Hermano Oil Manufacturing (Hermano), by letter, requested the Toll Regulatory Board that it be given an easement of right of

way to access the NLEX, since it was deprived of its enjoyment of its property when it was barred from entry and exit to the
North Luzon Expressway by the access fence that bounded its property located near the Sta. Rita exit of NLEX. The TRB
however denied the request, averring that it is a violation of Section 7.0 of the Limited Access Highway Act (Republic Act 2000)
and may have detrimental effects on the scheduled rehabilitation and improvement of the NLEX.

Hermano thus filed a complaint for specific performance with prayer for TRO against TRB, Engr. Jaime Dumlao, the TRB
Executive Director, the Philippine National Construction Corporation, and the Department of Public Works and Highways,
alleging that it was totally deprived of its enjoyment of its property by preventing ingress and egress to it, and the only access
being the road network in front of its property; that it was denied equal protection of the law because other properties adjacent to
it had access to the NLEX; and it was deprived of its property without due process and just compensation. The Office of the
Solicitor General, appearing for the TRB, filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that it is a suit against the State, and the proper
remedy was to file a petition for certiorari of the denial by the TRB not a complaint for specific performance.

The RTC granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the case, holding that the suit is in the nature of a suit against the State
although the defendants were being sued in their personal capacities, since it would entail appropriation from the State if and
when they were held liable for damages. The RTC also had no jurisdiction over the case in view of PD 1818 and RA 8975 which
prohibits courts from issuing injections and TRO’s in infrastructure projects of the government.

On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the dismissal of the case by the RTC, ruling that the relief sought by Hermano in its
complaint is in violation of the law (RA 2000); when it bought the land, the NLEX was already in existence, as such, an easement
of right of way cannot be granted if the isolation was brought about by the owner; as to non-suability, while the PNCC was sued
along with other governments agencies, it is performing a governmental function, which is the maintenance of highways; while it
put forward cases arguing that government agencies may be sued for performing non-government functions, still it did not
indicate reasons why the NLEX should not be considered a governmental function.
Hermano appealed to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari.

The Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Hermano was deprived of due process and equal protection of the laws when it was denied access to the
NLEX.

The putting up of the access fence on the petitioner’s property was in the valid exercise of police power, assailable
only upon proof that such putting up unduly violated constitutional limitations like due process and equal protection of the
law.10 In Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, the Court has further noted that:
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to certain destinations, its use,
operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on
toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could
use it.11
Clearly, therefore, the access fence was a reasonable restriction on the petitioner’s property given the location thereof
at the right side of Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX. Although some adjacent properties were accorded unrestricted access to the
expressway, there was a valid and reasonable classification for doing so because their owners provided ancillary services to
motorists using the NLEX, like gasoline service stations and food stores12. A classification based on practical convenience and
common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity13.
Lastly, the limited access imposed on the petitioner’s property did not partake of a compensable taking due to the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. There is no question that the property was not taken and devoted for public use.
Instead, the property was subjected to a certain restraint, i.e. the access fence, in order to secure the general safety and welfare of
the motorists using the NLEX. There being a clear and valid exercise of police power, the petitioner was certainly not entitled to
any just compensation.14