CASES IN CIVIL LAW 1 --Atty.
Judy Lardizabal
Researcher: Ely T. Tolentino, cpa
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CIVIL LAW CASES –ATTY JUDY
LARDIZABAL
Researcher : Ely T. Tolentino, cpa
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CASE NO 01 DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE FILED BY HEIRS AFTER DECEDENT’S
DEATH.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad
Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL,
ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter
or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage
was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner's successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit,
their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs'
deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the
validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to
their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed
the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47
of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court
grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance
with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the
basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the
petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under
Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon
motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal
and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the
law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of
the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to
Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage
license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which
the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from
the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family
as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
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union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but
a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in
such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of
public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise
to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that
"they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to
what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76
of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which
impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have
lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and
wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year
common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be
a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity —
meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5
years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law
would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge
of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the
local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to
the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to
the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall
note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in
the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages
by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage
was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or
more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are
considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage,
it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-
year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only
by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
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subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from
his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband
and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this
case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence
of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the
Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second
ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial
court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment
suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and
persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to
who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage
that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered
as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other
can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either,
in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no
legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in
Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article
51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's
father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him
and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds
from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that
was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed
at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake
of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances,
the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good
for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material,
either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is
not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into
a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based
only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if
the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
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SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
Footnotes
1
The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998
issued by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court
(RTC) — Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: "WHEREFORE,
premises considered, defendant's motion to dismiss is
hereby granted and this instant case is hereby ordered
dismissed without costs." (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).
2
Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.
3
Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.
4
Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.
5
Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).
6
Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be
solemnized unless all the requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent,
freely given;
(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.
7
Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following
marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character.
xxx xxx xxx
8
Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under
article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
9
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
10
Sec. 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA,
G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999; See alsoTuason v.
CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
11
Sec. 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.
12
Art. 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal or family life. . . .
13
Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).
14
Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license
shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
15
Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
16
Rollo, p. 29.
17
Art. 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, Family Code.
18
Art. 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years. . . .
Art. 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by
any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years. . ."
19
Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.
20
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed
by the following persons and within the periods indicated
herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the
party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her
consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-
one; or by the parent or guardian or person having legal
charge of the minor, at any time before such party has
reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the
sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity;
or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge
of the insane, at anytime before the death of either party, or
by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after
regaining sanity;
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(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the DECISION

injured party, within five years after the discovery of the
fraud; VELASCO, JR., J.:

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the
injured party, within five years from the time the force,
intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by
the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
21
Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998);
People v. Retirement Board, 272 III. App. 59 cited in I
Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.
22
In re Conza's Estate, 176 III. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal.
797, 167 Pac. 394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed.,
p. 271.
23
Art. 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.
24
Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v.
Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986); People v. Mendoza, 95
Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.
25
35 Am. Jur. 219-220.
26
18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.
27
Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47
(1997); Atienza v. Judge Brillantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312
Phil. 939 (1995).
28
Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).
29
Art. 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s.
1987 and further amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated February
23, 1998.
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CASE NO. 02 MARRIAGE CEREMONY
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the
Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay
City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner
Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of
Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and
raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a
marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title
1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the
annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that
Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite
on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing
officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of
this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he
met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they
were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in
Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992.
On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he
was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F.
Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived
with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going
to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his
stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He
further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to
apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided
in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage
license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage
contract wherein the marriage license number could be
found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C.
Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the
effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license
issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013 11 July 2003

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

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This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage
License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967
was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS
MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to
MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on
January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for
whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed
bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he
had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage
license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an
employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought
documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967,
which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan
on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for
marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July
11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying
that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and
that their office had not issued any other license of the same
serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and
presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez,
Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a
minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he
is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of
Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the
bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses
were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann
Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing
marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the
requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty.
Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the
actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared
by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it
was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and
Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the
marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor
of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother
of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a
certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple,
and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same
to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did
not know where the marriage license was obtained. 20 He
attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed
the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing
of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing
officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and
Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was
present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at
her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty.
Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage
license, and that a week before the marriage was to take
place, a male person went to their house with the application
for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person
went back to their house, showed her the marriage license
before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev.
Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she
did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and
that she was told that the marriage license was obtained
from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had
been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated
January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both
parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the
wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993;
(b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could
identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her
testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty.
Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband,
and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures
as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty.
Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to
be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house
and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and
after several days returned with an application for marriage
license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After
Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the
license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were
married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed,
born on June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against
Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage,
and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-
03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married
on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if
said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites,
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because the one who celebrated their marriage was
Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held
that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and
Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no
marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It
also took into account the fact that neither party was a
resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of
the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those
exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a
valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite,
the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was
void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between
the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was
acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of
the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar
General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to
cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7,
2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following
assignment of errors:
I Grounds in Support of Petition
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE
ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS
A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A
MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH
OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF
NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE
ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF
THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE
COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted
her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search
for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted,
and thus held that said certification could not be accorded
probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed
had been validly married and that there was compliance with
all the requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having
signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that
the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife,
and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed
a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order
dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between
Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on
09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1,
200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S
OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
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II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT
ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on
January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family
Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent
provisions that would apply to this particular case are
Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those
covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of
the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the
authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the
marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt
from the requirement of a valid marriage license under
Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this
case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license
had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid
marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there
was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage
license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage
contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove
the existence of said license. To prove that no such license
was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued
said license. It was there that he requested certification that
no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by
Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement
signed by an officer having the custody of an official record
or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry
of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain
no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the
Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents
to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of
the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by
the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued,
issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage
license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial
number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine
copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented,
which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the
names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the
certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words
"despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the
certification used stated that no marriage license appears to
have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted
and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
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To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular
case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court
that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the
Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which
merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be
located as the same did not appear in their records.
Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that
the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a
disputable presumption that an official duty has been
regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence
to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was
lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their
office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does
exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and
submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does
not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license
or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location
where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains
to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to
testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither
could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence
of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the
license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could
not even testify as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one
of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached
for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing
where the license came from. The task of applying for the
license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have
testified as to how the license was secured and thus
impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria
failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the
marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy
of the marriage license could have simply been secured from
that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that
there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of
Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license
was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The
case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to
discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It
cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the
marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent.
No marriage license was proven to have been issued to
Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support
its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To
quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial
and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been
validly married and there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally
capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even
issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The
parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted
that the signature above his name in the marriage contract
was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant
and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses
and other members of appellant’s family, taken during the
marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the
lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of
all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and
wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas,
who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than
ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition
appears to have been instituted by him only after an
Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003
was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent
marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura.
We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the
nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding
ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was
signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when
it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void
from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the
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same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized
as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.1âwphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to
Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure,
that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the
same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to
prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a
valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was
Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be
applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly
absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008
and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with
respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
ROBERTO A. ABAD
MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo
and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E.
Maambong and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.
2 contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
Penned by Judge Tingaraan U. Guiling.
33
Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local
Civil Registrar of the city or municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages
where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of
this Title.
51
Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are
at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized
without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain
valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives.
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that
there is no means of transportation to enable such party to
appear personally before the local civil registrar, the
marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage
license.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding
articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit
executed before the local civil registrar or any other person
legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was
performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either
party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that
there is no means of transportation to enable such party to
appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the
officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and
relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of
legal impediment to the marriage.
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last
preceding article, together with a legible copy of the
marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing
the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality
where it was performed within the period of thirty days after
the performance of the marriage.
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or
crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or
by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the
plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a
commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to
solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons
within the zone of military operation, whether members of
the armed forces or civilians.
Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the
ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without
the necessity of marriage licenses, provided they arc
solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or
practices.
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a
man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
marriage.
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CASE NO 03 ART 26 REMARRIAGE -FAMILY CODE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where
one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry,
can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine
law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the
Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife,
the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are
as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros
M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY
UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation.
The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized
alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her
to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law
pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to
remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that
the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8
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This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one
later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree,
and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties
are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his
capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for
judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the
validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was
the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into
law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to
govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems
to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried
an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the
Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those
whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-
marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of
divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered
to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose
that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as
in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife
became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained
a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of
a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
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to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of
the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit
and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within
the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case
must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the
proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie;
hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It
is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must
prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also
show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209,
as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow
a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the present petition
there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we
are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated
to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in
his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May
15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
.Footnotes
7
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.
8
Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3
September 2001, 364 SCRA 281, 286, citing Galarosa v.
Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA
729, 737.
9
Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.
10
No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
11
G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
12
Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1
February 1957, 100 Phil. 850, 855.
13
Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January
2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.
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14
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
SCRA 437, 447. court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

15
Id. at 451. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did
not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered
no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her
Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo0 financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested
that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
prayer to Gerbert’s.

CASE NO 04 CORPUZ V SANTO TOMAS In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
Republic of the Philippines party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
SUPREME COURT foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
Manila citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
THIRD DIVISION Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
vs.
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
GENERAL, Respondents.
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

DECISION Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
BRION, J.:
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the
to remarry under Philippine law.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the
of the Rules of Court (present petition).
legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was
who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on
enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments,
spouse."11
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned
to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
THE PETITION
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.
The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially
granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he,
The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the
2006.5 second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig
that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido
City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino
divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree

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possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he
marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two
marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support
Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases,
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights
after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and
the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the
spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse]
has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and
still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in
the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides
the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition
of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts
can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated
to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse
(other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other
words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse
can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a
right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights
in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that
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this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s
petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves
as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section
states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing,
the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for
the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another
action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are
not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a
copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation,
we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian
divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and
the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for
the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper;
hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar
to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry
in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and
status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
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A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign
one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must
be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of
Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall
keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in
which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of
name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in
the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of
the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing
the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority
of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength
alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of
the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a
final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the
civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of
the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the
foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation
of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated
in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38that the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings;39and that the time
and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as
one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not
be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry –
one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on
certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as
its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
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18
SO ORDERED. Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence
on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume One, with the
ARTURO D. BRION Family Code of the Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.
Associate Justice
19
Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.
WE CONCUR:
20
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

21
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

22
Footnotes Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.

23
* Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.
of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per
24
Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010. The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however,
depends on whether the foreign divorce decree capacitated
1
Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. the alien spouse to do so.
Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.
25
See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:
2
Id. at 3-20.
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
3
Id. at 27. status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
4
Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.
xxxx
5
Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts
6
Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, or property, and those which have for their object public
series of 1982, states: order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
It would therefore be premature to register the decree of determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
annulment in the Register of Annulment of Marriages in country.
Manila, unless and until final order of execution of such
foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court. 26
Parenthetically, we add that an alien’s legal capacity to
contract is evidenced by a certificate issued by his or her
7
Supra note 1. respective diplomatic and consular officials, which he or she
must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family
8
Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987. Code). The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however,
must still resort to a judicial action for a declaration of
9
Rollo, p. 31. authority to remarry.
10
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114. 27
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v.
Romillo, supra note 20.
11
Id. at 121.
28
Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.
12
Gerbert’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s October
30, 2008 decision was denied in an order dated February 17, 29
Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia
2009; rollo, p. 32. v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also Bayot v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA
13
Supra note 2. 472.
14
Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively. 30
Rollo, pp. 38-41.
15
The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 31
The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage
35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in relation to Article 52 of between Gerbert and Daisylyn was dissolved by the
the Family Code. Canadian court. The full text of the court’s judgment was not
included.
16
The voidable marriages are those enumerated under
Article 45 of the Family Code. 32
Literally means "a thing adjudged," Black’s Law Dictionary
(5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule that a final judgment
17
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction
SCRA 437, 452. is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all

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later suits, on points and matters determined in the
former. Supra note 28 at 462.
33
See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110,
where the Court said:
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign
judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed
to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel
them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary
for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for
enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is
that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in
order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is
because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to
proof to the contrary.
34
On the face of the marriage certificate, the word
"DIVORCED" was written in big, bold letters; rollo, p. 37.
35
Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007,
537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil.
114 (1964).
36
Rollo, pp. 47-50.
37
Id. at 51.
38
Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
39
Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
40
Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
41
When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e.,
the civil status of a person), a Rule 108 proceeding is
deemed adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil Register of
Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA
420, 430.
Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo0
Republic v Marelyn Tanedo-Manalo April 24, 2018
CASE NO 05 THIS IS A NOVEL CASE ON THE
APPLICATION OF PAR 2, ART 26, FAMILY CODE
WHICH ALLOWS A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO REMARRY IN
THE PHILIPPINES AS AN EXCEPTION TO ART. 15,
CIVIL CODE PROVIDED IT IS THE ALIEN SPOUSE WHO
INITIATED THE DIVORCE ABROAD. BUT IN THIS
CASE, IT IS THE FILIPINO SPOUSE WHO OBTAINED A
VALID DIVORCE AGAINST AN ALIEN HUSBAND
ABROAD ( JAPAN ) .
SC ruled that the Philippine Courts could not take
judicial notice on the Law of Japan particularly on its
Persons and Family Relations law nor apply the
processual presumption dogma (that foreign laws are
presumed to be the same as Philippine laws) as Art
53 requires delivery of presumptive legitimes to the
children of the spouses concerned as well as the
division of property before the dissolution of their
marriage.
In sum, the SC ruled that a Filipino Spouse who
obtained a valid divorce abroad against an alien
spouse could now remarry and could validly petition
the cancellation of entries in the Civil Registry of the
record of the said marriage pursuant to Rule 109,
ROC, provided that the Filipino Spouse could validly
prove that the foreign national law on Persons and
Family Relations of the alien spouse allows the same
effect as Philippine laws particularly in compliance
with delivery of presumptive legitimes of children if
there be any under Article 53, FC and the division of
property between the said spouses.
Hence, the said petition was partially granted as to the
propriety of remarriage of a Filipino spouse who
initiated the issuance of divorce decree abroad provided
there is proof of sameness of a foreign law on
Philippine Persons and Family Relations law. Hence, it
was for that latter reason that the said petition was
REMANDED to the CA for further proceedings to prove
that Japanese law follows Philippine law on Persons
and family relations. J. PERALTA, PONENTE.
See also the DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE
CAGUIOA
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CASE NO 05-A VAN DORN V ROMILLO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice
Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No.
1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of
the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in
the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4,
1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against
petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that
private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and
petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this
certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety
of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a
grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the
lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it
devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to
exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be
useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case
within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the
parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying
claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before
the American Court that they had no community of property;
that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree
issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to
determine whether the property relations between petitioner
and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had
obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained
jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address
as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt
Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility
in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in
the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of
KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to
represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to
file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things
necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated
by the Court.
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3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent
by the court. Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
Without costs.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree SO ORDERED.
is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
Footnotes
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are 1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People,
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same 114 SCRA 348 (1982).
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which 2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in 3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce 4 p. 98, Rollo.
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme
Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
794, 799:
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond
6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil
of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga, Private International
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."
tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of
Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo0
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no

CASE NO 5-B DACASIN V DACASIN ENFORCEMENT
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
OF POST FOREIGN DIVORCE AGREEMENT
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Republic of the Philippines
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
SUPREME COURT
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
Manila
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal SECOND DIVISION
property.
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner,
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under vs.
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private DECISION
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should CARPIO, J.:
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served. The Case

For review1 is a dismissal2 of a suit to enforce a post-foreign

divorce child custody agreement for lack of jurisdiction.

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The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and
respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent),
Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one
daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June
1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit
Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois
court) a divorce decree against petitioner.3 In its ruling, the
Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and
respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of
Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in
Manila a contract (Agreement4 ) for the joint custody of
Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive
forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement.
Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an
order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the
Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the
Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over
Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for,
among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois
court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained
respondent’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from
taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois
court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree,
including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to
respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner
following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this
jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening
Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code6 prohibiting
compromise agreements on jurisdiction.7
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument
that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void.
Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied
reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of
respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under
the laws of his nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the
validity of the Agreement to justify its enforcement by the trial
court: (1) the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree,
modifying the terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to
joint;8 or (2) the Agreement is independent of the divorce
decree obtained by respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on
the joint custody of the parties’ child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but
not to enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual
and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of
petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle
the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time
petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on
Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.9 An action for
specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the
Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of
actions.10 Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right
court.
Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit
was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its
thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of
jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois
court retained was "jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of
enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its]
Judgment for Dissolution."11 Petitioner’s suit seeks the
enforcement not of the "various provisions" of the divorce
decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child
custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois
court’s so-called "retained jurisdiction."
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce
the Agreement which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate
the terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban on
stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.12 Otherwise, the contract is denied
legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the
beginning."13 For lack of relevant stipulation in the
Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive
law serve as default parameters to test the validity of the
Agreement’s joint child custody stipulations.14
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28
January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was
under seven years old (having been born on 21 September
1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no longer
married under the laws of the United States because of the
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divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody
for spouses separated in fact or in law15 (under the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also
undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother x x x."16 (This statutory awarding
of sole parental custody17 to the mother is
mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy
consideration,19subject only to a narrow exception not
alleged to obtain here.20 ) Clearly then, the Agreement’s
object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime
between respondent and petitioner over their child under
seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to
law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she
refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement
would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated
because the law provides for joint parental authority when
spouses live together.21 However, upon separation of the
spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the
child is below seven years old and any agreement to the
contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody
regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or
divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age
bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides
for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care
of the child and that is to give custody to the separated
mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away
the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of
children below seven years anymore than they can privately
agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually
drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable
disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as
these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the
application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under
the second paragraph of Article 213.22
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article
213 of the Family Code applies only to judicial custodial
agreements based on its text that "No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit
this provision’s enforceability to court sanctioned
agreements while placing private agreements beyond its
reach is to sanction a double standard in custody regulation
of children under seven years old of separated parents. This
effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple
expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative
policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her
children under seven years of age "to avoid a tragedy where
a mother has seen her baby torn away from her." 23 This
ignores the legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the
deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age."24
It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one
separated parent (mother) over the other (father)
encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint
parental custody, robs the parents of custodial options, or
hijacks decision-making between the separated
parents.25 However, these are objections which question the
law’s wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The
forum to air and remedy these grievances is the legislature,
not this Court. At any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness or
undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the
separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the
father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements
are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody
under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely
grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody
of the minor under seven years of age, in case of
disagreements.1avvphi1
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second
paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only
until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the
child’s emancipation, the law gives the separated parents
freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree
on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even
supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from
entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of
Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by
asserting sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent’s act
effectively brought the parties back to ambit of the default
custodial regime in the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of
Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged
invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or
that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the
divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse26 - to support the
Agreement’s enforceability. The argument that foreigners in
this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo27 settled the matter by
holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a
divorce decree obtained abroad.28 There, we dismissed the
alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of alleged
post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission
that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is
not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree
is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
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xxxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss
criminal complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee
(who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former
Filipino spouse because he no longer qualified as "offended
spouse" entitled to file the complaints under Philippine
procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a
foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the
alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction
of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the
divorce.
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding
Justify Remand
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the
logical end to its lack of cause of action, we remand the case
for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanie’s
custody. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus
removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory
maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it
within coverage of the default standard on child custody
proceedings – the best interest of the child.30 As the question
of custody is already before the trial court and the child’s
parents, by executing the Agreement, initially showed
inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift and
efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take
advantage of the court’s jurisdiction, submit evidence on the
custodial arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and
let the trial court render judgment. This disposition is
consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody
proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child’s best
interest.31
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March
2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Footnotes
1
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
In the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005
issued by the Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60.
3
Petitioner did not contest the proceedings.
4
Denominated "Compromise Agreement on Child Custody
and Support."
5
Under Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides: "Laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad."
6
This provides: "No compromise upon the following
questions shall be valid: x x x (5) The jurisdiction of courts[.]"
7
The trial court held (Records, pp. 157-158):
[H]aving expressly recognized the validity of the Illinois
Court’s judgment [petitioner] is bound by its provisions
including the provision that the Court would maintain sole
jurisdiction to implement and enforce the provisions of the
said judgment which necessarily included guidelines for the
child’s custody.
[Petitioner] being admittedly an American, following the
nationality rule which Philippine civil laws adhere to, the
Judgment of the Illinois Court would be binding upon him
since the judicial disposition refers to matters of status or
legal capacity of a person.
xxxx
Moreover, this Court cannot act upon [petitioner’s] prayer to
enforce the terms of the said Compromise Agreement the
said agreement being invalid and therefore, void, precisely
because it seeks to transfer jurisdiction over the issue of
child custody from the Illinois Court to this Court by
agreement of the parties, when the previous Court had
already effectively asserted its authority to act upon all
matters relating to the said issue.
In this regard, Art. 2035 of the Civil Code expressly states
that no compromise upon the questions of civil status of
persons, validity of marriage, or legal separation, future
support, jurisdiction of courts and future legitimate shall be
valid.
8
As a corollary claim, petitioner submits that the stipulation
in the Agreement "vesting" exclusive jurisdiction to Philippine
courts over conflicts arising from the Agreement, even if void
for being contrary to Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil
Code, is severable from and does not affect the validity of
the other terms of the Agreement on joint custody.
9
Section 19, paragraph 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides: "Jurisdiction
in civil cases.- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; x x x x"
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10
See Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v. Herrera,
205 Phil. 61 (1983).
11
Records, p. 17 (emphasis supplied).
12
Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides: "The contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy."
13
Article 1409, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code provides: "The
following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning: (1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy; x x x x"
14
It can be inferred from the terms of the Agreement that the
parties intended to be bound by Philippine law on its intrinsic
validity (this is evident, for instance, from the stipulation
selecting Philippine courts as exclusive forum to settle "any
legal issue or dispute that may arise from the provisions of
[the] Agreement and its interpretation x x x" (Records, p. 19;
emphasis supplied). At any rate, Philippine law has the most
substantial connection to the contract, considering its object
(custody of a Filipino-American child), subject (Filipino-
American child under seven years of age, born of a Filipino
mother, both of whom reside in the country) and parties
(Filipina mother and alien father).
15
Including those marriages whose vinculum has been
severed (see Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the Family Code of
the Philippines 67-68 [1988]).
16
The provision states: "In case of separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account
all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise." (Emphasis supplied)
17
Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals (Res.), G.R. No.
174485, 11 July 2007, 527 SCRA 320 (reversing the Court
of Appeals’ ruling mandating joint custody and awarding sole
custody to the mother).
18
Perez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1014 (1996). For
children over seven, custody decisions are guided by the
standard of "best interest of the child."
19
Our discussion in Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V, G.R.
No. 154994, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA 450, 471-472, on the
statutory genealogy and policy grounding of the second
paragraph of Article 213 is enlightening:
[A]rticle 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount.
No mother shall be separated from her child under seven
years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for
such measure.
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall
not be separated from their mother finds its raison d’etre in
the basic need of minor children for their mother’s loving
care. In explaining the rationale for Article 363 of the Civil
Code, the Code Commission stressed thus:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy
where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No
man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is
deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed
by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of
the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s
heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of
adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative)
divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for
her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect
upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the
situation. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 12)
20
Sole maternal custody is denied only for "compelling
reasons" such as "neglect, abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a
communicable disease" (Id. at 476; internal citation omitted).
21
Civil Code, Article 211, as amended.
22
See note 20.
23
See note 19.
24
Id.
25
This line of argument can be subsumed under the rubric of
"unfair state intervention" but this complaint can very well be
leveled against the entire field of family law where the state
injects itself on a host of areas impinging on the decision-
making capacity and autonomy of individuals ranging from
the intensely personal (e.g. who can marry [Article 5, Family
Code], where to marry [Article 5, Family Code], who can
celebrate the marriage [Article 5, Family Code], and how to
relate to one’s spouse [Articles 68-72]) to proprietary (e.g.
Articles 74-125, Family Code, on property relations of
spouses and Articles 194-208, Family Code, on support) to
familial (e.g. Articles 209-233, Family Code, on parental
authority).1avvph!1
26
Petitioner hooks his argument on Gonzales v. Gonzales
(58 Phil. 67 [1933]), Arca v. Javier (95 Phil. 579 [1954]) and
Tenchavez v. Escaño (122 Phil. 752 [1965]). These cases,
involving Filipino spouses, merely applied the "nationality
rule" (now embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code) to reject
validating foreign divorce decrees obtained by Filipino
spouses to circumvent the no-divorce rule in this jurisdiction.
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They are no authority to support petitioner’s submission that
as to aliens, foreign divorce decrees are void here.
27
223 Phil. 357 (1985).
28
Id. at 361-363.Van Dornspawned the second paragraph of
Article 26 granting to Filipino spouses of aliens who obtain
foreign divorce decrees the right to remarry. (Republic v.
Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005, 472 SCRA
114).
29
G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
30
Bagtas v. Santos, G.R. No. 166682, 27 November 2009.
31
Thus, in habeas corpus proceedings involving child
custody, judicial resolutions extend beyond the custodial
right of persons exercising parental authority over the child
and reach issues on custodial arrangements serving the
child’s best interest (see Bagtas v. Santos, id., remanding a
habeas corpus petition to determine the fitness of the legal
custodians notwithstanding that the question of illegal
withholding of custody has been mooted by the transfer of
the child’s physical custody to the habeas corpus
petitioners).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SEPARATE OPINION
ABAD, J.:
I agree with the reasons that the majority of the Court gave
in support of the decision, except one. I am uncomfortable
with the proposition that an agreement between the mother
and the father on a joint custody over a child below seven
years of age is void for being contrary to law and public
policy. True, the law provides in Article 363 of the Civil Code
that "No mother shall be separated from her child under
seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure." The State can think up ways of
protecting the child. But the 1987 Constitution acknowledges
in Article II, Section 12, the natural and primary right and
duty of parents to nurture their children and that the State
must support them in this respect.1
I submit that, in the matter of child custody, the mutual will of
the child’s parents takes precedence in the absence of
circumstances that justify recourse to the law. The law
becomes relevant, only as a default, if a separated couple
cannot agree on the custody of their child. The law should
not supplant parental discretion or unnecessarily infringe on
parental authority.
Parents have a natural and fundamental right to autonomy in
the care, custody, and upbringing of their children. The
Family Code recognizes this in Article 209:
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents
over the person and property of their unemancipated
children, parental authority and responsibility shall include
the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being. (n)
The State ought not to interfere with the right of parents to
bring up their child unless its exercise causes potential harm
to him. The State steps in, through the law, only if there are
compelling reasons to do so. State intrusion is uncalled for
where the welfare of a child is not jeopardized.
Regardless of marital circumstances, the mother and the
father are presumed to be fit and competent to act in the
best interest of their child. They can agree to share parental
authority or, if you will, parental custody even as they decide
to live under separate roofs. In a voluntary joint custody the
mother might want to keep the child in her home during
schooldays but allow the father to have him on weekends.
And they could agree on some device for arriving at a
consensus on where the child will study and how his spiritual
needs are to be attended to.
The law does not take away from a separating couple the
authority and competence to determine what is best for their
child. If they resolve on their own that shared parental
custody is in their child’s best interest, then the law and the
courts have no business vetoing their decision. The parents
enjoy a primary right to make such decision. I cannot
concede that, where the child is below seven years of age,
any agreement that diminishes the mother’s absolute
custody over him is void.
The second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
should not be read as prohibiting separated couples from
agreeing to a custody arrangement, other than sole maternal
custody, for their child of tender age. The statutory
preference for the mother’s custody comes into play only
when courts are compelled to resolve custody fights
between separated parents. Where the parents settle the
matter out of court by mutual agreement, the statutory
preference reserved to the mother should not apply.
A reading of the entire text of Article 213 shows that the
second paragraph applies only to custody disputes that have
reached the courtroom. Thus:
Article 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.
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It is unmistakable that the legislative policy is to vest the
separated mother with physical custody of the child under
seven years old, in cases where the courts are called upon
to designate a parent for the exercise of parental authority.
The second sentence of the first paragraph and the second
paragraph itself merely qualify the general rule expressed in
the first sentence that "parental authority shall be exercised
by the parent designated by the Court," in case of parental
separation.
In choosing the parent who will exercise parental authority,
the court must take into account all relevant considerations.
One of these is the child’s age, as the court is directed to
give due regard to the child’s choice, if the child is more than
seven years of age. If the child, however, is below seven
years of age, the court cannot separate the child from the
mother, except for compelling reasons. This is the import of
the entire provision.
Thus, no legislative policy is violated if separated parents are
allowed to voluntarily agree to a child custody arrangement
other than sole maternal custody. It is not the policy of the
state to prohibit separated parents from compromising on
child custody even if the child is of tender age. On the
contrary, voluntary custody agreements are generally
favored as it can only work for the best interest of the child.
It is not logical to say that the Court would be subverting the
legislative policy of avoiding "a tragedy where a mother has
seen her baby torn away from her" if separated parents are
allowed to enter into a joint custody agreement. It can hardly
be said that a child is being "torn away" from the mother, if
the mother sees the wisdom and benefit of sharing custody
of the child with the father. The voluntary nature of the
agreement negates any "deep sorrow" or sense of
deprivation that the mother may experience on account of
her separation from the child.
Consequently, if separated parents mutually stipulate to
uphold some form of joint authority over their children of
tender age, it cannot in any way be regarded as illegal or
contrary to public policy. Joint parental authority and custody
is the norm and should be viewed as the more desirable
custody arrangement. It encourages continuing contact with
and involvement of both parents in the lives of their children.
It can only redound to the minor’s greater well-being and
should thus be favored.
To declare that a joint custody agreement over minors of
tender age contravenes Philippine laws will only discourage
separating couples from sharing parental duties and
responsibilities. It will render shared parenthood illegal and
unduly promote paternal alienation. It also presumes that
separated parents cannot cooperate and compromise for the
welfare of their children. It constitutes undue interference in
the parents’ intrinsic right to direct their relations with their
child.
A joint custody agreement can of course never be regarded
as permanent and unbending. The situations of the mother
or the father and even of the child can change and render
performance of such agreement no longer in the latter’s best
interest. If the parents disagree on what they think is best for
the child, recourse to the Court may be inevitable. But I
suggest that the parent who wants the joint custody
agreement changed or set aside bears the burden of
showing to the court the new situations of the parties and
how such arrangement have become unfavorable or
detrimental to the child under the circumstances. This is a
consequence of the presumption that contracts that are valid
remain valid unless shown otherwise.
Here, the agreement between petitioner Herald and his
estranged wife providing for joint custody of their then six-
year-old child is a valid exercise of parental discretion and
authority. It is independent of the foreign divorce decree and
may be enforced or repudiated in this jurisdiction, since its
object is the custody of a Filipino-American minor residing in
the Philippines. Although Herald’s complaint before the trial
court appears to be one for specific performance, it is, at
heart, an action for custody and enforcement of parental
rights. Being so, the Regional Trial Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over the action.
I concur in the decision subject to my above reservations.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Article II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government.
Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
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CASE NO 07 NAVALES V. NAVALES ART 36 FC
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167523 June 27, 2008
NILDA V. NAVALES, petitioner,
vs.
REYNALDO NAVALES, respondent.*
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DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16,
2005 which affirmed the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-
799 dated January 2, 2002, declaring the nullity of the
marriage of Reynaldo and Nilda Navales on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The facts are as follows:
Reynaldo Navales (Reynaldo) and Nilda Navales (Nilda) met
in 1986 in a local bar where Nilda worked as a waitress. The
two became lovers and Nilda quit her job, managed a
boarding house owned by her uncle and studied Health Aide
financed by Reynaldo. Upon learning that Nilda's uncle was
prodding her to marry an American, Reynaldo, not wanting
to lose her, asked her to marry him. This, despite his
knowledge that Nilda was writing her penpals and was
asking money from them and that she had an illegitimate son
by a man whose identity she did not reveal to him. 3 The two
got married on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal
Trial Court Judge of San Fernando, Cebu.4
Reynaldo claims that during the first year of their marriage,
their relationship went well. Problems arose, however, when
Nilda started selling RTWs and cosmetics, since she could
no longer take care of him and attend to household
chores.5 Things worsened when she started working as an
aerobics instructor at the YMCA, where, according to
Reynaldo, Nilda's flirtatiousness and promiscuity recurred.
She wore tight-fitting outfits, allowed male clients to touch
her body, and introduced herself as single. Reynaldo
received phone calls from different men looking for Nilda.
There was also a time when Nilda chose to ride with another
man instead of Reynaldo; and another when Nilda went
home late, riding in the car of the man who kissed her.
Reynaldo also claims that Nilda refused to have a child with
him, as it would destroy her figure.6 On June 18, 1992,
Reynaldo left Nilda and never reconciled with her again.7
On August 30, 1999, Reynaldo filed a Petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and Damages
before the RTC, Toledo City, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case
No. T-799 claiming that his marriage with Nilda did not cure
Nilda's flirtatiousness and sexual promiscuity, and that her
behavior indicates her lack of understanding and
appreciation of the meaning of marriage, rendering the same
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.8
Reynaldo testified in support of his petition and presented
telephone directories showing that Nilda used her maiden
name "Bacon" instead of "Navales."9 Reynaldo also
presented Josefino Ramos, who testified that he was with
Reynaldo when Reynaldo first met Nilda at the bar called
"Appetizer," and that he (Ramos) himself was attracted to
Nilda since she was sexy, beautiful, and jolly to talk
with.10 Reynaldo also presented Violeta Abales, his cousin,
who testified that she was a vendor at the YMCA where
Nilda worked and was known by her maiden name; that she
knows Nilda is sexy and wears tight fitting clothes; that her
companions are mostly males and she flirts with them; and
that there was one time that Reynaldo fetched Nilda at
YMCA but Nilda went with another man, which angered
Reynaldo.11
Finally, Reynaldo presented Leticia Vatanagul, a Clinical
Psychologist and Social Worker who drafted a Psychological
Assessment of Marriage dated March 28, 2001.12 In said
Assessment, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a
nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a social
deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social
personality disorder, among others, which illnesses are
incurable and are the causes of Nilda’s psychological
incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to Reynaldo.13
Nilda, for her part, claims that Reynaldo knew that she had a
child before she met him, yet Reynaldo continued courting
her; thus, their eventual marriage.14 She claims that it was
actually Reynaldo who was linked with several women, who
went home very late, kept his earnings for himself, and
subjected her to physical harm whenever she called his
attention to his vices. She worked at the YMCA to cope with
the needs of life, and she taught only female students.
Reynaldo abandoned her for other women, the latest of
whom was Liberty Lim whom she charged, together with
Reynaldo, with concubinage.15 Nilda presented a certification
from the YMCA dated October 17, 2001 stating that she was
an aerobics instructress for a program that was exclusively
for ladies,16 as well as a statement of accounts from PLDT
showing that she used her married name, Nilda B.
Navales.17
On January 2, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in the above-entitled case declaring defendant
Nilda B. Navales as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
her marital obligations with plaintiff Reynaldo V. Navales and
further declaring their marriage contracted on December 29,
1988, before the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of San Fernando, Cebu, as null and void.18
The RTC held that:
x x x From the testimonies and evidences x x x adduced, it
was clearly established that the defendant had no full
understanding of [the] effects of marriage and had no
appreciation of [the] consequences of marriage as shown by
her x x x act of concealing her marital status by using her
maiden name "Nilda T. Bacon", augmenting her pretense of
being still single through the telephone directories; by her
refusal to accompany with [sic] her husband despite of the
latter's insistence, but rather opted to ride other man's jeep,
whose name her husband did not even know; by her act of
allowing a man other than her husband to touch her legs
even in her husband's presence; by allowing another man to
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kiss her even in the full view of her husband; by preferring to
loss [sic] her husband rather than losing her job as aerobic
instructress and on top of all, by refusing to bear a child
fathered by her husband because it will destroy her figure, is
a clear indication of the herein defendant's psychological
incapacity.19
Nilda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC
denied on April 10, 2002.20
The CA dismissed Nilda’s appeal, ruling that the RTC
correctly held that Nilda concealed her marital status, as
shown by the telephone listings in which Nilda used her
maiden name; that nymphomania, the condition which the
expert said Nilda was afflicted with, was a ground for
psychological incapacity; and that the RTC correctly gave
weight to the four pieces of testimonial evidence presented
by Reynaldo vis-a-vis the lone testimony of Nilda.21
Nilda now comes before the Court alleging that:
I Court; that only questions of law may be raised before this
The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated to comply
[with] her marital obligations as a wife.
II
Psychological incapacity, if ever existing, of the wife is NOT
PERMAMENT or INCURABLE and was NEVER EXISTING
AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE.
III
The petitioner is not a nymphomaniac.
IV
The effort of herein petitioner into the case shows that she is
consciously and nobly preserving and continue to believe
that marriage is inviolable rather [sic].
V
The guidelines of Molina case in the application of Article 36
of the New Family Code has not been strictly complied
with.22
Nilda claims that she did not fail in her duty to observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity; that she never had any illicit
relationship with any man; that no case for inchastity was
initiated by Reynaldo against her, and that it was actually
Reynaldo who had a pending case for concubinage.23 She
questions the lower courts’ finding that she is a
nymphomaniac, since she was never interviewed by the
expert witness to verify the truth of Reynaldo's allegations.
There is also not a single evidence to show that she had
sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband while
they were still living together.24
Nilda also avers that the guidelines in Republic of the
Phillippines. v. Molina25 were not complied with. The RTC
resolved the doubt on her motive for using her maiden name
in the telephone directory in favor of the dissolution of the
marriage instead of its preservation. The expert opinion was
given weight, even though it was baseless to establish that
petitioner had psychological incapacity to comply with her
marital obligations as a wife; and that, assuming that such
incapacity existed, it was already existing at the time of the
marriage; and that such incapacity was incurable and grave
enough to bring about the disability of the wife to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.26
Reynaldo, for his part, argues that while the petition is
captioned as one under Rule 45, it is actually a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, since it impleads the CA as
respondent and alleges that the CA acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. 27 Reynaldo
also claims that the issues raised by Nilda necessarily
require a review of the factual findings of the lower courts,
which matters have already been decided and passed upon,
and factual findings of the courts a quo are binding on this
Court; that the RTC, in reaching its decision, complied with
the requirements of Molina; that the Solicitor General was
represented by the City Prosecutor of Toledo City; and that
Reynaldo discharged the burden of proof to show the nullity
of his marriage to Nilda.
Reynaldo further averred that he testified on his behalf;
presented corroborating witnesses, one of whom is an
expert clinical psychologist, as well as documentary
evidence in support of his cause of action; that Molina did
not require that the psychologist examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated; that Nilda did not
rebut the psychologist's findings and did not present her own
expert to disprove the findings of Vatanagul; that Nilda's
psychological incapacity, caused by nymphomania, was duly
proven to have been existing prior to and at the time of her
marriage to Reynaldo and to have become manifest during
her marriage, based on the testimonies of Reynaldo and his
witnesses; and that such incapacity was proven to be
incurable, as shown by the report of Vatanagul.28
Nilda filed a Reply, and both parties filed their respective
memoranda reiterating their arguments.29
Simply stated, the issue posed before the Court is whether
the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on
the ground of Nilda's psychological incapacity.
The answer, contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA,
is in the negative.
Preliminarily, let it be stressed that it is the policy of our
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution, and marriage as the
foundation of the family.30 The Constitution decrees marriage
as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties.31 The Family Code under Article
4832therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned, in cases of annulment or
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declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to appear on
behalf of the State in order to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Indeed, only the active
participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declarations of nullity of marriage by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication
or suppression of evidence.33
While the guidelines in Molina requiring the OSG to issue a
certification on whether or not it is agreeing or objecting to
the petition for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,34 still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and
active participation of the State through the fiscal or the
prosecuting attorney.35
In this case, contrary to the assertion of the RTC that the
OSG actively participated in the case through the Office of
the City Prosecutor, records show that the State's
participation consists only of the Report dated November 29,
1999 by Assistant City Prosecutor Gabriel L. Trocio, Jr.
stating that no collusion exists between the parties; 36 the
OSG's Opposition to the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage dated June 2, 2000;37 and the cross-examination
conducted by Prosecutor Trocio on Reynaldo38 and his
witness Abales.39 There were no other pleadings, motions, or
position papers filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG; and
no controverting evidence presented by them before the
judgment was rendered. Considering the interest sought to
be protected by the aforestated rules, the Court finds the
State's participation in this case to be wanting.40
But even on the merits, the Court finds that the totality of
evidence presented by Reynaldo, contrary to its appreciation
by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to sustain a finding
that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated.
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by
the CA, are binding on this Court. Such principle however is
not absolute, such as when the findings of the appellate
court go beyond the issues of the case; run contrary to the
admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of
facts.41 Such is the case at bar.
Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 3642 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that is
so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.43
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,44 the Court held that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.45 In Republic of the Philippines v. Molina,46 the
Court further set forth guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. x x x
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological --- not
physical, although its manifestation and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known that
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's". The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
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6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x.47
In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to establish
that Nilda was a flirt before the marriage, which
flirtatiousness recurred when she started working as an
aerobics instructress. The instances alleged by
Reynaldo, i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to ride home
with another man instead of him, that he saw Nilda being
kissed by another man while in a car, and that Nilda allowed
other men to touch her body, if true, would understandably
hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts by themselves are
insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that
is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36
of the Family Code.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations.48 Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of
the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.49 Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not
by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule.50
As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda was not all
that bad; in fact, it went well in the first year of their marriage.
As in other cases, an admission of a good and harmonious
relationship during the early part of the marriage weakens
the assertion of psychological defect existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage which deprived the party of
the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities.51
In determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36, the same must be read in conjunction with,
although to be taken as distinct from, Articles
35,52 37,53 3854 and 4155of the Family Code that would
likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage
void ab initio; or Article 45 that would make the marriage
merely voidable; or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation.56 These various circumstances are not
applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on
the matter.57 Indeed, Article 36 should not be equated with
legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like.58
Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which Nilda
used her maiden name "Bacon" to prove that Nilda
represented herself as single. As noted by the CA, however,
the telephone listings presented by Reynaldo were for the
years 1993 to 1995,59 after Reynaldo admittedly left Nilda on
June 18, 1992. Apart from Reynaldo and Abalales's
testimony, therefore, Reynaldo has no proof that Nilda
represented herself as single while they were still living
together. The Court cannot agree with the RTC, therefore,
that said telephone listings show that Nilda represented
herself to be single, which in turn manifests her lack of
understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Reynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul to
bolster his claim that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated.
While it is true that the Court relies heavily on psychological
experts for its understanding of the human personality, 60 and
that there is no requirement that the defendant spouse be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist before
the nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
may be declared,61 still, the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its
incapacitating nature fully explained,62 and said incapacity
established by the totality of the evidence presented during
trial.63
The Court finds that the psychological report presented in
this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's psychological
incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a
nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a
borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are
incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife,
has a very weak conscience or superego, emotionally
immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her
infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from
anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social
norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggresive,
irresponsible and vain.64 She further defined "nymphomia" as
a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor
behavior as shown by her sexual relationship with various
men other than her husband.65
The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men
Nilda had sexual relationship with or the circumstances
surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not
even a single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit
relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagul
claims, during her testimony, that in coming out with the
report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo but also Jojo
Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-
law and sister, respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain
Susan.66 Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of
these persons, which information were supplied by whom,
and how they came upon their respective informations.
Indeed, the conclusions drawn by the report are vague,
sweeping and lack sufficient factual bases. As the report
lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause of Nilda's
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4
psychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that Id.; records, p. 249.
5
there was a "natal or supervening disabling factor" or an Records, p. 364 (RTC Decision).
6
"adverse integral element" in Nilda's character that Rollo, pp. 29-30 (CA Decision).
7
effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby Records, p. 364 (RTC Decision).
8
complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that her Records, pp. 1, 3.
9
psychological or mental malady existed even before the Exhibit "B", machine copy of page 13 of the telephone
marriage.67 Hence, the Court cannot give weight to said directory for the year 1993-1994, records, p. 250; Exhibit
assessment. "C", machine copy of page 15 of the telephone directory for
the year 1994-1995, id. at 251.
The standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency 10
TSN, October 17, 2000, pp. 6-8; records, pp. 520-522.
of psychological reports may be deemed very strict, but that 11
TSN, February 12, 2001, pp. 6-9; id. at 510-513.
is only proper in view of the principle that any doubt should 12
TSN, March 28, 2001, pp. 2, 8; id. at 475, 254-263.
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the 13
Id. at 260-263.
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.68 14
Id. at 13.
15
Records, pp. 12-13; see also rollo, p. 30 (CA Decision).
Reynaldo also claims that Nilda does not want to get 16
Exhibit "2", records, p. 343.
pregnant which allegation was upheld by the trial court. A 17
Exhibit "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8" and "9", id. at 344-350.
review of the records shows, however, that apart from the 18
Records, p. 372.
testimony of Reynaldo, no other proof was presented to 19
Id. at 370-371.
support such claim. Mere allegation and nothing more is 20
Id. at 400-402; 423.
insufficient to support such proposition. As petitioner before 21
Rollo, pp. 32-34.
the trial court, it devolves upon Reynaldo to discharge the 22
Id. at 15-16.
burden of establishing the grounds that would justify the 23
Id. at 17-19.
nullification of the marriage.69 24
Id. at 20.
25
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
While Reynaldo and Nilda's marriage failed and appears to 26
Rollo, pp. 21-23.
be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is 27
Id. at 45.
not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of 28
Rollo, pp. 46-50.
psychological incapacity. A marriage, no matter how 29
Id. at 58-60; 66-95; 98-110.
unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. 70 And this 30
Republic of the Philippines v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No.
Court, even as the highest one, can only apply the letter and 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177, 184-185.
spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it may be.71 31
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006,
495 SCRA 396, 403.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed 32
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
promulgated on February 16, 2005 and the Decision dated prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 between the parties and to take care the evidence is not
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for fabricated or suppressed.
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and damages, In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
docketed as Civil Case No. T-799, is DISMISSED. judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.
Costs against respondent. 33
Republic of the Philippines v. Cuison-Melgar, supra, note
30, at 187-188.
SO ORDERED. 34
Took effect on March 15, 2003; see also Antonio v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353,
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ 375; Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896,
Associate Justice October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 435.
35
Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 34.
36
Records, pp. 40-41.
37
Id. at 109-110.
38
Id. at 527- 537.
Footnotes 39
Id. at 498-503.
* The Court of Appeals having been included as a co- 40
See Republic of the Philippines v. Cuison-Melgar, supra
respondent, is deleted from the title pursuant to Section 4,
note 30, at 187.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 41
1 Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at 400.
Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and 42
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
Vicente L. Yap, rollo, pp. 28-35.
2 comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin, records, pp. 359-372.
3 shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
Rollo, p. 29 (CA Decision); records, p. 363 (RTC Decision).
manifest only after its solemnization.

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43
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at 400-401. SECOND DIVISION
44
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
45 G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
Id. at 39. See also Republic of the Philippines v. Iyoy, G.R.
No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508,
521; Republic of the Philippines v. Cuison-Melgar, supra
note 30, at 188.
46
Supra note 25. JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Petitioner,
47
Id. at 676-678. vs.
48
Republic of the Philippines v. Iyoy, supra note 45, at 525. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE
49
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at 402; Republic PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note
25, at 674; Republic of the Philippines v. Iyoy, supra note 45, DECISION
at 525; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049,
April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121, 129. BRION, J.:
50
Republic of the Philippines v. Iyoy, supra note 45, at 525.
51
See Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo
401; Republic of the Philippines v. Cuison-Melgar, supra (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of
note 30, at 190; Navarro v. Cecilio-Navarro, supra note 49. Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the
52
Art. 35. (Marriages that are void from the beginning). January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court
53
Art. 37. (Marriages that are incestuous and void from the (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-
beginning). 1282.2 The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyn’s
54
Art. 38. (Marriages that are void from the beginning for marriage with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the
reasons of public policy) ground of psychological incapacity.
55
Art. 41. (Void subsequent marriage, unless spouse
THE FACTS
presumptively dead)
56
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra, note 31, at 405.
57 Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met
Id.
58 in June 1985; they were residents of Laguna at that time.
Id.; Republic of the Philippines v. Cuison-Melgar, supra
After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with
note 30, at 193-194.
59 Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days,
Rollo, p. 32 (CA Decision).
60 their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at 401.
61 them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter,
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
62 Jocelyn and Angelito’s marriage was arranged and they
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at 401.
63 were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by
Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 61; see also Republic of the
the Mayor of Biñan.
Philippines v. Cuison-Melgar, supra note 30, at190.
64
Records, pp. 260-263.
65 Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and
Id. at 260.
66 Angelito lived with Angelito’s parents after their marriage.
TSN, June 27, 2001, pp. 5-6, 14; records, pp. 459-460,
They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd
468.
67 jobs and worked for Angelito’s relatives as household help.
See Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, supra note 31, at 402.
68 Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of
Id.
69 the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and
Id.
70 violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn’s efforts.
Id. at 403.
71
Republic of the Philippines v. Cuison-Melgar, supra note
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito
30, at 195.
thereafter found another woman with whom he has since
lived. They now have children.

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997,

Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo0
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their
CASE NO. 08 SEPARATION IN FACT
relationship, she alleged in her complaint:

xxxx
Republic of the Philippines
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation
SUPREME COURT
in July 1987, their relationship had been marred with bitter
Manila
quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional
pains on the part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted

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physical injuries upon her every time they had a troublesome
encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the
refusal of the defendant to work or his indolence and his
excessive drinking which makes him psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations making life
unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their
separation in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant
started from the time of their marriage and became very
apparent as time went and proves to be continuous,
permanent and incurable;
xxxx
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he
submit himself to a psychological examination with
psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by
Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court
found that no collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn,
her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at
the trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations
in her petition, including the alleged incidents of physical
beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination,
she remained firm on these declarations but significantly
declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before
they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent
before you got married?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.
Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage,
will you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern before you got
married?
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the
house.
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of
violent nature before you got married (sic), is there any signs
(sic) of violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.
Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).3
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical
interpretation of his behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent
during the time of the marriage the respondent is suffering
from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and
severe apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic
and long-standing before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by
the petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is
no pattern of lying when I examined her, the petitioner was
found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital
relationship with respondent.
Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your report there
is a statement rather on the last page, last paragraph which
state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that
marriage between the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic)
even before the actual celebration of marriage.
Respondent(’s) immature, irresponsible and callous
emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having
blissful relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the
diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social
Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe
and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love, caring,
concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is
chronic and long-standing in proportion and appear(s)
incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the
wedding and became manifest thereafter due to stresses
and pressure of married life. He apparently grew up in a
dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does chronic
mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it
has been there long before he entered marriage apparently,
it came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not
develop (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure
such because psychological disorder are not detrimental to
men but to others particularly and this (sic) because the
person who have this kind of disorder do not know that they
have this kind of disorder.
Q. So in other words, permanent?
A. Permanent and incurable.
Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present
during the wedding or at the time of the wedding or became
manifest thereafter?
A. Yes, ma’am."
xxxx
Court:
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Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled
on Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic).
Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?
A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated
without any employment exploitative and silent (sic) on the
part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.
Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of
psychological disorder (sic)?
A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will
not admit that they are suffering that kind of disorder (sic).
Court:
Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner
suffers a lot (sic)?
A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of
marital relation to the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to
the parents (sic)?
A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give
due respect more often than not he even shouted at them for
no apparent reason (sic).
Court:
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of
the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. How was the petitioner tortured?
A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was
separated by the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is
incurable?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Why did you know?
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the
person itself, the respondent is not aware that this kind of
personality affect the other party (sic).
Court:
Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the
petitioner (sic)?
A. They do not have children because more often than not
the respondent is under the influence of alcohol, they do not
have peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than
one year and one thing what is significant, respondent
allowed wife to work as housemaid instead of he who should
provide and the petitioner never receive and enjoy her
earning for the five months that she work and it is also the
petitioner who took sustainance of the vices. (sic)
Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not
shown love to the petitioner?
A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to
sustain the marital relationship but what he need is to
sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).
Court:
Q. What are the vices?
A. Alcohol and gambling.
Court:
Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform
marital obligation?
A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of
Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he is good for nothing
person.4
The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report
she prepared. The Report pertinently states:5
Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M.
SUAZO, a petitioner for "Nullity of Marriage" versus
ANGELITO D. SUAZO
GENERAL DATA
[This pertains to Jocelyn’s]
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
xxxx
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd
year high school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest among 4
siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an
alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler. While mother is
a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their
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vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit relationship.
Familial relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic
whose bickering and squabbles were part and parcel of their
day to day living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life
is adequately suppressed so much so that it does not create
inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of
drives and motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her
socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She may be
sensitive yet capable of containing the effect of such
sensitiveness; in order to remain in goodstead (sic) with her
immediate environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks
forward for a better future in spite of difficulties she had gone
through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of
life that she set simple life goals which is (sic)
commensurate with her capabilities and limitations.
However, she needs to prioritize her interest in order to
direct her energy toward specific goals. Her tolerance for
frustration appears to be at par with her coping mechanism
that she is able to discharge negative trends appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologist’s testimony quoted
above]6
The Office of the Solicitor General – representing the
Republic of the Philippines – strongly opposed the petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a
Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the
psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what
she said about him was purely hearsay.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following
reasoning:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law
that a person may be considered as psychologically
incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that
would render a person to be unfit to comply with his marital
obligation, such as "immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective
sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise
peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the
family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group
approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which
a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks" (The
Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony
of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing –
that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life
with the respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not
shown love and respect to the petitioner manifested by the
former’s being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler,
drunkard and worst of all – a wife beater. The petitioner,
unable to bear any longer the misbehavior and attitude of the
respondent, decided, after one year and four months of
messy days, to leave the respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from
the start of her married life with the respondent, she already
suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted
upon her and that she was the one who worked as a
housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the latter’s
niece (sic) and because they were living with her husband’s
family, she was obliged to do the household chores – an
indication that she is a battered wife coupled with the fact
that she served as a servant in his (sic) husband’s family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be
attributed to the fact that at the time of their marriage, she
and her husband are still young and was forced only to said
marriage by her relatives. The petitioner and the respondent
had never developed the feeling of love and respect,
instead, the respondent blamed the petitioner’s family for
said early marriage and not to his own liking.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological
incapacity enunciated by this Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals,7 the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the
psychologist’ testimony quoted above] would only tend to
show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from
psychological incapacity which is not only grave but also
incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198,
wherein the Supreme Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina
ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the
testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the
psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not
a Dr. Familiar] attesting that there is psychological incapacity
on the part of the respondent to comply with the essential
marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven
and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no
psychological incapacity of the respondent is a speculation
and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will
enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as the battered
wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the
respondent, although they are now separated, and a grim
and sad reminder of her husband who made here a slave
and a punching bag during the short span of her marriage
with him. The law on annulment should be liberally
construed in favor of an innocent suffering petitioner
otherwise said law will be an instrument to protect persons
with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of
herein respondent.8
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THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA
reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the
guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs
Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally
examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of
evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological
incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or
clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality
of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in
Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved
spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were not
found to be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in
the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the
person whose mental and psychological capacity was in
question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold
that the respondent was psychologically incapable of
entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the
essential duties of marriage due to an underlying
psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand testimony
on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As
observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent may have
failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show
that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological
malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory
of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from
an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the
marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or
clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the
petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the
behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or
the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of
rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent
was not under a permanent compulsion because he had
later on shown his ability to engage in productive work and
more stable relationships with another. The element of
permanence or incurability that is one of the defining
characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were
under the same roof, the married life of the petitioner with
the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage
cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the Supreme
Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will
be a reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in
our country and the foundation of the family that the law
seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity is
not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient
excuses of parties to separate and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to
challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling based on
the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as
it totally disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring
the marriage null and void – Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA
158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals)
holds that "the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence
or non-existence of petitioner’s psychological incapacity at
the time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the
Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that
the trial court’s factual findings and evaluation of the
testimonies of private respondent’s witnesses vis-à-vis
petitioner’s defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous";
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological
incapacity; this omission was intentional to give the courts a
wider discretion to interpret the term without being shackled
by statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives
three conditions that would make a person unable to
contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows:
"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties which are
to be mutually given and accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential
obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic nature."
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently
conforms to these criteria. The RTC, being clothed with
discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological
incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the law itself
which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define
what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary,
she further claims, the OSG relied on generalities without
being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a
marriage that actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to
nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no
reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as
no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te
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Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended
application, as it merely introduced an abstract concept –
psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the
contractual obligations of marriage – without any concrete
definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We
must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of
psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in
jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals9 declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage."10
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of the law in Republic v. Court
of Appeals11 (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.12
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded
on the basic requirements of Santos.13
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A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,14 further clarified that there
is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration
of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if
the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability
can be duly established.15
Pesca v. Pesca16 clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply
even to cases then already pending, under the reasoning
that the court’s interpretation or construction establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as
so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of
that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when
a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to
be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied
on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit,
non respicit."
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by
the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently
provides:
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing
that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but
expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief
containing all the evidence presented, including expert
opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and
purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires
the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the
advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other
matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.
Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the
declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage
must be proved.
All cases – involving the application of Article 36 of the
Family Code – that came to us were invariably decided
based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state
of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court
decided Te v. Yu-Te17 (Te) which revisited the Molina
guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that
drafted the Family Code did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, by the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was
taken from the Canon Law.18 Te thus assumes it a basic
premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency
in its application.19
Te then sustained Santos’ doctrinal value, saying that its
interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a
case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to
a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower court’s judgment of annulment in
Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial
court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that
its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court,
in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private
respondent testified under oath before the lower court and
was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the
Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage
tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of
procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It
said that the resiliency with which the concept should be
applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had,
somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a
set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it;
wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own
facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not
suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following
Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that
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should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-
Ting20 follows Te’s lead when it reiterated that Te did not
abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements,
cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages:21
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular
root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach
thereto the verified written report of an accredited
psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive
for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of
poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where
these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee
deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the
examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall
now be determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from
Molina,22 merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages
based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for
its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded
on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence
the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance
of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause
of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v.
Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for
emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes
a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.23 [Underscoring supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-
Ting.24
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the
current string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code,
what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to
confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage; that the psychological illness that must have
afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.25 It is not
enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations.
Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse
integral element in the respondent’s personality structure
that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations – must be shown.26Mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different
from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.27
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations
of Santos’ juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability
requisites. This is proof of Santos’ continuing doctrinal
validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyn’s evidence insufficient to
establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity to perform
essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our
own examination of the evidence on record, which we were
compelled to undertake because of the differences in the
trial court and the appellate court’s appreciation and
evaluation of Jocelyn’s presented evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological
report did not conclusively show the root cause, gravity and
incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the
expert opinion evidence – the psychologist’s testimony and
the psychological evaluation report – that Jocelyn presented.
Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist
evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an
indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from
information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon,
the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion
with due care and with the application of the more rigid and
stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there
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must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties
by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal
examination of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this
type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While
such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not
be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged
relations between the parties. For a determination though of
a party’s complete personality profile, information coming
from persons intimately related to him (such as the party’s
close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an
approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility,
at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the
credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion
based entirely on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the
psych`ologist, using meager information coming from a
directly interested party, could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have conclusively formed
an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive
with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not
true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not
the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis
for the conclusion that psychological incapacity
exists.1avvphi1
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the
psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a
general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social
personality disorder, supported by the characterization of
this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The
psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the
bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to
the characterization she gave. These particulars are simply
not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her
testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelito’s
personality disorder is chronic or incurable; Angelito has long
been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with
Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage, as
basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support
this declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she
based her conclusion on the presumption that Angelito
apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite
noticeable, though, is the psychologist’s own equivocation
on this point – she was not firm in her conclusion for she
herself may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The
veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was
based entirely on Jocelyn’s assumed knowledge of
Angelito’s family background and upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the
questions of why and to what extent was Angelito’s
personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects
of the disorder on Angelito’s awareness of and his capability
to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to
the more important concerns or requisites of psychological
incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyn’s
cause.
b. Jocelyn’s Testimony
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the
psychological report and the psychologist’s testimony impel
us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyn’s testimony, to
find out whether she provided the court with sufficient facts
to support a finding of Angelito’s psychological incapacity.
Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn’s testimony to be insufficient.
Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s habitual drunkenness,
gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical
beatings she received from him – all of which
occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in
her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent
behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality
disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages
of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged
physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify
when these beatings exactly took place – whether it was
near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months
or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially
affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence
require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job,
while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by
themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital
obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be
considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in
the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves
a different treatment. While we may concede that physical
violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or
personality patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not
constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that
there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus
is irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that
the opinion of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even
assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of the physical
beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence
does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related
jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.
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22
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, A step that Te, a Third Division case, could not have
whose factual bases we now find to be clearly and legally undertaken because the Molina ruling is an En Banc
manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the ruling, in light of Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution.
23
finality of the factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 Supra note 16, pp. 231-232.
cases (which is Jocelyn’s main anchor in her present appeal 24
Supra note 19.
25
with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, See So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, and
on the contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14,
related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the 2009.
26
present case. Id., Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua.
27
Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition SCRA 272, 288-289.
for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against
the petitioner. Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo0
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice CASE NO.. 09 BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE

REYNATO S. PUNO Republic of the Philippines

Chief Justice SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, and
concurred in by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
Associate Justice Santiago Javier Rañada (both retired).
2
Penned by Judge Pedro de Leon Gutierrez. LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
3
TSN, March 31, 1998, pp. 16-17. vs.
4
TSN, July 16, 1998, pp. 15-22. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan
5
Record, pp. 36-39. Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.
6
Parenthetical notes supplied.
7
The RTC enumerated the requisites as follows: (1) that
psychological incapacity refers to no less than a mental not
physical incapacity; (2) that the law intended psychological QUIASON, J.:
incapacity to be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco
marriage; and (3) that the psychological condition must exist Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
at the time of the marriage and must be characterized by Court, Branch 20, Manila.
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. See citation at
note 9. Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda
8
Parenthetical notes supplied. De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street,
9
310 Phil 21 (1995). Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said
10
Id. at 39-40. house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in
11
335 Phil. 664 (1997). Manila.
12
Id. at 676-680.
13 In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom,
See Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
14 he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed.
Id.
15
Id. at 850. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent
16
408 Phil. 713, 720 (2001). had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not
17 bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
18 after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his
Id. at 213.
19 children.
Id.
20
G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009.
21 Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
children and even alienated the affection of his children for
him.

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Complainant claims that respondent is married to one
Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as
appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets
and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent
caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a
heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not
married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative
action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and
claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the
complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against
complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro
who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko,
although he admits having five children with her. He alleges
that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25,
1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a
marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of
Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither
party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care
and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil
rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and
purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto
can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code
provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the
Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil
Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took
place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless
of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of
the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This
is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that
was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application
to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals,
26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674
[1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith.
He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who
beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was
admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went
through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was
already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage
license. Any law student would know that a marriage license
is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was
given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage
when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His
failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions
betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of
moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his
appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and
illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued
when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a
judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as
to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of
morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety
at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in
his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-
evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon,
229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or
agency of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
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Researcher: Ely T. Tolentino, cpa
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Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
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CASE NO. 10 BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the
validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he
married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking
to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he
contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969,
with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as
Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely,
Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño
(hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no
children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden
due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He
passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of
Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased
from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao
was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from
“GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the
instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner
Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to
return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as
“death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite
service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer,
prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the
deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage
and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the
deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself
as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented:
1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner
which bears no marriage license number; 5and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage
license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and
SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on
June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true
copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the
records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan
Yee Cariño for whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was
paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the
death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in
the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition, contending that:
Page 44 of 110
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Researcher: Ely T. Tolentino, cpa
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I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE
INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL
MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED,
AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in
this case, as the same is essential to the determination of
who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the
deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage
license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their
marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license.
Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently
overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove
that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required
marriage license. Although she was declared in default
before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the
issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to
refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in
jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage
cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not
being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however,
that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes
of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of
the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan
Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the
deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that
their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a
judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void
ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is
the separation of the property of the spouses according to
the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of
property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property
Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
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Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the
property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to
the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in
the form of care of the home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and
the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage
then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in
order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and
PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits
from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof
to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed
money, property or industry in the acquisition of these
monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by
respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased
alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of
the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent,
not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This
article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147
of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.
In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages
and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation
shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be
divided equally between them, even if only one party earned
the wages and the other did not contribute
thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits”
were earned by the deceased alone as a government
employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As
there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith.
Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny
shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime,
and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children
with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court
awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased
to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the
first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her
husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his
estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently,
whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or
as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s
share in the property here in dispute....” And with respect to
the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void
ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by
the second marriage was dissolved before judicial
declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable solution
in this case would be to recognize the right of the second
wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her
and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining
to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” 21
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It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision
is premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason
why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the
parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court,
construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior
and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all
important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to
obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void,
before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same
rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void
because the parties are not free to determine for themselves
the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for
collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed
to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of
nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that
the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid.
Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the
issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage
involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in
accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it
is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code
connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only
for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of
P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ.,
concur.
Puno J., on official leave.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 43-47
2. Rollo, pp. 49-55
3. Exhibit “F”, Records, p. 38
4. Ibid
5. Exhibit “D-1”, Records, p. 36
6. Exhibit “E”, Records, p. 37
7. Rollo, p. 55
8. Rollo, p. 18
9. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]
10. Niñal, et al., v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14,
2000
11. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra
12. ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
these requisites are complied with:
(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2)Their consent, freely given;
(3)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.
13. ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under
article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides
14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character;
xxx xxx xxx
15. 236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule
132, Section 29
16. Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3),
(4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in
proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio
or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children,
and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred
to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in
default of children, the innocent spouse;
14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in
bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked
by operation of law
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17. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, p. 233-234 (1995)
18 Id., p. 234.18
19. Id., p. 230
20. 37 SCRA 316 [1971]
21. Id., p. 326
22. Supra
23. Supra
Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo0
CASE NO. 11 BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the
decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated
August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol,
Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found
herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison
term of seven (7) months of prision correccionalas minimum
to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of
the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying
Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as
follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates
at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province
of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete
lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from
Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after
an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for
Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained
constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to
petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at
the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in
Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court
(General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant
which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity
of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in
an Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
[City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on
the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently
denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution.
When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty
to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its
judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court
finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7)
Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years
and One (1) Day of Prision Mayoras maximum.
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SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted
petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and
void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the
trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not
a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void
even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court
cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in
which one or both spouses may resort merely for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a
divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition
anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in
contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know
the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act
constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from
the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No.
20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the
marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no
marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was
taken from this decision, which then became final and
executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the
same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the
appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of
nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020
could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to
be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is
the act of contracting a second marriage before the first
marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact
that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a
valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce
decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not
be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article
1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to
public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil
Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered
ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign
jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s
decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law
(such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis
for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the
motion for lack of merit.16 However, the denial was by a split
vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined
in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis.
The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly
declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to
speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes
of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our
resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES
PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.
COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58
PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not
petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense
of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for
relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario
court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon
bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues
that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like
other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code,
is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal
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intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that
there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime
and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second
marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient
but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our
ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy
can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements
concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code,
a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may
re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know
the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that
he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree
of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case
No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and
lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all
the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-
Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it
not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that
during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of
Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil
Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered
into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August
23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the
marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere
signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held
that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles
322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means
that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes,
reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first
marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the
first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law,
never married."24 The records show that no appeal was
taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under
the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence
and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there
is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished
from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated.
We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage
was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before
a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and
then again six months later before a priest in religious rites.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all
was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration
of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to
liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and
weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner
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has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we
need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of
good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution
of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying
herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that
his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S.
Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L.
Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz.
2
Records, pp. 114-119.
3 15
Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz,
with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Marina L.
Buzon, concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P.
Abesamis, dissenting.
4
Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for
emphasis). See Exh. "B," the copy of their marriage contract.
Records, p. 10.
5 invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in
Records, p. 1, reads:
"That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being
previously united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on
August 23, 1990 and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Maria Jececha
Limbago to the damage and prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the
amount to be proved during trial.
"Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code."
6
Rollo, pp. 38-40.
7
Records, p. 119.
8
G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.
9
42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).
10
58 Phil. 817 (1933).
11
Rollo, p. 43.
12
ART. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
13
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
14
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic
or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.
16
Rollo, p. 51.
17
Id. at 20-21.
18
G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.
19
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
20
Supra.
21
CA Rollo, p. 38.
22
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.
23
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,except as
stated in Article 35 (2).
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A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and
marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. executory on October 13, 2003.6

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez,
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with the
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for
administratively liable. Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was an
24
Rollo, p. 54. Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August
23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,9 which
25
G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122. alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to
Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On November
26
Id. at 124. 17, 2004, an Information10 for Bigamy was filed against
respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL.
The Information reads:
Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo0 That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of
San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
CASE NO. 12 CIVIL LAW BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE second or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO
CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with
SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by
proper judicial authorities.11
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent,
Manila
through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and
Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her
THIRD DIVISION
marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab
initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that
the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,
marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since
vs.
the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its
Comment13 arguing that the crime of bigamy had already
DECISION
been consummated when respondent filed her petition for
PERALTA, J.: declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of
contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid,
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet
seeks to annul the Order1 dated September 24, 2007 of the been annulled or declared void by the court.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch
31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the
the lnformation for Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes motion. It found respondent's argument that with the
Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more
Resolution2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for first marriage to speak of and thus the element of two valid
reconsideration. marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by
our ruling in Mercado v. Tan15 where we held:
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores
(Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.3 On January 24, 1983, during the In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage
subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his
Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna.4 In first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the
2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed
a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he
Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, Revised Penal Code.
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18,
2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an
Amended Decision5 declaring the marriage of respondent

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That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the
crime had already been consummated by then. x x x16
As to respondent's claim that the action had already
prescribed, the RTC found that while the second marriage
indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year
prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the commission
of the crime was only discovered on November 17, 2004,
which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription
has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for econsideration17 claiming that
the Mercado ruling was not applicable, since respondent
contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family
Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and
became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was
filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given
any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to
remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a
completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed
Order,18 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and
set aside. Let a new one be entered quashing the
information. Accordingly, let the instant case be
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had
contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e.,
before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did
not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a
condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage;
that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent
on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that
both marriages of respondent took place before the
effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled
state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before commencing a second
marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted
liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the absence
of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the
accused whose second marriage was declared once and for
all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC
of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the
prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution
dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling,
among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of
respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration
or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and
for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage
cannot be considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us
raising the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the
enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological
incapacity is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy for
entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the
Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-
Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Family Code and
the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the
necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the first
marriage before entering a second marriage ambivalent,
such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent
marriage without the annulment of the first without incurring
criminal liability.19
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the
RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed by
private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which should represent the government in all
judicial proceedings filed before us.20
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as
we had done in the past. In Antone v. Beronilla,21 the
offended party (private complainant) questioned before the
Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of the Information
for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed
the petition on the ground, among others, that the petition
should have been filed in behalf of the People of the
Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all
appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said
that we had given due course to a number of actions even
when the respective interests of the government were not
properly represented by the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in
the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is
aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal
case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to
question the order or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest
of the State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we
opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground.
Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as
we had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment,
we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the
instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a
Comment on the petition, which it did, praying that the
petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the
petition filed with us.
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As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is
whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for
bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes
bigamy as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender
has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage.23 It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage.24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a
second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with
Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same
had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent
authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in
the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she
alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's
marriage with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab
initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never
appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this
case, her marriage with Mr. Flores had already been
declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983
to speak of. In other words, there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two
valid marriages, is therefore wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity was declared only in
2003. The question now is whether the declaration of nullity
of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the
Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial,
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting
a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the
accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.28 Even if the accused eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point
is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between
the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said
marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is
that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may
still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.31
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing
jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's conviction for
bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a
second marriage without the previous one having been
judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated because at the time of the celebration
of the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which
had not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second
marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not
yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage would not change the fact that she
contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of
the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of
the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the
offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable,
since the declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came
after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where
the declaration was rendered before the information was
filed. We do not agree. What makes a person criminally
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liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.35
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since
her two marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be
given retroactive effect because this will impair her right to
remarry without need of securing a judicial declaration of
nullity of a completely void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for
reconsideration, argued that since her marriages were
entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then
the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act
3613),37 instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which
requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage.
We did not find the argument meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court
already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule
of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article
256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall
have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to
explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application
to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general
rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws.1âwphi1
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger
of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family
Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a
judicial declaration nullity of his first marriage and thereafter
to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution
for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even
enter into a marriage license and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of
nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is
void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on
bigamy.38
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is
GRANTED. The Order dated September 24, 2007 and the
Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case
No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No.
4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Footnotes
20
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. xxx It shall have the following specific powers
and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions
and special proceedings in which the Government or any
officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed
to:
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments,
bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General
and appear or represent the Government in cases involving
their respective offices, brought before the courts and
exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with
respect to such cases.
21
G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 615.
22
Antone v. Beronilla, supra, at 623.
23
Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005,
476 SCRA 461, 477; 512 Phil. 818, 833-834 (2005).
24
Id. at 833.
25
Rollo, p. 80.
26
Supra note 15, at 133; at 824.
27
G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 562.
28
Id. at 568
29
Id.
30
G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 272; 467
Phil. 723 (2004).
31
Id. at 284; at 744.
32
G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009, 601 SCRA 236.
33
Supra note 30.
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34
Landicho v. Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, February 23, 1968,
22 SCRA 731, 734; 130 Phil. 745, 748 (1968).
35
Id.
36
G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 24.
37
Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which
provided:
Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted
by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the
absentee being generally considered as dead and believed
to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being
valid in either case until declared null and void by a
competent court.
38
Jarillo v. People, supra 36, at 25-26. (Citation omitted
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the
decision2 dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed be
order3 dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP
Proc. Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor,
respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor’s husband,
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20,
1997. They lived together as husband and wife in their
conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a
violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s
inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry
would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of
animosity toward the respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this
was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since
then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything
from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time
of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent filed before the
RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive
death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed
that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already
dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-
law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her
neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding
Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the
patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these
earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile,
prompting her to file the petition in court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the
respondent’s petition and declaring Jerry presumptively
dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded
belief that her husband was already dead since more than
four (4) years had passed without the former receiving any
news about the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive
portion of the order dated December 15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby
declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor is presumptively
dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.5
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for
certiorari6filed by the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its
August 27, 2008 decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s
petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s
part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Order dated
December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively
dead is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.7
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition
before this Court. The Petition The petitioner contends that
certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final
orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the
Family Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial
courts in summary judicial proceedings, including
presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and
executory (hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the
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Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are not
subject to review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a
well-founded belief to justify the declaration of her husband’s
presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to
conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing
husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Court’s
attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the
case, particularly, the degree of search conducted and the
respondent’s resultant failure to meet the strict standard
under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Issues
The petition poses to us the following issues:
(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions,
judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that
Jerry is already dead.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
Court’s Judgment in the Judicial
Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable
The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in
summary proceedings, such as the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of
the Family Code, shall be immediately final and executory.
Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code
provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set
forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final
and executory. [underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is
no longer subject to an appeal, the dispositions and
conclusions therein having become immutable and
unalterable not only as against the parties but even as
against the courts.8 Modification of the court’s ruling, no
matter how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and
executory nature of this summary proceeding thus prohibits
the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v.
Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to appeal is not granted to
parties because of the express mandate of Article 247 of the
Family Code, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code,
there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an
appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder,
by express provision of [Article] 247, Family Code, supra,
are "immediately final and executory." It was erroneous,
therefore, on the part of the RTCto give due course to the
Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire
records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a
judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately
final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs.
Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a
part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege."
Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family
Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial
proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and
executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the
parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor
in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should
not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics
supplied]
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the
Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death Under the Family Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left
without a remedy. While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal
can be made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved
party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that
transpired.
As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a
decision has become final does not automatically negate the
original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued by
the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a court has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not
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available. Such a procedure finds support in the case
of Republic v. Tango,11 wherein we held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on
appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings
under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous
decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW,
establishes the rules that govern summary court
proceedings in the Family Code:
"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the
procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided
for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such
cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules."
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases
covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same
title. It states:
"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof
shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under
Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are
applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately
final and executory."
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal
can be had of the trial court's judgment ina summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine
of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's
original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases,
such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom
of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort
to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question
the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was
proper.
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief
The Essential Requisites for the
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be
obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse
had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already
dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.12
The Present Spouse Has the Burden
of Proof to Show that All the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show
that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code are
present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of
declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the
affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of
proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old
provision of the Civil Code which it superseded, imposes
a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that
the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration
of presumptive death can be granted. We have had occasion
to make the same observation in Republic v.
Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial differences between
Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to
arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is
need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to
enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the
Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code:
Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there
be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee
is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other
hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee
is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period
required by the law), lack of any news that such absentee is
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still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of
absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This
conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the
Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of
proving the additional and more stringent requirement of
"well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a
showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s
whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse
is still alive or is already dead.15
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded
belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each particular
case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-
case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the
present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result
of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent
spouseis already dead. It requires exertion of active effort
(not a mere passive one).
To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search"
required by the law, an analysis of the following relevant
cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.)16
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),17 the Court ruled that the present spouse failed to
prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent
spouse was already dead before he filed his petition. His
efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the
following:
(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired
about her whereabouts among his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver
to look for her in malls during his free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her;
and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station
and to the NBI.
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled
against the present spouse. The Court found that he failed to
present the persons from whom he allegedly made inquiries
and only reported his wife’s absence after the OSG filed its
notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining
the existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of
the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper
and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of
the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after
the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse
failed to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent
spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. In
this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother had
made inquiries from their relatives regarding the absent
spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to
the police nor seek the aid of the mass media. Applying the
standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
(Tenth Div.),20 the Court ruled against the present spouse, as
follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case,
petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate
a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her
brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquiredabout
the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these
relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s
testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in
her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she
were, she would have sought information from the
Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other
government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She
could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did
not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
iii.Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration
of presumptive death of his wife, who had been missing for
more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find her
consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts,
which all proved fruitless. The Court ruled that the present
spouse’s investigations were too sketchy to form a basis that
his wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of
evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to
communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that
she was dead.
iv.The present case
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In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief"
was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate
Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her
in-laws, neighbors and friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she
looked through the patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard"
and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the
following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing
husband.1âwphi1 It can be inferred from the records that her
hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’
directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely
undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital
visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him.
This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to
engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor
did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. While
a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the
situation in which the present spouse is placed, under
present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a
present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek
the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her
absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or
their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts
to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she
allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in
Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he
inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s
whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from
whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony
nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support
the respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent search.
Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had
a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she
inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband’s
whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the
respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she
relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws,
neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent
search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a
well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As
held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon
the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the natureand extent of the inquiries made by
[the] present spouse."
Strict Standard Approach Is
Consistent with the State’s Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage
In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the
possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has
consistently applied the "strictstandard" approach. This is to
ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to
conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow
procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter
standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),23 we
emphasized that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article
41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by
this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in
locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be
strictly complied with. There have been times when Article
41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties
wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged
missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that
those who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41
of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx summary
nature of its proceedings.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more
imperative if we consider the State’s policy to protect and
strengthen the institution of marriage.24 Since marriage
serves as the family’s foundation25 and since it is the state’s
policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be
dissolved at the whim of the parties. In interpreting and
applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale –to uphold
the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of
Appeals27 reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage
and the family in the preservation of which the State has the
strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the
most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under
Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit
The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse (and consequently, the application of a
stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present
spouse's benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a
criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code which might come into play if he/she
would prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration.
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8
Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Bernard and
spouse presumptively dead, the present spouse's good faith Cresencia Marañon, G.R. No. 189316, July1, 2013.
9
in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. 489 Phil. 761, 767 (2005).
10
The decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient 130 Phil. 459, 464 (1968).
11
proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 560, 566-567.
of remarriage is effectively negated.28 Thus, for purposes of 12
Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993,
remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the 220 SCRA 20, 25-26; emphasis ours.
13
stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially Guidangen v. Wooden, G.R. No. 174445, February 15,
declared presumptively dead. 2012, 666 SCRA 119, 131.
14
Supra note 12, at 25; emphases ours, italics supplied,
Final Word citations omitted.
15
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that Div.), 513 Phil. 391, 397-398(2005)
the strict standard required in petitions for declaration of 16
Ibid.
presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower 17
Ibid.
courts. We need only to cite the instances when this Court, 18
Id. at 397-398; emphases ours.
on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage 19
G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 432, 444-
and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict 445; emphasis ours.
standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this situation, lower 20
Supra note 15.
courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard 21
Supra note 12.
this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family 23
Id.at 396; emphasis ours, italics supplied.
Code. 24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed 26
CONSTITUTION, Article 2, Section 12.
decision dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals, 27
G.R. Nos. 96602 and 96715, November 19, 1991, 203
which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the SCRA 750, 761.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South 28
Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 836 (2005).
Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
SO ORDERED. oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo0

ARTURO D. BRION CASE NO. 14 CIVIL LAW PERSONS

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
Republic of the Philippines
MARIA See dissenting opinion SUPREME COURT
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN Manila
Associate Justice
SECOND DIVISION
CERTIFICATION G.R. No. 130623 February 29, 2008

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I

certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been LOREA DE UGALDE, petitioner,
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the vs.
writer of the opinion of the Court. JON DE YSASI, respondent.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Footnotes Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 21

1
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 9-31. November 1996 Decision2 and 2 September 1997
2
Id. at 33-41. Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
3
Id. at 42-47. 41121.
4
Id. at 48.
5
Id. at 47. The Antecedent Facts
6
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
7
Rollo, p. 40.

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On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon
de Ysasi (respondent) got married before Municipal Judge
Remigio Peña of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. On 1 March
1951,4 Rev. Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church
wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod City.
Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial
agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III.
Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April
1957.5 On 26 May 1964, respondent allegedly contracted
another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith (Smith) before
Judge Lucio M. Tanco of Pasay City. Petitioner further
alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and
disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as
the lawful wife. Petitioner alleged that she had been
defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their
conjugal properties.
On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 48 (trial court). The case
was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3330. In
particular, petitioner asked for her conjugal share in
respondent's inheritance as per the settlement of the estate
of respondent's parents, Juan Ysasi6 and Maria Aldecoa de
Ysasi, who died on 17 November 1975 and 25 February
1979, respectively.7 Petitioner also prayed for a monthly
support of P5,000 to be deducted from her share in the
conjugal partnership; the appointment of a receiver during
the pendency of the litigation; the annulment of all contracts,
agreements, and documents signed and ratified by
respondent with third persons without her consent; and
payment of appearance and attorney's fees.
Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and
petitioner entered into an agreement which provided, among
others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be
deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. Pursuant to the
agreement, they submitted an Amicable Settlement in Civil
Case No. 47918 then pending before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental (CFI). The Amicable
Settlement stipulates:
2. That the petitioner shall pay the respondent the sum of
THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) in full
satisfaction of and/or consideration for and to cover any and
all money and/or property claims she has or may have
against the petitioner in the future, including but not limited to
pensions, allowances, alimony, support, share in the
conjugal property (if any), inheritance, etc.;
3. That for and in consideration of the foregoing premises
and the payment of THIRTY THOUSAND pesos
(P30,000.00), the receipt of which sum is hereby
acknowledged and confessed by and to the entire
satisfaction of the respondent, she hereby completely and
absolutely transfer, convey, assign, set over, waive, remise,
release and forever quitclaim, unto petitioner, his successors
and administrators, any and all rights, claims and interests
which the respondent has or may hereafter have against the
petitioner arising, directly or indirectly, from the fact that the
petitioner and respondent were married on March 1, 1951,
including but not limited to any and all money and/or
property claims mentioned in the paragraph immediately
preceding;
4. That, except with reference to the custody of the boy, the
parties herein hereby waive any and all rights to question the
validity and effectivity of the provisions of this amicable
settlement, as well as the right to raise these matters on
appeal[.]9
In its Order10 dated 6 June 1961, the CFI approved the
Amicable Settlement.
Respondent further alleged that petitioner already obtained a
divorce from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico.
Petitioner then contracted a second marriage with Richard
Galoway (Galoway). After Galoway's death, petitioner
contracted a third marriage with Frank Scholey. Respondent
moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel,
laches, and res judicata.
In his Supplemental Affirmative Defense, respondent alleged
that the marriage between him and petitioner was void
because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage
license.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 22 November 1991, the trial court11 rendered judgment
as follows:
WHEREFORE, after collating the evidence, the evidence for
the respondent is preponderant to prove his affirmative and
special defenses that the petition does not state a sufficient
cause of action. On these bases and under the doctrine of
res judicata, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without
pronouncements as to costs and attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.12
The trial court ruled that the existence of a conjugal
partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage.
Considering that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, the
marriage was null and void, and no community of property
was formed between them. The trial court further ruled that
assuming that the marriage was valid, the action was barred
by res judicata. The trial court noted that petitioner and
respondent entered into an amicable settlement in Civil Case
No. 4791. The amicable settlement was approved by the CFI
and petitioner may no longer repudiate it. Finally, the trial
court ruled that there was no proof to show that during their
union, petitioner and respondent acquired properties.
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision before the
Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
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On 21 November 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the absence of a marriage
license is fatal and made the marriage between petitioner
and respondent a complete nullity. Hence, the trial court did
not err in finding that there was no conjugal partnership of
gains between petitioner and respondent. The Court of
Appeals further ruled that the compromise agreement is a
valid contract between the parties Since the compromise
agreement was entered into freely, voluntarily, and with the
full understanding of its consequences, it is conclusive and
binding on the parties. The Court of Appeals also ruled that
the action was barred by laches since it was filed by
petitioner 23 years from the time the CFI approved the
additional amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 4791. The
Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's ruling that
respondent's right over the estate of his deceased parents
was only inchoate and there was no evidence that petitioner
and respondent acquired any property that could be
considered conjugal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 2
September 1997 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court, raising the following
assignment of errors:
The lower court erred in ruling that since the marriage of the
plaintiff and respondent was void due to the absence of a
marriage license, no conjugal partnership arose from their
union.
The lower court erred in ruling that the amicable settlement
in Civil Case No. 4791 bars all claims by the plaintiff under
the principle of res judicata.
The lower court erred in ruling that respondent's right to [the]
estate of his deceased parents was merely inchoate, thus,
no property devolved to respondent and no conjugal
partnership was formed.
The lower court erred in ruling that the appellant's petition
did not sufficiently state a cause of action.13
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court's
Decision which dismissed the action for dissolution of
conjugal partnership of gains.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is without merit.
Validity of Petitioner and Respondent's Marriage
is the Subject of a Different Court Proceeding
Special Proceedings No. 3330 is an action for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains. In its 22 November 1991
Decision, the trial court ruled that the existence of conjugal
partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage. The
trial court then proceeded to rule on the validity of petitioner
and respondent's marriage. The trial court ruled that it was
shown by competent evidence that petitioner and
respondent failed to obtain a marriage license. Hence, the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and
void, and no community of property was formed between
them.
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the
validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage, which was
only raised by respondent as a defense to the action for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The validity
of petitioner and respondent's marriage was the subject of
another action, Civil Case No. 430 for Judicial Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage before the Regional Trial Court
of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, Branch 55. In a
Decision14 dated 31 May 1995, Civil Case No. 430 was
resolved, as follows:
In this jurisdiction it is required, except in certain cases, that
the marriage license must first be secured by the parties and
shown to the judge before the latter can competently
solemnize the marriage. In this present case, none was ever
secured. Failure to comply with the formal and essential
requirements of the law renders the marriage void ab initio.
Since void marriage can be assailed anytime as the action
on assailing it does not prescribe, the plaintiff is well within
his right to seek judicial relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage between JON A. DE YSASI
and LOREA DE UGALDE as NULL and VOID AB INITIO.
The Local Civil Registrar for the Municipality of Hinigaran is
hereby directed to cancel the entry of marriage between
JON A. DE YSASI and LOREA DE UGALDE from the
Marriage register and to render the same of no force and
effect.
Lastly, furnish copy of this decision the National Census and
Statistics Office, Manila, to make the necessary cancellation
of the entry of marriage between the plaintiff and the
defendant.
SO ORDERED.15
No appeal or motion for reconsideration of the 31 May 1995
Decision in Civil Case No. 430 has been filed by any of the
parties, and a Certification of finality was issued on 20
November 1995. Thus, the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was already judicially annulled as of 20
November 1995. The trial court had no jurisdiction to annul
again in Special Proceedings No. 3330 the marriage of
petitioner and respondent.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains Dissolved
in Civil Case No. 4791
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The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No.
4791 resulted in the dissolution of the petitioner and
respondent's conjugal partnership of gains.
Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February
1951. The applicable law at the time of their marriage was
Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of
the Philippines (Civil Code) which took effect on 30 August
1950.16 Pursuant to Article 119 of the Civil Code, the
property regime of petitioner and respondent was conjugal
partnership of gains, thus:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of
property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or
when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
only upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding
on third persons who are not parties to it.17
The Amicable Settlement had become final as between
petitioner and respondent when it was approved by the CFI
on 6 June 1961. The CFI's approval of the Compromise
Agreement on 6 June 1961 resulted in the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and
respondent on even date.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
result of the 21 November 1996 Decision and of the 2
September 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 41121.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Article 142 of the Civil Code defines conjugal partnership of

gains, as follows:
Footnotes
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their * As replacement of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is
separate property and the income from their work or on official leave per Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.
1
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the 2
Rollo, pp. 40-52. Penned by Associate Justice Fidel P.
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits Purisima with Associate Justices Angelina Sandoval-
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the Gutierrez and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., concurring.
marriage. 3
Id. at 54.
4
Not 1 March 1954 as stated in the Decision of the Court of
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of Appeals. See Certificate of Marriage, records, p. 145.
5
property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership De Ugalde alleged that de Ysasi drove her out of their
home. On the other hand, de Ysasi alleged that de Ugalde
of gains:
left their home.
6
Also referred to as Juan Isasi.
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates: 7
Records, pp. 154-160.
8
Action for custody of then minor Jon de Ysasi III and for
(1) Upon the death of either spouse; support.
9
Records, pp. 235-236.
10
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation; Id. at 237-239.
11
CA rollo, pp. 93-101. Through Judge Romeo J. Hibionada.
12
(3) When the marriage is annulled; Id. at 101.
13
Rollo, p. 133.
14
Id. at 89-94. Penned by Executive Judge Jose Y. Aguirre,
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article Jr.
191. (Emphasis supplied) 15
Id. at 94.
16
See Lara, et al. v. Del Rosario, Jr., 94 Phil. 778 (1954).
17
The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 See Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 166421,
approving the parties' separation of property resulted in the 5 September 2006, 501 SCRA 75.
termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in
Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence,
ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330,
the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent
was already dissolved.
CASE NO 15 PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY /
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve
the Compromise Agreement because the case was for
Republic of the Philippines
custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the
SUPREME COURT
parties, as also required under Article 191 of the Civil Code.
Manila
Petitioner cannot repudiate the Compromise Agreement on
this ground. A judgment upon a compromise agreement has
SECOND DIVISION
all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive

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G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18
October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3 of
the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial
court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño
(respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They
started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate
in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live
together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner
alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give
love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that
depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that
respondent was not faithful, and would at times become
violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon
respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was
already living in the United States of America. Despite
receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to
the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later
learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution
of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the
Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also
learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a
certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor
found that there were no indicative facts of collusion
between the parties and the case was set for trial on the
merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist,
submitted a psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her
early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent’s
disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the
petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented,
petitioner was able to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s
psychological report, the allegations in the complaint,
substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case
of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial
court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and
embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that
respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial
court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when
she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO
and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998,
and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the
beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall
only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of
the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the
Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor,
Las Piñas City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration
questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of
property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall
only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted
the motion and modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO
and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998,
and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the
beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
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A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall
be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office
of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Las Piñas City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas
City, for their information and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred
when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner
argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147
of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon
City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated
to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of
his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation
and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.
In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry
each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no
question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering
that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling
has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree
of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by
the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section
19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4)
and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in
proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab
initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children,
and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
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matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute
community of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it
is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive
legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of
the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in
cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by
mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided
for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their
property, may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed
shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of
the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the
parents; but the value of the properties already received
under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section
19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of
the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code,
which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where
a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void." Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to
voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until
they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in
an action for annulment.12 In both instances under Articles
40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property13 or conjugal partnership of
gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of
property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition
and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not
under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent
are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled
that the property relations of parties in a void marriage
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on co-
ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on
co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition
may be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate
the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court
with the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity
of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial
court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition,
and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
Rollo, pp. 28-34. Penned by Presiding Judge Gloria Butay
Aglugub.
3
Id. at 45-46.
4
Id. at 34.
5
Id. at 46.
6
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective 15 March 2003.
7
328 Phil. 1289 (1996).
8
Mercado-Fehr v. Bruno Fehr, 460 Phil. 445 (2003).
9
Id.
10
Article 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage
referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:
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(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually
to its termination shall be considered legitimate and their transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be
custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by incurable.
the court in a proper proceeding;
11
Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
12
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932 (1998).
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
13
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community Article 88 of the Family Code.
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
14
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the Article 105 of the Family Code.
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in
15
default of children, the innocent spouse; Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
such donations made to said donee are revoked by manifest only after its solemnization.
operation of law;
16
Supra note 7.
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the
other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable; and Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo0
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in
bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent
spouse by testate and intestate succession.
CASE NO. 16 COLLATERAL ATTACK OF DECREE
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of Republic of the Philippines
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. SUPREME COURT
Manila
Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: FIRST DIVISION

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the

marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without
the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA,
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party
and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
vs.
husband and wife;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR.,
EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL
after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
SAYSON, respondents.
husband and wife;

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,

unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
CRUZ, J.:
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents
and their capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force,
grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
(5) That either party was physically incapable of
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely,
consummating the marriage with the other and such
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976.

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Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March
23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981.
Their properties were left in the possession of Delia,
Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to
be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and
Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother,
filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate
estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court
of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the
disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their
own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of
the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against
the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay,
Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they
raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they
were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate
by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private
respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated
May 26, 1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally
adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of
the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was
their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate
dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children
were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S.
Sañez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the
defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel
as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded
the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where
they were consolidated. In its own decision dated February
28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541),
the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case
No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is
MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are
disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased
spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review
by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent court is sought on
the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners
and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it
declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo
were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been
born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption
was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel
disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent
provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among
those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel
herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel
but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a
petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural
mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent.
The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and
Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already
had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath
try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was
born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is
too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after
it became final and executory. That was way back in
1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties,
what they should have done was seasonably appeal the
decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that
disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this
earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did
not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge
of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN
(10) days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the
petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of
birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or
perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the
revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of
a child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation
or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered
opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and
EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the
present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting
the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the
adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that
their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made
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collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct
proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot
be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption
arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is
thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were
proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-
720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American
Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts
and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot
be considered void merely because the fact needed to show
statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial
determination of some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be
essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of
adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional
validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon
proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth;
a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and
hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the
rule, the status of adopted children would always be
uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by
different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one
court to have been valid, while another court would hold it to
have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the
findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent
court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed
means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and
Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners
stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at
bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was
born to Edita Abila was understandbly suspect, coming as it
did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying
her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of
Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was
never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it,
however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line
with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11where we ruled that "the
evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in
the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the
impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose.
Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not
have this purely evidential character. It serves a more
fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the
child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by
the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that
Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children,
are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of
the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed
the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to
sex or age, and even if they should come from different
marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting
parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love
descends first to his children and grandchildren before it
ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his
collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually
to his children as a token of his love for them and as a
provision for their continued care even after he is gone from
this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the
following pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law,
by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place
and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the
rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he
could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by
the law and not by the person represented. The
representative does not succeed the person represented but
the one who the person represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants
of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall
inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela,
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Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the
distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under
Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her
father would have directly inherited had he survived, which
shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other
children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of
Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total
strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as
the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is
between only the adopting parents and the adopted child
and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and
Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista,
are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share
the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of
Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel
has the right of representation in the inheritance of her
grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents
being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against the petitioners.
Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 66-71.
2 Exhibit C.
3 Exhibit B.
4 Rollo, pp. 60-64.
5 Martinez, J., ponente, with Castro-Bartolome and
Elbinias, JJ., concurring.
6 Original Records of Civil Case No. 1042, pp. 115-117.
7 Exhibit C.
8 16 SCRA 344.
9 Rule 131, Sec. 5(m), which provides the disputable
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed;
Article 410 of the Civil Code, which provides: "The books
making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall
be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained."
10 Rollo, pp. 52-53.
11 142 SCRA 82.
12 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 559.
13 Article 972, Civil Code.
14 Teotico v. Del Val, 13 SCRA 406.
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CASE NO. 17 CIVIL LAW VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF
PARENTS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L.
RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur;
VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10
years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was
filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc.
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from
criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without
discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T
before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This
petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982,
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition
for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura,
were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the
moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto
Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by
the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners'
complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of
Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action.
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Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7
December 1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or
on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for
reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing, however,
that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the
motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three
(3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said
notice shall state the time and place of hearing — both
motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18
April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court
dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the
notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
ending 22 December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's
Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18
April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to
appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again
contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the
indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by
the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of
this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or
not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal,
may still file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the
Court may still take cognizance of the case even through
petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2)
whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental
authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as
to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a
damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts
committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged
with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and
supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial
court, not having complied with the requirements of Section
13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of
Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not
interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the
trial court held that the motions, not having contained a
notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless
pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary
period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is
mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing
counsel indicating the time and place of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the
instant. Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be
served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the
application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice,
elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been
seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and
supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner
in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary
period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings
of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not
be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure
are used only to help secure not override, substantial justice.
if d technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their
aim would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of
shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a
cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176
of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for
any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives
with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when
the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is
frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of
"imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where
a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but
also for torts committed by others with whom he has a
certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of
the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental
authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of
vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v.
Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from
negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for
the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected
— to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon
whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or,
on the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that
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liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as
to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons
whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our
Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability —
with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which
moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having
failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of
one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by
reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency
with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct. 7 (Emphasis Supplied)
petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by which
the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36
should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents,
except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving
natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their (Emphasis supplied)
minor children living with them, may be seen to be based
upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to
such parents. The civil law assumes that when an have been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption
unemancipated child living with its parents commits a was filed.
tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil
of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child
Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor
who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in
child is the relationship existing between the parents and the
other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with
minor child living with them and over whom, the law
presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties
accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.
course, only presumed and the presumption can be Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted
this rule:
overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that
the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father
Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for
of a family to prevent the damage.
the damage caused by the child under their parental
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto authority in accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still
lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has
of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural
similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the
parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto,
tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the
are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
that because a decree of adoption was issued by the
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of
children living in their companyand under their parental
the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of
any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious
We do not believe that parental authority is properly
conduct.
regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child
time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that
and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so
as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report
of the Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically
placement agency and the evidence submitted before it, the custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption
court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain,
where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit
care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody period
or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant
has been completed, and that the best interests of the child
case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden
be entered, which shall be effective he date the original
them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have
foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since

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they were at the time in the United States and had no
physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair
and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be
inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis
underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part
of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control
at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the
conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be
finally granted unless and until the adopting parents are
given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at
least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional
readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial
custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally
vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given
actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the
instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet
begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air
rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was
then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to
the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the
indispensable parties being already before the court,
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review
is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No.
SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby
REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for
further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs
against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, concur.
Footnotes
1 Pojas v. Hon. Gozo-Dalole, 192 SCRA 575 (1990).
2 Fecundo v. Berjamen, 180 SCRA 235 (1989); Filipinas
Fabricators and Sales, Inc. v. Magsino, 157 SCRA 469
(1988).
3 72 SCRA 120 (1976).
4 Id., at 126.
5 See in this connection. Art. 311, 316. 357, Civil Code;
Exconde v. Capuno, 101 Phil. 843 (1957).
6 38 Phil. 768 (1918).
7 Id., at 775-776.
8 Presidential Decree No. 603, dated 10 December 1974.
9 Executive Order No. 209, dated 6 July 1967.
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CASE NO 18 RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22523 September 29, 1967
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR,
EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA. LUIS E. SANTOS, JR. and
EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
A. E. Dacanay for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.
ANGELES, J.:
An appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, in Special Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing
the petition instituted by the spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr. and
Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa y
Mendoza.
The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder sister may
adopt a younger brother.
The trial court dismissed the petition reasoning thus:
A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the
parents of the minor to be adopted are also the parents of
the petitioner-wife. The minor, therefore, is the latter's
legitimate brother.
In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an incongruous
situation where the minor Edwin Villa, a legitimate brother of
the petitioner-wife, will also be her son. In the opinion of the
court, that incongruity not neutralized by other circumstances
absent herein, should prevent the adoption.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but the
same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
The facts are not disputed.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the
court a quo on January 8, 1963, praying that the minor
Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their
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(petitioner's) son by adoption. Evidence was presented that
the order setting the case for hearing has been duly
published, Exhibit A. There having been no opposition
registered to the petition, the petitioners were permitted to
adduce their evidence.
It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of
age, Filipinos, residing in the City of Manila. They were
married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of
their own. They do not have a child of their own blood.
Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate,
acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction,
nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a
child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the
common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos
and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business
interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA
electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and
the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His income is
approximately P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife, is a
nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning of
about P300.00.
It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on
May 22, 1958, Exhibit C. He was a sickly child since birth.
Due to the child's impairing health his parents entrusted him
to the petitioners who reared and brought him up for the
years thereafter, and as a result, there developed between
the petitioners and the child, a deep and profound love for
each other. The natural parents of the minor testified that
they have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of
their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written
consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully
understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their
child by the petitioners.
We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has
been pointed to Us by the Office of the Solicitor General who
argues for the State in this case, that relatives, by blood or
by affinity, are prohibited from adopting one another. The
only objection raised is the alleged "incongruity" that will
result in the relation of the petitioner-wife and the adopted, in
the circumstance that the adopted who is the legitimate
brother of the adopter, will also be her son by adoption. The
theory is, therefore, advanced that adoption among people
who are related by nature should not be allowed, in order
that dual relationship should not result, reliance being made
upon the views expressed by this Court in McGee vs.
Republic. L-5387, April 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 820.1awphîl.nèt
In that case, an American citizen, Clyde E. McGee married
to a Filipina by whom he had one child, instituted a
proceeding for the adoption of two minor children of the wife
had by her first husband. The lower court granted the
petition of McGee to adopt his two minor step-children. On
appeal by the State. We reversed the decision. We said:
The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of
paternity and filiation where none existed before. Where
therefore the relationship of parent and child already exists
whether by blood or by affinity as in the case of illegitimate
and step-children, it would be unnecessary and superfluous
to establish and super impose another relationship of parent
and child through adoption. Consequently, an express
authorization of law like article 338 is necessary, if not to
render it proper and legal, at least, to remove any and all
doubt on the subject matter. Under this view, article 338 may
not be regarded as a surplusage. That may have been the
reason why in the old Code of Civil Procedure, particularly its
provisions regarding adoption, authority to adopt a step-child
by a step-father was provided in section 766 notwithstanding
the general authorization in section 765 extended to any
inhabitant of the Philippines to adopt a minor child. The
same argument of surplusage could plausibly have been
advanced as regards section 766, that is to say, section 766
was unnecessary and superfluous because without it a step-
father could adopt a minor step-child anyway. However, the
inserting of section 766 was not entirely without reason. It
seems to be an established principle in American
jurisprudence that a person may not adopt his own relative,
the reason being that it is unnecessary to establish a
relationship where such already exists (the same philosophy
underlying our codal provisions on adoption). So some
states have special laws authorizing the adoption of relatives
such as a grandfather adopting a grandchild and a father
adopting his illegitimate or natural-child.
Notwithstanding the views thus expressed, a study of
American precedents would reveal that there is a variance in
the decisions of the courts in different jurisdictions regarding,
the matter of adoption of relatives. It cannot be stated as a
general proposition that the adoption of a blood relative is
contrary to the policy of the law, for in many states of the
Union, no restriction of that sort is contained in the statutes
authorizing adoption, although laws of other jurisdiction
expressly provide that adoption may not take place within
persons within a certain degree of relationship (1 Am. Jur.
628-629). Courts in some states hold that in the absence of
express statutory restriction, a blood relationship between
the parties is not a legal impediment to the adoption of one
by the other, and there may be a valid adoption where the
relation of parent and child already exists by nature (2 Am.
Jur. 2d 869). Principles vary according to the particular
adoption statute of a state under which any given case is
considered. It would seem that in those states originally
influenced by the civil law countries where adoption
originated, the rules are liberally construed, while in other
states where common law principles predominate, adoption
laws are more strictly applied because they are regarded to
be in derogation of the common law.
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who
may not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners-
appellants herein are not among those prohibited from
adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who
cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is
under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law.
Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a
natural child by the natural father or mother, of other
illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-
child by the step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of
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course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a
relationship of parent and child between them by nature. To
say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter
and the adopted are related to each other, except in these
cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption
among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever Republic of the Philippines
degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not SUPREME COURT
the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to
be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption THIRD DIVISION
statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to
provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of
such children by person who can properly rear and educate IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
them (In re Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378). NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

With respect to the objection that the adoption in this HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
particular case will result in a dual relationship between the
parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the DECISION
adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent the
adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
law. The relationship established by the adoption is limited to
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural
the adopting parents and does not extend to their other
father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the
middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of
The facts are undisputed.
the legitimate children which they may have after the
adoption except that the law imposes certain impediments to
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein
marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of
petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate
the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein,
(Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p. 652, citing 1
among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26,
Oyuelos 284; Perez, Gonzales and Castan; 4-11
1994;2that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 177; Muñoz P. 104). So even
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and
considered in relation to the rules on succession which are
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be
in pari materia, the adoption under consideration would not
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle
be objectionable on the ground alone of the resulting
name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s
relationship between the adopter and the adopted. Similar
surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to
dual relationships also result under our law on marriage
"Catindig," his surname.
when persons who are already related, by blood or by
affinity, marry each other. But as long as the relationship is
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed
not within the degrees prohibited by law, such marriages are
Decision granting the adoption, thus:
allowed notwithstanding the resulting dual relationship. And
as We do not find any provision in the law that expressly "After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by
prohibits adoption among relatives, they ought not to be the petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the
prevented. petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by
For all the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed
law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
from is set aside, and the petition for the adoption of the
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that
subject minor, granted. No pronouncement as to costs.
the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest
and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
The Court further holds that the petitioner’s care and custody
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ.,
of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more
concur.
than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the
same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil
purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child
CASE NO. 19 USE OF SURNAME/MIDDLE NAME
and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of

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the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE
NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the
Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics
Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification
and/or reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA)
as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname
of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an
illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her
middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving
Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption
because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child
from having a middle name in case there is only one
adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have
as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle
name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption
is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child,
hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be
violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name
"Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her
illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her
middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be
permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her
natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s
filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of
the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the
latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship
in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with
her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to
use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle
name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This
custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family
Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the
designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined
as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or
appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world
at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with
him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that
every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or
proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The
given or proper name is that which is given to the individual
at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected
by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the
substantive rules which regulate the use of surname10 of an
individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he
may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married
woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally
use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a
voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her
husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating
that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is
the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name
and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may
resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may
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choose to continue employing her former husband's
surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another
person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife
shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased
husband's surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the
younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name
or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used
only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants
shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law
regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 17611 of
the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To
Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what
middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only
considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is
identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle
name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code
merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family
Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise
silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire
the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members
of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted
the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of
adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle
name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees, the members approved the
suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father,
thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference
between the use by the wife of the surname and that of the
child because the father’s surname indicates the family
to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist
on the use of the father’s surname by the child but that,
if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the
mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use
the surname of the mother, how will his name be written?
Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point
is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the
surname of the father and permissive in the case of the
surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is
covered by the present Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through
no choice of the person himself precisely because of this
misunderstanding. He then cited the following example:
Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the
mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty.
Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is
Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is David but they all call
him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article
(12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory
on the child to use the surname of the father but he may
use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a
middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this
for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the
proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of
legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the
appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification
suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father
should always be last because there are so many traditions
like the American tradition where they like to use their
second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also
followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan
name.
xxx
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Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that
in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say
that initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second
name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.
Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way.
The Committee approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the
adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters."13 Again, it
is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only
expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for
the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child,
whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general,
the rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act,
a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of
paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the
child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed
in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the
United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that
its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted
child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
"Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and
privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed
to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and
purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and
Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed
above. This is consistent with the intention of the members
of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s
continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her
middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be
noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her
hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are
living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390
Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for
all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa".
Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name
will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with
her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption –
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare
of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should
be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it
is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is
necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and
justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen
the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which
may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting
the law."28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use,
as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie
should be allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA"
as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete
name be entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and
Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
7
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees, August 10, 1985, p. 8.
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8 23
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No. Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 189, citing 38 Am Jur,
Name 594-595. 24
"Sec. 18. Succession. – In legal and intestate succession,
the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
9
Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 117209, succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509, citing Tolentino, A.M., However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had
Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern."
Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1993 ed., 672.
25
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
10
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra. G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, citing 2
Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 865.
11
"Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and
26
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., id.,
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 910.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their
27
father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., id.,
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil citing Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes, etc., et al., 142 SCRA
register, or when an admission in a public document or 485 (1986).
private handwritten instrument is made by the
28
father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action Paras, supra, p. 91.
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his
lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of
one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child."
Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
12
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
law Committees, August 10, 1985, pp. 16-18.

13
Article 365 of the New Civil Code.

14
Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., supra; Republic vs. CASE NO. 20 GRANDPARENT’S SUBSTITUTE
Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra. PARENTAL AUTHORITY

15
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I,
Fifteenth Edition, 2002, p. 685.
Republic of the Philippines
16
Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, SUPREME COURT
1989 Edition, p. 272-273, citing 4 Valverde, 473. Manila

17
Paras, supra, citing Prasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 665. EN BANC

18
Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, 406
SCRA 135, citing United Nation General Assembly/44/49
(1989). G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

19
"Sec. 17. Legitimacy. – The adoptee shall be considered LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents vs.
and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end,
the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance and support in
keeping with the means of the family."
VITUG, J.:
20
Id.
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely,
21
"Art. 189. (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is
be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adoptersand Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July
both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations 1987), which declares:
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
adopters;" of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
22
Supra.

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shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance
of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above
provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of
Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent,
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of
First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and
Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows
before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of
Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave
birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos,
Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family
affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel"
over a number of other things, like when and where the
couple should start living independently from Julia's parents
or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of
America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he
underwent a training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25
August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow
get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel
filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch
30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of
the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814).
Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through
counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact,
been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree
of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had
repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither
appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed
the decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-
compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification
of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at
the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his
own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him)
because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all
these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who
does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts
for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological
incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the
Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law,
Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting
in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to
say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand,
Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea
is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment
would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-)
Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make
the marriage null and void and the former only voidable.
Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be
modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge
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the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in
sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a
psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a
ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the
appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a
ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does
not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7),
the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word
"mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to
psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with
one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said
that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the
fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family
Code, the Committee used a language which describes a
ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice
Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable
marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable
marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason
why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in
marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is
"insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there
are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase
"even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be
modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the
marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of
the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in
the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does
not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he
had known these completely, he might not have consented
to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making
psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages
since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood
the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to
make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he
did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit
added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of
incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which
is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and,
therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there
are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is
curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero
inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very
essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it
from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that
his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since
there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together
of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations
attendant to marriage, which are completely different from
each other, because they require a different capacity, which
is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological
incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should
not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable
of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should
be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has
not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage
and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a
defense in the action for annulment so that when the action
for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that
actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer
true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not
cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated
that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not
be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still
insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that
they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter.
Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological
incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
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Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a
lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods
when there is an understanding of the consequences of
marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the
ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the
marriage was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to
copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice
Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence
that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and
only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated
that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa
remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in
law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological
incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft
provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with
the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab
initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the
psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in
void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of
marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the
provision is that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues
and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is
possible that after the marriage, one's psychological
incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice
Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this
case is to allow him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall
likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with
"although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that
the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after
its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to
create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot
argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and
physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that
mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the
minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it
is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word
"mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He
explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of
understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last
meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification
of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of
debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they
classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having
been annulments of marriages arising from psychological
incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law
because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common
provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to
have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that
marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled
in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should
be retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it
is their answer to the problem of church annulments of
marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the
other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned
about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote,
which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista
and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive
period of ten years within which the action for declaration of
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nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The
Committee approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision
Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the
law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may
be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all
that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an
account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any
doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the
rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of
marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract
marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to
the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas
naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological
anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it
would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the
cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person
should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of
marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity"
defies any precise definition since psychological causes can
be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage,"
written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy
Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality
can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here
described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a
farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which
he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself
must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c)
the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon
contemplates a true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul
II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it
must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive
the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of
the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese
of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
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otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself,
that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code
and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree
and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We
should continue to be reminded that innate in our society,
then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible
in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
(Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the
basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and
they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at
all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel
stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide
all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion
as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended
reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear
into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for
the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and private respondent.
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To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been
shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at
least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and
cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other
hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve
to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term
"psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But,
as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers
of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds
for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in
this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity"
can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to
have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however,
enough safeguards against this contingency, among which,
is the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties
and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established
that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits
specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United
States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract
expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is there
any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for
the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with
Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there
were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had
elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the
petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in
her answer, claimed that it is the former who has been
irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit
evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner
in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there
are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance,
an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or
cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also
be instances when, for economic and practical reasons,
husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital
bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and
respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the
absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the
other to inform the latter of his/her condition and
whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting
with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him.
In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her
husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she
any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private
respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological
incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations,
although these indications were made manifest after the
celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this
Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife
who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in
the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or
indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a
"habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with
another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love
which he has sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family
Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity
to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity
by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform
an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the
marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not
entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish
to add some observations. The letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of
then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the
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background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had
thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the
draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it
had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof
based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial
decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married
person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in
another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family
Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage
as —
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian
traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon
which the family and society are founded, and also realizing
the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic
sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our
people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings
did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead
opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It
was thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on
grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of
provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on
void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those
proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law,
the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with
the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion
of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of
void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked
or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article
34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our
country today may already dissolved or annulled on the
grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of
nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an
absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar
Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee
was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has
been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions,
would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or
premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of
some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a
family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman
who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to
have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that
they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo
among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon
their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the
Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above
intended to add another ground to those already listed in the
Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus
expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion
of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity
based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis;
hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of
what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the
Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the
time of marriage although it be manifested later.
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Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just ROMERO, J., concurring:

like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent
this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the
provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by
"experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may
be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken
from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will
remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve
ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be
taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish.
If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages,
by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties,
fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find
a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-
accepted means.
1 Written pursuant to the request of Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro during the March 23, 1985
joint meeting of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee at the UP Law Center for comments on P.B.
3149 (Pacificador Bill) on Divorce, P.B. No. 1986 (Monfort
and Collantes Bill) on Recognition of Church Annulments of
Marriages, P.B. No. 2347 (Sitoy Bill) on Additional Grounds
for Annulment of Marriage and Legal Separation and P.B.
1350 (Kalaw Bill) on Equal Rights of Filipino Women which
were pending before her Sub-Committee.
2 FAMILY CODE, Art. 48.
3 J.A. v. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 37 (1988).
4 As quoted in the majority opinion.
Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo0

Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted

the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for
unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to
the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which
some members of the Bench have implemented the
provision. These are not interchangeable, each being
separate and distinct from the other.

SEPARATE OPINIONS

Footnotes

1 Per Judge Enrique Garovillo.

2 Penned by Justice Jainal Rasul, concurred in by Justice
Pedro Ramirez and Ramon Mabutas, Jr.
3 Rollo, 37-42.
4 Rollo, 13-18.
5 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, July
26, 1986.
6 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee,
August 2, 1986.
7 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee,
August 9, 1986.
8 In her "Handbook on the Family Code."
9 Marriage in Canon Law, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc.,
1986, 129-130.
C 1095 Sunt incapaces matrimonii contrahendi:
1. qui sufficiente rationis usu carent;
2. qui laborant gravi defectu discretionis iudicii circa iura et
official matrimonialia essentialia mutuo tradenda et
acceptanda;
3. qui ob causas naturae psychicae obligationes matrimonii
essentiales assumere non valent.
10 Ibid., 131-132.
11 Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.

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CASES IN SUCCESSION
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR,
ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA
A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL
TITCO, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will
to clearly establish that the decedent was not of sound and
disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will.
Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the
wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner
provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the June
15, 2006 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52,
Guagua, Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of
the notarial will of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to
be impressed with merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-
1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a
new one entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of
the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED.5
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA
Resolution6 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration
thereto.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision and
instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which disallowed the
notarial will of Paciencia.
Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her
last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o
Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala"7 (Will) in the Pampango
dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the
house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin),
was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia
expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that
the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter
affixed her signature at the end of the said document on
page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof.9
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin
(Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R.
Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s due
execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation
clause10 and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof,11 in the presence of Paciencia and of one another
and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia
bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R.
Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their
children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
xxxx
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me
since then up to the present by the spouses LORENZO
LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH,
CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in parcels
1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON
F. LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and
KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and
Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently
residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and
their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS
LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their
parents who would decide to bequeath since they are the
children of the spouses;
xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered
aside from the properties mentioned in this last will and
testament, I am also bequeathing and giving the same to the
spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two
children and I also command them to offer masses yearly for
the repose of my soul and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala,
Epifania Regala and their spouses and with respect to the
fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to
fulfill the wishes of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala in accordance
with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x12
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains
undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she
treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know
and treated Paciencia as his own mother.13 Paciencia lived
with Lorenzo’s family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she
who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days
after the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981,
Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There,
she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on
January 4, 1996.
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In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge
Limpin.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April
27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for
the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
There being no opposition to the petition after its due
publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13,
200015allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22,
2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of
the instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last will
and testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981.16 The
Will was executed in her father’s (Judge Limpin) home office,
in her presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and
Faustino.17 Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her
signatures on all its four pages.18 She likewise positively
identified the signature of her father appearing
thereon.19 Questioned by the prosecutor regarding Judge
Limpin’s present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her
father had a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain
surgery.20 The judge can walk but can no longer talk and
remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated
that her father can no longer testify in court.21
The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio
Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition22 to Lorenzo’s petition.
Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s
Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his
predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to
bequeath them to Lorenzo.23
Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now
joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala,
Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie
M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a
Supplemental Opposition24 contending that Paciencia’s Will
was null and void because ownership of the properties had
not been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before her
death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil
Code.25 Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of
Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was
disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and
resident of the USA.26 Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.27
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an
Amended Opposition28 asking the RTC to deny the probate
of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not
executed and attested to in accordance with the
requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally
incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she
was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of
fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by
Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the
signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming
the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or
trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to
be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition
and Recommendation29 reiterating their opposition to the
appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties
and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30 denying
the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed
administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of the
USA while the latter’s claim as a co-owner of the properties
subject of the Will has not yet been established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the
Will continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled for cross-
examination by the petitioners. She testified as to the age of
her father at the time the latter notarized the Will of
Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia at the time
of the execution of the Will; and the lack of photographs
when the event took place. 31
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado
(Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico, son of
Faustino, testified on his father’s condition. According to him
his father can no longer talk and express himself due to
brain damage. A medical certificate was presented to the
court to support this allegation. 32
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his
departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan,
Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981
Paciencia went to the USA and lived with him and his family
until her death in January 1996; the relationship between
him and Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since
Paciencia took care of him since birth and took him in as an
adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and
without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencia’s death,
she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of
sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the
custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after
Paciencia’s death through Faustino; and he was already
residing in the USA when the Will was executed. 33 Lorenzo
positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three
different documents and in the Will itself and stated that he
was familiar with Paciencia’s signature because he
accompanied her in her transactions.34 Further, Lorenzo
belied and denied having used force, intimidation, violence,
coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he
was not in the Philippines when the same was
executed.35 On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that
Paciencia informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival
in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after her
death.36
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as
he already died on May 21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia
were first cousins.37 She claimed to have helped in the
household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing
her to stay therein from morning until evening and that
during the period of her service in the said household,
Lorenzo’s wife and his children were staying in the same
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house.38 She served in the said household from 1980 until
Paciencia’s departure for the USA on September 19, 1981.39
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw
Faustino bring "something" for Paciencia to sign at the
latter’s house.40 Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see
what that "something" was as same was placed inside an
envelope.41 However, she remembered Paciencia instructing
Faustino to first look for money before she signs them. 42 A
few days after or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to
the house of Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said
envelope.43 Upon going home, however, the envelope was
no longer with Paciencia.44 Rosie further testified that
Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful"
because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the
kitchen then start looking for it moments later. 45 On cross
examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a
doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia
was "magulyan" was based on her personal
assessment,46 and that it was Antonio who requested her to
testify in court.47
In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was
his aunt.48 He identified the Will and testified that he had
seen the said document before because Paciencia brought
the same to his mother’s house and showed it to him along
with another document on September 16, 1981. 49 Antonio
alleged that when the documents were shown to him, the
same were still unsigned.50 According to him, Paciencia
thought that the documents pertained to a lease of one of
her rice lands,51 and it was he who explained that the
documents were actually a special power of attorney to
lease and sell her fishpond and other properties upon her
departure for the USA, and a Will which would transfer her
properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her death. 52 Upon
hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words:
"Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties?"
Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have other
relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why
should I die already?"53 Thereafter, Antonio advised
Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want to,
to which the latter purportedly replied, "I know nothing about
those, throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not
sign them."54 After which, Paciencia left the documents with
Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September
18, 1981.55
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its
Decision56 denying the petition thus:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition
dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the notarized will
dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.
57
SO ORDERED.
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of
Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the
Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or
strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.58
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted
the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did
not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of
unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated
that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person
mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for
executing a Will."59 Moreover, the oppositors in the probate
proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that
every person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete
circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation
that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.60
Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion was
denied by the CA in its Resolution62 dated August 31, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for
Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following
errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF
PACIENCIA’S WILL DESPITE RESPONDENT’S UTTER
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF
THE RULES OF COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO
PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT
THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED63
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due
execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to
warrant its allowance for probate.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is
apparent from the face of the Will.
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Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the
extrinsic validity of a Will in probate proceedings.64 This is
expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court, which states:
Rule 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution.
– No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is
proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right
of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as
to its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed
the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.65 These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and
806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also
sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the
last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed
the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public
shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows
faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The
signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident
on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states
the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one another and
that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the
presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the
petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the
Will may be authentic although they question her state of
mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary
nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at
the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of
the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia
was "magulyan" or forgetful so much so that it effectively
stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed
in their Motion for Reconsideration66 filed with the CA that
Paciencia was not only "magulyan" but was actually
suffering from paranoia.67
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being
forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally
unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a
Will.68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound
mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the
testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or
that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of
making the will to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to
Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence,
medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of
unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the
other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s
testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when
the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily
executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses
to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled
to great weight where they are truthful and
intelligent."69 More importantly, a testator is presumed to be
of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the
burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800
of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind
at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who
opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one
month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to
be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will
must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly
known to be insane one month or less before the making of
the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia
was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners.
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However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence
was presented by them to prove the same, thereby
warranting the CA’s finding that petitioners failed to
discharge such burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of
the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects
of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As
aptly pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of
the nature of the document she executed. She specially
requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon
her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the
properties from her parents and the properties she is
bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his
two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution of
the will and was not included therein as devisee.70
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats,
undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and
trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a
will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the
willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute the
document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions
upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was
forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear
or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo
or by some other persons for his benefit; and that assuming
Paciencia’s signature to be genuine, it was obtained through
fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged
conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on September
16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will
and left it unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia
loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love
even extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children. This kind of
relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our
culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their
nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children.
Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has
resulted in many family discords between those favored by
the testamentary disposition of a testator and those who
stand to benefit in case of intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that
Paciencia’s relationship with Lorenzo and his family is
different from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact
that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him
both here and abroad, even if the latter was already married
and already has children, highlights the special bond
between them. This unquestioned relationship between
Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity
of the said document as against petitioners’ allegations of
duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper
influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from
being factual in nature, are not supported by concrete,
substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth
stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not
based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice
to move the Court to uphold said allegations.71Furthermore,
"a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on dubious
grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will
has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be
probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of
those interested in [the estate of the deceased]."72
Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before
it that the Will was duly executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the
ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was
not complied with. It provides:
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted
for where will contested. – If the will is contested, all the
subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills
executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present
in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and
examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of
them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some
of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside
the province where the will has been filed, their deposition
must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due
execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to
it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may
nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the
testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence
presented that the will was executed and attested in the
manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if
at least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are
in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any
competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary
public should have been presented in court since all but one
witness, Francisco, are still living.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to
appear and testify before the court was satisfactorily
explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by
his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden
and could no longer talk and express himself due to brain
damage. To prove this, said witness presented the
corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin
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testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in Associate Justice
1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge
Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
his daughter’s name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given Associate Justice
such condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to
note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners CERTIFICATION
neither interposed any objections to the testimonies of said
witnesses nor challenged the same on cross examination. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is
We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of had been reached in consultation before the case was
the said subscribing witness and of the notary public to assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencia’s
Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s testimony RENATO C. CORONA
proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well Chief Justice
as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule
that "[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the
attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither
does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the
attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is Footnotes
decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it,
1
not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they Gonzales Vda. de Precilla v. Narciso, 150-B Phil. 437, 473
must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the (1972).
manner required by law."73 1âwphi1 2
Rollo, pp. 9-31.
3
CA rollo, pp. 177-192; penned by Associate Justice Andres
Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim
posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and S. Abdulwahid and Vicente Q. Roxas.
due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate 4
Records, pp. 220-246; penned by Judge Jonel S. Mercado.
of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or 5
CA rollo, p. 192.
[evidence that] ought to be before it that is 6
Id. at 212.
controlling."74 "The very existence of [the Will] is in itself 7
Exhibit "G", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 36-39.
prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that 8
Exhibit "G-11," id. at 38.
[her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, 9
Exhibits "G-9," "G-10," and "G-11," id. at 36, 37 and 39.
and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, 10
Exhibit "G-6," id at 38.
such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of 11
Exhibits "G-4," "G-5," and "G-7," id. at 36, 37 and 39.
the parties affected thereby."75 This, coupled with Lorenzo’s 12
English Translation of the Last Will and Testament of Miss
established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the Paciencia Regala, Exhibits "H-1" and "H-2," id. at 41-42.
testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the 13
TSN dated April 18, 2001, pp. 2-6.
total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from 14
Records, pp. 1-3.
their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance 15
Id. at 13-14.
in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for 16
TSN dated June 22, 2000, p. 2.
probate. 17
Id. at 5.
18
Id. at 2-4.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 19
Id. at 3.
June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of 20
Id. at 2.
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 21
Id. at 6.
are AFFIRMED. 22
Motion with Leave of Court to Admit Instant Opposition to
Petition of Lorenzo Laxa; records, pp. 17-18.
SO ORDERED. 23
Id. at 17.
24
Id. at 25-28.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO 25
Article 1049. Acceptance may be express or tacit.
Associate Justice xxxx
Acts of mere preservation or provisional administration do
WE CONCUR: not imply an acceptance of the inheritance if, through such
acts, the title or capacity of an heir has not been assumed
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

LEONARDO-DE Associate Justice
CASTRO

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE
OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S.
LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON and
VICTORIA L. TUAZON, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the March 30,
2009 Decision1 and October 22, 2009 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87064 which
affirmed the August 26, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 42 (RTC), in SP. Proc. No. 99-
95225 disallowing the probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Enrique S. Lopez.
The Factual Antecedents
On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving
his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four legitimate children,
namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the
respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez (Diana), Marybeth de
Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as
compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a
Last Will and Testament4 on August 10, 1996 and constituted
Richard as his executor and administrator.
On September 27, 1999, Richard filed a petition for the
probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the
RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters
testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition
contending that the purported last will and testament was not
executed and attested as required by law, and that it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of Richard. The said opposition was also adopted by
Victoria.
After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional
requirements, Richard presented the attesting witnesses,
namely: Reynaldo Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria
Lourdes Manalo (Manalo); and the notary public who
notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco).
The instrumental witnesses testified that after the late
Enrique read and signed the will on each and every page,
they also read and signed the same in the latter's presence
and of one another. Photographs of the incident were taken
and presented during trial. Manalo further testified that she
was the one who prepared the drafts and revisions from
Enrique before the final copy of the will was made.
Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his
client for more than 20 years. Prior to August 10, 1996, the
latter consulted him in the preparation of the subject will and
furnished him the list of his properties for distribution among
his children. He prepared the will in accordance with
Enrique's instruction and that before the latter and the
attesting witnesses signed it in the presence of one another,
he translated the will which was written in English to Filipino
and added that Enrique was in good health and of sound
mind at that time.
On the other hand, the oppositors presented its lone witness,
Gregorio B. Paraon (Paraon), Officer-in-Charge of the
Notarial Section, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Manila.
His testimony centered mainly on their findings that Atty.
Nolasco was not a notary public for the City of Manila in
1996, which on cross examination was clarified after Paraon
discovered that Atty. Nolasco was commissioned as such for
the years 1994 to 1997.
Ruling of the RTC
In the Decision dated August 26, 2005,5 the RTC disallowed
the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of
the Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation
clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code
requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down
in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of
pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no
evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence required. While the
acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7
pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has 8
pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it
disallowed the will for not having been executed and attested
in accordance with law.
Aggrieved, Richard filed a Notice of Appeal which the RTC
granted in the Order dated October 26, 2005.6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 30, 2009,7 the CA issued the assailed decision
dismissing the appeal. It held that the RTC erroneously
granted Richard's appeal as the Rules of Court is explicit
that appeals in special proceedings, as in this case, must be
made through a record on appeal. Nevertheless, even on the
merits, the CA found no valid reason to deviate from the
findings of the RTC that the failure to state the number of
pages of the will in the attestation clause was fatal. It noted
that while Article 809 of the Civil Code sanctions mere
substantial compliance with the formal requirements set forth
in Article 805 thereof, there was a total omission of such fact
in the attestation clause. Moreover, while the
acknowledgment of the will made mention of "7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written," the will had actually 8 pages
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including the acknowledgment portion thus, necessitating the
presentation of evidence aliunde to explain the discrepancy.
Richard's motion for reconsideration from the decision was
likewise denied in the second assailed Resolution8 dated
October 22, 2009.
including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be
explained by mere examination of the will itself but through
the presentation of evidence aliund.11 On this score is the
comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of
Article 809, to wit:

Hence, the instant petition assailing the propriety of the CA's
decision.
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills,
particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also
sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the
last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed
the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them.1âwphi1 (underscoring supplied)
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects
that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself:
whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether
the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the
subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All
these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or
even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause
can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages,
and whether all persons required to sign did so in the
presence of each other must substantially appear in the
attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in
the probate proceedings.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the
will. Moreover, it correctly ruled that Richard pursued the
wrong mode of appeal as Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court explicitly provides that in special proceedings, as in
this case, the appeal shall be made by record on appeal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO

ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or

undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and Republic of the Philippines
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language SUPREME COURT
used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that Manila
the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805. FIRST DIVISION

The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of
the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any vs.
increase or decrease in the pages.9 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA
GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in JUGO, respondents.
the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in
this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion
of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7
pages including the page on which the ratification and GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
acknowledgment are written"10 cannot be deemed
substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now

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intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as
amended by the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring
as null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the
resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left
a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of
the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2
and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna
C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their
signatures below the attestation clause and on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the
testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The Will
was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo
Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein
petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only
executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the
testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by
whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita,
but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully
wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband
and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin
Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were
married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace.
The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal
wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his
entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner.
The Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my
aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son,
Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom
I declare and admit to be legally and properly entitled to
inherit from me; that while I have been estranged from my
above-named wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I
was legally married to her or that we have been separated
up to the present for reasons and justifications known fully
well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and
wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and
avow to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the things
which she has done for me, now and in the past; that while
Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and
consent, did comport and represent myself as her own
husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the
law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of
matrimony because of my aforementioned previous
marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the
probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of
letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina
Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia
that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and
improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the
time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already
very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and
thus, letters testamentary should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of
the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will
to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until
his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate
will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the
invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the
probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to
be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is
null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article
1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the
will in question declared valid except the devise in favor of
the appellant which is declared null and void. The properties
so devised are instead passed on in intestacy to the
appellant in equal shares, without pronouncement as to cost.
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her
children filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error"
praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the
dispositive portion of the decision be changed to "appellees"
so as to read: "The properties so devised are instead passed
on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without
pronouncement as to costs." The motion was granted by the
respondent court on August 10, 1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court in
a resolution dated December 28, 1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the
respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of
herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary
provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided in
the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings
because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to
establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. The
petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of
paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its nullity
could only be made by the proper court in a separate action
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brought by the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining
a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision in
the Will in favor of the person with whom the testator was
allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that
the last Will and Testament itself expressly admits
indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between
the testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner
herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged
ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led
private respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the
application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix
Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon.
Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27, 1975).
Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator
of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in
issue the legality of the devise. We agree with the
respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after
declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass
upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise
in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's
area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of
the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:
xxx xxx xxx
... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and
definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last
Will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are
valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v.
Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's
area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The
testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the
only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any
inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions
of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is
premature.
xxx xxx xxx
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of
the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of
the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the
execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of
the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution
(Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for
all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities
required by law and that the testator was in a condition to
make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the
new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment
in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing
more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the
validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide,
for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one
valid. ... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court,
the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and
completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this
nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically,
would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to
determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions
would be superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the
Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed
upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in
passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on
its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual
provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate
(which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the
petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand
that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare
with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967,
21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13
SCRA 693).
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the
extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed that the
Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities
required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity
to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she completely
agrees with the respondent court when in resolving the
question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied
the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4,
Decision, Annex A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of
the Court of Appeals' decision in toto.
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The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the
respondent court to declare the testamentary provision in
favor of the petitioner as null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated
in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for
probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary,
this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in
the record, in the record, in the event of probate or if the
court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as
well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions
of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.
Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we
remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a
separate action for that purpose simply because, in the
probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the
intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same
criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants
and ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of
nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee;
and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by
preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning
donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15,
1968, or almost six years before the testator's death on July
16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez
was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so
many years." He also declared that respondents Carmelita
Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. In Article
IV, he stated that he had been living as man and wife with
the petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo declared that the
petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He stated
that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but
"in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could
not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because
of my aforementioned previous marriage.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a
prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will.
There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo
lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22
years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and
Sofia J. Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the
Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then
51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now
contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the
belief that she was legally married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good
faith. As argued by the private respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits
indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between
the testator and petitioner, the devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of
evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of
the testator, which led private respondents to present
contrary evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic
validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the
deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the
man he had lived with as man and wife, as already married,
was an important and specific issue brought by the parties
before the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of
Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of
the will, it was petitioner who opted to present evidence on
her alleged good faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony of
Petitioner, TSN of August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).
Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that
would refute the testimony of petitioner on the point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator,
testified at length on the meretricious relationship of his
brother and petitioner. (TSN of August 18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the
parties made a decisive issue right at the inception of the
case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a
ruling on the question.
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and
petitioner 'were deemed guilty of adultery or concubinage', it
was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent woman
she pretended to be.
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xxx xxx xxx
3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless,
then private respondents respectfully offer the following
analysis:
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the
deceased testator in a town in Tarlac where neither she nor
the testator ever resided. If there was nothing to hide from,
why the concealment' ? Of course, it maybe argued that the
marriage of the deceased with private respondent Rufina
Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But it should be
remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family
way at that time and it would seem that the parents of Martin
Jugo were not in favor of the marriage so much so that an
action in court was brought concerning the marriage.
(Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18, 1975, pp.
29-30)
SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased
testator when they were still both single. That would be in
1922 as Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina Gomez on
November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner married the testator
only on December 5, 1952. There was a space of about 30
years in between. During those 30 years, could it be
believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did
not marry her nor contact her anymore after November,
1923 - facts that should impel her to ask her groom before
she married him in secrecy, especially so when she was
already about 50 years old at the time of marriage.
petitioner to break off with the deceased during their younger
years.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is
against the making of a donation between persons who are
living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which
becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the
recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will
invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was
disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been
living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate
Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova,
De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
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THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in
1923 is by itself conclusive demonstration that she new that
the man she had openly lived for 22 years as man and wife
was a married man with already two children.

FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of

respondent Rufina Gomez, is it possible that she would not
have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were his
illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom? That is un-
Filipino. SECOND DIVISION

FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
parents of the deceased testator, is it possible that she
would not have known that the mother of private respondent DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and
Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,
Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents of Martin vs.
Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and that of HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding
respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away? Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO,
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS,
unbelievable. They are, to say the least, inherently VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY
improbable, for they are against the experience in common D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES
life and the ordinary instincts and promptings of human D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man
she was going to marry whether or not he was already DECISION
married to another, knowing that her groom had children. It
would be a story that would strain human credulity to the AZCUNA, J.:
limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was already a
married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the
precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary

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restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated
August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition
for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated
cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc.
No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al."
and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C.
Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and
Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition
for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of the RTC,
and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa
D. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad
litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed
Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy
Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general
power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to
manage and exercise control and supervision over his
business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent
and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of
Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and,
4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20,
1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo
Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will,
petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to
have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings
for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic
will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99–93396, was
filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated
that the probate proceedings should take precedence over
SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 because testate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s
holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa
465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag
na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan
ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na
si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin
at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at
mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama
ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa
ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya
at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng
akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya
asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking
Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng
babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa
mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang
asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the
Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo
ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman
mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya
anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa
longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No.
98–90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396 were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the probate proceedings5 primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic
will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition
of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to
private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo,
and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence,
there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such
being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the
extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into
the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal
of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is
clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the
property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss
contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the probate
court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity
of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and
not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance
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constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4)
the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundo’s will
does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion
of one or more compulsory heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order,
dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by
oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly
shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned
thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being
omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies.
However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is
concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a
compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do
otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion. The
Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its
position clear: "for … respondents to have tolerated the
probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when,
on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void … would
have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial
court could have denied its probate outright or could have
passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was
resolved(underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special
Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby DISMISSED without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the
RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10
AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS
"A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I preterited in the holographic will since there was no
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN
COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF
THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE
FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS,
DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED
GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID
ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF
PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS
A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE
COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF
THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE
EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR’S
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE
WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED
BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR,
IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE
TESTATOR’S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND
THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND
EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE
CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT
TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4
of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate
the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will
when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance
thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be
published three weeks successively previous to the
appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b)
cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and
devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution
of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng
Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the
decedent’s will and the holographic will on its face is not
intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs,
petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole
exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were
institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the
holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically
valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the
hearing of the testate case; and,
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Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate
case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render
nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was
presented by petitioners was dated, signed and written by
him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of
preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as
regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana,
unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his
eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons
that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by
Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code
requires that the same must be effected through a will
wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated
by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the
incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of
maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the
matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a
child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as
well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an
attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse,
descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of
a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six
years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of
adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make
a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents
or ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child
or descendant;8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or
disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of
civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the
document executed by Segundo can be considered as a
holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil
Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the
hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form,
and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not
be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across
as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced
from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make
an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results
in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in
favor of those who would succeed in the absence of
Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the
will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law
in succession. All rules of construction are designed to
ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public
policy that it cannot be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one
who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present
case, should be construed more liberally than the ones
drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention
of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that
the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis
ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance
with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes
that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not
preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion,
Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also,
Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his
other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of
one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not
operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was
included plainly as a witness to the altercation between
Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s
holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over
intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with.
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless
the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his
property may be rendered nugatory.17
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In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should
have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled
that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10,
1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent
judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-
93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo
Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is
hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid
testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
9
Article 783 of the Civil Code states: "A will is an act
whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the
disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death."
10
Tolentino, Arturo M., "Commentaries and Jurisprudence
on the Civil Code of the Philippines," Volume III, p. 30.
13
In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only
issues to be resolved are: 1) whether the instrument
submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament;
2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law; 3) whether the decedent had
the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed; and, 4) whether the execution of the will and its
signing were the voluntary acts of the decedents. As a
general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to
pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated. However, in exceptional circumstances, courts are
not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do,
and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Ajero v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994, 236 SCRA
488).
15
Article 854 of the Civil Code states: "The preterition or
omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to
the right of representation."
16
Article 841 of the Civil Code states: "A will is valid even
though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such
institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even
though the person so instituted should not accept the
inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.
In such cases the testamentary dispositions made in
accordance with law shall be complied with and the
remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs."
17
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, No. L-57848, June 19,
1982, 114 SCRA 478.
18
Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, No. L-24742, October 26,
1973, 53 SCRA 360
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-
in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA
CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA,
FELY BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA
MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by
her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA
VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE
MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P.
DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS
SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS,
LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO,
PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M.
MENDOZA,Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure
the return of a reservable property to the third degree
relatives belonging to the line from which the property
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originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by
the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.1
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels
of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with
an area of 7,749 square meters;2 (2) Lot 1684, with an area
of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area of 880
sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name
of respondent Julia Delos Santos5(respondent). Lot No.
1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent
but co-owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of
the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido)
and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and Dominga
had four children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor,
Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria, Deogracias,
Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children of
Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and
Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentin’s children.
Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido
and Dominga’s properties that were subject of an oral
partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After
Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only
daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, her share went to
Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue.
They claimed that after Gregoria’s death, respondent, who is
Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties
as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence,
petitioners claim that the properties should have been
reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert
back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on
reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the
properties as these did not originate from petitioners’ familial
line and were not originally owned by Placido and Dominga.
According to respondent, the properties were bought by
Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931.
It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in
possession of the properties.6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
6, found merit in petitioners’ claim and granted their action
for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal,
Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its Decision
dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to
reconvey the three (3) parcels of land subject of this action in
the name of the plaintiffs enumerated in the complaint
including intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-
half of the property described in the old title, TCT No. T-
124852(M) which belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the
titles in the name of Julia Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M),
T-183631(M) and T-149035(M) and reconvey the same to
the enumerated plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorney’s fees and
damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set
aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by
petitioners. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated
November 16, 2006 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial
Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 is
hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA
denied the same per Resolution9 dated January 17, 2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners
failed to establish that Placido and Dominga owned the
properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even
assuming that Placido and Dominga previously owned the
properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva troncal as
neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did
Gregoria predecease Exequiel.11
Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE NOT
RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO
FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT
HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY
VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12
Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending
that it is sufficient that the properties came from the paternal
line of Gregoria for it to be subject to reserva troncal. They
also claim the properties in representation of their own
predecessors, Antonio and Valentin, who were the brothers
of Exequiel.13
Ruling of the Court
This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The general rule in this regard is that it
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should raise only questions of law. There are, however,
admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the
CA’s findings are contrary to those of the trial court. 14 This
being the case in the petition at hand, the Court must now
look into the differing findings and conclusion of the RTC and
the CA on the two issues that arise – one, whether the
properties in dispute are reservable properties and two,
whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these
properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of
the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant
any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister,
is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within
the third degree and belong to the line from which said
property came. (Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal.
The first transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by
inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to
a descendant called the prepositus. The second
transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the
other ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The
third and last transmission is from the reservista to the
reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the
third degree from which the property came.15
The lineal character of the
reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891
on reserva troncal is not applicable.
The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded from
the erroneous premise that Placido is the ascendant
contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence, it
sought to trace the origin of the subject properties back to
Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased
Exequiel.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or
gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received
the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who
obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of
law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree
from the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco)
from which the property came and for whom the property
should be reserved by the reservor.16
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties
should be reckoned only from Exequiel’s as he is the
ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or
from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The
law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in
determining the lineal character of the property.17It was also
immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel
owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom
the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the
other hand, is the descendant who received the properties
from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property
should have been acquired by the descendant or prepositus
from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A
transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being
repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that
the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel
(ascendant). After his death, Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as
inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants and
collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the
property should be an ascendant (also known as the
reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia,
however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant; rather, she is
Gregoria’s collateral relative.
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Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of
degrees among ascendants and descendants, and those
who are not ascendants and descendants but come from a
common ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be
either direct or collateral.1âwphi1 A direct line is that
constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and
descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among persons who are not ascendants and descendants,
but who come from a common ancestor. (Emphasis and
italics ours)
Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and
Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On
the other hand, Gregoria’s descendants, if she had one,
would be her children, grandchildren and great-
grandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s ascendants, both
petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral relatives. In
determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is made
to the common ancestor and then descent to the relative
from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia’s
collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made
from Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then
to the common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonor’s parents
(second line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt
(third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral relative
within the third degree and not her ascendant.
First cousins of the
descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered
reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the
third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is
the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line
from which the property came and upon whom the property
last revolved by descent.19 It is Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her
first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios. 20
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors
Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of
reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from
whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized
exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the
prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants
(fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the
prepositus and relatives within the third degree.21 In
Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate
succession, when there are relatives of the descendant
within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatario, over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to
him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming
same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belong to the line
from which such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 now Article 891 is in
the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
the designated persons who are the relatives, within the third
degree, of the person from whom the reservable property
came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the
law does not recognize them as such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part
of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned
by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person
from whom the reservable property came. x x x. 23 (Emphasis
and underscoring ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that
the properties are reservable in character, petitioners cannot
benefit from reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now
holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant
within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and
second, because petitioners are not Gregoria’s relatives
within the third degree. Hence, the CA’s disposition that the
complaint filed with the RTC should be dismissed, only on
this point, is correct. If at all, what should apply in the
distribution of Gregoria’s estate are Articles 1003 and 1009
of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased
in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the
whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to
determine the proper distribution of Gregoria’s estate at this
point as the cause of action relied upon by petitioners in their
complaint filed with the RTC is based solely on reserva
troncal. Further, any determination would necessarily entail
reception of evidence on Gregoria’s entire estate and the
heirs entitled thereto, which is best accomplished in an
action filed specifically for that purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of
the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error
in the RTC’s disposition of the case. In upholding the right of
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petitioners over the properties, the RTC ordered the CERTIFICATION

reconveyance of the properties to petitioners and the
transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC should Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
have done, assuming for argument’s sake that reserva certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
troncal is applicable, is have the reservable nature of the reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
property registered on respondent’s titles. In fact, writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to
annotate the reservable character of the property on the MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
title.24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from a Chief Justice
prepositus, whether by the latter’s wish or by operation of
law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly
transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of
ownership belong to him exclusively.25
Footnotes
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the
1
reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition De Papa v. Camacho, 228 Phil. 269, 274-275 (1986).
2
that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the Covered by TCT No. T-149035 (M) (formerly TCT No. T-
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable 101248 [M]).
3
property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The Covered by TCT No. T-183631 (M) (formerly TCT No. T-
transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of 139184 [M]).
4
the reservor. The transferee’s rights are revoked upon the Covered by TCT No. T-149033 (M) (formerly TCT No. T-
survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the 124852 [M]).
5
reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees Respondent was subsequently substituted by her heirs.
6
predecease the reservor.26 (Citations omitted) Rollo, p. 38.
7
Id. at 50.
8
It is when the reservation takes place or is Id. at 40.
9
extinguished,27 that a reservatario becomes, by operation of Id. at 42-43.
10
law, the owner of the reservable property. 28 In any event, the Id. at 37.
11
foregoing discussion does not detract from the fact that Id. at 39.
12
petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the properties Id. at 19.
13
in dispute. Id. at 19-25.
14
Maglana Rice and Corn Mill, Inc. v. Tan, G.R. No. 159051,
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 21, 2011, 658 SCRA 58, 64-65.
15
November 16, 2006 and Resolution dated January 17, 2007 Gonzales v. CFI of Manila (Br. V), et al., 192 Phil. 1, 12
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as (1981).
16
it dismissed the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. Id. at 12-13.
17
609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice Tolentino, A.M., COMMENTARIES AND
to any civil action that the heirs of Gregoria JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Vol. III, 2003 ed., p. 276, citing 6 Manresa
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the 273, 6 Sanchez Roman 1020.
18
determination of ownership of the properties in question. Chua v. CFI of Negros Occidental, Br. V, 168 Phil. 571,
575 (1977).
19
SO ORDERED. Supra note 15, at 14.
20
Id.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES 21
Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 490 (1919).
Associate Justice 22
40 Phil. 480 (1919).
23
Id. at 489-490.
WE CONCUR: 24
Sumaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 278 Phil. 201,
210-211 (1991).
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO 25
Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 307-308 (1913).
Chief Justice 26
Supra note 15, at 15.
Chairperson 27
Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, 48 Phil. 60 I, 603-604 (1926).
28
Supra note 15, at 17.
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTRO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

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