A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004 6.
23, 2004 6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.
HEINZ R. HECK, complainant,
vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,1respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO SR., J.:
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary
commission more than twenty years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the novel
issue presented for resolution before this Court.
The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21, 2001
Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s appointment as RTC judge
on April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial law, thus:
Judge Santos, based on ANNEX "A," was not duly commissioned as notary public
until January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis)
notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980
uncommissioned until the 9th of January 1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to
December 31st 1987 and January 6th 1988 to December 31st 1989 but the
records fail to show any entry at the Clerk of Court after December 31st
1985 until December 31st 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration
of his commission in December 1989.2
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future
public service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any delaying
tactics from Judge Santos or any agency and or public servants involved in
this administrative case.
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the
premises.3
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-
Beja, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, which contained the following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and available in this
office, the following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned
notary public in the following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E.
Santos submitted his notarial reports in the ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June
6, 1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of
submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission
h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of
submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986
 l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents
under the name Atty. Anthony Santos after December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty.
Anthony Santos was on January 6, 1988 until December 31, 1989. 4
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge categorically denied the
charges against him. He also submitted a certification5 from Clerk of Court, Atty.
Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the commissioned
lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized
documents/notarial register. The respondent further averred as follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and
submitted by the respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said
notarized documents and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled
Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and
Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding
Judge. The undersigned resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs. 6
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator recommending the
need to resort to a full-blown investigation to determine the veracity of the parties’
assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a)
treat the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to
Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation,
report and recommendation.7
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the complainant
requested that the hearing be held at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially
denied the request but upon the complainant’s insistence, the matter was forwarded
to the Court, which favorably acted thereon in a Resolution dated July 8, 2002. 8 The
complainant presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before retired Court of
Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.9
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz
made the following recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found
guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by (a) notarizing documents without
commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding
of his notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his commission; and
[ii] that for these infractions, he be suspended from the practice of law and barred
from being commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his present
commission, if any, be revoked.10
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce evidence in
his defense, while the complainant presented documentary evidence to support the
charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was
commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of
the first certification. He merely alleged that "there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register." And, as already observed, he presented no evidence,
particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was
so commissioned) and submission of notarial reports and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that "there were only two Record
Books available in the notarial section" of the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de
Oro City); and that the "(f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission contains
items on the Name, Date Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of
the notary public. First entry appearing was made on December 1982."
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the "first book" would
disclose so (at least, for the years 1982 and 1983). However, he did not present
said book. Neither did he present a certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of
Misamis Oriental, or documents from his files showing that he was commissioned in
1980 to 1983. Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of appointment for all those
years. Under Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be prepared and
forwarded by the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor General, together
with the oath of office of the notary public.11
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence presented by the
complainant, that the respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without
being commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that his earliest
commission of record was on January 9, 1984.12
The Procedural Issues
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint, a brief
backgrounder.
On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,13 to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are
lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action
of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned
as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on
the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases
against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated
separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases against erring
justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government
service may be automatically treated as disbarment cases. The Resolution, which
took effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the
respondents have not yet been required to comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution, since the
respondent filed his Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases Involving A Retired Judge For
Acts Committed While He Was Still A Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired judge; (2) the
complainant prays for his disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the ground for
disbarment were committed when the respondent was still a practicing lawyer,
before his appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not
for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with
notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state
clearly, and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate
and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the
government service: Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the
Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with
them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed
against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment to the Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court
for disposition and adjudication.14
The investigation may thereafter commence either before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), in accordance with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or
before the Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings initiated motu proprio by
the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires,
the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to
any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the
investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof,
save that the review of the report shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated
Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor
General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the
Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations
together with the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the
final action of the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable by the
Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer
the complaint for investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor General,
any officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court will
thereafter base its final action.15
Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered
as a member of the bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the
Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 16of the 1987 Constitution.
Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As
such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule mandates that in
case the respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court, the
complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court. 17
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude The Filing Thereafter Of
An Administrative Charge Against Him For Which He Shall Still Be Held Answerable
If Found Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service
does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of
the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members
of the bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:18
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent, had ceased in office
during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce
the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.
A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of
his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty
proper and imposable under the situation. 19
However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or
criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment," we
issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC20 which took effect on November 3, 2003. It reads in
part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court
Administrator, an administrative complaint against any Justice of the Court
of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts filed in
connection with a case in court is shown to be clearly unfounded and
baseless and intended to harass the respondent, such a finding should be
included in the report and recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or affirmed by the Court,
the complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt of court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may further be
required to show cause why he or she should not be administratively
sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory
retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that
occurred at least a year before such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it
is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended
for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator
must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from
receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and
recommendation not later than 30 days from receipt of the comment. The
Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of compulsory
retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six (6)
months from such date without prejudice to the release of the retirement
benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking
into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or
justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement
of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year
before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to
harass the respondent.
adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those
filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary.23 It need not be shown that the
respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that
the evidence on record supports the charge on the respondent, considering the
gravity of the offense.
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained of must be
continuing in order for the respondent judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v.
Salubre,24 the respondent judge was charged with violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for acts committed while he was still a practicing lawyer.
The respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of his client despite demands,
and persisted in his refusal even after he was appointed as a judge. However, the
Court also stated in this case that the respondent’s subsequent appointment as a
judge will not exculpate him from taking responsibility for the consequences of his
acts as an officer of the court.25
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,26 we held that proof of prior immoral conduct
cannot be used as basis for administrative discipline against a judge if he is not
charged with immorality prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated, thus:
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered
from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk
proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A
lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to
know, that he must pay a high price for that honor - his private and official conduct
must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. ... 27
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove the charges by
substantial evidence.28 The complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to
the respondent’s previous indiscretion while still a practicing lawyer; no evidence
was, however, adduced to prove that the latter continued to engage in illicit acts
after being appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was exonerated in this
case because the complainant failed to present evidence that the indiscretion
continued even after the respondent was appointed to the judiciary.

The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public interest that it is both the
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by
right and duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the public
the Office of the Court Administrator on March 26, 2001. 21 The respondent retired
welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this
compulsorily from the service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002. Likewise,
Court.29 The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
the ground for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by
disciplinary power over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounden
the respondent did not occur a year before the respondent’s separation from the
duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its
service. Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant complaint was not prima
members.30
facie shown to be without merit and intended merely to harass the respondent.
Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall within the ambit of the foregoing
resolution. Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes
Malpractice, If Not The Crime Of Falsification Of Public Documents
A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His Appointment To The
Judiciary It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. 31Notarization by a
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his
notary public converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in
appointment to the judiciary. 22 In fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it
evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due
provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and
execution.32
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be
treated as a mere casual formality.33 The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of
notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of
public documents."34 For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned
erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial
commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment. 35
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the occasion to state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at
a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be
subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically,
the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when
he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood,
which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." 37
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-
emphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity of public documents is at
stake in every aspect of that function.38
The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal offer of evidence,
prompting the Investigating Justice to decide the case on the basis of the pleadings
filed.39 Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the years
1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. The respondent
merely alleged in his answer that "there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register." Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice,
the respondent presented no evidence of his commission as notary public for the
years 1980 to 1983, as well as proof of submission of notarial reports and the
notarial register. 40
The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges and to
controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of
a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. 41
The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the
documents so notarized, and as such was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An
attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties
as an attorney and counselor which include the statutory grounds under Section 27,
Rule 13842 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or the court motu
proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right
of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and from
which conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable
consequences. 43
An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed
with upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in the profession. It is a
continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
one’s mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his
admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer.44 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to
admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. 45
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own,
distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. 46 As we
held in the leading case of In re Almacen: 47
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. ....48
In a case involving a mere court employee 49 the Court disregarded the Court
Administrator’s recommendation that the charge for immorality against the
respondent be dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to adduce
evidence that the respondent’s immoral conduct was still ongoing. Aside from being
found guilty of illicit conduct, the respondent was also found guilty of dishonesty for
falsifying her children’s certificates of live birth to show that her paramour was the
father. The complaint in this case was filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years
after the illicit affair ended.50 The Court held that administrative offenses do not
prescribe.51
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an
administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as
a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was
committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of
the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately
come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to
protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice.
No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of
the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical
pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter
them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. This should particularly apply in this
case, considering the seriousness of the matter involved - the respondent’s
dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the offending act
to the institution of the administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the requisite authority
therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative Case Would Merely
Mitigate The Respondent’s Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not
a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty,
and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar.52 By his
actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such standards; 53 he undermined the
confidence of the public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. The respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 54 In
representing that he was possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he
was, in fact, not so authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar
him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.55 Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case, considering
that the complaint against the respondent was filed twenty-four years after the
commission of the act complained of;56 that there was no private offended party
who came forward and claimed to have been adversely affected by the documents
so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is a retired judge
who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned retirement benefits.57 The
Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing
documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. He is hereby
ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., join Mr. Justice J. C. Vitug in his separate opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring in the Result)
VITUG, J.:
Allow me to express, very briefly, my views on the various scenarios appurtenant to
the subject of inquiry.
In A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, respondent Judge, now retired, has been charged on 21
March 2001, while still an incumbent judge, with having transgressed, prior to his
appointment to the judiciary, the Notarial Law.
A. Exceptionally, a judge may be held administratively accountable for acts
committed before his appointment to the Judiciary.
Generally, a judge is not made to account administratively for acts
committed prior to his appointment. In Sevilla v Salubre, 1 respondent
judge was charged with misappropriating for his own benefit money
entrusted to him by his client while he was still a practicing lawyer. He,
however, continued to ignore, even after his appointment in the judiciary,
his previous client’s demand for restitution. The Court explained: “Being
the visible representation of law, and more importantly, of justice, the
people see in the respondent the intermediary of justice between two
conflicting interests. If while still in active litigation practice lawyers do not
know how to (so) uphold this kind of justice to their clients previous to
their appointment as Judges, how then could people expect them to render
judgments in the cases before them?” In the earlier case of Alfonso v.
Juanson2 where respondent judge was simply admonished for “appearance
of impropriety,” the Court said that he could not be disciplined for immoral
acts committed prior to his appointment in the judiciary absent showing
that he continued to engage in these acts after his appointment.
B. The retirement or resignation of a judge could preclude the filing
thereafter of an administrative charge against him for an infraction
committed during his incumbency.
The filing of an administrative proceeding against a judge is predicated on
the holding of his office or position in the judiciary; thus, his resignation or
retirement from office could bar an administrative case 3 from being
initiated. An administrative charge already pending upon resignation or
retirement is not necessarily rendered moot since the penalty that can still
be imposed, if the respondent is found guilty, goes beyond just dismissal
from the service. Noteworthy is A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC which provides that
if a complaint against a judge is filed within six months before his
compulsory retirement for an alleged infraction occurring at least a year
 before such filing, and shown prima facie to be intended to harass the
judge, the complaint must forthwith be recommended for dismissal.

C. A judge, already retired, may, but only under certain conditions, be

subject to disciplinary action for acts committed prior to his appointment to
the judiciary.

A judge, already retired, may yet be subject to disciplinary sanction for an

act committed prior to his appointment in the judiciary if (a) the judge has
persisted, even after his appointment to the judiciary, in his assailed act,
and (b) the administrative charge is filed while still an incumbent in the
judiciary.

D. If, such as in the instant administrative case, the two conditions, above,
are not shown, respondent judge may still be disciplinarily dealt with for
his misconduct not as a judge but as a lawyer.

A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis; neither purely civil

nor purely criminal. It is not - and it does not involve - a trial of an action
or a suit; it is rather an investigation into the conduct of an officer of the
court. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor.
Interest in the service of the profession is its primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or not the attorney may still be
a fit person to continue enjoying his privileges as such. 4 It may thus be
concluded that the administrative complaint can still be pursued.

While the cause of action does not prescribe, it is to be assumed, however,

that the complaint must be filed within a reasonable time. What may or
may not be a reasonable time is determined by circumstances peculiar and
pertinent to the case.5 The administrative charge for alleged violation of
the Notarial Law in this instance is said to have been committed more than
twenty years ago by respondent judge prior to his appointment in the
judiciary, filed several years after that appointment and just about a year
prior to his retirement. No specific injury or damage has been shown for
the alleged violation. The circumstances are enough, in my view, to
warrant the dismissal of the complaint, and I so vote.
A.C. No. 6490 July 9, 2013
(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054)
LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This case involves a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) charging respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). 1
Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985, complainant Lilia Tabang
sought the advice of Judge Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott’s
father. Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of thirty (30) hectares of
agricultural land located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which
consisted of several parcels belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott noted that
under the government’s agrarian reform program, Tabang was prohibited from
acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Thus,
Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of
fictitious persons.2
Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and obtained the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious
persons, as follows:
1. TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes;
2. TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy;
3. TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla;
4. TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio;
5. TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez;
6. TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan; and
7. TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy.3
Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels
as they were in need of funds for their medication and other expenses. Claiming
that he would help complainants by offering the parcels to prospective buyers,
respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the
parcels.4
About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he failed to negotiate
any sale, complainants confronted respondent. Respondent then told the
complainants that he had lost all seven titles.5
On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent advised them to
file petitions in court for re-issuance of titles. Pretending to be the "authorized
agent-representative" of the fictitious owners of the seven parcels, Lilia Tabang filed
petitions for re-issuance of titles.6
In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed similarities in the
signatures of the supposed owners that were affixed on the Special Powers of
Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed in favor of Lilia Tabang. The public prosecutor,
acting on his observation, asked the court to have the supposed owners
summoned.7
Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions voluntarily
dismissed without prejudice to their being re-filed.8
Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This time, she changed the
fictitious owners’ signatures in the hope of making them look more varied. 9
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions, respondent
executed several documents that included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits
of recovery purportedly signed by the parcels’ (fictitious) owners. Respondent then
caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels. 10
Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as
the owner of the parcels and announced that these were for sale. 11 Later,
respondent succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a total of
?3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales.12
Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit,
complainants filed their complaint directly with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
on February 3, 2003. The case was docketed as Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
Case No. 03-1054.
In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels were not
fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added that Lilia
Tabang had been merely the broker for the seven parcels and that she had
unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of
the sale of the seven parcels. He alleged that after she had been refused to be given
a "balato," Lilia Tabang had threatened to defame him and seek his disbarment. 13
In her Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2004, 14 IBP Investigating
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for
violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004, 15 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the
report of Commissioner Navarro. However, the IBP Board of Governors increased
the penalty to disbarment. Thereafter, the case was referred to the Supreme Court
pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004,16 the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the IBP. The Court noted that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by
complainants were mere photocopies and affidavits and that the persons who
supposedly executed such documents were neither presented nor subpoenaed.
Thus, there could not have been adequate basis for sustaining the imposition of a
penalty as grave as disbarment.
The case was then assigned to Investigating Commissioner Dennis B. Funa.
Hearings were conducted on March 22, 2005; October 7, 2005; July 18, 2006;
August 29, 2006; November 7, 2006; February 23, 2007; and July 25, 2007. 17
The complainants presented several witnesses. One was Dieter Heinze, President of
the Swiss American Lending Corporation. 18 Heinze testified that in April 2001, a
friend introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner
of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase
of a lot priced at ₱900,000.00. His company, however, paid only ₱668,000.00.
Heinze noted that his company withheld payment upon his realization that Lilia
Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim and upon respondent’s
failure to produce Leonor Petronio, the alleged lot owner.
Another of complainants’ witnesses was Atty. Agerico Paras.19 He testified that
Heinze introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner
of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase
of a lot priced at ₱2,300,000.00. He paid for the said parcel in two (2) installments.
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim, he
wrote to respondent asking him to either work on the cancellation of the claim or to
reimburse him. He added that respondent was unable to produce Amelia Andes, the
ostensible owner of the parcel he had purchased.
mandatory conferences, on the parties’ Position Papers (and supporting
documents), and on the results of clarificatory questioning (if such questioning was
found to be necessary). As such, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied, and he was required to file his Position Paper. 23
On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his Position Paper.24 Subsequently, the case was
deemed submitted for Commissioner Limpingco’s Report and Recommendation.
In his Position Paper, respondent noted that he filed criminal complaints against Lilia
Tabang on account of Tabang’s statement that she had fabricated the identities of
the owners of the seven (7) parcels. He claimed that since 1996, he had relied on
the Torrens Titles of the seven (7) owners who were introduced to him by Lilia
Tabang. He asserted that Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven
(7) parcels since the SPAs executed by the parcels’ owners clearly made her a mere
agent and him a sub-agent. He also assailed the authenticity of the public
announcements (where he supposedly offered the seven 7 parcels for sale) and
Memorandum of Agreement. He surmised that the signatures on such documents
appearing above the name "Glenn C. Gacott" had been mere forgeries and crude
duplications of his own signature.
In his Report and Recommendation dated August 23, 2010, 25 Commissioner
Limpingco found respondent liable for gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He
likewise noted that respondent was absent in most of the hearings without
justifiable reason, in violation of Rule 12.04 of the CPR.26 He recommended that
respondent be disbarred and his name, stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution 27 adopting the
Report of Investigating Commissioner Limpingco.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration.28

Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of the seven parcels, also testified for
Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal with the IBP on August 8, 2011.
complainants.20 He testified that in February 2001, he was introduced to respondent
who claimed that several parcels with a total area of thirty (30) hectares were
owned by his mother. Gallinero agreed to purchase a parcel for the price of On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the Supreme Court his Urgent Motion
₱2,000,000.00 which he paid in cash and in kind (L-300 van). for Extension of Time (to file Petition for Review/Appeal). On September 20, 2011,
the Court granted respondent’s Motion and gave him an extension of thirty (30)
days to file his Appeal. The Supreme Court warned respondent that no further
Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on the matters stated in the Complaint. 21
extension will be given. Despite this, respondent filed two (2) more Motions for
Extension – the first on September 29, 2011 and the second on November 3, 2011
On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the complainants to submit their – both of which were denied by the Court.
Position Paper. Respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration and the Inhibition of
Commissioner Funa who, respondent claimed, deprived him of the chance to cross-
Despite the Court’s denials of his Motions for Extension, respondent filed on
examine complainants’ witnesses, and was "bent on prejudicing" 22 him.
December 14, 2011 a Motion to Admit Petition for Review/Appeal (with attached
Petition/Appeal). This Motion was denied by the Court on April 17, 2012.
Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following this, the case was reassigned
to Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco.
For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
In the meantime, with the Supreme Court En Banc’s approval of the IBP-CBD’s Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment.
Rules of Procedure, it was deemed proper for an Investigating Commissioner to
submit his/her Report and Recommendation based on matters discussed during the
After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the In Daroy v. Legaspi:31 The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon Legaspi for
findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of having converted to his personal use the funds that he received for his clients.
Governors. It is clear that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and
deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he executed the revocations of SPAs
Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must be done with utmost caution. As this
and affidavits of recovery and in arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven
Court noted in Moran v. Moron: 32
(7) subject parcels.

Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by
While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit
his serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. Disbarment
activities, the complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the
is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar
repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made even
must always be exercised with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons
graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty,
and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the
integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment
cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and
should not be decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand,
torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it.
suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired.33
Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon
respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment.
Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that clearly
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify its imposition. 34
Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred
for any of the following grounds:
As explained in Aba v. De Guzman, 35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than
deceit;
that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." 36
malpractice;
Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in
gross misconduct in office; determining preponderance of evidence:

grossly immoral conduct; All the facts and circumstances of the case;

conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; The witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity
of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony;
violation of the lawyer's oath;

The witnesses’ interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility so far
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and

willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.

The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.
It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is proper when lawyers commit
gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in usurping the property rights of other
In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that
persons. By way of examples:
respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule
1.01 of the CPR.
In Brennisen v. Contawi:29 Respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi was disbarred for
having used a spurious SPA to mortgage and sell property entrusted to him for
Specifically, complainants have shown not only through Lilia Tabang’s testimony but
administration.
more so through the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro
Gallinero that:
In Sabayle v. Tandayag:30 One of the respondents, Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor, was
disbarred for having acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the absence of the purported
respondent misrepresented himself as the owner of or having the right to dispose of
vendors and for taking advantage of his position as Assistant Clerk of Court by
the subject parcels;
purchasing one-half (1/2) of the land covered by said Deed of Sale knowing that the
deed was fictitious.
respondent actively sought to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject parcels;
respondent perfected the sales and received the proceeds of the sales – whether in
cash or in kind – of the subject parcels;
such sales were without the consent or authorization of complainants; and
respondent never remitted the proceeds of the sales to complainants.
More importantly, complainants’ witnesses showed that when respondent had been
confronted with Lilia Tabang’s adverse claims and asked to substantiate the
identities of the supposed owners of the subject parcels, he had failed to produce
such persons or even show an iota of proof of their existence. In this regard, the
testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero are
particularly significant in so far as they have been made despite the fact that their
interest as buyers is contrary to that of complainants’ interest as adverse claimants.
In contrast, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's
allegations.
Respondent’s defense centered on his insistence that the owners of the seven
parcels were not fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels.
Respondent also evaded the allegations against him by flinging counter-allegations.
For instance, he alleged that Lilia Tabang had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato"
from the proceeds of the sale of the subject parcels and that after she had been
refused, she threatened to defame respondent and seek his disbarment. In support
of this allegation, he pointed out that he had filed criminal complaints against Lilia
Tabang. He also surmised that the signatures on the subject documents appearing
above the name "Glenn C. Gacott" were mere forgeries and crude duplications of his
signature.
Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, 37 the burden of proof is vested upon
the party who alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in
Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator
v. Gutierrez38 where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to
submit evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the
violation is sustained.
It was incumbent upon respondent to prove his allegation that the supposed owners
of the seven parcels are real persons. Quite the contrary, he failed to produce the
slightest proof of their identities and existence, much less produce their actual
persons. As to his allegations regarding Lilia Tabang’s supposed extortion and threat
and the forgery or crude duplication of his signature, they remain just that –
allegations. Respondent failed to aver facts and circumstances which support these
claims.
At best, respondent merely draws conclusions from the documents which form the
very basis of complainants’ own allegations and which are actually being assailed by
complainants as inaccurate, unreliable, and fraudulent. Respondent makes much of
how Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since her
name does not appear on the parcels’ TCTs 39 and how he merely respected the title
and ownership of the ostensible owners. 40 Similarly, he makes much of how Lilia
Tabang was named as a mere agent in the SPAs. 41However, respondent loses sight
of the fact that it is precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs and SPAs indicate and
the deception they engender that are the crux of the present controversy. In urging
this Court to sustain him, respondent would have us rely on the very documents
assailed as fraudulent.
Apart from these, all that respondent can come up with are generic, sweeping, and
self-serving allegations of (1) how he could not have obtained the TCTs from
Tabang as "it is a standing policy of his law office not to accept Torrens title [sic]
unless it is related to a court case" 42 and because "[he] does not borrow any
Torrens title from anybody and for whatever purpose;" 43 (2) how complainants
could not have confronted him to demand the return of the TCTs and how he could
not have told them that he lost the TCTs because "[a]s a lawyer, [he] always
respects and recognizes the right of an owner to keep in his custody or possession
any of his properties of value;"44 and (3) how he could not have met and talked with
Lilia Tabang for the engagement of his services only to refuse Lilia Tabang because
legal practice constituted his livelihood, and there was no reason for him to refuse
an occasion to earn income.45
Rather than responding squarely to complainants’ allegations, respondent merely
embarks on conjectures and ascribes motives to complainants. He accuses Lilia
Tabang of demanding a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the
sale of the seven parcels, and of threatening to defame him and to seek his
disbarment after she had been refused.1âwphi1 This evasive posturing
notwithstanding, what is clear is that respondent failed to adduce even the slightest
proof to substantiate these claims. From all indications, Lilia Tabang had sufficient
basis to file the present Complaint and seek sanctions against respondent.
Given the glaring disparity between the evidence adduced by complainants and the
sheer lack of evidence adduced by respondent, this Court is led to no other
reasonable conclusion than that respondent committed the acts of which he is
accused and that he acted in a manner that is unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and
deceitful in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to
his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the State – the administration of justice – as
an officer of the court." 46 Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a
high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing."47
Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he
employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took advantage of the
credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious
damage on others. He did so over the course of several years in a sustained and
unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous wrongdoing with even greater, more
detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted
himself in these proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and
assuaging complainants’ plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this
Court his duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself from the IBP’s hearings without
justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal despite his own
failure to comply with the much extended period given to him, thus inviting the
Court to be a party in delaying complainants’ cause. For all his perversity,
respondent deserves none of this Court’s clemency.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly violated the

Canons of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal
record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6470 July 8, 2014
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZMALIT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus)
against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following
grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become
an officer of the Court.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In the Affidavit-Complaint1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar
Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had
drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely
named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee
sued complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of money. She claimed that
respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan,
and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned. Prior
thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal
and financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by
respondent sometime in September 1999 without the signature of the lessees.
However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been signed by
the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another copy from
respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property covered by a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a
certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and
notarized said agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was still
covered by the period within which it could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently
submitted three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an
Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs
were not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the
named attorneyin-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit
corroborated complainant’s allegations against respondent. 2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution
requiring respondent to submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days
from receipt of notice.3
In her Comment,4 respondent explained thatthe mortgage contract was prepared in
the presence of complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing her
signature. However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract
was hastily done. It was only copied from a similar file in respondent’s computer,
and the phrase "absolute and registered owner" was inadvertently left unedited.
Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action, because complainant
constructed the subject public market stall under a "Build Operate and Transfer"
contract with the local government unit and, technically, she could be considered its
owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property
in which complainant was represented as the property’s absolute owner, but she did
not complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against complainant was
not the representation ofherself as owner of the mortgaged property, but her
guarantee that it was free from all liens and encumbrances. The perjury charge was
even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that complainant and her spouse
had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the previous mortgage contract over the
same market stall.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document
attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of
the agreement to complainant to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra
copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s
assurance that the lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the
original copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent
claimed that complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed
no advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase
agreement was notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the
agreement mentioned nothing about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that
the property was the subject of a case pending before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of
the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by
complainant as additional evidence wereproperly notarized. It can be easily gleaned
from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before
respondent; hence,the notarization was limited to the former’s participation in the
execution ofthe document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the
document must be notarized in the principal’s place of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensuedafter respondent submitted her Comment. After
her rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent Ex-ParteMotion for Submission of
Additional Evidence.5 Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized by
respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which
referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked
the signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale
with incomplete signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn
Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five
unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by
the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter toa potential investor in Japan; (9) an
unsigned Bank Certification; and (10)an unsigned Consent to Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective
Position Papers.6 Notably, respondent’s Position Paper did not tackle the additional
documents attached to complainant’s Urgent Ex ParteMotion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R.
Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of
respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation of
her oath as such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who
had purportedly appeared before her. He accepted respondent’s explanations with
respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to
Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate
mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of
Canon 187 and Rule 18.038of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also
recommended that she besuspended from the practice of law for six months. 9
The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May
2008, unanimously adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year.10
Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration 11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the additional documents submitted by
complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the
procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004
Rules on Notarial Practice).13Moreover, the Urgent Ex ParteMotion of complainant
was actually a supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under the rules of
procedure of the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not the proper
party to question those documents. Hence, the investigating commissioner should
have expunged the documents from the records, instead of giving them due course.
Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically
the following: absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish
motive; personal and emotional problems; timely goodfaith effort to make
restitution or to rectify the consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure
to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character
or reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March
2012, deniedrespondent’s motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason
to justify a reversal of the IBP’s findings. 14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura
Angelica Y. Santiago – through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice
Antonio T. Carpio – transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment
Complaint against respondent.15
THE COURT’S RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the
parties’ submissions in this case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall
first dispose of some procedural matters raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by
complainant are inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule
VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised in
Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the respondent therein opposed the admission of
the birth certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly immoral
conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993. 17 Rejecting his argument, the Court
reasoned as follows:
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is
admissible when it isrelevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to
the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for
the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in
violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for
sanctions against persons violating the ruleon confidentiality of birth records, but
nowhere does itstate that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule
would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised
Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a
result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said
rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person
from interference by the government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we explained
that: The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern
itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It
governs the relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The
Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the individual against
any aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government
and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in
this case. The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of
appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the
constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the
subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised
Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth
certificates inquestion, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should
be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case
against respondent.18
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the
inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly
consideredin evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant as
additional evidence.
Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-ParteMotion of complainant constitutes a
supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental
pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary pleading. Its usual
office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with
respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original
complaint. 19 Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by
complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her charges against respondent is
that the latter notarizedincomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease
agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred
from submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds
that she committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court
has repeatedlystressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act,
but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled tofull faith
and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties;
otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined.20
less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law and perpetual
disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating
Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is
IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a
member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country
for their information and guidance.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the
notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity
and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence
in notarial documents diminished.21 In this case, respondent fully knew that
complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contractdoes not make
respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for
tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of
Canon 122 and Rules 1.01 23 and 1.0224 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by

complainant sometime in September 1999 25 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy
of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she could have given complainant a
certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a
rarityin respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show that on various
occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were
either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each document
maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to
demand that a document be signed in his or her presence. 26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are
the very same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said
notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. 27 Thus,
in acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her,
respondent also violated Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood.29 Certainly, respondent is unfit
to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several instances, the
Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to
the solemnity of their oath as notaries public. 30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment
is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court will not disbar a
lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. 31 The
blatmt disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a notary public warrants the
A.C. No. 10689 might or could lawfully do if personally present and hereby ratifying and confirming
all that our said attorney shall do or cause to be done by virtue of these presents
until revoked in writing by me.
ROMEO A. ALMARIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. DOMINICA LLERA-AGNO, Respondent IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed this instrument on the 26 th day of July 2006
at Muntinlupa City.
DECISION
xxxx
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
HEIRS OF THE LATE VICTORIA A. ALMARIO:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint 1 filed by complainant Romeo A.
Almario (complainant) before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated (Signed)
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking to disbar Atty. Dominica L. Agno (respondent RONALD A. GATDULA
lawyer), for notarizing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) without the personal
appearance of one of the affiants therein.
(Signed)
FRANCISCA A. MALLARI
Factual Background
xxxx
On July 5, 2006, a Complaint for Judicial Partition with Delivery of Certificate of
Title, docketed as Civil Case No. 06115416 2 (civil case), was instituted before the
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila by the herein complainant against therein
defendants Angelita A. Barrameda and several other persons. It was therein alleged
that complainant is the sole surviving registered owner of a parcel of land situated REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES) SS.
at No. 973 Del Pan Street, San Antonio, Tondo, Manila, covered by Transfer CITY OF MUNTINLUPA )
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 244909, and that the defendants therein are co-owners
of that parcel of land by virtue of intestate succession. BEFORE ME, a notary public for the City of Muntinlupa, personally appeared the
following persons on the 26[th] day of July 2006:
Relative to the said civil case, herein respondent lawyer, as counsel for therein
defendants, notarized and acknowledged a SPA 3 which reads: xxxx

SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY Ronald A. Gatdula with CTC No. 16785315 issued at Manila on 1-19-06 Francisca
Mallari with CTC No. 16785314 issued at Manila on 1-19-06 known to me and to me
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing Special Power of
Attorney, consisting of three (3) pages including this page where the
acknowledgement is written, signed by the parties and their instrumental witnesses
WE, x x x the HEIRS OF THE LATE VICTORIA ALMARIO, to wit: RONALD A. GA TD
and they acknowledged to me that the same is their own true act and deed.
ULA, of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of 973 Del Pan St., Tondo, Manila
and FRANCISCA A. MALLARI, of the same address, do hereby appoint, name and
constitute also MA. LOURDES ALMARIO P. PEDIA, above named, to do the following WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL.
acts and things:
(Signed)
1. To act as our representative and agent in administering our property x x x DOMINICA L. AGNO
located at District of Tondo, City of Manila consisting of SEVENTY EIGHT SQUARE
METERS AND SIXTY FIVE DECIMETERS (78.65) Square meters, covered by TCT No. Notary Public
T-244909 of the [Register] of Deeds of the City of Manila; Until 31 Dec 2006
PTR No. 0007769
xxxx Muntinlupa City
06 January 2006
IBP Life Roll 00577
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto our said attorney-in-fact full power and
Doc. No. 193
authority, whatsoever requisite to be done in or about the premises, as fully as we
Page No. 55
Book No. 11
Series of 2006
It is complainant's contention: (l) that the said SP A was falsified because one of the
affiants therein, Francisca A. Mallari (Mallari), 4 could not possibly have executed the
same because she was in Japan at the time the SP A was executed, as certified
to5 by the Bureau of Immigration (BI); (2) that this SP A was used in the said civil
case to perpetrate fraud and deception against complainant resulting in the filing of
Criminal Case No. 452612-CR, for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
(Use of Falsified Document) against Ma. Lourdes Almario Pedia, (Pedia), the
attorney-in-fact mentioned in the SPA; (3) that respondent lawyer notarized the SP
A although Mallari did not personally appear before her; (4) that in the process of
notarizing the SP A, respondent lawyer also accepted a Community Tax Certificate
(CTC), which is no longer considered a competent evidence of identity pursuant to
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; and (5) that, therefore, respondent lawyer
violated Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which state -
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any
suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
xxxx
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
6
In her Answer, respondent lawyer prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and
offered the following arguments:
1) On July 12, 2006, Pedia sent the SPA to Mallari in Japan and it was
brought back to the Philippines on July 25, 2006 by Mallari's son, Roman
Mallari-Vestido;
2) The SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 for reasons of expediency,
because therein defendants were pressed for time in filing their Answer in
the civil case, and that in any event, Mallari undertook to have the SPA
acknowledged before the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August
28, 2006, (thereby giving it retroactive effect). Respondent lawyer claimed
that the aforementioned circumstances showed that she acted in good faith
in notarizing the SPA;
3) Mallari was able to acknowledge the SP A with red ribbon 7 before the
Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August 28, 2006;
4) Neither fraud nor deception was perpetrated as the parties in the said
civil case executed a Compromise Agreement, 8 which was approved by the
RTC;9
5) Contrary to complainant's claim, CTCs are still presently accepted as
proof of personal identification in cases where no other proof of personal
identification is available; and,
6) That, if at all, it was complainant himself who defrauded the RTC when
he stated in his verified complaint that Mallari is a resident of No. 973 Del
Pan St., San Antonio, Tondo, Manila, even though he knew that Mallari was
in Japan at the time of filing of the civil case.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
In a Report and Recommendation, 10 the Investigating Commissioner found
respondent lawyer liable for violation of Section 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice and recommended that she be suspended for six months as notary public.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, it was evident that respondent lawyer
notarized the SPA despite knowing that Mallari, one of the affiants therein, did not
personally appear before her.
Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
On April 16, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution 11 adopting
the finding and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent lawyer filed a verified Motion for Reconsideration, 12 which was denied
by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution13 dated May 3, 2014.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
Respondent lawyer admits the infraction imputed against her, and simply pleads
that the penalty recommended by the IBP be reduced or lowered. She argues that:
(1) this is her first offense since she was first commissioned as a notary public in
1973; (2) the case involved only one document; (3) the notarization was done in
good faith; (4) the civil case wherein the questioned SP A was used ended in a
Compromise Agreement; and finally (5) she is already 71 years old and is truly
sorry for what she had done, and promises to be more circumspect in the
performance of her duties as a notary public. 14
In his Comment15 to the Petition, complainant insists that respondent lawyer must
be disciplined accordingly and that suspension is the appropriate penalty for such
infraction.
The sole issue that this Court must thus address is the appropriate penalty to be
meted out against respondent lawyer.
Our Ruling
The importance of the affiant's personal appearance when a document is notarized
is underscored by Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which
states:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - 'Acknowledgment' refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete
instrument or document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or
document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument
or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free
and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity,
that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Section 2(b), Rule 1V of the same Rules provides that:
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to
the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by
the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions mandate the notary public to require the physical or personal
presence of the person/s who executed a document, before notarizing the same. In
other words, a document should not be notarized unless the person/s who is/are
executing it is/are personally or physically present before the notary public. The
personal and physical presence of the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature/s of the affiant/s therein
and the due execution of the document.
Notaries public are absolutely prohibited or forbidden from notarizing a fictitious or
spurious document.1âwphi1 They are the law's vanguards and sentinels against
illegal deeds. The confidence of the public in the integrity of notarial acts would be
undermined and impaired if notaries public do not observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties spelled out in the notarial law.
This Court, in Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos, 16 held that "notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routinary act[;i]t is imbued with public interest x xx."
In cognate or similar cases, 17 this Court likewise held that a notary public must not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same persons
who executed the same, and personally appeared before him to attest to the truth
of the contents thereof. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free and voluntary act and deed.
In the present case, the SPA in question was notarized by respondent lawyer
despite the absence of Mallari, one of the affiants therein. Mallari could not have
personally appeared before respondent lawyer in Muntinlupa City, Philippines where
the SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 because Mallari was in Japan at that time,
as certified to by the Bureau of Immigration.
It goes without saying that it was respondent lawyer's bounden duty, as a lawyer
and notary public, to obey the laws of the land and to promote respect for legal
processes. Respondent lawyer may only forsake this duty at the risk of forfeiting her
membership in the Philippine Bar and the revocation of her license as a notary
public. Considering however, the circumstances attendant upon this case, we
resolve to reduce or lower the recommended penalty on respondent lawyer.
The Court opts to suspend respondent lawyer as a notary public for two months,
instead of six months as the IBP had recommended. We are impelled by the
following reasons for taking this course of action: first, the apparent absence of bad
faith in her notarizing the SP A in question; second, the civil case wherein the
flawed SP A was used ended up in a judicial Compromise Agreement; and finally,
this is her first administrative case since she was commissioned as a Notary Public
in 1973. In addition, respondent lawyer invites our attention to the fact that she is
already in the twilight years of her life.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Dominica L. Agno is hereby SUSPENDED as
Notary Public for the aforesaid infraction for two months and WARNED that the
commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to Atty. Agno's personal record. Further, let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for
their info1mation and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
March 10, 2015
A.C. No. 5816
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar 0.
Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo)
(respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends
since the mid-1960’s when they were both students at the University of the
Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths
of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig
started to court Dr. Perez. 2
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez
(Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist
Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of
Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only
married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would
make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could
have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School. 4
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a
foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually
marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984,
Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic.
Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was
lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage. 5
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in
the United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they
named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity
since the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the
latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty.
Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their
union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the
laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son. 7
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their
union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her
that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition. 8
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter 9 in the
mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that
sometime later, she came upon a love letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig
for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his
love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his "impediment is removed."
Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig
to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of
his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the
nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved
to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was
frequently seen.12
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file
their respective comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002. 14
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18,
1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed
signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had
serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four
children, their relationship simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984.
They then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how
the agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven
suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of
property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide
them.16
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of
Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws.
Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the
Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed
a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984. 17
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that
the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the
Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and
Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus,
Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA. 18
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since
his previous marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr.
Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He
merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship. 19
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually,
he left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing. 20
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his
relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that
Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was
attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He
likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001. 21
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She
claimed that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm.
She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she
could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for
her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which
was the reason why she resigned from his law firm. 22
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice.23
On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an
Order24 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4,
2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties
manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the
pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit
their respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty.
Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 2003 25 and
October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper 27 on October 24,
2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-
CBD issued a Report and Recommendation, 28 which recommended the disbarment
of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed
out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his
previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal
conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating
Commissioner further opined that:
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of
Atty. Catindig established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants
fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it
was reprehensible to the highest degree.
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his
official and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s
bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely
caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head up
high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a
model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In
contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a
prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise
inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of
the community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge
against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present
clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged affair between the
respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, 30 which
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in
relying solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under
Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be
supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the
absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave
credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that
he never concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig
asserted that he had always been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution 32 dated December 29, 2012, denied
Atty. Catindig’s motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality,
which would warrant their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the
circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations
of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral
character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but
it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive
and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad
character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it
is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded
trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his
all."34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer
may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly
immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis ours)
"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor."35 Immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral, conduct.36
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a
grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from
Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly
immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central
Methodist Church in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983,
Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously,
15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that
his first marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy
problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from
Gomez, dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree
from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the
same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he
moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that
has at least a semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained
from the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as
he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still
validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage
be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void.
This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances
seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a
blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr.
Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage
remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the
USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the
subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that
Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he
resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his
otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.1âwphi1
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal
actions he resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty.
Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to
properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then
already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer
employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty.
Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms
part of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty.
Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue
as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage.’"37 In various cases, the Court has held that
disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an
illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a child. 38
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to
ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality
and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law.

Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in
definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar
admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial
advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that courts.
degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the
penalty of disbarment.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo 1s hereby DISMISSED
for lack of evidence.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
This Decision takes effect immediately.
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish
the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, SO ORDERED.
the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since
they are uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig
himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his
previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides
ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a
dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the
respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her
claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents
were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings

against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The
evidence required m suspens10n or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence.39

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only
proves that the latter indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations
between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein.
Similarly,. the supposed love letter, if at all, only provesAtty.that Catindig wrote
Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is
indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.
A.C. No. 10676 September 8, 2015
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment 1 filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April
12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic
womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities"
which cause "undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims
that respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and grossly
immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the
University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a
peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar
examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both
registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has
three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent
had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women
between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:
a. AAA,2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from
1990 to 1992, which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit
relations;
b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to
1996, despite being already married to Jardiolin;
c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically
involved with DDD;
d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being
married to Jardiolin and while still being romantically .involved with CCC;
e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from
May 2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically
involved with CCC.3
Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived
CCC and DDD by representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two
women to start a love affair with him, when in. truth, he was then still married to
Jardiolin.4
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of
1998 to 2000, respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development
Corporation (KOC). However, despite being a public officer and a government
counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC,
and assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of
the Philippine Government.5
Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor
Rolando Martin of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the
latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC.
In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was
allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty.
Espejo. The vehicle was seen several times by respondent's classmates and
officemates being driven and parked by respondent in his own home and in the
OGCC premises itself.6
In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that
respondent was summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land
titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation of the alleged spurious land
titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon
and Justice & Human Rights Committees recommended that respondent be
investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for
graft and corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary sanction by this Court for
grave misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code. 7
It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent
even attempted to conceal the evidence by requesting complainant's parents,
spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL
parked in their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time.
Respondent's request, however, was refused by the spouses when they learned that
the vehicle was the subject of the Senate Inquiry. 8
It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman
issued a Resolution finding probable cause against respondent, and an Information
was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.9 Complainant also claims that respondent abused his
authority as an educator in Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College,
College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College, where respondent induced his male
students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained the romantic
gestures of his female students in exchange for passing grades. 10 The Petition was
docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.
In an Order11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable
Rogelio A. Vinluan, required respondent to file his verified answer.
In his undated Answer,12 respondent opted not to present any counter-statement of
facts in supp01i of his defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition
suffers from procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to
substantiate the allegations or charges against him. Respondent pointed out that
Annex "J" of the Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked
formal requirements, and thus, should be treated as a mere scrap of paper.
Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages attached to the petition were
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence.13 He claims that the identities of the owners of the e-mail messages, as
well as the allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not properly
established. Respondent further argues that the statements of complainant's
witnesses were merely self-serving and deserved scant consideration.
Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer), 14 stating that the
allegations in the complaint were deemed admitted by reason of respondent's
failure to make specific or even general denials of such in his Answer.
In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant), 15 respondent simply denied all
of complainant's accusations in the petition, allegedly for "lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof." 16
On August 3, 2007, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
(Commissioner Villadolid) set the case for mandatory conference on August 28,
2007,17 which respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent filed a Motion
to Cancel Hearing,18 praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference allegedly
due to a previously scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was
opposed by complainant and eventually denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his
Order19 dated August 28, 2007. In the same order, complainant's
Manifestation20 praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be
complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by Commissioner Villadolid.
Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the presentation of complainant's witnesses
on September 11, 2007 and the respective subpoenas 21 were issued.
A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration,22 praying that the Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and
that the hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of October. In said
motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or more
commonly known as "sore eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at
least one to two weeks while his eyes are being treated. Attached to his motion
were photocopies of two medical certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan
was suffering from sore eyes.
During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed
petitioner's motion, arguing that based on his personal verification with the court
personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parafiaque City, there
was no case calendared for hearing on the date of the previous setting. Complainant
also argued that this is another ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings
because he knew that complainant worked overseas and was only in the country for
a limited period of time. Finding merit in complainant's opposition, respondent's
motion was denied and complainant was allowed to present his
witnesses.23 Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor
General Karl Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty.
Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo
Ecraela, and Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.
ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate Report
had recommended the disbarment of respondent.
Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the
email messages submitted by complainant indeed originated from respondent based
on their familiarity with respondent, paiiicularly, the email messages which
contained references to his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and
respondent's high blood pressure.
Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as
his girlfriend and that sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another
girl in Glorietta despite still being married to his wife. Atty. Litong also recalled
encountering respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC,
whom she perceived to be respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed
that respondent had, in more than one occasion, brought with him his students
during their drinking sessions and had even one student driving for him.
For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about
respondent's preoccupations with his students. Atty. Corpus also testified that ODD
called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that the latter had
broken up with respondent upon learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus
surmised based on her telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not
tell the latter his actual marital status. Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled
that during complainant's farewell party in February 2007, respondent introduced
CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.
To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of
their affidavits since their testimonies were based on the affidavits that complainant
included in his petition.
Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory
conference/hearing was terminated and the parties were directed to submit their
respective verified position papers with supporting documentary evidence within
thi1iy (30) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which,
the case was considered submitted for report and recommendation.
On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with
Comments),24 pertaining to respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for
the IBP-CBD to formally request for records from Branch 77 of MTC, Parañaque City
to verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first
scheduled mandatory conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received
complainant's Compliance (with Comments),25 submitting the certified photo copies
of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Resolution dated January 22,
2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position
Paper.26 Complainant thereafter filed two Manifestations, 27 asserting that respondent
is already barred from submitting his verified position paper and that any decision
or judgment would have to be based solely on complainant's Verified Position
Paper.28
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner
Villadolid rendered a Report,29 finding that there is more than sufficient evidence
establishing respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral
character as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code 30 and/or
RA 301931 as reflected in the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the
Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite respondent's denials,
complainant was able to present certified true copies of the relevant documents
which support his allegations in the petition.
As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited
complainant's asse1iion that respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his
alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the Rep01i, complainant was not
able to discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the email messages
pertaining to this adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However,
Commissioner Villadolid found merit in complainant's claim that respondent
committed grossly immoral conduct by having illicit relations with ODD, CCC, and
BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws. which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution,
specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable
social institution. is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.
xxxx
4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon I, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that .. a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"' nor shall a lawyer
"engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life. behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession".32
Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and
recommendation: V. Conclusion/Recommendations
5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient
evidence establishing Respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and
moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar, this Commissioner
respectfully recommends that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform
his conduct in a manner consistent with the norms prescribed by the Canons of
Professional Responsibility.33
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a
Resolution 34 adopting and approving, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of Governors
disbarred respondent, thus:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280
CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violations of
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty.
Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered
Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys.
On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 35 dated
July 3, 2013, to which complainant was required to submit his comment. 36
For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report
dated June 28, 2012)37 dated August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required
to comment on complainant's motion in an Order38 dated August 27, 2013. On the
same date, complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration).39 Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment
on/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Leave 40 dated September 12,
2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or Opposition 41 dated September 20,
2013.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration.42 Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline
forwarded the records of this case to this Court on November 11, 2014. 43
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct,
which would warrant his disbarment.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of
Governors' resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was
fully supported by the evidences offered.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life. behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for the profession.44 Good moral character is not
only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to
maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.45
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
proceedings against a member of the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that
clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De
Guzman, Jr.:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto. Under Section I of Rule 133, in determining whether or not
there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the
facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying. the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest. and
also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial;
and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which
side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the
burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally
balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent. 46
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by
which respondent has been found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his
personal affairs. This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of
lawyers who were proven to have not only failed to retain good moral character in
their professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the
institution of marriage by maintaining illicit affairs.
In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed
disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair
with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.47
A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked
his privilege to practice law after his philandering ways was proven by preponderant
evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit.48 We ruled:
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.
xxxx
The fact that respondent s philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of
his profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his
profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
with which his license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaw, "[t]he
grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of the Rules of Court are not !imitative
and are broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional
or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members of the bar.49
Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan
Catindig,50 the Court disbarred respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly and
purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting to various legal
strategies to render a facade of validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the
existence of his first marriage. We said:
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as
such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance. which makes 'a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage." In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a child. 51 (emphasis ours.)
In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several
adulterous and illicit relations with both married and unmarried women between the
years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of
the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit
relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant evidence. Respondent's main defense
against the alleged illicit relations was that the same were not sufficiently
established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's petition
contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence. Respondent did not
specifically deny complainant's allegations and, instead, questioned the admissibility
of the supporting documents.1âwphi1 Due to respondent's own failure to attend the
hearings and even submit his own position paper, the existence of respondent's
illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution,
specifically A1iicle XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.52 (emphasis in the original.)
Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid' s
findings that respondent violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as Rule I 0.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 10 - A LA WYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT. Rule 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
xxx
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.
In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate
Inquiry and had a pending case for graft and corruption against him with the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:
13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice &
Human Rights Committees to be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman,
the same as contained in their "Committee Final Report No. 367" herein attached as
Annex D;
14. Respondent has also been recommended by the abovementioned committees to
suffer the penalty of disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the herein
attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for graft and corruption against
him is still pending with the Sandiganbayan." 53
Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that
complainant failed to adduce additional evidence that a case had been filed against
him, and that complainant's statements were merely self-serving averments not
substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied
complainant's averments for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report, viz:
4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were
made in attempt to mislead this Commission. Respondent could have easily
admitted or denied said allegations or explained the same, as he (sic) clearly had
knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of Complainant's
position of being not present in the country and not being able to acquire the
necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the Commission. In doing so, he
has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule
10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to
be misled by any artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."
4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor
and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a
member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the
Commission finds that Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he should be disciplined. 54 (emphasis in the
original.)
In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to
mislead the IBP, which intention was more so established because complainant was
able to submit supporting documents in the form of certified true copies of the
Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.
We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the
lawyer's oath which he took before admission to the Bar, which states:
I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines: I will support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same: I will delay
no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out
of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking
the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His
actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member
of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the

resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly,
respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality
and of violating Section 2 of A1iicle XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian
Raymond A. Pangalangan with the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies of this Decision
be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by
the Cou1i Administrator to all the cou1is in the country for their information and
guidance.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 February 3, 2015
MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against
Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and
A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September
2014.
A.C. No. 7973
On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before
the Office of the Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia
alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children,
Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a
dentist and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in1992,
Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage, which was eventually
granted.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister
Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was
already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In
2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned
abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia
alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged
that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against
moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice
of law.
In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar
complaint against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreño alleged that
Garcia’s complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he
acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.
In the Court’s Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973
to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a
complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that
Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal
Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has
not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-CBD,
Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the same
facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted
and the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted.
Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the
disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further
alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that
Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to
retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties
agreed on the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved in a
conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
found Sesbreño guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. On appeal, this Court downgraded the crime to homicide and
sentenced Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporalas
maximum. The IBP-CBD found that Sesbreño was released from confinement on 27
July 2001 following his acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground
for disbarment or suspension. Citing International Rice Research Institute v.
National Labor Relations Commission,1 the IBPCBD further ruled that homicide may
or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-
CBD reviewed the decision of this Court convicting Sesbreño for the crime of
homicide, and found that the circumstances leading to the death of the victim
involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:
Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher Yapchangco was
shown to be a foe of respondent and neither had the victim Luciano nor his
companion Christopher shown to have wronged the respondent. They simply
happened to be at the wrong place and time the early morning of June 3, 1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent,
bear the earmarks of moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court
observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the respondent, by his conduct, displayed
extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. Respondent acted like a god who
deserved not to be slighted by a couple of drunks who may have shattered the
stillness of the early morning with their boisterous antics, natural display of loud
bravado of drunken men who had one too many. Respondent’s inordinate over
reaction to the ramblings of drunken men who were not even directed at respondent
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent
was not only vindictive without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced sense of
superiority.2
Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon 3 where the respondent
was disbarred for having been convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD
recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD.
Sesbreño alleged that the IBP-CBD misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty.
Dizon. He alleged that the attendant circumstances in Sorianoare disparate, distinct,
and different from his case. He further alleged that there was no condition set on
the grant of executive clemency to him; and thus, he was restored to his full civil
and political rights. Finally, Sesbreño alleged that after his wife died in an ambush,
he already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in the case for bigamy against
Garcia and that he already advised his clients to settle their other cases. He alleged
that Garcia already withdrew the complaints against him.
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-
31 denying Sesbreño’s motion for reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the
records of the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case
No. 08-2273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the Court’s Resolution dated 30
September 2014, the Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.
The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide
involves moral turpitude.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution
No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11
February 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the
appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude.4 Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general,
contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. 5
The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was
discussed by this Court in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC 6 where it
ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude.1âwphi1 Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on
the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is
not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any
particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but
not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado
not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist
by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are
crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are
crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows
therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the
meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the
cases are reached.7
In People v. Sesbreño, 8 the Court found Sesbreño guilty of homicide and ruled:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H.
Sesbreñois hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a
prison term of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided by
law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the amount of
₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.9
We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the
circumstances show the presence of moral turpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his
companion Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by
Sesbreño’s house when the latter, without any provocation from the former, went
out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at them. According to
Yapchangco, theywere about five meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreño
when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around,
they saw Sesbreño aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away
but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he
heard shots and opened the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and
Amparado running away while Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting
Rabanes’ house in the process. Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall
down after being shot, then saw Sesbreño in the middle of the street, carrying a
long firearm, and walking back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD
correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and
time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by
Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full
civil and political rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio 10 to bolster his
argument. In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was granted "an absolute and unconditional
pardon"11 which restored his "full civil and political rights,"12 a circumstance not
present inthese cases. Here, the Order of Commutation 13 did not state that the
pardon was absolute and unconditional. The accessory penalties were not
mentioned when the original sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation and
they were also not mentioned in stating the commuted sentence. It only states: By
virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the original sentence of
prisoner RAUL SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted by the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City
and Supreme Court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years
and 1 day to 16 years and 4 months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of
₱50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an indeterminate prison term of from 7
years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of
₱50,000.00.14
Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and
unconditional and restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the
President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. 15 In this case, the executive
clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6
months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation
is a mere reduction of penalty.16 Commutation only partially extinguished criminal
liability.17 The penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served the
commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More
importantly, the Final Release and Discharge 18 stated that "[i]t is understood that
such x x x accessory penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted
herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here. Even if
Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that
it was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right
but a privilege.19 It is granted only to those possessing good moral character. 20 A
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition
of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment. 21

WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately

upon his receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a
copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5473 [a)] He [had] filed the annulment of adoption of Melchor Arruiza in Abra, stating
that the hearing would commence by the end of May 2000; and that the trial had
been brought to completion;
GENE M. DOMINGO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent [b)] He was processing the transfer of the titles of the properties [in the names of
petitioner and his children;]
DECISION
[c)] He processed the cancellation of the adverse claim of Melchor Arruiza annotated
on the two titles of the properties, claiming that he was there at the Land
PER CURIAM:
Registration Authority in Quezon City for the final approval of the cancellation;

A disbarred lawyer who is found to have committed an offense that constitutes

[d)] He was processing the payment of taxes and other fees on the properties to be
another ground prior to his eventual disbarment may be heavily fined therefor. The
transferred, including capital gains tax, transfer tax, registration fees and
Court does not lose its exclusive jurisdiction over his other disbarrable act or
documentary stamp tax;
actuation committed while he was still a member of the Law Profession.

[e)] That he was negotiating with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to reduce the tax
The Case
from ₱80,000.00 to ₱10,000.00;

Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment instituted by Gene Domingo
[f)] That the new titles in the names of petitioner's children would be ready by July
(complainant) against Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), 1 alleging that the
20, 2000;
latter deliberately and feloniously induced and persuaded the former into releasing
almost half a million pesos on the false pretense of having performed and
accomplished legal services for him. [g)] That the new titles in the children's names were issued;

Antecedents
The complainant is an American citizen of Filipino descent. During a visit to the
Philippines in 2000, he sought the services of a lawyer to handle the cases to be
filed against his cousin Melchor Arruiza and to work on the settlement of the estate
of his late mother Judith Arruiza.2 In April 2000, petitioner met respondent, a lawyer
recommended by a friend. Petitioner informed respondent about his need for the
services of a lawyer for the rescission of Melchor Arruiza's adoption and for the
settlement of his mother's estate.3
The complainant alleged that the respondent represented to him that he would take
on the cases in behalf of the law firm of Agabin Verzola Hermoso Layaoen & De
Castro, where he worked as an associate. He assured petitioner that the law firm
was able and willing to act as his legal counsel in the cases he intended to institute
against his adopted brother, and to undertake the transfer of his mother's
properties to his and his children's names. 4 Trusting the representations of
respondent, the complainant agreed to engage respondent and his law firm, and
paid the initial amount of ₱80,000.00.
Being based in the United States of America, the complainant maintained constant
communication with respondent often through electronic mail (e-mail) and
sometimes by telephone to get updates on the cases. The complainant alleged that
based on his correspondences with respondent, the latter made several
misrepresentations, as follows:
[h)] That Melchor Arruiza opposed the cancellation of the adoption, and boasted
that he knew many big time politicians in Abra who would help him;
[i)] That the Judge x x x handling the case for the cancellation of the adoption
[would] rule in petitioner's favor only if he would give to the Judge 10% of the value
of the property in Better Living Subdivision, Parafiaque City;
[j)] That the Judge agreed on x x x ₱200,000.00 but he (respondent) needed an
additional ₱50,000.00 "for the boys" in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court;
[k)] That the Judge [already wrote] a decision in petitioner's favor, but [for his
protection insisted upon a kaliwaan of the copy of the decision and the payment;]
[l)] That the Judge received the money and [already promulgated the] decision in
petitioner's favor;
[m)] That said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals and eventually to the
Supreme Court where respondent was working doubly hard to influence [a
favourable] outcome;
[n)] That the Supreme Court had to meet en bane on the decision of the Abra
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge in petitioner's favor; and

[o)] That in consideration of all the above transactions, he (respondent) needed

money [totalling] ₱433,002.61 [as payment to the Judge, BIR and related agencies,
actual expenses and legal fees], [but requested] the payment in staggered amounts
and on different dates.5
Based on the respondent's representation as to how justice was achieved in the
Philippines, the complainant was constrained to give to the respondent the
requested amounts in the belief that he had no choice. 6 The complainant would
repeatedly request the original or at the very least copies of the decisions and the
titles by e-mail, facsimile (fax) or courier service, but respondent repeatedly failed
to comply with the requests, giving various reasons or excuses. The respondent
even volunteered to meet with the complainant in the United States of America to
personally deliver the promised documents. The respondent never went to the
United States of America to meet with the complainant. He also did not turn over
the requested documents to the latter. Even worse, the respondent ultimately tried
to avoid the complainant by cutting off communications between them.
Given the respondent's evasion, the complainant decided to write the law firm of
Agabin Verzola Hermoso Layaoen & De Castro to inform them of the fraudulent
actions of the respondent.7 The complainant was surprised to be informed by the
law firm that he had never been its client.8 The law firm also told him that the
respondent had been forced to resign from the law office because of numerous
complaints about his performance as a lawyer.9
Hence, the complainant terminated the services of the respondent for refusal to
respond and to surrender the alleged documents in his possession. He engaged the
services of another law firm to verify the status of the cases allegedly brought by
respondent in petitioner's behalf. The new law firm secured a certification from the
RTC of Abra to the effect that no case against Melchor Arruiza had been filed. The
complainant also discovered that none of the representations of the respondent, as
enumerated above, had come to pass because all of such representations were
sham and intended to induce him to remit almost half a million pesos to the
respondent.10
On July 24, 2001, the complainant filed his complaint for disbarment in this the
Court accusing the respondent of committing acts in violation of Canons 1, 2, 13, 15
& 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 11
On August 22, 2001, the Court required the respondent to comment. 12
In his comment dated October 21, 2001,13 the respondent denied the accusations,
and countered as follows:
Melchor Arruiza as a legally adopted son of his late mother on the two titles
cancelled, and to have the properties transferred in the names of petitioner's
children;
c) Respondent explained to petitioner that it would be very hard to revive the case
because the order of adoption issued on May 25, 1979 had long become final and
executory;
d) It would also be inconvenient for petitioner to pursue the cancellation case
considering that he was a permanent resident of the United States of America and
the need for his personal presence at the RTC in Abra to testify against his adopted
brother;
e) Respondent further told petitioner that his law firm at the time did not allow its
members to handle personal cases, especially if the cases were filed in far flung
provinces; and that the particular case of annulment of the judgment of adoption,
being a special proceeding, would take years to finish inasmuch as the losing party
would likely elevate the matter up to the Supreme Court and would be very costly in
terms of expenses and attorney's fees;
f) Respondent claimed that petitioner still profusely pleaded with him to pursue the
case no matter how much it would cost him, as long as his adopted brother was
prevented from inheriting from the estate of his mother;
g) Respondent tried to talk some sense into petitioner, particularly that it was only
just and fair that his adopted brother would inherit from their mother, but petitioner
could not be swayed;
h) Even though respondent sensed the greediness, wickedness and scheming design
of petitioner, he still accepted the engagement to handle the case of annulment of
the judgment of adoption, as well as to have the annotations at the back of the
titles cancelled and eventually have the properties transferred in the names of
petitioner's children;
i) Respondent proposed that petitioner pay ₱500,000.00, more or less, as the total
package of expenses and attorney's fees; petitioner agreed to the proposal and
promised to remit the amount by installment upon his return to the United States of
America, and to send the special power of attorney authorizing respondent to bring
the case against Melchor Arruiza;

j) As a means of protecting the interest of petitioner, respondent offered to issue a

a) Petitioner wanted to have the adoption of Melchor D. Arruiza by his late mother
check for ₱500,000.00 as a security for the amount to be remitted by petitioner
Judith D. Arruiza granted by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dolores-San
from his United States of America account; his offer of the check was to give a sign
Juan in the Province of Abra annulled because he had not been informed about the
of his good faith, because his primary aim was to provide the best and effective
adoption which affected his inheritance, particularly with respect to the two parcels
legal services petitioner needed under the circumstances;
of land located in Parañaque City. Petitioner related to respondent why he
(petitioner) filed the action for annulment of adoption in the RTC in Parañaque City,
but Branch 258 of the RTC dismissed the petition on January 19, 2000 for lack of k) Respondent then prepared an affidavit of self-adjudication for petitioner
jurisdiction over the case; respecting the two properties registered in the name of petitioner's late mother; he
caused the publication of the affidavit in a tabloid;
b) Following the dismissal of the case, petitioner desperately wanted to revive it in
the RTC in Abra. Petitioner also wanted the annotation of rights, title and interest of
l) Respondent informed petitioner that there was no way for him to win the
annulment case unless he personally appeared and testified against his adopted
brother, but petitioner said that he could not personally testify because he feared
for his life due to Abra being an NPA- infested area;
m) On August 27, 2001, respondent went on and filed the complaint for annulment
of the adoption in the RTC in Abra, docketed as Civil Case No. 1989, even without
any firm assurance from petitioner that he would personally appear in court;
n) After the filing of the case, petitioner started making unreasonable demands, like
having an immediate decision from the RTC in Abra in his favor, the cancellation of
the adverse claim of his adopted brother on the titles of the properties, and
transferring the titles in the names of petitioner's three children;
o) Respondent tried to explain to petitioner that his demands were impossible to
meet because civil and special proceedings cases take years to finish inasmuch as
the aggrieved parties would elevate the cases up to the Supreme Court; and that
the cancellation of the adverse claim would depend on the outcome of the case they
filed, but his refusal to appear and testify was still a problem;
p) Petitioner still adamantly insisted that respondent comply with his demands, or
else he would sue him if he did not.14
On November 26, 2001, the Court referred the complaint for disbarment and the
comment to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision.15
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP conducted hearings. The case
was then submitted for resolution after the complainant and the respondent
submitted their manifestation and reply/counter manifestation, respectively.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated September 6, 2002, 16 the IBPCBD found
the respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility with
respect to negligence in the performance of his duties towards his client, and
recommended the penalty of reprimand with a stem warning that a repetition of the
offense would warrant a more severe penalty. It ruled that the proceeding before it
was basically a disciplinary proceeding; that it could only decide on the fitness of
respondent to continue in the practice of law; 17 that it could not go beyond the
sanctions that could be imposed under the Rules of Court; that it had the power to
require the restitution of the client's money as part of the penalty; that it could only
order the restitution of whatever amount that was given by petitioner to respondent
but not other monetary claims of petitioner like travel and plane fare and litigation
expenses, which were properly within the jurisdiction of other authorities; 18 and
that, accordingly, it ordered respondent to immediately deliver to petitioner the
amount of ₱513,000.00, plus interest computed at the legal rate.
In Resolution No. XV-2002-597 passed on October 19, 2002,19 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation dated
September 6, 2002 of the Investigating Commissioner.
On January 14, 2003, the complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 praying
that Resolution No. XV-2002-597 be reconsidered and set aside, and that the
appropriate penalty of disbarment, or, at the very least, suspension be imposed on
the respondent.
On January 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed and adopted Resolution
No. XV-2003-4921 denying the complainant's Motion for Reconsideration on the
ground that the Board had no jurisdiction to consider and resolve the matter by
virtue of its having already been endorsed to the Court.
Meanwhile, on January 29, 2003, the Court issued a resolution: (1) noting the
resolution of the IBP-CBD reprimanding the respondent; and (2) directing him to
inform the IBP of his compliance with the resolution. 22
After the IBP denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, the complainant filed
his petition dated March 6, 2003.23
On April 3, 2003, the respondent filed his Manifestation and Motion praying that the
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors be reconsidered and set aside. 24
On April 30, 2003, the Court noted the IBP's denial of the complainant's Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction, and the respondent's Manifestation and
Motion; and took cognizance of the March 6, 2003 petition of the complainant, and
required the respondent to file his Comment.25
On October 20, 2003, the Court took note of the respondent's Comment with Motion
for Reconsideration, and required the complainant to file his Reply. 26 After
requesting an extension of time to file his Reply, the complainant filed his Reply on
December 8, 2003.27
Ruling of the Court
In its findings, the IBP concluded that the respondent was guilty ofnegligence in the
performance of his duties to his client, and recommended that: (a) he be
reprimanded with a stem warning that any repetition of his conduct would be dealt
with more severely; and (b) he be ordered to return the sums of money totalling
₱513,000.00 he had received from the complainant.
After reviewing the established circumstances of the case, the Court accepts the
findings against the respondent but modifies the recommended penalty considering
that his violation of the Code of Professional Responsibilityconstituted deliberate
defraudation of the client instead of mere negligence.
Firstly, the respondent misled the complainant into thinking that it would be his law
firm that was to take on the case. Secondly, despite the fact that he had intimated
to the complainant that it would be highly unlikely to still have the adoption decree
nullified due to the decree having long become final and executory, he nonetheless
accepted the case. Thirdly, he told the complainant that he had already instituted
the action for the annulment of the adoption despite not having yet done so.
Fourthly, he kept on demanding more money from the complainant although the
case was not actually even moving forward. Fifthly, he continued to make up
excuses in order to avoid having to furnish to the complainant the requested copies
of court documents that, in the first place, he could not produce. And, lastly, he
claimed that he intended to return the money to the complainant but instead sent
the latter a stale check.
All these acts, whether taken singly or together, manifested the respondent's
dishonesty and deceit towards the complainant, his client, in patent violation of Rule
1.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We note that the respondent filed the case for the annulment of the adoption decree
only on August 27, 2001 29 after the complainant had sent him the demand letter
dated April 10, 2001.30 Such filing was already during the pendency of the
administrative investigation of the complaint against him in the IBP. Had the
complainant not threatened to charge him administratively, he would not have filed
the petition for annulment of the adoption at all.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The Court has consistently held, in respect of this Rule, that the mere failure of the
lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.31
Despite the fact that the complainant engaged his services and advanced sums of
money to cover the court fees and related expenses to be incurred along the way,
the respondent did not file the petition for annulment. His conduct was
reprehensible because it amounted to dishonesty and plain deceit. His filing of the
petition for annulment later on did not mitigate his sin because he did so only
because he had meanwhile received the complainant's demand letter that contained
the threat of filing administrative charges against him. Moreover, he repeatedly did
not inform the complainant on the actual status of the petition although the latter
regularly sought to be updated. Instead, the respondent kept on making up excuses
and conjured up pretenses to make it appear that the case was moving along. His
conduct of accepting money for his legal services in handling the annulment of the
adoption decree, and of failing to render the contracted legal services violated
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.32 Also, the highly fiduciary and
confidential relation of attorney and client required that he as the lawyer should
promptly account for all the funds received from, or held by him for, the
complainant as the client.33
Furthermore, the respondent did not abide by the mandate of Canon 15 that
required members of the Legal Profession to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all their dealings and transactions with their clients.
In their conversations, the respondent told the complainant that the judge handling
the case would rule in their favor only if he would be given 10% of the value of the
property at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, and that the handling judge
consequently agreed on the fee of ₱200,000.00 but needed an additional
₱50,000.00 "for the boys" in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In doing
so, the respondent committed calumny, and thereby violated Rules 15.06 and 15.07
of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and
principles of fairness.
Members of the Bench are tasked with ensuring that the ends of justice are
served.1âwphi1 Such negative imputations against them and the collegial bodies of
the Judiciary on the part of the respondent tended to erode the trust and confidence
of the people in our judicial system. The Court should not take such conduct of the
respondent lightly considering that the image of the Judiciary was thereby
diminished in the eyes of the public; hence, the Court must severely reprove the
respondent.
The respondent's commission of various offenses constituting professional
misconduct only demonstrated his unworthiness to remain as a member of the
Legal Profession. He ought to be disbarred for such offenses upon this complaint
alone. A review of his record as an admitted member of the Bar shows, however,
that in Que v. Revilla, Jr.,34 the Court had disbarred him from the Legal Profession
upon finding him guilty of violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and
10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. In view of his prior disbarment, we can no longer impose the
appropriate penalty of disbarment as deserved because we do not have double or
multiple disbarments in this jurisdiction.35
In the meanwhile, on February 15, 2016, the respondent filed a so-called Most
Respectful Motion to Dismiss36in which he adverted to the earlier submission
through his Manifestation filed on April 24, 201537 of the copy of the amicable
settlement he had concluded with the complainant to the effect that, among others,
he had already paid back to the latter, through his lawyer (Atty. Hope Ruiz
Valenzuela), the amount of ₱650,000.00 "as full and complete settlement of the
Complainant's claims against the Respondent." He thereby sought the dismissal of
the complaint out of "justice and fairness."
In the resolution promulgated on September 22, 2015, the Court merely noted
without action the Manifestationdated April 21, 2015. 38
The Most Respectful Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the amicable settlement
between the parties cannot be granted. Although the amicable settlement
obliterated the legal obligation to return to the complainant the amounts obtained
by deceit, the respondent was not entitled to demand the dismissal of the charges
against him for that reason. He ought to have known that his professional
responsibilities as an attorney were distinct from his other responsibilities. To be
clear, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to
punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose
utter disregard of their Lawyer's Oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging
the trust reposed in them as members of the Bar. 39
Moreover, the practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions.40 Every like serving with humility as a Lay Minister at St. Peter Church in Quezon City and
attorney is a vanguard of our legal system, and, as such, is expected to maintain as a regular lecturer on the Legal Aspects of Marriage. 51
not only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing in order that the people's faith and confidence in the legal
Pleas for judicial clemency reflected further remorse and repentance on the part of
system are ensured.41 He must then conduct himself, whether in dealing with his
the respondent.52 His pleas appear to be sincere and heartfelt. In human
clients or with the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at all times. 42 Any
experience, remorse and repentance, if coupled with sincerity, have always been
violation of the high moral standards of the Legal Profession justifies the imposition
regarded as the auspicious start of forgiving on the part of the offended, and may
on the attorney of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
eventually win even an absolution for the remorseful. The Court will not be the last
disbarment.43 Verily, the respondent's deceitful conduct as an attorney rendered
to forgive though it may not forget.
him directly answerable to the Court on ethical, professional and legal grounds
despite the fact that he and the complainant had amicably settled any differences
they had that might have compelled the complainant to bring the complaint against In view of the foregoing circumstances, perpetual disqualification from being
him. reinstated will be too grave a penalty in light of the objective of imposing heavy
penalties like disbarment to correct the offenders. 53 The penalty ought to be
tempered to enable his eventual reinstatement at some point in the future. Verily,
In fine, the gravity of the respondent's professional misconduct and deceit should
permanently barring the respondent from reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by
fully warrant his being permanently barred from reinstatement to the ranks of the
virtue of this disbarrable offense will deprive him the chance to return to his former
Philippine Bar and from having his name restored in the Roll of Attorneys.
life as an attorney.

However, circumstances attendant in his case should be considered and appreciated

in mitigating the penalty to be imposed.44
The first of such circumstances related to the context of the engagement between
the parties. Upon reflecting on the adverse effects on his inheritance from his late
mother of his cousin's adoption by her, the complainant had engaged the
respondent's legal services and representation for the purpose of nullifying or
undoing the adoption. At the outset, the respondent was candid in explaining to the
complainant that the prosecution of the case would be complicated mainly because
the adoption had been decreed in 1979 yet, and also because the complainant, as a
permanent resident of the United States of America, would be thereby encountering
difficulties and high costs, aside from untold inconvenience due to his physical
presence in the country being needed every now and then.45 The respondent's
candid explanations notwithstanding, the complainant persisted in pursuing the
case, impelling the respondent to take on the engagement.
To start the respondent on the long road to reinstatement, we fine him in the
amount of ₱100,000.00, a figure believed to be a fair index of the gravity of his
misdeeds. Less than such amount might undeservedly diminish the gravity of his
misdeeds. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that he committed the offense
complained of herein before the Court disbarred him in A.C. 7054. Meting the stiff
fine despite his disbarment is a way for the Court to assert its authority and
competence to discipline all acts and actuations committed by the members of the
Legal Profession. The Court will not waver in doing so.
But the fine comes with the stem warning to the respondent that he must hereafter
genuinely affirm his remorse and start to demonstrate his readiness and capacity to
live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member
of the Bar in good standing and of every officer of the Court; 55 otherwise, he would
be be sanctioned with greater severity.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA,

Another circumstance is that the respondent had already returned to the
JR. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 15.06 and 15.07 of Canon 15,
complainant the amount of ₱650,000.00 the former had received from the latter on
and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, but, in view
account of the professional engagement. The returned amount was in full and
of his continuing disbarment, hereby METES the penalty of FINE of ₱l00,000.00.
complete settlement of the latter's claims.46 Judicial precedents exist in which the
Court treated the return in full of the money the respondent attorneys had received
from their complaining clients as mitigating circumstances that lowered the This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY
penalties imposed.47 For sure, the voluntary restitution by the respondent herein of
the amount received in the course of the professional engagement, even if it would Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator
not lift the sanction meted on him, manifested remorse of a degree on his part for for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and
his wrongdoing, and was mitigating in his favor. guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to the respondent's personal record as a member of the
And, thirdly, the Court cannot but note the respondent's several pleas for judicial Bar.
clemency to seek his reinstatement in the ranks of the Philippine Bar. 48 He has
backed up his pleas by adverting to his personal travails since his disbarment. He SO ORDERED.
claims, too, that his health has been failing of late considering that he had been
diagnosed to be suffering from chronic kidney disease, stage five, and has been
undergoing dialysis three times a week. 49 His advancing age and the fragile state of
his health may also be considered as a mitigating factor. 50 In addition, it is
noteworthy that he has been devoting some time to Christian and charity pursuits,
A.C. No. 10134 November 26, 2014 On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she was not privy to the disbursement of the
said term-end bonus.8
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), represented by
its President, ATTY. VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL, Complainant, Initially, the case was assigned to IBP Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano. After an
vs. exchange of pleadings, the mandatory conference was held. Afterwards, the
ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, Respondent. protagonists were directed to submit their respective position papers. Thereafter,
the case was re-assigned to IBP Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner
Fernandez).9
DECISION

The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule
MENDOZA, J.:
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which reads:

This resolves the complaint for suspension or disbarment filed by the Philippine
"A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
Association of Court Employees (PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia C. Rafael
conduct."
(Atty. Rafael), on July 17, 2008 against Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz (Atty. Diaz),
former National Treasurer of PACE, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). 1 In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010, Commissioner Fernandez
recommended the dismissal of the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. Atty.
Diaz offered documentary evidence to show that she was able to submit the
PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in the Judiciary
liquidation reports for the two aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also took
held its 11th National Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6 to 8, 2005.
note that Atty. Rafael herself acknowledged the liquidation report made by Atty.
As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz was entrusted with all the money
Diaz with respect to the Davao City convention. 10 As to the sufficiency and
matters of PACE.
completeness of these reports, this would be better resolvedthrough an audit rather
than in disbarment proceedings.1âwphi1 Besides, Commissioner Fernandez did not
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention consider the position of Atty. Diaz as national treasurer of PACE to have any
was submitted by Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national connection with her being as a lawyer. Thus, according to him, she should be
convention in Iloilo City2; that during the 12th convention, an election of officers sanctioned in accordance with the by-laws of PACE instead of a disbarment case. 11
was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National Treasurer, but she was
not elected; that on the last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007,the
As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for re-election in the PACE elections
outgoing Board of Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution
even though she was no longer connected with the Judiciary and therefore
No. 1-2007 appropriating the amount of 30,000.00as term-end bonus for each PACE
disqualified, Commissioner Fernandez opined that the best evidence, which was the
official qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the
"certificate of candidacy," was never offered, 12 and that Atty. Diaz, being a lawyer,
12th convention; that there was no turn over of monies belonging to the association
knew that her bid for re-election would be a useless exercise since she would not
as a matter of procedure despite a letter of demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to
beable to assume office if she won.13
Atty. Diaz;3 and that the new set of PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07
directing past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to
explain why they failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed Atty. Diaz’s assertion that she never
conventions. 4 sponsored the appropriation of the 30,000.00 term-end bonus and that the approval
of Resolution No. 1-2007 was a collegial action among the Board of Directors.
Again, Commissioner Fernandez was of the view that her participation in the
In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of Liquidation
passage of the questioned board resolution was not connected to her being a
for the 11th national convention in Davao in less than a week after the said
lawyer.14
convention; that it was duly audited by the national auditor, Letecia Agbayani; that
the net proceeds of that convention was "fully accounted, liquidated and entirely
deposited to PACE accounts;"5 that she also filed the Statement of Liquidation for On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a resolution
the 12th national convention on May 22, 2007; that the report, together with the adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Commissioner
cash, checks and original receipts, were received by Rosita Amisola and witnessed Fernandez, and dismissed the complaint against Atty. Diaz. 15
by former PACE officers;6 that she denied running for re-election as PACE national
treasurer during the Iloilo convention as she had already filed her certificate of
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended Resolution,16 dated June 21,
candidacy for Board Member of the First District of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay;7 that
2013, granting the complainant’s motion for reconsideration. It reversedand set
the approval of the ₱30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest with her solely, rather,
asideits earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz from the practice of law for one
it was approved by the previous board of directors; and that she never sponsored
(1) year.17
the bonus, as it was initiated by Aliven Maderaza and seconded by Atty. Lourdes
Garcia and Sarah Ampong.
The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz’ liquidation of
PACE funds;(ii) her running for re-election when she was no longer with the
Judiciary; and (iii) her entitlement to the term-end bonus when she was no longer
working in the Judiciary, constituted a "triple -whammy" of questionable
actions18 committed by Atty. Diaz in contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for its distribution to
all courts of the land; the IBP; and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into
respondent's personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

The Court’s Ruling

This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended
Resolution. Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege.
It is definitely not a right. Inorder to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he
possesses, and continues to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.

One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all
their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the
legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations
with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are
bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the
best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their
clients.19Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted only
to those of good moral character. The Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and
fair dealing. Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times,
whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of
the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. 20

It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that
profession which society entrusts with the administration of law and the
dispensation of justice. For this, he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and
should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily,
this Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character
from members of the Bar. They are always expected to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and to refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of this noble profession.21

Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-
election, including her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown not by
her certificate of candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her
involvement in the approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE
officers, including herself even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary,
were definitely not the candor the Court speaks of. There was much to be desired in
Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1,

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.

This decision shall be immediately executory.

A.C. No. 10576 January 14, 2015
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty.
Christine Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet
(GIS) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon
12 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The facts are culled from the pleadings.
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer
and thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy
Group of Companies. He resigned from his post effective August 11, 2008 and
transferred to St. Luke's Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc.
(LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI
for "updating purposes". The GIS 4 identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of
Directors (BOD) and President.
Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on
December 18, 2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin
violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a
stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he
had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as
chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never received any notice
of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He
has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a
stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the
GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected
in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter.
She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her
certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting held on
March 3, 2008. 5
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on
October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her
so hemay sign a Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in
the affirmative and said that he would meet with her on Friday, October 17, 2008.
Guarin, however, neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for reasons
unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarin’s positive reply, Atty. Limpin
filed the GIS on November 27, 2008.
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented
Secretary’s Certificates dated May 16, 20066 , May 22, 20067 , and June 13,
20078 bearing Guarin’s signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against
the directors and officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator
Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc. 10 In those
proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was
spurious and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that "when the criminal
prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any
administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of
the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings."11 During the mandatory
preliminary conference, however, both parties stipulated that the complaint filed by
Senator Roxas was dismissed as to Guarin.12
Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to
warrant disbarment.1âwphi1 She stated that merely presenting the GIS does not
constitute as proof of any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01
and 1.0214 of the CPR and thus recommended that she be suspended from the
practice of law for three months. It noted that based on the submissions of the
parties, Guarin was never a stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible
tobe a member of the BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the
President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCI’s bank accounts. This made the
verified statement of Atty. Limpin untrue.15
Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to
appoint or designate directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this
procedure was not legally permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular, she
allowed herself to be dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a
stockholder, chairman and president of the company. The Secretary’s Certificates
with Guarin’s signature Atty. Limpin presented were of no moment since inthese
Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of bank accounts and these do not
show that Guarin was a stockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution 16 adopted in totothe
CBD Report. Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration17 but was denied in the March
21, 2014 Resolution18 of the IBP Board of Governors.
We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated
Canon 1, Rule 1.01and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, ratherthan seek exceptions as loopholes. 19 A lawyer who assists a client
in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which
justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.20
Disbarment proceedings are sui generisand can proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.1âwphi1 As Justice Malcolm stated "[t]he serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance
of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is
innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the
court in accordance with his oath." 21

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section
27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice.

After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with
the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and
that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the
company.23 It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a
stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good
faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification
of the statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would
sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We
also note that there was no submission which would support the allegation that
Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained
false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her
oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.1âwphi1

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business
practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers
of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect
to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin's action m submitting a false

document we see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months
suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice
of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014 informed complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, but the
latter insisted in pursuing the same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant
"not for money or malice" but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,
court’s unfavorable decision.16
vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
DECISION
In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent
PER CURIAM:
administratively liable, and accordingly recommended that the penalty of
suspension for a period of one (1) year be meted out against him. 18
For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint 1 for disbarment dated
February 1, 2008 filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against
The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against
respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of
respondent to be well-founded, observing that instead of meeting complainant’s
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for fabricating and using a
allegations squarely, particularly, the issue of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of
spurious court order, and for failing to keep his client informed of the status of the
the partition case, respondent sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly
case.
had an effect on the issues at hand. 19

The Facts
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondent’s
accusation that the spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant,
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the ratiocinating that it was respondent who was motivated to fabricate the same to
late Luis Tan, secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for cover up his lapses that brought about the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and
partition of property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad make it appear that there is still an available relief left for Tan. 20
Valencia-Tan. 2 After accepting the engagement, respondent filed the corresponding
complaint 3 before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC),
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed by
adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation. 21
the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action and
insufficiency of evidence.5 While respondent was notified of such dismissal as early
as August 14, 2007,6 complainant learned of the same only on August 24, 2007 The Issue Before the Court
when he visited the former’s office. 7 On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked
for the amount of ₱10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other costs, but
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
since complainant could not produce the said amount at that time, respondent,
administratively liable for violating the CPR.
instead, asked and was given the amount of ₱500.00 purportedly as payment of the
reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC. 8 On September
12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, The Court’s Ruling
filed a notice of appeal9 before the RTC.10
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings,
In an Order 11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by law. respondent.
Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant
an Order12 dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9, Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client
2007 Order) directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his constantly updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining
filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the notice. Considering the latter’s confidence, to wit:
the technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the
RTC and requested for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then
that he discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
the RTC’s Clerk of Court.13 Complainant also found out that, contrary to the DILIGENCE.
representations of respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he
filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent. Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
In his Comments/Compliance 15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it
was complainant’s failure to timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the
appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him, he
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of
whatever important information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He
should notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether
to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the
developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and
confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer
must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be
binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with
the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the
right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but
also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause. 23
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already
knew of the dismissal of complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this
fact, he never bothered to inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only
knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office. To add
insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing complainant’s appeal
only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period therefor, thus
resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill,
care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise
in such matters of professional employment.24
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by
fabricating the November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing
to make it appear that complainant’s appeal had been given due course, when in
truth, the same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and
unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25 failing in
which whether in his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue
his practice of law.26 A lawyer’s inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s interests
with utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect should never be
countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful
scheme to keep complainant in the dark and conceal his case’s true status through
the use of a falsified court order evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct. 27 His acts
should not just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice
law.28 In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis29 is
instructive, viz.:
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable.
They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer.1âwphi1 They are unacceptable practices. A
lawyer’s relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of
good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The
lawyer’s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must
be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that
he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition
precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that any
gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts
his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit
to continue in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their
clients of the status of their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a
period of six (6) months. In Mejares v. Romana, 31 the Court suspended the lawyer
for the same period for his failure to timely and adequately inform his clients of the
dismissal of their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr., 32 the same
penalty was imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed to update his client of
the status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct by falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct
and disbarred them. In Brennisen v. Contawi, 33 the Court disbarred the lawyer who
falsified a special power of attorney in order to mortgage and sell his client’s
property. Also, in Embido v. Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against
the lawyer who falsified an in existent court decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to
misrepresent to his client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in
his case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed for failure to timely file
an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent’s
acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting
his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His
actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession.
Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and
prejudice caused to his client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of
disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross
Misconduct and violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from
the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in
this Court. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted AMALI to file an Urgent Motion
to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and later on a Compliance and
Motion for Reconsideration.
Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC.
(REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E. On July 28, 2011, the CA issued a preliminary injunction and required AMALI to file
VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO its Comment. AMALI complied and filed a Comment which also served as its motion
for partial reconsideration of the July 28, 2011 Resolution. On October 12, 2011,
AMALI filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve and to Approve Counterbond. Allegedly,
DECISION
these motions were left unresolved when the CA Tenth Division, which included
Associate Justices Bueser and Rosario, required the parties to submit their
BERSAMIN, J.: respective memoranda.6

Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a
office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The decision granting the petition of WWRAI. 7
complainant may be held liable for indirect contempt of court as a means of
vindicating the integrity and reputation of the judges and the Judiciary.
AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 202342, entitled AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents Association,
AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative complaint against Associate Inc.8
Justice Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate
Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, all members of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them
AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices
with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of
had conspired with the counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and
their oaths on account of their promulgation of the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
Atty. Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI
118994 entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. v. The Honorable Regional
stated that the decision of the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San Juan, and AMA Land, Inc.
and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In
thereby knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of
Antecedents gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and
10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium project located the Rules of Court.
along Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack,
Mandaluyong City.1 Due to the project’s location, AMALI would have to use Fordham Issue
Street as an access road and staging area for the construction activities. In that
regard, AMALI needed the consent of the Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc.
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and
(WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI, which ignored the notice.
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of
Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office along Fordham Street that it enclosed
Professional Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
with a temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field office and set
up a fence to deny access to AMALI’s construction workers, which prompted AMALI
to file a petition for the enforcement of an easement of right of way in the Regional Ruling
Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City. The petition, which included an application for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
(WPMI), was docketed as Civil Case No. 65668. 2 On July 24, 1997, the RTC granted
AMALI’s prayer for the WPMI.3
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations of the complaint by substantial evidence. 9 Failure to do so will lead to
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project into a 34-storey
the dismissal of the complaint for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative
building of mixed use (to be known as the AMA Residences) after AMALI’s petition
charge against any official of the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial
for corporate rehabilitation was approved. 4
evidence.10But when the charge equates to a criminal offense, such that the judicial
officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal from the service, the showing of
On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668 an urgent motion to set culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing short of proof beyond
for hearing its prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in character. 11
contained in its answer. The denial of the prayer for injunction by the RTC impelled
WWRAI to bring a petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO and/or writ of
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly
preliminary injunction in the CA to enjoin the RTC from proceeding in Civil Case No.
rendering an unjust judgment against respondent Justices.
65668.5
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense.
Article 204, Revised Penal Code, provides that any judge who "knowingly render[s]
an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision" is punished with
prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification. To commit the offense, the
offender must be a judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust
judgment, not one who merely committed an error of judgment or taken the
unpopular side of a controversial point of law. 12 The term knowingly means "sure
knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice." 13 Thus, the
complainant must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is
patently contrary to law or not supported by the evidence but that it was also made
with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will
shield a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust decision. 14 In other words, the
judge was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some other similar motive in
issuing the judgment.15 Bad faith is, therefore, the ground for liability. 16 The failure
of the judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence
presented does not necessarily render him administratively liable. 17
But who is to determine and declare that the judgment or final order that the
judicial officer knowingly rendered or issued was unjust? May such determination
and declaration be made in administrative investigations and proceedings like a
preliminary investigation by the public prosecutor? The answers to these queries are
obvious – only a superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate or supervisory
jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved may make such determination and
declaration. Otherwise, the public prosecutor or administrative hearing officer may
be usurping a basic judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the
Constitution or by law elsewhere in the appellate court.
Moreover, AMALI’s allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the
CA through an administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the
pernicious practice by disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of resorting to
administrative charges against sitting judges instead of exhausting all their available
remedies. We do not tolerate the practice. In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar
L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport
Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,18 we emphatically
held that the filing of administrative complaints or even threats of the filing
subverted and undermined the independence of the Judiciary, to wit:
It is evident to us that Ongjoco’s objective in filing the administrative complaint was
to take respondent Justices to task for the regular performance of their sworn duty
of upholding the rule of law. He would thereby lay the groundwork for getting back
at them for not favoring his unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at
all, for even a mere threat of administrative investigation and prosecution made
against a judge to influence or intimidate him in his regular performance of the
judicial office always subverts and undermines the independence of the Judiciary.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings
and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his
official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial
remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved
should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial officers who rule
against it in its cases. That impression is not at all devoid of basis.1âwphi1 The
complaint herein is actually the second one that AMALI has brought against
respondent Justices in relation to the performance of their judicial duty in the same
case. In its first complaint entitled Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against
Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario,
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, 19 AMALI accused respondent Justices of:
(a) dishonesty and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross misconduct, and
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, in violation of Section 8, Rule 140
of the Rules of Court; and (b) violating provisions of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. The Court dismissed the first complaint upon finding that it centered on
the propriety of the interlocutory orders issued by respondent Justices in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 118994. The Court appropriately observed:
A perusal of the records of the case as well as the parties’ respective allegations
disclosed that the acts complained of relate to the validity of the proceedings before
the respondent CA Justices and the propriety of their orders in CA-G.R. SP No.
118994 which were done in the exercise of their judicial functions. Jurisprudence is
replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise
of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies.
Disciplinary proceedings against justices do not complement, supplement or
substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the
judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or
judgments.
xxxx
In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging
the questioned order of the respondent CA justices which is still pending final action
by the Court. Consequently, a decision on the validity of the proceedings and
propriety of the orders of the respondent CA Justices in this administrative
proceeding would be premature. Besides, even if the subject decision or portions
thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only attach upon proof
that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith,
dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently
shown to exist in this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or
conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly
shown before he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same
vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is
adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALI’s bare and self-serving claim that
respondent CA Justices "conspired with WWRAI’s counsel in knowingly and in bad
faith rendering an unjust judgment and in committing xxx other misconduct," no act
clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for the claim that
respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus, the
presumption that the respondent judge has regularly performed his duties shall
prevail. Moreover, the matters raised are best addressed to the evaluation of the
Court in the resolution of AMALI’s petition for review on certiorari.
Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the
judicial issues involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice and further clog
the courts’ dockets. Those who seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to
ignore basic legal rules and abuse of court processes in their efforts to vindicate
their rights. (Bold emphasis supplied)
This administrative case is no different from the first. They are identical, with the
complaint herein containing only a few but insignificant changes in relation to the
first. Both were intended to intimidate or to disparage respondent Justices in the
performance of their judicial functions.
Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized representative, Joseph B.
Usita, its Senior Assistant Vice President, and the Members of the Board of Directors
of AMALI who had authorized Usita to file the present complaint, to show cause in
writing why they should not be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the
unfounded and baseless charges against respondent Justices not only once but
twice. To be clear, the filing of unfounded and baseless administrative charges
against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d),
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not only
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a
repulsive, but also an outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
Court. Unfounded administrative charges against judges truly degrade the judicial
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard
office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.
by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
Although the Court did not then deem fit to hold in the first administrative case
for indirect contempt:
AMALI or its representative personally responsible for the unfounded charges
brought against respondent Justices, it is now time, proper and imperative to do so
in order to uphold the dignity and reputation of respondent Justices, of the CA itself, (a)Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official
and of the rest of the Judiciary. AMALI and its representatives have thereby duties or in his official transactions;
demonstrated their penchant for harassment of the judges who did not do its
bidding, and they have not stopped doing so even if the latter were sitting judges.
(b)Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
To tolerate the actuations of AMALI and its representatives would be to reward them
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
with undeserved impunity for an obviously wrong attitude towards the Court and its
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process
judicial officers.
of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held to account or executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
to answer for performing his judicial functions and office because such performance possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
is a matter of public duty and responsibility. The office and duty to render and
administer justice area function of sovereignty, and should not be simply taken for
(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
granted. As a recognized commentator on public offices and public officers has
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of
written:20
this Rule;

It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil

(d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
action can be sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
claiming to have been injured by the officer’s judicial action within his jurisdiction.
From the very nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his
judgment in the matter, and the law holds his duty to the individual to be performed (e)Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such
when he has exercised it, however erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it without authority;
may appear either to the party or to others.
(f)Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been advanced in support of
this rule. Thus it is said of the judge: "His doing justice as between particular (g)The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody
individuals, when they have a controversy before him, is not the end and object of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
which were in view when his court was created, and he was selected to preside over
or sit in it. Courts are created on public grounds; they are to do justice as between
suitors, to the end that peace and order may prevail in the political society, and that But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
rights may be protected and preserved. The duty is public, and the end to be process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending
accomplished is public; the individual advantage or loss results from the proper and such proceedings. (3a)
thorough or improper and imperfect performance of a duty for which his controversy
is only the occasion. The judge performs his duty to the public by doing justice Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v.
between individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals, he may be Distribution Management Association of the Philippines: 22
called to account by the State in such form and before such tribunal as the law may
have provided. But as the duty neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil
redress, as for an individual injury, is not admissible." 21 Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the
rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings
by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to
disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted
and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice,
or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its
legal signification a variety of different acts.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be
specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial
system. Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue
of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence,
submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers
from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt
essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently,
for the due administration of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for
contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution;
without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.23 (Bold emphasis supplied)

ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against

Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and
Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for its utter lack of merit; and (b) ORDERS
Joseph B. Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice President of AMA Land, Inc., and all the
members of the Board of Directors of AMA Land, Inc. who had authorized Usita to
bring the administrative complaint against respondent Associate Justices to show
cause in writing within 10 days from notice why they should not be punished for
indirect contempt of court for degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate
Justices, and for interfering with the due performance of their work for the
Judiciary.

SO ORDERED.