54883, affirming in toto the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 259, dated
November 14, 1996, in Civil Case No. 95-044.

The facts of this case, as gleaned from the findings of the Court of Appeals, are:

Teofilo C. Villarico, petitioner, is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Paraaque City, Metro Manila with an area of sixty-six
(66) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) No. 95453 issued by the Registry of Deeds, same
city.

Petitioners lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging to the government. As
this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore higher than the adjoining areas, the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at several portions of this strip of public land to enable the people
to have access to the highway.

Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her husband Beth Del Mundo, respondents
herein, had a building constructed on a portion of said government land. In November that same year, a part thereof
was occupied by Andoks Litson Corporation and Marites Carinderia, also impleaded as respondents.

In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30 square meter portion of the same
area owned by the government. The property was registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the Registry of Deeds of
Paraaque City.

In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 259, Paraaque City, a complaint for accion publiciana against respondents,
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-044. He alleged inter alia that respondents structures on the government land closed his
right of way to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue; and encroached on a portion of his lot covered by T.C.T. No. 74430.

Respondents, in their answer, specifically denied petitioners allegations, claiming that they have been issued licenses
and permits by Paraaque City to construct their buildings on the area; and that petitioner has no right over the subject
property as it belongs to the government.

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the defendants to have a better right of possession over the subject land except the portion thereof
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74430 of the Register of Deeds of Paraaque;

2. Ordering the defendants to vacate the portion of the subject premises described in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
74430 and gives its possession to plaintiff; and

3. Dismissing the claim for damages of the plaintiff against the defendants, and likewise dismissing the claim for
attorneys fees of the latter against the former.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The trial court found that petitioner has never been in possession of any portion of the public land in question. On the
contrary, the defendants are the ones who have been in actual possession of the area. According to the trial court,
petitioner was not deprived of his right of way as he could use the Kapitan Tinoy Street as passageway to the highway.

On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision affirming the trial courts Decision in toto, thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment hereby appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[4]

In this petition, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following assignments of error:

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS CONTAINED A CONCLUSION WITHOUT CITATION OF SPECIFIC
EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE SAME WAS BASED.

II

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE ONLY ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER OR NOT THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS ACQUIRED A RIGHT OF WAY OVER THE LAND OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS BETWEEN HIS
PROPERTY AND THE NINOY AQUINO AVENUE.

III

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCION PUBLICIANA IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY IN THE
CASE AT BAR.

IV
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS RIGHT OF
WAY DOES NOT CARRY POSSESSION OVER THE SAME.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION
OVER THE SUBJECT LAND BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES.[5]

In their comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that petitioners action for accion
publiciana is not the proper remedy in asserting his right of way on a lot owned by the government.

Here, petitioner claims that respondents, by constructing their buildings on the lot in question, have deprived him of his
right of way and his right of possession over a considerable portion of the same lot, which portion is covered by his
T.C.T. No. 74430 he acquired by means of exchange of real property.

It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioners alleged right of way exists belongs to the state or property of public
dominion. Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows:

ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character.

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

Public use is use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.[6] Records show that
the lot on which the stairways were built is for the use of the people as passageway to the highway. Consequently, it is a
property of public dominion.

Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or
otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject
to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.[7]

Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public dominion, it can not be
burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by mere
tolerance of the government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he can not claim
any right of possession over it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession.

Accordingly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents have better right of
possession over the subject lot.

However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that defendants buildings were constructed on the portion of
the same lot now covered by T.C.T. No. 74430 in petitioners name. Being its owner, he is entitled to its possession.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 7, 1998 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 54883 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that neither petitioner nor respondents have a right of
possession over the disputed lot where the stairways were built as it is a property of public dominion. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Manila International Airport Authority vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No 155650, July 20, 2006.

Carpio, J.:

Doctrine: The term “ports” includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port”
constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of
public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Complex in
Parañaque City. As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment
within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land,including the
runways and buildings (“Airport Lands and Buildings”) then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter
further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode
unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel issued
Opinion No. 061, in which it said that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption for real estate tax
granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA charter. Therefore, MIAA was held to be delinquent in paying its taxes.
The City of Parañaque Levied upon the properties of MIAA, and posted invitations for public biddings of MIAA’s
properties. The City of Parañaque averred that Section 193 of the Local Government code expressly withdrew tax
exemptions from government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs).

Issue: Whether properties of the MIAA are subject to real estate taxes.

Held: No. In the first place, MIAA is not a GOCC, it is an instrumentality of the government. MIAA is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other
government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. As operator of the
international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA
Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways and buildings (“Airport Lands
and Buildings”) then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the
land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the
President of the Philippines.

Furthermore, Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or
the Republic of the Philippines. Article 419 of the Civil Code provides, The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are
property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

The Civil Code provides:

ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial
property.

ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part
of the patrimonial property of the State.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like “roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports” includes seaports
and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the
Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines.

The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and
domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does
not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The operation by the
government of a tollway does not change the character of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay for the
maintenance of the road, either the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or only those among
the public who actually use the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the road. The tollway system is even a
more efficient and equitable manner of taxing the public for the maintenance of public roads.

The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public dominion or
not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one “intended for public use.” Even if the
government collects toll fees, the road is still “intended for public use” if anyone can use the road under the same terms
and conditions as the rest of the public. The charging of fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the road,
the speed restrictions and other conditions for the use of the road do not affect the public character of the road.

The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk
of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA
as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed user’s tax. This means taxing those among the public who
actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use the particular public facility. A
user’s tax is more equitable — a principle of taxation mandated in the 1987 Constitution.

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its Charter calls the “principal airport of the Philippines for both
international and domestic air traffic,” are properties of public dominion because they are intended for public use. As
properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

Being a property of public dominion, the properties of MIAA are beyond the commerce of man.