Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A. Elements of a State. .
1. People.
Inhabitants [Sec. 2, Art. Ill; Sec. 1, Art. XIII];
Citizens [Preamble; Secs. 1 & 4, Art. II; Sec. 7, Art. Ill]; (iii)
Electors [Sec. 4, Art. VII].
ii) UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [April 30,1982; ratified by the
Philippines in August, 1983] provides (i) Contiguous Zone of 12 miles; (ii) Exclusive
Economic Zone of 200 miles. Although the contiguous zone and most of the exclusive
economic zone may not, technically, be part of the territory of the
.State, nonetheless, the coastal State enjoys preferential rights over the marine
resources found within these zones. See also P.D. 1599, June 11, 1978.
3. Government is The agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is
formulated, expressed and realized. See U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil 332. i)
a) Functions:
c) Classification:
De jure having a right or existence as stated by law:
A de jure government is the legal, legitimate government of a state and is so recognized by other
states. In contrast,
a de facto government is in actual possession of authority and control of the state. For example, a
government that has been overthrown and has moved to another state will attain de jure status if other
nations refuse to accept the legitimacy of the revolutionary government.
vs. De facto. See: Co Kim Chan v. Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113; Lawyers League for a Better
Philippines v. Aquino, supra..
Kinds of de facto government: That which takes possession or control of, or usurps, by
force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against
the will of the latter; that which is established by the inhabitants of a territory who rise in
insurrection against the parent state; and that which is established by the invading forces of an
enemy who occupy a territory in the course of war. The last is denominated a de facto
government of paramount force.
i) Jurisdiction
i) Territorial: power of the State over persons and things within its
territory. EXEMPT ARE: (a) Foreign states, heads of state, diplomatic representatives,
and consuls to a certain degree; (b) Foreign state property, including embassies,
consulates, and public vessels engaged in noncommercial activities; (c) Acts of state; (d)
Foreign merchant vessels exercising the rights of innocent passage or involuntary entry,
such as arrival under stress; (e) Foreign armies passing through or stationed in its
territory with its permission; and (f) Such other persons or property, including
organizations like
the United Nations, over which it may, by agreement, waive jurisdiction. See:
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations; Convention on Privileges
and Immunities of Specialized Agencies of the United Nations; World Health
Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242; Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center v.
NLRC, 206 SCRA 283.
ii) Personal: power of the State over its nationals, which may be
exercised by the State even if the individual is outside the territory of the State.
B. State Immunity from Suit. “The State cannot be sued without its consent” [Sec.
3, Art. XVI].
1. Basis: There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the
law on which the right depends [Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83], However, it
may be sued if it gives consent, whether express or implied. The doctrine is also
known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.
a) The State’s diplomatic agents, including consuls to a certain extent, are also
exempt from the jurisdiction of local courts and administrative tribunals. [See PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, infra.].
i) A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending State. The cloak of protection is removed the moment the
foreign agent is sued in his individual capacity, as when he is sought to be made liable
for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. In Minucherv. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 142396, February 11, 2003, it was sufficiently established that respondent Arthur
Scalzo an agent of the US Drug Enforcement Agency, was tasked to conduct surveillance
on suspected drug activities within the country, and having ascertained the target, to
inform the local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In
conducting this surveillance and later, acting as the poseur- buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo can hardly be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official functions or
duties. He should, therefore, be accorded diplomatic immunity.
b) The United Nations, as well as its organs and specialized agencies, are
likewise beyond the jurisdiction of local courts [Convention on Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations; Convention on Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies
of the United Nations; World Health Organization v. Aquino, supra.].
on a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. The Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA
29, ruling cannot apply to parties which enjoy foreign and diplomatic immunity
[SEAFDEC-Aquaculture v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 283].
The doctrine of promissory estoppel prevents one party from
withdrawing a promise made to a second party if the latter has
reasonably relied on that promise
Estoppel is a legal principle that precludes a person from
alleging facts that are contrary to previous claims or
actions. In other words, estoppel prevents someone from
arguing something contrary to a claim made or act
performed by that person previously.
For example, if a mother states that a child is not hers,
estoppel could prevent her from later trying to claim child
support payments from the child's father.
ii) In Callado v. IRRI, 244 SCRA 210, the Court upheld anew the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, P.D. 1620, which provides that the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director
General of the Institute or his authorized representative. Citing International Catholic
Migration Commission v. Calleja (and Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI v.
Secretary of Labor), 190 SCRA 120, the Court stated that the letter of the Acting
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Labor and Employment constituted a
categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys
immunities accorded to international organizations, a determination held to be a
political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political
department of the government.
a) In Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302, the Supreme Court said that
State immunity from suit may be invoked as long as the suit really affects the property,
rights or interests of the State and not merely those of the officers nominally made
party defendants. In this case, the Court said that the promotion of public welfare and
the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property rights and interests
of the State. In Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 214
OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW
SCRA 286, the suit for damages filed against the PC Chief and the PC-SUSIA would
require an affirmative act of appropriation should damages be awarded, and is,
therefore, a suit against the State.
a) Incorporated: If the charter provides that the agency can sue and be sued,
then suit will lie, including one for tort. The provision in the charter constitutes express
consent on the part of the State to be sued. See: PNB v. CIR, 81 SCRA 314; Rayo v. CFI of
Bulacan, 110 SCRA 460; SSS v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 707.
claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
basis of civil action between private parties”), the Department of Agriculture could be
sued on the contract for security services entered into by it (subject to prior filing of the
claim with the Commission on Audit), despite it being an unincorporated agency
performing primarily governmental functions.
ii) If proprietary: suit will lie^ because when the State engages in
principally proprietary functions, then it descends to the level of a private individual,
and may, therefore, be vulnerable to suit. See: National Airports Corporation v.
Teodoro, 91 Phil. 207; Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 28.
5. Suit against Public Officers. The doctrine of State immunity also applies to
complaints filed against officials of the State for acts performed by them in the
discharge of their duties within the scope of their authority. Thus, in the Veterans
Manpower case, the suit against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA was dismissed for being a
suit against the state, since it was a suit against public officers in the discharge of official
functions which are governmental in character. Likewise, in Larkins v. NLRC, 241 SCRA
598, it was noted that the private respondents were dismissed from their employment
by Lt. Col. Frankhauser acting for and in behalf of the US government which, by right of
sovereign power, operated and maintained the dormitories at the Clark Air Base for
USAF members.
b) The unauthorized acts of government officials are not acts of state; thus,
the public officer may be sued and held personally liable in damages for such acts [Shauf
v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713], Where a public officer has committed an ultra vires
act, or where there is a showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence, the officer can
be held personally accountable, even if such acts are claimed to have been performed in
connection with
official duties [Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357]. Thus, the PCGG or any of its members,
may be held civilly liable (for the sale of an aircraft to Fuller Aircraft, which was void) if
they did not act with good faith and within the scope of their authority in the
performance of official duties [Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142476, March 20,
2001]. Likewise, in U.S. v. Reyes, 219 SCRA 192, petitioner Bradford, Activity Exchange
Manager at JUSMAG Headquarters, was held personally liable, inasmuch as the search
of respondent Montoya at the JUSMAG parking lot (which subjected respondent to
embarrassment) was held to be beyond the scope and even beyond the Manager’s
official functions. Similarly, in Republic v. Hon. Edilberto Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124, even as
the Supreme Court dismissed the suit against the Republic of the Philippines, the action
for damages against the military personnel and the policemen responsible for the 1989
Mendiola massacre was upheld, inasmuch as the initial findings of the Davide Commission
(tasked by President Aquino to investigate the incident) showed that there was, at least,
negligence on their part when they fired their guns.
c) Where the public official is sued in his personal capacity, the doctrine of
state immunity will not apply, even if the acts complained of were committed while the
public official was occupying a'public position. In Lansang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
102667, February 23, 2000, the petitioner was sued for allegedly “personal motives” in
ordering the ejectment of the General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) from the Rizal
Park; thus, the case was not deemed a suit against the State.
6. Need for consent. In order that suit may lie against the state, there must be
consent, either express or implied. Where no consent is shown, state immunity from suit
may be invoked as a defense by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings,
because waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred
lightly and must be construed in strictissimi juris. Accordingly, the complaint (or
counterclaim) against the State must allege the existence of such consent (and where the
same is found), otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed [Republic v. Feliciano, 148
SCRA 424].
of Agriculture may be sued for money claims based on a contract entered into in its
governmental capacity, because of the express consent contained in Act No. 3038,
provided that the claim be first brought to the Commission on Audit in accordance with
CA 327, as amended [Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693].
ia) But in Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360, an action for the recovery
of the value of the property taken by the government and converted into a public street
without payment of just compensation was allowed, despite the failure of the property
owner to file his claim with the Auditor General. Invoking Ministerio
v. City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464, the Supreme Court said that suit may lie because the
doctrine of State immunity cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice. This ruling was
reiterated in De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA 11, where it was
held that the “public respondents’ belief that the property is public, even if buttressed by
statements of other public officials, is no reason for the unjust taking of petitioner’s
property”; after all, the TCT was in the name of the petitioner. See also Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 212.
ib) In EPG Construction v. Secretary Vigilar, G.R. No. 131544, March 16,
2001, the ruling in Ministerio was invoked when the respondent DPWH Secretary denied
the money claims of petitioners even after the DPWH Auditor interposed no objection to
the payment and the DBM had ordered the release of the amount under a corresponding
Advise of Allotment it issued. Where in Ministerio, the Court said that the doctrine cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen, in this case the Supreme
Court declared that it is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal
norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.
iia) By virtue of P.D. 1620, the grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and
unequivocal, and an express waiver by its Director General is the only way by which it may
relinquish or abandon this immunity [Callado v. IRRI, supra.].
b) Implied Consent
ii) When the State enters into a business contract. See: U.S. v. Ruiz, 136
SCRA 487, where the Supreme Court distinguished between contracts entered into by
the State in jure imperii (sovereign acts) and in jure gestionis (commercial or proprietary
acts). Where the contract is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, there is no waiver of
immunity, and no implied consent may be derived therefrom.
iia) In U. S. v. Ruiz, it was held that the contract for the repair of
wharves was a contract in jus imperii, because the wharves were to be used in national
defense, a governmental function. In JUSMAG Phil. v. NLRC, 239 SCRA 224, the
engagement of the services of private respondent was held to be performance of a
governmental function by JUSMAG, on behalf of the United States. Accordingly,
JUSMAG may not be sued under such a contract. In Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, G.R.
No. 154705, June 26, 2003, it was held that contracts entered into by a sovereign state in
connection with the establishment of a diplomatic mission, including contracts for the
upkeep or maintenance of air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities,
water heaters and water motor pumps of the embassy and the Ambassador’s residence,
are contracts in jure imperii. The fact that the contract contains a provision that any
legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the
Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines does not necessarily mean a
waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity from suit.
iib) Conversely, in U.S. v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644, the contract bidded
out for barbershop facilities in the Clark Field US Air Force Base was deemed
commercial. Similarly, in a companion case, U.S. v. Rodrigo, a contract for restaurant
services within the Camp John Hay Air Station was likewise held commercial in
character.
iid) In Republic (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006, 227
shares in Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI) owned and registered
in the name of private respondent Benedicto were sequestered and taken over by PCGG
fiscal agents. In a suit for payment of dues of the sequestered shares, PCGG raised,
among others, the defense of immunity from suit. The Supreme Court held that by
entering into a Compromise Agreement with Benedicto, the Republic stripped itself of its
immunity and placed itself in the same level as its adversary. When the State enters into
a contract through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose
and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal
benefits accruse and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even
without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract, the sovereign
descends to the level of the citizen.
a) Such execution will require another waiver, because the power of the
court ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment, unless such disbursement is
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law [Republic v. Villasor, 54
SCRA 84; Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693]. Thus, in Larkins v. NLRC, 241
SCRA 598, considering that the employer of private respondents was not Lt. Col.
Frankhauser or the petitioner but the U.S. Government which, by right of sovereign
power, operated and maintained the dormitories at the Clark Air Base for USAF
members, the awards (of monetary claims to the private respondents) will have to be
satisfied by the U.S. Government. Without its consent the properties of the U.S.
Government may not be subject to execution.
c) In Pacific Products v. Ong, 181 SCRA 536, the Supreme Court said that by
the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the garnishee for a debt due from
the defendant. The debtor-stranger becomes a forced intervenor; when served with the
writ of attachment, he becomes a party to the action. Money in the hands of
government agency (engaged in governmental functions), even if due to a third party, is
not liable to creditors of the third party through garnishment. To allow this would be to
allow a suit against the State without the latter’s consent.
. b) In Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486, the Supreme Court said that the
National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a
juridical personality separate and distinct from the government; it is a corporate body performing
proprietary functions. Thus, the NIA may be held liable for damages caused by the negligent act of its
driver who was not a special agent. This was reiterated in National Irrigation Administration v. Court of
Appeals, 214 SCRA 35.