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Pakistan
February 2018
The Economist Intelligence Unit
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ISSN 0966-8888
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
2 Pakistan
Taxes
2018-19: Gas rates for industrial and commercial customers, which are subsidised, are increased, including those for large
users such as power plants.
2020-22: Most Pakistanis remain outside the tax net, but efforts to close tax loopholes for business and industry continue.
Financing
2018-19: Most lending consists of private bank loans to the public sector, but lending to the private sector grows modestly.
2020-22: Smaller, private banks merge as competition in the banking sector intensifies. The Islamic-finance subsector
develops. The role of microcredit banks and branchless banking continues to expand.
Infrastructure
2018-19: The Bin Qasim, Thar-I and Thar-II coal-fired power plants, under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
come online, adding generating capacity of 3,300 MW. Construction on an international airport in Gwadar begins.
2020-22: Renewable energy-based power plants are built to diversify electricity generation. The remaining energy projects
under the CPEC are completed.
Editors: Kamal Madishetty (analyst); Fung Siu (consulting analyst) Editorial closing date: January 26th 2018
All queries: Tel: (44.20) 7576 8000 Email: london@eiu.com Next report: To request the latest schedule, email schedule@eiu.com
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
Pakistan 3
Fact sheet
Annual data 2016 a Historical averages (%) 2012-16
Population (m) 193.2 Population growth 2.1
GDP (US$ bn; market exchange rate) 278.9 Real GDP growth 4.6
GDP (US$ bn; purchasing power parity) 1,014 Real domestic demand growth 4.9
GDP per head (US$; market exchange rate) 1,444 Inflation 6.1
GDP per head (US$; purchasing power parity) 5,246 Current-account balance (% of GDP) -1.6
Exchange rate (av) PRs:US$ 104.8 FDI inflows (% of GDP) 0.6
a Actual.
Background: The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was founded in 1947. East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) seceded in 1971. Since
independence, there have been several coups. The last was in 1999, when the chief of army staff, Pervez Musharraf, became
the chief executive of Pakistan. Mr Musharraf became president in 2001, and parliament re-elected him in 2007.
Mr Musharraf resigned as army chief in November 2007 and stood down as president in August 2008. The February 2008
general election resulted in a new coalition government, led by the Pakistan People’s Party, which was to become the first
elected administration in Pakistan to serve a full five-year term. The 2013 election was won by the Pakistan Muslim League
(Nawaz) and marked the first transition between elected governments in the country's history.
Political structure: Following a series of alterations to the constitution that increased the powers of the president at the
expense of parliament and the prime minister, parliamentary supremacy was restored in 2010, when both houses of the
legislature approved a landmark amendment to the charter that reversed the changes of the previous few years.
The National Assembly (the lower house of parliament) began a new five-year term in June 2013. Provinces are represented
in the lower chamber in proportion to the size of the population. An election to the Senate (the upper house), in which the
four provinces have equal representation, was held in March 2015. Senators serve terms of six years, and half the seats in
the upper house come up for re-election every three years.
Policy issues: Although Pakistan has been undergoing a process of economic liberalisation since Mr Musharraf’s rule,
political instability and the threat of terrorist violence have made the business operating environment difficult.
The government will need to reassure foreign investors and encourage foreign-investment inflows. Long-term economic
stability will depend on speeding up the privatisation programme, achieving greater growth in exports and maintaining
official inflows of remittances. The latter will be crucial as the country faces mounting strains on its balance of payments.
Taxation: The highest income tax rate stands at 30% and the lowest at 5%; the latter rate of tax is imposed on annual
incomes above PRs400,000 (around US$3,600). The corporate tax rate was lowered to 31% at the start of 2017.
Foreign trade: According to the IMF, merchandise exports (fob) stood at US$21.7bn in 2016, while imports (fob) totalled
US$42.7bn, yielding a trade deficit of US$21bn.
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
4 Pakistan
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
Pakistan 5
Election watch The next election for the National Assembly is due to be held in July 2018.
We believe that, given ongoing political turmoil, the PML (N) has little incentive
to bring the election forward and will therefore see out its term in office.
This will allow more time for the economic benefits from energy and road
infrastructure investments to filter through to voters.
Opposition parties such as the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Tehreek-
e-Insaf (PTI) will seek to benefit from the political turmoil in the PML (N).
The PTI, in particular, is hoping to capitalise on the troubles of the ruling party
and expand its presence in Punjab. Social unrest stoked by Islamist groups also
poses a challenge to the PML (N), which could erode its traditional Punjabi vote
base. In the event that religiously backed political parties, such as the Milli
Muslim League, gain traction, the ruling party could lose additional seats in
Punjab. However, given its entrenched grip on the province, the PML (N) is
likely to maintain an overall electoral advantage. Moreover, the fact that
Shehbaz Sharif is the current chief minister of Punjab will enable the party to
build on its already-strong local base.
Although no civilian prime minister has served out a full term, the country
witnessed the first transfer of power between elected civilian governments in
its history at the 2013 parliamentary elections. We expect this to be repeated
in 2018, helping to strengthen Pakistan's democratic institutions.
International relations China will remain Pakistan's leading economic partner in 2018-22 as projects
under the umbrella of the CPEC are executed. The majority of funding will be
allocated to energy and transport infrastructure projects. Although public
sentiment towards China remains favourable, the financing terms of CPEC
investments will occasionally be a point of contention. This was highlighted by
the Chinese authorities' decision to suspend funding temporarily for three road
infrastructure projects in December 2017. Such disagreements, however, will not
fundamentally threaten the strengthening of bilateral co-operation.
In the Middle East, Pakistan will face a difficult diplomatic balancing act as it
seeks to maintain robust working ties with rivals such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Pakistan's relations with the US, its largest export market and an important
security partner, will remain tense. This will partly reflect the poor security
situation in Afghanistan. The Afghan government will continue to accuse
Pakistan of fomenting instability to retain its leverage in that country—a concern
that has also been consistently raised by the US administration.
Relations between Pakistan and India will remain fractious. However, we do
not expect irregular clashes along the border to prompt a full outbreak of
hostilities. The sovereignty dispute over Kashmir, which both sides claim in full,
will remain a major impediment to the normalisation of Indo-Pakistani ties in
the forecast period.
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
6 Pakistan
Fiscal policy We expect the budget deficit to remain wide over the forecast period, averaging
the equivalent of 5.2% of GDP in fiscal years 2017/18-2021/22 (July-June). Fiscal
conditions have loosened markedly since an IMF programme ended in 2016.
The government had set an ambitious fiscal deficit target of 3.8% of GDP in
2016/17, but the actual deficit stood at 5.8%, according to the Ministry of Finance.
On the revenue side, numerous efforts to widen the tax net have had only
partial success. The majority of tax revenue is derived from indirect taxes,
making the tax system relatively regressive. Concerted efforts to widen the tax
base will lead to only a slight reduction of the budget deficit in 2017/18,
as spending pressures are expected to remain high at least until the elections,
which are scheduled for July 2018. Furthermore, the administration will face
some political difficulties in rationalising consumer power tariffs, which are
often too low to cover production costs, and improving revenue collection by
electricity distributors.
In our view, the fiscal deficit is likely to narrow only slowly in subsequent
years, as the pressure to increase development expenditure, which includes
infrastructure, will remain high throughout the forecast period. Moreover, given
the parlous domestic security situation, military spending will remain high,
hampering fiscal consolidation efforts and leaving little leeway to expand
funding for social welfare programmes.
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
Pakistan 7
Monetary policy The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP, the central bank) sanctioned a 25-basis-point
increase in its benchmark interest rate, the target rate, to 6% following a
monetary policy meeting in January. We now expect the SBP to continue to
tighten monetary policy throughout 2018 as it strives to prevent a build-up of
inflationary expectations. These will be fanned by persistent exchange-rate
weakness, rising global oil prices and higher government expenditure
compared with the previous year. The central bank will then keep the target
rate close to 6.5% over the remainder of the forecast period, as inflationary
pressures are expected to largely remain under control.
Economic forecast
Economic growth We forecast that real GDP (measured on an expenditure basis) will expand
by 5.3% a year on average in 2017/18-2021/22. Economic growth will continue to
be supported by progress on CPEC energy projects and improved domestic
business sentiment. Pakistan's large population and robust growth rates will
also attract higher levels of foreign direct investment from non-Chinese
companies towards the end of the forecast period. However, such investment
will have a domestic focus and is unlikely to spur a significant increase in
employment in export-oriented industries. Consumption will therefore remain
tied closely to the agricultural sector and remittance inflows. Moreover, low
investment in human capital and the existence of barriers to women entering
the workforce make it unlikely that Pakistan will benefit fully from a potential
"demographic dividend" during the forecast period.
The annual average growth rate of 5.3% in 2017/18-2021/22 masks a slight
upward revision to our forecasts for 2017/18-2018/19 in the light of changes
made to our real GDP forecast for China, where we now expect real GDP to
grow by 6.4% in 2018, compared with 5.8% previously. Given the fact that China
is Pakistan's second-largest export market, we now expect Pakistan's real GDP to
grow by an annual average of 5.2% in 2017/18-2018/19, compared with 5.1%
previously. We continue to expect the US to record a shallow cyclical downturn
in 2020. The resulting volatility on global financial markets and the weak
external environment will dampen the growth outlook for Pakistan in 2019/20.
However, as external demand recovers and global economic activity revives,
Pakistan's GDP growth will start to accelerate again.
Despite the steady growth outlook, macroeconomic risks arising from
imbalances in the external sector will persist. In addition, we expect risks in the
banking sector to build gradually, as a large amount of credit has been extended
to the poorly performing textiles sector. The authorities' ability to adopt
stimulus measures in the event of a sharper than expected downturn in
economic activity will be limited heavily by the country's stretched fiscal
accounts.
Inflation We have revised up our forecast for consumer price inflation following an
adjustment to our global oil price outlook for 2018-19. We now expect consumer
prices in Pakistan to increase by an annual average of 5.2% in 2018-19, compared
with 5.1% previously. Our forecast assumes that electricity tariffs will be
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
8 Pakistan
increased in several steps over the forecast period as the authorities pass on
some of the cost of expanding power infrastructure to consumers. The feed-
through effects of the weakening of the Pakistan rupee against the US dollar
and the pick-up in global oil prices will also add to consumer price pressures.
We expect consumer prices to increase by an annual average of 5.2% in 2019-22.
Our inflation outlook assumes normal monsoon rainfalls over the coming
years, but there is a risk that poor harvests could temporarily push up prices in
any given year.
Exchange rates We expect the exchange rate to weaken to an annual average of PRs111:US$1 in
2018. We maintain our view that the local currency will continue to weaken
against the US dollar in 2019-22. We also believe that the SBP will continue to
operate a managed exchange-rate regime in 2018-22, using foreign-exchange
reserves to prevent sharp movements in the Pakistan rupee's value. Similar to
the action that it took in December 2017, it is likely to make occasional changes
to its target range for the Pakistan rupee:US dollar exchange rate. We expect the
SBP to keep the currency at around PRs110:US$1 in the first half of 2018 in a bid
to smooth excess exchange-rate volatility ahead of the parliamentary election,
but it will depreciate further in the second half of the year.
Over the medium term, several factors will put depreciatory pressure on the
currency. These include a wide merchandise trade deficit, increasing debt
repayments, a large fiscal deficit and rising policy interest rates in the US until
early 2020. Given Pakistan's reliance on imports of consumer goods and a
heavy debt burden denominated in foreign currency, the SBP will be keen to
ensure that this depreciation proceeds in a gradual manner. However, the
central bank's ability to manage this in a sustained fashion will be constrained.
We expect total international reserves (including gold) to provide three months
of import cover in 2022, down from an estimated four months in 2018, making
the exchange rate highly vulnerable to domestic and exogenous shocks.
External sector We forecast that the current-account deficit will average the equivalent of 3.9%
of GDP in 2018-22. The large shortfall will remain a key source of macro-
economic risk over the coming years. We continue to expect the merchandise
trade deficit to remain wide in US dollar terms over the forecast period and
to be a major contributor to the current-account shortfall. Exports will be
supported by gains in global trade growth and stronger demand from the EU.
However, Pakistan's exporters (particularly in the garment sector) will struggle
to take full advantage of these opportunities because of infrastructure
constraints, as well as growing competition from the garment sectors in other
parts of South and South-east Asia.
The primary income deficit, in particular, could come under the scrutiny of the
authorities once Chinese companies begin to repatriate profits from CPEC
energy projects. The subdued economic outlook for Gulf countries—some of the
main destinations for overseas Pakistani workers—will weigh on remittance
inflows in the initial part of the forecast period, but the surplus on the
secondary income account will remain substantial.
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
Pakistan 9
Mounting strains on its external accounts mean that there is a growing risk that
Pakistan may require another IMF bail-out package after the 2018 election.
However, our core forecast remains that the country will instead use other
sources of external finance available to it (such as commercial loans and
government bond issuance). Our forecast is based on the assumption that oil
prices (dated Brent Blend) will average US$60.9/barrel a year over 2018-22.
In the event of a much sharper than anticipated increase in oil prices, balance-
of-payments problems could reach a level that would make another IMF
package necessary.
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
10 Pakistan
Data summary
Global outlook
2013 a 2014 a 2015 a 2016 a 2017 b 2018 c 2019 c 2020 c 2021 c 2022 c
International assumptions (%)
World GDP growth 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.3 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.8 2.8
US GDP growth 1.7 2.6 2.9 1.5 2.2 a 2.3 2.4 0.9 2.1 2.0
EU28 GDP growth 0.3 1.8 2.3 1.9 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.8
Asia & Australasia growth 4.6 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.5 4.3 4.4 4.0 4.2 4.2
World trade growth 3.3 3.1 2.3 2.3 4.6 4.3 4.0 2.8 3.8 3.7
US CPI 1.5 1.6 0.1 1.3 2.1 a 2.2 2.3 1.3 1.8 1.9
EU28 CPI 1.5 0.5 0.0 0.3 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9
Manufactures export price -0.3 -0.1 -4.6 -1.8 3.5 4.2 4.0 3.1 3.8 3.3
Oil price (Brent; US$/b) 108.9 98.9 52.4 44.0 54.4 a 63.0 60.0 57.8 60.6 63.3
US$ 3-month commercial paper rate 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.1 a 1.7 2.5 2.3 1.5 1.8
¥:US$ (av) 97.6 105.9 121.0 108.8 112.1 a 111.3 109.4 104.0 100.0 100.2
¥:€ (av) 129.6 140.7 134.3 120.4 126.6 a 132.5 129.1 125.3 120.5 124.0
a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. c Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
Pakistan 11
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
12 Pakistan
Fiscal indicators
2013 a 2014 a 2015 b 2016 b 2017 b 2018 c 2019 c 2020 c 2021 c 2022 c
Fiscal indicators (% of GDP; fiscal years ending Jun 30th)
Government expenditure 21.5 20.0 19.6 a 19.9 a 21.3 a 21.4 21.2 20.9 20.6 20.6
Interest 5.1 5.8 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.6 4.5
Non-interest 16.4 14.2 14.8 15.1 16.7 16.8 16.6 16.4 16.1 16.1
Government revenue 13.3 14.5 14.3 a 15.3 a 15.5 a 15.9 15.7 15.5 15.7 15.6
Budget balance -8.2 -5.5 -5.3 a -4.6 a -5.8 a -5.6 -5.5 -5.4 -4.9 -4.9
Primary balance -3.1 0.2 -0.5 0.2 -1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.9 -0.4 -0.5
Government debt 55.9 b 56.0 b 57.4 59.5 60.8 60.8 59.7 59.2 58.0 56.7
a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. c Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
Pakistan 13
Monetary indicators
2013 a 2014 a 2015 a 2016 a 2017 b 2018 c 2019 c 2020 c 2021 c 2022 c
Monetary indicators
Exchange rate PRs:US$ (av) 101.63 101.10 102.77 104.77 105.46 a 111.03 115.18 118.15 121.73 123.90
Exchange rate PRs:US$ (year-end) 105.68 100.46 104.87 104.81 110.43 a 114.10 117.56 120.14 122.31 123.99
Exchange rate PRs:¥100 (av) 104.17 95.51 84.92 96.33 94.04 a 99.73 105.25 113.61 121.73 123.65
Exchange rate PRs:¥100 (year-end) 100.41 83.82 87.19 89.75 98.00 103.20 109.88 118.60 122.31 123.62
Real effective exchange rate (av),
CPI-based 91.78 b 98.05 b 106.28 b 107.78 b 109.66 106.53 105.98 105.06 104.21 104.54
Purchasing power parity PRs:US$
(av) 27.99 27.62 29.31 28.83 29.40 a 30.85 32.51 34.02 35.95 37.25
Money supply (M2) growth (%) 14.8 10.5 12.8 15.5 13.4 12.6 13.8 11.5 16.1 16.3
Domestic credit growth (%) 19.6 7.8 12.0 13.8 15.7 13.4 14.8 11.5 16.0 16.3
Lending rate (av; %) 10.3 10.5 8.4 6.9 6.9 7.6 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8
Deposit rate (av; %) 5.1 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.9 3.6 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
Short-term interest rate (av; %) 8.8 9.2 7.0 5.8 5.8 6.3 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. c Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
14 Pakistan
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018
Pakistan 15
External debt
2013 a 2014 a 2015 a 2016 b 2017 b 2018 c 2019 c 2020 c 2021 c 2022 c
External debt
Total external debt (US$ bn) 57.9 61.1 65.8 72.7 82.6 95.1 98.0 105.7 112.7 120.6
Total external debt (% of GDP) 25.0 25.0 24.3 26.1 27.2 29.1 27.7 27.8 27.0 26.4
Debt/exports ratio (%) 128 126 135 154 170 189 187 189 191 188
Debt-service ratio, paid (%) 15.3 9.8 7.7 8.9 13.4 12.1 21.2 16.2 16.0 15.5
a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. c Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.
Global data
US and OECD GDP growth: OECD
World trade growth: Economist Intelligence Unit aggregates
OECD and US consumer price inflation: OECD
Oil prices: dated Brent Blend
US$ 3-month commercial paper rate: IMF, IFS
Domestic data
GDP: expenditure on GDP at constant market prices on a fiscal-year basis (ending
on June 30th of year indicated)
GDP growth: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey
US$ GDP: IMF, IFS
Population: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan Statistical Yearbook; Ministry of
Finance, Economic Survey; UN, World Development Report
GDP per head: growth in real GDP deflated by population growth
Inflation: based on a combined cost-of-living index for industrial, commercial and
government employees; Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey; Prime Minister’s
Secretariat, Consumer Price Index Data
Exchange rate: IMF, IFS; Financial Times
Balance of payments: IMF, IFS
Foreign debt: World Bank, International Debt Statistics
Foreign direct investment: UNCTAD, World Investment Report
Abbreviations
IFS: International Financial Statistics
UNCTAD: UN Conference on Trade and Development
Country Forecast February 2018 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2018