119 – TRIAL

11. PEOPLE VS. JOSE GO

The Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued Resolution ordering the closure of the Orient
Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) and placing such bank under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC). The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the
loans purportedly in the names of Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form of manager’s
checks in the name of Philippine Recycler’s and Zeta International, Inc. Thereafter, these two manager’s checks –
together with several others totaling P 120, 819, 475. 00 – were encashed, and then deposited in OCBC Savings
Account of Go. Two counts of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed by PDIC against Go.
After the presentation of all of the prosecution’s evidence, the private respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer. The respondent RTC judge granted the same and an order was promulgated by the respondent RTC judge
finding the private respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the Criminal Case and
acquitting all of the accused in these cases. CA affirmed RTC Order granting Go’s demurrer. Whether The CA
committed grave abuse of discretion by affirming the decision of RTC Judge in granting the demurrer of
evidence. The Supreme Court held: YES. The rules provide that when the accused files a demurrer, the court must
evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. /Trial court effectively failed and /or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against Go,
considering that the case involved hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositors’ money – not to mention that
banking industry is impressed with public interest, the trial court should have conducted itself with circumspection
and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving issues. Demand is not an element of the felony. Furthermore, as the
beneficiary of the proceeds, Go is presumed to be the author of the falsification. It is irrelevant that the proceeds of
supposed loans were made payable to entities other than the alleged borrowers. The bottom line is that they are
encashed using bank funds, and the proceeds were deposited in Go’s bank savings and current accounts and used to
fund personal checks.

10. BANGAYAN JR. VS. BANGAYAN

Sally Go filed complaint accusing Bangayan, Jr and Resally having committed bigamy. Sally Go learned that
Bangayan, Jr had taken Resally as is concubine. Sally Go further discovered that Bangayan Jr also married a certain
Azucena in Caloocan City. After arraignment, both Bangayan Jr and Resally pleaded not guilty. Prosecution
presented and offered evidence. Both Bangayan Jr and Resally separately filed their respective motions for leave to
file demurrer to evidence. RTC dismissed case for insufficiency of evidence. Sally Go elevated case to CA via
petition for certiorari. CA held that the pieces of evidence presented by prosecution were sufficient to deny demurrer
to evidence. On the issue whether or not Petitioners’ right against double jeopardy was violated by CA when
it reversed RTC order dismissing criminal case against them. YES. Double jeopardy already set in. All 4
elements of double jeopardy are present. A valid information for bigamy was filed against petitioners. They pleaded
not guilty to charges against them and subsequently case was dismissed after the prosecution rested its case. If the
court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants demurrer, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits,
which is equivalent to acquittal of the accused. Even if trial court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence against
petitioners, it only committed an error of judgment and not one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by
certiorari. It must be shown that a party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard. On the issue of appeal, the
Supreme Court leans toward Resally's contention that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari
before the CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private
complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the
accused is concerned.
8. IMPERIAL VS. JOSON

This case involved 3 vehicular mishap that led to killing the driver a Van and 7 of its passengers, and inflicting
serious physical injuries upon 3 other passengers. A criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damages to Property was filed against petitioners with
the MTC. Francisco proposed a series of facts for stipulation with the prosecution. Prosecutor Zabella refused to
stipulate. Court issued pre-trial order to that effect. Francisco filed motion to “compel and disqualify Prosecutor
Zabella and to correct the pre-trial order. MTC denied motion. However, it directed another pre-trial conference in
view of the reassignment of the case to new Prosecutor Sia. However, Sia failed to attend hearings because he
needed to study the case. Then Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before RTC which, a prayer
for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to stop further proceedings in Criminal Case.
Then, the case was reassigned to another Prosecutor, Baligod, as a consequence of Prosecutor Sia’s subsequent
transfer to another government office. Whether the Petitioner’s right to a speedy trial was violated. The Supreme
Court held: NO. Section 3 a (3), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against
interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence. Viewed in the
context of the above discussed procedural antecedents as well as the further reassignment of the case to Prosecutor
Baligod as a consequence of Prosecutor Sias subsequent transfer to another government office, Petitioner’s right to a
speedy trial was not violated.

7. PEOPLE VS. TAN

Information for violation of Revised Securities Act were filed against Tan in the RTC. After arraignment, he pleaded
not guilty to the charges and trial commenced. The prosecutor completed its presentation of evidence and, on the
day after, filed its formal offer of evidence. Then, the respondent filed an opposition to petitioner’s formal offer.
Instead of filing a reply as directed by the RTC, the Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Prosecutions Formal
Offer of Evidence and to Re-open Presentation of Evidence. Said motion was granted by the RTC and the
Prosecutor thus continued its presentation of evidence. Then, the Prosecutor filed a request for marking of certain
documents and motion to admit attached formal offer of evidence. RTC approved and the Prosecutor filed its Formal
Offer of Evidence. Tan filed an omnibus motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence which the RTC granted. Then
the RTC issued an Order granting the respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Then, the Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA assailing the Orders of the RTC. CA denied the petition, ruling that the dismissal of a criminal
action by the grant of a demurrer to evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for which reason, the
prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. Whether or not the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by violating the petitioner’s right to
due process. The Supreme Court held that: NO. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated, therefore, the court committed grave abuse
of discretion. Here, the Petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the
factual antecedents which led to the grant of respondents demurrer.

6. CABADOR VS. PEOPLE

The public prosecutor charged Cabador of murdered. After 5 years of trial and 5 witnesses, RTC ended the
prosecution's presentation of witnesses and required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its
documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. The public prosecutor asked for 3 extensions of time but was still
not able to make the offer. Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, invoking his right to a speedy trial.
Moreover, he claimed that the trial court could not consider any evidence against him that had not been formally
offered. 4 days before such filing, without the knowledge of Cabador, another extension was asked for, and an offer
was made on the day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss. RTC issued an order treating Cabador's motion to dismiss
as a demurrer to evidence. And since he filed his motion without leave of court, he waived his right to present
evidence in his defense. CA affirmed RTC. Whether or not the motion filed by Cabador was demurrer to
evidence or a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court held that: IT WAS A MOTION TO DISMISS. The rules
provide that after the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to
the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. A demurrer to evidence assumes that the
prosecution has already rested its case. Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits, the same day
Cabador filed his motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the admission
of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the prosecution be
deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecutions
formal offer, before the trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could not
be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.

5. ASISTIO VS. PEOPLE

Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio was charged with violation Cooperative Code of the Philippines before RTC and for
falsification of private document before MeTC (MeTC granted her demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a
criminal case for falsification of private document). The accused being the Chairperson and Managing Director of
A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative entered into a contract with Coca Cola Products
in her own personal capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused fully well knew, the sale of Coca-Cola
products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative should have accrued to Cooperative
to the damage and prejudice of the said Cooperative. After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution,
petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among
other matters, that the Regional Trial Court does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged does not
carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable. Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. The private respondent appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. CA rendered
a Decision reversing and setting aside the RTC Orders remanded the case records to the RTC for further
proceedings. Whether the CA’s order remanding the case back to the RTC for further proceedings ignored
the rule that dismissal of the charged on demurrer of evidence amounts to an acquittal and the dismissal is
not appealable. NO. In this case, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for
insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. This being the case the RTC
order of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal hence may still be subject to an appeal under Rule 41 of the ROC.
Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that
the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the
defendant is not guilty. On the issue of Whether or not the prosecution of her case before the RTC is barred
by res judicata because the MeTC granted her demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for
falsification of private document. NO. Res Judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal
proceedings. At any rate, petitioner's argument is incidentally related to double jeopardy [(1) a first jeopardy
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first. As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b)
before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused
was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent] which
embrace's a prohibition against being tried for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information. Whether the offense charged in the information for
Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is necessarily included in a crime for falsification of private
document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. NONE. The test to determine whether an
offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other is provided under Section 5, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court: An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter. Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes
of falsification of private document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938,
as alleged in the Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be said to necessarily include
or is necessarily included in the other, the third requisite for double jeopardy to attach—a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first—is, therefore, absent. Not only are their elements different, they also have a distinct
nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the part of the offender,
while the latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes it a crime is the special, law enacting it.
4. PEOPLE VS. DE GRANO

An Information for the murder of Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the RTC against Joven de Grano, Armando de
Grano, and Estanislao Lacaba, together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho, Domingo Landicho, and Leonardo
Genil, who were at-large. Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded “not guilty.” Originally, RTC
found the accused guilty of the offenses charged. However, an order was issued that modified the previous decision,
which downgraded the charge of murder to homicide for Domingo Landicho and Estanislao Lacaba and
ARMANDO DE GRANO and JOVEN DE GRANO are ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt. Then, only
Estanislao attended promulgation of judgement. Therefore, when they filed their Joint Motion for Reconsideration
which included that of Estanislao, the RTC take cognizance resolve the joint motion. Whether RTC exceeded its
jurisdiction when it entertained the Joint Motion for Reconsideration. YES. Under the Rules, if the judgment is
for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies
available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. When the Decision was
promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the
reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents
who were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion. Whether right against double jeopardy of Joven,
Armando, and Domingo were violated. No. Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy
because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued
without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it
cannot be the source of an acquittal.

3. JIMENEZ VS. PEOPLE

Montero, a former employee of the BSJ company owned by the Jimeneze’s executed sworn statements confessing
his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda and naming petitioner Jimenez, Lope Jimenez, Descalso,
Ponce and Fernandez as his coconspirators.. The state prosecutors charged the accused of murder for the killing of
Barrameda. Montero thereafter filed a motion for his discharge as state witness. Evidence revealed that it appears
that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation, and execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he
had no direct participation in the actual killing of Ruby Rose. Not one of the accused-conspirators, except Montero,
was willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her killing. RTC ruled that that
the prosecution complied with the requisites of Sec. 17, Rule 119 further ruling that Montero is qualified to be
discharged as state witness. The CA affirmed the Decision of RTC. Whether or not Montero’s discharge as a
state witness complied with the requirements of Sec. 17, Rule 119 of the ROC. YES. The requirement is that a
state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he or she should not only "appear to be the most
guilty. The SC ruled that from the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its motion to discharge
Montero, it appears that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation, and execution stage as most of his co-
accused had been, he had no direct participation in the actual killing of Ruby Rose. Whether there is an absolute
necessity for the testimony of Montero. Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be
discharged when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms, necessity is not there when
the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the prosecution’s evidence. The requirement
of absolute necessity for the testimony of a state witness depends on the circumstances of each case regardless of the
number of the participating conspirators. In the present case, not one of the accused-conspirators, except Montero,
was willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her killing. RTC acted properly
and in accordance with jurisprudence in ruling that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero. He
alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime. To the prosecution belongs the control of its case and this
Court cannot dictate on its choice in the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal requirements have not
been complied with.

2. VDA. DE MANGUERRA VS. RISOS

Respondents were charged with Estafa before the RTC of Cebu City which arose from the falsification of a deed of
real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that petitioner De Manguerra,
the owner of the mortgaged property affixed her signature to the document. Petitioner was then confined in a
hospital in Manila for gastro-intestinal bleeding. Respondents filed a motion for suspension of criminal proceedings
on the ground of a prejudicial question alleging that the action for the declaration of nullity of mortgage should first
be resolved. The RTC granted the motion. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA to nullify
the RTC orders. Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to take her deposition due to petitioner’s weak physical
condition. The RTC granted the motion and ordered petitioner’s deposition to be taken before the Clerk of Court of
Makati. Respondents assailed the RTC orders before the CA, with the CA ruling in their favor stating that Rule 119,
Section 15 and not Rule 23 applies in this case. Whether or not Rule 23 applies to the deposition of De
Manguerra. NO. The Rules provide conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It
is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to
waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be
conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer. The
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119
adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23
suppletorily or otherwise. Here, the deposition was taken before the RTC Court of Makati. Therefore, the deposition
is not in accordance with the Rules.

1. SALVANERA VS. PEOPLE

Petitioner Rimber to Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is
charged with the murder of Ruben Parane. Petitioner was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman;
Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place of the commission of the crime; while
Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter. All the accused have been arrested and detained except Edgardo
Lungcay who remained at-large. The prosecution, moved for the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix, to
serve as state witnesses, however, the trial court denied the prosecution’s motion. The prosecution then appealed to
the Court of Appeals. It contended that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion
to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witnesses. It alleged that the testimonies of the two accused
are absolutely necessary to establish that petitioner masterminded the murder of Ruben Parane. The Court of
Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused Abutin and Tampelix from the Information to become state
witnesses. Whether or not there was substantial corroboration of Abutin and Tampelix’s testimony to
discharge them and serve as State Witnesses. YES. The Rules Provides that before an accused be discharged as
witness for the state, the court must be satisfied, among others, that the testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points.The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have
to consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. A conspiracy is more
readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. As co-conspirators, Abutin and Tampelix
can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the
conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not
eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder.
The testimonies of the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the
commission of the crime.

121 - NEW TRIAL

1. ESTINO VS. PEOPLE

Informations were filed against Estino and Pescadera. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for failure to pay the
Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of the provincial government employees of Sulu and
crime of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code for failure to remit the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) contributions. However, the Sandigan acquitted both in the crime of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and only Estino to the crime of malversation of public funds. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial which were denied by
Sandiganbayan where petitioners presented a Certification stating that the Representation and Transportation
Allowance for the period January to May 1999 was paid to the officials entitled to it and that the GSIS premiums
pertaining to prior years were also settled by the Provincial Government of Sulu. Whether or not the motion for
new trial should be granted. YES. Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a
judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could
not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly
discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was
unnecessary. They stressed that they no longer presented the evidence of payment of RATA because Balabaran
testified that the subject of the charge was the nonpayment of benefits under the 1999 budget, without mention of
the RATA nor the 1998 reenacted budget. It seems that they were misled during trial. They were precluded from
presenting pieces of evidence that may prove actual payment of the RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget because
the prosecutions evidence was confined to alleged nonpayment of RATA under the 1999 budget.

2. BRIONES VS. PEOPLE

A criminal information was filed against Briones for crime of robbery. Briones allegedly took the service firearm of
S/G Gual while the latter approached the group where the former is involved in a mauling. S/G Gual positively
identified Briones. RTC found Briones guilty of the crime of simple theft (Art. 309 Par. 3 of RPC) after giving
weight to prosecutions positive testimony as against the defenses of denial and alibi. On his appeal, he raised the
issue of self-defense. The Court of Appeals found Briones guilty of robbery under Article 293 in relation to par.5 of
Article 294 of RPC and not of theft. Whether or not a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. NO. Evidence to be newly discovered, must be one that could not, by exercise of due
diligence, have been discovered by the court below. In this case, Briones failed to show he had exerted reasonable
diligence to locate the firearm. In petitions for new trial in a criminal proceeding where certain evidence was not
presented, the defendant, in order to secure a new trial, must satisfy the court that; he has a good defense, and that
the acquittal would in all probability follow the introduction of the omitted evidence. Briones change of defense
from denial to alibi to self-defense or in defense of a relative will not change the outcome.

3. SALUDAGA VS. SANDIGAN

Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of Barangay Day Care Centers without
conducting a competitive public bidding as required by law, which caused damage and prejudice to the government.
An information was filed on 2000 for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing undue injury to the Government.
The information was quashed for failure to prove the actual damage, hence a new information was filed on 2007,
now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused moved
for a new preliminary investigation to be conducted on the ground that there is substitution and/or substantial
amendment of the first information. However, Sandigan denied the petition. Petitioners interpose the present petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court averring that the newly discovered evidence of
Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was executed way back in 2000. Whether or not
the affidavit of the author of the audit report may qualify as newly-discovered evidence. NO. The Rules
provide that the evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation). The Pornelos affidavit cannot
qualify as newly-discovered evidence as it was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case.

4. LUMANOG VS. PEOPLE

This resolves the motions for reconsideration separately filed by Lenido Lumanog and Augusto Santos, Cesar
Fortuna and Rameses de Jesus assailing the decision of the Court dated September 7, 2010 convicting them of the
crime of murder. The petitioners seek the reversal of their conviction on the basis of the Affidavit dated November
12, 2009 executed by a certain Orencio G. Jurado, Jr. who claims to be one of the police officers initially assigned to
investigate the case. One of the accused, Fortuna, contends that said belated statement would certainly cast doubt on
the procedures undertaken by the police authorities in the apprehension of the likely perpetrators. Whether or not
the affidavit of Jurado qualify as newly discovered evidence that would warrant new trial. No. Evidence, to be
considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered
before the trial in the court below. Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure
testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or
objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado does not
qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify re-opening of the trial and/or vacating the judgment.

5. PAYUMO VS. SANDIGAN

A composite team of Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police units allegedly fired at a group of
civilians instantly killing one civilian and wounding seven others, including Edgar Payumo. The accused pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged. During the trial, the accused interposed the defenses of lawful performance of
duty, self-defense, mistake of fact, and alibi. They insisted that the incident was a result of a military operation, and
not an ambush as claimed by the prosecution. SandiganBayan promulgated its judgment, convicting the accused of
the crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. The accused filed their Supplemental Omnibus Motion to Set
Aside Judgment and for New Trial because there was serious irregularity during the trial due to the erroneous
admission of the testimonies of the witnesses of the petitioners, such should be taken anew and to afford the accused
the opportunity to present in evidence the records of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO) relative to the
shooting as to whether it was an ambush or the result of a military operation. The omnibus motion was granted.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted a new trial in favor of
the accused. YES. Rule 121, Section 2 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure enumerates the grounds for a new
trial, to wit: Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds: (a)
That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been commited during
the trial; (b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change
the judgment. It must be emphasized that an erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the trial court is
not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there are other independent evidence to sustain the
decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted; would not have changed the decision.

6. DE VILLA VS. DIRECTOR OF NEW BILIBID PRISON

By final judgment, petitioner de Villa, the trial court found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza when she
was 12 years old, his niece by affinity and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua; and ordered
him to give support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving
his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, there
was a question of Reynaldo de Villa’s guilt or innocence. Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of
Reynaldo. He alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could
determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim’s child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only
informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner’s case that DNA testing could resolve the issue
of paternity. Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn
Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. After
testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report and showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired
any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers.
Whether or not the DNA result is a valid basis for new trial. NO. A motion for new trial based on newly-
discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered
after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trail even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. In this instance, although the
DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for
newly-discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have been
discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was
“unaware” of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this court. Lack of
knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of
petitioner’s counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner. Even if it is conclusively
proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand as the
pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. On the issue of Petition for Habeas
Corpus. The Supreme Cuourt DENIED the petition. Review of judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in a very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess. The SC stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error,
and should not be thus used.