CO 20 Pritts. Jacques Lacan = A feminist introduction Elizabeth{Grosz NOTICE: THIS MATERIAL MAY BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT LAW (TITLE 17 U.S. CODE) (44 Rn Routledge London and New York2 The ego and the imaginary Freud’s two views of the ego Freud vacillated betweenc(Woyuite different views of the ego, He used both conceptions intermittently throughout his career; itis by rno means clear which represents his final ve position, whether he regards them as alternatives, or whether he aimed to replace one with the other. Both are useful in some explanatory contexts but notin others. I will describe them as the realist and the narcissistic views. In outlining each, 1 will focus on ther differences, which will become significant in distinguishing Lacan's position from that of neo-Freudianism, revisionist Freudianism, or ego- psychology. The realist view is sketched in rudimentary form in the post- humously published draft, The Project for a Scientific Psychology” Freud couched his model ofthe psyche and its agencies in neuronal and neuro-physiological terms in this proto-psychoanalytic text Later he ‘translates’ this model into psychological terminology i The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). In The Ego and The I (1923), over a quarter of a century later, he returns to it. And atthe very end of his life, in An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1938a), he affirms it yet ag The narcissistic view is developed more in the middle period of Freud’s work, yet it too has a similarly long and protracted history. In The Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality (1905), Freud claims that an explanation of the genesis and development of the ego is needed, yet it was left unelaborated until his metapsych: eal papers, particularly ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ (1914a). In a related paper from the same period, ‘Mourning and Melan- cholia’ (1915a), he elaborates further details of the narcissistic account. He appears to abandor in The Ego and the Id; but in fact returns to it in the last paper published in his lifetime, “The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence’ (1938b). 4 4 ail di is Ra id hi ple The ego and the imaginary Clearly a number of central questions need to be raised here: are the two views compatible, or contradictory? Which is to be preferred, and on what grounds? The realist ego In The Ego and The Id, Freud describes the ego as an agency which fervenes in the conflict between anti-social, endogenous, sexual ses or wishes, which originate in the id, and the demands of reality to the id. Freud likens the ego to the rider of a horse; the horse signifies the energies of the id, energies which must be correctly harnessed if the is represented by the path or destination the rider must entice and control the horse to follow: In its relation to the id, the ego is ike a man on horse back, who hhas to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength ‘hile the ego uses bgrrowed forces. The analogy may be carried le further. Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so, in the same way, the ego is in the habit of transforming the id’s will into action as if it were its own, (1923: 25) The res ego is motivated by principles of ‘rational’ compromise. It protects the rules and norms of (social) reality by modifying the ‘unreasonable’, impossible demands of the id, on the one hand; while on the other, the ego protects the id by shielding it from harmful or excessively strong stimuli coming from reality ~ from external criticism, harsh judgements, the absence of desired objects. In relation to the id’s endogenous functions, it acts as a bearer or representative of reality. Here its role is unifying, homogenizing, and organizing the chaotic, pleasure-secking impulses of the id. In relation to reality, its aim is to rationalize and justify many of id’s demands, to represent it to social Law. It is a’ moderating influence on the strength and specificity of id impulses, bringing them into line with what is socially acceptable. As a rational mediator, it strives to protect the organism from threats and danger from the social; and at the same time, it strives to procure maximum satisfaction and pleasure for the wishes of id it also serves, while ensuring the smooth reproduction of social norms and values. It is an agency serving two masters. Tt functions by means of expediency and compromise in attempting 25The ego and the imaginary to gain maximum satisfaction in a pleasure-repressing social con- text. On this model, the ego is thus a more or less stable agency or entity, identified with ‘the sel’ it modifies the pleasure-seeking id, influencing it in accordance with the dictates of the reality principle. It also modifies the demands of reality in accordance with the individual's psychic needs. Itis identified with the ‘higher’ mental functions and achievements of the individual. The key features of the realist view can be indicated as follows: I the ego is a pre-given, natural, or innate faculty, the biological result of the interaction of psychical and social relations with the surface of the organism; 2 the ego is one ‘agency’ or system among a number of others which compete for gratification within the subject 3. the ego is the ‘reasonable’ mediator intervening between antago- nistic forces, arbitrating as an outsider between the demands of the id and the requirements of reality, 4 the ego's specific form is a consequence of the neuronal impact of external impingements on the subject's interiority. It also acts as, fa delegate for the id’s wishes. It is the agency guarding and supervising the pleasure-seeking id and a hostile, repressive reali 5 the ego,’ as mediator or rational harmoniser of psychical conflict, is thus responsible for the ‘higher’ mental accomplishments of culture; 6 the ego functions to inhibit psychical impulses and/or the force of social custom. Its role is to modify both, inducing compromises between these antagonistic interests by inhibiting their strength or impetus. This realist view of the ego has been adopted by neo-Freudian orthodoxy, which Lacan has scathingly described as ‘the psy- ctptégy of frce enterprise’.' The conceptualization of the exo'as a bearer of reality is, he claims, fundamentally conservative: the two terms between which it mediates are given and unquestioned, the id being a function of biology, and re. ahistorical system, t surprising that the he ego. The ego can most pias ageney is precise thus be con: eak’ in so far as the balance between pleasure and reality her one direction or anather, The function of psychoanalytic therapy in this case is to strengthen and reinforce the ego, thus enabling it to accept and satisfy some of the id’s wishes while conforming to social expectation, Lacan's most biting irony is reserved for ego-psychologists (including some of the best known contemporary analysts, Abraham, Hartmann, Kris, Erikson, Loewenstein, Segal, and 26 The ego and the imaginary others) who are committed both to the ideal of the ‘autonomous ego’, the ego functioning outside the influence of the unconscious, and to psychoanalysis as a mode of transmission of normati ideals. Psychoanalysis directs the analysand to a pre-selected goal a strong, masterful, autonomous ego. For those whose egos are ‘weak’, the task of analysis is to model the analysand’s ego on the analyst's (i. the analyst functions a5 the ego-ideal with whom the analysand identifies). Lacan . .. naturally opposed the idea that there is a whole self that serves as an agent of strength, synthesis, mastery, intes~ ration, and adaptation to realistic norms. Lacan_ perceives partisan analysts pushing analysands towards an ideal of health which merely defined group norms. (Ragiand-Sullivan 1986: 119) For Lacan, these ‘popularized’ or ‘consumerist’ versions of psychoanalytic therapy bring the analysand to a pre-set destina- tion ~ being a better wife and mother, a more successful bu: nessman, a child who can ‘cope’ with the demands of schooling, and so on. In his view, by contrast, there can be no guarantee of where psychoanalysis will lead, no given point of termination, no promise of ‘cure’, no assurances of ‘normality’ (cf. Schneiderman 1983). Psychoanalysis, for Lacan, is resolutely disconnected from medicine; it is not an analysis of the ‘self’, consciousness, or the imed at boosting its performance. If the analyst acts as the judge, ego-ideal or superego for the analysand, patching up those areas of “breakdown' or unsuccessful socialization of the subject. ‘What happens when the subject begins to speak to the analyst? It is to him that is offered something that will first, take the form of a demand. Everyone knows that itis this that has oriented all thinking on analysis in the direction of a recognition of the function of frustration. But the subject knows that, whatever his needs may be, none of them will find satisfaction in analysis, (Lacan 1977b: 269, emphasis added) Psychoanalysis neither strengthens nor weakens the ego. It is not a system of ‘cure’ It doesn’t provide a ‘deeper’ understanding of the ‘self? These are descriptions more appropriate to therapy than analysis, Psychoanalysis is no more - nor any less - than an analysis of the unconscious which belies the subject's ego or consciousness (Schneiderman 1983). It subverts, renders ambiguous, and resists the ego's conscious ideals. The ego cannot judge reality, or mediate 2