DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, vs. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.

FACTS: The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro G.
Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the time of the filing of
the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was representing his clients Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R.
Tecson. Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the “Alabang
Boys”) were the accused in cases filed by PDEA for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. In a Joint
Inquest Resolution, the charges were dropped for lack of probable cause. Because of the failure of
Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during the evaluation of the case, several media
outlets reported on incidents of bribery and “cover-up” allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug
trade. This prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It
was revealed during one such hearing that respondent had prepared the release order for his three
clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul
Gonzales. Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that
respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a highly irregular and
unethical act. He had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts
unbecoming a member of the bar. For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s
alleged violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for legal processes. Atty. Lozano
contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the said order
and sending it to a highranking public official, even though the latter was not a government prosecutor.
Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground that a similar action had been filed by Dante
Jimenez. DEFENSE: Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to
prepare and draft the release order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, âif the
Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything may be expedited. In any case, respondent continues,
the drafted release order was not signed by the Secretary and therefore remained “a mere scrap of
paper with no effect at all.” The Investigating Commissioner noted that both complaints remained
unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore,
no evidence was adduced to prove the charges. However, by his own admissions in paragraphs 11 and 12
of his Comment, respondent drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary.
This act of “feeding” the draft order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to
influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the
same or any similar action.

ISSUE: Whether or not Verano should be suspended for violating CPR.

HELD: Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon
13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months. The Court may conduct its own investigation into charges against members of the bar,
irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints brought before it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment
case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
By now, it is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. The affidavit of withdrawal of the
disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A
case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven xxx. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. Canon 13 states that a lawyer shall rely upon
the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court. We believe that other provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in
all other venues in the justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a
member of the bar. During the mandatory hearing, the following statements were established as
respondent’s admission that: 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the
case was still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release
order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of expediting
the case. The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and
consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be
regulated by the codified norms for the bar. The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the
administration of justice. To that end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a
member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any
means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his
devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical. Zeal and persistence in advancing a clientâs
cause must always be within the bounds of the law. Rule 1.02 states: A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Further, according
to Rule 15.06, a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body. The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer to impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.

Aida R. Campos, Alistair R. Campos, and Charmaine R. Campos v. Judge Eliseo M. Campos A.M. No.
MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012 Carpio, J.

FACTS: This is a complaint for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty filed by complainants
against respondent, former Presiding Judge of the MTC of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. Complainant Aida
and respondent were married in 1981 and had two children, complainants Alistair and Charmaine. In
2008, respondent filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, alleging that he and Aida were
both psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. For his part,
respondent is a homosexual who could not be intimate with his wife unless he imagined he was with
another man, while his wife had affairs with other men as a result of his homosexuality. To her defense,
Aida denied the allegations and filed for legal separation. According to her, respondent wanted their
marriage annulled so that he could marry another woman with whom he was having a relationship. In
the meantime, a separate case was pending against the respondent, to which a certain parcel of
registered land might be taken from the their property in the event of loss. Facts show that the title to
such land was kept by respondent in his drawer. When respondent could not find the title in his usual
place for safekeeping, he sought the advice of the Register of Deeds who told him to execute the
affidavit of loss, to which he did. Respondent then registered the title but in the name of Alistair, a minor
at that time.

ISSUE: Is respondent guilty of immorality, dishonesty, and serious misconduct?

HELD: NO, respondent is not guilty of immorality, dishonesty and serious misconduct but only simple
misconduct. First, the complainants failed to present any proof of respondent’s alleged relationship with
another woman, so as to justify a charge for immorality. There was no evidence presented that
respondent engaged in scandalous conduct that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary action
against him. However, the Court reminded respondent of the judge's duty to conduct himself in a way
that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. As such, he must comport himself at all times in
such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public
that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. Second, respondent was not guilty of
dishonesty as regards the declaration of loss of title because respondent did not appear to have acted in
bad faith or committed dishonesty in executing the affidavit of loss of the title to the property. As shown
by the facts, he merely took the advice of the Register of Deeds in the execution of the document. Third,
while respondent has not committed any serious misconduct, it is clear that respondent is guilty of
simple misconduct. In this case, respondent knew at that time of the registration of the property that he
had a pending case and that he could possibly lose the case. In order to manipulate the situation and
taking advantage of his knowledge of the law, respondent caused the registration of the property in
Alistair’s name with the intention of defrauding a possible judgment-obligee. Clearly, it was an improper
behavior that warrants a disciplinary sanction by the Court.

Non suspension from practice of law for using intemperate languages in pleadings HON. MARIBETH
RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal vs. ATTY. RODOLFO
FLORES [A.C. No. 8954. November 13, 2013.] DEL CASTILLO, J p

: Facts: A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal.
Respondent Atty. Flores appeared as counsel for the defendant. He filed his Pre-Trial Brief without proof
of MCLE compliance hence; it was expunged from the records without prejudice to the filing of another
Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. The preliminary conference was reset several
times for failure of respondent to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE
compliance. The court a quo gave respondent last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning
that failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on his part. Respondent later filed his Pre-Trial Brief
bearing an MCLE number which was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of
compliance. During the preliminary conference, respondent manifested that he will submit proof of
compliance of his MCLE on the following day. The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to
give due respect to the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance
with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate
language in his pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the
practice of law for one year

. Issue: Whether respondent should be suspended from practice of law for using intemperate language
in his pleadings

Held: NO. There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court's order to submit proof of his
MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. Atty. Flores also employed
intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be
circumspect in his language. However, the court found the recommended penalty too harsh and not
commensurate with the infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first
infraction committed by respondent. Also, the court is not prepared to impose on the respondent the
penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that
he has been in the practice of law for half a century. Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering
the foregoing, the court deem it proper to fine respondent and to remind him to be more circumspect in
his acts and to obey and respect court processes

SC dismissed administrative complaint vs. SC Assoc. Justices Carpio, Sereno. - A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC

A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC

"x x x.

On September 19, 2011 Peña filed the present complaint against Justices Carpio and Sereno. Peña
averred that Justice Carpio, as Member-in-Charge of the consolidated cases, caused the issuance of the
falsified November 13, 2002 resolution which suspended and stayed the transfer of MSCI’s club shares
from Urban Bank to those who won them in the bidding. Peña repeated his claim that the Court merely
took note of Urban Bank’s motion for clarification and did not grant it. Peña also pointed out that
opposing counsel, Atty. Manuel Singson, got an advance copy of the November 13 resolution, and faxed
it to him on November 19, 2002, days before the Court released it for mailing.

With respect to Justice Sereno, Peña alleged that, as Member-in-Charge to whom the main cases were
re-raffled, she unjustifiably refused to inhibit herself from the case notwithstanding that Justice Carpio’s
former law office, the Villaraza Cruz Marcelo Angangco Law Office, had a significant role in her
appointment to the Supreme Court. Peña said that, because of this, Justice Sereno “will attempt to
protect Justice Carpio.”
Pending consideration of Peña’s present complaint, on October 19, 2011 the Second Division rendered a
decision in the consolidated cases (G.R. 145817, 145822, and 162562) respecting the merits of Peña’s
claim for compensation, among others, against Urban Bank and the execution pending appeal of the
RTC’s decision. Apart from disposing of the principal actions on their merits, in the per curiamDecision
of the Court en banc promulgated on April 17, 2012 in A.C. No. 6332, the Court found Peña guilty for
violating Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for failing to give due
respect to the Courts and his fellow lawyers, and meted out to him the penalty of disbarment.

Peña claimed that Justice Carpio caused the issuance of the Court’s November 13, 2002 resolution that
granted Union Bank’s motion for clarification when, based on the copy of the supplemental agenda he
submitted (his Annex B), the Court merely noted the motion. But this charge has no basis. The Court did
not merely note the motion. The item in the agenda included several matters. The Court’s action on the
first, as the Division chairman noted on his copy of the agenda, was “SEE RES” which in the Court’s action
code meant the approval during its session of the draft resolution that the Member-in-Charge submitted
for consideration. As it happened, the draft resolution granted the motion for clarification.

The Court’s action on the other matters in the item, including the motion for clarification, was uniformly
“N.” Under the code in use, this meant that the Court was taking note of such other matters. The two
actions, approving the submitted draft of a resolution and noting the other matters are compatible. The
Court noted the motion for clarification and granted it as stated in the draft resolution.

Peña also sought to ascribe to Justice Carpio the alleged fact that Atty. Singson, counsel for Urban Bank,
got an advance copy of the November 13, 2002 resolution and faxed it to him on November 19, days
before the Court released it for mailing. But, Peña has been unable to show that this advance copy came
from Justice Carpio. Besides, the record shows that the First Division released the resolution for
dissemination on November 14, days before Atty. Singson faxed a copy to Peña. Moreover, it was the
Division Clerk of Court, not Justice Carpio, who had the duty to release decisions and resolutions for
dissemination.[2]

In the case at bar, complainant also seeks disciplinary action against Justice Carpio for allegedly taking
cognizance of Urban Bank’s Motion for Clarification of which respondent was allegedly not furnished a
copy of, and for issuing the November 13, 2002 clarificatory resolution without first requiring
complainant to comment on Urban Bank’s Motion. Moreover, the November 13, 2002 resolution
allegedly caused irreparable damage to complainant and other auction buyers and destroyed the
credibility and sanctity of valid auction sales.

Judicial remedies were available to complainant in the main cases. In fact, the allegations in the present
complaint are a mere rehash of the allegations in complainant’s Urgent Omnibus Motion (To Expunge
Motion for Clarification and Recall of the 13 November 2002 Resolution) dated December 9, 2002 and
Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion dated January 30, 2003
filed in the main cases, which, in fact, have already been decided on October 19, 2011.

Peña charges Justice Sereno of unfairly refusing to inhibit herself from taking part in the deliberation in
the main cases notwithstanding that Justice Carpio’s former law office supposedly worked for her
appointment in the Supreme Court. But the Court had already found in its April 17, 2012 per
curiam decision in A.C. No. 6332 that this charge has no “extrinsic factual evidence to support it.” The
charge is purely conjectural.

BANSIG VS CELERA

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014 ]

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

Bansig, sister of bunagan narrated that, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan, entered into a contract
of marriage. However, notwithstanding respondent’s marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted
another marriage with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid
and in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage
had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders
him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

Issue:

whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice

Ruling:

For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders
him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct
and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

AVIDA LAND CORPORATION v. ATTY. AL C. ARGOSINO, AC. No. 7437, 2016-08-17

Facts:

Complainant is a Philippine corporation engaged in the development and sale of subdivision houses and
lots.[6] Respondent was counsel for Rodman Construction & Development Corporation (Rodman).

Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman,[8] under which the latter was to acquire from
the former a subdivision house and lot in Santa Rosa, Laguna through bank financing. In the event that
such financing would be disapproved, Rodman was supposed to pay the full contract price of
P4,412,254.00, less the downpayment of P1,323,676.20, within 15 days from its receipt of the loan
disapproval.[9]

After settling the downpayment, Rodman took possession of the property.[10]In three separate
letters[11], complainant demanded that Rodman pay the outstanding balance of P3,088,577.80.[12]
Both parties agreed that the amount would be paid on a deferred basis within 18 months.[

Rodman made a partial payment... to P1,458,765.06 from March 1999 to July 1999, which complainant
disputed.[

Consequently, complainant rescinded the Contract to Sell by notarial act, and demanded that Rodman
vacate the subject property.[15]As Rodman remained in possession of the property,[16] complainant
filed an unlawful detainer case against the former before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City.
[17]

Rodman filed a Complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) seeking the
nullification of the rescission of the Contract to Sell. It also prayed for the accounting of payments and
the fixing of the period upon which the balance of the purchase price should be paid.

The MTC took cognizance of Rodman's HLURB Complaint, and dismissed the unlawful detainer case on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[19]

HLURB Regional Office No. IV (HLURB Regional Office), through its arbiter Atty. Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino,
similarly dismissed Rodman's Complaint and ordered it to pay damages and attorney's fees.[20] Rodman
appealed the ruling to the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board).[21]
In its subsequent Decision,[22] the HLURB Board modified the arbiter's ruling, directing Rodman "to
immediately pay its outstanding balance failing in which respondent shall have the right to rescind the
contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by complainant less deductions as may be stipulated in
the contract and less monthly... compensation for the use of the premises at the rate of 1% of the
contract price per month."[23]

Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24] of the HLURB Board's Decision, questioning the
order to refund the sums paid by Rodman less deductions in case of a rescission of the contract. Rodman
filed a Comment/Opposition[25] to complainant's motion and sought a clarification of certain aspects of
the Decision,[26] but did not move for reconsideration.

The HLURB Board thereafter issued a Resolution[27] modifying its earlier Decision... complainant
(Rodman) is directed to immediately pay to the respondent (herein complainant) its outstanding balance
of P1,814,513.27, including interests and penalties... failing in which, the respondent shall have the right
to rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by the complainant less deductions as
may be stipulated in the contract and less monthly compensation for the use of the premise... neither of
the parties appealed the judgment within the period allowed, it became final and executory.

The parties thereafter attempted to arrive at a settlement on the judgment, but their efforts were in
vain.[28] With the judgment award still not satisfied after the lapse of six months, complainant filed a
motion for writs of execution and possession[29] before the HLURB Board.

Respondent filed an Opposition/Comment on the motion and subsequently a Rejoinder[30] to

complainant's Reply.[

HLURB Board granted complainant's motion and remanded the case records to the HLURB Regional
Office for proceedings on the execution of the judgment and/or other appropriate disposition.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the Order... issues on the computation of interests.
Complainant filed an Opposition[34] and Rejoinder,[35] to which respondent filed a Reply[36] and Sur-
rejoinder.[37]

Board issued an Order[38] denying Rodman's Motion for Reconsideration... respondent filed a Motion
for Computation of Interest[40] before the HLURB Regional Office,... Complainant filed its Opposition
with Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution and Possession.

HLURB Regional Office accordingly computed the interest due, arriving at the total amount of
P2,685,479.64 as payment due to complainant. It also directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution
implementing the HLURB Board's earlier Resolution.[43]

Instead however of complying with the Order and the Writ of Execution,[44] respondent, on behalf of
Rodman, filed a Motion (1) to Quash... the Writ of Execution; (2) for Clarification; and (3) to Set the Case
for Confere

Conference... said motion injected new issues and claims and demanded the inclusion in the Order of a
"provision that upon actual receipt of the amount of P2,685,479.64, [complainant] should
simultaneously turn-over the duplicate original title to Rodman." (Emphasis omitted)
Respondent also filed a Petition[46] to Cite Complainant in Contempt for issuing a demand letter to
Rodman despite the pendency of the latter's Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution.

the HLURB Regional Office summoned the parties to a conference to thresh out the problems with the
execution of the writ. The conference, however, failed to serve its purpose.

Respondent thereafter moved for the inhibition of Atty. Aquino as arbiter of the case and for the setting
of a hearing on the Petition to Cite Complainant in Contempt.[47] The motion alleged that Arbiter
Aquino had shown bias in favor of complainant, and that she had failed to set the Petition for hearing.
[48]

HLURB Regional Office (1) denied the motion for inhibition; (2) granted complainant's Motion for
Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and Writ of Possession; and (3) directed complainant to comment on
the Petition citing the latter for contempt.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, reiterating that Arbiter Aquino
should inhibit herself from the case because of her bias. Arbiter Aquino eventually yielded and ordered
the re-raffle of the case, which went to Arbiter Raymundo A. Foronda.

When complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Pending Motion for the Issuance of an
Alias Writ of Execution, respondent submitted his vehement Opposition.

He insisted that his Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle should be acted upon firs... and
argued that "the merits of the instant case as well as the motions filed in relation thereto must be re-
evaluated by the new handling arbiter after the re-raffling... respondent filed a Manifestation on the
Notice of Conference issued by Arbiter Foronda. The Manifestation stated that Rodman would be
attending the conference, not to submit itself to the jurisdiction of Arbiter Foronda, but to facilitate the
re-raffling of the case.

respondent filed a Motion for Inhibition against Arbiter Foronda, claiming that his designation violated
due process. He said the re-raffle was questionable because he was not notified of its conduct despite
his earlier Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle.

the parties submitted various pleadings on the issue of whether or not Arbiter Foronda could rule on the
pending motions.

Arbiter Foronda held that (1) the notice of re-raffle was not an indispensable prerequisite for a substitute
arbiter to have jurisdiction over a case at the execution stage; (2) the claim of

Rodman that its Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 April 2008 Order had remained unresolved was
rendered moot by Arbiter Aquino's eventual inhibition from the case; and (3) Rodman's prayer for the...
summary dismissal of complainant's motions to resolve the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution was denied

Resolution put an end to the long-drawn-out dispute, as respondent did not file any more pleadings.

On 21 February 2007, in the midst of the squabble over the HLURB case, complainant - through its vice
president for project development Steven J. Dy - filed a Complaint-Affidavit[50] against respondent for
alleged professional misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath. The Complaint alleged that
respondent's conduct in relation to the HLURB case manifested a disregard of the following tenets:[... his
Comment,[52] respondent claimed that what primarily caused the delays in the HLURB case were the
legal blunders of complainant's counsel

Respondent also raised the issue of complainant's counsel's erroneous acts of notarial rescission and
filing of an ejectment suit before the trial court. These acts allegedly contributed to the delay in the
resolution of the dispute.[55]... argued that he could not have possibly caused delays in the execution of
the Decision dated 22 June 2005 at the time the instant Complaint was filed on 21 February 2007, as
complainant filed its Motion for Writ of Execution before the HLURB Regional Office only in April 2007.
[56]... respondent asserted that he merely followed his legal oath by defending the cause of his client
with utmost dedication, diligence, and good faith.[57]As respondent allegedly continued performing
dilatory and frivolous tactics, complainant filed Supplemental Complaints[58] against him.

Court referred this case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.[... the IBP issued a
Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation on
the Complaint.[60] Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition within the period
allowed.

Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct.

Issues:

The only issue before Us is whether respondent's act of filing numerous pleadings, that caused delay in
the execution of a final judgment, constitutes professional misconduct in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Al C. Argosino is found GUILTY of violating Rules 10.03 and
12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this Resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Principles: