ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Chapter I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Q- What is administrative law?

ANS: Administrative law is that part of public law which fixes the
organization and determines the competence of the administrative
authorities and indicates to the individual, remedies for the violation
of his rights.

Q - What is the subject matter of administrative law?

ANS: Basically, the subject matter of administrative law is the nature
and mode of exercise of administrative power and the system of
relief against administrative action.

Q - What is the basic purpose of administrative law?

ANS: The basic purpose of administrative law is the protection of
private rights.

Q- What is administration?

ANS: As a function: the execution, in non-judicial matters, of the law

or will of the State as expressed by competent authority.

As an organization: that group or aggregate of persons in whose

hands the reign of government are for the time being.

Q- What are the kinds of administration?

ANS Internal: legal side of public administration, e.g., matters

concerning personnel,
fiscal and planning activities.
 External: deals with problems of government regulations, e.g.,
regulation of lawful calling or profession, industries or businesses.

Q- What is an administrative agency or body?

ANS: It’s an organ of the government, other than a court and other
than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties either
through adjudication or rule-making.

A body, other than the courts and legislature, endowed with quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial powers for the purpose of enabling it
to carry out laws entrusted to it for enforcement or execution

Q- What is the criterion of an administrative agency or body?

ANS: A body or agency is administrative where its function is

primarily regulatory even if it conducts hearings and determines
controversies to carry out its regulatory duty. On its rule-making
authority, it is administrative when it does not have discretion to
determine what the law shall be but merely prescribes details for the
enforcement of the law.

Q- What are the types of administrative body or agency?

ANS: a) Bodies set up to function in situations where the government

is offering some gratuity, grant or special privilege, e.g., Bureau of
Lands.

b) Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is

seeking to carry on certain business of government, e.g., BIR.

c) Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is

performing some business service for the public, e.g., MWSS.

d) Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is

 seeking to regulate business affected with public interest, e.g.,
LTFRB.

e) Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is

seeking under the police power to regulate private business and
individuals, e.g., SEC.

f) Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is

seeking to adjust individual controversies because of a strong social
policy involved, e.g., ECC.

g) Bodies set up to make the government a private party, e.g., GSIS.

Q - How are administrative agencies created?

ANS: They are created by the Constitution, law, and by authority of
law.

Q - What are the purposes for which administrative agencies are

created?

ANS: The purposes for the creation of administrative agencies are:

(1) To dispense with certain privileges accorded by the gov-
ernment;
(2) To carry on government business or functions;
(3) To undertake some business service for the public;
(4) To regulate certain public callings or business affected with
public interest;
(5) To promote rights of individuals through public regulation;
and
(6) To determine the rights of individuals in certain cases where a
strong social policy is involved.

Q - How may administrative agencies be abolished?

ANS: It depends. If they are created by the Constitution, they can be
 abolished only by amending the Constitution, not by
law. If they are created by law, they can be abolished by law. In
short, they can be abolished only by the same mode they were
created.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CHAPTER II
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Q - What are the powers of administrative agencies?

ANS: The powers of administrative agencies are:

(1) Rule-making.
(2) Adjudication; and
(3)Determinative or incidental powers.

Q - What is the concept of the rule-making power of administrative

agencies?

ANS: It is the power to promulgate rules and regulations to imple-

ment a particular law. It is an auxiliary or subordinate legislative
power or it can be considered as legislation in the administrative
level where Congress delegated such power subject to certain
restrictions.

Q- What is quasi-legislative power of an administrative agency or

body?

ANS: This is the exercise of delegated legislative power, involving

no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to
fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in
 the law itself.

a) Rules and regulations issued by administrative authorities

pursuant to the powers delegated to them have the force and effect
of law; they are binding on all persons subject to them, and the
courts will take judicial notice of them.

b) Both Letters of Instruction and Executive Orders are presidential

issuances; one may repeal or otherwise alter, modify or amend the
other, depending on which comes later [Philippine Association of
Service Exporters v. Torres, 225 SCRA 417].

c) It may be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and

regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of the law into effect. Thus,
administrative regulations cannot extend the law or amend a
legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law [Land
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 149]. Indeed, administrative
issuances must not override, but must remain consistent with the law
they seek to apply and implement. They are intended to carry out,
not to supplant nor to modify, the law [Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Cou.rt of Appeals, 240 SCRA 368].

Q- What are the kinds of administrative rules or regulations?

ANS: a) Supplementary or detailed legislation. They are rules and

regulations "to fix the details" in the execution and enforcement of
a policy set out in the law, e.g., Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code.

b) Interpretative legislation. They are rules and regulations

construing or interpreting the provisions of a statute to be enforced
and they are binding on all concerned until they are changed, e.g.,
BIR Circulars, CB circulars, etc.. They have the effect of law and
 are entitled to great respect; they have in their favor the presumption
of legality [Gonzalez v. Land Bank, 183 SCRA 520]. The erroneous
application of the law by public officers does not bar a subsequent
correct application of the law [Manila Jockey Club v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 103533, December 15, 1998].

c) Contingent legislation. They are rules and regulations made by an

administrative authority on the existence of certain facts or things
upon which the enforcement of the law depends. See: Cruz v.
Youngberg, 56 Phil 234.

Q - What are the requisites for the validity of rules and regulations
promulgated by administrative agencies?

ANS: They are the following:

(1) The rules must be issued by authority of law.
(2) The rules must be within the scope and purview of the law.
In Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 149, the Court
nullified DAR Adm. Circular No.9, which allowed the opening of a
trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for the
property taken, because Sec. 16(e), R.A. 6657, is specific that the
deposit must be made in "cash" or in "Land Bank bonds". The
implementing regulation cannot outweigh the clear provision of the
law. See also Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. Drilon, 176 SCRA
24.

In Romulo, Mabanta v. Home Development Mutual Fund,

G.R. No. 131082, June 19, 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that the
HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a
regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to enforce and
administer. Administrative issuances must not override, supplant or
modify the law.

Where the regulatory system has been set up by law, it is

beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. Any
change in policy must be made by the legislative department
[Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccatars v. Philippine
Coconut Authority, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998].

R.A. 8171 empowers the Secretary of Justice, in

conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, to issue the necessary implementing rules
and. regulations. The rules! however, authorized the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections to prepare a manual setting forth the details
of the proceedings prior to, during and after the administration of
the lethal injection on the convict. Because the rule did not provide
for the approval of the said manual by the Secretary of Justice,
considering that the Bureau of Corrections is merely a constituent
unit of the Department of Justice and it is the Secretary of Justice
who is granted rule-making authority under the law, the rule
authorizing the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to promulgate
said manual is invalid being an abdication of responsibility by the
Secretary of Justice [Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
132601, October 12, 1998].

In the same case, Sec. 17 of the rules and regulations

implementing R.A. 8171 which provided that the death penalty shall
not be conflicted upon a woman within three years next following
the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant was declared
invalid, the same being an impermissible contravention of Sec. 83
of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the death penalty
shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within
one year after delivery.

(3) The rules must be reasonable.

(4)The rules must be published. except in cases of interpretative
rules and regulations, or those merely internal in nature, or the so-
called letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. Publication must be
in full, or it is no publication at all [Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA
446]. See also Executive Order No. 200.

i) Thus, in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.

109023, August 12, 1998, it was held that administrative rules and
regulations the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an
existing law pursuant to .a valid delegation, must be published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, except
interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, Le.,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency, not the
general public. The same rule was upheld in Caltex (Philippines)
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 273. Likewise, in Philippine
International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit. G.R.
No. 132593, June 25, 1999, it was held that the DBM Corporate
Compensation Circular (DBM-CCC) No.10, which completely
disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation
to government officials and employees starting November 1, 1989,
is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation, and must go
through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The reissuance of the CCC and its
submission for publication per letter to the National Printing Office
on March 9, 1999, will not cure the defect precisely because
publication is a condition precedent to its effectivity.

ii) In Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Torres,

212 SCRA 298, DOLE Department Order No. 16-91 and POEA
Memorandum Circulars Nos.30 and 37, while recognized as valid
exercise of police power as delegated to the executive department,
were declared legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack
of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Register (as required by Art. 5, Labor Code of the
Philippines). This ruling was reiterated in Philsa International
Placement and Services Corporation v. Secretary of Labor and
 Employment, G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001, where" POEA
Memorandum Circular No.2, Series of 1983, which provided the
schedule of placement and documentation fees for private
employment agencies, was declared ineffective because it was not
published and filed with the National Administrative Register. In
Transaction Overseas Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No.
109583, September 5, 1997, on the question of the validity of the
cancellation of the petitioner's license to recruit workers for
overseas, work because the Revised Rules of Penalties had not been
filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center as required
by the Administrative Code of 1987, the Supreme Court said that
the Revised Rules of Penalties did not prescribe additional rules
governing overseas employment but merely detailed the
administrative sanctions. for prohibited acts. Besides, the
cancellation of the license was made under authority of Art. 35 of
the Labor Code, not pursuant to the Revised Rules of Penalties.

Q - What is the reason behind the validity of granting ad-

ministrative agencies the power to issue rules and regulations
to implement a law?
ANS: Due to the growing complexity of the modern society, it has
become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to
help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the
particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from
the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the
increasing vesture of quasilegislative and quasi-judicial powers in
what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the
government. (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72).
Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned
must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the
rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the
multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of
 contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no
longer uniquely a judicial function, exercisable only by our regular
courts. (Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing
Authority, G.R. No. L-50444, August 31,1987,153 SCRA 399).
With global trade and business becoming more intricate, nay,
even with new discoveries in technology and electronics not-
withstanding, the time has come to grapple with legislations and
even judicial decisions aimed at resolving issues affecting not
only individual rights but also activities of which foreign
governments or entities may have interests. Thus, administrative
policies and regulations must be devised to suit these changing
business needs in a faster rate than to resort to traditional acts of
the Legislature.

This tendency finds support in a well-stated work on the subject,

viz.:

"Since Legislature had neither the time nor the knowledge to create
detailed rules, however, it was soon clear that new governmental
arrangements would be needed to handle the job of rule-making.
The courts, moreover, many of them already congested, would have
been swamped if they had to adjudicate all the controversies that the
new legislation was bound to create, and judges, already obliged to
handle a great diversity of cases, would have been hard pressed to
acquire the knowledge they needed to deal intelligently with all the
new types of controversy."
So the need to "create a large number of specialized administrative
agencies and to give them broader powers than administrators had
traditionally been exercised." This include the power to issue
regulations having the force of law, and the power to hear and decide
cases - powers that had previously been reserved to the Legislature
and the courts. (Houghteling/Pierce, Lawmaking by Administrative
Agencies, p. 166; Philippine International Trading Corporation vs.
Angeles, ., 75 SCAD 464, G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996).
Q - The rules and regulations implementing the Labor Code
provide that the aggrieved party may appeal the decision under
the Labor Code within ten (10) working days. The Code
provides for ten (10) days to appeal. Is the rule promulgated
valid? Why?

ANS: No, because the interpretation of the 10-day period as 10

working days is not within the purview of the law as it merely
intends 10 calendar days. When the law does not distinguish, the
administrative agency cannot distinguish. The rule may just be an
implementation of the law, it must not conflict with the law. (Vir-
Jen Shipping vs. NLRC, 115 SCRA 347; Narag vs. NLRC,
October 28, 1987).

Q - R.A. No. 6640 allows the crediting of CBA anniversary wage

increases for purposes of compliance with the law. The rules
implementing it prohibit the same. Are the rules valid? Why?
ANS: No, because they are not in harmony with the law. Imple-
menting rules cannot add or detract from the law. They must be
promulgated for the sole purpose of carrying the law into effect.
They cannot be expanded. An administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress. (Cebu Oxygen Acetylene Co. vs.
Drilon, G.R. No. 82849; August 2, 1989). In Vda. de Pineda vs.
Pena, 186 SCRA 22 (1990), it was said that in order to be valid,
the administrative regulation must be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law, conform to the standards that the law
prescribes, and must relate solely to carrying into effect the
general provisions of the law.

Q - The Fisheries Law prohibits the use of obnoxious and poisonous

substances in catching fish. The implementing rules prohibit
electro-fishing as additional prohibition. Is the rule valid? Why?
ANS: No, because an administrative agency promulgating rules to
implement a law cannot expand the law. The rules must be in
harmony with the law. (People vs. Mauren, 79 SCRA450)
Q - The SSS passed Resolution No. 56 providing for ''financial
assistance" for retiring employees. It was not passed in audit
by the COA, hence, this petition. Is the COA correct? Why?
ANS: Sec. 28(b) of CA 186 as amended by R.A. No. 4968 bars in no
uncertain terms the creation of any insurance or retirement plan,
other than the GSIS for government employees, thus, Res. No. 56
contravened the law, hence, void.
In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the
former must prevail. (KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 57 SCAD
660, G.R. No. 115381, December 23, 1994). A rule or regulation
must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the
enabling statute inorder for such rule or regulation to be valid. (Lina
vs. Carin, 221 SCRA 515). The rule-making power of a public
administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may
not use either to abridge the authority given by the Congress or the
Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what
rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well
as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may
not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution or a statute it is administering or
which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose
of a statute. Though well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are
liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree (Tantuico vs. Domingo,
48 SCAD 577, G.R. No. 96422, February 28,1994), nevertheless,
there is nothing to interpret in either R.A. No. 4968 or Res. 56, and
correspondingly, in the absence of any doubts as to the ultra vires
nature and illegality of the disputed resolution. Res. No. 56 is void.
(Conte, et al. vs. COA, 76 SCAD 16, G.R. No. 116422, November
4, 1996).
Q - R.A. No. 6125 imposed stabilization tax on proceeds of
exportation of bananas. The law states that the tax shall be
collectible the following fiscal year if it exceeds
P5,OOO,OOO.OO. Central Bank circular states that it
should be collectible on January 1, 1972 or immediately
within the year the bananas were exported where the
exportation exceeded P5,OOO,OOO.OO. Is the circular
valid? Why?
ANS: No, it is void because it is in contravention of the law.
Administrative regulations must be in harmony with law. The law
cannot be modified. (Shell Phils., Inc. vs. CB, 162 SCRA 628;
Vassar Industries, Inc. vs. Vassar Industries Employees Union,
177 SCRA 323).

Q - Memo. Circular No.2 of the POEA provides for burial and death
benefits of seamen employed overseas. It was questioned as
unconstitutional contending that there is undue delegation of
legislative power. Is the contention correct? Why?
ANS: No, because the POEA can issue rules and regulations. The
circular is valid because there are sufficient standards provided for,
as the protection of equitable and fair employment practices.
(Eastern Shipp~g Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, 166 SCRA 533).

Q - Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the ''Probation Law," was

questioned as violative of the equal protection clause for the
reason that its application is not uniform and because Sec. 11 of
the same endowed the provincial boards with the power to make
said law effective or otherwise in their respective provinces. It
was also claimed that there was undue delegation of legislative
power. Decide.
ANS: The law is unconstitutional. The power to make laws is vested
in the Congress. Any attempt to delegate this power is
unconstitutional on the basis of the principle of potestas delegata
non potest delegare. One exception is the power to delegate to local
 governments. The Probation Law, however, does not fix and impose
upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
their discretionary power. What is granted is a "roving commission"
which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion.
Section 11 of the law, seemingly on its own authority, extends the
benefits of the Probation Act to provinces but in reality leaves the
entire matter for the provincial boards to determine. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied to its province, all that
it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the
salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative
power to the provincial boards. The Legislature has not made the
operation of the law contingent upon specified facts or conditions to
be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the operation or
non-operation of the law upon the provincial boards. (People vs.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56).

Q- Is notice and hearing necessary in the promulgation of a general

regulation by an administrative agency?

ANS: There is no constitutional requirement for a hearing in the

promulgation of a general regulation by an administrative body.
Where the rule is procedural, or where the rules are, in effect, merely
legal opinions, there is no notice required. Neither is notice required
in the preparation of substantive rules where the class to be affected
is large and the questions to be resolved involve the use of discretion
committed to the rule-making body. In Corona v. United Harbor
Pilots Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 111953, December
12, 1997, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that a prior hearing
is not necessary for the issuance of an administrative rule or
regulation.

a) However, see Commissioner of Internal Revenue II. Court of

Appeals, 261 SCRA 236, where the Supreme Court distinguished
between administrative rules in the nature of subordinate legislation
and those which are merely interpretative rules. An administrative
rule in the nature of subordinate legislation is designed to implement
a law by providing its details, and before it is adopted there must be
a hearing under the Administrative Code of 1987. When an
administrative rule substantially adds to or increases the burden of
those concerned, an administrative agency must accord those
directly affected a chance to be heard before its issuance, In this
case, prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
37-93, the cigarettes manufactured by the respondent were in the
category of locally-manufactured cigarettes not bearing a foreign
brand, Had it not been for Revenue Memo Circular No. 37-93, the
enactment of R.A 7654 would not have resulted in a new tax rate
upon the cigarettes manufactured by the respondent. The BIR did
not simply interpret the law; it exercised quasi. legislative authority,
and the requirements of notice, hearing and publication should not
have been ignored.

b) In Philippine Consumers Foundation II. Secretary, DECS, 153

SCRA 622, it was held that the function of prescribing rates by an
administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative
function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice
and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due
process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing
are essential to the validity of such rates. Where the rules and the
rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout
the country, they may partake of a legislative character. But if they
apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact,
then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

c) In Lina v. Carino, 221 SCRA 515, the Supreme Court upheld the
authority of the Secretary of Education to issue DECS Order No. 30,
prescribing guidelines concerning increases in tuition and other
school fees.

d) In Maceda vI. Energy Regulatory Board; 192 SCRA 363, the

 Supreme Court declared that while under Executive Order No. 172,
a hearing is indispensable, it does not, preclude the Board from
ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase subject to its final
disposition of whether or not to make it permanent, to reduce or
increase it further, or to deny the application. Sec. 3 (e) is akin to a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary attachment
issued by the court, which are given ex parte, and which are subject
to the resolution of the main case.

Q- What is the doctrine of subordinate legislation?

ANS: Doctrine of subordinate legislation – power of administrative

agency to promulgate rules and regulations on matters of their own
specialization.

Q- What is the doctrine of legislative approval by re-enactment?

ANS: Doctrine of legislative approval by reenactment – the rules and

regulations promulgated by the proper administrative agency
implementing the law are deemed confirmed and approved by the
legislature when said law was reenacted by later legislation or
through codification. The legislature is presumed to have knowledge
of the contents of the regulations then at the time of re-enactment.

Q - May an administrative agency promulgate rules providing for

penal sanctions?

ANS: Yes, provided that the following requisites are complied with:
(1) The law must declare the act punishable;
(2) The law must define the penalty; and
(3) The rules must be published in the Official Gazette.

Q - A law allows the court to determine the maximum penalty that

it may impose in convicting an accused. Is the law valid? Why?
ANS: No, there is undue delegation of legislative power. When Con-
gress enacted the law, it should have defined the penalty for
violation of the same. To allow the courts determine the maximum
penalty would be allowing the court to determine what the law is.
(People vs. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90).

Q - Are administrative officers tasked to implement a law also

authorized to interpret the law? Why?

ANS: Yes, because they have the expertise to do so. In a long line of
cases, the SC reasoned out by saying that to deprive administrative
bodies of that power to interpret would be to defeat the law. The law
will practically be nullified and will remain unenforced because of
inaction. (PLDT vs. NTC, 190 SCRA 717 [1990]; Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Dev't. Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166
[1990]).

Q – If the administrative offices can interpret the law, are they

binding?

ANS: Yes, such interpretations by officers given the task to imple-

ment the law are given great weight. (Atlas Consolidated Case;
Gonzales vs. Land Bank, 183 SCRA 520).

Q- What are the determinative or incidental powers of

administrative agencies?

ANS: 1. Enabling: to permit or allow something which the law

undertakes to regulate, e.g:, grant or denial of licenses to engage in
a particular business.

2. Directing: illustrated by the power of assessment of the BIR or

the Bureau of Customs.

3. Dispensing: to exempt from a general prohibition, or relieve an

 individual or corporation from an affirmative duty, e.g., authority of
zoning boards to vary provisions of zoning ordinances, or the
authority of the Acceptance Board of the Philippine Army to relieve
certain persons from military training.

4. Examining: also called the investigatory power; consists in

requiring production of books, papers, etc., the attendance of
witnesses and compelling their testimony. I

a) Power to compel attendance of witnesses not inherent in

administrative body; but an administrative officer authorized to
take testimony or evidence is deemed authorized to administer
oath, summon witnesses, require production of documents, etc..

b) Power to punish contempt must be expressly granted to the

administrative body; and when so granted, may be exercised only
when administrative body is actually performing quasi-judicial
functions. See Guevara v. Commission on Elections, 104 Phil 268;
Masangcay v. Commission on Elections ) SCRA 27; Carino v.
Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483.

5. Summary: power to apply compulsion or force against persons or

property 0 effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to
authorize such action, e.g., in the fields of health inspections,
abatement of nuisances, etc. .

Q - What is the concept of administrative adjudication or quasi-

judicial power?

ANS: It is the power to hear and determine or ascertain facts and

decide by the application of rules of law to the facts and the
enforcement and administration of law.
Q - What are the requisites of administrative adjudication?

ANS: They are:

(1) Jurisdiction;
(2) Notice; and
(3) Hearing.

Q - What are the requirements of administrative due process?

ANS: The requirements of administrative due process are:

(1) Impartial tribunal;
(2) Due notice and hearing or
opportunity to be heard (Esber, e al.
vs. Sto. Tomas, et al., 44 SCAD
283, G.R. No. 107324, August 26,
1993);
(3) Procedure consistent with the
essentials of a fair trial; and
(4) Proceedings should be conducted to give
opportunity for a court to determine whether the
applicable rules of law and procedure were
observed.

Q - State the cardinal rights of a person in administrative

investigation.

ANS: The following are the cardinal rights of a person in an ad-

ministrative investigation:
(1) The right to hearing;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented;
(6) The board or its judges must act on their own individual
consideration of the law and the facts in the controversy or
 they must be impartial; and
(7) The decision must be rendered in a manner that the parties
may know the various issues involved. (Ang Tibay vs. CIR,
69 Phil. 635).

Q - What is substantial evidence?

ANS: It is more than mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 6357; Police Commission
vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 757 [1984]).

Q- What is administrative due process?

ANS: In administrative proceedings, due process simply means the

opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of; a formal or
trial-type hearing is not, at all times, necessary (Padilla v. Sto.
Tomas, 243 SCRA 155) However, administrative due process cannot
be fully equated to due process in the strict judicial sense [Ocampo
v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 114683, January 18,2000].
The standard of due process that must be met in administrative
tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness
is not ignored; even in the absence of previous notice, there is no
denial of due process as long as the parties are given the opportunity
to be heard [Adamson v. Amores, 152 SCRA 237].

Q - What is the essence of due process in administrative

proceedings? Explain.

ANS: In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due

process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side.
(Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125). Such process requires
notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is
 rendered. (Calma vs. CA, 302 SCRA 682). One may be heard,
not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also -
and perhaps even many times more creditably and practically
through pleadings. (Ocampo vs. The Office of the Ombudsman,
322 SCRA 17). So long as the parties are given the opportunity
to explain their side, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this constitutional
mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling.
(Lumiqued vs. Exevea, supra.; Gracia vs. Pajaro, et al., G. R.
No. 141149, July 5, 2002).

Q- What are the instances wherein notice and hearing may be

dispensed?

ANS: a) Grant of provisional authority for increased rates, or to

engage in a particular line of business [RCPI v. National
Telecommunications Commission, 184 SCRA 517; PLOT v.
National Telecommunications Commission, 190 SCRA 717].

b) Summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon the property of

a delinquent taxpayer.

c) Cancellation of a passport where no abuse of discretion is

committed by Secretary of Foreign Affairs [Suntay v. People, 101
Phil 770].

d) Summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects the

immediate safety of persons or property [Art: 704, Civil Code of the
Philippines].

e} Cancellation of passport where no abuse of direction is

committed.
 f} preventive suspension of officer or employee pending
investigation.

g}Grant or revocation of licenses for permit to operate certain

businesses affecting public orders or morals.

Q- Is the right against self incrimination available in administrative

proceedings?

ANS: In Cabal v. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1064, it was held that since the
administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent
therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under R.A. 3019,
the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand
without encroaching on his right against self-incrimination. In
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 345, the same
rule was followed in administrative proceedings against a medical
practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to
practice medicine.

This right may be invoked by the respondent at the time he is called

by the complainant as a witness; however, if he voluntarily takes the
witness stand, he can be cross-examined; but he may still invoke the
right at the time the question which calls for an answer which
incriminates him of an offense other than that which is charged is
asked. See People v. Judge Ayson, supra

Q - Air Manila, Inc. filed a petition seeking to nullify Res. No.

139(68) ofthe Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), Case No. 1414,
approving the Domestic Flight Schedule of PAL, contending
that the same was granted without receiving evidence of the
parties, hence, violative of the right to be heard. The case was
heard by a hearing officer who made a report. The Board passed
upon it on the basis of the report. No proof was shown that it
 was not notified of the hearings. Decide.
ANS: The case should be dismissed. Administrative proceedings are
not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in
investigation and trials. Administrative due process includes the
right to notice; reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his
rights; a tribunal which is impartial; and finding or the decision by
the tribunal supported by substantial evidence. Air Manila was not
denied its rights to due process as it was duly notified, there were
hearings actually conducted. (Air Manila vs. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489
[1971]).

Q - X and Y are holders of a certificate of public convenience for

an ice plant in Orion, Bataan. For abandonment or non-
operation, it was revoked on February 20,1960 after a report
was made by the engineer of the Commission after an
inspection. Was there due process? Why?
ANS: None. The ex-parte revocation of certificates without giving
the operators previous notice and opportunity to explain their side
is violative of the due process clause. (Danan vs. Aspillera, 6
SCRA 609 (1992); Bohol Land Trans. vs. Jureidini, 53 Phil. 560;
Pantranco vs. Halili, L-6075, August 31, 1954; Collector vs.
Buan, July 31, 1958).

Q - Lolita Dadubo and Rosario Cidro, both employees of the DBP

were administratively charged with conduct unbecoming or
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The charges
were based on reports on the unposted withdrawals in the
bank. They were guilty. The Civil Service Commission later
upheld the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board
finding them guilty, but they appealed, claiming lack of due
process that they were not sufficiently informed of the
charges. Decide.
ANS: The contention is without merit. While the rules governing
judicial trials should be observed as much as possible, their strict
observance is not indispensable in administrative cases. (Citing
Bautista vs. Sec. Of Labor and Employment, 196 SCRA 470). The
standard of due process that must be met in administrative
tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of
fairness is not ignored. (citing Adamson and Adamson, Inc. vs.
Amores, 152 SCRA 237; Gas Corp. of the Phils. vs. Inciong, 93
SCRA 653).
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of
Themistocles to Eurybiades: "Strike, but hear me first." Less
dramatically, it simply connotes an opportunity to be heard.
Petitioners had several opportunities to be heard and present
evidence. She testified; she filed a motion for reconsideration;
appealed to the MSPB, then to the CSC. She cannot complain of
denial of due process.

The charge against the respondents need not be drafted with the
precision of an information in criminal prosecution. It is sufficient
that they are apprised of the substance of the charge against them,
what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not
the designation of the offense. (Dadubo vs. CSC, et ai., 42 SCAD
751, G.R. No. 106498, June 28, 1993, citing Heirs of Celso Amante
vs. CA, 185 SCRA 585; Eugenio, Sr. vs. Velez, 185 SCRA 425).

Q - What body has jurisdiction over a complaint for illegal

collection of power bills. Is it the National Electrification
Administration or the ERB? Explain.
ANS: It is the NEA that has the power to conduct hearings and issue
orders on the rates that may be changed. (P.D. No. 269 Sec. 47). The
aggrieved party may file a petition for review before the CA from
the NEA. (Rule 43, Rules of Court). A premature invocation of the
jurisdiction of the trial court warrants dismissal of the case, hence,
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable.
Q- What is the distinction between quasi-legislative functions and
quasi-judicial functions of administrative bodies?

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE QUASI-JUDICIAL
FUNCTION FUNCTION
1. Consist of issuance of rules 1. Refers to its end product
and regulations called order, reward or
decision
2. General applicability 2. Applies to a specific
situation
3. Prospective; it envisages the 3. Present determination of
promulgation of the rule or rights, privileges and duties as
regulation generally applicable of previous or presents time or
in the future occurrence

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CHAPTER III
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

Q - What are the bases for the exercise of the power of judicial
review of administrative actions?

ANS: The power may be based on the Constitution, the law or gen-
eral principles of public law.
If no law authorizes the review of an administrative action by the
Supreme Court, it is reviewable by certiorari based on grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Q - What are the requisites of judicial review of administrative

action?
ANS: The requisites are:
(1) Administrative action must have been completed known as
"the principle of the finality of administrative action"; and
(2) Administrative remedies must have been exhausted known as
"the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies."

Q - What is the doctrine of finality of judgment or action?

ANS: It is a rule which proscribes the re-opening of a matter once an
administrative office invested with quasi-judicial power to decide
becomes final at some definite date fixed by law. (Carreon vs. WCC,
77 SCRA 297; Dollor Co. vs. Tuvera, 123 SCRA 354). No resort to
courts will be allowed unless administrative action has been
completed and there is nothing left to be done in administrative
structure.

Q - What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?

ANS: This means that where there is competence or jurisdiction vested
upon
administrative body to act upon a matter, no resort to courts may
be made before
such administrative body shall have acted upon the matter.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction simply means that the courts
will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training
of such agencies. (Y smael, Jr. and Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary, 190 SCRA 673 [1990]). In Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Morato,
203 SCRA 515 (1991), it was said that were the law provides an
administrative forum within which to ventilate a given case before
resort to judicial action, that remedy must first be availed of,
otherwise, there is a violation of the rule of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. (Septimo vs. Villarama, G.R. No. 101943,
February 18, 1992; Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs. Abad,
 February 24, 1991)
.
Q - How does the doctrine of primary jurisdiction operate?

ANS: The doctrine operates or applies where a claim is originally

cognizable in courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of
the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body, in such a case, the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to an administrative body for its
view. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, April 18, 1990).
The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the
case below. It needs only to be suspended until after the matters
within the competence of the Board are threshed out and
determined.
Q- What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?
ANS; Whenever there is an available administrative remedy
provided by law, no judicial recourse can be made until all such
remedies have been availed of and exhausted

Q - What are the reasons for the requirement that before resorting
to court action, there must be exhaustion of administrative
remedies?
ANS: The reasons are the following:
(1) There would be delay and expenses. The requirement would
prevent the courts from being revamped by resort to courts at the
first instance;
(2) The agency concerned would be given a chance to correct itself;
(3) The principle of comity and convenience CValmonte vs.
Belmonte, February 13, 1989);
(4) Since review is resorted to through special civil action, the same
cannot be resorted to, if there is appeal or any plain speedy or
adequate remedy (Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs. Abad, G.R.
 No. 85502, February 24, 1991);
(5) The principle of separation of powers which enjoins upon the
judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters
coming primarily within the competence of the other
departments. (Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs. Abad, G.R. No.
85502, February 24, 1992).

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without

its practical and legal reasons. Indeed, resort to administrative
remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for speedier
disposition of controversies. Our courts of justice for reason of
comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied
with so as to give the administrative agency every opportunity to
correct its error and to dispose of the case. (Seagull Shipment
Management and Transport, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123619, June
8, 2000)

Q- Are all decisions of administrative agencies subject to the rule

on exhaustion of administrative remedies?

ANS: NO. Only those decisions of administrative agencies made in

the exercise of quasi-judicial powers are subject to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies [Association of Philippine
Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, G.R. No..
110526, February 10, 1998J. In like manner, the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction applies only where the administrative
agency exercises its quasi-judicial judicial or adjudicatory powers.
Thus, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a
rule or regulations issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same [Smart Communications v.
National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908,
August 12, 2003].
ANS: No, it would be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. (Gonzales vs. Auditor General, December 28, 1964).
Q- What is the effect for the failure the exhaust administrative
remedies?

ANS: The jurisdiction of the court is not affected; but the

complainant is deprived of a cause of action which is ground for a
motion to dismiss. However, if no motion to dismiss is filed on this
ground, there is deemed to be a waiver. See Soto v. Jareno, 144
SCRA 116; tern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533.

Q - X applied for a permit to build a house. It was denied, hence, he

went to court on mandamus. Will the action prosper? Why?

ANS: No, because X failed to exhaust all administrative remedies

before going to court. He should have gone to the Director of Public
Works when the application was denied. The last recourse in the
administrative level is the Secretary of Public Works. (Delos Santos
vs. Limbaga, January 31, 1962).

Q - X has a monetary claim against the State. Suppose the COA

denies it and he fails to appeal to the President, will recourse to
court prosper? Why?

Q - X claimed that his son is the valedictorian. He went to the

Bureau of Private Schools which decided for the school. He
appealed to the Secretary of Education but during the pendency
of the case, he went to the Supreme Court. Was judicial recourse
proper? Why?
ANS: No, because it was premature, for failure of X to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies. (Rosales vs. CA, September 15, 1988).

Q - Governor Espiritu placed Mayor Melgar under preventive

 suspension on May 28, 1991. Upon receipt of the order, Mayor
Melgar filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
with prayer for a restraining order in the RTC. The judge issued
the writ of preliminary injunction to stop the Governor from
placing the Mayor under preventive suspension pending investi-
gation of the administrative case against him. Is the action valid?
Why?

ANS: No. Since the Mayor believed that his preventive suspension
was unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought
relief first from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, not
from the courts. In refusing to dismiss the action, the court gravely
abused its discretion.
There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the
charges against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity
to prove his innocence. Preventive suspension is allowed so that the
respondent may not hinder the normal course of the investigation
through the use of his influence and authority over possible
witnesses. (Espiritu vs. Melgar, G.R. No. 100874, February 11,
1992).

Q - The LTC granted Royal Class the authority to operate tourist

car services at the MIA (NAIA) from said place to any point in
the Island of Luzon. Qualitrans moved for reconsideration to
correct the route specified in the order. During the pendency of
the case, Qualitrans filed a civil case before the RTC for
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction against Royal Class. In the meantime, Royal Class
filed a petition for declaratory relief requesting the latter to
declare the extent of its rights under its provisional authority. Is
the action proper? Why?
ANS: Yes. The LTC under E.O. No. 101 is vested with ample powers
 to modify CPC's including the grant of latitudinarian franchise in
favor of public utilities. Royal Class' application for an expanded
route is one over which the Commission exercises jurisdiction under
its charter. Whether the petition is for declaratory relief, or for
revision of grant, or cance11ation of an existing certificate of public
convenience, the authority of the Commission is justified, so long as
it is properly invoked.
The fact that Qualitrans had filed a suit before the RTC for damages
does not oust the Commission of its primary jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Royal Class' inquiry. (Qualitrans Limousine Services,
Inc. vs. Royal Class Limousine Services, Inc., G.R. Nos. 79886-
79889, November 22,1989).

Q - The National Telecommunications Commission issued

petitioner a renewable temporary permit to operate its radio
and television broadcasting system. Later on, the National
Telecommunications Commission ordered petitioner to show
cause why its temporary permit should not be recalled for its
failure to obtain a legislative franchise. It also directed
petitioner to stop operating its television station. Petitioner filed
its answer explaining that a legislative franchise was not
necessary. While the case was pending, it filed in the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, which
reiterated the same grounds stated in its answer. Is the petition
proper? Why?
ANS: No, because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first
avail himself of a11 the means afforded him by administrave
processes. The Aadministrative case was the proper forum for
petitioner to ventilate its side. (Associated Communications and
Wireless Services, Ltd. vs. Dumlao, G. R. No. 136762, November
21, 2002).
Q- Is non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies jurisdictional? Why?
ANS: No, because it merely results in lack of cause of action, which
is a ground for a motion to dismiss. Failure to invoke it operates as
a waiver of the objection as a ground for motion todismiss and the
court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been
observed. (Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs. Abad, G.R. No.
85502, February 24, 1992).

Q - Ferdinand Pontejos, a permanent civil service employee of the

NLRC was detailed at the Fourth Division of the NLRC. He
questioned his detail in court without raising it first before the
Merit Systems and Protection Board whose functions have been
transferred to the Civil Service Commission. A motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed
contending that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies
is jurisdictional. Rule on the contention.
ANS: The contention is not correct. Non-exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders the action
premature or that the claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial
determination and for that reason a party has no cause of action to
ventilate it in court. (Carale, et al. vs. Ron. Abarintos, et al., 80
SCAD 116, G.R. No. 120704, March 3, 1997).

Q - State the basic reasons/purposes for the observance of the

principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

ANS: Observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of admin-

istrative remedies is a sound practice and policy. It ensure an orderly
procedure which favors a preliminary sifting process, particularly
within the competence of the administrative agency, avoidance of
judicial action until the administrative process had run its course,
and prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by a resort to them
in the first instance. The underlying principle of the rule rests on the
 presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete
chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly.
(Carale, et al. vs. Abarintos, et al., supra., citing Delos Santos vs.
Limbaga, 4 SCM 224).

Q - What are the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies?
ANS: The exceptions are:
(1) When resort to administrative remedies is fruitless or of no
value;
(2) When the government agency is under estoppel (Tan vs.
Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377)
(3) When the question is purely legal. (Pascual vs. Provincial
Board, October 31, 1959; Limoico vs. Board of Administrators,
PVAO, 133 SCRA 43; Andresolo vs. CA,133 SCRA 249;
Kilusang Bayan Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda sa Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, et al. vs. Dominguez, G.R.
No. 85439; Bunye vs. SB, G.R. No. 91927, January 13,1992);
(4) When lack of jurisdiction is the issue (Paraga vs. CA, 254
SCRA 606);
(5) When there is unreasonable delay or there is official
inaction;
(6) When irreparable damage or injury would result (Sabello vs.
DECS, December 26, 1989; De Lara vs. Clorible, 14 SCRA 269);
(7) Doctrine of qualified political agency (Bunye, et al. vs. SB,
G.R. No. 91927 and Companion case, January 13, 1992; Paraga
vs. CA, 254 SCRA 606);
(8) When there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law (Laganapan vs. Asedillo, G.R. No. 28353,
September 30, 1987; NDC vs. Collector of Customs, 9 SCRA
429);
(9) In land cases, where it is private land (Obana VB. Boncaros,
 128 SCRA 457; Morcoso vs. CA, G.R. No. 96605, May 8, 1992;
Sotto vs. Jareno 144 SCRA 166); and
(10) When special reasons or circumstances demand the immediate
action of courts. (Cipriano vs. Marcelino, 43 SCRA291).

Q - Public Estates Authority entered into a joint venture agreement

with private respondent for the reclamation of submerged area
surrounding the Freedom Islands. Petitioner filed a petition to
enjoin them from signing a new agreement. It argued that the
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing
the case. Is the contention proper? Why?
ANS: No. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply when the issue involved is purely legal or con-
stitutional question. The principal issue in the case is the capacity of
private respondent to acquire lands held by respondent in view of
the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the
public domain to private corporations. The principle of exhaustion
of admit..istrative remedies does not apply in this case. (Chavez vs.
Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002).

Q - X filed a claim for benefits with the PV AO, but it was denied,
stating that the claimant can go to court. When X filed a suit in
court, the respondent moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Rule on the contention.
ANS: The contention is not correct because the administrative
agency is in estoppel. (Tan vs. Veterans BackpayCom., 105 Phil.
377).

Q - A complaint in court was filed without complying with the

requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. When
objected to, he invoked his poverty and the fact that he is a non-
lawyer. Decide.
ANS: The suit should not be dismissed by way of exception to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Supreme
Court in Sa bello vs. DECS, G.R. No. 87687, December 26, 1989,
said that taking into consideration that the petition was filed by a
non-lawyer, who claimed that poverty denied him the services of a
lawyer, he can go directly to court, otherwise, irreparable damage or
injury would result.

Q - X, a policeman was summarily dismissed. Can he question his

dismissal directly in court without complying with the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies? Why?
ANS: Yes, because his right to due process was violated. Appeal is
not an adequate remedy to question his dismissal, otherwise, the
one-year period to file a quo warranto proceeding would prescribe.
(Laganapan vs. Asedillo, G.R. No. 28353, September 30, 1987).

Q - A and B were removed from the service due to a reorganization.

They claimed that they were illegally removed, hence, they sued
for reinstatement. Arguing that A and B failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, Secretary Alunan, et al., moved for the
dismissal of the action. Decide.
ANS: A and B are correct. The failure to exhaust administrative
remedies should be disregarded because of the demands of public
interest, including the need for stability in the public service, and
because of the serious implications of this case on the administration
of the civil service and the rights of public servants. (Aldovino vs.
Sec. Alunan III, 49 SCAD 340, G.R. No. 102232, March 9, 1994).

Q - X is engaged in growing softwood for the local match industry.

B imported matches. Claiming that the Revised Forestry Code
bans the importation of wood and products derived from wood,
X filed a case in the Regional Trial Court to enjoin B from
importing matches and the Commissioner and Collector of
Customs from releasing the importation. Is the action of X
 proper? Why?
ANS: No, because it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to
exercise jurisdiction over prohibited importations. The enforcement
of the import ban under the Revised Forestry Code is within the
exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs. The letter of petitioner
to the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of the importation
of matches is in the nature of an administrative proceeding, the
pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. (Provident Tree Farms, Inc. vs.
Batario, 49 SCAD 803, G.R. No. 92285, March 28, 1994).

Q - Tirol filed a complaint for recovery of possession and

declaration of ownership of 4.5 hectares of land against
Morcoso, alleging that he inherited it from his father in 1930.
Morcoso alleged that a lease contract was entered into between
her and Tirol on December 28, 1978 without rentals and for a
period of six (6) years, for the lessee to develop- the land into a
fishpond. While working on said land, Morcoso was informed
that the land was within the area of alienable and disposable
public land, prompting her to apply for a fishpond permit in
1973. Morcoso refused to surrender the same to Tirol, hence, an
unlawful detainer suit was filed by Tirol but the same was
dismissed for not having been filed on time. The trial court,
however, ruled that the fishpond belonged to Tirol which the CA
affirmed. Before the SC, Morcoso claimed that the trial court
erred in taking cognizance of the case involving a parcel of land
under the administration and control of a government agency.
Decide.
ANS: The conclusions drawn by the trial court are in order. The
technical description and the sketch plan of the BFAR personnel
who conducted an ocular inspection of the fishpond area showed
that the land was the subject of a lease contract between Morcoso
and Tirol. The fishpond not having been part of the public domain,
the trial court correctly adjudged Tirol as the rightful owner of the
 land. (Morcoso vs. CA, G.R. No. 96605, May 20, 1992).

Q - If the respondent is a member of the cabinet, will the principle

of exhaustion of administrative remedies be a proper ground to
object contending that the case should have been appealed to the
President? Why?
ANS: No, because the doctrine does not apply when the respondent
is a Department Secretary who acts as an alter ego of the President.
His act bears the implied approval of the President, unless actually
disapproved by him. Recourse to the courts could be had
immediately. (Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda
ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, et al. vs. Dominguez,
G.R. No. 85439; Bunye, et al. vs. SB, G.R. No. 91927, January
13,1992).

Q- What is the rule in the judicial review of administrative

decisions?
ANS: Except when the Constitution requires or allows it, judicial
review may be granted or withheld as Congress chooses. Thus, the
law may provide that a determination made by an administrative
agency shall be final and executory. In such a case, there is no
violation of due process. However, Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VIII,
Philippine Constitution, which provides that the judicial power
includes the power of the courts of justice to determine whether if
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any agency or instrumentality of
government, clearly means that judicial review of administrative
decisions cannot be denied the courts when there is an allegation of
grave abuse of discretion.

Q- What is the essence of judicial review?

ANS: 1. To determine constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, executive order, or regulation;
2. To determine jurisdiction of any administrative board,
commission or officer;
3.To determine any other questions of law; and
to determine questions of facts when necessary to determine either:
a)constitutional or jurisdictional issue;
b)commission of abuse of authority; and
c)when administrative fact finding body is unduly restricted by an
error of law.

Q- What are the bases for judicial review?

ANS: 1. The Constitution. For instance, Sec. 7, Art. IX-A,

Constitution, provides: "Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof".

2. Statutes.

3. General principles of law. In San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary

of Labor (1975), it was held that there is an underlying power in the
Courts to scrutinize the acts of administrative agencies on questions
of law and jurisdiction although no right of review is given by
statute. This is designed to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and to protect substantial rights of parties affected by its
decisions. It is part of the system of checks and balances which
restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudication. In Continental Marble v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 151, the
Supreme Court held that by the nature of his functions, the voluntary
arbitrator acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. The Court must pass upon
his work where a question of law is involved, or where a showing
of abuse of authority or discretion in their official acts is properly
raised in a petition for certiorari. In Unicraft Industries International
 v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134903, March 23, 2001, it was held
that the decision of a Voluntary Arbitrator, although generally
accorded finality, may still be subject to judicial review if there was
a violation of due process. In this case, the omission to give the
petitioner a chance to present evidence is a clear violation of a
party's constitutional right, and has the effect of rendering the
Arbitrator's judgment null and void.

Q - What are the grounds for judicial review of administrative

agencies?
ANS: They are:
(1) When the act is beyond the powers vested in the administrative
agency;
(2) When the determination is without or in excess of authority;
(3) In case of arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of power; and
(3) When the determination is based on error of law.

Q- What court has jurisdiction in reviewing administrative

decisions?
ANS Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
Court of Appeals
shall have appellate jurisdiction over judgments or final orders of the
Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

In Philippine Sinter Corporation v. Cagayan Electric Power &

Light, G.R. No. 27371, April 25, 2002, the Supreme Court noted that
Sec. 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the Energy
Regulatory Board) provides that a review of ERB's decisions or
orders is lodged in the Supreme Court (now in the Court of Appeals).
The Court then reiterated the rule that where the law provides for an
appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme
Court or to he Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-
 equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature,
and logically, beyond the control of the latter. It bears stressing that
this doctrine of non-interference by trial courts with co-equal
administrative bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability in the
administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction nay not be opened, modified or vacated by
any court of concurrent jurisdiction.

However, in Board of Commissioners, CID v. Judge de la Rosa,

supra., the Supreme Court ruled that there is nothing in the law
creating the Commission on immigration and Deportation [now
Bureau of Immigration] which provides that its decisions may be
reviewed only by the Court of Appeals; accordingly, review )y the
RTC was upheld. Likewise, in Commendador v. de Villa, 200 SCRA
80, it vas held that the decision/order of a court martial may be
reviewed by the RTC. By the same token, although the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) has express powers as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body, it is not co-equal to the regional Trial Court
[LLDA v. Court of Appeals, supra.].

Q- What questions are subject to judicial review?

ANS: 1. Questions of Law.

2. Questions of Fact. Factual findings of administrative agencies are

generally conclusive upon the courts if supported by substantial
evidence; thus, Courts are precluded from reviewing questions of
fact, except:

a) When expressly allowed by statute;

b) Fraud, imposition or mistake other than error of judgment in
evaluating the evidence [Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil
440]; or ,
c) Error in appreciation of the pleadings and in the
interpretation of the documentary evidence presented by the parties
[Tan Tiang Teek v. Commission, 40 O. G., 6th Supp. 125].
 3. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact [Brandeis Doctrine of
Assimilation of Facts]: Where what purports to be a finding upon a
question of fact is so involved with and dependent upon a question
of law as to be in substance and effect a decision on the latter, the
Court will, in order to decide the legal question, examine the entire
record including the evidence if necessary.

Q - Is the doctrine of res judicata applicable in administrative cases?

Explain.
ANS: Yes, in order to put to final rest a decision which has become
final and executory. (San Luis vs. CA, 174 SCRA 258; N asipit
Lumber vs. NLRC, 177 SCRA 93; Puma Sportschufabrilon Rudolf
Dassler vs. Madayag, 189 SCRA 592 [1990]).

In Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary, 190 SCRA 673, the

Supreme Court said that decisions and orders of administrative
agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a
final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.
These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the
affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of
general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the
reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting
within their exclusive jurisdiction. See also Boiser v. National
Telecommunications Commission, 169 SCRA 198; Nasipit Lumber
v. NLRC, 177 SCRA 93; United Housing v. Dayrit, 181 SCRA 285.

In United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma, 288 SCRA

15, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that the doctrine of res
judicata applies to adversary administrative proceedings. Thus,
because proceedings for certification election are quasi-judicial in
nature the decisions therein can attain finality. In Fortich v. Corona,
289 SCRA 624, it was held that when the Office of the President
declared its decision final because the motion for reconsideration
 was filed out of time, it lost jurisdiction over the case; accordingly,
its act of modifying its decision (upon a second motion for
reconsideration) was in gross disregard of the rules and the legal
precept that accord finality to administrative decisions.

Q - X was suspended and dismissed. The CSC decided that the

suspension and dismissal was illegal and ordered
reinstatement. The Office of the President sustained the CSC
decision but without reinstatement. It became final. Can it be
reviewed by the courts? Why?
ANS: No more, because the decision of the President's Office has the
force and effect of final judgment within the purview of res judicata.
The principle of conclusiveness of prior judgment is not confined to
judicial decisions but also to bodies conferred with judicial power.
(San Luis vs. CA, supra.; Dulay vs. Min. of Natural Resources, et
al., G.R. No. L-48766, February 9,1993, citingYsmael, Jr., et al. vs.
Deputy Exec. Secretary, 190 SCRA 673).

Q - Is judicial review of administrative decisions a trial de novo?

Why?
ANS: No. It is merely an ascertainment of whether the executive
findings are not in violation of the Constitution or the laws. The
Court merely determines that the findings are free from fraud or
imposition or whether they find reasonable support in the evidence.
(Lovina vs. Moreno, November 29,1963).