The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES VS. AQUINO
G.R. No. 73748 73972 May 22, 1986
Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano, petitioner
vs.
President Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the
New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Discussions:
In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct
of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury
is likely to be redressed by a favourable action.
people that made the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the
Supreme Court held its legitimacy.
Rulings:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The
holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did
not have a cause of action.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which
is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government
but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
Tañada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2,
1997
DECISION
(En Banc)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO
Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference
to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national
treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of
member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of
the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase
“effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
II. THE ISSUE
Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide
trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy
that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine
Senate of the President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating
in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating
into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to
ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out
foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy.
While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services
and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that
is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy”
does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.” As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of
this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly
aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does
not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the
international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control
of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of
natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade
without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules
of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade
policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that
are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear
policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual
development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.
Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to
compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and
managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper
against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the
State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and
to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced
goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative
guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other
equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the
pursuit of a “trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of
industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby justifying
its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise
of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the
Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave
its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a
legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no “patent and gross”
arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise. It
is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even
agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down
Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse
in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a
valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is
outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy
makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward
trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal
of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
THE HOLY SEE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES,
INC., respondents.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and
set aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-183.
The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the complaint in
Civil Case No. 90-183, while the Order dated September 19, 1991 denied the motion for
reconsideration of the June 20,1991 Order.
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy,
and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged
in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square
meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner.
Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the Philippine
Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as
agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute
arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of
squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
I
On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and
specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio,
and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
(Civil Case No.
90-183).
The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of petitioner
and the PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the price of P1,240.00
per square meters; (2) the agreement to sell was made on the condition that earnest
money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the sellers, and that the sellers clear the said
lots of squatters who were then occupying the same; (3) Licup paid the earnest money to
Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in the same month, Licup assigned his rights over the property to private
respondent and informed the sellers of the said assignment; (5) thereafter, private
respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the sellers fulfill their undertaking and clear
the property of squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the
squatters' refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent
undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter; (6) private
respondent counterproposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the
purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square
meter; (7) Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private
respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price
in cash; (8) private respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later
discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC, without notice to private
respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sale, one
over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers' transfer certificate
of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and registered in the name of Tropicana;
(9) Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself
at the expense of private respondent; (10) private respondent demanded the rescission of
the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and (11) private
respondent is willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has
actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers'
breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00.
Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between
petitioner and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other; (2) the reconveyance
of the lots in question; (3) specific performance of the agreement to sell between it and the
owners of the lots; and (4) damages.
On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint
— petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr.
Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private
respondent.
On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's
motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering
into the business contract in question" (Rollo, pp. 20-21).
On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On August 30, 1991,
petitioner filed a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual
Allegation for claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense." So as to facilitate the
determination of its defense of sovereign immunity, petitioner prayed that a hearing be
conducted to allow it to establish certain facts upon which the said defense is based.
Private respondent opposed this motion as well as the motion for reconsideration.
On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the motion
for reconsideration until after trial on the merits and directing petitioner to file its answer
(Rollo, p. 22).
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege
of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the
Papal Nuncio.
On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards
the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it "adopts by reference, the allegations
contained in the petition of the Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments relative to its
claim of sovereign immunity from suit" (Rollo, p. 87).
Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In
compliance with the resolution of this Court, both parties and the Department of Foreign
Affairs submitted their respective memoranda.
II
A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to question the
order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. The general rule is that an order denying a
motion to dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate courts, the remedy of the movant
being to file his answer and to proceed with the hearing before the trial court. But the
general rule admits of exceptions, and one of these is when it is very clear in the records
that the trial court has no alternative but to dismiss the complaint (Philippine National Bank
v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v. Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA 114
[1992]. In such a case, it would be a sheer waste of time and energy to require the parties
to undergo the rigors of a trial.
The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or legal
interest of the Department of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case in behalf of the Holy
See (Rollo, pp. 186-190).
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign
or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where
it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the
foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the
Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the
Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the
Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to
immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a
certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International
Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and
Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the
courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130
(1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued
because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA
242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect.
In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United
States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The
Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum
as amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs
moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court
allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of
sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local
courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50
[1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of
America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases). In cases where the
foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make
their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved.
III
The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner,
being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private respondent
insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute and that petitioner has
divested itself of such a cloak when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial
transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the Philippines.
A. The Holy See
Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into its status as a
sovereign state is in order.
Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the monarch and
he, as the Holy See, was considered a subject of International Law. With the loss of the
Papal States and the limitation of the territory under the Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres,
the position of the Holy See in International Law became controversial (Salonga and Yap,
Public International Law 36-37 [1992]).
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the
exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also
recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats
to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to International Law (Garcia,
Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of
assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it
indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations" (O'Connell, I
International Law 311 [1965]).
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the
statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested
that the treaty created two international persons — the Holy See and Vatican City (Salonga
and Yap, supra, 37).
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution
to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to
other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz, International Law 37
[1991]). In a community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized
not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size
and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope,
who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in
conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the
world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an
"international state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160
[1956]).
One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant
implication — that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects essentially different from
those pursued by states to be invested with international personality (Kunz, The Status of
the Holy See in International Law, 46 The American Journal of International Law 308
[1952]).
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as
the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's
own view, it is the Holy See that is the international person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign
sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic
representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to
be the universal practice in international relations.
B. Sovereign Immunity
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the
generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such
principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a
condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations (United States of
America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer
or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago,
Public International Law 194 [1984]).
Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial
determination when an act may be considered as jure gestionis. The United States passed
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which defines a commercial activity as
"either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act." Furthermore, the law declared that the "commercial character of the activity shall be
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or
act, rather than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian Parliament enacted in 1982 an
Act to Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial
activity" as any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that
by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial character."
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving
the issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the
decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing
whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis or an
act jure imperii.
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely
commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental functions.
This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took control of
nationalized business activities and international trading.
This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties
as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use
of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding
for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States of America v.
Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment status of base employees (Sanders v.
Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).
On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state
with private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center,
consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop
at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to American servicemen and the general
public (United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding
for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United States of
America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and other
facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a
governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the
discharge of its proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself
of its sovereign immunity from suit.
In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered
"commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own
guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot
be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question
is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If
the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or
transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity,
or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for
gain or profit.
As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state,
will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered
into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the
contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such
waiver may be implied.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a
real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure
gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of
Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its
mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute
said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The
donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign
to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate
and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil
and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private
immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds
on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided
for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards
the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise
clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living
thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.
The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they
stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its
complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).
The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to
trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides,
the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the
Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department
tasked with the conduct of the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987,
Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this
case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic
mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all
the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country
(Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or
instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is
conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190
SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive
arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations (World Health
Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration
Commission and in World Health Organization, we abide by the certification of the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court to conduct
a hearing to establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its motion. In view of said
certification, such procedure would however be pointless and unduly circuitous (Ortigas &
Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994).
IV
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances.
Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved
by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause
through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to
espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine
government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign
Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations
between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private
Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private
Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to
espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the
International Court of Justice:
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to diplomatic
action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality
asserting its own rights — its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
respect for the rules of international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302 [1924]).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No.
90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any
Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force.
About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero,
discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by
witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Shortly
thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-
General, the Secretary for the Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and
of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The day following the convening of
the Senate, September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio
Perfecto, published an article reading as follows:
Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous
robbery of records which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate,
yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of
the crime will ever be discovered.
To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and
the persons in charge of the investigation of the case would not have to display
great skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless they should encounter
the insuperable obstacle of offical concealment.
In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and
nothing more.
After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that
have surrounded it, does not surprise us at all.
The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the
place in which it was committed.
How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience
and with serenity of mind, that they do not owe their victory to electoral robbery?
How may?
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the
Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured
their election through fraud and robbery.
The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution
authorizing its committee on elections and privileges to report as to the action which should
be taken with reference to the article published in La Nacion. On September 15, 1920, the
Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the
Attorney-General, for his study and corresponding action, all the papers referring to the
case of the newspaper La Nacion and its editor, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a result, an
information was filed in the municipal court of the City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal,
in which the editorial in question was set out and in which it was alleged that the same
constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto
was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested,
the defense moved for the dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or not article
256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the trial
judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said:
This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain
for the protection of the Ministers of the Crown and other representatives of the
King against free speech and action by Spanish subjects. A severe punishment
was prescribed because it was doubtless considered a much more serious offense
to insult the King's representative than to insult an ordinary individual. This
provision, with almost all the other articles of that Code, was extended to the
Philippine Islands when under the dominion of Spain because the King's subject
in the Philippines might defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other
representatives of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other
persons in authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said
provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into
"innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands has, by a
majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day. . . .
The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon
this court until otherwise determined by proper authority.
In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language:
In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal
offense, and little importance is attached to them, because they are generally the
result of political controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored or
exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon a legislative body are not punishable,
under the Libel Law. Although such publications are reprehensible, yet this court
feels some aversion to the application of the provision of law under which this case
was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of
that Code prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting language about
Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain doubtless left the
need of such protection to his ministers and others in authority in the Philippines
as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here.
Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a majority
decision, has held that this provision is still in force, and that one who made an
insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable under it.
(U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear to be
 applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without fear or
favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the
Supreme Court shall otherwise determine.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as
charged in the information and under article 256 of their Penal Code sentences
him to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both instances.
The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive
brief, and eloquent oral argument made in his own behalf and by his learned counsel, all
reduce themselves to the pertinent and decisive question which was announced in the
beginning of this decision.
It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the
rule announced in the case of United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not published).
In that case, the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the President and
his proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He
was found guilty in a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again
on appeal to the Supreme Court, with the writer of the instant decision dissenting on two
principal grounds: (1) That the accused was deprived of the constitutional right of cross-
examination, and (2) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force.
Subsequently, on a motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court
of First Instance had committed a prejudicial error in depriving the accused of his right to
cross-examine a principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the judgment appealed
from and ordered the return of the record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new
trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the
Helbig case has never again been elevated to this court.
There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig
case, in view of the circumstances above described. This much, however, is certain: The
facts of the Helbig case and the case before us, which we may term the Perfecto case, are
different, for in the first case there was an oral defamation, while in the second there is a
written defamation. Not only this, but a new point which, under the facts, could not have
been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged upon the court. And,
finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by
strict adherence to a former decision. We much prefer to resolve the question before us
unhindered by references to the Helbig decision.
This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can
be had. A majority of the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277,
has had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to
written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the
defendant is neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel
Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason
that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 156 of the
Penal Code. Three members of the court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely
by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is
inconsistent with democratic principles of government.
Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will
discuss the two main points just mentioned.
1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code. — The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the Philippine
Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body. Section 1 defines
libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs
or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or
publish the alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him
to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts
of laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby
repealed. . . ."
That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith,
and that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be
gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults,
must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo
de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel
Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria."
Recently, specific attention was given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the
Penal Code, dealing with calumny and insults, and it was found that those provisions of
the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of writing an
publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law. (People vs. Castro [1922], p.
842, ante.)
The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as
for instance article 256.
The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing,
which may have had the tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of
members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule, which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen
is authority for the statement that a libel is indictable when defaming a "body of persons
definite and small enough for individual members to be recognized as such, in or by means
of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.) But in the United
States, while it may be proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a
legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the
range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's
Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind, recall that article 256
begins: Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the
Crown or other person in authority," etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known
rule of statutory construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-
matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the
legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held
to be repealed by necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p.
465.) For identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this
article as punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have
affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine
son article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. — Appellant's main proposition in the
lower court and again energetically pressed in the appellate court was that article
256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the
change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and because
inconsistent with democratic principles of government. This view was indirectly
favored by the trial judge, and, as before stated, is the opinion of three members
of this court.
Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of
Book II punishes the crimes of treason, crimes that endanger the peace or independence
of the state, crimes against international law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of the same
book punishes the crimes of lese majeste, crimes against the Cortes and its members and
against the council of ministers, crimes against the form of government, and crimes
committed on the occasion of the exercise of rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws
of the state, including crime against religion and worship. Title III of the same Book, in
which article 256 is found, punishes the crimes of rebellion, sedition, assaults upon
persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts, insults, injurias, and threats against
persons in authority, and insults, injurias, and threats against their agents and other public
officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in Chapter V define and
punish the offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be word or deed defame,
abuse, insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The with an
article condemning challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now being
weighed in the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing,
shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided
that the offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," — that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of
any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of
the Crown in the United States of America), or other person in authority in the Monarchy
of Spain.
It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do
with such subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and
contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is
a determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated,
whether it is in the nature of a municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States and the characteristics and institutions of the
American Government.
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate
the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American
Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway
Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.)
Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course
of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn,
supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with
the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new government are at once
displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power — and the
latter is involved in the former — to the United States, the laws of the country in support of
an established religion or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and
unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without
any declaration to that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It
cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United
States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they have
capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or
otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own government, and not
according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military
Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of
the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the
punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible
with the new order of things. But President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt,
was careful to say: "The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the
severance of the former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new
political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it has been taken for granted that the
provisions under consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the language of the
United States Supreme Court in Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there
was not and could not be, except as precise questions were presented, a careful
consideration of the codal provisions and a determination of the extent to which they
accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty and law' which had been
'made the basis of our governmental system.' " But when the question has been squarely
raised, the appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the
Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American constitutional principles.
(U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta
[1913], 25 Phil., 533; Weems vs. U.S., supra.)
The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American
sovereignty was outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine liberty,
his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part, the President said:
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are
authorized to prescribe, the Commission should bear in mind that he government
which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression
of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people
of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform
to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent
consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and
effective government. At the same time the Commission should bear in mind,
and the people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are
certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our
governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the
maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been
denied the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules
of government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these
great principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules of
government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of
their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or
laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is evident that the most
enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of
these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command
universal assent.
The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our
Supreme Court, in the case of United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The
President and Congress framed the government on the model with which American are
familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests
and the protection of individual rights and privileges."
Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the
happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands and their customs,
habits, and prejudices, to follow the language of President McKinley, demand obeisance
to authority, and royal protection for that authority.
According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the
Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King.
With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, as
set up in the Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for
convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws were continued. The demands
which the new government made, and makes, on the individual citizen are likewise
different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted
position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our
Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal
rights with every other man. We have no rank or station, except that of respectability and
intelligence as opposed to indecency and ignorance, and the door to this rank stands open
to every man to freely enter and abide therein, if he is qualified, and whether he is qualified
or not depends upon the life and character and attainments and conduct of each person
for himself. Every man may lawfully do what he will, so long as it is not malum in
se or malum prohibitum or does not infringe upon the qually sacred rights of others."
(State vs. Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)
It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United
States are derived, there were once statutes of scandalum magnatum, under which words
which would not be actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made actionable if
spoken of a peer of the realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown, without proof of
any special damage. The Crown of England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that
that of other sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors Augustus, Caesar, and Tiberius.
These English statutes have, however, long since, become obsolete, while in the United
States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is not known. In the early days of the
American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel the
Government, the Congress, or the President of the United States, but the law met with so
much popular disapproval, that it was soon repealed. "In this country no distinction as to
persons is recognized, and in practice a person holding a high office is regarded as a target
at whom any person may let fly his poisonous words. High official position, instead of
affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as
making his character free plunder for any one who desires to create a senation by attacking
it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6
L.R.A., 680.)
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the
American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from
the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which
separates a monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This
article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its
authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the
offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical conception of the nature of political authority,
as opposed to the American conception of the protection of the interests of the public, have
been obliterated by the present system of government in the Islands. 1awph!l.net

From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes
contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the
entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a
government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies,
an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the
people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they
are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of
government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and
obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an
official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic
punishment for contemptuous remarks.

The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty
of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although
for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and
appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.

Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concu