Discuss reasons for the changing nature of US involvement in Vietnam 1954-75

The US became involved the region when President Truman (1945–53) helped the French effort to maintain control of
Vietnam, beleiving the French were fighting Communism. By the end of his presidency, the USA was paying nearly 80 per
cent of the French bill for Indochina and had given over $2 billion and a great deal of military equipment and advice to
the French. However, it was not until the presidency of Eisenhower, from 1954 onwards that the US started to become
heavily involved in the Vietnam War, which ended in defeat with the Fall of Saigon in 1975. Reasons for involvement
vary from each president and it is too simplistic to look to a specific school of history such as Orthodox or Revisionist to
explain involvement in Vietnam between 1954. As we shall see, each president had their own political motivations which
influenced their decisions to increase or decrease involvement. In addition to this, until the Tet Offensive the ‘quagmire
theory’ and ‘commitment trap theory’, help to explain reasons for the changing nature of US involvement in Vietnam
1954-75.

Firstly, US involvement in Vietnam increased significantly during the presidency of Eisenhower. Initially, Eisenhower
continued to aid the French. In early 1954 he gave them armaments worth $385 million and US bombers accompanied
by 200 American technicians. He told Congress that he disliked putting Americans in danger but that ‘we must not lose
Asia’. This can partially be explained by his belief in the ‘Domino Theory’, which he spelled out in, historic press
conference on April 7, 1954, where he stated 'The loss of any single country in South East Asia could lead to the loss of
all Asia, then India and Japan, finally endangering the security of Europe’. Therefore, “domino theory” dominated U.S.
thinking about Vietnam for the next decade and can be seen as a key reason for Eisenhower’ decision to increase US
involvement in the region. However, the domino theory alone cannot sufficiently explain the US reasons for involvement
during Eisenhower’s presidency.

In addition to this, the military and political situation in the months after Eisenhower’s speech further dictated the
nature of US involvement. In May 1954 the Battle of Dien Bien Phu culminated in a comprehensive French defeat which
meant that there was no longer a foreign power in the region to combat communism in the region. After the Geneva
conference, Ho and the Communists governed North Vietnam (from Hanoi) while Diem governed South Vietnam (from
Saigon). Between 1955 and 1961, in defiance of the Geneva Accords, Eisenhower made the USA the guarantor of an
independent state of South Vietnam and committed the USA to the defence of a particularly unpopular leader in Diem.
He gave Diem $7 billion worth of aid and around 1000 American advisers, nearly half of whom were military. Once such
a commitment was undertaken, it was arguable that America had incurred an obligation to see it through. Overall, many
historians argue the ‘commitment trap theory’ and state that an inherited commitment to Vietnam made it harder for
the next president to exit without the nation and its leader losing face.

Secondly, this commitment to US involvement in Vietnam was then inherited by President Kennedy when he became
president in 1961. An important theory in explaining the changing nature of US involvement in Vietnam during
Kennedy’s presidency is called the ‘quagmire theory’ and was put forward by David Halberstam. According to
Halberstam Ignorant of Vietnam and overconfident about American power and ideals, US leaders became trapped in an
expensive commitment in an unimportant area, unable to exit without losing credibility. The theory was more deeply
developed by Arthur Schlesinger, who stated that the quagmire metaphor represented the one-step-at-a-time process
that the U.S. inadvertently became entrapped in the military and diplomatic swamp of Vietnam. Further to this, J.
Schell pointed out a crucial change from the Eisenhower administration to the Kennedy administration: the ‘territorial
domino theory’ became the ‘psychological domino theory’ or the ‘doctrine of credibility’. It was not so much that other
territories would become Communist if Vietnam did, but that the USA would lose credibility. Therefore, as David
Anderson concluded, the Eisenhower administration trapped itself and its successors into a commitment.
In addition to this, Kennedy had various additional reasons for continuing US involvement in Vietnam. Like Eisenhower,
Kennedy also believed in and quoted the domino theory and considered Vietnam ‘a proving ground for democracy’.
Kennedy had criticized Eisenhower for allowing the rise of Communism in the newly emergent nations of the ‘Third
World’, which Kennedy (and the Soviet leader Khrushchev) considered to be the new Cold War battleground. The
unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and the possibility of a Soviet-backed Communist triumph in Laos made
Kennedy determined to avoid another Third World failure. Kennedy did not want to be accused of ‘losing’ Vietnam in
the way that Truman had ‘lost’ China. For such reasons, he USA provided ever more money, weaponry, helicopters and
nearly 20,000 ‘advisers. In 1961, Kennedy agreed that America should finance an increase in the size of the South
Vietnamese Army from 150,000 to 170,000 and it was during Kennedy’s presidency that the ‘Strategic Hamlet’
programme was introduced. Overall, securely in the ‘commitment trap’ and ‘quagmire’ set by Truman and Eisenhower
and his own personal motivations Kennedy increased his country’s commitment.

Thirdly, the dramatic escalation of the war under Johnson led many contemporaries and historians to blame him for US
involvement. However, he inherited a long-standing commitment to Vietnam, in which the USA had invested a great
deal of money, prestige and credibility. President Johnson inherited nearly 20,000 American ‘advisers’ in Vietnam, but
the Saigon regime had still not defeated the Communists. So, Johnson took the first great escalatory step in early 1965,
with air strikes of such intensity that they were known as ‘Rolling Thunder’. The reasons for bombing the routes taking
men and materials to the South would hopefully secure the position of Americans in South Vietnam, decrease
infiltration from the North, demoralize Hanoi, and revitalize the unpopular Saigon regime. In his second great escalatory
step, Johnson sent the first American ground troops to Vietnam in spring 1965. General Westmoreland repeatedly
requested more troops in order to assist those already there and because he felt more were needed in order to secure
victory. There were around 200,000 American soldiers in Vietnam by late 1965, and over 500,000 by early 1968. By
sending in ground troops and ordering ‘Rolling Thunder’, Johnson had dramatically changed the nature of the war.
Therefore, the military situation in Vietnam led Johnson to increase US involvement and his presidency saw a massive
escalation.

In addition to this, Johnson in order to escalate involvement in Vietnam, Johnson needed congressional support.
Because of real and imagined attacks on US ships off the coast of North Vietnam in August 1964, Congress passed the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave Johnson the power to do as he saw fit in Vietnam. Then in autumn 1964, a
Working Group was brought together by President Johnson to study Vietnam, suggested that a further escalation was
necessary due to the weakness of the Saigon government and to protect American soldiers. They also said that said
American ‘national prestige, credibility, and honour’ were at stake, which would fit into J Schell’s ‘doctrine of credibility.
Also after the escalation, Johnson’s public approval rating rose from 42 to 72 per cent, helping him to win the November
1964 presidential election with a landslide victory. In a speech in April 1965, Johnson summed up the reasons why the
USA had to continue and escalate its commitment to Vietnam. He said that since Eisenhower and Kennedy had helped
build and defend South Vietnam, abandonment would dishonour the USA and cause allies to doubt its word and
credibility. This would seem to support the quagmire theory and J Schell’s term of the ‘doctrine of credibility’. Therefore,
along with the quagmire and doctrine of credibility, Johnson was also clearly influenced by his advisors and domestic
political position.

However, the nature of US involvement again changed dramatically after the Tet Offensive on January 1968. The Tet
Offensive was one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War by forces of the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese People's Army against the forces of the South including the US. After the Tet Offensive, a combination of
factors drove Johnson toward a re-evaluation of US policy. The Tet Offensive suggested Washington and Saigon were
nowhere near defeating the Communists and Johnson’s approval rating fell from 48 to 36 per cent. Taxpayers were
increasingly resentful about funding this expensive war. The government deficit rose from $1.6 billion in 1965 to $25.3
billion in 1968, causing inflation and endangering America’s economic well-being. Also, in 1967, the CIA director had said
the USA could get out of Vietnam without suffering any great loss of international standing or credibility, which had
been such an influential factor in previous US involvement. Overall, Johnson at first escalated the war due to various
ideological and personal concerns, but after the Tet Offensive, Johnson halted the escalation and began peace talks.

Finally, when Richard Nixon became president in January 1969, there were around half a million US soldiers in Vietnam.
Despite having been a notable Cold Warrior, Nixon got the USA out of Vietnam, although the withdrawal was slow and
painful. He knew that the Vietnam War had ruined Johnson’s presidency and peace in Vietnam would reinvigorate the
USA, and ensure Nixon’s place in the history books and his re-election in 1972. However, the Tet Offensive was a great
turning point for Nixon. He realized that there would have to be changes in US policy. He said American forces should be
withdrawn and ARVN built up ‘Vietnamization’. This was a program to expand, equip, and train South Vietnamese forces
and assign to them an ever-increasing combat role, at the same time steadily reducing the number of U.S. combat
troops. Therefore, personal political considerations and the Tet Offensive persuaded Nixon to gradually withdraw US
troops through his program of ‘Vietnamization’.

In addition to this, Nixon’s aim was a peace settlement that would allow President Thieu to remain in power in an
independent South Vietnam. He hoped to achieve this through ‘Vietnamization’, an improved relationship with the USSR
and China, and heavier bombing of North Vietnam. Then, in January 1970 extending the war to Laos and Cambodia
when he escalated the air offensive with heavy bombing of the trail in Laos and Cambodia and of North Vietnamese anti-
aircraft bases. He believed that demonstrations of US power would counter Saigon’s pessimism about American troop
withdrawals, help protect the remaining Americans in Vietnam, intimidate Hanoi and gain better peace terms. Nixon
sent 30,000 American and ARVN forces into south-western Cambodia, but they found no Communists and 344
Americans and 818 ARVN died, and 1592 Americans and 3553 ARVN were wounded. Therefore, from 1970 onwards
Nixon widened the war with the intention of strengthening the hand of South Vietnam when negotiating a peace
settlement.

Eventually, a series of factors forced Nixon to reach a settlement which was agreed in Paris in January 1973. To begin
with, by 1971 the morale of the US Army in Vietnam had plummeted and Nixon’s approval rating had dropped to 31 per
cent and influenced by the spring protests 300,000 marched in Washington, DC. Also, the urgency for a settlement was
increased because ‘Vietnamization’ was not working, Furthermore, Nixon’s planned rapprochement with both the USSR
and China was becoming a reality. Therefore, Nixon’s concessions, Soviet and Chinese pressure, the failure of their
offensive to take big cities, the destructiveness of the American bombing, and Nixon’s probable re-election all helped
drive Hanoi toward a settlement. In January 1973, Nixon believed that when a settlement was reached he had achieved
‘peace with honor’ however, he had not really won peace for Indochina and South Vietnam was overrun by the
Communists in 1975. Overall, Nixon widened the war in 1970 so that the South Vietnamese could negotiate from a
position of power, however a peace settlement was eventually reached and Nixon got troops out of Vietnam in the face
of the failure of his policies and increasing anti-war sentiment in the US.

In conclusion,