A.M. No. P-11-2903. February 5, 2014.

[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-2181-MTJ]

ANGELITO R. MARQUEZ, EDUARDO R. MARQUEZ, CRISTINA M. OCAMPO, CARMEN MARQUEZ-ROSAS,

HEIRS OF ERNESTO MARQUEZ, RENATO R. MARQUEZ, ALFREDO R. MARQUEZ, FRED EVANGELISTA,
JOSE MACALINO, SANTIAGO MARQUEZ, SPOUSES FREDDIE AND JOCELYN FACUNLA, SPOUSES
RODRIGO AND VIRGINIA MAZON, SPOUSES ALFONSO AND LEONILA CASCO, SPOUSES BENJAMIN AND
PRISCILLA BUENAVIDES, EDUARDO FACUNLA, and ALICIA A. VILLA-NUEVA, complainants, vs. JUDGE
VENANCIO M. OVEJERA in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac,
and SHERIFF IV LOURDES E. COLLADO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Paniqui, Tarlac, respondents.

Administrative Law; Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A.
No. 6713); Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN); Public Officers; Section 8 of RA 6713,
requires all public officials and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of their
assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and
of unmarried children under 18 years of age living in their households.—Section 8 of RA 6713,
requires all public officials and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of their
assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and
of unmarried children under 18 years of age living in their households. In this relation, the same
provision mandates full disclosure of the concerned public official’s (a) real property, its
improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value, (b) personal property
and acquisition cost, (c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds,
and the like, (d) liabilities, and (e) all business interests and financial connections.

Verily, the requirement of SALN submission is aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for
official corruption, as well as at maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. With such
disclosure, the public would, to a reasonable extent, be able to monitor the affluence of public
officials, and, in such manner, provides a check and balance mechanism to verify their undisclosed
properties and/or sources of income.

Same; Same; Public Officers; Penalties; Section 11 of RA 6713 states that “[a]ny public official or
employee, regardless of whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual, temporary,
holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any violation of this Act shall be punished [with,
among others,] a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months’ salary depending on the gravity
of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency.”—As for the
appropriate penalty, Section 11 of RA 6713 states that “[a]ny public official or employee, regardless of
whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular
capacity, committing any violation of this Act shall be punished [with, among others,] a fine not
exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months’ salary x x x depending on the gravity of the offense after
due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency.” Consistent with existing jurisprudence,
the Court finds that the penalty of a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 is amply justified considering
that Collado’s misstep in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005 appears to be her first offense, adding
too that same does not appear to have been attended by any bad faith or fraudulent intent.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS in the Supreme Court. Abuse of Authority, Disregard of Due Process,
Misuse and Fabrication of Judicial Orders, Arrogance and Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer of the
Court, Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713), and
the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 (AMLA).

G.R. No. 185838. February 10, 2014.*

RICARDO V. QUINTOS, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD

and KANLURANG MINDORO FARMER’S COOPERATIVE, INC., respondents.

Agrarian Reform; Tenancy Relationship; Tenancy is a legal relationship established by the existence of
particular facts as required by law.—Tenancy is a legal relationship established by the existence of
particular facts as required by law. For a tenancy relationship to exist between the parties, the
following essential elements must be shown: (a) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (b) the
subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent between the parties; (d) the purpose is
agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f) there is sharing of the
harvests between the parties. All the above elements must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship. Thus, the absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, a cultivator or a
planter thereon, a de jure tenant entitled to security of tenure under existing tenancy laws.

Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The burden of proof rests on the one claiming to be a tenant to prove
his affirmative allegation by substantial evidence.—The burden of proof rests on the one claiming to
be a tenant to prove his affirmative allegation by substantial evidence. His failure to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim would put the opposite party under no
obligation to prove his exception or defense. The rule applies to civil and administrative cases.

Same; Same; The right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be
provided by law.—It bears stressing that the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a
landowner, except as may be provided by law. Hence, the consent of the landowner should be
secured prior to the installation of tenants.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Foreclosure of Mortgage; It is settled that a mortgagee does not
become the owner of the mortgaged property until he has foreclosed the mortgage and, thereafter,
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.—In the present case, the PARAD, the DARAB and the
CA all held that a tenancy relationship exists between GCFI and the 53 KAMIFCI members who were
allegedly installed as tenants by APT, the “legal possessor” of the mango orchard at that time.
Records are, however, bereft of any showing that APT was authorized by the property’s landowner,
GCFI, to install tenants thereon. To be sure, APT only assumed the rights of the original mortgagees in
this case, i.e., PNB and DBP, which, however, have yet to exercise their right to foreclose the
mortgaged properties due to the RTC’s order enjoining the same. It is settled that a mortgagee does
not become the owner of the mortgaged property until he has foreclosed the mortgage and,
thereafter, purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. With the foreclosure proceedings having
been enjoined, APT could not have been regarded as the “landowner” of the subject property. Thus,
since the consent of the standing landowner, GCFI, had not been secured by APT in this case, it had no
authority to enter into any tenancy agreement with the KAMIFCI members.
G.R. No. 207819. March 12, 2014.*

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GUILLERMO B. CADANO, JR.,

accused-appellant.

Criminal Law; Rape; Statutory Rape; Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman
below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force,
intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that
the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of
12.—Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age
regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is
unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent
is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that
the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual
act. Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of
proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse
between the accused and the complainant.

Same; Same; Same; Child-Witnesses; When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts
are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is
not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.—Absent any evidence
that the trial court’s assessment was tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of a fact of consequence
or influence — especially so when affirmed by the CA — it is entitled to great weight, if not conclusive
and binding on the Court. Moreover, “[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and
credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if
the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity. A young girl’s revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to
medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out
the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction.”

Same; Same; Qualified Rape; It is apt to discuss that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 introduced various
qualifying circumstances that would increase the penalty for the crime of rape from reclusion
perpetua to death, e.g., when the offended party is a minor under 18 years of age and the offender is
a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim — a circumstance that was not present
under the old rape provision, i.e.,

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—The Court likewise agrees that Cadano should suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of statutory rape. On this matter, it is apt to discuss that
R.A. 8353 introduced various qualifying circumstances that would increase the penalty for the crime
of rape from reclusion perpetua to death, e.g., when the offended party is a minor under 18 years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim — a
circumstance that was not present under the old rape provision, i.e., Article 335 of the RPC. Thus, the
aforementioned circumstance could not qualify the first two (2) rape incidents which occurred prior
to the enactment of R.A. 8353, but it could be properly appreciated in the third one. Nevertheless, in
light of the abolition of the death penalty pursuant to R.A. 9346, the imposable penalty for the third
rape incident is lowered to reclusion perpetua, with the offender being rendered ineligible for parole.

G.R. No. 191590. April 21, 2014.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. TRANSUNION CORPORATION, respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Interlocutory Orders; An order denying a
motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.—An order
denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of
a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.
Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action
for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant
of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.

Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The rule on exhaustion of administrative

remedies provides that if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power
can be sought.—To elaborate, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then
such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The
underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a
complete chance to pass upon the matter will decide the same correctly.

Constitutional Law; Due Process; It is well-established that the touchstone of due process is the
opportunity to be heard.—The Court finds that there was no violation of Transunion’s right to
administrative due process since, as the Republic pointed out, not only did it file an answer, but it also
presented its evidence and formally offered the same. It is well-established that the touchstone of
due process is the opportunity to be heard. This Transunion was unquestionably afforded in this case,
despite having been denied the remedies of reconsideration and appeal which, however, remain
unavailable, either by statute or regulation, against the investigation report and recommendation
assailed herein. At any rate, lack of administrative due process, on the assumption of its truth, is not a
ground for a motion to dismiss; hence, the RTC’s ruling was altogether proper.

A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841. June 2, 2014.*

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2388-MTJ)

GERSHON N. DULANG, complainant, vs. JUDGE MARY JOCYLEN[1] G. REGENCIA, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURT (MCTC), ASTURIAS-BALAMBAN, CEBU, respondent.

Administrative Law; Judges; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Prompt disposition of cases is attained
basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges.—Prompt disposition of cases is
attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not possess
those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly,
judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their
obligation to administer justice promptly. This is embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which states that “[a] judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods” and echoed in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that “[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.”

Remedial Law; Rules of Summary Procedure; Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of
Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the last
affidavit or position paper within which a decision thereon must be issued.—Being an ejectment case,
it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from
the submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision thereon must be issued.
Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only about two (2) years and four (4) months later,
or on February 18, 2011. While rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus,
should be regarded as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges
and has been understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their
businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due to justifiable reasons. However, Judge
Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case,
thus, making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.

Administrative Law; Judges; Undue Delay in Rendering Decision; Undue delay in rendering a decision
is classified as a less serious charge, punishable either by: (a) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.—Undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less
serious charge, punishable either by: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00. In imposing the proper sanction on Judge Regencia, the Court notes that aside
from her aforementioned misrepresentation, she was also previously found administratively liable for
gross inefficiency where she was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 and warned that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Moreover, as correctly observed by
Justice Arturo D. Brion during the deliberations of this case, her length of service of more than 17
years should be taken against her instead of being considered a mitigating factor as she should have
already known that Civil Case No. 212-B, being an ejectment case, is a summary proceeding and, thus,
ought to be expeditiously resolved. Hence, a fine of P40,000.00, instead of suspension, should be the
appropriate penalty for Judge Regencia’s misconduct.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Inefficiency, Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Gross Incompetence, Serious Misconduct and Serious Dereliction of Duty.

A.M. No. P-13-3132. June 4, 2014.*

(formerly A.M. No. 12-3-54-RTC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. SARAH P. AMPONG, COURT INTERPRETER
III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ALABEL, SARANGANI PROVINCE, BRANCH 38, respondent.

Administrative Jurisdiction; Court Personnel; Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee

belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary.—Notably, the Court also addressed Ampong’s misgivings on the issue of
jurisdiction in the same case, viz.: It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil
service. As defined under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to
“control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations.” This authority grants to the CSC
the right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations. However,
the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over all
courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee
the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the
powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific mandate of the Constitution granting
to the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it undermines the
independence of the judiciary. x x x That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC
does not take her case out of the administrative reach of the Supreme Court. The bottom line is
administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of
whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Immutability of Judgments; The doctrine of immutability of judgment
states that “a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact and law.”—Pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states that “a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,” Ampong
could no longer seek the August 26, 2008 Decision’s modification and reversal. Consequently, the
penalty of dismissal from service on account of Ampong’s Dishonesty should be enforced in its full
course. In line with Section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a)
cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any
government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution. Ampong should
be made to similarly suffer the same.

Administrative Law; Dismissal from Service; Leave Credits; It is a standing rule that despite their
dismissal from the service, government employees are entitled to the leave credits that they have
earned during the period of their employment.—Despite Ampong’s dismissal on the ground of
dishonesty, she should nevertheless be entitled to receive her accrued leave credits, if any, pursuant
to the aforementioned provision of the URACCS, which does not include the forfeiture of the same. It
is a standing rule that despite their dismissal from the service, government employees are entitled to
the leave credits that they have earned during the period of their employment. As a matter of fairness
and law, they may not be deprived of such remuneration, which they have earned prior to their
dismissal.

Same; Court Personnel; Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name
and integrity of the courts of justice.—It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should
be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the
highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her
personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing. The
image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who
work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in
order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet
these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with
the Judiciary.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Dis-honesty.

G.R. No. 192302. June 4, 2014.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINEvs. MANALO, GRACE M. OLIVA, and FREIDA Z. RIVERA-YAP, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Moot and Academic; A case or issue is considered moot and academic
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an
adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.—A case or
issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of

supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no
practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would
be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case which
presents a moot question can no longer be enforced.

G.R. No. 192820. June 4, 2014.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. plaintiff-appellee, RENATO DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.

Criminal Law; Rape; Elements of.—For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must be able to
prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished the act
through force, threat or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.

Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; Elements of.—The crime of acts of lasciviousness, as punished under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is defined as follows: ART. 336. Acts of lasciviousness.—Any
person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prisión correccional. The
elements of this crime are: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) it is
done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is
under 12 years of age; and (3) the offended party is another person of either sex.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; When the credibility of a witness is of primordial consideration,
the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded
respect if not conclusive effect.—As held in Dizon v. People, 600 SCRA 525 (2009): Jurisprudence
instructs that when the credibility of a witness is of primordial consideration, as in this case, the
findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if
not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has had the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of a witness and was in the best position to discern whether they were telling the truth.
When the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, as in the present case, said
findings are generally binding upon this Court.
Same; Same; Motives; Ill motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative and credible
declaration from the rape victim, which clearly establishes the liability of the accused.—The
accused-appellant’s bare defense of denial deserves scant consideration. The same cannot overcome
the positive identification and affirmative testimonies of AAA and BBB. Anent the accused-appellant’s
argument that the alleged ill motives of AAA and BBB destroyed their credibility, the same is utterly
unconvincing. The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that ill motives become inconsequential if
there is an affirmative and credible declaration from the rape victim, which clearly establishes the
liability of the accused. In this case, AAA never wavered in her identification of the accused-appellant
as her abuser. We had occasion to rule in People v. Balunsat, 626 SCRA 77 (2010), that it is unlikely for
a young girl and her family to impute the crime of rape to their own blood relative and face social
humiliation if not to vindicate the victim’s honor. Indeed, no member of a rape victim’s family would
dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor tainting the family unless the crime was in
fact committed, more so in this case where the offender and the victim are father and daughter.

Criminal Law; Rape; Witnesses; Testimonial Evidence; In rape cases, the testimony of complainant
must be considered and calibrated in its entirety, and not in its truncated portion or isolated passages
thereof.—Verily, we also held in Dizon v. People, 600 SCRA 525 (2009), that: In rape cases, the
testimony of complainant must be considered and calibrated in its entirety, and not in its truncated
portion or isolated passages thereof. The true meaning of answers to questions propounded to a
witness is to be ascertained with due consideration of all the questions and answers given thereto.
The whole impression or effect of what has been said or done must be considered, and not individual
words or phrases alone. Facts imperfectly stated in answer to a question may be supplied or clarified
by one’s answer to other questions.

Same; Same; Penalties; Death Penalty; Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, imposes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the

penalties of the Revised Penal Code.—Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the appropriate penalty that should be imposed
upon the accused-appellant in said case is reclusion perpetua. This is in accordance with Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 9346, which imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, when the
law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; Penalties; The crime of acts of lasciviousness is punishable with prisión
correccional.—In Criminal Case No. 3254-M-2004, the crime of acts of lasciviousness is punishable
with prisión correccional. In view of the alternative circumstance of relationship attendant in this case,
the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period, the range of which is four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the said
penalty shall constitute the maximum term while the minimum term shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree to that of the penalty provided by law, which is arresto mayor or one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly imposed
upon the accused-appellant the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prisión correccional, as maximum.

G.R. No. 207525. June 18, 2014.*

BONIFACIO PIEDAD, represented by MARIA INSPIRACION PIEDAD-DANAO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
VICTORIO GURIEZA and EMETERIA M. GURIEZA, respondents.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; Unlawful detainer is an action to recover
possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied.—Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful
detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. An
ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the category of
unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance
without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he/she will
vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.

Same; Same; Same; Actions; Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the complaint must be
filed “within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.”—Under
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the complaint must be filed “within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession” and must allege that: (a) the defendant originally
had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b)
eventually, the defendant’s possession of the property became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the
plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendant’s right of possession; (c)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff the
enjoyment thereof; and (d) within one (1) year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

G.R. No. 192861. June 30, 2014.*

LINDA RANA, petitioner, vs. TERESITA LEE WONG, SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG and RUBEN ANG ONG,
represented by their Attorney-in-fact WILSON UY, and SPS. ROSARIO and WILSON UY, respondents.

G.R. No. 192862. June 30, 2014.*

SPS. ROSARIO and WILSON UY, WILSON UY as attorney-in-fact of TERESITA LEE WONG, and SPS.
SHIRLEY LEE ONG and RUBEN ANG ONG, petitioners, vs. SPS. REYNALDO and LINDA RANA,
respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Nuisance; Words and Phrases; Based on case law, the term “nuisance” is deemed
to be “so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the
rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his
comfort.”—Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is defined as “any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the
health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards
decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.” Based on case law,
however, the term “nuisance” is deemed to be “so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost
all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the
enjoyment of his property, or his comfort.”

Same; Same; Same; Classifications of Nuisance.—Article 695 of the Civil Code classifies nuisances with
respect to the object or objects that they affect. In this regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public
nuisance (or one which “affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal”);
or (b) a private nuisance (or one “that is not included in the foregoing definition” [or, as case law puts
it, one which “violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few persons”]).
Jurisprudence further classifies nuisances in relation to their legal susceptibility to summary
abatement (that is, corrective action without prior judicial permission). In this regard, a nuisance may
either be: (a) a nuisance per se (or one which “affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity”); or (b) a nuisance per accidens
(or that which “depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a
question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide
whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.”)

Same; Same; Same; Damages; Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which should be taken
under the parameters stated in Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and 706 (for private nuisances) of
the Civil Code, a private person whose property right was invaded or unreasonably interfered with by
the act, omission, establishment, business or condition of the property of another may file a civil
action to recover personal damages.—Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which should
be taken under the parameters stated in Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and 706 (for private
nuisances) of the Civil Code, a private person whose property right was invaded or unreasonably
interfered with by the act, omission, establishment, business or condition of the property of another
may file a civil action to recover personal damages. Abatement may be judicially sought through a civil
action therefor if the pertinent requirements under the Civil Code for summary abatement, or the
requisite that the nuisance is a nuisance per se, do not concur. To note, the remedies of abatement
and damages are cumulative; hence, both may be demanded.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Nominal Damages; Temperate Damages; Under Article 2216 of the Civil
Code, courts have the discretion to determine awards of nominal and temperate damages without
actual proof of pecuniary loss.—As the records establish, Sps. Rana, without prior consultation with
Wong, et al. and to their sole advantage, elevated and cemented almost half of the 10-meter wide
subject road. As homeowners of Peace Valley Subdivision, Wong, et al. maintain the rights to the
unobstructed use of and free passage over the subject road. By constructing the subject portion, Sps.
Rana introduced a nuisance per accidens that particularly transgressed the aforesaid rights. Thus, for
the vindication and recognition of Wong, et al.’s rights, Sps. Rana should be similarly held liable for
nominal damages. Under Article 2216 of the Civil Code, courts have the discretion to determine
awards of nominal and temperate damages without actual proof of pecuniary loss, as in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Pari Delicto Rule; The principle of in pari delicto provides that when two
parties are equally at fault, the law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them.
However, this principle does not apply with respect to inexistent and void contracts.—Assessing the
respective infractions of the parties herein, the Court finds it prudent to sustain the CA’s verdict
offsetting the damage caused by said parties against each other. The Court can, however, only concur
with the CA in result since the latter inaccurately applied, as basis for its ruling, the in pari delicto
principle enunciated in the case of Yu Bun Guan v. Ong (Yu Guan), 367 SCRA 559 (2001). In said case,
the Court discussed the in pari delicto principle with respect to the subject matter of inexistent and
void contracts, viz.: Inapplicability of the in Pari Delicto Principle The principle of in pari delicto
provides that when two parties are equally at fault, the law leaves them as they are and denies
recovery by either one of them. However, this principle does not apply with respect to inexistent and
void contracts. Said this Court in Modina v. Court of Appeals: “The principle of in pari delicto non
oritur actio denies all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. It applies to cases where the nullity arises
from the illegality of the consideration or the purpose of the contract. When two persons are equally
at fault, the law does not relieve them. The exception to this general rule is when the principle is
invoked with respect to inexistent contracts.” (emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Clearly, no void
or inexistent contract is herein at issue, hence, the Court’s disagreement with the CA’s invocation of
Yu Guan in this respect.

Same; Same; Recovery of Property; Settled is the rule that in order that an action for the recovery of
property may prosper, the party prosecuting the same need only prove the identity of the thing and
his ownership thereof.—Settled is the rule that in order that an action for the recovery of property
may prosper, the party prosecuting the same need only prove the identity of the thing and his
ownership thereof. In the present cases, the report of the court-appointed commissioner, Atty. Pintor,
who conducted a relocation survey of the Rana and Uy properties identified and delineated the
boundaries of the two properties and showed that Sps. Uy’s perimeter fence intruded on 2 sq. m. of
the Rana property. Both the RTC and the CA relied upon the said report; thus, absent any competent
showing that the said finding was erroneous, the Court sees no reason to deviate from the
conclusions reached by the courts a quo. Having sufficiently proven their claim, Sps. Rana are,
therefore entitled to the return of the 2 sq. m. encroached portion. Corollary thereto, compliance by
Linda Rana with the directive in Civil Case No. CEB-20893 to build a retaining wall on their property
shall be held in abeyance pending return of the encroached portion.

Malicious Prosecution; The mere filing of a suit which subsequently turns out to be unsuccessful does
not render a person liable for malicious prosecution, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate.—As the Court sees it, the filing by the parties of their respective
complaints against each other was not clearly and convincingly shown to have been precipitated by
any malice or bad faith, sufficient enough to warrant the payment of damages in favor of either party.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires
the presence of two (2) elements, namely: (a) malice; and (b) absence of probable cause. Moreover,
there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person; and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and baseless. Hence,
the mere filing of a suit which subsequently turns out to be unsuccessful does not render a person
liable for malicious prosecution, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate. As the aforementioned elements were not duly proven, the claims for malicious prosecution
are hereby denied.
Civil Law; Damages; Moral Damages; Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.—With
respect to the claims for moral damages, although the Court found the parties to have sustained
nominal damages as a result of the other parties’ acts, an award of moral damages would nonetheless
be improper in this case. Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that “[m]oral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act for
omission.” Corollary thereto, Article 2219 of the same code (Article 2219) states that “[m]oral
damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in
physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal
search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts
mentioned in Article 309; [and] (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34, and 35.”

Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary damages are imposed only “by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.”—The Court deems that an award of exemplary damages would be inappropriate since
these damages are imposed only “by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.” Bluntly placed, the Court does not view
the present matters of such caliber. Hence, there is no reason to grant the parties’ claims for the
same.

Attorney’s Fees; Damages; Considering that neither of the parties was able to successfully prove (a)
their claims for malicious prosecution, (b) their entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, and (c)
the attendance of any of the circumstances under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, their respective
claims for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses against each other are also denied.—Considering
that neither of the parties was able to successfully prove (a) their claims for malicious prosecution, (b)
their entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, and (c) the attendance of any of the
circumstances under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, their respective claims for attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses against each other are also denied.

A.C. No. 4428. December 12, 2011.*

ELPIDIO P. TIONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO, respondent.

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Disbarment; Possession of good moral character is not only a
condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain one’s good standing in
the legal profession.—It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral
character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain
one’s good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to observe the
highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant
behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show him
deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his
suspension or disbarment.

Same; Same; Same; Respondent’s act of having an affair with his client’s wife manifested his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity.—Respondent’s
act of having an affair with his client’s wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for
the ethics of his profession. Likewise, he violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by
complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Undeniably, therefore, his illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly
immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his office by the Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among others.

Same; Same; Same.—It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not
meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the
legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an
investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court
and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which
is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings.

G.R. No. 171591. June 25, 2012.*

ACE NAVIGATION CO., INC., petitioner, vs. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION and PIONEER INSURANCE
AND SURETY CORPORATION, respondents.

Mercantile Law; Bill of Lading; A bill of lading is defined as “an instrument in writing, signed by a
carrier or his agent, describing the freight so as to identify it, stating the name of the consignor, the
terms of the contract for carriage, and agreeing or directing that the freight to be delivered to the
order or assigns of a specified person at a specified place.”—A bill of lading is defined as “an
instrument in writing, signed by a carrier or his agent, describing the freight so as to identify it, stating
the name of the consignor, the terms of the contract for carriage, and agreeing or directing that the
freight to be delivered to the order or assigns of a specified person at a specified place.” It operates
both as a receipt and as a contract. As a receipt, it recites the date and place of shipment, describes
the goods as to quantity, weight, dimensions, identification marks and condition, quality, and value.
As a contract, it names the contracting parties, which include the consignee, fixes the route,
destination, and freight rates or charges, and stipulates the rights and obligations assumed by the
parties. As such, it shall only be binding upon the parties who make them, their assigns and heirs.

Civil Law; Agency; An agent is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless he
expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient
notice of his powers.—Article 1868 of the Civil Code states: “ART. 1868. By the contract of agency, a
person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of
another, with the consent or authority of the latter.” Corollarily, Article 1897 of the same Code
provides that an agent is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless he
expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient
notice of his powers.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235. March 11, 2013.*

(Formerly A.M. No. 10-3-94-RTC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JESUS L. GRAGEDA, respondent.

Administrative Proceedings; Public Officers; In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an
administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent
public official or employee.—Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that in order for the Court to
acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the
incumbency of the respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing of an
administrative case is predicated on the holding of a position or office in the government service.
However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by the mere fact that the public official
or employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the case. In fine, cessation from office by
reason of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to dismiss the case filed against the said
officer or employee at the time that he was still in the public service or render it moot and academic.

Same; Same; In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., 654 SCRA 539 (2011), the Court
ruled that while the Ombudsman is not precluded from conducting an investigation against the errant
employee, it can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan who had already resigned,
more so since his resignation or severance of employment from the service was not availed of to
prevent the continuation of the pending administrative case or to pre-empt the imminent filing of
one.—In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., 654 SCRA 539 (2011), the Court ruled
that while the Ombudsman is not precluded from conducting an investigation against the errant
employee, it can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan who had already resigned,
more so since his resignation or severance of employment from the service was not availed of to
prevent the continuation of the pending administrative case or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one.
The Court also dismissed an administrative case filed against a retired court stenographer for having
been initiated over a month after her retirement from the service. Moreover, in Re: Missing Exhibits
and Court Properties in Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte, 692 SCRA 8
(2013), the Court absolved herein respondent, Judge Grageda, from any administrative liability since
the complaint against him was filed after his retirement from the judiciary.

G.R. No. 200667. March 11, 2013.*

RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA (ILOILO), INC., petitioner, vs. GERRY CENTENO, respondent.

Civil Law; Land Registration; Consolidation of Titles; After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens
into the absolute right of a confirmed owner.—It is well-established that after consolidation of title in
the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to
possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of
possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale becomes merely a ministerial function, unless it appears that the property is in possession of a
third party claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor. The foregoing rule is contained in
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which partly provides.

Same; Same; In China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), the Court held that the
phrase “a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor”
contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as
that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary.—In China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, 557 SCRA 177
(2008), the Court held that the phrase “a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to
the judgment obligor” contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse
title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant,
and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or
transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the
property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party adversely to
the judgment obligor.

Remedial Law; Civil Law; Appeals; Absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness
committed by the lower court, its findings of facts are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme
Court.—On the issue regarding the identity of the lots as raised by respondent in his Comment,
records show that the RTC had already passed upon petitioner’s title over the subject lots during the
course of the proceedings. Accordingly, the identity of the said lots had already been established for
the purpose of issuing a writ of possession. It is hornbook principle that absent any clear showing of
abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts are binding
and conclusive upon the Court, as in this case.

G.R. No. 175900. June 10, 2013.*

KAPISANANG PANGKAUNLARAN NG KABABAIHANG POTRERO, INC. and MILAGROS H. REYES,

petitioners, vs. REMEDIOS BARRENO, LILIBETH AMETIN, DRANREV F. NONAY, FREDERICK D. DIONISIO
and MARITES CASIO, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping exists “when one party repetitively
avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other
court.”—Forum shopping exists “when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court.” What is truly important to consider
in determining whether it exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a
party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes
and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the pro-cess creating the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by different fora upon the same issues.

G.R. No. 187722. June 10, 2013.*

SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. and/or DANNY Z. ESCALANTE, petitioners, vs.
TEOFILO GONZAGA, respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It is an established rule that
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing
errors of law as the former is not a trier of facts.―It must be pointed out that the main issue in this
case involves a question of fact. In this light, it is an established rule that the jurisdiction of the Court
in cases brought before it from the CA via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing errors of law as the former is not a trier of facts. In the
Court’s exercise of its power of review, thus, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding
as it is not the former’s function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. However, one of the
recognized exceptions to this rule is when there resides a conflict between the findings of facts of the
NLRC and of the CA. In such instance, there is a need to review the records to determine which of
them should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts, as in this case. Accordingly,
the Court proceeds to examine the cause and procedure attendant to the termination of Gonzaga’s
employment.

Labor Law; Termination of Employees; Illegal Dismissals; The burden of proof rests on the employer to
show that the dismissal is for a valid cause. Failing in which, the law considers the matter a case of
illegal dismissal.―In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a valid cause. Failing in which, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.
In this relation, the quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence
which, as defined in case law, means that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise.

Same; Statutory Construction; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Technical rules of evidence are not
strictly followed in labor cases and thus, their liberal application relaxes the same.―To note,
petitioners could not be faulted for not presenting each and every bill or receipt due to their
voluminous character. Corollarily, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that documents of such
nature could indeed consist of multiple pages; likewise, it is clear that petitioners only sought to
establish a general result from the whole, i.e., the total cash shortage. In this regard, the requirement
that the offeror first establish the voluminous nature of the evidence sought to be presented, as
discussed in the CA’s March 30, 2009 Resolution, is dispensed with. Besides, technical rules of
evidence are not strictly followed in labor cases and thus, their liberal application relaxes the same.
Same; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Gross and Habitual Neglect of Duty; Serious
Misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty are just causes for termination which are explicitly
enumerated under Article 296 of the Labor Code.―The Court finds the evidence presented by the
petitioners, as opposed to the bare denial of Gonzaga, sufficient to constitute substantial evidence to
prove that he committed serious misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty to warrant his
dismissal from employment. Such are just causes for termination which are explicitly enumerated

under Article 296 of the Labor Code, as amended: Article 296. Termination by Employer.—An
employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious Misconduct or
wilful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work; (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; x x x x At any
rate, Gonzaga had admitted that he failed to remit his collections daily in violation of SURNECO’s
company policy, rendering such fact conclusive and binding upon him. Therefore, for his equal
violation of Section 7.2.2 of the Code of Ethics (failure to remit collections/monies), his dismissal is
justified altogether.

Same; Same; Formal Hearing; Jurisprudence dictates that it is not enough that the employee is given
an “ample opportunity to be heard” if company rules or practices require a formal hearing or
conference.―Jurisprudence dictates that it is not enough that the employee is given an “ample
opportunity to be heard” if company rules or practices require a formal hearing or conference. In such
instance, the requirement of a formal hearing and conference becomes mandatory. In Perez v.
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, 584 SCRA 110 (2009), the Court laid down the
following principles in dismissing employees: (a) “ample opportunity to be heard” means any
meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him
and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair,
just and reasonable way. (b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when
requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exists or a company rule or
practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it. (c) the “ample opportunity to be heard”
standard in the Labor Code prevails over the “hearing and conference” requirement in the
implementing rules and regulations. [emphases and underscoring supplied] The rationale behind this
mandatory characterization is premised on the fact that company rules and regulations which
regulate the procedure and requirements for termination, are generally binding on the employer.
Thus, as pronounced in Suico v. NLRC, et al., 513 SCRA 325 (2007): Company policies or practices are
binding on the parties. Some can ripen into an obligation on the part of the employer, such as those
which confer benefits on employees or regulate the procedures and requirements for their
termination.

Same; Same; In Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004), the Supreme
Court pronounced that where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process
should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should
indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights.―In this relation, case law states that
an employer who terminates an employee for a valid cause but does so through invalid procedure is
liable to pay the latter nominal damages. In Agabon v. NLRC (Agabon), 442 SCRA 573 (2004), the Court
pronounced that where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights. Thus, in Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay
the employee nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00. By analogy, the Court finds that the
same principle should apply to the case at bar for the reason that an employer’s breach of its own
company procedure is equally violative of the laborer’s rights, albeit not statutory in source. Hence,
although the dismissal stands, the Court deems it appropriate to award Gonzaga nominal damages in
the amount of P30,000.00.

Brion, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Remedial Law; Civil Law; Labor Law; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; View that a labor case
is generally elevated to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, after it has been resolved by the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.―Pursuant to the established rules and jurisprudence, a
labor case is generally elevated to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, after it has been resolved by the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. The object of a Rule 45 petition is to determine the correctness of the
assailed decision, i.e., whether the respondent court committed a reversible legal error in resolving
the case. In contrast, the object of a Rule 65 petition is to determine jurisdictional error on the part of
the respondent court, i.e., whether the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In light of this review process, the Court takes on a unique
approach in reviewing a CA decision on a labor case in that “we ... examine the CA decision from the
prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the
[National Labor Relations Commission] decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC
decision on the merits of the case was correct.” Hence, the question to ask is whether the CA
correctly determined whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling in this case. In
this particular case, I believe that the CA erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC.

Labor Law; Termination of Employment; View that as ruled in Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004), where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer
should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights.―Gonzaga’s misappropriation
of the funds under his custody constitutes a just and valid cause for his dismissal. Nonetheless, as the
ponencia found, Gonzaga was not afforded the procedural due process for failure of the petitioners to
observe their own established policy in investigating erring employees. As ruled in Agabon v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004), “[w]here the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the
instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or
ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory
rights...” Hence, the employer should be required to pay the employee nominal damages, which has
been set by jurisprudence at P30,000.00.

G.R. No. 198732. June 10, 2013.*

CHRISTIAN CABALLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Law; Child Prostitution; Elements of.―Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.—Children, whether male or female, who for money,
profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x x x x (b) Those who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall
be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended,
the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty
for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in
its medium period x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As determined in the case of Olivarez
v. CA (Olivarez), 465 SCRA 465 (2005), the elements of the foregoing offense are the following: (a) The
accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) The said act is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) The child, whether
male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Same; Same; Child Abuse Law (R.A. No. 7610); Republic Act No. 7610 was meant to advance the state
policy of affording “special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development” and in such
regard, “provide sanctions for their commission.”―To put things in proper perspective, it must be
pointed out that RA 7610 was meant to advance the state policy of affording “special protection to
children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other conditions
prejudicial to their development” and in such regard, “provide sanctions for their commission.” It also
furthers the “best interests of children” and as such, its provisions are guided by this standard.

Same; Same; Same; Congress crafted Article III of R.A. No. 7610 in order to penalize child prostitution
and other forms of sexual abuse.―Driven by the foregoing considerations, Congress crafted Article III
of the same law in order to penalize child prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse. Section 5
thereof provides a definition of who is considered a “child exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.” As illumined in Olivarez v. CA, 465 SCRA 465 (2005), citing People v. Larin, 297 SCRA 309
(1998), and Amployo v. People, 457 SCRA 282 (2005), the final version of the aforesaid provision was
a product of various deliberations to expand its original coverage to cases where the minor may have
been coerced or intimidated into sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money
or profit, viz.: The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise present. As succinctly explained in People v. Larin, 297
SCRA 309 (1998): A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when
the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group... It must be
noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in
which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct. We reiterated this
ruling in Amployo v. People, 457 SCRA 282 (2005): ... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of
Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in
which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation...

Same; Same; Same; As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a
child indulges in sexual intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, the child is deemed to be a “child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.”―As it is
presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual
intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is
deemed to be a “child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.” In this manner, the law is
able to act as an effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to their development. In this relation, case law
further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free
exercise of the offended party’s free will. Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse
Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of
forms. It is defined as: The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a
child to engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or
the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving
violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.―Jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases
involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and Caballo
were sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive on this point: For
purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person. The language of the law
is clear: it seeks to punish “[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.” Unlike rape, therefore,
consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of
having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil
that is proscribed. A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection. The harm which results from a child’s
bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal.
Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual
behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual
activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to
afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual
predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair
game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving
rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.

G.R. No. 192890. June 17, 2013.*

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. VIRGINIA PALMARES, LERMA P. AVELINO, MELILIA P.
VILLA, NINIAN P. CATEQUISTA, LUIS PALMARES, JR., SALVE P. VALENZUELA, GEORGE P. PALMARES,
and DENCEL P. PALMARES herein represented by their ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, LERMA P. AVELINO,
respondents.

Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Principal Factors Enumerated Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657
that Guide Special Agrarian Courts in the Determination of Just Compensation.—The principal basis of
the computation for just compensation is Section 17 of RA 6657, which enumerates the following
factors to guide the special agrarian courts in the determination thereof: (1) the acquisition cost of
the land; (2) the current value of the properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and income; (4) the sworn
valuation by the owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the assessment made by government assessors;
(7) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the
government to the property; and (8) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land, if any. Pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of
the same law, the DAR translated these factors into a basic formula.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Adm. Case No. 7332. June 18, 2013.*

EDUARDO A. ABELLA, complainant, vs. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., respondent.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Disbarment; A lawyer who holds a government office may be disciplined as a
member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer.―Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyer’s responsibility to society: Rule 1.01 engraves
the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying
any man’s cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to
lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one’s public position to: (1) promote
private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public
duties. It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a government office may be disciplined as a member
of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. In this light, a
lawyer’s compliance with and observance of the abovementioned rules should be taken into
consideration in determining his moral fitness to continue in the practice of law.

Same; Same; Same; The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession; Any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities,
which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient
to warrant suspension or disbarment.―To note, “the possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession.” This proceeds from the lawyer’s duty to observe the highest
degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar’s integrity. Consequently, any errant behavior on the
part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.

Labor Law; Backwages; Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate
and distinct from separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and are awarded conjunctively to an
employee who has been illegally dismissed.―Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that
backwages are separate and distinct from separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and are awarded
conjunctively to an employee who has been illegally dismissed. There is nothing in the records that
could confound the finding that complainant was illegally dismissed as LA Carreon, the NLRC, and the
CA were all unanimous in decreeing the same. Being a labor arbiter, it is hardly believable that
respondent could overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to backwages in view of the
standing pronouncement of illegal dismissal. In this regard, respondent’s defense deserves scant
consideration.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Disbarment; Immoral Conduct; Gross Misconduct; Words and Phrases;
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community; On the other
hand, gross misconduct constitutes “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.”―Jurisprudence illumines that immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to
the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. It treads the line of grossness
when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes “improper or wrong
conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment.”

Same; Same; Same; Suspension; Penalties; Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when
a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be suspended or
disbarred.―Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of
gross immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred: SEC. 27. Attorneys
removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.―A member of the bar may be removed
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Thus, as respondent’s
violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct, his disbarment should
come as a matter of course. However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already
been disbarred in a previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., 615
SCRA 206 (2010), which therefore precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same. In view
of the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of P40,000.00 in
order to penalize respondent’s transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future.

Same; Same; Practice of Law; The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who continue to
meet its exacting qualifications.―As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the
practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who continue to meet its exacting qualifications.
Verily, for all the prestige and opportunity which the profession brings lies the greater responsibility
to uphold its integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it is quintessential that its members
continuously and unwaveringly exhibit, preserve and protect moral uprightness in their activities,
both in their legal practice as well as in their personal lives. Truth be told, the Bar holds no place for
the deceitful, immoral and corrupt.
G.R. No. 205033. June 18, 2013.*

ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G.

CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L.
LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, and ELBERT C. ATILANO, respondents.

Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Motion for Reconsideration; Section 3, Article IX-C
of the 1987 Constitution requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may
take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power.―Section
3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power.
It finds no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of administrative
functions. The distinction between the two is well-defined. As illumined in Villarosa v. COMELEC, 319
SCRA 470 (1999): [T]he term ‘administrative’ connotes, or pertains, to ‘administration, especially
management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application,
or conduct of persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and
weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. While a ‘quasi-judicial function’ is a term
which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

Same; Same; Disqualification of Candidates; Certificate of Candidacy; The COMELEC’s denial of due
course to and/or cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy in view of a candidate’s disqualification to
run for elective office based on a final conviction is subsumed under its mandate to enforce and
administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections.―In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, 683 SCRA 1
(2012), the Court held that the COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in
view of a candidate’s disqualification to run for elective office based on a final conviction is subsumed
under its mandate to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections. Accordingly,
in such a situation, it is the COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate’s CoC,
notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of
the same.

Same; Same; Same; Same; As petitioner’s disqualification to run for public office had already been
settled in a previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc
to cancel his Certificate of Candidacy as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.―In this light,
there is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc would be acting in a
purely administrative manner. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies
and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. As petitioner’s disqualification to
run for public office had already been settled in a previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is
incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, else it be remiss in
fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. Equally compelling is the fact that the denial of petitioner’s Petition for Inclusion as a
registered voter in Zamboanga City had already attained finality by virtue of the RTC’s Order dated
October 31, 2012. In this accord, petitioner’s non-compliance with the voter registration requirement
under Section 39(a) of the LGC is already beyond question and likewise provides a sufficient ground
for the cancellation of his CoC altogether.

Statutory Construction; Every new statute should be construed in connection with those already
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand
together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.―Well-established is the rule
that every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation to
the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done
by any fair and reasonable interpretation.

Same; Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; While Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code
allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he
serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes
a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for
elective office.―Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective candidates, provides: SEC.
40. Disqualifications.—The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) And on the other hand, Article 30 of the RPC reads:
ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification.—The penalties
of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following
effects: 1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held,
even if conferred by popular election. 2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any
popular office or to be elected to such office. 3. The disqualification for the offices or public
employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned. In case of temporary
disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last
during the term of the sentence. 4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any
office formerly held. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Keeping with the above-mentioned
statutory construction principle, the Court observes that the conflict between these provisions of law
may be properly reconciled. In particular, while Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run
for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the said
provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty, either as principal
or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office. An example of
this would be Article 41 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
as an accessory to the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal: ART. 41.
Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal―Their accessory penalties.―The penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the
period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In this relation, Article
30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification has the
effect of depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run for elective office. To note, this penalty,
as well as other penalties of similar import, is based on the presumptive rule that one who is
rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is
unfit to hold public office, as the same partakes of a privilege which the State grants only to such
classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common good.
Same; Same; Same; Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code should be considered as a law of
general application and therefore, must yield to the more definitive Revised Penal Code provisions in
line with the principle of lex specialis derogat generali ― general legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the
special provisions are not applicable.―Pertinently, it is observed that the import of Article 41 in
relation to Article 30 of the RPC is more direct and specific in nature ― insofar as it deprives the
candidate to run for elective office due to his conviction ― as compared to Section 40(a) of the LGC
which broadly speaks of offenses involving moral turpitude and those punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment without any consideration of certain disqualifying effects to one’s right to
suffrage. Accordingly, Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law of general application
and therefore, must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle of lex
specialis derogat generali ― general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same
subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are
not applicable. In other words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one specially designed therefor should prevail.

Same; Same; Same; Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states that one who is previously
convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.―Article
41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. In this case, the same accessory penalty had not
been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and as such,
petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist. Further, it is well to note
that the use of the word “perpetual” in the aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime
restriction and in this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison term which is imposed as
its principal penalty. Instructive on this point is the Court’s ruling in Lacuna v. Abes, 24 SCRA 780
(1968), where the Court explained the meaning of the term “perpetual” as applied to the penalty of
disqualification to run for public office: The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification
disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only
during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the
case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961. But this does not hold true with respect to the
other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.
This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually, distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the
sentence.

Brion, j., Separate Opinion:

Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; Certificate of Candidacy; View that the Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) of petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos should be cancelled for his failure to comply with the
voter registration requirement in light of the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) final judgment denying
Jalosjos’ inclusion as a voter.―I CONCUR with the ruling that the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) of
petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos should be cancelled for his failure to comply with the voter registration
requirement in light of the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) final judgment denying Jalosjos’ inclusion as a
voter. To the extent that the RTC’s basis for its denial was the perpetual absolute disqualification of
Jalosjos arising from the reclusion perpetua imposed on him, I also agree that the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) en banc’s ruling cannot legally be faulted.

Same; Same; Same; View that the perpetual absolute disqualification is an improper ground whose
proper place and role is the basis for disqualification, not for the cancellation of a Certificate of
Candidacy, and one that cannot be made motu proprio.―I make a reservation, however, on the latter
ground to the extent that the perpetual absolute disqualification is motu proprio cited by the
Comelec en banc in the exercise of its administrative power and as an independent ground for the
cancellation it ordered. From this perspective, I take the position that the perpetual absolute
disqualification is an improper ground whose proper place and role is the basis for disqualification,
not for the cancellation of a CoC, and one that cannot be made motu proprio. A candidate who has
filed an otherwise valid CoC may, for example, put up as a defense that he or she has been granted an
absolute pardon that erased the accessory penalties attached to his offense and its penalty (as in the
recent case of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada). This example glaringly shows that a
perpetual absolute disqualification involves a question of fact that requires the full application of due
process and cannot, motu proprio and in the exercise of administrative powers, be simply cited as a
ground for the cancellation of a CoC.

Same; Same; Same; View that a party whose Certificate of Candidacy is denied or is cancelled would
not be considered a candidate; on the other hand, one who filed a valid Certificate of Candidacy but
who is subsequently disqualified (e.g., for unlawful electioneering under Sections 68 and 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code) was a candidate but was not allowed to be voted for or, after elections,
would not be allowed to serve if he would win.―A party whose CoC is denied or is cancelled would
not be considered a candidate; on the other hand, one who filed a valid CoC but who is subsequently
disqualified (e.g., for unlawful electioneering under Sections 68 and 12 of the Omnibus Election Code)
was a candidate but was not allowed to be voted for or, after elections, would not be allowed to serve
if he would win. Directly relevant to this distinction is Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code which
allows the substitution of disqualified candidates as has been extensively discussed by Mr. Justice
Lucas P. Bersamin in the recent case of Talaga v. Commission on Elections, 683 SCRA 197 (2012).

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

G.R. No. 201892. July 22, 2015.*

NORLINDA S. MARILAG, petitioner, vs. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ, respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Elements of.—A case is barred by prior
judgment or res judicata when the following elements concur: (a) the judgment sought to bar the new
action must be final; (b) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (c) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action.

Same; Same; Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Litis Pendentia; Litis pendentia, as a ground for the
dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and
vexatious.—To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action,
refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis
pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would
amount to res judicata in the other. The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a
party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the
same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should
not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting
judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to
avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. Consequently, a party will not be permitted
to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole cause must be
determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ground of
dismissal is litis pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be).

Loans; In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage (REM), the rule is that the
creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the
debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real
action to foreclose on the mortgage security.—In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage,
the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor--mortgagor, i.e.,
to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the
institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative,
not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee
opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the unpaid debt,
except only for the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of the
debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties.
Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that the mortgaged property
was sold at public auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation.

Same; While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note (PN) executed by
respondent who was not the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct
contract of loan which would have given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach.—While the
ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note executed by respondent who was not
the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct contract of loan which would
have given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records are bereft of any
indication that respondent’s agreement to pay Rafael’s loan obligation and the execution of the
subject PN extinguished by novation the contract of loan between Rafael and petitioner, in the
absence of express agreement or any act of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation is
never presumed, but must be clearly and unequivocally shown. Thus, in order for a new agreement to
supersede the old one, the parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their
old contract in favor of a new one, which was not shown here.

Foreclosure of Mortgage; As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over
the mortgaged property, she is now barred from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection,
regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality.—As petitioner
had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now
barred from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of whether or not the
decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the collection case is in
order. Considering, however, that respondent’s claim for return of excess payment partakes of the
nature of a compulsory counterclaim and, thus, survives the dismissal of petitioner’s collection suit,
the same should be resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support.

Attorney’s Fees; The rule is well-settled that the trial court must clearly state the reasons for awarding
attorney’s fees in the body of its decision, not merely in its dispositive portion, as the appellate courts
are precluded from supplementing the bases for such award.—Inasmuch as the court a quo failed to
state in the body of its decision the factual or legal basis for the award of attorney’s fees to the
respondent, as required under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, the Court resolves to delete the
same. The rule is well-settled that the trial court must clearly state the reasons for awarding
attorney’s fees in the body of its decision, not merely in its dispositive portion, as the appellate courts
are precluded from supplementing the bases for such award.

G.R. No. 205575. July 22, 2015.*

VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP and CASMERO MAHILUM, petitioners, vs.
VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. (VECO), respondent.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, certiorari should be filed “not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order
or resolution” sought to be assailed.—Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
certiorari should be filed “not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution” sought to be assailed. The provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that
even this Court cannot trifle with.
Same; Same; Same; The fact that the delay in the filing of the petition for certiorari was only one (1)
day is not a legal justification for noncompliance with the rule requiring that it be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution.—The fact that the delay in
the filing of the petition for certiorari was only one day is not a legal justification for noncompliance
with the rule requiring that it be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed
judgment, order or resolution. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory that the ends of justice
would be better subserved by allowing a petition for certiorari filed only one-day late. When the law
fixes sixty (60) days, it cannot be taken to mean also sixty-one (61) days, as the Court had previously
declared in this wise: [W]hen the law fixes thirty days [or sixty days as in the present case], we cannot
take it to mean also thirty-one days. If that deadline could be stretched to thirty-one days in one case,
what would prevent its being further stretched to thirty-two days in another case, and so on, step by
step, until the original line is forgotten or buried in the growing confusion resulting from the
alterations? That is intolerable. We cannot fix a period with the solemnity of a statute and disregard it
like a joke. If law is founded on reason, whim and fancy should play no part in its application.

Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; It is a fundamental doctrine in labor law that the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply
with its provisions.—True, it is a fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between
the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If the provisions of the CBA seem clear
and unambiguous, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control. However, as in this case,
when general and specific provisions of the CBA are inconsistent, the specific provision shall be
paramount to and govern the general provision. Section 4, Article XVII of the CBA states that “(a)ny
difference of opinion, controversy, dispute problem or complaint arising from Company--Union or
Company-Worker relations concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement or
regarding any matter affecting Company--Union or Company-Worker relations shall be considered a
grievance.” On the other hand, under Section 13, Article XIV, “(t)he Company agrees that henceforth
there shall be a fair and uniform application of its rules and regulations. It is understood that
disciplinary actions imposed on employee or laborer shall be governed by the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Company as well as those provided for by existing laws on the matter.”

Same; Termination of Employment; Loss of Trust and Confidence; The Supreme Court (SC) has
consistently held that loss of trust and confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust
reposed in the employee by his employer.—The Court has consistently held that “x x x loss of trust
and confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer.
Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse,
as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Moreover, it
must be based on substantial evidence and not on the employer’s whims or caprices or suspicions[,]
otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. x x x. And, in order to
constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and show that the
employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. In addition, loss of confidence
x x x is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust, and
confidence or that the employee concerned is entrusted with confidence with respect to delicate
matters, such as handling or care and protection of the property and assets of the employer. The
betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized.”

Same; Same; Settled is the rule that an employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is
guilty of acts inimical to the interests of the employer. A company has the right to dismiss its
employee if only as a measure of self-protection.—With the derogatory statements issued by
Mahilum that were intended to incite, not just public condemnation of VECO, but antagonism and
obstruction against rate increases in electricity that it may be allowed, by law, to fix, there can be no
dispute that VECO, indeed, had lost its trust and confidence in Mahilum and his ability to perform his
tasks with utmost efficiency and loyalty expected of an employee entrusted to handle customers and
funds. Settled is the rule that an employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is guilty of
acts inimical to the interests of the employer. A company has the right to dismiss its employee if only
as a measure of self-protection.

Same; Social justice does not mandate that every dispute should be automatically decided in favor of
labor.—As a final word, while it is the state’s responsibility to afford protection to labor, this policy
should not be used as an instrument to oppress management and capital. In resolving disputes
between labor and capital, fairness and justice should always prevail. Social justice does not mandate
that every dispute should be automatically decided in favor of labor. Justice is to be granted to the
deserving and dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.

G.R. No. 211972. July 22, 2015.*

WILSON GO and PETER GO, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF THE LATE FELISA TAMIO DE
BUENAVENTURA, represented by RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS, and REGINA A. BIHIS; and
RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS, in their personal capacities,
respondents.

G.R. No. 212045. July 22, 2015.*

BELLA A. GUERRERO, DELFIN A. GUERRERO, JR. and LESTER ALVIN A. GUERRERO, petitioners, vs. THE
ESTATE OF THE LATE FELISA TAMIO DE BUENAVENTURA, herein represented by RESURRECION A.
BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS, and RESURRECION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A.
BIHIS, in their personal capacities, respondents.

Civil Law; Trusts; Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is
vested in another.—Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which
is vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for
the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An
express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust comes
into being by operation of law.
Same; Same; Express Trusts; Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by
some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create
a trust.—Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed,
or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article
1444 of the Civil Code, “[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.” It is possible to create a trust without using the word “trust”
or “trustee.” Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily indicate an
intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the trustor manifested an intention
to create the kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not
he knows that the relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he
knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust.

Same; Same; Same; Reconveyance; Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that the action for
reconveyance instituted by respondents has not yet prescribed, following the jurisprudential rule that
express trusts prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is repudiated.—Anent the issue of
prescription, the Court finds that the action for reconveyance instituted by respondents has not yet
prescribed, following the jurisprudential rule that express trusts prescribe in ten (10) years from the
time the trust is repudiated. In this case, there was a repudiation of the express trust when Bella, as
the remaining trustee, sold the subject property to Wilson and Peter on January 23, 1997. As the
complaint for reconveyance and damages was filed by respondents on October 17, 1997, or only a
few months after the sale of the subject property to Wilson and Peter, it cannot be said that the same
has prescribed.

Same; Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; Words and Phrases; A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or an interest in, such
property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of some other person’s claim or interest in the property.—A purchaser in good faith is one who
buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or an interest in,
such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he
has notice of some other person’s claim or interest in the property. Corollary thereto, when a piece of
land is in the actual possession of persons other than the seller, the buyer must be wary and should
investigate the rights of those in possession. Without making such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is
a buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to buy or deal with realty, his duty is to read the public
manuscript, that is, to look and see who is there upon it and what his rights are. A want of caution
and diligence, which an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in making
purchases, is in contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or
discover that the land sold to him is in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith.

G.R. No. 206032. August 19, 2015.*

JOSE RUDY L. BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC., AUGUSTEA
SHIPMANAGEMENT ITALY, and/or Captain ANTONIO S. NOMBRADO,** respondents.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; The entitlement of overseas seafarers to disability benefits is
a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but also by law and contract.—The entitlement of
overseas seafarers to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but also by
law and contract. The pertinent statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199 (formerly Articles 191 to
193) of the Labor Code in relation to Section 2, Rule X of the Rules implementing Title II, Book IV of
the said Code; while the relevant contracts are: (a) the POEA-SEC, which is a standard set of
provisions that is deemed incorporated in every seafarer’s contract of employment; (b) the CBA, if any;
and (c) the employment agreement between the seafarer and his employer.

Same; Same; Work-Related Injury; Work-Related Illness; Words and Phrases; The 2000 Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) defines
“work-related injury” as “injury(ies)” resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of
employment” and “work-related illness” as “any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of
an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein
satisfied.”—The 2000 POEA-SEC defines “work-related injury” as “injury(ies)” resulting in disability or
death arising out of and in the course of employment” and “work-related illness” as “any sickness
resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this
contract with the conditions set therein satisfied,” viz.: 1. The seafarer’s work must involve the risks
described herein; 2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the
described risks; 3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other
factors necessary to contract it; and 4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

Same; Same; Occupational Diseases; Cardiovascular Disease; Section 32(A)(11) of the 2000 Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) expressly
con-siders Cardiovascular Disease (CVD) as an occupational disease.—Section 32(A)(11) of the 2000
POEA-SEC expressly considers Cardiovascular Disease (CVD) as an occupational disease if it was
contracted under any of the following instances, to wit: (a) If the heart disease was known to have
been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly
precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work. (b) The strain of work that
brings about an acute attack must be sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the
clinical signs of cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship. (c) If a person who was apparently
asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury
during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a
causal relationship.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely
on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue.—A party in whose favor the legal
presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. The
effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.
However, other than their bare and self-serving assertion that petitioner’s Hypertensive
Cardiovascular Disease was a mere complication of his Diabetes Mellitus II, respondents failed to
introduce countervailing evidence that would otherwise overcome the disputable presumption of
compensability of the said disease.

Labor Law; Seafarers; Occupational Diseases; It is safe to presume that, at the very least, the nature of
petitioner’s employment had contributed to the aggravation of his illness, considering that as Chief
Cook, he was exposed to constant temperature changes, stress, and physical strain.—Verily, it is not
required that the employment of petitioner as Chief Cook should be the sole factor in the
development of his hypertensive cardiovascular disease so as to entitle him to claim the benefits
provided therefor. It suffices that his employment as such had contributed, even in a small degree, to
the development of the disease. Thus, it is safe to presume that, at the very least, the nature of
petitioner’s employment had contributed to the aggravation of his illness, considering that as Chief
Cook, he was exposed to constant temperature changes, stress, and physical strain.

G.R. No. 213189. September 8, 2015.*

FAUSTINO A. SILANG vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds; As a general rule, public
officials who are directly responsible for any illegal expenditure of public funds are personally liable
therefor.—As a general rule, public officials who are directly responsible for any illegal expenditure of
public funds are personally liable therefor.

Same; Same; Same; Section 342, Chapter IV, Title V, Book II of the Local Government Code (LGC)
states that the superior officer directing, or the department head participating in the illegal or
improper use or application or deposit of government funds or property, shall be jointly and severally
liable with the local treasurer, accountant, budget officer, or other accountable officer for the sum or
property so illegally or improperly used, applied or deposited.—Section 342, Chapter IV, Title V, Book
II of the LGC states that the superior officer directing, or the department head participating in the
illegal or improper use or application or deposit of government funds or property, shall be jointly and
severally liable with the local treasurer, accountant, budget officer, or other accountable officer for
the sum or property so illegally or improperly used, applied or deposited.

Same; Same; Same; Section 104, Chapter 5 of the Auditing Code provides that the treasurer of the
local government unit (LGU) shall exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising the
accountable officers under him; otherwise, he shall be jointly and solidarily liable with them for the
loss of government funds or property under their control.—Section 104, Chapter 5 of the Auditing
Code provides that the treasurer of the local government unit shall exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in supervising the accountable officers under him; otherwise, he shall be jointly and
solidarily liable with them for the loss of government funds or property under their control.

Same; Same; Same; By way of exception, however, passive recipients or payees of disallowed salaries,
emoluments, benefits, and other allowances need not refund such disallowed amounts if they
received the same in good faith.—By way of exception, however, passive recipients or payees of
disallowed salaries, emoluments, benefits, and other allowances need not refund such disallowed
amounts if they received the same in good faith. Stated otherwise, government officials and
employees who unwittingly received disallowed benefits or allowances are not liable for their
reimbursement if there is no finding of bad faith. In Lumayna v. COA, 601 SCRA 163 (2009), the Court
declared that notwithstanding the disallowance of benefits by COA, the affected personnel who
received the said benefits in good faith should not be ordered to refund the disallowed benefits.

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds; View that this liability of
government employees and officials for illegal expenditures similarly finds support in the Local
Government Code (LGC), which imputes personal liability for unlawful expenditures against the
official or employee responsible for it.—Section 52, Chapter 9, Title I-B, Book V of the Administrative
Code expressly provides that persons who are directly responsible for the illegal expenditures of
public funds shall be liable: General Liability for Unlawful Expenditures.—Expenditures of government
funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of
the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor. [Emphasis supplied] This liability of
government employees and officials for illegal expenditures similarly finds support in the Local
Government Code, which imputes personal liability for unlawful expenditures against the official or
employee responsible for it, viz.: Section 351. General Liability for Unlawful
Expenditures.—Expenditures of funds or use of property in violation of this Title and other laws shall
be a personal liability of the official or employee responsible therefor.

Same; Same; Local Government Units; View that Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
Circular No. 2006-1 authorizes the local chief executive and the Sanggunian to use savings from
released Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) funds to grant cash incentives to
rank-and-file employees of the local government, through a Collective Negotiation Agreement
(CNA).—Under the local government code, an ordinance is necessary for the use of local funds. The
local chief executive prepares the budget proposal, which is the basis for the budget to be enacted by
the local Sanggunian. As a rule, savings generated from the annual budget revert back to the general
fund. DBM Circular No. 2006-1 authorizes the local chief executive and the Sanggunian to use savings
from released Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) funds to grant cash incentives to
rank-and-file employees of the local government, through a CNA.

Same; Same; Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds; View that the Court En Banc held the approving
officers who acted in bad faith to be solidarily liable for the return of the disallowed funds even if they
did not receive any part of the fund.—That these approving officers did not receive any of these funds
is not sufficient justification to absolve them from liability. The receipt or nonreceipt of illegally
disbursed funds is immaterial to the solidary liability of government officials directly responsible
therefor. We had the occasion to rule on this point in the recent case Maritime Industry Audit v. COA,
745 SCRA 300 (2015), where the Court En Banc held the approving officers who acted in bad faith to
be solidarily liable for the return of the disallowed funds even if they did not receive any part of the
fund.

Same; Same; Same; View that the only set of employees who are not obliged to reimburse the illegally
disbursed funds in the present case are its passive recipients, i.e., the ordinary rank-and-file
employees of the local government unit (LGU) of Tayabas, including the Unyon ng mga Kawani ng
Pamahalaang Lokal ng Tayabas (UNGKAT) members and officers who had no direct participation in
the negotiations.—The only set of employees who are not obliged to reimburse the illegally disbursed
funds in the present case are its passive recipients, i.e., the ordinary rank-and-file employees of the
LGU of Tayabas, including the UNGKAT members and officers who had no direct participation in the
negotiations. The reason for this conclusion is that they had been mere passive recipients of good
graces and they had (and still have) every right to rely on the presumptions of regularity and good
faith accorded to public officers responsible for the disbursement and expenditure of public funds. In
particular, as mere passive recipients, they did not actively take part in the CNA, had no responsibility
to undertake in carrying out the requirements for union registration and accreditation, and could not
have known the taints of irregularities that the funds released to them carried.

G.R. No. 194906. September 9, 2015.*

LORALEI P. HALILI, petitioner, vs. JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL, ROB MORRIS, and
GUNDELINA A. VELAZCO, respondents.

Civil Law; Contracts; Applicable laws form part of, and are read into, contracts without need for any
express reference thereto; more so, when it pertains to a labor contract which is imbued with public
interest.—Applicable laws form part of, and are read into, contracts without need for any express
reference thereto; more so, when it pertains to a labor contract which is imbued with public interest.
Each contract thus contains not only what was explicitly stipulated therein, but also the statutory
provisions that have any bearing on the matter.

G.R. No. 207949. September 9, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO

DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON,
accused-appellants.

Criminal Law; Death of the Accused Pending Appeal; Criminal Liability; Civil Liability; The death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability
ex delicto.—In People v. Amistoso, 704 SCRA 369 (2013), the Court explained that the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability
ex delicto. Consequently, Renato’s death on June 10, 2014 renders the Court’s July 23, 2014
Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to him, and is therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal
case against Renato is dismissed.

G.R. No. 211588. September 9, 2015.*

WORLD’S BEST GAS, INC., petitioner, vs. HENRY VITAL, joined by his and wife FLOSERFINA VITAL,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed
for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party.—With the RTC’s jurisdiction
established over the above mentioned causes of action, Vital’s claim of P500,000.00 due from WBGI’ s
acquisition of his shares of stocks should therefore be offset against the P923,843.59 in arrearages
payable to WBGI by ERJ Enterprises owned by respondents, as prayed for by him. Hence, no amount
can be adjudicated in Vital’s favor, since it is the respondents who, after due computation, would be
left liable to WBGI in the net amount of P423,843.59. This notwithstanding, WBGI cannot recover this
latter amount in this case since it never interposed a permissive counterclaim therefor in its answer. It
is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by the party. WBGI may, however, opt to file a separate collection suit, including those
related thereto (e.g., moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees), to recover such sum.

G.R. No. 172352. September 16, 2015.*

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO HABABAG, SR., substituted by his wife,
CONSOLACION, and children, namely: MANUEL, SALVADOR, WILSON, JIMMY, ALFREDO, JR., and
JUDITH, all surnamed HABABAG, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 172387-88. September 16, 2015.*

ALFREDO HABABAG, SR., substituted by his wife, CONSOLACION, and children, namely: MANUEL,
SALVADOR, WILSON, JIMMY, ALFREDO, JR., and JUDITH, all surnamed HABABAG, petitioners, vs. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.

Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Words and Phrases; In the landmark case of Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989),
the Supreme Court (SC) defined the term “just compensation” as follows: Just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has
been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s
loss.—In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989), the Court defined the term “just compensation”
as follows: Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the
taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word
“compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full [and] ample.

Same; Same; Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 enumerates the factors which must be taken
into consideration to accurately determine the amount of just compensation to be awarded in a
particular case.—The RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has been conferred with the original and
exclusive power to determine just compensation for parcels of land acquired by the State pursuant to
the agrarian reform program. To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the
factors which must be taken into consideration to accurately determine the amount of just
compensation to be awarded in a particular case. They are: (a) the acquisition cost of the land; (b) the
current value of like properties; (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income
therefrom; (d) the owner’s sworn valuation; (e) the tax declarations; (f) the assessment made by
government assessors; (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any. Corollarily, pursuant to its
rule-making power under Section 49 of the same law, the DAR translated these factors into a basic
formula, which courts have often referred to and applied, as the CA did in this case. It, however, bears
stressing that courts are not constrained to adopt the said formula in every case since the
determination of the amount of just compensation essentially partakes the nature of a judicial
function. In this accord, courts may either adopt the DAR formula or proceed with its own application
for as long as the factors listed in Section 17 of RA 6657 have been duly considered.

Same; Same; Market Value; Words and Phrases; The Supreme Court (SC) has repeatedly ruled that
the constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent of the
market value of the property, which is, in turn, defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market
in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as
between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government.—To elucidate, in determining the amount of just compensation for the subject lands,
the RTC applied the Income Productivity Approach which approximated the income for the remaining
productive life of the crops therein, without considering the fortuitous events and plant diseases, and
with the expectation that they would be compensated by developments which could be made by the
property owner. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the constitutional limitation of just
compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent of the market value of the property, which is, in
turn, defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who
desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. In this accord, therefore,
the Court cannot sustain the formula used by the RTC which was “based on the principle of
anticipation which implies that the value of a property is dependent on the potential net benefit that
may be derived from its ownership.” Clearly, this approach, which is largely characterized by the
element of futurity, is inconsistent with the idea of valuing the expropriated property at the time of
the taking.

Same; Same; In order to be just, the compensation for the land must be what the farmer-beneficiaries
can reasonably afford to pay based on what the land can produce.—Since they generally live on a
hand-to-mouth existence, their source of repaying the just compensation is but derived out of their
income from their cultivation of the land. Hence, in order to be just, the compensation for the land
must be what the farmer-beneficiaries can reasonably afford to pay based on what the land can
produce. It would therefore be highly inequitable that in the 30-year allowable period to pay the
annual amortizations for the lands, farmer-beneficiaries would be required to pay for the same
income they expect to earn therefrom on top of the computed market value of the landholdings. Such
could not have been the intent of the State’s agrarian reform program. In fine, the Court cannot
sustain the RTC’s application of the Income Productivity Approach used as one of its bases in arriving
at its decreed valuation. Not only is the same aversive to the jurisprudential concept of “market value,”
but it also deviates from the factors laid down in Section 17 of RA 6657 and thus, remains legally
baseless and unfounded.
G.R. No. 203370. April 11, 2016.*

MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and HELEN Y. DEE, petitioners, vs. PHILIP PICCIO, MIA
GATMAYTAN, MA. ANNABELLA RELOVA SANTOS, JOHN JOSEPH GUTIERREZ, JOCELYN UPANO, JOSE
DIZON, ROLANDO PAREJA, WONINA M. BONIFACIO, ELVIRA CRUZ, CORNELIO ZAFRA, VICENTE
ORTUOSTE, VICTORIA GOMEZ JACINTO, JUVENCIO PERECHE, JR., RICARDO LORAYES, PETER C.
SUCHIANCO, and TRENNIE MONSOD, respondents.

G.R. No. 215106. April 11, 2016.*

MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIP PICCIO, MIA GATMAYTAN, MA.
ANNABELLA RELOVA SANTOS, JOHN JOSEPH GUTIERREZ, JOCELYN UPANO, JOSE DIZON, ROLANDO
PAREJA, WONINA M. BONIFACIO, ELVIRA CRUZ, CORNELIO ZAFRA, VICENTE ORTUOSTE, VICTORIA
GOMEZ JACINTO, JUVENCIO PERECHE, JR., RICARDO LORAYES, PETER C. SUCHIANCO, and TRENNIE
MONSOD, respondents.

Attorneys; Office of the Solicitor General; The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal
cases before the Supreme Court (SC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) is vested solely in the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which is “the law office of the Government whose specific powers and
functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the People [of the Philippines] before any
court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.”—The
authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Court and the CA is vested
solely in the OSG which is “the law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions
include that of representing the Republic and/or the People [of the Philippines] before any court in
any action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.” Section 35(1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that: Section 35. Powers and
Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation
or matter requiring the services of a lawyer, x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and
functions: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.

Criminal Law; Venue; Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime
was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction.—“Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction. This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360 [of the
RPC], as amended [by Republic Act No. 4363], specifically provides for the possible venues for the
institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.”
Same; Same; Libel; Generally speaking, “the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private
individual is limited to only either of two (2) places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed
and first published.”—Generally speaking, “the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a
private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was
printed and first published. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. vs.

A.C. No. 8172. April 12, 2016.*

ALEX NULADA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA, respondent.

Attorneys; Lawyer’s Oath; By taking the lawyer’s oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an
indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of justice. As such, he can be disciplined for
any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to be an
officer of the court.—Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar “to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law x x x.” Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that “[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By taking the lawyer’s oath, a
lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly administration
of justice. As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.

Same; Legal Ethics; Suspension from Practice of Law; In Heenan v. Espejo, 711 SCRA 290 (2013), the
Supreme Court (SC) suspended therein respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.—In Heenan
v. Espejo, 711 SCRA 290 (2013), the Court suspended therein respondent from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of
funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio, 622 SCRA 616 (2010), the same penalty was imposed
by the Court to respondent who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan. Likewise, in Dizon v. De
Taza, 726 SCRA 70 (2014), the Court meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years to
respondent for having issued bouncing checks, among other infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya II,
569 SCRA 256 (2008), respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, respondent also
breached his client’s trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a wanton
disregard of the IBP’s Orders in the course of its proceedings. Accordingly, and in view of the
foregoing instances when the erring lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2) years for the same
violation, the Court finds it appropriate to mete the same penalty to respondent in this case.

Same; A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a
public or private capacity.—It should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a
privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or
her actions whether acting in a public or private capacity. Any transgression of this duty on his part
would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in the legal
profession as a whole. In this case, respondent’s conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected
of him as a member of the bar, for which he must suffer the necessary consequences.

G.R. No. 202618. April 12, 2016.*

CONSULAR AREA RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its President BENJAMIN V. ZABAT,
ROMEO JUGADO, JR., and NANCY QUINO, petitioners, vs. ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA, ENGR.
TOMAS Y. MACROHON, LOCAL HOUSING BOARD OF TAGUIG CITY, and the CITY GOVERNMENT OF
TAGUIG, respondents.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Prohibition; Case law dictates that “[f]or a party to be entitled to
a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a
tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial[, quasi-judicial] or ministerial; (b)
the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.”—While the instant petition is denominated as one for prohibition, a
careful perusal of the same reveals that it is actually a petition for injunction as it ultimately seeks
that a writ of injunction be issued to permanently stop “[r]espondents, or any other person acting
under their orders or authority, from carrying out, or causing to carry out, the demolition of
[p]etitioner’s properties.” More significantly, respondents (with the exception of Casanova as will be
herein discussed) are not asked to be prevented from exercising any judicial or ministerial function on
account of any lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion, which allegation is key in an
action for prohibition. Case law dictates that “[f]or a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he
must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board
or person exercising functions, judicial[, quasi-judicial] or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation,
board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion;
and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.”

Same; Injunction; Military Reservations; It is Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7227, which solely
authorizes the Supreme Court (SC) to issue injunctions to restrain or enjoin “[t]he implementation of
the projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of the military reservations.”—It is a
fundamental rule of procedural law that it is not the caption of the pleading that determines the
nature of the complaint but rather its allegations. Hence, considering the above discussed allegations,
the petition, albeit denominated as one for prohibition, is essentially an action for injunction, which
means that Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court would not apply. Instead, it is Section 21 of RA
7227, which solely authorizes the Supreme Court to issue injunctions to restrain or enjoin “[t]he
implementation of the projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of the military
reservations,” that would govern: Section 21. Injunction and Restraining Order.—The implementation
of the projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of the military reservations are
urgent and necessary and shall not be restrained or enjoined except by an order issued by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.

Same; Special Civil Actions; Quo Warranto; The title to a public office may not be contested except
directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally.—The Court observes
that the collateral attack on respondent Casanova’s title as President and Chief Executive Officer,
which is a public office by nature is improper to resolve in this petition. The title to a public office may
not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally.
Also, it has already been settled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the
appointment of a public officer. In fact, petitioner impliedly recognized the impropriety of raising this
issue herein by stating that “until the final resolution regarding the purported authority of
[respondent Casanova], he should be prohibited from acting for and on behalf of BCDA and from
issuing notices of demolition.” Thus, at all events, the foregoing characterization of this action as one
for injunction, and the consequent conclusion that it was properly filed before the Court remain. That
being said, the Court now proceeds to the main issue in this case.

Same; Same; Injunction; Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the
petitioner should be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.—Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of
injunction to issue, the petitioner should be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and
permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear
legal right, the writ must not issue. A restraining order or an injunction is a preservative remedy
aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests, and it is not designed to protect contingent or
future rights. Verily, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of adequate existing rights is
not a ground for injunction.

Demolitions; Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992; The Supreme Court (SC) has already
settled, in the case of Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. v. Robredo, 730 SCRA 322 (2014), that
demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order when, among
others, government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented
pursuant to Section 28(b) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7279.—For another, petitioner argues against the
legality of the intended demolition, insisting that there should be a court order authorizing the
demolition pursuant to Article 536 of the Civil Code and Section 28 of RA 7279, and not a mere
Certificate of Compliance on Demolition. However, contrary to petitioner’s argument, the Court has
already settled, in the case of Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. v. Robredo, 730 SCRA 322
(2014), that demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order when,
among others, government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of RA 7279, which reads: Sec. 28. Eviction and
Demolition.—Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition,
however, may be allowed under the following situations: (a) When persons or entities occupy danger
areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other
public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; (b) When government infrastructure
projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or (c) When there is a court order for
eviction and demolition.
 Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; Case law states that [t]he presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform
a duty.—Bereft of any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, such certificate should be
accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of respondent Local
Housing Board of Taguig City. Case law states that “[t]he presumption of regularity of official acts may
be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be
made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or
unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness,” as in this case.

G.R. No. 214934. April 12, 2016.*

PACIFIC REHOUSE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOVEN L. NGO, as represented by OSCAR J. GARCIA,
respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Substitution of Parties; Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
allows the substitution of a party-litigant who dies during the pendency of a case by his heirs,
provided that the claim subject of said case is not extinguished by his death.—Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court allows the substitution of a party-litigant who dies during the pendency of a case
by his heirs, provided that the claim subject of said case is not extinguished by his death. As early as in
Bonilla v. Barcena, 71 SCRA 491 (1976), the Court has settled that if the claim in an action affects
property and property rights, then the action survives the death of a party-litigant, viz.: The question
as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for.
In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property
and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action
which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property
affected being incidental.

Same; Same; Consolidation of Cases; Case law states that consolidation of cases, when proper, results
in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the resources of the parties and the courts, and
a possible major abbreviation of trial; Likewise, it avoids the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the courts in two (2) or more cases which would otherwise require a single
judgment.—In sum, the CA erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 2031-08 based solely on Bautista’s death.
As such, it should be reinstated and consolidated with LRC Case No. 1117-09, considering that the two
cases involve the same property and, as correctly opined by the court a quo, any adjudication in
either case would necessarily affect the other. In this relation, case law states that consolidation of
cases, when proper, results in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the resources of
the parties and the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial. It is a desirable end to be
achieved, within the context of the present state of affairs where court dockets are full and individual
and state finances are limited. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with
the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before
the courts. Likewise, it avoids the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in
two or more cases which would otherwise require a single judgment.

A.C. No. 11139. April 19, 2016.*

PHILCOMSAT** HOLDINGS CORPORATION, duly represented by ERLINDA I. BILDNER, complainant, vs.

ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and ATTY. SIKINI C. LABASTILLA, respondents.

Attorneys; Criminal Contempt; Words and Phrases; Criminal contempt is conduct that is directed
against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.—At the outset,
the Court notes that the indirect contempt case originally filed before the Sandiganbayan is in the
nature of a criminal contempt. “[C]riminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice
which tends to bring the court into disrespute or disrespect.” “[C]riminal contempt, being directed
against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against organized society and, in addition,
is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue between the public and the
accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive.”

Same; Disbarment; It is well-settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a
criminal action filed against a lawyer despite being involved in the same set of facts.—Since the
indirect contempt case is criminal in nature, respondents cannot insist that the filing of an
administrative case against them on the basis of the Sandiganbayan’s ruling in the aforesaid case is
premature on the premise that their conviction has not attained finality. It is well-settled that a
disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer despite
being involved in the same set of facts. Case law instructs that a finding of guilt in the criminal case
will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the lawyer’s
acquittal does not necessarily exculpate them administratively.

Same; Legal Ethics; A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.—As members of the Bar, respondents should
not perform acts that would tend to undermine and/or denigrate the integrity of the courts, such as
the subject checkbook entry which contumaciously imputed corruption against the Sandiganbayan. It
is their sworn duty as lawyers and officers of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this
guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations. This is the very thrust of Canon
11 of the CPR, which provides that “[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.” Hence, lawyers who are
remiss in performing such sworn duty violate the aforesaid Canon 11, and as such, should be held
administratively liable and penalized accordingly, as in this case.
Same; Same; It is every lawyer’s duty to maintain the high regard to the profession by staying true to
his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach.—Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to
“at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession” for the strength of the legal
profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. It is every lawyer’s duty to maintain the
high regard to the profession by staying true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach. It
must be reiterated that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice; as acts and/or omissions emanating from lawyers which tend to
undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the attainment
of the liberties of the people. Thus, all lawyers should be bound not only to safeguard the good name
of the legal profession, but also to keep inviolable the honor, prestige, and reputation of the judiciary.
In this case, respondents compromised the integrity of the judiciary by maliciously imputing corrupt
motives against the Sandiganbayan through the subject checkbook entry. Clearly, respondents also
violated Canon 7 of the CPR and, thus, should be held administratively liable therefor.

Same; Same; Penalties; Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers perform acts which
tend to erode the public confidence in the courts, put the courts in a bad light, and bring the justice
system into disrepute, the Supreme Court (SC) imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law.—Anent the proper penalty to be meted to respondents, jurisprudence provides
that in similar cases where lawyers perform acts which tend to erode the public confidence in the
courts, put the courts in a bad light, and bring the justice system into disrepute, the Court imposed
upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Baculi v. Battung, 658 SCRA 209
(2011), the Court meted the aforesaid penalty to a lawyer for his disrespect to the courts, to the point
of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the judicial system itself. Under the foregoing
circumstances, the Court imposes upon Atty. Labastilla the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year for his complicity in the making of the subject checkbook entry. On
the other hand, since Atty. Lokin, Jr. was the one directly responsible for the making of the subject
checkbook entry, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon him the graver penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, as recommended by the IBP.

G.R. No. 191699. April 19, 2016.*

WILLIAM GO QUE CONSTRUCTION and/or WILLIAM GO QUE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
DANNY SINGSON, RODOLFO PASAQUI,1 LENDO LOMINIQUI,2 and JUN ANDALES, respondents.

Labor Law; Quitclaims; The settled rule is that legitimate waivers resulting from voluntary settlements
of laborers’ claims should be treated and upheld as the law between the parties.—At the outset, it
should be pointed out that in a Resolution dated July 15, 2010, the CA had already dismissed the
petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 109427 with respect to private respondents Singson and
Pasaqui on account of the Satisfaction of Judgment/Release of Claim they executed in petitioner’s
favor subsequent to the filing of the instant case. Notably, Singson and Pasaqui, thru their counsel,
Atty. Perez, moved that the instant petition be dismissed, without prejudice to the claims of the other
private respondents, Lominiqui and Andales, who are “on the run.” The settled rule is that legitimate
waivers resulting from voluntary settlements of laborers’ claims should be treated and upheld as the
law between the parties. In view of the foregoing developments, there is no longer any justiciable
controversy between petitioner and private respondents Singson and Pasaqui, rendering the instant
case moot and academic, and dismissible with respect to them.

Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[a]
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.”—Section 4,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[a] pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant
has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge
or based on authentic records.” “A pleading required to be verified which x x x lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.”

Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Requirements of a Certification Against Forum

Shopping.—Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief,
or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or
is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.” “Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements
shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided.

Same; Verification; In Fernandez v. Villegas, 733 SCRA 548 (2014), the Supreme Court (SC)
pronounced that noncompliance with the verification requirement or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.—In Fernandez v. Villegas, 733 SCRA 548 (2014), the
Court pronounced that noncompliance with the verification requirement or a defect therein “does
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction
or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.” “Verification is
deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true and correct.” Here, there was no substantial compliance
with the verification requirement as it cannot be ascertained that any of the private respondents
actually swore to the truth of the allegations in the petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 109427
given the lack of competent evidence of any of their identities. Because of this, the fact that even one
of the private respondents swore that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct of his
knowledge and belief is shrouded in doubt. For the same reason, neither was there substantial
compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement. In Fernandez, the Court
explained that “noncompliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on
the ground of ‘substantial compliance’ or presence of ‘special circumstances or compelling reasons.’”
Here, the CA did not mention — nor does there exist — any perceivable special circumstance or
compelling reason which justifies the rules’ relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if any of the private
respondents certified under oath that no similar action has been filed or is pending in another forum.
Same; Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Case law states that “[v]erification is required to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct, and not merely speculative.” On the other hand, “[t]he certification against forum shopping is
required based on the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in different fora.”—Case law states that “[v]erification is required to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not
merely speculative.” On the other hand, “[t]he certification against forum shopping is required based
on the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
different fora.” The important purposes behind these requirements cannot be simply brushed aside
absent any sustainable explanation justifying their relaxation. In this case, proper justification is
especially called for in light of the serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of the remaining
private respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales. Thus, by simply treating the insufficient submissions
before it as compliance with its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring anew the submission of a
proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently and grossly ignored settled
procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its discretion. All things considered, the proper course of
action was for it to dismiss the petition.

Liberal Interpretation; To merit liberality, the one seeking such treatment must show reasonable
cause justifying its noncompliance with the Rules, and must establish that the outright dismissal of
the petition would defeat the administration of substantial justice.—It is well to stress that
“procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the
convenience of a party, x x x. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.” Resort to the liberal application of procedural rules remains
the exception rather than the rule; it cannot be made without any valid reasons underpinning the said
course of action. To merit liberality, the one seeking such treatment must show reasonable cause
justifying its noncompliance with the Rules, and must establish that the outright dismissal of the
petition would defeat the administration of substantial justice. Procedural rules must, at all times, be
followed, save for instances when a litigant must be rescued from an injustice far graver than the
degree of his carelessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. The limited exception
does not obtain in this case.

G.R. No. 210540. April 19, 2016.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HOMER and MA. SUSANA DAGONDON, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgments; Under the
doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land.—Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of
judgments, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the
land. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
The mandatory character, however, of the rule on immutability of final judgments was not designed
to be an inflexible tool to excuse and overlook prejudicial circumstances. Hence, the doctrine must
yield to practicality, logic, fairness, and substantial justice. In Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance
Corporation, 760 SCRA 532 (2015), the Court had the occasion to name certain circumstances which
necessitate a relaxation of the rule on the immutability of final judgments.

Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; Republic Act (RA) No. 26 governs the process
by which a judicial reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title may be done.—Republic Act (RA) No.
26 governs the process by which a judicial reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title may be done.
Specifically, Section 2 of the said law enumerates in the following order the competent and exclusive
sources from which reconstitution of an OCT may be based, viz.: Section 2. Original certificates of title
shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order: (a) The owner’s

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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Republic vs. Dagondon

duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the
certificate of title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of
deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or
patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; (e) A
document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in
said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document
showing that its original had been registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of
the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to
be reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens System.—Verily, case
law provides that “[t]he reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form
and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The
purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the
title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. RA 26
presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought
under the provisions of the Torrens System.” Hence, under the aforesaid law, the following must be
present for an order for reconstitution to issue: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or
destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered
owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the
time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Thus, petitioner
correctly pointed out that the applicability of RA 26 in this case is contingent on the existence of a
previously issued OCT which has been lost or destroyed.

G.R. No. 213299. April 19, 2016.*

PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and
PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents.

Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Closure of Business; Jurisprudence provides that [t]he
determination to cease operations is a prerogative of management which the State does not usually
interfere with, as no business or undertaking must be required to continue operating simply because
it has to maintain its workers in employment, and such act would be tantamount to a taking of
property without due process of law.—Closure of business is an authorized cause for termination of
employment, Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of the Labor Code, as amended, reads: ART. 298.
Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel.—The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one
(1)-month before the intended date thereof. x x x. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)-month pay or
to at least one-half (1/2)-month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at
least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year. (Emphases supplied) In this relation,
jurisprudence provides that “[t]he determination to cease operations is a prerogative of management
which the State does not usually interfere with, as no business or undertaking must be required to
continue operating simply because it has to maintain its workers in employment, and such act would
be tantamount to a taking of property without due process of law. As long as the company’s exercise
of the same is in good faith to ad-

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* FIRST DIVISION.

428

428

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PNCC Skyway Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment

vance its interest and not for the purpose of circumventing the rights of employees under the law or a
valid agreement, such exercise will be upheld.”

Same; Same; Same; Procedurally, Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of the Labor Code, as amended
provides for three (3) requirements to properly effectuate termination on the ground of closure or
cessation of business operations.—Procedurally, Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of the Labor Code,
as amended provides for three (3) requirements to properly effectuate termination on the ground of
closure or cessation of business operations. These are: (a) service of a written notice to the
employees and to the DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date of termination; (b) the
cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of
termination pay amounting to one (1)-month pay or at least one-half-month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher.

Same; Same; Nominal Damages; Case law has settled that an employer who terminates an employee
for a valid cause but does so through invalid procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal
damages.—Case law has settled that an employer who terminates an employee for a valid cause but
does so through invalid procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages. In Agabon v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004), the Court pronounced that, where the dismissal is
for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal,
or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his
statutory rights. Thus, in Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay the employee nominal damages in
the amount of P30,000.00. Proceeding from the same ratio, the Court modified Agabon in the case
of Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot, 454 SCRA 119 (2005), where it created a distinction
between procedurally defective dismissals due to a just cause, on the one hand, and those due to an
authorized cause, on the other. In Jaka, it was explained that if the dismissal is based on a just cause
under Article 282 (now, Article 297) of the Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with the
notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal
process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if the dismissal is based on an
authorized cause under Article 283 (now,

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PNCC Skyway Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment

Article 298) of the Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the
sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of
his management prerogative. Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was dismissed for an authorized
cause of retrenchment — as contradistinguished from the employee in Agabon who was dismissed for
a just cause of neglect of duty — the Court ordered the employer to pay the employee nominal
damages at the higher amount of P50,000.00.
Same; Same; Case law teaches that an employer may opt not to require the dismissed employees to
report for work during the thirty (30)-day notice period.—Ultimately, it was within PSC’s prerogative
and discretion as employer to retain the services of its employees for one month after the turn-over
date to SOMCO and to continue paying their salaries and benefits corresponding to that period even
when there is no more work to be done, if only “to ensure a smooth transition and gradual phasing in
of the new operator, which had yet to familiarize itself with the business.” Case law teaches that an
employer may opt not to require the dismissed employees to report for work during the 30-day
notice period.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Grave Abuse of Discretion; When a lower court or tribunal
patently violates the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is
committed.—All told, considering that PSC had complied with Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of
the Labor Code, as amended, the indemnity award in favor of the terminated employees was grossly
improper and must therefore be nullified, in this respect, the DOLE Secretary gravely abused its
discretion and the CA erred in ruling otherwise. When, a lower court or tribunal patently violates the
Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is committed, as in this
case.

G.R. No. 215994. June 6, 2016.*

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, petitioner, vs. ROLANDO B. FALLER,

respondent.

Administrative Law; Misconduct; To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to

or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer.—Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. To constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions
and duties of a public officer. The misconduct is considered as grave if it involves additional elements
such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element
of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others.

Same; Dishonesty; Words and Phrases; Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth
in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his
duty.—Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to
one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.

Same; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; Jurisprudence states that acts may
constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as long as they tarnish the image and
integrity of his/her public office.—Faller’s mistakes and/or the irregularities involved in the contested
disbursements which he actually

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* FIRST DIVISION.

362

362

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman-Field Investigation Office vs. Faller

received resulted in an anomaly that tainted the public’s perception of his office, thereby subjecting
him to administrative liability for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Jurisprudence
states that acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as long as they
tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office, as in this case.

Same; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; Penalties; Under Section 50 of the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), if the respondent is found guilty
of two (2) or more charges, the penalty for the most serious charge shall be imposed and the other
charges shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.—Simple misconduct is classified as a less
grave offense punishable by suspension for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months for the first offense, while conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classified as
a grave offense punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year for the first offense. Under Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, if the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges, the penalty for the most serious
charge shall be imposed and the other charges shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
Likewise, under Section 49 of the same Rules, the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed where
only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, as in this case. Accordingly, the Court
concurs with the CA that the penalty of suspension for one (1) year must be imposed upon Faller, and,
conformably with Section 52 of the same Rules, meted the accessory penalty of disqualification from
promotion for the entire period of the suspension. Office of the Ombudsman-Field Investigation
Office vs. Faller, 792 SCRA 361, G.R. No. 215994 June 6, 2016

A.C. No. 10465. June 8, 2016.*

SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO and GLORIA J. EUSTAQUIO, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDGAR R.
NAVALES, respondent.

Attorneys; Practice of Law; When the Supreme Court (SC) orders a lawyer suspended from the
practice of law, he must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in
government requiring the authority to practice law.—It is settled that the Court has the exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. As such, when the Court orders a lawyer suspended from
the practice of law, he must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in
government requiring the authority to practice law. The practice of law embraces any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and
experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering
any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Same; Same; The government office of Assistant City Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized
to practice law. Hence, respondent’s continuous discharge of his functions as such constitutes
practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) order of suspension against
him.—Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071, otherwise known as the “Prosecution Service Act of
2010,” provides the powers and functions of prosecutors, to wit: Section 9. Powers and Functions of
the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor.—The provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor shall:
(a) Be the law officer of the province of the city officer, as the case may be; (b) Investigate and/or
cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and
ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons accused. In the conduct of such
investigations he/she or any of his/her assistants shall receive the statements under oath or take oral
evidence of witnesses, and for this purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and
testify under oath before him/her, and the attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant
witness may be enforced by application to any trial court; and (c) Have charge of the prosecution of
all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts at the province
or city and therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal actions, subject to the
provisions of the second paragraph of Section 5 hereof. Verily, a plain reading of the foregoing
provision evidently shows that the government office of Assistant City Prosecutor requires its holder
to be authorized to practice law. Hence, respon-

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379

Eustaquio vs. Navales

dent’s continuous discharge of his functions as such constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear
defiance of the Court’s order of suspension against him.

Same; Same; Willful Disobedience to Lawful Order of a Superior Court; Disbarment; Suspension;
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
court and willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so — acts which respondent is
guilty of in this case — are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.—Under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court
and wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so — acts which respondent is guilty of
in this case — are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, to wit: Section 27.
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.—A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC), in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to
impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is
possible.—As a final note, it must be stressed that “[d]isbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims
to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility
and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring
lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate
its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to
impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is
possible.”

Eustaquio vs. Navales, 792 SCRA 377, A.C. No. 10465 June 8, 2016

A.C. No. 11069. June 8, 2016.*

RONALDO C. FACTURAN, complainant, vs. PROSECUTOR ALFREDO L. BARCELONA, JR., respondent.

Attorneys; Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined
by the Supreme Court (SC) as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer.—The Court concurs with the IBP’s factual findings and
recommendation to hold respondent administratively liable, but not for violating Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the CPR, but instead, of Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the same Code. The pertinent rules provide:
CANON 6 – THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE
OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS. x x x x Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties. Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member
of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined
by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath
as a lawyer. In this regard, Rule 6.02 above quoted is particularly directed to lawyers in the
government service, enjoining them from using one’s public position to: (1) promote private interests;
(2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties.
Same; Prosecutors; Absent any intelligent explanation as regards his lapses in the handling of I.S. No.
04-211 and his failure to timely return the case records thereof for further action, despite the
directive to do so, it can only be inferred that respondent not merely failed, but obstinately and
deliberately refused to perform his duties as a prosecutor.—Absent any intelligent explanation as
regards his lapses in the handling of I.S. No. 04-211 and his failure to timely return the case records
thereof for further action, despite the direc-

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* FIRST DIVISION.

390

390

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Facturan vs. Barcelona, Jr.

tive to do so, it can only be inferred that respondent not merely failed, but obstinately and
deliberately refused to perform his duties as a prosecutor. Such refusal, under the circumstances,
evidently worked to the advantage of the respondents in I.S. No. 04-21.1 — which included
respondent’s cousin, Elezar — as the absence of the case records in the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor resulted in the delay in the filing of the appropriate criminal information in court against
them. Hence, it is apparent that respondent used his public position as a prosecutor to advance and
protect the private interest of his relative, which is clearly proscribed in the CPR.

Same; Same; A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, he must also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing.—Indeed, respondent’s actions and omissions in this case, i.e., his failure to resolve I.S. No.
04-211 and to turn over the case records thereof despite orders to do so, appear to have been
committed for the benefit of and to safeguard private interests. As a lawyer who is also a public
officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal
profession. It bears stressing that a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act
or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, he
must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith
and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice. Accordingly, the Court finds that suspension for a period of one (1) year, as recommended
by the IBP, should be meted upon respondent. Facturan vs. Barcelona, Jr., 792 SCRA 389, A.C. No.
11069 June 8, 2016

G.R. No. 219510. November 14, 2016.*

MARLON CURAMMENG y PABLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Petition for Review; Appeals of cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction are taken by filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court.—Appeals of cases decided by the RTCs in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction are taken by
filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Section 2, thereof, provides that such
petitions shall be accompanied by, inter alia, material portions of the record which would support the
allegations of said petitions as well as a certification of non-forum shopping.

Appeals; The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.—It
must be stressed that since a petition for review is a form of appeal, noncompliance with the
foregoing rule may render the same dismissible. This is in furtherance of the well-settled rule that
“the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege,
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who
seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which
the right to appeal is invariably lost.”

Liberal Interpretation; If a rigid application of the rules of procedure will tend to obstruct rather than
serve the broader interests of justice in light of the prevailing circumstances of the case, the Court
may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.—Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the rules of procedure will tend to obstruct rather
than serve the broader interests of justice in light of the prevailing circumstances of the case, such as
where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the Court may relax
the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
Same; Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant
of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.—Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of
counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the
outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.

G.R. No. 221770. November 16, 2016.*

NANITO Z. EVANGELISTA** (substituted by his Heirs, represented by the Surviving Spouse,

LEOVIGILDA C. EVANGELISTA), petitioners, vs. SPOUSES NEREO V. ANDOLONG III and ERLINDA T.
ANDOLONG*** and RINO AMUSEMENT INNOVATORS, INC., respondents.

Evidence; Burden of Proof; In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the
burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence.—In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the
party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Also,
parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by their opponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the defendant was not given the
opportunity to present evidence because of a default order.

Same; Preponderance of Evidence; Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term ‘greater
weight of the evidence’ or ‘greater weight of the credible evidence.’—“Preponderance of evidence is
the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term ‘greater weight of the evidence’ or ‘greater weight of the credible
evidence.’ Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.”

Same; Respondents’ failure to present the documents in their possession — whether such failure was
intentional or not — raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced.—Respondents opted not to shed light on the issues at

_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.

** Deceased.

*** “Spouses Nereo Andolong and Edina Andolong” in the petition (see Rollo, pp. 3 and 4).

272

272

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Evangelista vs. Andolong III

hand as they, unwittingly or otherwise, waived their right to present evidence in this case. In this light,
the Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the respondents’ failure to present the
documents in their possession — whether such failure was intentional or not — raises the
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.

Damages; Temperate Damages; In Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation v. DMC-Construction

Resources, Inc., 743 SCRA 33 (2014), the Court allowed the recovery of temperate damages in
instances where it has been established that some pecuniary loss has been suffered, but its amount
cannot be proven with certainty.—Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court is convinced that
Nanito should have received remittances representing net profits from respondents, albeit he failed
to prove the exact amount he should receive from the latter. In Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation
v. DMC-Construction Resources, Inc., 743 SCRA 33 (2014), the Court allowed the recovery of
temperate damages in instances where it has been established that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered, but its amount cannot be proven with certainty. Evangelista vs. Andolong III, 809 SCRA 271,
G.R. No. 221770 November 16, 2016
A.C. No. 11394. December 1, 2016.*

MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO “ARGEE” C. GUEVARRA,

respondent.

Social Media; Facebook; Words and Phrases; Facebook is a “voluntary social network to which
members subscribe and submit information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling friends to share
information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one another.”—Facebook is currently the
most popular social media site, having surpassed one (1) billion registered accounts and with 1.71
billion monthly active users. Social media are web-based platforms that enable online interaction and
facilitate users to generate and share content. There are various classifications of social media
platforms and one can be classified under the “social networking sites” such as Facebook. Facebook is
a “voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit information. x x x It has a
worldwide forum enabling friends to share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with
one another.” Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who they are,
add other users as friends, and exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they
update their profile. A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be
made visible to anyone, depending on the user’s privacy settings.

Same; Same; Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking
activity — in this case, Facebook — it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep
certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.—To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile, as well as
information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg, Republic
of South Africa recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but with the
cautionary advice that although Facebook, as stated in its policies, “makes every effort to protect a
user’s information, these privacy settings are however not foolproof.” Consequently,

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.
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before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity — in this
case, Facebook — it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook’s privacy tools. In other
words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user’s
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.

Same; Same; Restricting the privacy of one’s Facebook posts to “Friends” does not guarantee absolute
protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one’s circle of
friends.—Restricting the privacy of one’s Facebook posts to “Friends” does not guarantee absolute
protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one’s circle of friends. The
user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also,
when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person
who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at
“Friends.” Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent’s claim of violation of right to privacy is
negated.

Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; The constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be
availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring
them into disrepute.—Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. While the freedom of expression and the right of
speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every
person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may
not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or
bring them into disrepute. A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed
that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of
complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a “quack doctor,” “Reyna ng Kaplasti-
394

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Belo-Henares vs. Guevarra

kan,” “Reyna ng Payola,” and “Reyna ng Kapalpakan,” and insinuating that she has been bribing
people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name and
reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon
complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured (“binaboy”) his client Norcio, labeling
BMGI a “Frankenstein Factory,” and calling out a boycott of BMGI’s services all these despite the
pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even threatened
complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa — which is contrary to one’s
obligation “to act with justice.”

Same; Same; By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and Belo Medical
Group, Inc. (BMGI), respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper
decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life.—By posting the subject remarks on Facebook
directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to
observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he
must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent.
Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and
conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant’s and BMGI’s
reputation.

Same; Same; That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage
who is exposed to criticism does not justify respondent’s disrespectful language.—That complainant is
a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to criticism does
not justify respondent’s disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall
be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. In this case, respondent’s
remarks against complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be
administratively sanctioned.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good
character being an essential qualification for the admission to the
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practice of law and for continuance of such privilege.—“Lawyers may be disciplined even for any
conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity
or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice
of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one’s behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct, which — albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession — would show them
to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.”
Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, as originally recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Belo-Henares vs. Guevarra, 811
SCRA 392, A.C. No. 11394 December 1, 2016

G.R. No. 223254. December 1, 2016.*

ROSALIE SY AYSON, petitioner, vs. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., and FAIRWAYS AND BLUEWATER
RESORT AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 223269. December 1, 2016.*

FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., and FAIRWAYS & BLUEWATER RESORT & COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,
petitioners, vs. ROSALIE SY AYSON, respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; The findings of Fil-Estate
and Fairways’ bad faith, as well as their liability for moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees, are all factual matters which are not within the ambit of the instant petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.—Verily, the finding of Fil-Estate and Fairways’
bad faith as well as their liability for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees, are all
factual matters which are not within the ambit of the instant petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In this regard, it has long been settled that factual findings of the trial
court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, save for
certain exceptions, which Fil-Estate and Fairways failed to show in this case — at least regarding this
issue. Ayson vs. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc., 811 SCRA 520, G.R. No. 223254, G.R. No. 223269 December
1, 2016

G.R. Nos. 212014-15. December 6, 2016.*

RICHARD A. CAMBE, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, and FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 212427-28. December 6, 2016.*

SENATOR RAMON “BONG” REVILLA, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, through its
SPECIAL PANEL OF INVESTIGATORS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, and
FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.

_______________

* EN BANC.

538

538

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 212694-95. December 6, 2016. *

SENATOR RAMON “BONG” REVILLA, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 212794-95. December 6, 2016. *

RICHARD A. CAMBE, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, and FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213477-78. December 6, 2016. *

JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES in her official capacity as
Ombudsman, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213532-33. December 6, 2016. *

RONALD JOHN LIM, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES in her official capacity as
Ombudsman, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213536-37. December 6, 2016. *

JANET LIM NAPOLES, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES in her official capacity as
Ombudsman, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 218744-59. December 6, 2016.*

MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS, ROSARIO SALAMIDA NUÑEZ, LALAINE NARAG PAULE, and MARILOU DIALINO
BARE, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Administrative Cases; Public Officers; In Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan, 547 SCRA 658 (2008), the
Supreme Court (SC) explained that: [T]here are three (3) kinds of remedies that are available against a
public officer for impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties: (1) civil,
(2) criminal, and (3) administrative [and that] [t]hese remedies may be invoked separately, alternately,
simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of
remedies.—The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the
COA’s audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder
and/or of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence, the incidents related to it should
have no effect on the filing of the latter. In Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan, 547 SCRA 658 (2008), this
Court explained that: [T]here are three kinds of remedies that are available against a public officer for
impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal,
and (3) administrative [and that] [t]hese remedies may be invoked separately, alternately,
simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of
remedies. x x x x It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each other.
The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters,
such that the first two will not inevitably govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily,
administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.

Same; Same; As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, an audit disallowance may not necessarily
result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecution of the responsible
persons.—As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, “an audit disallowance may not necessarily
result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecution of the responsible persons.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

Conversely, therefore, an administrative or criminal case may prosper even without an audit
disallowance. Verily, Rule XIII, Section 6 is consistent with the ruling in [Reyna v. Commission on Audit,
642 SCRA 210 (2011)] that a proceeding involving an audit disallowance is distinct and separate from
a preliminary investigation or a disciplinary complaint.” In fine, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse
its discretion in promulgating its March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied Cambe’s motion to
suspend proceedings. Perforce, Cambe’s petition in G.R. Nos. 212014-15 is dismissed. That being said,
the Court now proceeds to resolve the main substantive issue anent the presence of probable cause
against all petitioners.

Ombudsman; Policy of Non-interference; Time and again, this Court’s consistent policy has been to
maintain noninterference in the Ombudsman’s determination of the existence of probable cause,
provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.—Time and again, this Court’s
consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the Ombudsman’s determination of the
existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This
observed policy is based not only in respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the 1987 Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; In determining the elements of the crime charged
for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, “only facts sufficient to support a prima facie
case against the [accused] are required, not absolute certainty.”—In determining the elements of the
crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, “only facts sufficient to support
a prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not absolute certainty.” In this case, the
petitioners were charged with the crimes of Plunder and/or violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080, as amended, has the following elements:
(a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (b)
that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts described in Section 1(d) thereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of
the ill-gotten wealth
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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). On the other hand,
the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy
with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions. In determining probable cause therefor, only a showing of the ostensible presence of these
elements is required.

Same; Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; Probable cause is determined during the context of a
preliminary investigation which is “merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be
held responsible for it.—It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the
context of a preliminary investigation which is “merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether
or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it.” It “is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
the prosecution’s evidence.” Therefore, “the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as
well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at
the preliminary investigation level.” Accordingly, “owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings.”
In this light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this Court has ruled that “probable cause can be
established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay,” and
that even an invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta at this stage of the proceedings is improper.

Priority Development Assistance Fund; At the forefront are the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself requesting
the implementing agencies (IAs) to release his PDAF funds to the identified Janet Lim Napoles
(JLN)-controlled Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), as well as other documents that made
possi-
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

ble the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the Memorandum of Agreements (MOAs) executed by the
legislator’s office, the IA, and the chosen NGO.—The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is
amply supported by the evidence on record. At the forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of
the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds
to the identified JLN--controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that made possible the processing
of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator’s office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. All these
documents — even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla — directly implicate him for the crimes
charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica), 710 SCRA 1 (2013), this Court observed that
“the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators —
to participate in the post--enactment phases of project implementation.” “At its core, legislators ­
may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program menus — have been consistently
accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations.” It is through this mechanism that individual legislators, such as
Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their
offices throughout the years.

Same; Forgery; Anent Sen. Revilla’s claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented
were forged, it must be emphasized that the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of forgery]
should be ventilated in a full-blown trial.—Anent Sen. Revilla’s claim that his signatures in the
documentary evidence presented were forged, it must be emphasized that “the findings of the x x x
prosecutor [on the issue of forgery] should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by
the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its
general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to
determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an independent
examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
[As such], Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to
make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine.” Accordingly, Sen. Revilla’s
evidence of forgery, including the findings of his purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores
(Azores) and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, (Pagui) cannot be readily credited
at this stage of the proceedings. Besides, the Ombudsman aptly observed that Azores and Pagui
admittedly used mere photocopies of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) documents in
their handwriting analyses. In Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 565 (1998), this Court
ruled that “[w]ithout the original document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make
a definitive comparison which would establish forgery,” and that “[a] comparison based on a mere
[photo] copy or reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable results.”
Furthermore, it may not be amiss to state that the credibility of Azores and Pagui as handwriting
experts has yet to be tested. They still have to authenticate their findings and be subjected to
cross-examination. Without a doubt, the prosecution should also be given a chance to properly
contest Azores and Pagui’s findings with evidence of its own. It could all too well present its own
handwriting experts during trial to rebut such findings.

Same; Same; The Ombudsman’s own factual finding on the absence of forgery, at least for the
purpose of determining probable cause, should be regarded with utmost respect.—It is significant to
emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen. Revilla’s signatures
on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: “[a]t all events,
the Special Panel members, after a prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned
signatures appearing in the PDAF documents and the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe
in their respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures, which bear the same style
and flourish, were written by one and the same hands.” Verily, the Ombudsman’s own factual finding
on the absence of forgery, at least for the purpose of determining probable cause, should be regarded
with utmost respect. “[F]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence,” as in this case. The Ombudsman’s finding on the absence of
forgery further gains credence in light of the July 20, 2011 Letter signed by Sen. Revilla submitted to
the COA (Confirmation Letter).
544

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

The letter evinces on its face that Sen. Revilla had confirmed the authenticity of his and Cambe’s
signatures appearing on the PDAF documents: After going through these documents and initial
examination, it appears that the signatures and/or initials on these documents are my signatures or
that of my authorized representative.

Same; Same; Luy’s testimony therefore explicates that although the whistleblowers would sometimes
forge the legislators’ signatures, such were made with the approval of Napoles based on her prior
agreement with the said legislators.—Luy’s testimony therefore explicates that although the
whistleblowers would sometimes forge the legislators’ signatures, such were made with the approval
of Napoles based on her prior agreement with the said legislators. It is not difficult to discern that this
authorization allows for a more expedient processing of PDAF funds since the documents required for
their release need not pass through the legislator’s respective offices. It is also apparent that this
grant of authority gives the legislators room for plausible deniability: the forging of signatures may
serve as a security measure for legislators to disclaim their participation in the event of discovery.
Therefore, Luy’s testimony completely makes sense as to why the legislators would agree to authorize
Napoles and her staff to forge their signatures. As such, even if it is assumed that the signatures were
forged, it does not mean that the legislators did not authorize such forgery.

Same; Conspiracy; It is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of
the conspiracy since they were employees of Janet Lim Napoles (JLN) Corporation — the epicenter of
the entire Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) operation — and in their respective
capacities, were individually tasked by Napoles to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the
financial transactions, follow up the release of the Notices of Cash Allocation (NCAs) with the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds
deposited in the Non-Governmental Organizations’ (NGOs’) accounts.—The testimonies of the
whistleblowers — which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman — are, in fact, the most
integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the inner workings of
the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the
Senators, only the Offices of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile), and
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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

Sen. Jinggoy, Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated to have dealt with Napoles in the
plunder of their PDAF. Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal
knowledge of the conspiracy since they were employees of JLN Corporation — the epicenter of the
entire PDAF operation — and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by Napoles to
prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of the
NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs’ accounts.

Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; Evidence; In Reyes v. Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354 (2016),
citing Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), the Supreme Court (SC) had unanimously ruled that
the testimonies of the same whistleblowers against Jo Christine and John Christopher Napoles,
children of Janet Napoles who were also charged with the embezzlement of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), are admissible in evidence, considering that technical rules of evidence are
not binding on the fiscal during preliminary investigation.—Sen. Revilla opposes the admission of the
whistleblowers’ testimonies based on the res inter alios acta rule. However, in Reyes v. Ombudsman,
787 SCRA 354 (2016), citing Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), this Court had unanimously
ruled that the testimonies of the same whistleblowers against Jo Christine and John Christopher
Napoles, children of Janet Napoles who were also charged with the embezzlement of the PDAF, are
admissible in evidence, considering that technical rules of evidence are not binding on the fiscal
during preliminary investigation. This Court was unequivocal in declaring that the objection on res
inter alios acta should falter: Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the
whistleblowers based on their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of
Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence
which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada,
the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman’s appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be
inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation “as long as there
is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.” This is
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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

because “such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties.” Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that there lies
substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed
by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case
law edifies, “[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation,” as in this case.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Independently Relevant Statements; Under the doctrine of independently
relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made
is relevant.—In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply
during preliminary investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers’ statements as hearsay is bound
by the exception on independently relevant statements. “Under the doctrine of independently
relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made
is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence
as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.”
Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the
involvement of Sen. Revilla and his co--accused in the present controversy, considering their
respective participations in the entire PDAF scam. Therefore, the statements made by whistleblowers
Suñas, Sula, and Luy, who were employees of JLN Corporation and privy to the financial transactions
of Napoles concerning, among others, Sen. Revilla’s PDAF, should be given consideration as they are
directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand. To add, the prosecution also presented
Luy’s ledger entries which corroborate his testimony that Sen. Revilla dealt with Napoles and received
PDAF kickbacks. Luy’s records disclose that the kickbacks amounted to “at least P224,512,500.00:
P10,000,000.00 for 2006; P61,000,000.00 for 2007; P80,000,000.00 for 2008; P40,000,000.00 for 2009;
and P33,512,500.00 for 2010.”

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Same; Same; Witnesses; The fact that Luy did not personally know Sen. Revilla or that none of the
whistleblowers personally saw anyone handing/delivering money to Sen. Revilla does not mean that
they did not personally know of his involvement.—Relatedly, it should be clarified that the fact that
Luy did not personally know Sen. Revilla or that none of the whistleblowers personally saw anyone
handing/delivering money to Sen. Revilla does not mean that they did not personally know of his
involvement. Because of their functions in JLN Corporation as above stated, it is evident that they had
personal knowledge of the fact that Napoles named Sen. Revilla as one of the select-legislators she
transacted with. More significantly, they personally processed the PDAF funds and documents
connected with Sen. Revilla’s Office, which lasted for a considerable amount of time, i.e., four (4)
years [2006-2010 as charged]. As such, their testimonies should not be completely disregarded as
hearsay.

Probable Cause; Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.—In any case, this Court has resolved that “probable cause
can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay.” The substantial basis for crediting the whistleblowers’ testimonies, even if so regarded as
hearsay, rests on their key functions in JLN Corporation as above mentioned, as well as the collective
evidence gathered by the prosecution tending to support the same conclusion that Sen. Revilla and
his alleged coconspirators acted in concert to pillage his PDAF funds.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Affidavits of Co-respondents; There is no law or rule
requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his
corespondents.—This Court would like to dispel the notion that due process rights were violated
when Sen. Revilla was denied copies of the counter-affidavits of his corespondents in the preliminary
investigation proceedings before the Ombudsman as he argues in G.R. Nos. 212427-28. This matter
was already resolved in the similar case of Estrada, where this Court said: Both the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and
affidavits of

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his supporting witnesses. Neither of these Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with copies of the affidavits of his [corespondents]. The right of the respondent is only “to
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant,” as expressly stated in Section 3(b), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that
“Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the
respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions
to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine.” Moreover, Section 4 (a, b and c), of Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rule of
Procedure, read together, only require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies
of the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. There is no law or rule requiring the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his corespondents. In
any event, the Ombudsman in this case went beyond its legal duty and eventually granted Sen.
Revilla’s requests to be furnished with said counter-affidavits, and even afforded him the opportunity
to comment thereto. Thus, there is more reason to decline his flawed claims of denial of due process.
Case law state that the touchstone of due process is the opportunity to be heard, which was
undeniably afforded to Sen. Revilla in this case.

Same; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Case law holds that once the trial court finds
probable cause, which results in the issuance of a warrant of arrest (as the Sandiganbayan in this case,
with respect to Sen. Revilla and his co-petitioners), any question on the prosecution’s conduct of
preliminary investigation becomes moot.—Taking together all of the above stated pieces of evidence,
the COA and FIO reports tend to prima facie establish that irregularities had indeed attended the
disbursement of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF and that he had a hand in such anomalous releases, being the
head of Office which unquestionably exercised operational control thereof. As the Ombudsman
correctly observed, “[t]he PDAF was allocated to him by virtue of his position as a Senator, and
therefore he exercise[d] control in the selection of his priority projects and programs. He indorsed
[Napoles’] Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in consideration for the remittance of kickbacks
and commissions from

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Napoles. Compounded by the fact that the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be ‘ghost projects,’
and that the rest of the PDAF allocation went into the pockets of Napoles and her cohorts, [there is
probable cause to show that] Revilla thus unjustly enriched himself at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.” Hence, he should stand trial
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. For the same reasons, it is apparent that ill-gotten wealth in
the amount of at least P50,000,000.00 (i.e., P224,512,500.00) were amassed, accumulated or
acquired through a combination or series of overt acts stated in Section 1 of the Plunder Law.
Therefore, Sen. Revilla should likewise stand trial for Plunder. Besides, case law holds that once the
trial court finds probable cause, which results in the issuance of a warrant of arrest (as the
Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect to Sen. Revilla and his co--petitioners), any question on the
prosecution’s conduct of preliminary investigation becomes moot.

Priority Development Assistance Fund; Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to
have received Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) money for himself and for Sen.
Revilla.—There is no dispute that Cambe was Sen. Revilla’s trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff. By
such authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen. Revilla’s office, including
the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe’s signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF documents,
such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla’s PDAF funds allocated for certain projects
to various JLN-controlled NGOs. Moreover, Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to
have received PDAF money for himself and for Sen. Revilla. As recounted by Luy, Cambe was the one
who would go to Napoles’s office and receive cash from the latter in the aggregate amount of
P224,512,500.00 representing Sen. Revilla’s “commissions” or “kickbacks” coming from the PDAF
scam. The cash would come either from Luy’s vault or from Napoles herself. In simple terms, Cambe
allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles.

Same; Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the
illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla’s Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF).—Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the
illegal utilization, diversion,

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and disbursement of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the mastermind of the entire
PDAF scam. As outlined by the Ombudsman, Napoles would approach legislators, such as Sen. Revilla,
and “offer to ‘acquire’ his x x x PDAF allocation in exchange for a ‘commission’ or kickback amounting
to a certain percentage of the PDAF.” Once Napoles was informed of the availability of Sen Revilla’s
PDAF, she and/or her staff would prepare listings of the available projects specifically indicating the
IAs which would carry out the same. After the listings are released by Sen. Revilla’s Office, Napoles
would then give a down payment from her own pockets for delivery to Sen. Revilla, or in case of his
unavailability, to Cambe who would receive the same on Sen. Revilla’s behalf. Once the SARO and/or
the Notices of Cash Allocation (NCA) regarding said project is released, Napoles would then deliver
the promised “kickbacks” to Sen. Revilla. Thereafter, Sen. Revilla and/or Cambe would endorse
Napoles’ NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded projects, all of which turned out to be “ghost” or
“inexistent”; thus, allowing Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation.

Criminal Law; Plunder; Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) documents, whistleblowers’ testimonies, the accounts of the implementing
agencies (IAs) officials, and the Commission on Audit (COA) report, as well as the field verifications of
the Field Investigation Office (FIO), Ombudsman, the Supreme Court (SC) is convinced that there lies
probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established
that she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities, was significantly involved in
the aforedescribed modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla’s PDAF amounting to at least
P50,000,000.00 in “kickbacks.”—Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF
documents, whistleblowers’ testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report, as well
as the field verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies probable
cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established that she,
in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the
aforedescribed modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla’s PDAF amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 in
“kickbacks.” In the same manner, there is probable cause against Napoles for violations of Section 3(e)
of RA

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3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to illegally divert PDAF Funds to “ghost” projects caused
undue prejudice to the government.

Same; Same; Conspiracy; It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in the aforesaid
crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to
have conspired with said officers in committing the same.—That a private individual, such as Napoles,
could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in
those crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the
primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable
for the same if they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This
proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. In
this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the systematic
pillaging of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a coconspirator for the
aforementioned crimes.

Same; Same; Whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly named De Asis as one of those who prepared
money to be given to the lawmaker. Said whistleblowers even declared that De Asis, among others,
received the checks issued by the implementing agencies (IAs) to the Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) and deposited the same in the bank; and that, after the money is withdrawn
from the bank, he was also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles’
house.—Records show that De Asis was designated as the President/Incorporator of KPMFI which was
one of the many NGOs controlled by Napoles that was used in the embezzlement of Sen. Revilla’s
PDAF allocations. Moreover, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly named De Asis as one of those
who prepared money to be given to the lawmaker. Said whistleblowers even declared that De Asis,
among others, received the checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs and deposited the same in the bank;
and that, after the money is withdrawn from the bank, he was also one of those tasked to bring the
money to Janet Napoles’ house. Indeed, the foregoing prove to be well-grounded bases to believe
that, in all probability, De Asis conspired with the other co-accused to commit the crimes charged.

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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

Priority Development Assistance Fund; As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, whistleblowers
Luy and Suñas narrated that over the course of the perpetuation of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, they, along with the other staff of Napoles — which includes Lim would
prepare, and thereafter deliver, the kickbacks intended for Sen. Revilla.—As correctly pointed out by
the Ombudsman, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas narrated that over the course of the perpetuation of
the PDAF scam, they, along with the other staff of Napoles — which includes Lim — would prepare,
and thereafter deliver, the kickbacks intended for Sen. Revilla. The preparation and delivery of
kickbacks to the legislator and/or his trusted staff are indeed overt acts that relate to his involvement
in the PDAF scheme. To note, even if it is assumed that Lim only prepared the money and did not
deliver the same as he claims, the act of preparation is still connected to the common objective of the
conspiracy. Accordingly, this establishes the existence of probable cause against him for the crime
charged.

Same; As pointed out by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, some of the Special Allotment
Release Orders (SAROs) and Notices of Cash Allocation (NCAs) issued in the perpetuation of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam were issued by the Office of Relampagos as
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Undersecretary, where Nuñez, Paule, and Bare are all
working — a finding that they themselves did not dispute.—As pointed out by the Ombudsman and
the Sandiganbayan, some of the SAROs and NCAs issued in the perpetuation of the PDAF scam were
issued by the Office of Relampagos as DBM Undersecretary, where Nuñez, Paule, and Bare are all
working — a finding that they themselves did not dispute. More significantly: (a) whistleblower Luy
positively identified Relampagos, et al. as Napoles’ “contact persons” in the DBM; and (b) the COA
Report found irregularities in their issuances of the aforesaid SAROs and NCAs. Ostensibly, these
circumstances show Relampagos, et al.’s manifest partiality and bad faith in favor of Napoles and her
cohorts that evidently caused undue prejudice to the Government. Thus, they must stand trial for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

Forgery; Hearsay Evidence; The Supreme Court (SC) cannot tag key documentary evidence as
forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay at this stage of the proceedings; otherwise, it would defy
established

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principles and norms followed during preliminary investigation.—In this case, the Ombudsman (and
the Sandiganbayan as to Relampagos, et al.) did not err in finding probable cause against all the
petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by the evidence on record and no semblance of
misapprehension taints the same. Moreover, this Court cannot tag key documentary evidence as
forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay at this stage of the proceedings; otherwise, it would defy
established principles and norms followed during preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence teaches us
that “[i]n dealing with probable cause[,] at the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These
are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly
correlative to what must be proved.” Overall, based on the foregoing disquisitions, the standard of
probable cause was adequately hurdled by the prosecution in this case. As such, no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan in the proceedings a quo. All
the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they were charged.

VELASCO, JR., J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Ombudsman; Principle of Non-interference; View that the courts do not usually interfere with the
Ombudsman in the determination as to the existence of probable cause.—As the ponencia points out,
the courts do not usually interfere with the Ombudsman in the determination as to the existence of
probable cause. In other words, the Ombudsman possesses ample latitude to determine the propriety
of filing a criminal charge against a person. Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that the
Ombudsman’s broad authority is circumscribed by the need of an upright conduct of a preliminary
investigation. This balancing rule is intended to guarantee the right of every person from “the
inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal
trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed” and to guard the State
against the “burden of unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding
trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges.”

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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

Remedial Law; Evidence; View that ruling in favor of the complainants, the Ombudsman sweepingly
concluded that Revilla conspired with Napoles and her cohorts to amass ill-gotten wealth at the
expense of the State.—The majority sustained the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause to indict
Revilla for Plunder and violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, for supposedly amassing ill-gotten wealth by
allegedly misappropriating, or supposedly receiving commission for allowing the misappropriation of
the PDAF in conspiracy with and/or by giving unwarranted benefit to Napoles and her cohorts. As I
have previously stated, I cannot concur with the majority opinion. A look at the evidence that the
complainants had presented demonstrates that there is nary any competent and relevant evidence
that can constitute as basis for the finding of probable cause against Revilla. Ruling in favor of the
complainants, the Ombudsman sweepingly concluded that Revilla conspired with Napoles and her
cohorts to amass ill--gotten wealth at the expense of the State.

Priority Development Assistance Fund; View that the pieces of evidence relied upon by the
Ombudsman do not provide sufficient basis for even a prima facie finding of probable cause to
believe that Revilla negotiated and agreed with Napoles on: (i) the list of projects to be chosen by the
lawmaker; (ii) the corresponding implementing agencies (IA) that would implement the project; (iii)
the project cost; (iv) the Napoles-controlled Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that would
implement the project; and (v) the amount of commission or kickback which the lawmaker would
receive in exchange for endorsing the NGO.—Notably, the pieces of evidence relied upon by the
Ombudsman do not provide sufficient basis for even a prima facie finding of probable cause to
believe that Revilla negotiated and agreed with Napoles on: (i) the list of projects to be chosen by the
lawmaker; (ii) the corresponding IA that would implement the project; (iii) the project cost; (iv) the
Napoles-controlled NGO that would implement the project; and (v) the amount of commission or
kickback which the lawmaker would receive in exchange for endorsing the NGO. Indeed, the
Ombudsman’s affirmation of these allegations stands on mere inferences and presumptions. What is
certain is that the Ombudsman surmised Revilla’s involvement with the PDAF scam from the following:
(1) his purported signatures appearing in several documents endorsing the NGOs affiliated with
Napoles; (2) the testimonies of the so-called “whistleblowers” and (3) the Counter-Affidavits of some
of Revilla’s corespondents. As will be

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discussed, these are neither relevant nor competent, and do not constitute sufficient bases to sustain
the finding of probable cause to subject Revilla to continuous prosecution.

Same; View that the Ombudsman ought to have exercised caution especially since the
“whistleblowers” no less admitted to forging the lawmakers’ endorsements of Napoles’
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to the corresponding implementing agencies (IAs) along
with all other Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Documents.—As Revilla maintained all
along, his involvement/participation in the release of his PDAF was limited only to the identification
and selection of projects or programs listed in the the GAA and communicating such selection to the
Chair of the Senate Committee on Finance and the Senate President. Any endorsement made by him
does not and cannot sway these IAs to act per his will and contrary to legal requirements. It is,
therefore, perplexing that Revilla’s involvement in the PDAF scam is hinged on apparently worthless
“endorsements” of Napoles-controlled NGOs. Further, the Ombudsman ought to have exercised
caution especially since the “whistleblowers” no less admitted to forging the lawmakers’
endorsements of Napoles’ NGOs to the IAs along with all other PDAF Documents. Suñas testified that
they prepared these endorsement letters, upon which Revilla is now being indicted.

Same; View that even a cursory glance at some of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
Documents questioned by Revilla reveals a forgery so obvious as to be remarkably noticeable to the
naked eye of an ordinary person.—In fact, even a cursory glance at some of the PDAF Documents
questioned by Revilla reveals a forgery so obvious as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of
an ordinary person. A prime example is the “endorsement” letter addressed to Gondelina Amata of
the NLDC dated October 23, 2009, supposedly signed by Revilla. Compared to the standard signatures
submitted by Revilla, the signature contained therein lacks the cursive flourishes of his true signatures
and instead contains sharp and blunt strokes. Similarly noticeable is the variance of the letterheads
used in these various endorsement letters, with some containing supposed bar codes of Revilla’s
office, others simply a number.

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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

Same; Handwriting Experts; View that where the genuineness of the documents is crucial to the
respondents’ defense, it is more prudent, as stressed in People v. Agresor, 320 SCRA 302 (1999), to
allow the opinion of handwriting experts.—At the very least, the Azores and Pagui findings should
have impelled the Ombudsman to consider the veracity of the signatures on the PDAF documents
given that these experts’ findings uniformly detail discrepancies between the signatures in the PDAF
documents and Revilla’s admitted genuine specimens of writing. That the Ombudsman failed to even
require NBI handwriting experts to study the questioned signatures renders the immediate dismissal
of the two handwriting expert’s certifications highly suspect. Where the genuineness of the
documents is crucial to the respondents’ defense, it is more prudent, as stressed in People v. Agresor,
320 SCRA 302 (1999), to allow the opinion of handwriting experts.

Criminal Law; Plunder; Probable Cause; View that the finding of probable cause to indict a person for
plunder cannot be based on admittedly falsified documents.—Being uncontroverted and, in fact,
confirmed by the complainants’ witnesses, I submit that this forgery of Revilla’s signatures and the
falsification of the PDAF Documents should have dissuaded the Ombudsman from filing the
Informations against Revilla. Certainly, the finding of probable cause to indict a person for plunder
cannot be based on admittedly falsified documents. While probable cause falls below proof beyond
reasonable doubt in the hierarchy of quanta of evidence, it must nonetheless be supported by
sufficient, credible and competent evidence, i.e., there should be facts and circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a prudent and cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of
the crime with which he is charged.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Extrajudicial Confessions; Res Inter Alios Acta Rule; View that it is basic that
an extrajudicial confession binds only the confessant or declarant and is inadmissible against his or
her co-accused. This basic postulate, an extension of the res inter alios acta rule, is embodied in
Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.—Absent any credible proof of Revilla’s actual link or
participation in the alleged scheme to divert his PDAF to Napoles’ NGOs, the Ombudsman should
likewise not have accepted hook, line, and sinker any testimony of a participant in the supposed con-

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spiracy. It is basic that an extrajudicial confession binds only the confessant or declarant and is
inadmissible against his or her co--accused. This basic postulate, an extension of the res inter alios
acta rule, is embodied in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; View that the conclusion reached by the Ombudsman falls short of the threshold
requirement that conspiracy itself must be proved as positively as the commission of the felony itself.
The quantum of evidence required is as should be, as conspiracy is a “facile device by which an
accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.”—As discussed above, besides the
admittedly falsified and forged PDAF documents, there is no concrete proof showing that Revilla
pulled off any “overt act” in furtherance of the supposed conspiracy with Napoles. Other than saying
that without Revilla, the scheme would have supposedly failed, the Ombudsman has been unable to
point to concrete set of facts to support her conclusion as to the complicity of Revilla to the
conspiracy in question. Thus, the conclusion reached by the Ombudsman falls short of the threshold
requirement that conspiracy itself must be proved as positively as the commission of the felony itself.
The quantum of evidence required is as should be, as conspiracy is a “facile device by which an
accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.” For this reason, I submit that the
testimonies of Revilla’s co­respondents cannot be taken against him. Yet, the Ombudsman repeatedly
and freely cited the previously withheld counter-affidavits of Revilla’s co­respondents in finding
probable cause to indict him for Plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

Same; Same; Audio Evidence; Electronic Evidence; View that Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence provides that an audio evidence, such as a telephone conversation, is admissible
only if it is presented, explained, or authenticated.—A closer look of Cunanan’s testimony, which was
a critical part of the Ombudsman’s Resolutions, bares the infirmity of his claim. While he could have
easily asked for a written confirmation of the authorization given by Revilla to Cambe, Cunanan
himself admitted that he, instead, supposedly sought verification over the telephone. Yet, an audio
recording of the alleged telephone conversation was not presented or even mentioned. Not even a
transcript of the alleged telephone con-

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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

versation was attached to Cunanan’s Counter-Affidavit. Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence provides that an audio evidence, such as a telephone conversation, is admissible only if it is
presented, explained, or authenticated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) had previously declared that the person
with whom the witness was conversing on the telephone must first be reliably identified before the
telephone conversation can be admitted in evidence and given probative value.—Given that no audio
evidence of the telephone conversation was presented, much less “identified, explained or
authenticated,” the occurrence of the alleged telephone conversation is rendered highly suspect, if
not improbable, and any testimony thereon is inadmissible and of no probative value. But granting,
arguendo, that Cunanan did call Revilla’s office, it still begs the question of how he could have
recognized or confirmed the identity of the person he was speaking with over the phone and not
face-to-face. There is no indication, and Cunanan never even hinted, that he was closely familiar with
Revilla’s voice that he can easily recognize it over the phone in a single conversation. This Court had
previously declared that the person with whom the witness was conversing on the telephone must
first be reliably identified before the telephone conversation can be admitted in evidence and given
probative value.

Criminal Law; Plunder; Probable Cause; View that the Ombudsman should not have found probable
cause to indict Revilla given that: there is nothing but falsified documents, hearsay testimonies and
declarations barred by the res inter alios acta that support the complaints.—For this and for the fact
that there is absolutely nothing competent and relevant that can sway a reasonable man to believe
that Revilla had participated in the PDAF scheme, I vote for the reversal of the Ombudsman’s finding
of probable cause to indict Revilla for plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 on account of
grave abuse of discretion. It must not be forgotten that the crimes involved in these clases are
Plunder and violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019 — two grave charges that can strip a man of his good
name and liberty, as in this case. The Ombudsman should not have found probable cause to indict
Revilla given that there is nothing but falsified documents, hearsay testimonies and declarations
barred by the res inter alios acta that support the complaints. Worse, the Om-

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budsman violated the due process protection of the Constitution in citing affidavits and testimonies
not previously furnished Revilla. Without doubt, the Assailed Resolutions, insofar as it found probable
cause against Revilla, were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Same; Same; View that as gathered from the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution, the fact of Cambe,
acting on his own as a public officer, amassing or acquiring ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) through any of the means provided under the plunder law or
acting in violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 has not been demonstrated.—Interestingly, the
March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution of the respondent Ombudsman did not once mention the
examination report of Atty. Pagui, nor did it squarely address the allegation of forgery. It immediately
dismissed the argument by saying: Forgery is not presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive, and
convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. Further, as gathered
from the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution, the fact of Cambe, acting on his own as a public officer,
amassing or acquiring ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00)
through any of the means provided under the plunder law or acting in violation of RA 3019 has not
been demonstrated.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Res Inter Alios Acta Rule; View that the requisites to bring a given set of facts
under the exception to the res inter alios acta rule were not met in the present case.—The exception
to the res inter alios acta rule, as earlier indicated, in Section 30 of Rule 130 provides: Section 30.
Admission by conspirator.—The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. People v. Cachuela, 698 SCRA 161 (2013), succinctly
dwells on the application the rule and its exception, thus: At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial
confession is inadmissiblin evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule. This
rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not
admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them. An
exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule
130 of the

560

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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy, and during its existence, may he given in evidence against the coconspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission
of a conspirator may be received against his or her coconspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the
common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other
piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired
with the appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be
shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial
court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime. The requisites to bring a
given set of facts under the exception to the res inter alios acta rule were not met in the present case.

Judicial Review; View that considering the apparent whimsical and capricious approach thus taken by
the Ombudsman, I submit that the Supreme Court (SC) should have exercised its power of judicial
review.—Considering the apparent whimsical and capricious approach thus taken by the Ombudsman,
I submit that this Court should have exercised its power of judicial review. Tolerating the practice of
establishing probable cause based on forged or questionable documents would expose the criminal
justice system to malicious prosecution. It will create a dangerous precedent. It will encourage
unscrupulous individuals to file trumped up charges based on fictitious, spurious, or manipulated
documents. Malicious lawsuits designed to harass the innocent will proliferate, in clear violation of
their rights enshrined by no less than the Constitution. This, I cannot allow.

Criminal Law; Plunder; Priority Development Assistance Fund; View that while I submit that the Court
can accord merit to Napoles’ assertion respecting the undue reliance of the Ombudsman on
inadmissible evidence, such as the statements and ledgers submitted by Luy, I concur with the
majority that the Ombudsman’s finding as to the existence of probable cause to charge Napoles is
substantiated.—While I submit that the Court can accord merit to Napoles’ assertion

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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

respecting the undue reliance of the Ombudsman on inadmissible evidence, such as the statements
and ledgers submitted by Luy, I concur with the majority that the Ombudsman’s finding as to the
existence of probable cause to charge Napoles is substantiated. Her argument that no evidence was
presented to show her affiliation to the NGOs and the implementation of the PDAF-financed projects
holds no water. Save for her bare denials, Napoles did not submit any contrary evidence which would
support her claim. On the contrary, the Ombudsman, through the efforts of the FIO and the NBI, was
able to secure the statements of Napoles’ former employees, to independently establish how she set
up NGOs and colluded with people in and out of the government to acquire the proceeds of the PDAF
of various legislators. Notably, an employee, Mary Arlene Baltazar, categorically testified having been
instructed by Napoles to forge the signatures of directors in her NGO, as well as the signatures of
listed beneficiaries in the PDAF-funded projects, and to shred documents related to the PDAF scheme.
Counter-affidavits of the public officers from the implementing agencies involved also admitted
having coordinated with Napoles in processing the projects.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; View that a cursory reading of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and Field Investigation Office (FIO) complaints would show substantial compliance
with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on sufficiency of complaint and information.—A cursory
reading of the NBI and FIO complaints would show substantial compliance with the above provision.
All the accused were specifically named, the designation of the offenses charged clearly indicated,
and the acts allegedly constituting the offenses and where they were committed enumerated.
Considering the offenses charged, it was correctly indicated that the State is the offended party. As
for the date of when the offenses were committed, it is sufficient if, as here, the approximate period
of commission, i.e., span of four years starting from and ending on, is provided, the exact date of the
commission of the crime not being an element in either Plunder or violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019.

Criminal Law; Conspiracy; View that De Asis, as Napoles’ employee, possesses knowledge of facts and
circumstances, which can put one wary of his employer’s nature of business. Possessing this

562

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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

knowledge while continuously participating in the illegal scheme, even if instructed by his employer,
is tantamount to acquiescence in the illegal act, thus belying his bona fide claim.—The Ombudsman
aptly pointed out the inconsistency of De Asis’ acts with the principle of good faith. Routinely
withdrawing and delivering huge sums of cash for Napoles and producing fictitious list of beneficiaries
and liquidation reports would make a reasonable person doubt the legitimacy of his employer’s
business. De Asis, as Napoles’ employee, possesses knowledge of facts and circumstances, which can
put one wary of his employer’s nature of business. Possessing this knowledge while continuously
participating in the illegal scheme, even if instructed by his employer, is tantamount to acquiescence
in the illegal act, thus belying his bona fide claim.

Same; Same; Principal by Indispensable Cooperation; View that evidence shows that there is probable
cause to believe that Lim cooperated in order to divert the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) to their own pockets. By rendering assistance in the delivery of money, Lim is deemed to have
conspired in the illegal transaction. Under these circumstances, Lim is as much liable as the principal
because of his overt and indispensable cooperation in perpetuating the scam.—While preparation or
segregation and the actual delivery are separate acts, they are interconnected with a common
objective. It is immaterial, thus, whether Lim only prepared or segregated the money, actually
delivered it or both. The fact is, there is probable cause to believe that he performed a role in the
consummation of the crime of Plunder. Further, evidence shows that there is probable cause to
believe that Lim cooperated in order to divert the PDAF to their own pockets. By rendering assistance
in the delivery of money, Lim is deemed to have conspired in the illegal transaction. Under these
circumstances, Lim is as much liable as the principal because of his overt and indispensable
cooperation in perpetuating the scam. At this juncture, it is necessary to state that Revilla is not the
only named public officer involved in this issue. There are others against whom the Ombudsman
found probable cause. Thus, Lim, being a private individual, may be charged with Plunder, there being
probable cause to believe that he acted in concert with some public officers.

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Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; View that Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a judge “may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause.”—I submit that the issues raised by the parties are ripe for
adjudication and easily verifiable by the submissions of the parties. To wait for trial will only
unnecessarily prolong the disposition of the case. On this note, Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that a judge “may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause.” As borne by the records, the Ombudsman initially found
probable cause to charge petitioners Relampagos, et al. for sixteen (16) counts of violation of Sec. 3(e),
RA 3019 on account of Luy’s testimony that petitioners are Napoles’ contact in the DBM. Yet, even
Luy himself twice admitted during the September 12, 2013 Senate Blue Ribbon Committee that
petitioners did not receive any part of the PDAF. Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 812 SCRA 537,
G.R. Nos. 212014-15, G.R. Nos. 212427-28 December 6, 2016

G.R. No. 215009. January 23, 2017.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARMEN SANTORIO GALENO, respondent.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has
no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule.—The contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent’s sole
witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their
contents, as she did not prepare any of the certifications nor was she a public officer of the concerned
government agencies. Notably, while

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* FIRST DIVISION.

** Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2416, dated January 4, 2017.
192

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Galeno

it is true that the public prosecutor who represented petitioner interposed no objection to the
admission of the foregoing evidence in the proceedings in the court below, it should be borne in mind
that “hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can
show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule,” which do not,
however, obtain in this case. Verily, while respondent’s documentary evidence may have been
admitted due to the opposing party’s lack of objection, it does not, however, mean that they should
be accorded any probative weight.

Same; Same; In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of
evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendant’s.—Case law states that the “absence of opposition from government
agencies is of no controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents. Neither is the Republic barred from assailing the decision
granting the petition for reconstitution [or correction of title, as in this case] if, on the basis of the law
and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.” Moreover, “in civil cases, the party having
the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.” Republic vs.
Galeno, 815 SCRA 191, G.R. No. 215009 January 23, 2017

G.R. No. 218466. January 23, 2017.*

MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 221425. January 23, 2017.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA a.k.a. “JOHN,”
“KONYONG” SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL @ “INONG” @ DIONISIO NACIONAL,
accused-appellants.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors.—At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws
the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned
in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the
case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.

Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.—To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following
elements must be established: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Use of Unlicensed Firearm; Under Section 1 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 8294, “[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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227
Ramos vs. People

unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.”—Under Section 1 of RA No.

8294, “[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.” There are two (2) requisites
to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that
the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to
carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the
Information lies with the prosecution.

Same; Same; Same; As the Information alleged that accused-appellants used an unlicensed firearm in
killing Rolando, the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this allegation. Having failed in this respect,
the Supreme Court (SC) cannot simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance.—In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot wounds
which led to his demise, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able
to recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo that such firearm was
recovered, whether or not such firearm was licensed. The Court notes that the disquisitions of the
courts a quo were silent regarding this matter. As the Information alleged that accused-appellants
used an unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando, the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this allegation.
Having failed in this respect, the Court cannot simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as
an aggravating circumstance. Ramos vs. People, 815 SCRA 226, G.R. No. 218466<br/>G.R. No. 221425
January 23, 2017

A.C. No. 5333. March 13, 2017.*

ROSA YAP-PARAS, complainant, vs. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, respondent.

Attorneys; Formal Investigation; Generally, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP’s) formal
investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with, except for valid and
compelling reasons, as it is essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues
raised.—Generally, the IBP’s formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be
dispensed with, except for valid and compelling reasons, as it is essential to accord both parties an
opportunity to be heard on the issues raised. Absent a valid fact-finding investigation, the Court
usually remands the administrative case to the IBP for further proceedings. However, in light of the
foregoing circumstances, as well as respondent’s own admission that he resumed practicing law even
without a Court order lifting his suspension, the Court finds a compelling reason to resolve the
matters raised before it even without the IBP’s factual findings and recommendation thereon.
Same; Practice of Law; According to jurisprudence, the “practice of law embraces any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,]
and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and experience.”—According to jurisprudence, the “practice
of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal
principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and experience.” During
the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing law. It
must be stressed, however, that a lawyer’s suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse of
the suspension period. The lawyer must submit the required documents and wait for an order from
the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law. In this case, the OBC
correctly pointed out that respondent’s suspension period became effective on May 23, 2001 and
lasted for one (1) year, or until May 22, 2002. Thereafter, re-

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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117

Yap-Paras vs. Paras

spondent filed a motion for the lifting of his suspension. However, soon after this filing and without
waiting for a Court order approving the same, respondent admitted to accepting new clients and
cases, and even working on an amicable settlement for his client with the Department of Agrarian
Reform. Indubitably, respondent engaged in the practice of law without waiting for the Court order
lifting the suspension order against him, and thus, he must be held administratively liable therefor.

Same; Same; Disbarment; Suspension from Practice of Law; Willful Disobedience; Under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and
willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so — acts which respondent is guilty of in
this case — are grounds for dis-barment or suspension from the practice of law.—Under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and
willfully appearing as an attorney with-out authority to do so — acts which respondent is guilty of in
this case — are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, to wit: Section 27.
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.—A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Same; Same; Penalties; Prevailing case law shows that the Supreme Court (SC) consistently imposed
an additional suspension of six (6) months on lawyers who continue practicing law despite their
suspension.—Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, prevailing case law shows that
the Court consistently imposed an additional suspension of six (6) months on lawyers who continue
practicing law despite their suspension. Thus, an additional suspension of six (6) months on
respondent due to his unauthorized practice of law is proper. The Court is mindful, however, that
suspension can

118

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yap-Paras vs. Paras

no longer be imposed on respondent considering that just recently, respondent had already been
disbarred from the practice of law and his name had been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys in Paras v.
Paras, 804 SCRA 189 (2016). In Sanchez v. Torres, 741 SCRA 620 (2014), the Court ruled that the
penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be imposed on a lawyer who had been previously
disbarred. Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the lawyer’s administrative liability for recording
purposes in the lawyer’s personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court held that respondent therein
should be suspended from the practice of law, although the said penalty can no longer be imposed in
view of his previous disbarment. In the same manner, the Court imposes upon respondent herein the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, although the said
penalty can no longer be effectuated in view of his previous disbarment, but nonetheless should be
adjudged for recording purposes. That being said, the issue anent the propriety of lifting his
suspension is already moot and academic. Yap-Paras vs. Paras, 820 SCRA 116, A.C. No. 5333 March 13,
2017
G.R. No. 225608. March 13, 2017.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO ALEJANDRO y RIGOR and JOEL ANGELES y
DE JESUS, accused-appellants.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In criminal cases, “an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors.”—In criminal cases, “an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review
and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even
reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.
The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law.”

Criminal Law; Homicide; Elements of.—To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following
elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused
killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention to kill,
which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the
acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim
without medical intervention or attendance.

Same; Rape; Elements of.—The elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or
the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under twelve (12)
years of age or demented. The provision also states that if the act is committed either with the

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* FIRST DIVISION.

190

190

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Alejandro

use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating
the imposition of a higher penalty.

Same; Same; Qualified Rape; Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) states that if the rape is
committed under certain circumstances, such as when it was committed by two (2) or more persons,
the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this instance.—On a related matter, since the Information in
Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) was allowed to be amended to include Alejandro as a co-accused and that
accused-appellants were convicted of such charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the
conviction in said case from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. As adverted to earlier, Article 335 of the
RPC states that if the rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as when it was committed
by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this instance. Notably, this will no
longer affect Alejandro as he had already withdrawn his appeal prior to the promulgation of this
decision. People vs. Alejandro, 820 SCRA 189, G.R. No. 225608 March 13, 2017

G.R. No. 225965. March 13, 2017.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PUYAT MACAPUNDAG y LABAO,
accused-appellant.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; An appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for
review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the
appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.—At the outset, it must be stressed that
an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing
tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and
cite the proper provision of the penal law.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs; Elements of.—

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* FIRST DIVISION.

205

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205

People vs. Macapundag

Macapundag was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5
and 11, Article II of RA 9165. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale
of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove the: (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment. On the other hand,
the prosecution must establish the following elements to convict an accused charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.

Same; Same; It is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable
doubt.—Notably, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs,
the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account
for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Section 21, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 provides the
chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs,
in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.—Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides
the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized
drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the
apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were
seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice,
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within
twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.

206

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Macapundag

Same; Same; Same; The plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers,
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.—In the present case, the prosecution did not even bother to explain why the
inventory and photograph of the seized evidence were not made either in the place of seizure and
arrest or at the police station, as required by the IRR in case of warrantless arrests, or why the
marking of the seized item was not made at the place of seizure in the presence of Macapundag. It
was also silent on the absence of a representative from the DOJ, the media and an elected public
official to witness the inventory and receive copies of the same. Similarly unexplained was the lack of
inventory and photographs of the seized items. Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of
procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. It has been repeated in jurisprudence
that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed
aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of
illegal drug suspects. People vs. Macapundag, 820 SCRA 204, G.R. No. 225965 March 13, 2017

G.R. No. 226622. March 14, 2017.*

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. BAI HAIDY D. MAMALINTA, respondent.

Administrative Law; Misconduct; Dismissal from the Service; To warrant dismissal from the service,
the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not
trifling.—Mis-conduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the
service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a
direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties
of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest
in the former.

Same; Simple Neglect of Duty; Gross Neglect of Duty; Words and Phrases; As compared to Simple
Neglect of Duty which is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required
task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference, Gross Neglect of Duty is characterized
by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the consequences, or by flagrant
and palpable breach of duty.—As compared to Simple Neglect of Duty which is defined as the failure
of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness
or indifference, Gross Neglect of Duty is characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by
conscious indifference to the consequences, or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty.

Same; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service; Certain acts may be considered as Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of the

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* EN BANC.

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VOL. 820, MARCH 14, 2017

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Commission on Elections vs. Mamalinta

public office and may or may not be characterized by corruption or a willful intent to violate the law
or to disregard established rules.—Meanwhile, certain acts may be considered as Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of Service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of the public office and
may or may not be characterized by corruption or a willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules. In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr., 696 SCRA 240 (2013), the Court outlined the following acts
that constitute this offense, such as: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure
to report back to work without prior notice, failure to keep in safety public records and property,
making false entries in public documents, and falsification of court orders.

Same; Dismissal from the Service; Duress; Intimidation; The double proclamation and the
unauthorized transfer of the place for canvassing, the Supreme Court (SC) agrees with the Court of
Appeals (CA) that Mamalinta should not be held administratively liable for the same to warrant her
dismissal from the service, as such acts were committed while under duress and intimidation.—The
double proclamation and the unauthorized transfer of the place for canvassing, the Court agrees with
the CA that Mamalinta should not be held administratively liable for the same to warrant her
dismissal from the service, as such acts were committed while under duress and intimidation. In
People v. Nuñez, 276 SCRA 9 (1997), the Court defined duress as follows: Duress, force, fear or
intimidation to be available as a defense, must be present, imminent and impending, and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not
done. A threat of future injury is not enough. To be available as a defense, the fear must be
well-founded, an immediate and actual danger of death or great bodily harm must be present and the
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for escape or
self-defense in equal combat. It would be a most dangerous rule if a defendant could shield himself
from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from or because of a threat of a third person.

Same; Same; Same; Duress, as a valid defense, should be based on real, imminent or reasonable fear
for one’s own life.—“[D]uress, as a valid defense, should be based on real, imminent or reasonable
fear for one’s own life. It should not be inspired by specu-

288

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Commission on Elections vs. Mamalinta

lative, fanciful or remote fear. A threat of future injury is not enough. It must be clearly shown that
the compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.”

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Administrative Proceedings; As a rule, technical rules of

procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings.—The CA did not err in
considering Mamalinta and Mato’s Joint Affidavit — as well as the Minutes of the MBOC dated May
14 and 15, 2004 and the Report dated May 16, 2004 both prepared by Peñafiel — although they were
not formally offered as evidence during the investigation before the COMELEC. As a rule, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. Hence, in
proper cases such as this, the procedural rules may be relaxed for the furtherance of just objectives.
Thus, the CA did not err in taking these documents in consideration.

Election Law; Canvassing of Votes; In Nasser Immam v. COMELEC, 322 SCRA 866 (2000), the Supreme
Court (SC) ruled that a complete canvass of votes is necessary in order to reflect the true desire of the
electorate, and that a proclamation of winning candidates on the basis of incomplete canvass is illegal
and of no effect.—The Court notes that the CA failed to determine Mamalinta’s administrative
liability on the third act she was accused of committing, i.e., the premature proclamation of Sinsuat as
the winning candidate on the basis of an incomplete canvass of election returns. In Nasser Immam v.
COMELEC, 322 SCRA 866 (2000), the Court ruled that a complete canvass of votes is necessary in
order to reflect the true desire of the electorate, and that a proclamation of winning candidates on
the basis of incomplete canvass is illegal and of no effect.

G.R. No. 224834. March 15, 2017.*

JONATHAN Y. DEE, petitioner, vs. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED,
BONDEAST PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select
Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select
Foods International, Inc., respondents.

G.R. No. 224871. March 15, 2017.*

HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BONDEAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT
HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C.
YAP-CHUA, as a Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., petitioners, vs.
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H.
SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, and BARBARA ANNE C.
MIGALLOS, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Obiter Dictum; Words and Phrases; An obiter dictum is a
remark made, or opinion

_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.

586

586

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dee vs. Harvest All Investment Limited

expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause by the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and
not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument.—In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, 782 SCRA 441 (2016), the Court had the opportunity to define an
obiter dictum and discuss its legal effects as follows: [An obiter dictum] “x x x is a remark made, or
opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause by the way, that is, incidentally or
collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in
the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. It does
not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and is made without argument, or full
consideration of the point. It lacks the force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of an opinion
with no binding force for purposes of res judicata.”

Same; Same; Intra-Corporate Controversies; Filing Fees; The deletion of Section 21(k) of Rule 141 and
in lieu thereof, the application of Section 7(a) [fees for actions where the value of the subject matter
can be determined/estimated], 7(b)(1) [fees for actions where the value of the subject matter cannot
be estimated], or 7(b)(3) [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the same Rule to cases
involving intra-corporate controversies for the determination of the correct filing fees.—Verily, the
deletion of Section 21(k) of Rule 141 and in lieu thereof, the application of Section 7(a) [fees for
actions where the value of the subject matter can be determined/estimated], 7(b)(1) [fees for actions
where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated], or 7(b)(3) [fees for all other actions not
involving property] of the same Rule to cases involving intra-corporate controversies for the
determination of the correct filing fees, as the case may be, serves a dual purpose: on the one hand,
the amendments concretize the Court’s recognition that the subject matter of an intra-corporate
controversy may or may not be capable of pecuniary estimation; and on the other hand, they were
also made to correct the anomaly created by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by
the Lu obiter dictum) implying that all intra-corporate cases involved a subject matter which is
deemed capable of pecuniary estimation.
587

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587

Dee vs. Harvest All Investment Limited

Same; Same; Retroactivity of Laws; While the Supreme Court (SC) is not unaware that the
amendments brought by A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016 only came after the filing of the
complaint subject of this case, such amendments may nevertheless be given retroactive effect so as
to make them applicable to the resolution of the instant consolidated petitions as they merely
pertained to a procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141, and not substantive law.—While the Court is not
unaware that the amendments brought by A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016 only came
after the filing of the complaint subject of this case, such amendments may nevertheless be given
retroactive effect so as to make them applicable to the resolution of the instant consolidated
petitions as they merely pertained to a procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141, and not substantive law. In Tan,
Jr. v. CA, 373 SCRA 524 (2002), the Court thoroughly explained the retroactive effectivity of
procedural rules, viz.: The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not
ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been held that “a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one
which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already
past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not
create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation
of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general
rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.” The general rule against giving statutes retroactive
operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not
prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they
neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is
presumptively applicable to all actions — those which have accrued or are pending. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive
application of procedural statutes
588

588

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dee vs. Harvest All Investment Limited

constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal,
of any other than the existing rules of procedure.”

Same; Same; Docket Fees; Having classified Harvest All, et al.’s action as one incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the
appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule
141 [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with
A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016.—Having classified Harvest All, et al.’s action as one
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the
appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule
141 [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with
A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016.

G.R. No. 198799. March 20, 2017.*

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. AMADO M. MENDOZA and MARIA MARCOS Vda. de
MENDOZA, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The test for determining whether the supposed error was
one of ‘law’ or ‘fact’ is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether
the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact.—As a general rule, the Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the review of pure questions of
law. Otherwise stated, a Rule 45 petition does not allow the review of questions of fact because the
Court is not

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

42

42

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Mendoza

a trier of facts. Case law provides that “there is a ‘question of law’ when the doubt or difference arises
as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a ‘question
of fact’ when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test
for determining whether the supposed error was one of ‘law’ or ‘fact’ is not the appellation given by
the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised
without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact.”
Where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from
these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a reevaluation of
the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their
relationship to each other, the issue is factual.
Same; Evidence; Preponderance of Evidence; It is settled that in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.—It is settled that in
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon,
with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant’s. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term ‘greater weight of evidence’ or
‘greater weight of credible evidence.’ Succinctly put, it only requires that evidence be greater or more
convincing than the opposing evidence.

Same; Same; Witnesses; Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight,
as the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique
opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under
gruelling examination.—Aside from his bare testimony, Amado did not present any corroborative
evidence to support his claim that his performance of the aforesaid voluntary acts was subject to BPI’s
presentment of the proper and authenticated proof of the dishonored subject check. Amado’s
unsubstantiated testimony is self-serving at the most, and hence, cannot be relied upon. In fact, the
RTC did not lend any credence to Amado’s testimony in resolving this case. In this regard, it should be

43

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43

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Mendoza

borne in mind that the “findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight,
as the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique
opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under
gruelling examination. Absent any showing that the trial court’s calibration of credibility was flawed,
the appellate court is bound by its assessment,” as in this case.

Same; Same; Documentary Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; While the Best Evidence Rule under Section
3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that generally, the original copy of the document must be
presented whenever the content of the document is under inquiry, the rule admits of certain
exceptions, such as “[w]hen the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror.”—Anent the subject check, while the Best Evidence Rule
under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that generally, the original copy of the
document must be presented whenever the content of the document is under inquiry, the rule
admits of certain exceptions, such as “[w]hen the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror.” In order to fall under the aforesaid
exception, it is crucial that the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b)
the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (c) the
absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.

Same; Same; It is well-settled that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may validly be
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.—It should be pointed out that respondents did
not proffer any objection to the evidence presented by BPI, as shown by their failure to file their
comment or opposition to the latter’s formal offer of evidence. It is well-settled that evidence not
objected to is deemed admitted and may validly be considered by the court in arriving at its judgment,
as what the RTC did in this case, since it was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence
presented during the trial.

Civil Law; Quasi-Contracts; Solutio Indebiti; Bank of the Philippine Islands’ (BPI’s) payment of the
proceeds of the subject check was due to a mistaken notion that such check was cleared, when in fact,
it was dishonored due to an alteration in the amount indicated

44

44

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Mendoza

therein. Such payment on the part of BPI to respondents was clearly made by mistake, giving rise to
the quasi-contractual obligation of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 in relation to Article 2163 of the
Civil Code.—Records reveal that BPI’s payment of the proceeds of the subject check was due to a
mistaken notion that such check was cleared, when in fact, it was dishonored due to an alteration in
the amount indicated therein. Such payment on the part of BPI to respondents was clearly made by
mistake, giving rise to the quasi-contractual obligation of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 in
relation to Article 2163 of the Civil Code. Not being a loan or forbearance of money, an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the amount to be refunded and on the damages and
attorney’s fees awarded, if any, computed from the time of demand until its satisfaction.
Consequently, respondents must return to BPI the aforesaid amount, with legal interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of extrajudicial demand — or on June 27, 1997, the date
when BPI informed respondents of the dishonor of the subject check and demanded the return of its
proceeds — until fully paid. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Mendoza, 821 SCRA 41, G.R. No. 198799
March 20, 2017

G.R. No. 215820. March 20, 2017.*

ERLINDA DINGLASAN-DELOS SANTOS and her daughters, namely, VIRGINIA, AUREA, and BINGBING, all
surnamed DELOS SANTOS, petitioners, vs. ALBERTO ABEJON and the estate of TERESITA DINGLASAN
ABEJON, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pre-trial; It is mandatory for the trial court to conduct pretrial in civil
cases in order to realize the paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating, and expediting
trial.—At the outset, it must be emphasized that a pretrial is a procedural device intended to clarify
and limit the basic issues raised by the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of
surprise and maneuvering. More significantly, a pretrial has been institutionalized as the answer to
the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important procedural
innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it paves the way for a less cluttered trial
and resolution of the case. It is, thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct pretrial in civil cases in
order to realize the paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating, and expediting trial.

Civil Law; Void Contracts; It is settled that “the declaration of nullity of a contract which is void ab
initio operates to restore things to the state and condition in which they were found before the
execution thereof.” Pursuant to this rule, since the Deed of Sale involving the subject land stands to
be nullified in view of the parties’ stipulation to this effect, it is incumbent upon the parties to return
what they have received from said sale.—It is settled that “the declaration of nullity of a contract
which is void ab initio operates to restore things to the state and condition in which they were found
before the execution thereof.” Pursuant to this rule, since the Deed of Sale involving the subject land
stands to be nullified in view of the parties’ stipulation to this effect, it is incumbent upon the parties
to return what they have received from said sale. Accordingly, Erlinda and the rest of petitioners (as
Pedro’s heirs) are entitled to the return of the subject land as stipulated during the pretrial. To effect
the same, the Register of Deeds of Makati City should cancel TCT No. 180286 issued in the name of
Teresita, and thereafter,

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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VOL. 821, MARCH 20, 2017

133

Dinglasan-Delos Santos vs. Abejon

reinstate TCT No. 131753 in the name of Pedro and Erlinda and, restore the same to its previous state
before its cancellation, i.e., with the mortgage executed by the parties annotated thereon. On the
other hand, respondents, as Teresita’s successors-in-interest, are entitled to the refund of the
additional P50,000.00 consideration she paid for such sale. However, it should be clarified that the
liability for the said amount will not fall on all petitioners, but only on Erlinda, as she was the only one
among the petitioners who was involved in the said sale. Pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 703
SCRA 439 (2013), the amount of P50,000.00 shall be subjected to legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Same; Builders in Good Faith; The terms builder, planter, or sower in good faith as used in reference
to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers to one who, not being the owner of the land, builds, plants, or
sows on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or mode of
acquisition.—The terms builder, planter, or sower in good faith as used in reference to Article 448 of
the Civil Code, refers to one who, not being the owner of the land, builds, plants, or sows on that land
believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or mode of acquisition. “The
essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior
claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.” On the other hand, bad faith may only be
attributed to a landowner when the act of building, planting, or sowing was done with his knowledge
and without opposition on his part.
Same; Same; Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that where both the landowner and the builder,
planter, or sower acted in bad faith, they shall be treated as if both of them were in good faith.—In
this relation, Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that where both the landowner and the builder,
planter, or sower acted in bad faith, they shall be treated as if both of them were in good faith, viz.:
Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on
the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other
shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith. It is understood that there is bad faith on
the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on
his part.

134

134

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dinglasan-Delos Santos vs. Abejon

Same; Same; Whenever both the landowner and the builder/planter/sower are in good faith (or in
bad faith, pursuant to 548 of the Civil Code), the landowner is given two (2) options under Article 448
of the Civil Code, namely: (a) he may appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbursing the
buyer (the builder in good faith) the necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of the
Civil Code; or (b) he may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that of
the improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.—Whenever both the
landowner and the builder/planter/sower are in good faith (or in bad faith, pursuant to the aforecited
provision), the landowner is given two (2) options under Article 448 of the Civil Code, namely: (a) he
may appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good faith)
the necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or (b) he may sell the
land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case,
the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.

Attorney’s Fees; Attorney’s fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit.—Anent the
issue on attorney’s fees, the general rule is that the same cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be
awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article
2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. In this case, the Court finds
no justification for the award of attorney’s fees to either party. Accordingly, any award for attorney’s
fees made by the courts a quo must be deleted. Dinglasan-Delos Santos vs. Abejon, 821 SCRA 132, G.R.
No. 215820 March 20, 2017
G.R. No. 220940. March 20, 2017.*

JOY VANESSA M. SEBASTIAN, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES NELSON C. CRUZ and CRISTINA P. CRUZ and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Void Judgments; The prevailing rule is that where there is
want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void.—Under Section 2,
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. In case of
absence, or lack of jurisdiction, a court should not take cognizance of the case. Thus, the prevailing
rule is that where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null
and void. A void

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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151
Sebastian vs. Cruz

judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be
obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims
flowing out are void. It is not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become
executory. It also follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason
of res judicata.

Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; Requisites that Must be Complied With for
an Order for Reconstitution to be Issued.—From the foregoing, it appears that the following requisites
must be complied with for an order for reconstitution to be issued: (a) that the certificate of title had
been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to
warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the
registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in
force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the
property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition
of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the
reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title
reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. RA 26
presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought
under the provisions of the Torrens System.

Same; Same; Same; The fact of loss or destruction of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title is crucial
in clothing the Regional Trial Court (RTC) with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution
proceedings.—Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title is
crucial in clothing the RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution proceedings. In Spouses
Paulino v. CA, 725 SCRA 273 (2014), the Court reiterated the rule that when the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title was not actually lost or destroyed, but is in fact in the possession of another person,
the reconstituted title is void because the court that rendered the order of reconstitution had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Sebastian vs. Cruz, 821 scra 150, G.R. No. 220940
March 20, 2017

G.R. No. 224943. March 20, 2017.*

JORGE B. NAVARRA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; The Court of Appeals (CA) correctly ruled that his
failure to object to the alleged defect in the Information before entering his plea amounted to a
waiver of such defects, especially since objections as to matters of form or substance in the
Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.—Preliminarily, the Court notes that
petitioner assails the validity or regularity of the Information filed against him on the ground that it
allegedly did not charge a criminal offense. However, as pointed out by the CA, petitioner never
raised such issue prior to his arraignment. In fact, a reading of the records shows that petitioner only
raised the same after he was convicted by the RTC and the case was already on appeal before the CA.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that his failure to object to the alleged defect in the Information before
entering his plea amounted to a waiver of such defects, especially since objections as to matters of
form or substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Hence, petitioner
can no longer be allowed to raise this issue before the Court.

Social Security System; Mandatory Contributions; Prompt remittance of Social Security System (SSS)
contributions under Section 22(a) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8282 is mandatory.—A plain reading of the
Information reveals that petitioner, as FENICS’s President and Chairman of the Board of Directors at
that time, is charged for violation of Section 22(a), in relation to Section 28(h) and (f), of RA 8282 for
FENICS’s failure and/or refusal to remit its employees’ SSS contributions to the SSS during the period
from July 1997 to June 2000. Section 22(a) of RA 8282 states: Section 22. Remittance of
Contributions.—(a) The contributions imposed in the preceding section shall be remitted to the SSS
within the first ten (10) days of each calendar month following the month for which they are
applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe. Every

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* FIRST DIVISION.

180

180

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Navarra vs. People

employer required to deduct and to remit such contributions shall be liable for their payment and if
any contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a
penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from the date the contribution falls due until paid. If
deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission, the collection and remittance of contributions
shall be made quarterly or semi-annually in advance, the contributions payable by the employees to
be advanced by their respective employers: Provided, That upon separation of an employee, any
contribution so paid in advance but not due shall be credited or refunded to his employer. x x x x
Verily, prompt remittance of SSS contributions under the aforesaid provision is mandatory. Any
divergence from this rule subjects the employer not only to monetary sanctions, i.e., the payment of
penalty of three percent (3%) per month, but also to criminal prosecution if the employer fails to: (a)
register its employees with the SSS; (b) deduct monthly contributions from the salaries/wages of its
employees; or (c) remit to the SSS its employees’ SSS contributions and/or loan payments after
deducting the same from their respective salaries/wages. In this regard, Section 28(f) of RA 8282
explicitly provides that “[i]f the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association,
partnership, corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be
liable to the penalties provided in this Act for the offense.” Notably, the aforesaid punishable acts are
considered mala prohibita and, thus, the defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent are
rendered immaterial. Navarra vs. People, 821 SCRA 179, G.R. No. 224943 March 20, 2017

G.R. No. 225593. March 20, 2017.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PALA TOUKYO y PADEP, accused-appellant.

Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused; Upon Toukyo’s death pending
appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused.—Upon Toukyo’s death pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.

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* FIRST DIVISION.
191

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People vs. Toukyo

Notably, there is no civil liability that arose from this case, there being no private complainant to
begin with. People vs. Toukyo, 821 SCRA 190, G.R. No. 225593 March 20, 2017

G.R. No. 186421.* April 17, 2017.**

ROBERTO P. FUENTES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Law; Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act (RA) No.
3019; Elements of.—As may be gleaned above, the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Same; Same; Manifest Partiality; Evident Bad Faith; Words and Phrases; There is “manifest partiality”
when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather
than another. On the other hand, “evident bad faith” connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.—There is “manifest partiality” when there is a clear,
notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. On the
other hand, “evident bad faith” connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.

Same; Same; Bad Faith; As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor’s
prerogative to suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits pursuant to Sections 16

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* Part of the Court’s Case Decongestion Program.

** FIRST DIVISION.

510

510

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fuentes vs. People

and 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code (LGC) as an incident of his power to issue the same, it
must nevertheless be emphasized that: (a) the power to suspend or revoke is premised on the
violation of the conditions specified therein; and (b) the power to refuse issuance is premised on
noncompliance with the prerequisites for said issuance.—As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is
within the municipal mayor’s prerogative to suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits
pursuant to Sections 16 and 444 (b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code as an incident of his power
to issue the same, it must nevertheless be emphasized that: (a) the power to suspend or revoke is
premised on the violation of the conditions specified therein; and (b) the power to refuse issuance is
premised on noncompliance with the prerequisites for said issuance. In the exercise of these powers,
the mayor must observe due process in that it must afford the applicant or licensee notice and
opportunity to be heard.

Same; Same; Damages; Under prevailing case law, “[p]roof of the extent of damage is not essential, it
being sufficient that the injury suffered or the benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough
and not merely negligible.”—Fuentes’ acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit in Valenzuela’s favor,
coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from
engaging in its ship chandling operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue
injury on the part of Valenzuela. Undeniably, such suspension of Triple A’s ship chandling operations
prevented Valenzuela from engaging in an otherwise lawful endeavor for the year 2002. To make
things worse, Valenzuela was also not issued a Business Permit for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and
2006, as it was only in 2007 that such permit was issued in Triple A’s favor. Under prevailing case law,
“[p]roof of the extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the
benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible.”

Same; Same; Penalties; As regards the proper penalty to be imposed on Fuentes, Section 9(a) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 states that the prescribed penalties for violation of the aforesaid crime
includes, inter alia, imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) month to fifteen (15) years,
and perpetual disqualification from public office.—As regards the proper penalty to be imposed on

511

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Fuentes vs. People

Fuentes, Section 9(a) of RA 3019 states that the prescribed penalties for violation of the aforesaid
crime includes, inter alia, imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) month to fifteen (15)
years, and perpetual disqualification from public office. Thus, the Sandiganbayan correctly sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1)
month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and six (6) months, as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from public office.
Same; Same; Nominal Damages; As defined under Article 22 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are
“recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that
has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no
substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.”—The Sandiganbayan
awarded her P200,000.00 as nominal damages occasioned by Fuentes’s non-issuance of a Business
Permit to Triple A. As defined under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are “recoverable
where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has
produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no
substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.” In this case, however, it
is clear that Valenzuela suffered some sort of pecuniary loss due to the suspension of Triple A’s ship
chandling operations, albeit the amount thereof was not proven with certainty. Thus, the award of
temperate, and not nominal, damages, is proper. Fuentes vs. People, 822 SCRA 509, G.R. No. 186421
April 17, 2017

G.R. No. 227158. April 18, 2017.*

JOSEPH C. DIMAPILIS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Election Law; A person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required
qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run, but must also possess none of the
grounds for disqualification under the law.—A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public
office. Section 74 of the OEC provides that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others,
that he is eligible for the office he seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true to the best
of his knowledge. To be “eligible” relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of being elected to
an office. Conversely, “ineligibility” has been defined as a “disqualification or legal incapacity to be
elected to an office or appointed to a particular position.” In this relation, a person intending to run
for public office must not only possess the required qualifications for the position for which he or she
intends to run, but must also possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the law.

Same; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; Under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the 1987 Constitution,
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the duty to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.”—Under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the 1987
Constitution, the COMELEC has the duty to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations rela-
_______________

* EN BANC.

452

452

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dimapilis vs. Commission on Elections

tive to the conduct of an election x x x.” The Court had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the
legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office, albeit, arising from a criminal conviction. Considering, however,
that Section 52(a), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service similarly
imposes the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the
penalty of dismissal from service, the Court sees no reason why the ratiocination enunciated in such
earlier criminal case should not apply here.

Same; Same; Same; It is incumbent upon the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to cancel
petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its
Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.—As petitioner’s disqualification to run for public office pursuant to the final and executory
OMB rulings dismissing him from service now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the
COMELEC to cancel petitioner’s CoC as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its
Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. Accordingly, the Court finds no merit to petitioner’s claim of denial of due process because
even though the special circumstance extant herein calls for the outright cancellation of his CoC in the
exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative function, it even allowed him to submit his Verified Answer
cum Memorandum to explain his side, and to file a motion for reconsideration from its resolution.

Public Officers; Dismissal from Service; The penalty of dismissal [from service] shall carry with it that
of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.—In this case,
the OMB rulings dismissing petitioner for Grave Misconduct had already attained finality on May 28,
2010, which date was even prior to his first election as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in
the October 2010 Barangay Elections. As above stated, “[t]he penalty of dismissal [from service] shall
carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise pro-

453

VOL. 823, APRIL 18, 2017

453

Dimapilis vs. Commission on Elections

vided in the decision.” Although the principal penalty of dismissal appears to have not been
effectively implemented (since petitioner was even able to run and win for two [2] consecutive
elections), the corresponding accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public
office had already rendered him ineligible to run for any elective local position. Bearing the same
sense as its criminal law counterpart, the term perpetual in this administrative penalty should likewise
connote a lifetime restriction and is not dependent on the term of any principal penalty. It is
undisputable that this accessory penalty sprung from the same final OMB rulings, and therefore had
already attached and consequently, remained effective at the time petitioner filed his CoC on October
11, 2013 and his later reelection in 2013. Therefore, petitioner could not have been validly reelected
so as to avail of the condonation doctrine, unlike in other cases where the condonation doctrine was
successfully invoked by virtue of reelections which overtook and thus, rendered moot and academic
pending administrative cases.

Certificate of Candidacy; A person whose Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) had been cancelled is deemed
to have not been a candidate at all because his CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus, cannot give
rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes.—A person whose CoC had been cancelled is
deemed to have not been a candidate at all because his CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus,
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. The cancellation of the CoC
essentially renders the votes cast for him or her as stray votes, and are not considered in determining
the winner of an election. This would necessarily invalidate his proclamation and entitle the qualified
candidate receiving the highest number of votes to the position. Dimapilis vs. Commission on
Elections, 823 SCRA 451, G.R. No. 227158 April 18, 2017
G.R. No. 189950.* April 24, 2017.**

BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA BILAG-SANTILLAN, DIXON BILAG, REYNALDO B. SUELLO, HEIRS OF

LOURDES S. BILAG, HEIRS OF LETICIA BILAG-HANAOKA, and HEIRS OF NELLIE BILAG, petitioners, vs.
ESTELA AY-AY, ANDRES ACOP, JR., FELICITAS AP-AP, SERGIO AP-AP, JOHN NAPOLEON A. RAMIREZ, JR.,
and MA. TERESA A. RAMIREZ, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence has consistently held
that jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a
case.—Jurisprudence has consistently held that “[j]urisdiction is defined as the power and authority of
a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have author-

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* Part of the Court’s Decongestion Program.

** FIRST DIVISION.

79

VOL. 824, APRIL 24, 2017

79
Bilag vs. Ay-Ay

ity to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine
the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the
consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists.
Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the
action.” Perforce, it is important that a court or tribunal should first determine whether or not it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter presented before it, considering that any act that it performs
without jurisdiction shall be null and void, and without any binding legal effects.

Civil Law; Land Registration; Director of Lands; Since the subject lands are untitled and unregistered
public lands, then petitioners correctly argued that it is the Director of Lands who has the authority to
award their ownership.—Since the subject lands are untitled and unregistered public lands, then
petitioners correctly argued that it is the Director of Lands who has the authority to award their
ownership. Thus, the RTC Br. 61 correctly recognized its lack of power or authority to hear and resolve
respondents’ action for quieting of title. In Heirs of Pocdo v. Avila, 719 SCRA 552 (2014), the Court
ruled that the trial court therein correctly dismissed an action to quiet title on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction for lack of authority to determine who among the parties have better right over the
disputed property, which is admittedly still part of public domain for being within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; When a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the only power it has is to dismiss the action, as any act it performs without jurisdiction is null and
void, and without any binding legal effects.—RTC Br. 61 has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5881-R
as the plaintiffs therein (herein respondents) seek to quiet title over lands which belong to the public
domain. Necessarily, Civil Case No. 5881-R must be dismissed on this ground. It should be stressed
that the court a quo’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case renders it without authority
and necessarily obviates the resolution of the merits of the case. To reiterate, when a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action, as any act it
performs without jurisdiction is null and void, and without any binding legal effects. In this light, the
Court finds no further need to discuss the other grounds relied upon by petitioners in this case.

G.R. No. 224764. April 24, 2017.*

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER ALFREDO V. MISAJON, GROUP
SUPERVISOR ROLANDO M. BALBIDO, and EXAMINER REYNANTE DP. MARTIREZ, petitioners, vs.
LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., respondent.

Mercantile Law; Corporations; Corporate Rehabilitation; Words and Phrases; Case law has defined
corporate rehabilitation as an attempt to conserve and administer the assets of an insolvent
corporation in the hope of its eventual return from financial stress to solvency.—[C]ase law has
defined corporate rehabilitation as an attempt to conserve and administer the assets of an insolvent
corporation in the hope of its eventual return from financial stress to solvency. It contemplates the
continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its
former position of successful operation and liquidity.

Same; Same; Same; The inherent purpose of rehabilitation is to find ways and means to minimize the
expenses of the distressed corporation during the rehabilitation period by providing the best possible
framework for the corporation to gradually regain or achieve a sustainable operating form.—Verily,
the inherent purpose of rehabilitation is to find ways and means to minimize the expenses of the
distressed corporation during the rehabilitation period by providing the best possible framework for
the corporation to gradually regain or achieve a sustainable operating form. “[It] enable[s] the
company to gain a new lease in life and thereby allow creditors to be paid [t]heir claims from its
earnings. Thus, rehabilitation shall be undertaken when it is shown that the continued operation of
the corporation is economically more feasible and its creditors can recover, by way of the present
value of payments projected in the plan, more, if the corporation continues as a going concern than if
it is immediately liquidated.”

Same; Same; Same; The creditors must ventilate their claims before the rehabilitation court, and any
“[a]ttempts to seek legal or other resource against the distressed corporation shall be sufficient to
support a finding of indirect contempt of court.”—To clarify, however, creditors of the distressed
corporation are not without remedy as they may still submit their claims to the rehabilitation court
for proper consideration so that they may participate in the proceedings, keeping in mind the general
policy of the law “to ensure or maintain certainty and predictability in commercial affairs, preserve
and maximize the value of the assets of these debtors, recognize creditor rights and respect priority
of claims, and ensure equitable treatment of creditors who are similarly situated.” In other words, the
creditors must ventilate their claims before the rehabilitation court, and any “[a]ttempts to seek legal
or other resource against the distressed corporation shall be sufficient to support a finding of indirect
contempt of court.”