BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS OGARIO
It does not mean
FACTS:Felipe A. Bartolome, District Collector of
Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention of 25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of
"SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan" shipped on board the
M/V "Alberto," which was then docked at Pier 6 in Cebu
City. The warrant was issued on the basis of the report of
the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB), Region VII that the rice had been illegally
imported.
Mark Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks of rice,
and his buyer, Nelson Ogario, filed a complaint for
injunction before the RTC of Cebu City. In separate
motions, the Bureau of Customs (BOC), Port of Cebu
and the EIIB, as well as the Philippine Navy and Coast
Guard, sought the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction, but their
motions were denied.
ISSUE:Whether the Regional Trial Courts are
competent to pass upon the validity or regularity of the
seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the
Bureau of Customs.
RULING:In Jao v. Court of Appeals, [10] this Court,
reiterating its ruling in a long line of cases, said:
There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are
devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or
regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings
conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or
otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The
Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
determine all questions touching on the seizure and
forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts
are precluded from assuming cognizance over such
matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus.
It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff
and Customs Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125, as
amended, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the
Court of Tax Appeals," specify the proper fora and
procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or
issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions
of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the
Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is
subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of
Appeals.
The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review
powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the
policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the
governments drive, not only to prevent smuggling and
other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to
render effective and efficient the collection of import and
export duties due the State, which enables the
government to carry out the functions it has been
instituted to perform.
Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were
illegal, which has yet to be proven, we have said that
such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of
jurisdiction thereon.
Under the law, the question of whether probable cause
exists for the seizure of the subject sacks of rice is not
for the Regional Trial Court to determine. The customs
authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that the articles on board a vessel were imported
from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before
they may exercise the power to effect customs searches,
seizures, or arrests provided by law and continue with
the administrative hearings.[12] As the Court held
in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya:[13]
The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of
Customs, is vested with exclusive authority. Even if it be
assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive
competence a taint of illegality may be correctly
imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain
circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred
1
may oust it of such jurisdiction.
however that correspondingly a court of first instance is
vested with competence when clearly in the light of the
above decisions the law has not seen fit to do so. The
proceeding before the Collector of Customs is not final.
An appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and
thereafter to the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach
this Court through the appropriate petition for
review. The proper ventilation of the legal issues raised
is thus indicated. Certainly a court of first instance is not
therein included. It is devoid of jurisdiction.
RIETA VS PEOPLE
FACTS:Col. Panfilo Lacson, the[n] Chief of the Police
Intelligence Branch of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group (MISG for brevity), received information
that certain syndicated groups were engaged in
smuggling activities somewhere in Port Area, Manila. It
was further revealed that the activities [were being] done
at nighttime and the smuggled goods in a delivery panel
and delivery truck [were] being escorted by some police
and military personnel. He fielded three surveillance
stake-out teams the following night along Roxas
Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge,
whereby they were to watch out for a cargo truck. At
around 9:00 oclock in the evening, Col. Lacson and his
men returned to the same area, and as per information
given to him, the said cargo truck will come out from the
premises of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. COSAC
stands for Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime
Battalion. The night watch lasted till the wee hours of
the following morning. About 3:00 a.m. an Isuzu panel
came out from the place of the 2nd COSAC
Detachment. It returned before 4:00 a.m. of [the] same
day.
At around 5 minutes before 4:00 oclock that morning, a
green cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 came out
from the 2nd COSAC Detachment followed and escorted
closely by a light brown Toyota Corona car with Plate
No. GR-433 and with 4 men on board. At that time, Lt.
Col. Panfilo Lacson had no information whatsoever
about the car, so he gave an order by radio to his men to
intercept only the cargo truck. The cargo truck was
intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed that the Toyota car
following the cargo truck suddenly made a sharp U-turn
towards the North, unlike the cargo truck [that] was
going south. Almost by impulse, Col. Lacsons car also
made a U-turn and gave chase to the speeding Toyota
car, which was running between 100 KPH to 120
KPH. Col. Lacson sounded his siren. The chase lasted
for less than 5 minutes until said car made a stop along
Bonifacio Drive, at the foot of Del Pan Bridge. Col.
Lacson and his men searched the car and they found
several firearms, particularly: three (3) .45 cal. Pistols
and one (1) armalite M-16 rifle. He also discovered that
T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was the driver of the Toyota car,
and his companions inside the car were Sgt. Guillermo
Ferrer, Sgt. Fidel Balita and Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre,
[all] belonging to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They
were found not to be equipped with mission orders.
When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was
searched, 305 cases of blue seal or untaxed cigarettes
were found inside. The cargo truck driver known only as
Boy was able to escape while the other passengers or
riders of said truck were apprehended, namely: Police
Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force, Pat.
Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit Police Force, and Gonzalo
Vargas, a civilian.
Lacsons men hauled the intercepted vehicles, the
arrested men and confiscated goods to Camp Crame,
Quezon City. All the 371 cases (305 + 66) of blue seal
cigarettes were turned over to the Bureau of
Customs. Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba executed an Affidavit
of Arrest together with Arnel Acuba. The Booking and
Information Sheet of Ernesto de Castro showed that he
was arrested by the MISG after delivering assorted blue
seal cigarettes at 185 Sanciangco St., Tonsuya, Malabon.
ISSUE:Whether or not the evidence obtained against the
accused is inadmissible in evidence because petitioner
and his co-accused were arrested without a warrant.
RULING:The search and seizure of goods, suspected to
have been introduced into the country in violation of
customs laws, is one of the seven doctrinally accepted
exceptions[36] to the constitutional provision. Such provision
mandates that no search or seizure shall be made except by
virtue of a warrant issued by a judge who has personally
determined the existence of probable cause. [37]
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and
arrest may be made even without a warrant for purposes of
enforcing customs and tariff laws.Without mention of the
need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code
specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through
or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building
that is not a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box
or envelope or any person on board; or to stop and search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.[38]
SALVADOR VS PEOPLE
FACTS: A Special Mission Group from the PAF
Special Operations Squadronconducted routine
surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic Airport
to check on reports of alleged drug trafficking and
smuggling being facilitated by certain PAL personnel.
Major Pagcaliuangan then ordered Sgts. Teves and
Ople to keep close watch on the second airplane parked
inside the Domestic Airport terminal.
At around 11:30 that same evening, Sgt. Teves
reported over his radio that three (3) persons had
2
boarded the Airbus 300. The team did not move, but
continued its surveillance.
At 12:15 a.m. the following day, Sgt. Teves
reported that the three (3) persons who earlier boarded
the Airbus 300 had disembarked with their abdominal
areas bulging. They then boarded an airplane tow truck
with its lights off.
The PAF surveillance team promptly boarded their
vehicles and followed the aircraft tow truck. At the Lima
Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and
stopped the tow truck. Sgt. Teves then got off, identified
himself and asked the four (4) persons on board to alight.
They were later identified as Tomas Salvador, petitioner,
Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and Napoleon Clamor,
the driver of the tow truck.
Sgt. Teves approached Aurelio Mandin. He noticed
that Mandins uniform was partly open, showing a girdle.
While Sgt. Teves was reaching for the girdle, a package
wrapped in brown packaging tape fell. Suspecting that
the package contained smuggled items, Sgt. Teves yelled
to his teammates, Positive! Thereupon, the rest of the
team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who
surrendered without a fight. The team searched their
bodies and found that the three were wearing girdles
beneath their uniforms, all containing packets wrapped
in packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5) packets,
while petitioner and Santos had four (4) each. The team
confiscated the packets and brought all the accused to
the PAFSECOM Office.
At around 8:00 oclock the following morning,
Emilen Balatbat, an examiner of the Bureau of Customs,
opened one of the packets and on seeing that it contained
dutiable goods, she proceeded to weigh the thirteen (13)
packets seized from the accused. She then prepared an
inventory of the items seized and listed the weight of the
packets.[4] Thereafter, she brought the seized packets to
the In-Board Section, Bureau of Customs, Airport Office
where their contents were identified and appraised. The
Bureau of Customs found 248 pieces of assorted watches
and fourteen karat (14K) gold jewelries.
Petitioner now contends that the warrantless search and
seizure conducted by the PAF operatives is illegal,
alleging that at the time he and his co-accused were
stopped by the PAF law enforces, they were unaware
that a crime was being committed. Accordingly, the law
enforcers were actually engaged in a fishing expedition
in violation of his Constitutional right against unlawful
search and seizure. Thus, the seized items should not
have been admitted in evidence against him.
ISSUE:Whether or not the seized items are admissible in
evidence.
RULING:As a rule, the Bill of Rights prohibits
intrusions by the law enforcers to a persons body,
personal effects or residence, unless the same are
conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant issued in
compliance with the procedure mandated by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court. Thus, Sections 2
and 3(2), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provide:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 3.
xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
x x x.
The above Constitutional provisions do not
prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as
are unreasonable. Our jurisprudence provides for
privileged areas where searches and seizures may
lawfully be effected sans a search warrant. These
recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving
vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3) customs searches;
(4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk
situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. [10]
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in
question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was
to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of
drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL
personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words,
the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his
co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As
such, the team properly effected the search and seizure
without a search warrant since it exercised police
authority under the customs law.
In Papa vs. Mago[12] involving a customs search, we held
that law enforcers who are tasked to effect the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are
authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant,
any article, cargo or other movable property when there
is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have
been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the
tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a
warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of
holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at
bar.
Also, at the time of the search, petitioner and his co-
accused were on board a moving PAL aircraft tow truck.
As stated earlier, the search of a moving vehicle is
recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the
requirement for a search warrant. Such exception is easy
to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained
when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or
other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to
obtain a warrant when the search is conducted in
3
a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor vehicle since they
can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
where the warrant must be sought.
The Court then concluded that the articles involved in
the instant controversy were validly seized by the
authorities even without a search warrant, hence,
admissible in evidence against petitioner and his co-
accused.
PEOPLE VS DE GRACIA
FACTS:Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division,
National Capital Region Defense Command, was on
board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of
the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team.
The surveillance was conducted pursuant to an
intelligence report received by the division that said
establishment was being occupied by elements of the
RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the
vehicle around ten to fifteen meters away from the
Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street. A crowd was
then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-
going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a
while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from
the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance
team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated
in front, saw the approaching group and immediately
ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area.
As they passed by the group, then only six meters away,
the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at
the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt.
Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance
team was able to retaliate because they sought cover
inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or
bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence, a searching team raided the Eurocar
Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six
cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4
dynamites, M-shells of different calibers,
and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging
to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right
portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one
to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia
inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and
suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the
only person then present inside the room. A uniform with
the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a
result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as
Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at
the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an
inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and
ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search
warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, at that time there was so much
disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo
was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was
simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar
office, aside from the fact that the courts were
consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later
that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr.
Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a "boy"
therein.
ISSUE:Whether or not there was a valid search and
seizure in this case.
RULING:It is admitted that the military operatives who
raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a
search warrant at that time. 15 The raid was actually
precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was
being used as headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the
raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises
wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of
men coming from the Eurocar building. When the
military operatives raided the place, the occupants
thereof refused to open the door despite requests for
them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break
into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously
not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or
arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives
and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in
the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual
quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could
not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In
addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that
time because of simultaneous and intense firing within
the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel
forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding areas were
obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and
houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered
opinion that the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking
into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was consequently more than sufficient
probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore,
under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had
no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant
from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that
on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his
court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of
the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be
dispensed with.
In Umil, et al., vs. Ramos, et al., the Court held:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether
as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-
violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more
an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory
offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires
the determination by a judge of the existence of probable
cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing
4
overt acts of violence against government forces, or any
other milder acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the
exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival
of society and its government and duly constituted
authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against
the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed
hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a
rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of
invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining
them while any of these contingencies continues cannot
be less justified.
PEOPLE VS MARTI
FACTS:Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation
to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed Anita
Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in
Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract
necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name,
passport number, the date of shipment and the name and
address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ,
Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland."
Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti
refused, who assured the former that the packages
simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's
representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a
brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the
bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with
masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the
Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and
took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes
forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the
NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the
samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At
the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages
was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-
like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves.
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of
the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects.
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no
avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the
Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information
was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After
trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional
Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision,
convicting Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article
IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)
(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ISSUE:Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly
in violation of the accused's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State.
RULING:In the absence of governmental interference,
the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA
345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against
unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one's person, whether citizen or
alien, from interference by government,
included in which is his residence, his papers,
and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does
not as such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which
is called upon to refrain from any invasion of
his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his
life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384
US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116
US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
The contraband in the case at bar having come into
possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why
the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged.
The factual considerations of the case at bar readily
foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an
illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who
made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection
was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on
the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the
Bureau of Posts. The mere presence of the NBI agents
did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is
in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which
is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are
5
identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting
officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made
at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
The constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people,
does not govern relationships between individuals.
Alleged violations against unreasonable search and
seizure may only be invoked against the State by an
individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign
authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private
individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also
be construed as an act of the State would result in serious
legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the
constitution.
WATEROUS DRUG CORP VS NLRC
FACTS:Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner
Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS) on
15 August 1988.
On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a Catolico.[10]
memorandum[6] from WATEROUS Vice President-
General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to
dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latters
accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On
the same date, Co issued another memorandum [7] to
Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of
medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department,
as this would impair the companys control of purchases
and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with
the suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny
her responsibility but explained that her act was due to
negligence, since fellow employee Irene Soliven
obtained the medicines in bad faith and through
misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a
charge slip by the Admitting Dept. Catolico then asked
the company to look into the fraudulent activities of
Soliven.[8]
In a memorandum[9] dated 21 November 1989,
WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned
Catolico against the rush delivery of medicines without
the proper documents.
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk
Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an
irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and that there was a discrepancy
between several purchase orders and it was found that
the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the
check but she denied having received it and that she is
unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation
with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she
confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was
actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact,
Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the
envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered
her talagang ganyan, bukas. It appears that the amount
in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms.
Petitioners evidence consisted only of the check
of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant,
which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the
envelope. But, it the NLRC declared that the check was
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1
and 2) of Article III of the Constitution.
ISSUE:Whether or not there was a valid search and
seizure in the present case.
RULING:It was never shown that petitioners paid for
the Voren tablets. While Valdez informed Co, through
the formers memorandum[28] of 29 January 1990, that
WATEROUS paid YSP P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check
No. 222832, the said check was never presented in
evidence, nor was any receipt from YSP offered by
petitioners.
Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren
tablets presented by petitioners do not indicate an
overcharge. The purchase order dated 16 August
1989[29] stated that the Voren tablets cost P320.00 per
box, while the purchase order dated 5 October
1989[30] priced the Voren tablets at P384.00 per
bottle. The difference in price may then be attributed to
the different packaging used in each purchase order.
Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two
purchase orders for the Voren tablets were recommended
by Director-MMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-
MNG Noli M. Lopez and approved by Vice President-
General Manager Emma R. Co. The purchase orders
were silent as to Catolicos participation in the purchase.
If the price increase was objectionable to petitioners,
they or their officers should have disapproved the
6
transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to
blame for their predicament but themselves. This set of
facts emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation
proposed by petitioners. Despite the memorandum
warning Catolico not to negotiate with suppliers of
medicine, there was no proof that she ever transacted, or
that she had the opportunity to transact, with the said
suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders indicate,
Catolico was not at all involved in the sale of the Voren
tablets. There was no occasion for Catolico to initiate,
much less benefit from, what Valdez called an under the
table deal with YSP.
Catolicos dismissal then was obviously grounded
on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
employees dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid
causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination
of employment;[31] and even the dismissal of an
employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on
substantial grounds and not on the employers
arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.[32] Besides,
Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to
which class of employees the term trust and confidence
is restricted.[33]
As regards the constitutional violation upon which
the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to
revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti[34] that
the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico
claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits,
such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil
liabilities.
PEOPLE VS MENDOZA
FACTS:Accused-appellant, his wife Cecilia Mendoza,
and their then 10-year-old daughter attended the birthday
party of a relative of accused-appellant held at
McDonald's in Harrison Plaza. While the party was
going on, accused-appellant left and proceeded to KFC
where he had some beer. When it was time for Cecilia
and Charmaine to go home, they could not find accused-
appellant, hence, they decided to just leave. Cecilia and
Charmaine arrived home at around 7 o'clock in the
evening but accused-appellant was not yet there. After a
while, mother and daughter left for the house of Cecilia's
parents in Bacoor, Cavite to bring some perfume for
Cecilia's brother.
Upon getting home, accused-appellant who was drunk
instructed Charmaine to get cold water and to douse him.
She willingly obliged, after which she was told to go to
her room. She changed her clothes and readied herself
for bed. While in her room, Charmaine heard her parents
quarrelling over the issue of Cecilia and Charmaine
having left accused-appellant at the party. Thereafter,
Charmaine suddenly heard three gunshots. Running out
of her room, Charmaine saw her mother Cecilia down on
the floor of their living room, bleeding profusely.
Charmaine saw accused-appellant hiding a gun under the
bed in her parents' room.
Accused-appellant subsequently called his brother-in-
law, Sgt. Antonio Gabac, and told him that Cecilia had
been shot and is already dead. Gabac, on the other line,
told accused-appellant not to touch anything and that he
would be arriving shortly. When Gabac finally arrived,
he and accused-appellant carried the lifeless body of
Cecilia into accused-appellant's car and brought her to
the Perpetual Help Hospital but Cecilia was pronounced
dead on arrival.
Upon receiving information about the shooting incident,
Chief Investigator Cpl. Leopoldo Africa, together with
his team, proceeded to the hospital to investigate the
incident, but accused-appellant refused to give any
statement or comment. Thereafter, the policemen invited
Antonio Gabac to accompany them to the crime scene.
While they were inspecting the premises, Cpl. Africa
noticed something tucked inside Gabac's waist. He
promptly told Gabac "Pare, pakisurrender mo nga iyang
baril." Gabac immediately handed Cpl. Africa a .38
caliber revolver with two empty shells and two live
rounds. Gabac informed Africa that the gun was handed
to him by accused-appellant when Gabac arrived at the
crime scene to respond to the call of accused-appellant
for assistance.
Cecilia's father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of
his daughter's death, and that valuables were being taken
out of his daughter's house, decided to remove, together
with his sons, the remaining pieces of property therein,
including accused-appellant's personal effects. From the
aforestated personal effects of accused-appellant, Alipio
found Mission Order No. 86-580-893 issued to accused-
appellant by Col. Eladio Gonzales, which authorized
accused-appellant to carry a Colt Revolver, 38 Caliber
with Serial No. 41001 from November 15, 1986 to
December 15, 1986.
Accused-appellant now claims that these documents
were illegally procured in grave violation of his
constitutional right to privacy of communication and
papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
ISSUE:Whether or not there was a valid search and
seizure that transpired.
RULING:Such right applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies. The case in
piont is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where
this Court had the occasion to rule that the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
refers to the immunity of one's person from interference
by government and it cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within
the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
7
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission
order were discovered by accused-appellant's father-in-
law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search
warrant is dispensable.
PEOPLE VS BONGCARAWAN
FACTS:An interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry
5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. The vessel was
about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security
officer, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from
passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry.
Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no.
106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of
the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search
for the suspect whom they later found at the economy
section.[4] The suspect was identified as the accused,
Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the
complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no.
106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no
jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2)
security agents back to the economy section to get his
baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and
brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the
security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a
brown bag and small plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be
shabu, the security personnel immediately reported the
matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the
accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also
called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.
[5]
Members of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and
took custody of the accused and the seized items--the
Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag[6] and eight (8) small
plastic packs of white crystalline substance. [7] When
asked about the contraband articles, the accused
explained that he was just requested by a certain Alican
Alex Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latters brother
in Iligan City.[8] The accused and the seized items were
later turned over by the coast guard to the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and it was
later confirmed that the substance was indeed shabu.
Accused-appellant now contends that the Samsonite
suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu was forcibly opened and searched without his
consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any
evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and
seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against
him. He also contends that People v. Marti[15] is not
applicable in this case because a vessel security
personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a
policeman.
ISSUE:Whether or not a valid search and seizure was
effected.
RULING:The right against unreasonable search and
seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.[16] Evidence acquired in violation of this
right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[17] Whenever this right is challenged, an
individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed,
however, that protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its agent. As held by
this Court in the case of People v. Marti,[18] [i]n the
absence of governmental interference, liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State.[19] The constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.[20]
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-
appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel.
It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase
that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the
contraband items was therefore carried out without
government intervention, and hence, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure does
not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-
appellant that the search and seizure performed by the
vessel security personnel should be considered as one
conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the
former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and
order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a
private employee and does not discharge any
governmental function. In contrast, police officers are
agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of
enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is
against them and other agents of the state that the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
may be invoked.
SALES VS PEOPLE
FACTS:Petitioner was scheduled to board a Cebu
Pacific plane bound for Kalibo, Aklan at its 9:45 a.m.
flight. As part of the routine security check at the
predeparture area, petitioner passed through the Walk-
Thru Metal Detector Machine and immediately
thereafter was subjected to a body search by a male
frisker on duty, Daniel M. Soriano, a non-uniformed
personnel (NUP) of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Aviation Security Group (ASG)..
While frisking petitioner, Soriano felt something slightly
bulging inside the right pocket of his short pants. When
Soriano asked petitioner to bring the item out, petitioner
obliged but refused to open his hands. Soriano struggled
with petitioner as the latter was nervous and reluctant to
show what he brought out from his pocket. Soriano then
called the attention of his supervisor, PO1 Cherry Trota-
Bartolome who was nearby. PO1 Trota-Bartolome
approached petitioner and asked him to open his hands.
Petitioner finally opened his right hand revealing two
8
rolled paper sticks with dried marijuana leaves/fruiting
tops.
Petitioner now assails the conduct of Soriano and PO1
Trota-Bartolome in singling him out by making him
stretch out his arms and empty his pockets. Petitioner
believes such meticulous search was unnecessary
because, as Soriano himself testified, there was no beep
sound when petitioner walked past through the metal
detector and hence nothing suspicious was indicated by
that initial security check. He likewise mentioned the
fact that he was carrying a bundle of money at that time,
which he said was not accounted for.
ISSUE:Whether or not the frisking done to petitioner
was valid.
RULING:Persons may lose the protection of the search
and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced
privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets
that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject
to seizure. These announcements place passengers on
notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine
airport procedures.
The search of the contents of petitioner’s short pants
pockets being a valid search pursuant to routine airport
security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana)
seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence.
Petitioner’s reluctance to show the contents of his short
pants pocket after the frisker’s hand felt the rolled papers
containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused
the suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed
carrying an item or material subject to confiscation by
the said authorities.
PEOPLE VS CADIDIA
FACTS: While performing her duty as a female frisker
assigned at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal I
(domestic airport), Marilyn Trayvilla frisked the accused
Cadidia upon her entry at the departure areaand she
noticed something unusual and thick in the area of
Cadidia’s buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that
it was only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual
thickness. Not convinced with Cadidia’s explanation,
Trayvilla and her female co-employee Leilani M.
Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room inside
the domestic airport to check. When she and Bagsican
asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they discovered
that inside were two sachets of shabu.
ISSUE:Whether or not the frisking done on the accused
was valid.
RULING:Airport frisking is an authorized form of
search and seizure.1âwphi1 As held in similar cases of
People v Johnson73 and People v Canton,74 this Court
affirmed the conviction or the accused Leila Reyes
Johnson and Susan Canton for violation of drugs law
when they were found to be in hiding in their body
illegal drugs upon airport frisking. The Court in both
cases explained the rationale for the validity of airport
frisking thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure or their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack or subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers
attempting to hoard an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors: their carry-on baggage as well as
checked luggage arc routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects. physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question
that such searches arc reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity or the safety interests involved,
and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed. travellers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and
notices in their airline tickets that the are subject to
search and. if any prohibited materials or substances are
found, such would he subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches
and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.