SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125359. September 4, 2001]

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners, vs. THE

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR.,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision rendered on May 23, 1996, by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35719. CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 had
affirmed the order dated September 6, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 26,
insofar as it denied petitioners respective Motions to Quash the Informations in twenty-five (25)
criminal cases for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960. Therein included were informations
involving: (a) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883 filed against Mrs.
Imelda R. Marcos, Roberto S. Benedicto, and Hector T. Rivera; (b) consolidated Criminal Cases
Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892 filed against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto; and (c) Criminal Cases
Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 also against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto. Note, however, that the
Court of Appeals already dismissed Criminal Case No. 91-101884.
The factual antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted
for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960[1] in relation to Section 34[2] of the Central Bank Act
(Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that
the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to
register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated
by Circular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining
foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the Central Bank.[3] It also
required all residents of the Philippines who habitually earned or received foreign currencies from
invisibles, either locally or abroad, to report such earnings or receipts to the Central Bank.
Violations of the Circular were punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the Central
Bank Act.
That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with the
same offense, but involving different accounts, were filed with the Manila RTC, which docketed
these as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. The accusatory portion of the charge sheet
in Criminal Case No. 91-101888 reads:
That from September 1, 1983 up to 1987, both dates inclusive, and for sometime
thereafter, both accused, conspiring and confederating with each other and with the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residents of Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail to submit reports in the prescribed form and/or register with the
Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within 90 days from October 21,
1983 as required of them being residents habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or
receiving foreign exchange from whatever source or from invisibles locally or from
abroad, despite the fact they actually earned interests regularly every six (6 ) months
for the first two years and then quarterly thereafter for their investment of $50-million,
later reduced to $25-million in December 1985, in Philippine-issued dollar
denominated treasury notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the name of
Bank Hofmann, AG, Zurich, Switzerland, for the benefit of Avertina Foundation, their
front organization established for economic advancement purposes with secret foreign
exchange account Category (Rubric) C.A.R. No. 211 925-02 in Swiss Credit Bank
(also known as SKA) in Zurich, Switzerland, which earned, acquired or received for
the accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her late husband an interest of $2,267,892
as of December 16, 1985 which was remitted to Bank Hofmann, AG, through
Citibank, New York, United States of America, for the credit of said Avertina account
on December 19, 1985, aside from the redemption of $25 million (one-half of the
original $50-M) as of December 16, 1985 and outwardly remitted from the
Philippines in the amounts of $7,495,297.49 and $17,489,062.50 on December 18,
1985 for further investment outside the Philippines without first complying with the
Central Bank reporting/registering requirements.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

The other charge sheets were similarly worded except the days of the commission of the
offenses, the name(s) of the alleged dummy or dummies, the amounts in the foreign exchange
accounts maintained, and the names of the foreign banks where such accounts were held by the
accused.
On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the
same offense, again in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same court, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. The Informations were similarly worded as the
earlier indictments, save for the details as to the dates of the violations of Circular No. 960, the
identities of the dummies used, the balances and sources of the earnings, and the names of the
foreign banks where these accounts were maintained.
All of the aforementioned criminal cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the said trial
court.
On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 were filed, the Central
Bank issued Circular No. 1318[5] which revised the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange
transactions. It took effect on January 20, 1992.
 On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank, pursuant to the governments policy of further
liberalizing foreign exchange transactions, came out with Circular No. 1353,[6] which amended
Circular No. 1318. Circular No. 1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central Bank approval for
foreign exchange-funded expenditures obtained from the banking system.
Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a saving clause, excepting from
their coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of Circular No. 960 and, in the case
of Circular No. 1353, violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular No. 1318.
On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to return
to the Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges instituted against them,
including the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter cases.
On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both pleaded not
guilty to the charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had earlier entered
a similar plea during her arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them in
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91-
101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, extinction of criminal
liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960, prescription, exemption from the Central Banks
reporting requirement, and the grant of absolute immunity as a result of a compromise agreement
entered into with the government.
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion. A similar motion filed on
May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases against her due to the
repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the trial court in its order dated June 9, 1994.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this motion
on October 18, 1994.
On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration. The trial court, in its order of November 23, 1994, denied petitioners motion and
set the consolidated cases for trial on January 5, 1995.
Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition, with similar prayers for temporary
restraining orders and/or writs of preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 35928, were respectively filed by Mrs. Marcos and petitioners with the Court of
Appeals. Finding that both cases involved violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
appellate court consolidated the two cases.
On May 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals disposed of the consolidated cases as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge

in denying petitioners respective Motions to Quash, except that with respect to
Criminal Case No. 91-101884, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The assailed September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the Motion to
Quash Criminal Case No. 91-101884 is hereby nullified and set aside, and said case is
hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[7]

Dissatisfied with the said decision of the court a quo, except with respect to the portion
ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 91-101884, petitioners filed the instant petition,
attributing the following errors to the appellate court:

THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

INFORMATIONS/CASES FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE
QUASHABLE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

(A) LACK OF JURISDICTION/FORUM SHOPPING/NO VALID PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION

(B) EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

1) REPEAL OF CB CIRCULAR NO. 960 BY CB CIRCULAR NO.

1353;

2) REPEAL OF R.A. 265 BY R.A. 7653[8]

(C) PRESCRIPTION

(D) EXEMPTION FROM CB REPORTING REQUIREMENT

(E) GRANT OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.[9]

Simply stated, the issues for our resolution are:

(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to Quash for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, forum shopping by the prosecution,
and absence of a valid preliminary investigation?

(2) Did the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by
Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the
criminal liability of petitioners?

(3) Had the criminal cases in violation of Circular No. 960 already prescribed?

(4) Were petitioners exempted from the application and coverage of Circular No. 960?

(5) Were petitioners' alleged violations of Circular No. 960 covered by the
absolute immunity granted in the Compromise Agreement of November 3,
1990?
 On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. They aver that
the dollar-salting charges filed against them were violations of the Anti-Graft Law or Republic
Act No. 3019, and the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over their cases.
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the
law in force at the time the action is instituted.[10] The 25 cases were filed in 1991-92. The
applicable law on jurisdiction then was Presidential Decree 1606.[11] Under P.D. No. 1606, offenses
punishable by imprisonment of not more than six years fall within the jurisdiction of the regular
trial courts, not the Sandiganbayan.[12]
In the instant case, all the Informations are for violations of Circular No. 960 in relation to
Section 34 of the Central Bank Act and not, as petitioners insist, for transgressions of Republic
Act No. 3019. Pursuant to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, violations of Circular No. 960 are
punishable by imprisonment of not more than five years and a fine of not more
than P20,000.00. Since under P.D. No. 1606 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try criminal
cases where the imposable penalty is less than six years of imprisonment, the cases against
petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960 are, therefore, cognizable by the trial court. No error
may thus be charged to the Court of Appeals when it held that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction
to hear and try the dollar-salting cases.
Still on the first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the cases for violations of
Circular No. 960 before the RTC of Manila constitutes forum shopping. Petitioners argue that the
prosecution, in an attempt to seek a favorable verdict from more than one tribunal, filed separate
cases involving virtually the same offenses before the regular trial courts and the Sandiganbayan.
They fault the prosecution with splitting the cases. Petitioners maintain that while the RTC cases
refer only to the failure to report interest earnings on Treasury Notes, the Sandiganbayan cases
seek to penalize the act of receiving the same interest earnings on Treasury Notes in violation of
the Anti-Graft Laws provisions on prohibited transactions. Petitioners aver that the violation of
Circular No. 960 is but an element of the offense of prohibited transactions punished under
Republic Act No. 3019 and should, thus, be deemed absorbed by the prohibited transactions cases
pending before the Sandiganbayan.
For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action pending in one
court and another action before another court: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such
that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration.[13] Here, we find that the single act of receiving
unreported interest earnings on Treasury Notes held abroad constitutes an offense against two or
more distinct and unrelated laws, Circular No. 960 and R.A. 3019. Said laws define distinct
offenses, penalize different acts, and can be applied independently.[14] Hence, no fault lies at the
prosecutions door for having instituted separate cases before separate tribunals involving the same
subject matter.
With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings violate Circular No. 960 in
relation to Republic Act No. 265 because the same was unreported to the Central Bank. The act to
be penalized here is the failure to report the interest earnings from the foreign exchange accounts
to the proper authority. As to the anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan involving the same
interest earnings from the same foreign exchange accounts, the receipt of the interest earnings
transgresses Republic Act No. 3019 because the act of receiving such interest is a prohibited
transaction prejudicial to the government. What the State seeks to punish in these anti-graft cases
is the prohibited receipt of the interest earnings. In sum, there is no identity of offenses charged,
and prosecution under one law is not an obstacle to a prosecution under the other law. There is no
forum shopping.
Finally, on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation by the
Department of Justice was invalid and in violation of their rights to due process. Petitioners argue
that governments ban on their travel effectively prevented them from returning home and
personally appearing at the preliminary investigation. Benedicto and Rivera further point out that
the joint preliminary investigation by the Department of Justice, resulted to the charges in one set
of cases before the Sandiganbayan for violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set before
the RTC for violation of Circular No. 960.
Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution.[15] It is
an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof.[16] Instead, the right to
a preliminary investigation is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived,
either expressly or by implication.[17] The waiver extends to any irregularity in the preliminary
investigation, where one was conducted.
The petition in the present case contains the following admissions:

1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993on the condition that he
face the criminal charges pending in courts, petitioner-appellant Benedicto, joined by
his co-petitioner Rivera, lost no time in attending to the pending criminal charges by
posting bail in the above-mentioned cases.

2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the preliminary

investigation because of their forced absence from the Philippines then, petitioners-
appellants invoked their right to due process thru motions for preliminary
investigationUpon denial of their demands for preliminary investigation, the
petitioners intended to elevate the matter to the Honorable Court of Appeals and
actually caused the filing of a petition for certiorari/prohibition sometime before their
arraignment but immediately caused the withdrawal thereofin view of the
prosecutions willingness to go to pre-trial wherein petitioners would be allowed
access to the records of preliminary investigation which they could use for purposes
of filing a motion to quash if warranted.

3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department of

Justicerespondent Judge set the case for pre-trial in order to afford all the accused
access to the records of the prosecution

xxx
5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-appellants Benedicto and Rivera
moved for the quashing of the informations/cases[18]

The foregoing admissions lead us to conclude that petitioners have expressly waived their
right to question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary investigation or to ask for a new
preliminary investigation. Petitioners, in the above excerpts from this petition, admit posting bail
immediately following their return to the country, entered their respective pleas to the charges, and
filed various motions and pleadings. By so doing, without simultaneously demanding a proper
preliminary investigation, they have waived any and all irregularities in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation.[19] The trial court did not err in denying the motion to quash the
informations on the ground of want of or improperly conducted preliminary investigation. The
absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the information.[20]
On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted for acts punishable
under laws that have already been repealed. They point to the express repeal of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 by Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 as well as the express repeal of Republic Act
No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653. Petitioners, relying on Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code,[21] contend that repeal has the effect of extinguishing the right to prosecute or punish the
offense committed under the old laws.[22]
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its authority
to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal.[23] This is because an
unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been
previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who
committed it never did so. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a
saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending
actions.[24] Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and punishes
the act previously penalized under the old law. In such instance, the act committed before the
reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending cases are not affected,
regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the accused.[25]
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No.
1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from
non-trade foreign exchange transactions.[26] Second, even the most cursory glance at the repealing
circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a saving clause, expressly
providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation
of the latter Circular.[27] A saving clause operates to except from the effect of the repealing law
what would otherwise be lost under the new law.[28] In the present case, the respective saving
clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State
to prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases
are either pending or under investigation.
Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265, particularly Section
34,[29] by Republic Act No. 7653, removed the applicability of any penal sanction for violations of
any non-trade foreign exchange transactions previously penalized by Circular No. 960. Petitioners
posit that a comparison of the two provisions shows that Section 36[30] of Republic Act No. 7653
neither retained nor reinstated Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265. Since, in creating the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, Congress did not include in its charter a clause providing for the application
of Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 to pending cases, petitioners pending dollar-salting cases
are now bereft of statutory penalty, the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 notwithstanding. In
other words, absent a provision in Republic Act No. 7653 expressly reviving the applicability of
any penal sanction for the repealed mandatory foreign exchange reporting regulations formerly
required under Circular No. 960, violations of aforesaid repealed Circular can no longer be
prosecuted criminally.
A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko Sentrals charter repealing the
former show that in consonance with the general objective of the old law and the new law to
maintain internal and external monetary stability in the Philippines and preserve the international
value of the peso,[31] both the repealed law and the repealing statute contain a penal clause which
sought to penalize in general, violations of the law as well as orders, instructions, rules, or
regulations issued by the Monetary Board. In the case of the Bangko Sentral, the scope of the penal
clause was expanded to include violations of other pertinent banking laws enforced or
implemented by the Bangko Sentral. In the instant case, the acts of petitioners sought to be
penalized are violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board. These acts are
proscribed and penalized in the penal clause of the repealed law and this proviso for proscription
and penalty was reenacted in the repealing law. We find, therefore, that while Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265 was repealed, it was nonetheless, simultaneously reenacted in Section 36 of
Republic Act No. 7653. Where a clause or provision or a statute for that matter is simultaneously
repealed and reenacted, there is no effect, upon the rights and liabilities which have accrued under
the original statute, since the reenactment, in effect neutralizes the repeal and continues the law in
force without interruption.[32] The rule applies to penal laws and statutes with penal provisions.
Thus, the repeal of a penal law or provision, under which a person is charged with violation thereof
and its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the same act done by him under the old law, will
neither preclude the accuseds prosecution nor deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear and try
his case.[33] As pointed out earlier, the act penalized before the reenactment continues to remain an
offense and pending cases are unaffected. Therefore, the repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by
Republic Act No. 7653 did not extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners for transgressions of
Circular No. 960 and cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be made a basis for quashing
the indictments against petitioners.
Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in reenacting
Section 34 of the old Central Act, increased the penalty for violations of rules and regulations
issued by the Monetary Board. They claim that such increase in the penalty would give Republic
Act No. 7653 an ex post facto application, violating the Bill of Rights.[34]
Is Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto legislation?
An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the
law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes
it greater than it was when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of
evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only, in
effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.[35]
 The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution is: Does
the law sought to be applied retroactively take from an accused any right that was regarded at the
time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which he
enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him? [36]
The crucial words in the test are vital for the protection of life and liberty.[37] We find, however,
the test inapplicable to the penal clause of Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws and laws which,
while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties
for their violation operate prospectively.[38] Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except
when they are favorable to the accused.[39] Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular
Section 36, is there any indication that the increased penalties provided therein were intended to
operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest earnings subject of the
criminal cases instituted against them were remitted to foreign banks on various dates between
1983 to 1987. They maintain that given the considerable lapse of time from the dates of the
commission of the offenses to the institution of the criminal actions in 1991 and 1992, the States
right to prosecute them for said offenses has already prescribed. Petitioners assert that the Court
of Appeals erred in computing the prescriptive period from February 1986. Petitioners theorize
that since the remittances were made through the Central Bank as a regulatory authority, the dates
of the alleged violations are known, and prescription should thus be counted from these dates.
In ruling that the dollar-salting cases against petitioners have not yet prescribed, the court a
quo quoted with approval the trial courts finding that:

[T]he alleged violations of law were discovered only after the EDSA Revolution in
1986 when the dictatorship was toppled down. The date of the discovery of the
offense, therefore, should be the basis in computing the prescriptive period. Since
(the) offenses charged are punishable by imprisonment of not more than five (5)
years, they prescribe in eight (8) years. Thus, only a little more than four (4) years had
elapsed from the date of discovery in 1986 when the cases were filed in 1991 .[40]

The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by Section 34 of Republic Act
No. 265 by a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and by imprisonment of
not more than five years. Pursuant to Act No. 3326, which mandates the periods of prescription
for violations of special laws, the prescriptive period for violations of Circular No. 960 is eight (8)
years.[41] The period shall commence to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.[42] In the instant case, the indictments against
petitioners charged them with having conspired with the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in
transgressing Circular No. 960.Petitioners contention that the dates of the commission of the
alleged violations were known and prescription should be counted from these dates must be viewed
in the context of the political realities then prevailing. Petitioners, as close associates of Mrs.
Marcos, were not only protected from investigation by their influence and connections, but also
by the power and authority of a Chief Executive exercising strong-arm rule. This Court has taken
judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Marcos, his family, relations, and close associates resorted to all
sorts of clever schemes and manipulations to disguise and hide their illicit acquisitions. [43] In the
instant case, prescription cannot, therefore, be made to run from the dates of the commission of
the offenses charged, for the obvious reason that the commission of those offenses were not known
as of those dates. It was only after the EDSA Revolution of February, 1986, that the recovery of
ill-gotten wealth became a highly prioritized state policy,[44] pursuant to the explicit command of
the Provisional Constitution.[45] To ascertain the relevant facts to recover ill-gotten properties
amassed by the leaders and supporters of the (Marcos) regime[46] various government agencies
were tasked by the Aquino administration to investigate, and as the evidence on hand may reveal,
file and prosecute the proper cases. Applying the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed,[47] we are more inclined to believe that the violations for which petitioners are charged
were discovered only during the post-February 1986 investigations and the tolling of the
prescriptive period should be counted from the dates of discovery of their commission. The
criminal actions against petitioners, which gave rise to the instant case, were filed in 1991 and
1992, or well within the eight-year prescriptive period counted from February 1986.
The fourth issue involves petitioners claim that they incurred no criminal liability for
violations of Circular No. 960 since they were exempted from its coverage.
Petitioners postulate that since the purchases of treasury notes were done through the Central
Banks Securities Servicing Department and payments of the interest were coursed through its
Securities Servicing Department/Foreign Exchange Department, their filing of reports would be
surplusage, since the requisite information were already with the Central Bank. Furthermore, they
contend that the foreign currency investment accounts in the Swiss banks were subject to absolute
confidentiality as provided for by Republic Act No. 6426,[48] as amended by Presidential Decree
Nos. 1035, 1246, and 1453, and fell outside the ambit of the reporting requirements imposed by
Circular No. 960. Petitioners further rely on the exemption from reporting provided for in Section
10(q), [49] Circular No. 960, and the confidentiality granted to Swiss bank accounts by the laws of
Switzerland.
Petitioners correctly point out that Section 10(q) of Circular No. 960 exempts from the
reporting requirement foreign currency eligible for deposit under the Philippine Foreign Exchange
Currency Deposit System, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6426, as amended. But, in order to avail
of the aforesaid exemption, petitioners must show that they fall within its scope. Petitioners must
satisfy the requirements for eligibility imposed by Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426.[50] Not only
do we find the record bare of any proof to support petitioners claim of falling within the coverage
of Republic Act No. 6426, we likewise find from a reading of Section 2 of the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act that said law is inapplicable to the foreign currency accounts in question. Section 2,
Republic Act No. 6426 speaks of deposit with such Philippine banks in good standing, as maybe
designated by the Central Bank for the purpose.[51] The criminal cases filed against petitioners for
violation of Circular No. 960 involve foreign currency accounts maintained in foreign banks, not
Philippine banks. By invoking the confidentiality guarantees provided for by Swiss banking laws,
petitioners admit such reports made. The rule is that exceptions are strictly construed and apply
only so far as their language fairly warrants, with all doubts being resolved in favor of the
general proviso rather than the exception.[52] Hence, petitioners may not claim exemption under
Section 10(q).
With respect to the banking laws of Switzerland cited by petitioners, the rule is that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[53] Laws of foreign jurisdictions must be alleged
and proved.[54] Petitioners failed to prove the Swiss law relied upon, either by: (1) an official
publication thereof; or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied by a certification from the secretary of the Philippine embassy or
legation in such country or by the Philippine consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent
stationed in such country, or by any other authorized officer in the Philippine foreign service
assigned to said country that such officer has custody.[55] Absent such evidence, this Court cannot
take judicial cognizance of the foreign law invoked by Benedicto and Rivera.
Anent the fifth issue, petitioners insist that the government granted them absolute immunity
under the Compromise Agreement they entered into with the government on November 3,
1990. Petitioners cite our decision in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 226 SCRA 314
(1993), upholding the validity of the said Agreement and directing the various government
agencies to be consistent with it. Benedicto and Rivera now insist that the absolute immunity from
criminal investigation or prosecution granted to petitioner Benedicto, his family, as well as to
officers and employees of firms owned or controlled by Benedicto under the aforesaid Agreement
covers the suits filed for violations of Circular No. 960, which gave rise to the present case.
The pertinent provisions of the Compromise Agreement read:

WHEREAS, this Compromise Agreement covers the remaining claims and the cases
of the Philippine Government against Roberto S. Benedicto including his associates
and nominees, namely, Julita C. Benedicto, Hector T. Rivera, x x x

WHEREAS, specifically these claims are the subject matter of the following
cases (stress supplied):

1. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 9

2. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 24

3. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34

4. Tanodbayan (Phil-Asia)

5. PCGG I.S. No. 1

xxx

WHEREAS, following the termination of the United States and Swiss cases, and also
without admitting the merits of their respective claims and counterclaims presently
involved in uncertain, protracted and expensive litigation, the Republic of the
Philippines, solely motivated by the desire for the immediate accomplishment of its
recovery mission and Mr. Benedicto being interested to lead a peaceful and normal
pursuit of his endeavors, the parties have decided to withdraw and/or dismiss their
mutual claims and counterclaims under the cases pending in the Philippines, earlier
referred to (underscoring supplied);
 xxx

II. Lifting of Sequestrations, Extension of Absolute Immunity and Recognition of the

Freedom to Travel

a) The Government hereby lifts the sequestrations over the assets listed in Annex C
hereof, the same being within the capacity of Mr. Benedicto to acquire from the
exercise of his profession and conduct of business, as well as all the haciendas listed
in his name in Negros Occidental, all of which were inherited by him or acquired with
income from his inheritanceand all the other sequestered assets that belong to
Benedicto and his corporation/nominees which are not listed in Annex A as ceded or
to be ceded to the Government.

Provided, however, (that) any asset(s) not otherwise settled or covered by this
Compromise Agreement, hereinafter found and clearly established with finality by
proper competent court as being held by Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto in trust for the
family of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, shall be returned or surrendered to the
Government for appropriate custody and disposition.

b) The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized under the

pertinent provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, to Benedicto, the
members of his family, officers and employees of his corporations above mentioned,
who are included in past, present and future cases and investigations of the Philippine
Government, such that there shall be no criminal investigation or prosecution against
said persons for acts (or) omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986, that may be
alleged to have violated any laws, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019,
in relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned or included in this
Agreement.

x x x[56]

In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the parties by looking at the
words employed to project their intention. In the instant case, the parties clearly listed and limited
the applicability of the Compromise Agreement to the cases listed or identified therein. We have
ruled in another case involving the same Compromise Agreement that:

[T]he subject matters of the disputed compromise agreement are Sandiganbayan Civil
Case No. 0009, Civil Case No. 00234, Civil Case No. 0034, the Phil-Asia case before
the Tanodbayan and PCGG I.S. No. 1. The cases arose from complaints for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, members of his family, and alleged cronies, one of
whom was respondent Roberto S. Benedicto.[57]
 Nowhere is there a mention of the criminal cases filed against petitioners for violations of
Circular No. 960. Conformably with Article 1370 of the Civil Code,[58] the Agreement relied upon
by petitioners should include only cases specifically mentioned therein. Applying the parol
evidence rule,[59] where the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, the contents of the
writing constitute the sole repository of the terms of the agreement between the
parties.[60] Whatever is not found in the text of the Agreement should thus be construed as waived
and abandoned.[61] Scrutiny of the Compromise Agreement will reveal that it does not include all
cases filed by the government against Benedicto, his family, and associates.
Additionally, the immunity covers only criminal investigation or prosecution against said
persons for acts (or) omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to have
violated any penal laws, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the
acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned, or included in this Agreement.[62] It is only when the
criminal investigation or case involves the acquisition of any ill-gotten wealth treated, mentioned,
or included in this Agreement[63] that petitioners may invoke immunity. The record is bereft of any
showing that the interest earnings from foreign exchange deposits in banks abroad, which is the
subject matter of the present case, are treated, mentioned, or included in the Compromise
Agreement. The phraseology of the grant of absolute immunity in the Agreement precludes us
from applying the same to the criminal charges faced by petitioners for violations of Circular No.
960. A contract cannot be construed to include matters distinct from those with respect to which
the parties intended to contract.[64]
In sum, we find that no reversible error of law may be attributed to the Court of Appeals in
upholding the orders of the trial court denying petitioners Motion to Quash the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 92-101959 to 92-
101969. In our view, none of the grounds provided for in the Rules of Court[65] upon which
petitioners rely, finds application in this case.
One final matter. During the pendency of this petition, counsel for petitioner Roberto S.
Benedicto gave formal notice to the Court that said petitioner died on May 15, 2000. The death of
an accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon.[66]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed consolidated Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35719,
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the charges against deceased petitioner, Roberto S.
Benedicto, particularly in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892,
and 92-101959 to 92-101969, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are
ordered dropped and that any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable
to him in the aforesaid cases are declared extinguished by reason of his death on May 15, 2000. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.