PROF.

MERLIN M. MAGALLONA VS. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA

FACTS: The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines because an
archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to
comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the
Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortened one baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories such as the Kalayaan Island
Ground (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as “regimes of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones. Petitioners, in their capacities as “citizens, taxpayers or legislators” assail the constitutionality of
R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments contending that the law unconstitutionally “converts” internal waters into
archipelagic waters, thus subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III,
including overflight. Petitioners have contended that these passage rights will violate the Constitution as it shall
expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard.

ISSUE: WON R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal waters into archipelagic waters

HELD: Petition DISMISSED.

The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with the Philippine’s national interest. Aside from being
a vital step in safeguarding the country’s maritime zones, the law also allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf. The Court also finds that the
conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of
the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic
sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters
and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein. Furthermore, due to the absence of its own legislation
regarding routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage, the Philippines has no
choice but to comply with the international law norms. The Philippines is subject to UNCLOS III, which grants
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and
conditions for their exercise, thus, the right of innocent passage, being a customary international law, is
automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. If the Philippines or any country shall invoke its
sovereignty to forbid innocent passage, it shall risk retaliatory measures from the international community. With
compliance to UNCLOS III and the enactment of R.A. 9522, the Congress has avoided such conflict. Contrary to
the contention of the petitioners, the compliance to UNCLOS III through the R.A. 9522 will not expose Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard. As a matter of fact, if the Philippines did not comply
with the baselines law, it will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of
its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured and which will produce two-fronted disaster: (1) open
invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas
around the archipelago and (2) it shall weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine
maritime space. Such disaster was avoided through the R.A. 9522.

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

FACTS:
The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the respondent, then Secretary of
DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial
logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rain forest. They further asserted that the rights of their
generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. Plaintiffs further
assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.


HELD:
The SC decided in the affirmative. Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard. Under Section
16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors assert
that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they
can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature”. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. This landmark
case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.














Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque

Facts: Named, as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent
since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency. Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative
powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk
Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breast milk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA
adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected,
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breast milk substitutes. In
1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument
provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure
that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On
May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR, which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.


Issue: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional?


Held: YES

Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members, in the same way that
conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the
WHO Constitution reads:

Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any
matter within the competence of the organization for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it
must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with
such rules.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method
applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The
provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented
by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.










Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his
right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by
limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or
are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most
qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for
the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national
organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation
of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles
and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no
plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate
as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is
to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of
legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that
can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent
impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by
the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have
not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure
that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the
practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in
preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous
enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would
actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to
constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the
electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless
sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the
factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence
is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on
whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.


Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified
compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2),
the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able
to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for
at least ten years immediately preceding such election.





























Grace Poe Vs. COMELEC

Facts:

In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from 24 May 2005.

May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that
however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968,
found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized
as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010,
before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to
satisfy the RA 9225 requirement. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological
parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she
is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her
COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency.
Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read Dissent)

Held:

No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and deciding
on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.

In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the election
contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President,
only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the
Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates
before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate
grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to
the intent of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace as
a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)

Held:

Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the
constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.

First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of
Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines
is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a
Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents’ nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it
is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to
accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is based on
the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language, which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence
and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the
framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the
general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it
adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is
found.

Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Held:

Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new
domicile.

Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her application
under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree that an alien’s stay in the
country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is
without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.

Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC

Held:

No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and
residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide
upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided
by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false
representations regarding her qualifications.

In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.


Mercado v. Manzano

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation
was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he
was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was
reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and
registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other
country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate
of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country;
that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and
that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that
he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part
in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.



























APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR, vs. VICENTE D. CHING

Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of a chinese citizen and Filipino mother, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La
Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Vicente has resided in the Philippines. Vicente, after completing his LLB
course from St. Louis University in Baguio, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution
of this Court, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the
Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. Ching submitted the following documents:
1. CPA License issued by the PRC;
2. Voter Certification he is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification that he was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 1992
elections.
The results Bar Examinations were released and Vicente was one of the successful Bar examinees. Because of the
questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. The Court required him to submit
further proof of his citizenship and the required the OSG to file a comment on the petition and the documents
submitted. The OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it
would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar
circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the
construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. Vicente filed a
manifestation that he has already elected Philippine citizenship.

Issue:
Whether or not a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the
question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:
The Court held Vincente was already 35 years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 or
over 14 years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching
the age of majority," Vicente's election was clearly beyond the allowable period within which to exercise the
privilege. The special circumstances invoked by Vicente cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. Vicente failed to
validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of 14 years that lapsed is clearly way beyond the contemplation of
the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry. Vicente's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed
when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, Vicente slept on
his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.







Valles Vs. Comelec

FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In
1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a
Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In
the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on
the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino


HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus
soli, which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what
served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed
the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also
known as the Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and
resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father,
Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which
were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently
retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a
Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to
her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent
can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.










Bengzon Vs. HRET

FACTS:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27,
1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.

However, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship
for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."

Respondent Cruz then reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630
entitled as “An Act Providing For Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship By Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States.” He ran for and was
elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a
convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.

HELD:
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship as provided under Section 1 of R.A.
No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Therefore, Cruz has all the qualifications to be elected as a member of the House of Representatives. The HRET
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, thus the petition was dismissed.






Moya lim yao Vs. Comm. of immigration

Facts:

On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March
1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among
others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25
January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for
injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer
for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage
to a Filipino citizen.

Held:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of
the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino
cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial
or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.














Frivaldo Vs. COMELEC


Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October 27,
1988, respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of petitioner’s election and proclamation
on the ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the
day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor.

Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was
not “impressed with voluntariness.” His oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient
act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of
American citizenship under the laws of the US, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself
after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office in the Philippines.
His election did not cure of this defect because the electorate could not amend the Constitution, the Local
Government Code and the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office.

Held: No. First, petitioner’s loss of his naturalized American citizenship did not and could not have the effect of
automatic restoration of his Philippine citizenship.

Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a natural born Filipino citizen, is not a
sufficient act of repatriation.

Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.





















Tecson Vs. Comelec

FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy on 31
December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place
of birth to be Manila.

Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of candidacy by
claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able
to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as
viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of
private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San
Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death.
Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have
been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt
that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born
on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines
those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.