[ GR No. 149995, Sep 28, 2007 ] P590,000.00.
To secure the payment of the loan, petitioner issued a postdated
ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA v. PEOPLE
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879
dated September 17, 2001, affirming the September 23, 1997 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 91-5617
convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with violation of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in an
Information which reads as follows:
That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and issue to Alex
B. Carlos to apply on account or for the value the check described
below:
Check No. : 326317PR
Drawn Against : Asian Savings Bank
Paseo de Roxas Branch
In the amount of : P590,000.00
Postdated : February 15, 1988
Payable to : Dr. Alex B. Carlos
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment in full of the face amount of such check when presented
for payment within (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face
amount of said check or make arrangement for full payment
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioner's non-
apprehension despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. On June 27,
1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled and set aside after petitioner posted
the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.
Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987,
petitioner and his wife borrowed money from him in the amount of
check for the same amount in favor of the complainant. However, when the
check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank for
insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed
to make good the said dishonored check.
Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was
an investment by the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the
subject check was not issued in September 1987 to guarantee the payment of
a loan since his checking account was opened only on December 1, 1987. He
claimed that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor
allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership
with the necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was
issued sometime in February 1988, complainant knew that the same was not
funded.
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23,
1997 a Decision finding petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana
guilty as charged and sentences him to a prison term of Six (6)
months and to indemnify the private complainant the sum of
P590,000.00 plus legal interest from filing of this case until full
payment.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial court's decision in toto.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued
as a guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioner's "investment theory".
In ruling against the existence of a partnership between them, the trial court
noted that the so-called partnership venture, Palana's General Merchandising,
was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of petitioner. The Court
of Appeals also held that the act of lending money does not necessarily
amount to an investment of capital.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT DISREGARDING THE
DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A
CONSIDERATION OR FOR VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED WAS
ONLY TRICKED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE
THE SAID CHECK AS A MEANS OF BINDING THE ACCUSED
 TO RETURN HIS INVESTMENT IN THE PARTNERSHIP
WHICH WAS THEN SUFFERING FROM BUSINESS
REVERSALS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME THE ACCUSED
WAS ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25, 1995 R.A. 7691 EXPANDING
THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT.
The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22; and 2) whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
case.
Petitioner's argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691
is without merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and not during the
arraignment of the accused. The Information charging petitioner with violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law
determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129 which provides:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be
exclusively taken cognizance by the latter.
x x x x
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
x x x x
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where
the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30
days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than
double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. In
the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial
Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Metropolitan Trial Court
could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is
only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.
The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An Act Expanding
the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and
the Metropolitan Trial Court" on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the Regional Trial
Court of jurisdiction over petitioner's case. Where a court has already obtained
and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to
the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate
on actions pending before its enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains
retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that have not
yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by
implication can it be construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application
to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its
effectivity. The jurisdiction of the RTC over the case attached upon the
commencement of the action by the filing of the Information and could not be
ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of
inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in
nature.
After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioner's conviction
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P.
Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to
apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner
admitted that at the time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such
check. Consequently, when the check was presented for payment, it was
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he
received demand letters to pay the amount of the check from private
complainant but he did not comply with it.
In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or value, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld private complainant's claim that the
check was issued as a guaranty for the loan and rejected petitioner's
"investment theory". The issue as to whether the amount of the subject check
represents the amount of the money loaned by private complainant to
petitioner or as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question
involving the credibility of witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the
appellate court will not generally disturb the findings of the lower court
considering that it is in a better position to settle that issue since it had the
advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct during the
trial, which circumstances carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In
the present case, we see no reason to reverse the finding of the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the amount of the subject check was a
loan and not an investment.
Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is
presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration, which may
consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who
makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other side. Since it was established that petitioner received money from private
complainant in various amounts, petitioner cannot now claim that the checks
were not issued for value.
The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to potential suppliers
is not a valid defense. In Cueme v. People, the Court held thus:
The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended
to be shown to prospective investors of her corporation is, to say
the least, not a defense. The gravamen of the offense punished
under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check
malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the
rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law
has been breached. Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where
the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, and the
defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent are
unavailing.
The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be
encashed or deposited in a bank, produce the same effect as
ordinary checks. What the law punishes is the issuance of a
rubber check itself and not the purpose for which the check was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This
is not without good reasons. To determine the purpose as well as
the terms and conditions for which checks are issued will greatly
erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial
value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in
the trading and banking communities. Besides, the law does not
make any distinction as to the kind of checks which are the
subject of its provisions, hence, no such distinction can be made
by means of interpretation or application. What is important is the
fact that petitioner deliberately issued the checks in question and
those checks were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the
prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.
The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the subject check is
likewise immaterial. Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, is the first delivery of the check. In the case at bar, the Information alleged
that the check was postdated February 15, 1988 although issued in or about
September 1987. During trial, petitioner testified that the Checking Account
was opened only on December 1, 1987 and that the check was issued
sometime in February 1988.
The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof
adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and
prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights. In a
prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the issuance of the subject
check is material since it forms part of the second element of the offense that at
the time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of funds. However,
it cannot be said that petitioner was prejudiced by such variance nor was
surprised by it. Records show that petitioner knew at the time he issued the
check that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the amount
of the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the same claiming that the same
would only be shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid.
Moreover, there is no merit in petitioner's allegation that private complainant
knew that the check is not funded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found that the subject check was issued as guaranty for payment of the loan
hence, was intended to apply for account or for value. As such, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to see to it that the check is duly covered when
presented for payment.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified
by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty of fine may be
imposed in lieu of imprisonment considering that the prosecution failed to
prove or allege that petitioner is not a first-time offender. Hence, in lieu of
imprisonment, a fine of P200,000.00 shall be imposed upon petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO M.
PALANA guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay private complainant the amount
of P590,000.00, representing the value of the check, with six (6%) percent
interest from date of filing of the Information until the finality of the decision,
the amount of which, inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve percent
(12%) interest, from finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of
imprisonment, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

[ GR No. 154557, Feb 13, 2008 ]
PEOPLE v. The CA
Where a court acquired jurisdiction over an action, its jurisdiction continues to
the final conclusion of the case. Such jurisdiction is not affected by new
legislation placing jurisdiction over such dispute in another court or tribunal
unless the statute provides for retroactivity.
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to nullify the June
13, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17275
which set aside the July 25, 1994 Judgment of the Surigao City Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 32 and dismissed Criminal Case No. 551 entitled People
of the Philippines v. Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao for violation of Section 68
of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 705, as amended by Executive Order No.
(EO) 277.
On February 24, 1992, private respondents Rico and Rickson Lipao were
indicted for and pleaded not guilty to violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705, as
amended by EO 277. The Information in Criminal Case No. 551 reads:
That on or about the 21st day of October 1991 in Cagdianao,
Surigao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao without
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, conspiring, confederating and helping one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess
without license eight (8) pieces of round timbers and 160 bundles
of firewood with a market value of P3,100.00, said forest products
not covered with legal transport document, and willfully and
unlawfully load these forest products in the pumpboat "Rickjoy"
owned by Rico Lipao, nor the accused Rico Lipao and Rickson
Lipao holders of a license issued by the DENR, to the prejudice
of the government in the sum of P3,100.00.
Contrary to law. The offense is punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
as provided under Section 68 of PD No. 705.
The offense charged is punishable under Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished
by:
x x x x
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
period, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos
but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
Prision correccional in its medium period is imprisonment from 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months while prision correccional in its
maximum period is imprisonment from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years.
Parenthetically, during the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 551 and before
the RTC rendered its Judgment, Republic Act No. (RA) 7691 took effect on
April 15, 1994 or 15 days after its publication on March 30, 1994. RA 7691
expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
(MCTCs) in criminal cases to cover all offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including civil penalties arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value
or amount thereof. Before the amendments of RA 7691, Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 entitled The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provided that the MeTC,
MTC, and MCTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or
a fine of not more than PhP 4,000, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof.
On July 25, 1994, the RTC rendered its Judgment, finding private respondents
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused
Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao both guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.
705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, in
relation to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty of
from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum; and each to pay one-
half of the costs
The posts and firewood in question, or the proceeds thereof if
sold at public auction are hereby forfeited in favor of the
Government.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondents seasonably interposed their appeal before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17275. They argued that private respondent
Rickson was subjected to an illegal search and seizure of the round posts and
firewood which cannot be used as evidence against him. They insisted that
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) personnel
together with some Philippine National Police personnel who stopped private
respondent Rickson did not have a search warrant. They also opined that the
"plain sight" or "open review" doctrine is inapplicable as the posts and firewood
are not incriminatory, more so as firewood is available and sold in public
markets without the requirement of any permit from the DENR.
Moreover, private respondents argued that the prosecution failed to prove their
lack of license to possess timber. They contended that since private
respondent Rico is merely the owner of the pumpboat and was not present
when the posts and firewood were seized, he could never be held liable for
illegal possession of timber as he was never in possession of the round posts.
Relying on People v. Macagaling,private respondents asserted that
constructive possession of forest products is no longer the rule in successfully
prosecuting offenses for violation of the Forestry Code.
On June 13, 2002, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, granting the appeal
of private respondents and dismissing the case before it on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction of the RTC. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the Decision appealed from
is SET ASIDE. The instant criminal case is DISMISSED for lack
of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
In sustaining the appeal of private respondents, the CA did not rule on the
assigned errors or on the merits of the case. It anchored its dismissal of the
criminal case on the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to hear and decide it.
Thus, People of the Philippines filed the instant petition, raising the sole
assignment of error that:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARBITRARILY AND
WHIMSICALLY DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ON THE GROUND THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE IN VIEW OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691 WHICH BECAME
EFFECTIVE ON APRIL 15, 1994.
Petitioner People posits that the passage of RA 7691 did not ipso facto take
jurisdiction away from the RTC to hear and decide the instant criminal case
instituted prior to the passage of said law expanding the jurisdiction of the
MTCs.
On the other hand, in their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents
do not meet head on the sole issue raised by petitioner on jurisdiction but
instead argue that the instant petition should have been outrightly dismissed
on the grounds of noncompliance with the requirements for a special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 and the requisites for a valid verification.
Private respondents asseverate that the instant petition cannot be entertained
as no motion for reconsideration has been filed before the CA, which is a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy available to petitioner and an indispensable
and jurisdictional requirement for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, relying
on Labudahon v. NLRC. Moreover, they contend that an action for certiorari
under Rule 65 is the wrong remedy as the dismissal by the CA on lack of
jurisdiction did not constitute double jeopardy and, thus, an appeal through a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy. They
maintain that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), while undoubtedly the
counsel for the State and its agencies, cannot arrogate unto itself the authority
to execute in its name the certificate of non-forum shopping for a client office,
which in the instant case is the DENR.
The arguments of private respondents are unmeritorious.
On the issue of the propriety of the resort to a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 instead of a petition under Rule 45, we find that Rule 65 is the
proper remedy. The CA ruled that the RTC was ousted of its jurisdiction as a
result of the enactment of RA 7691. While the defense of lack of jurisdiction
was never raised by private respondents before the RTC and the CA, the CA
nevertheless proceeded to acquit private respondents based on the new law.
It is quite glaring from Sec. 7 of RA 7691 that said law has limited retroactivity
only to civil cases. As such, the CA indeed committed grave abuse of
discretion as it acted in an arbitrary and patently erroneous exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the use of Rule 65 is proper.
On other procedural issues, we also find for petitioner. First, we reiterate our
holding in Santiago and City Warden of the Manila City Jailthat the signature
by the Solicitor General on the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping in a petition before the CA or with this
Court is substantial compliance of the requirement under Sec. 4, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, considering that the OSG is the legal
representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its
agencies and instrumentalities, more so in a criminal case where the People
or the State is the real party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party.
Second, while it is true that petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration
of the assailed CA Decision which normally is a ground for dismissal for being
premature and to accord respondent CA opportunity to correct itself, yet the
rule admits of exceptions, such as where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless, and where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government.
In the instant case, these exceptions are present; thus, the propriety of the
instant petition. The assailed CA Decision rendered on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction clearly bespeaks that any motion for reconsideration is useless.
For one, the issue of lack of jurisdiction was never raised by private
respondents in their Brief for the Accused-Appellants, but was
considered motu proprio by the CA. For another, the issues and errors raised
by private respondents were not considered and much less touched upon by
the CA in its assailed Decision.
But of more importance, as this Court held in Vivo v. Cloribel, a motion for
reconsideration is not necessary before a petition for certiorari can be filed
when the respondent court took almost eight years to the day to resolve private
respondents' appeal. It is not only the accused who has a right to a speedy
disposition of his case, but the prosecution or the State representing the
People also has and must be accorded the same right. Thus, any further delay
would prejudice the interest of the Government to prosecute and bring closure
to a criminal case filed way back in early 1992.
On the main issue of whether the RTC retained jurisdiction over the criminal
case, we agree with petitioner. The passage of RA 7691 did not ipso
facto relieve the RTC of the jurisdiction to hear and decide the criminal case
against private respondents.
This issue has been laid to rest in People v. Velasco, where this Court
emphatically held:
As to the issue of whether or not R.A. 7691 operated to divest the
Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over appellant's case, we rule
in the negative. It has been consistently held as a general rule
that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising
jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the
final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The
exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or
is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions
pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the
jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be
applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of a
statute.
A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions
apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial
stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it
be understood as having retroactive application to criminal cases
pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its
effectivity. Thus, the general rule enunciated above is the
controlling doctrine in the case at bar. At the time the case against
the appellant was commenced by the filing of the information on
July 3, 1991, the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
offense charged, inasmuch as Section 39 of R.A. 6425 (the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 prior to the amendments
introduced by R.A. 7659 and R.A. 7691), provided that:
Sec. 39. Jurisdiction. - The Court of First Instance,
Circuit Criminal Court, and Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court shall have concurrent original
jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses
punishable under this Act: Provided, That in cities or
provinces where there are Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts, the said courts shall take exclusive
cognizance of cases where the offenders are under
sixteen years of age.
xxxx
It must be stressed that the abovementioned provision
vested concurrent jurisdiction upon the said courts
regardless of the imposable penalty. In fine, the jurisdiction
of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was
conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425
before amendment) when the information was
filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the
action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A.
7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the
application of which to criminal cases is, to stress,
prospective in nature. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court categorically reiterated the above ruling in the 2003 case of Yu Oh
v. Court of Appeals, in the 2004 case of Alonto v. People, and in the 2005 case
of Lee v. Court of Appeals.
Thus, where private respondents had been charged with illegal logging
punishable under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code with
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months, and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction at
the inception of the criminal case. Since jurisdiction over the criminal case
attached upon the filing of the information, then the RTC is empowered and
mandated to try and decide said case notwithstanding a subsequent change
in the jurisdiction over criminal cases of the same nature under a new statute.
The rule is settled that jurisdiction continues until the court has done all that it
can do to exercise that jurisdiction unless the law provides otherwise.
While jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage of the proceedings, private
respondents did not bother to raise the issue of jurisdiction in their appeal
before the CA. In addition, private respondents did not lift a finger to reinforce
the CA decision relying on lack of jurisdiction as ground for the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 551 in their submissions before this Court. Indeed, it
appears that even respondents are not convinced of the correctness of the CA
ruling on the issue of jurisdiction.

Lastly, the CA committed reversible error in making use of the values adduced
during the hearing to determine jurisdiction. It is basic that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined both by the law in force at the time of the commencement
of the action and by the allegations in the Complaint or Information.

Thus, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction when it heard and decided Criminal
Case No. 551. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the RTC was divested of jurisdiction
by reason of the enactment of RA 7691.

However, considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, we remand the case
to the CA to resolve the appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 17275 on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed June 13, 2002 CA

Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 17275 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The CA is directed to resolve the appeal of private respondents on the merits
and with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 177960, Jan 29, 2009 ]
JEFFREY RESO DAYAP v. PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated 17 August
2006 and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie
H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and Jeffrey Reso Dayap.
The case had its origins in the filing of an Information on 29 December 2004
by the Provincial Prosecutor's Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging
herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence
resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to
Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads:
That at about 11:55 o'clock in the evening of 28 December 2004
at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo
truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with
sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto
of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an
automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by
Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with two female passengers,
namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing the
instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious
physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and
extensive damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is
registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin
St., Dumaguete City, to the damage of the heirs of the same Lou
Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-
mentioned.
An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan,
Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong
and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an amended
information. They sought to add the allegation of abandonment of the victims
by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the
victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside the
car; he was only extracted from the car by the by-standers."
On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus
Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be considered
withdrawn. On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal and the
motion to amend was considered withdrawn.
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the
prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought leave
to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer
to Evidence dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecution's failure to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence,
to which respondents filed a Comment dated 25 April 2005.
In the Order dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted
petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the
evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the
Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:
An examination of the allegations in the information and
comparing the same with the evidence presented by the
prosecution would reveal that the evidence presented has not
established said allegations. The facts and circumstances
constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. It is
elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his
own affirmative allegations.
x x x x
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find
that it was the accused who committed the crime as charged. Its
witnesses have never identified the accused as the one who has
committed the crime. The prosecution never bothered to
establish if indeed it was the accused who committed the crime
or asked questions which would have proved the elements of the
crime. The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it was the
accused who was driving the truck at the time of the incident. The
Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is the person
responsible for it. There was no evidence on the allegation of the
death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was no death certificate
that was offered in evidence. The alleged less serious physical
injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not also
proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same
nor was a doctor presented to establish such injuries. The
alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in
any manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and no
documentary evidence was also presented to state the
damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it
was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene
R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy,
including the damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of the victim
testified only on the expenses she incurred and the shock she
and her family have suffered as a result of the incident. But sad
to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who
committed the crime and be held responsible for it. This Court
could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled this
case from its inception.
x x x x
The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the
prosecution's [evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of
vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck]
is the proximate cause of the accident. The court again is inclined
to agree with this argument of the defense. It has looked carefully
into the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter
and can only conclude that the logical explanation of the accident
is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the
latter's inner fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is a picture of
vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of
vehicle 1's ramming into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing
the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and
pulled out together with their axle. The cutting of the differential
guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting the tires to the truck
body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and
swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that
caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.
x x x x
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two
things the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements
of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact
that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the
prosecution has miserably failed to prove these two things. When
the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the
guilt of the accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in
his behalf.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted
and the accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary
liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered released to the
accused or his duly authorized representative.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging
that the MTC's dismissal of the case was done without considering the
evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added that the MTC failed
to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as provided in Sec.
11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability
of the accused in spite of the evidence presented. The case was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.
In the order dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner
but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the
civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTC's recital of every fact in
arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the
evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that
the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no longer presented
its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the accused's demurrer to
evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC
however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accused's civil liability,
especially since the judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC
declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved to
remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court
of Sibulan on accused's acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case is
REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for further
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but these
were denied for lack of merit in the order dated 12 September 2005.
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under
Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court
subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution. The Court of
Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties
damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the
proceedings before the MTC are null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court
cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia) which ruled
that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or
physical injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take
cognizance of the case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to
property resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the corresponding
penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary
Procedure, which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the
imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. As there was no proof of the
total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the
amount of P1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the RTC's
jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32, Negros Oriental for
proper disposition of the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision, arguing
that jurisdiction over the case is determined by the allegations in the
information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure nor Sec.
36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the RTC's
jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007. It
reiterated that it is the RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the
information alleged a willful, unlawful, felonious killing as well as abandonment
of the victims.
In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had
jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to the
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which confers jurisdiction to first-
level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on
the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information
alleging abandonment. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the
MTC's order acquitting petitioner through a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.
The petition has merit. It should be granted.
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction
over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the
Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious
physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however
declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the same
offense but aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. It
appears from the records however that respondents' attempt to amend the
information by charging the aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the MTC
had approved the Provincial Prosecutor's motion to withdraw their motion to
amend the information. The information filed before the trial court had
remained unamended. Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been charged only
with the offense alleged in the original Information without any aggravating
circumstance.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless
imprudence, commits any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute
a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period. When such reckless imprudence
the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended the same
article imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.
The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property, a
complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or
more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48
speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the
definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law"
committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa). Thus, the penalty
imposable upon petitioner, were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in
its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum
period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).
Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear
and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution
of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof. When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No.
7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over
criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It
explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It
follows that criminal cases for reckless imprudence punishable with prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within the
jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear
and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original
jurisdiction over the criminal case. Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros
Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings
before it were valid and legal.
As the records show, the MTC granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence and
acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The
demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after
the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls
"for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
double jeopardy. But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to
evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual
findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only
legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to
evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari
alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case and
failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same, and
in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of
Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTC's conclusions were based on
facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to
consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show
that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand
of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to
the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in
directing a similar remand to the MTC.
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime
of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict
may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed
to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless
the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. This is because when the accused files a demurrer to
evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the
prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial
judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and
set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the
civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by
way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect
of the case.
A scrutiny of the MTC's decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was
based on the findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him; hence, petitioner's civil liability has been extinguished by his
acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot
find any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and
that accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution
failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime as charged
since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the
cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the
proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck
caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo
truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly establishing
that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no
more need to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the civil
aspect of the case, since petitioner's acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision
dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No.
01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-
04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso
Dayap of the offense charged therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 167409, Mar 20, 2009 ]
RODOLFO B. GARCIA v. PRIMO C. MIRO
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction. The petition seeks to impugn the Orders dated November 23,
2004 and January 26, 2005 issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental.
The antecedents are as follows:
On January 31, 2003, Julieta F. Ortega (Julieta) filed a letter complaint before
the Ombudsman-Vizayas, Primo C. Miro (Miro), charging Judge Rodolfo B.
Garcia, then Presiding Judge of the MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros
Occidental, and Ricardo Liyage (Liyage), ambulance driver, Municipality of
Calatrava, Negros Occidental, with the crime of murder and the administrative
offenses of grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
The complaint arose from the death of Julieta's husband, Francisco C. Ortega,
Jr., on November 12, 2002, as a result of a vehicular mishap between a Toyota
Land Cruiser driven by the petitioner and the motorcycle driven by the
deceased.
The letter complaint was treated as two (2) separate criminal and
administrative complaints docketed as OMB-V-C-03-0076-B and OMB-V-A-
03-0051-B, respectively.
On February 21, 2003, Deputy Ombudsman Miro approved a Joint Evaluation
Report dated February 12, 2003. In said evaluation report, Graft Investigation
Officer (GIO) Antonio B. Yap found the letter complaint to be sufficient in form
and substance. He concluded that the offense charged is not related to the
functions of petitioner as a judge and can be the subject of preliminary
investigation. With regard to the administrative aspect of the case, GIO Yap
recommended that the case be indorsed to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.
GIO Yap also received information that it would be difficult on the part of the
prosecutors to conduct the investigation because they regularly appear before
the sala of petitioner for their cases. The Provincial Prosecutor of Negros
Occidental also manifested that they would inhibit if the case would be returned
to them. Consequently, he deemed that it would be more appropriate if the
Office of the Ombudsman would conduct the necessary investigation.
Corollarilly, on March 8, 2003, petitioner compulsory retired from the service.
After the preliminary investigation, GIO Yap found the existence of probable
cause for the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide in OMB-V-
C-03-0076-B. In a Resolution dated August 12, 2003, he recommended the
filing of the corresponding charges against the petitioner but dismissed the
charges against Liyage.
On January 27, 2004, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide was filed against the petitioner before the MCTC Calatrava-Toboso,
Negros Occidental, which was later docketed as Criminal Case No. 5982-C.
On March 1, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
following grounds: (1) that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form; (2) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged and over his person; and, (3) that the officer who filed the information
had no authority to do so. Ultimately, petitioner prayed that the information be
quashed and be referred to this Court for appropriate action.
On August 25, 2004, the MCTC issued an Order granting the motion and,
consequently, quashing the information.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court granted in an
Order dated November 23, 2004. The court opined, among other things, that
the case had nothing to do with the performance of petitioner's official functions
and that an administrative complaint against him had already been filed, as
such, the purpose of referring cases against judges and court personnel to the
Supreme Court has already been served. Accordingly, the MCTC set aside its
earlier order and denied petitioner's motion to quash, the decretal portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
subject motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution is
granted. Accordingly, the order of this court dated August 25,
2004, granting the accused's motion to quash the information is
hereby reconsidered and set aside and, therefore, the accused's
motion to quash the information is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner then filed his Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in the
Order dated January 26, 2005.
Hence, the petition.
At the outset, it is apparent that the present petition was directly filed before
this Court, in utter disregard of the rule on the hierarchy of courts which, thus
warrants its outright dismissal. In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto, this Court stressed
that "[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be
presented," thus:
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned
to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with
 causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue
the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally
be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court
of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court
of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement
must be presented. This is, and should continue, to be the
policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must
strictly observe.
Later, we reaffirmed such policy in People v. Cuaresma after noting that there
is "a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their
applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their
appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest
tribunal of the land." We stressed that -
[t]his Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. x x x
It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court,
with the Court of Appeals x x x. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level x x x courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court
of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding
of the Court's docket. x x x.
Notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant petition for failure to observe
the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the
case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner argues that respondents violated this Court's pronouncements
in Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman, directing the Ombudsman to refer all cases
against judges and court personnel filed before his office to the Supreme
Court; and, in Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, restricting not
only the Ombudsman and the prosecution arm of the government, but also
other official and functionary thereof in initiating or investigating judges and
court personnel.
Petitioner's contentions are misplaced.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the two cases cited by the
petitioner involve the performance of administrative and professional duties of
the judges that were involved. Caoibes concerns the judge's dealings with his
fellow member of the Bench, while Fuentes touches on the acts of a judge in
the exercise of his official functions, particularly the issuance of a writ of
execution.
In Caoibes, two members of the judiciary got entangled in a fight within court
premises over a piece of office furniture. One of the judges filed a criminal
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman and an administrative
complaint before this Court over the same incident. When the Ombudsman
denied the motion of Judge Caoibes to refer the case to the Supreme Court,
he filed a petition for certiorari before this Court seeking the reversal of the
order. In granting the petition, the Court held that:
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme
Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision
over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise,
the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether
a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves
an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have
all cases against judges and court personnel filed before
it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether
an administrative aspect is involved therein.
x x x x
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that
can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with
all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if
they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
In Fuentes, the issue was whether the Ombudsman may conduct an
investigation over the acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions
alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the
absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme
Court. According to this Court:
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal
or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner
judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the
judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative
actionagainst them if they commit any violation of the laws of the
land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Petitioner's questioned order directing the attachment of
government property and issuing a writ of execution were done in
relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order
may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under
the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of
the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to
supervise the courts. "No other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any
other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to
review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or
not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a
criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust
judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone."
Indeed, supervision over all inferior courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest ranked court employee,
is vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. However, that prerogative
only extends to administrative supervision. As such, the Ombudsman cannot
encroach upon this Court's task to oversee judges and court personnel and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
of the laws of the land.
In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against petitioner was in no way
related to the performance of his duties as a judge. The Information reveals:
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses JUDGE RODOLFO B. GARCIA,
of the crime of RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO
HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under ARTICLE 365 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of November, 2002, at about 5:15
o'clock in the afternoon, at Sitio Tunga, Barangay Bantayanon,
Municipality of Calatrava, Province of Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused JUDGE RODOLFO B. GARCIA, a public
officer, being then the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, with Salary
Grade 26, then driving a Land Cruiser Toyota bearing Plate No.
FDB-193, along the road at Sitio Tunga, Barangay Bantayanon,
Calatrava, Negros Occidental, a public highway, did then and
there drive or operate said vehicle in a reckless, negligent and
imprudent manner without taking the necessary precaution
considering the grade, visibility and other conditions of the
highway, nor due regard to the traffic rules and ordinances in
order to prevent accident to persons or damage to property,
thereby causing by such recklessness, negligence and
imprudence the said vehicle to hit and bump the motorcycle
driven by Francisco C. Ortega, Jr., bearing Plate No. FH-2324,
with Josemarie Paghubasan as his backrider, thereby causing
upon Francisco C. Ortega, Jr. the following physical injuries, to
with [sic]:
x x x x
which injuries resulted to the death of Francisco C. Ortega, Jr.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
From the foregoing, the filing of the criminal charges against the
petitioner before the MCTC was warranted by the above
circumstances. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years. Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended
by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7691, provides as follows:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. -
 Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or

municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with

imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value
or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

As such, the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the case is beyond contestation.

Moreover, contrary to petitioner's allegation, the administrative aspect of the

case against him was endorsed by the Ombudsman-Visayas to the OCA for
appropriate action. In addition, an administrative complaint against petitioner
involving the same facts was filed by Julieta Ortega with the OCA. The case
was docketed as Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 03-1403-MTJ, and is still
pending to date. Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact considering that
he filed a Comment and Answer to the Complaint-Affidavit of Mrs. Julieta
Ortega, dated March 21, 2003. Thus, the Court's mandate, as laid down
in Caoibes, was more than satisfactorily complied with.

To reiterate, the case filed against petitioner before the MCTC is a criminal
case under its own jurisdiction as prescribed by law and not an administrative
case. To be sure, trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of
offenses committed by judges of the lower courts.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Municipal

Circuit Trial Court of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, is ordered to
proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 5982-C with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 154473, Apr 24, 2009 ]
PEOPLE v. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed
under Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing
the June 18, 2002 and the June 23, 2002 Orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407; and (2)
G.R. No. 155573 challenging the June 25, 2002 and the September 18,
2002 Orders of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-
02-109406.
The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on different factual settings,
thus:
G.R. No. 154473
On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the "Forum on
Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines" held at the Balay
Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, Quezon City. The
speech was subsequently published in the February 4 and 5, 2002 issues of
the Manila Bulletin.
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the
respondent when he stated in his speech that
Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing
a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have
been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isn't
even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no
contract was signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to
hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly
disadvantageous to the government that it offends common
sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price
tag.
filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint for libel.
Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the
jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-
QC). Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for libel
against the respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407, with the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 102.
Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation, contending that
Judge Jaime N. Salazar of Branch 102 could not impartially preside over the
case because his appointment to the judiciary was made possible through the
recommendation of respondent's father-in-law. Petitioner further moved that
the case be ordered consolidated with the other libel case [Criminal Case No.
Q-02-103406, which is the subject of G.R. No. 155573] pending with Branch
101 of the RTC.
While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, moved
for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus, could
not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and that,
assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged Order dismissing
Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407 and considering as moot and academic
petitioner's motion to inhibit. While the RTC found that respondent was no
longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed by
Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to
his office--he delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair.
Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to
the exclusion of all other courts.
On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was
not vested with jurisdiction to hear the libel case.
Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure questions of law,
the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 122 in relation to Rule
45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED
THE MOTION TO INHIBIT BEFORE RESOLVING THE
MOTION TO DISMISS;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY
ACCUSED "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE;" AND
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD
NO JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.
G.R. No. 155573
On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC
Commissioner Luzviminda Tangcangco were guests of the talk show "Point
Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon and televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel.
The television show's episode that day was entitled "COMELEC Wars." In that
episode, the following conversation transpired:
Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are
being used for a "PR" campaign against you? Is that what you are
 saying?
Benipayo: No, I think [it's] not COMELEC funds, [it's] Photokina
funds. You know, admittedly, according to [c]hargé d'[a]ffaires of
the U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it is
what's been [so] happening to the Photokina deal, they have
already spent in excess of 2.4 [m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that
time[,] that's about 120 [m]illion pesos and I said, what for[?]
[T]hey wouldn't tell me, you see. Now you asked me, [who is]
funding this? I think it's pretty obvious.
Petitioner considered respondent's statement as defamatory, and, through its
authorized representative, filed a Complaint-Affidavitfor libel. Respondent
similarly questioned the jurisdiction of the OCP-QC. The City Prosecutor,
however, consequently instituted Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 by filing the
corresponding Information with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101.
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar
arguments that the court had no jurisdiction over his person, he being an
impeachable officer; and that, even if criminal prosecution were possible,
jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan.
On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed Order dismissing Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109406 for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent. The RTC, in the further assailed September 18, 2002
Order, denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners seasonably filed before
this Court, on pure questions of law, another Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
the following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY
RESPONDENT "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE"; AND
II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE
INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL WAS
COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS
OFFICE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW.
III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE
SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN
INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT.
Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the same issues and
the same parties, the Court, upon the recommendation of the Clerk of
Court, consolidated the cases.
The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is whether
the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings
on the issue of whether the alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed
in relation to his office. They are of the conviction that the resolution of the said
question will ultimately determine which court--the RTC or the Sandiganbayan-
-has jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The Court, however, notes that
both parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost concern, which
the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, under our
current laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations to be more
specific, is shared by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said
courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be
pointless to still determine whether the crime is committed in relation to office.
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear
and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution
of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act No. 4363, is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases
of written defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now,
the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense xxx.[Underscoring and italics ours.]
More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v.
Endaya, acknowledged the unmistakable import of the said provision:
There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first
instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] that is specifically
designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its
meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory
provisions that leave no room for interpretation. All that is required
is application. What the law ordains must then be followed.
This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is
echoed in Bocobo v. Estanislao, where the Court further declared that
jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous act is committed "by
similar means," and despite the fact that the phrase "by similar means" is not
repeated in the latter portion of Article 360. In these cases, and in those that
followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the
expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over
libel cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera, we explained at length that:
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is]
lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).
This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in
G.R. No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and
Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel
was raised. In that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the
first level courts which had jurisdiction due to the enactment of
RA 7691. Upon elevation of the matter to us, respondent judge's
orders were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the
respondent Court's Orders dated August 14, 1995,
September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are
declared null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from
further taking cognizance of and proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded
to remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition."
Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving
the matter:
"Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no
reversible error committed by public respondent
Court of Appeals in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The contention ** that
R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of
jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained.
While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six
months and one day to four years and two months
(Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable
penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial Court's
jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 ), said law
however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao,
72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA
261, correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid
down the rule that Regional Trial courts have the
exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the
expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to
inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases."
Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public
respondent committed an error in ordering that the criminal case
for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged
dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding the jurisdiction
of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is
a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of
the RPC, a law of a special nature. "Laws vesting jurisdiction
exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and
should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of
other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a
general law." A later enactment like RA 7691 does not
automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled
principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general
law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the
dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law
on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general
law on the MTC.
Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no
manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If
there was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly
so indicated because implied repeals are not favored. As much
as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered
by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Furthermore,
for an implied repeal, a pre-condition must be found, that is, a
substantial conflict should exist between the new and prior laws.
Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed
as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or
repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. The two
laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which
broadened the jurisdiction of the first level courts, there is no
absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial Courts from taking
cognizance of certain cases over which they have been priorly
granted special and exclusive jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC
(previously CFI) was categorically contained in the first sentence
 of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency referred
to in Section 6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of
criminal libel.
Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October
1996, this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel
cases, hence settled the matter with finality:
"RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR
KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING,
DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER
HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN
LIBEL CASES.
relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction
to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error. This Court,
therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and
Q-02-109407 and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for
further proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds unnecessary any further
discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari are GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-
109407 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

xxxx

"LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE
EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS."
(Underscoring supplied)

As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial

Court of Quezon City, Br. 32, Manzano, and analogous cases, we must, in the
same way, declare herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that
criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other
courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other
courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or
modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as
aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by similar means. The
grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over offenses committed in
relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the
MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to
try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is
committed in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of
Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No.
8249, cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply
modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.

Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without
qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether
the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by
the trial court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in
 [ GR Nos. 162144-54, Nov 21, 2012 ]
PEOPLE v. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO
This case, which involves the alleged summary execution of suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang, is once again before this Court this
time questioning, among other things, the trial court's determination of the
absence of probable cause and its dismissal of the criminal actions.
The Facts and the Case
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine
National Police's Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP
ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat (then headed by Police Chief
Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson), Traffic Management Command ([TMC] led
by then Police Senior Superintendent Francisco G. Zubia, Jr.), Criminal
Investigation Command (led by then Police Chief Superintendent Romeo M.
Acop), and National Capital Region Command (headed by then Police Chief
Superintendent Jewel F. Canson) killed 11 suspected members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.
Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation
Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out
between the police and those who were slain. After investigation, the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved,
including respondents Panfilo M. Lacson, Jewel F. Canson, Romeo M. Acop,
Francisco G. Zubia, Jr., Michael Ray B. Aquino, Cezar O. Mancao II, and 28
others (collectively, the respondents). On review, however, the Office of the
Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder against the
police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 23047 to
57, except that in the cases of respondents Zubia, Acop, and Lacson, their
liabilities were downgraded to mere accessory. On arraignment, Lacson
pleaded not guilty.
Upon respondents' motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their
cases to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on the ground that
none of the principal accused had the rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Pending the resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's motion
for reconsideration of the transfer order, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.)
8249 that expanded the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction by deleting the word
"principal" from the phrase "principal accused" to apply to all pending cases
where trial had not begun. As a result of this new law, the Sandiganbayan
opted to retain and try the Kuratong Baleleng murder cases.
Respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 8249 in G.R.
128096 but this Court upheld its validity. Nonetheless, the Court ordered the
transfer of the trial of the cases to the RTC of Quezon City since the amended
informations contained no allegations that respondents committed the
offenses charged in relation to, or in the discharge of, their official functions as
required by R.A. 8249.
Before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, then presided over by Judge
Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., could arraign respondents in the re-docketed Criminal
Cases Q-99-81679 to 89, however, SPO2 Delos Reyes and the other
prosecution witnesses recanted their affidavits. Some of the victims' heirs also
executed affidavits of desistance. These prompted the respondents to file
separate motions for the determination of probable cause before the issuance
of warrants of arrests.
On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal
of the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial following
the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of
the private complainants.
Two years later or on March 27, 2001 PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza
sought to revive the cases against respondents by requesting the Department
of Justice (DOJ) to conduct another preliminary investigation in their cases on
the strength of the affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo
Ramos. In response, then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez constituted a
panel of prosecutors to conduct the requested investigation.
Invoking their constitutional right against double jeopardy, Lacson and his co-
accused filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila in Civil Case
01-100933. In an Order dated June 5, 2001, that court denied the plea for
temporary restraining order. Thus, on June 6, 2001 the panel of prosecutors
found probable cause to hold Lacson and his co-accused liable as principals
for 11 counts of murder, resulting in the filing of separate informations against
them in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 81, now presided over by respondent Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.
On the same day, respondent Lacson filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the RTC of Manila's order which allowed the
renewed preliminary investigation of the murder charges against him and his
co-accused. Lacson also filed with the RTC of Quezon City a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause. But on June 13, 2001 he sought the
suspension of the proceedings in that court.
In the meantime, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
RTC of Quezon City from issuing warrants of arrest or conducting any
proceeding in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 before it. On August 24, 2001
the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson's petition on the ground of double
jeopardy since, although the dismissal of Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89
was provisional, such dismissal became permanent two years after when they
were not revived.
Upon the prosecution's appeal to this Court in G.R. 149453, the Court ruled
that, based on the record, Lacson failed to prove compliance with the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 governing provisional dismissals. The
records showed that the prosecution did not file a motion for provisional
dismissal and, for his part, respondent Lacson had merely filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause. Nowhere did he agree to some
proposal for a provisional dismissal of the cases. Furthermore, the heirs of the
victims had no notice of any motion for such provisional dismissal.
The Court thus set aside the CA Decision of August 24, 2001 and directed the
RTC of Quezon City to try the cases with dispatch. On motion for
reconsideration by respondent Lacson, the Court ordered the re-raffle of the
criminal cases to a heinous crimes court. Upon re-raffle, however, the cases
still went to Branch 81, which as already stated was now presided over by
Judge Yadao.
On October 12, 2003 the parents of two of the victims submitted birth
certificates showing that they were minors. Apparently reacting to this, the
prosecution amended the informations to show such minority and asked
respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad M. Dizon to recall the assignment
of the cases to Branch 81 and re-raffle them to a family court. The request for
recall was denied.
On October 20, 2003 the prosecution filed an omnibus motion before Branch
81, praying for the re-raffle of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to12 to the family
courts in view of the changes in the two informations. On October 24, 2003
the prosecution also filed its consolidated comment ex-abundanti cautela on
the motions to determine probable cause.
On November 12, 2003 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the
prosecution's motion for re-raffle to a family court on the ground that Section 5
of R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors. She also granted the motions for
determination of probable cause and dismissed the cases against the
respondents since the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses were
inconsistent with those they submitted in the preliminary investigations before
the Ombudsman for the crime of robbery.
On November 25, 2003 the prosecution filed a verified motion to recuse or
disqualify Judge Yadao and for reconsideration of her order. It also filed an
administrative complaint against her for dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the
best interests of the service, manifest partiality, and knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment. On January 14, 2004, the prosecution filed an urgent
supplemental motion for compulsory disqualification with motion for
cancellation of the hearing on motion for reconsideration.
On January 21, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the motion to
recuse her, prompting the prosecution to appeal from that order. Further, on
January 22, 2004 Judge Yadao issued another order, denying the
prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12,
2003 that dismissed the action against the respondents. In response, the
prosecution filed a notice of appeal from the same. Finally, on January 26,
2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecution's motion for
reconsideration of its January 16, 2004 Order not only for lack of merit but also
for having become moot and academic.
On February 16, 2004 the prosecution withdrew ex-abundanti cautela the
notices of appeal that it filed in the cases. Subsequently, on March 3, 2004 it
filed the present special civil action of certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The prosecution presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not Executive Judge Dizon gravely abused her discretion
in allowing Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 to be re-raffled to other
than among the RTC of Quezon City's family courts.
2. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
took cognizance of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 contrary to the
prosecution's view that such cases fell under the jurisdiction of family
courts.
3. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
did not inhibit and disqualify herself from taking cognizance of the
cases.
4. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of probable cause
and barred the presentation of additional evidence in support of the
prosecution's motion for reconsideration.
5. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
adopted certain policies concerning the conduct of hearings in her
court.
The Court's Rulings
Before addressing the above issues, the Court notes respondents' contention
that the prosecution's resort to special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is
improper. Since the trial court dismissed the criminal actions against
respondents, the prosecution's remedy was to appeal to the CA from that order
of dismissal.
Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an action is an
appeal. Here, the prosecution in fact filed a notice of appeal from such an
order issued in the subject cases. But it reconsidered its action and withdrew
that notice, believing that appeal was not an effective, speedy, and adequate
remedy. In other words, the prosecution's move was not a case of forgotten
remedy but a conscious resort to another based on a belief that respondent
Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion in issuing her various orders and
that certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper and all-encompassing remedy for
the prosecution. The Court is not prepared to say that the remedy is altogether
implausible as to throw out the petition outright.
Still, the Court notes that the prosecution skipped the CA and filed its action
directly with this Court, ignoring the principle of judicial hierarchy of
courts. Although the Supreme Court, the CA, and the RTCs have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, such concurrence does not give the
People the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum. In any case, the immense
public interest in these cases, the considerable length of time that has passed
since the crime took place, and the numerous times these cases have come
before this Court probably warrant a waiver of such procedural lapse.
1. Raffle of the Cases
The prosecution points out that the RTC of Quezon City Executive Judge
gravely abused her discretion when she placed Criminal Cases 01-101102 to
12 under a separate category which did not restrict their raffle to the city's
special criminal and family courts in accordance with SC Administrative Order
36-96. Further, the prosecution points out that she violated Administrative
Order 19-98 when Branches 219 and 102 were left out of the raffle. The
presiding judges of these two branches, both heinous crimes courts eligible to
receive cases by raffle, had just been appointed to the CA.
The records of the cases show nothing irregular in the conduct of the raffle of
the subject cases. The raffle maintained a separate list for criminal and civil
cases. Criminal cases cognizable by special criminal courts were separately
listed. Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 were given a separate heading, "Re-
Raffle," but there was nothing irregular in this since it merely indicated that the
cases were not being raffled for the first time.
The Executive Judge did not err in leaving out Branches 219 and 102 from
raffle since these branches remained without regularly appointed
judges. Although the pairing judges of these branches had authority to act on
incidental, interlocutory, and urgent matters, this did not mean that such
branches should already be included in the raffle of cases.
Parenthetically, the prosecution was represented during the raffle yet it did not
then object to the manner by which it was conducted. The prosecution raised
the question only when it filed this petition, a clear afterthought.
2. Jurisdiction of Family Courts
The prosecution points out that, although this Court's October 7, 2003
Resolution directed a re-raffle of the cases to a heinous crimes court, the
prosecution in the meantime amended the informations to reflect the fact that
two of the murder victims were minors. For this reason, the Executive Judge
should have raffled the cases to a family court pursuant to Section 5 of R.A.
8369.
The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that
vests in family courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn
covers murder cases where the victim is a minor. Thus:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below
eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age,
or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of
the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is
found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain
any civil liability which the respondent may have incurred.
(Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their welfare and
best interests. For this reason, when the need for such protection is not
compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule. In several cases, for
instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the
family courts in hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.
Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder
cases moved to a family court, are dead. As respondents aptly point out, there
is no living minor in the murder cases that require the special attention and
protection of a family court. In fact, no minor would appear as party in those
cases during trial since the minor victims are represented by their parents who
had become the real private offended parties.
3. Inhibition of Judge Yadao
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave abuse of discretion
in failing to inhibit herself from hearing the cases against the respondents.
The rules governing the disqualification of judges are found, first, in Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which
he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision
is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties
in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.
and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:
Rule 3.12. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases
include among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceeding;
x x x x
(e) the judge knows the judge's spouse or child has a financial
interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or
any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding. In every instance, the judge shall
indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12, Canon 3 provide for
the compulsory disqualification of a judge while the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 provides for his voluntary inhibition.
The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge since he is in a better position to determine
whether a given situation would unfairly affect his attitude towards the parties
or their cases. The mere imputation of bias, partiality, and prejudgment is not
enough ground, absent clear and convincing evidence that can overcome the
presumption that the judge will perform his duties according to law without fear
or favor. The Court will not disqualify a judge based on speculations and
surmises or the adverse nature of the judge's rulings towards those who seek
to inhibit him.
Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have inhibited
herself for improperly submitting to a public interview on the day following her
dismissal of the criminal cases against the respondents. But the Court finds
nothing basically reprehensible in such interview. Judge Yadao's dismissal of
the multiple murder cases aroused natural public interest and stirred the media
into frenzy for correct information. Judge Yadao simply accommodated, not
sought, the requests for such an interview to clarify the basis of her
order. There is no allegation that she gave out false information. To be sure,
the prosecution never once accused her of making public disclosures
regarding the merits of those cases prior to her order dismissing such cases.
The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge Yadao's statement that
a very close relative stood to be promoted if she was to issue a warrant of
arrest against the respondents. But this statement merely shows that she
cannot be dissuaded by some relative who is close to her. How can this
constitute bias? Besides, there is no evidence that the close relative she
referred to was her spouse or child which would be a mandatory ground for
disqualification.
Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its motion for
reconsideration when she said in her comment to the administrative complaint
against her that such motion was merely the prosecution's stubborn insistence
on the existence of probable cause against the respondents. The comment
could of course not be regarded as a prejudgment of the issue since she had
precisely already issued an order holding that the complainant's evidence
failed to establish probable cause against the respondents. And there is
nothing wrong about characterizing a motion for reconsideration as a
"stubborn" position taken by the party who filed it. Judge Yadao did not
characterize the motion as wholly unjustified at the time she filed her comment.
4. Dismissal of the Criminal Cases
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when
she set the motions for determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred
the issuance of warrants of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its
evidence and argue its case. The prosecution stresses that under Section 6,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court Judge Yadao's duty was to determine probable
cause for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on the basis of the
investigating prosecutor's resolution as well as the informations and their
supporting documents. And, if she had some doubts as to the existence of
probable cause, the rules required her to order the investigating prosecutor to
present additional evidence to support the finding of probable cause within five
days from notice.
Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao dug up and
adopted the Ombudsman's findings when the latter conducted its preliminary
investigation of the crime of robbery in 1996. Judge Yadao gave weight to the
affidavits submitted in that earlier preliminary investigation when such
documents are proper for presentation during the trial of the cases. The
prosecution added that the affidavits of P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos and SPO1
Wilmor B. Medes reasonably explained the prior inconsistent affidavits they
submitted before the Ombudsman.
The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de
novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.
But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain
in their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted
to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for
Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause based on those
affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and
related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part of
the records. Besides, she received no new evidence from the respondents.
The public prosecutor submitted the following affidavits and documents along
with the criminal informations to enable Judge Yadao to determine the
presence of probable cause against the respondents:
1. P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu's affidavit of March 24, 2001 in which he said that on
May 17, 1995 respondent Canson, NCR Command Head, ordered him to form
two teams that would go after suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members
who were seen at the Superville Subdivision in Parañaque City. Yu headed
the assault team while Marlon Sapla headed the perimeter defense. After the
police team apprehended eight men inside the safe house, it turned them over
to their investigating unit. The following day, Yu just learned that the men and
three others were killed in a shoot-out with the police in Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City.
2. P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos' affidavit of March 24, 2001 in which he said that
he was part of the perimeter defense during the Superville operation. After the
assault team apprehended eight male suspects, it brought them to Camp
Crame in two vans. Ramos then went to the office of respondent Zubia, TMC
Head, where he saw respondents Lacson, Acop, Laureles, Villacorte and other
police officers.
According to Ramos, Zubia said that the eight suspects were to be brought to
Commonwealth Avenue and killed in a supposed shoot-out and that this action
had been cleared with higher authorities, to which remark Lacson nodded as
a sign of approval. Before Ramos left the meeting, Lacson supposedly told
him, "baka may mabuhay pa diyan." Ramos then boarded an L-300 van with
his men and four male suspects. In the early morning of May 18, 1995, they
executed the plan and gunned down the suspects. A few minutes later, P/S
Insp. Glenn G. Dumlao and his men arrived and claimed responsibility for the
incident.
3. SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes' affidavit of April 24, 2001 in which he corroborated
Ramos' statements. Medes said that he belonged to the same team that
arrested the eight male suspects. He drove the L-300 van in going to
Commonwealth Avenue where the suspects were killed.
4. Mario C. Enad's affidavit of August 8, 1995 in which he claimed having
served as TMC civilian agent. At around noon of May 17, 1995, he went to
Superville Subdivision together with respondents Dumlao, Tannagan, and
Nuas. Dumlao told Enad to stay in the car and observe what went on in the
house under surveillance. Later that night, other police officers arrived and
apprehended the men in the house. Enad went in and saw six men lying on
the floor while the others were handcuffed. Enad and his companions left
Sucat in the early morning of May 18, 1995. He fell asleep along the way but
was awaken by gunshots. He saw Dumlao and other police officers fire their
guns at the L-300 van containing the apprehended suspects.
5. SPO2 Noel P. Seno's affidavit of May 31, 2001 in which he corroborated
what Ramos said. Seno claimed that he was part of the advance party in
Superville Subdivision and was also in Commonwealth Avenue when the
suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were killed.
6. The PNP ABRITG After Operations Report of May 31, 1995 which narrated
the events that took place on May 17 and 18, 1995. This report was submitted
by Lacson, Zubia, Acop and Canson.
7. The PNP Medico-Legal Reports which stated that the suspected members
of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang tested negative for gunpowder nitrates.
The Court agrees with Judge Yadao that the above affidavits and reports,
taken together with the other documents of record, fail to establish probable
cause against the respondents.
First. Evidently, the case against respondents rests on the testimony of
Ramos, corroborated by those of Medes, Enad, and Seno, who supposedly
heard the commanders of the various units plan the killing of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang members somewhere in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City and actually execute such plan. Yu's testimony is limited to the capture
of the gang members and goes no further. He did not see them killed.
Second. Respecting the testimonies of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, the
prosecution's own evidence the PNP ABRITG's After Operations Report of
May 31, 1995 shows that these men took no part in the operations against
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members. The report included a comprehensive
list of police personnel from Task Force Habagat (Lacson), Traffic
Management Command (Zubia), Criminal Investigation Command (Acop), and
National Capital Region Command (Canson) who were involved. The names
of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno were not on that list. Notably, only Yu's
name, among the new set of witnesses, was on that list. Since an after-battle
report usually serves as basis for commendations and promotions, any omitted
name would hardly have gone unchallenged.
Third. Ramos, whose story appeared to be the most significant evidence
against the respondents, submitted in the course of the preliminary
investigation that the Office of the Ombudsman conducted in a related robbery
charge against the police officers involved a counter-affidavit. He claimed in
that counter-affidavit that he was neither in Superville Subdivision nor
Commonwealth Avenue during the Kuratong Baleleng operations since he
was in Bulacan on May 17, 1995 and at his home on May 18. Notably, Medes
claimed in a joint counter-affidavit that he was on duty at the TMC
headquarters at Camp Crame on May 17 and 18.
Fourth. The Office of the Ombudsman, looking at the whole picture and giving
credence to Ramos and Medes' statements, dismissed the robbery
case. More, it excluded Ramos from the group of officers that it charged with
the murder of the suspected members of theKuratong Baleleng Gang. Under
the circumstances, the Court cannot be less skeptical than Judge Yadao was
in doubting the sudden reversal after six years of testimony of these witnesses.
Of course, Yu may have taken part in the subject operation but, as he narrated,
his role was limited to cornering and arresting the suspected Kuratong
Baleleng Gang members at their safe house in Superville Subdivision. After
his team turned the suspects over to an investigating unit, he no longer knew
what happened to them.
Fifth. True, the PNP Medico-Legal Reports showed that the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang members tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. But this
finding cannot have any legal significance for the purpose of the preliminary
investigation of the murder cases against the respondents absent sufficient
proof that they probably took part in gunning those gang members down.
The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright,
Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present
additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional
Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has
already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge
who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this
Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the
judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by
the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of
information.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options
upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of
arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the
existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not
mandatory. The court's first option under the above is for it to "immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause against the respondents.
It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that the judge
may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from
notice. But that is not the case here. Discounting the affidavits of Ramos,
Medes, Enad, and Seno, nothing is left in the record that presents some
doubtful probability that respondents committed the crime charged. PNP
Director Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in 2001, six years
after it happened. It would have been ridiculous to entertain the belief that the
police could produce new witnesses in the five days required of the
prosecution by the rules.
In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple
murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety
of a public trial.
5. Policies Adopted for Conduct of Court Hearing
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized only one
public prosecutor and one private prosecutor for all the offended parties but
allowed each of the counsels representing the individual respondents to be
heard during the proceedings before it. She also unjustifiably prohibited the
prosecution's use of tape recorders.
But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court ample
inherent and administrative powers to effectively control the conduct of its
proceedings. Thus:
Sec. 5. Inherent powers of court. Every court shall have power:
x x x x
(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person
or persons empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under
its authority;
x x x x
(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner
connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining
thereto;
x x x x
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice;
xxxx
There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadao's policy of allowing only one
public prosecutor and one private prosecutor to address the court during the
hearing for determination of probable cause but permitting counsels
representing the individual accused to do so. A criminal action is prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The burden of
establishing probable cause against all the accused is upon him, not upon the
private prosecutors whose interests lie solely in their clients' damages
claim. Besides, the public and the private prosecutors take a common position
on the issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of the accused is
entitled to adopt defenses that are personal to him.
As for the prohibition against the prosecution's private recording of the
proceedings, courts usually disallows such recordings because they create an
unnecessary distraction and if allowed, could prompt every lawyer, party,
witness, or reporter having some interest in the proceeding to insist on being
given the same privilege. Since the prosecution makes no claim that the
official recording of the proceedings by the court's stenographer has been
insufficient, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in Judge Yadao's
policy against such extraneous recordings.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this petition and AFFIRMS the
following assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
81 in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12:
1. the Order dated November 12, 2003 which denied the prayer for re-
raffle, granted the motions for determination of probable cause, and
dismissed the criminal cases;
2. the Order dated January 16, 2004 which granted the motion of the
respondents for the immediate resolution of the three pending
incidents before the court;
3. the Order dated January 21, 2004 which denied the motion to recuse
and the urgent supplemental motion for compulsory disqualification;
4. the Order dated January 22, 2004 which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2003; and
5. the Order dated January 26, 2004 which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the January 16, 2004 Order.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 200465, Apr 20, 2015 ]
JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO v. PEOPLE
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated August 31, 2011 and its
Resolution dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders dated
14 October 2008 and 12 February 2009 of Branch 40, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the
records of this case be REMANDED to Branch 40 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, for further appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46
of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938). The
accusatory portion of the Information filed against her reads:
That on or about July 27, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, being then the Chairperson and Managing
Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, and as such, have a complete control and
exclusively manage the entire business of A. Mabini Elementary
School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously acquires, in violation of her
duty as such and the confidence reposed on her, personal
interest or equity adverse to A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative by then and there entering
into a contract with Coca Cola Products at A. Mabini Elementary
School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative in her own personal
capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused fully well
knew, the sale of Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary
School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative should have
accrued to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative to the damage and prejudice of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon her arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution sought to prove that petitioner, then Chairperson of the A.
Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, had entered
into an exclusive dealership agreement with Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines,
Inc., (Coca Cola) for the sale of softdrink products at the same school. By virtue
of a Memorandum of Agreement between the school and the Cooperative, Dr.
Nora T. Salamanca, the school principal, directed petitioner to submit her
financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson. Instead, petitioner claimed
that the principal had no business and authority to require her to produce
financial statements, and that the said reports had been posted on the school
bulletin board.
The school principal then created an audit committee to look into the financial
reports of the Cooperative. The committee was composed of Aurora Catabona
(Chairperson), Monica Nealiga (member), with Noemi Olazo (Chairperson-
auditor) and Sylvia Apostol (auditor), who later executed their respective
affidavits in support of the charge against petitioner. Based on the documents
obtained from Coca-Cola, including the records of actual deliveries and sales,
and the financial statements prepared by petitioner, the audit committee found
that petitioner defrauded the Cooperative and its members for three (3) years
in the following amounts: School Year (S.Y.) 1998-1999 - P54,008.00; S.Y.
1999-2000 - P40,503.00; and S.Y. 2000-2001 - P8,945.00. Despite requests
for her to return to the Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly
misappropriated, petitioner failed and refused to do so. Thus, the Cooperative
issued a Board Resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges against
petitioner.
After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner
moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of
court. She argued, among other matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime
charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction
for which she can be held criminally liable.
On October 14, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, thus:
Considering that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offense or predicated thereon, and considering that violation of
[Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 would be punishable by imprisonment of
not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine
of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the Court, this Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction to
hear and determine the instant case which properly pertains to
the first level courts.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and holds
that it has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Accordingly,
the instant case is hereby DISMISSED. This Court having no
jurisdiction, further discussions over the defense' allegation that
there was a violation of the principle of primary jurisdiction and
that the private complainants used a falsified resolution to
purposely empower them to file the instant case become moot
and academic.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
On February 12, 2009, the RTC denied for lack of merit the private prosecutor's
motion for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal.The RTC held:
Nowhere in said [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 does it provide for penal
sanctions/liability for violation of acts or omission prescribed
therein. If ever, the liability is only for damages and for double the
profits which otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative. It
is a fundamental rule in law that an act or omission is not a crime
unless there is a law making it so and providing a penalty therefor.
Otherwise put, the facts charged in the information do not charge
an offense. And even assuming arguendo that they do constitute
an offense, the penalty therefor is that provided under paragraph
4 of [Section] 124 of R.A. [6938] which is "imprisonment of not
less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of
not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the court," which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the first, not the second level court.
Another factor which strongly militates against the cause of the
prosecution is the undisputed fact that before this case was filed
in Court, conciliation/mediation process for the amicable
settlement of the dispute was not availed of by the private
complainants who are all members (directors) of the A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative in
accordance with the by-laws of the Cooperative and the
Cooperative Code itself and the Guidelines for the
Implementation of Conciliation/Mediation of Cooperative dispute
(Memo Circular No. 2007-05, Series of 2007). The dispute
involving the parties is certainly a dispute and issue between and
among directors, officers or members of the A. Mabini Elementary
School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative which is governed
by the Guidelines.
Prior availment and exhaustion of administrative remedies until
the Office of the President as outlined in the Cooperative Code
and in its implementing rules not having been resorted to by the
complainants, the rule on primary jurisdiction was violated and
this Court acquired no jurisdiction to hear and determine the
present case.
Dissatisfied, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the order of dismissal to the CA.
On August 31, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside
the RTC Orders dated October 14, 2008 and February 12, 2009 and remanded
the case records to the RTC for further proceedings. On January 31, 2012, the
CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its decision.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER IN REVERSING THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION OF DISMISSAL, HAS THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
CLEAN, UNAMBIGUOUS AND CATEGORICAL PROVISION OF
PARAGRAPH 4 OF [SECTION] 124 OF RA-6938 IN
REFERENCE TO THE PENAL SANCTION FOR VIOLATION OF
[SEC] 46 OF THE COOPERATIVE [CODE], RA-6938 AND
ADOPTING FOR ITS DECISION ONE DERIVED FROM ITS
INTERPRETATION OF A SUPPOSED STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION WHICH INTERPRETATION, EVEN
SUBJECT PETITIONER TO A HIGHER PENALTY OF 5 YEARS
TO 10 YRS. WHICH WAS TO JUSTIFY THAT TFIE RTC
SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE CASE AND USED IT AS
A GROUND TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE HON.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
2. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE
OTHER GROUNDS ASSIGNED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE
CRIMINAL CHARGE OTHER THAN THE VIOLATION OF
[SECTION] 46 OF RA-6938, (COOPERATIVE CODE). THAT
THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON PRIMARY
JURISDICTION - EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES IN THE COOPERATIVE LEVEL BEFORE GOING
TO COURT.
3. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS' ORDER
REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IGNORED THE RULE
THAT DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGE ON DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL, AND THE
DISMISSAL IS NOT APPEALABLE.
 4. WHETHER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
SUBJECT THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED TO DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AND TO HIGHER PENALTY HAS NOT BEEN
CONSIDERED.
5. [WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT A
NEW AND AMENDED COOPERATIVE CODE RA-9520 COULD
POSSIBLE APPLY TO THIS CASE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, VIOLATIVE OF EXPOSE (SIC) FACTO LAW.]
The petition has no merit.
Prefatorily, the Court notes that petitioner filed a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, instead of an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, which the OSG points out as the proper
remedy to assail the CA decision.
Petitioner asserts that she filed the petition pursuant to Rule 65, because the
assailed CA decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. She posits that
the Court ordered the exclusion of the CA as one of the party respondents,
and considered the petition as one filed under Rule 45, since the focal issue
raised in the petition is a question of law calling for an interpretation of Sections
46 and 124 of RA 6938, in relation to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA 7691. She adds that
had she chosen to file an appeal by certiorari, the Court would be faced with
the same question of law.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In Mercado v. Court of
Appeals, the Court had again stressed the distinction between the remedies
provided for under Rule 45 and Rule 65, to wit:
xxx [T]he proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the
Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45, which is
not identical to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under Rule
45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals
in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition
for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil
action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the
specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot
be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary
appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45. xxx.
In Artistica Ceramica, Inc., v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association,
Inc., the Court explained that one of the requisites of certiorari is that there be
no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is
grave abuse of discretion. It is also well settled that a party cannot file a petition
both under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court because said procedural
rules pertain to different remedies and have distinct applications. The remedy
of appeal under Rule 45 and the original action for certiorari under Rule 65 are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Thus, when petitioner
adopts an improper remedy, petition may be dismissed outright.
However, the Court may set aside technicality for justifiable reasons as when
the petition before it is clearly meritorious and filed on time both under Rules
45 and 65. In accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of
Court and in the interest of justice, the Court may treat the petition as having
been filed under Rule 45. Here, no justifiable reasons were proffered by
petitioner for a more liberal interpretation of procedural rules. Although it was
filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65, the petition at bench lacks
substantive merit and raises only questions of law which should have been
duly made in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
On the substantive issue of which court has jurisdiction over petitioner's
criminal case for violation of Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and
Committee Members) of RA 6938, the Court affirms the CA ruling that it is the
RTC, not the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), which has jurisdiction over her
case.
In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments
of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of
the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for
the crime charged at the time of its commission. Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended, provides that the MeTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of the
amount of fine:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. -
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective
of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
 nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
(Emphasis added)
Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six years, irrespective of
the amount of fine, fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, in
accordance with Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended:
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or
body, except those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Petitioner insists that Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee
Members) of RA 6938 provides only for a civil liability but not a criminal
sanction, hence, the MeTC has jurisdiction over her criminal case which is
punishable under paragraph 4 of Section 124:
Section 124. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or
omissions affecting cooperatives are hereby prohibited:
(4) Any violation of any provision of this Code
for which no penalty is imposed shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months
nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less
than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the court. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner argues that the provisions of Section 46 (Liability of Directors,
Officers and Committee Members), Section 47 (Compensation) and Section
124 (Penal Provisions) of RA 6938, are plain, unambiguous, and categorical.
She submits that statutory construction of such clear provisions, especially if
prejudicial to her rights as an accused and would subject her to higher penalty,
should not be allowed.
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over
petitioner's case pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 124 of RA 6938:
(3) A director, officer or committee member who violated the
provisions of Section 47 (liability of directors, officers and
committee members), Section 50 (disloyalty of a director) and
Section 51 (illegal use of confidential information) shall upon
conviction suffer a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years
but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's
discretion; (Emphasis supplied)
The OSG points out that Section "47" in the above-quoted provision is a
clerical error because the "liability of directors, officers and committee
members" is undisputedly governed by Section 46 of RA 6938, while Section
47 thereof deals with the compensation of directors, officers and employees,
to wit:
Section 46. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee
Members. - Directors, officers and committee members, who
willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts
or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the
affairs of the cooperative or acquire any personal or pecuniary
interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or
committee member shall be liable jointly and severally for all
damages or profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative,
members and other persons.
When a director, officer or committee member attempts to acquire
or acquires, in violation of his duty, any interest or equity adverse
to the cooperative in respect to any matter which has been
reposed in him in confidence, he shall, as a trustee for the
cooperative, be liable for damages and for double the profits
which otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative.
Section 47. Compensation. - (1) In the absence of any provision
in the by-laws fixing their compensation, the directors shall not
receive any compensation except for reasonable per
diem: Provided, That any compensation other than per diems
may be granted to directors by a majority vote of the members
with voting rights at a regular or special general assembly
meeting specifically called for the purpose: Provided further, that
no additional compensation other than per diems shall be paid
during the first year of existence of any cooperative.
The Court sustains the OSG's contention. Petitioner failed to present any
compelling reason to warrant a departure from the exhaustive CA ruling on
why the RTC, not the MeTC, has jurisdiction over her criminal case for violation
of Section 46 of RA 6938, thus:
The Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the
legislature, may correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints
which, if uncorrected, would render the statute meaningless,
empty or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended
operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent on the
face of the whole enactment and no specific provision is
 abrogated. To correct the error or mistake is to prevent the
nullification of the statute and give it a meaning and purpose. For
it is the duty of the court to give a statute a sensible construction,
one that will effectuate legislative intent and avoid injustice or
absurdity. It is its duty to arrive at the legislative intent and in doing
so, it should not adopt an arbitrary rule under which it must be
held without variance or shadow of turning the legislature
intended to make a typographical error, the result of which would
be to make nonsense of the act, and not to carry out the
legislative scheme, but to destroy it.
xxxx
Clearly, the accused-appellee cannot insist that reference to
[Sec] 124, paragraph 4, as the trial court did, is necessary and
therefore, warranted the dismissal of the criminal case for lack of
jurisdiction. To reiterate, [Sec] 46 of the Code, entitled "Liability of
Directors, Officers, and Committee Members," provides for
violations under which the said officers could be held liable for,
and the corresponding liability for damages and profits from the
said violations. Since the said [section] does not provide for penal
sanction, an application of [Sec] 124, paragraph 3 should follow
as the said provision evidently refers to the penal sanction on
erring directors, officers and committee members. It would
make no sense if we were to follow what clearly appears to be a
clerical error, that is, applying [Sec] 124, paragraph 4 instead, just
because paragraph 3 of the same [section] refers to [Sec] 47,
which upon examination of the Code provides for the
"Compensation" of the directors, officers and other employees of
the cooperative.
We, thus, agree with the contention of the People that [Section]
124 (3) should refer to "[Section] 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers
and Committee Members, [Section] 49 (Disloyalty of a Director)
and [Section] 51 (Illegal use of confidential information)."
Following this interpretation, violation of [Sec] 46, therefore, is
punishable by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but
not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion,
which under B.P. Blg. 129, shall be within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
It may not be amiss to point out that the clerical error noted by the OSG in
Section 124 (3) of RA 6938 on the liability of directors, officers and committee
members, has been recognized and duly corrected when the legislature
enacted RA 9520, entitled "An Act Amending the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines to be known as the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008."
Pertinent portions of the corrected provision read:
ART. 45. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members.
- Directors, officers and committee members, who are willfully
and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts or who
are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs
of the cooperative or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest
in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or committee
members shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages or
profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members, and other
persons.
xxxx
ART. 140. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions
affecting cooperatives are hereby prohibited:
xxxx
(5) A director, officer or committee member who violated the
provisions of Article 45 on the Liability of Directors, Officers
and Committee Members, Article 48 on the Disloyalty of a
Director, and Article 49 on the Illegal Use of Confidential
Information shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or imprisonment of not
less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or both
at the court's discretion; [Emphasis added]
On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated
when the Cooperative filed a criminal case against petitioner without
undergoing conciliation/mediation proceedings pursuant to the Cooperative
Code and the By-laws of the Cooperative, the Court rules in the negative.
Conciliation or mediation is not a pre-requisite to the filing of a criminal case
for violation of RA 6938 against petitioner, because such case is not an intra-
cooperative dispute. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
Neither can the accused-appellee insist that this is an intra-
cooperative dispute and should have been resolved at the
cooperative level. As aptly argued by the People, this is not an
intra-cooperative dispute. Intra-cooperative dispute is a dispute
arising between or among members of the same cooperative.
The instant case is a dispute between the Cooperative and its
former chairperson, the accused-appellee. The Board Resolution
authorizing the filing of the criminal complaint by the Board of
Directors, for and in behalf of the Cooperative, is proof that this is
not an intra-cooperative dispute, and within the jurisdiction of the
regular court.
Moreover, it is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is
the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party
is limited to the civil liability, and her role in the prosecution of the offense is
limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. In petitioner's criminal case for
violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, the State is the real offended party, while
the Cooperative and its members are mere private complainants and
witnesses whose interests are limited to the civil aspect thereof. Clearly, such
criminal case can hardly be considered an intra-cooperative dispute, as it is
not one arising between or among members of the same cooperative.
On whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to
evidence amounts to an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable, the Court
rules in the negative.
In Gutib v. Court of Appeals, the Court stressed that demurrer to the evidence
is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not,
to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The Court, in passing
upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required
to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
In People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court explained the general rule that the
grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and
unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at
bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case" and when
the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of
the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of
demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be
to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of
acquittal, the case ends there.
In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and
dismissed the case not for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not decide the case on the
merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence based on
the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case, the October
14, 2008 RTC Order of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may
still be subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. As aptly
noted by the CA:
The accused-appellee is also of a mistaken view that the
dismissal of the case against her is an acquittal. It should be
emphasized' that "acquittal is always based on the merits, that is,
the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show
that the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but
dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the
defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding,
either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction,
or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc."
On whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right
against double jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, the Court rules in the negative and upholds the CA in ruling that
the dismissal having been granted upon petitioner's instance, double jeopardy
did not attach, thus:
The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be
placed in double jeopardy upon this appeal. It must be stressed
that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her
filing of a demurrer to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous,
of the trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction.
The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach
are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent
jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d)
the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case
dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the
dismissal was with the accused-appellee's consent, that is, by
moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to
evidence. As correctly argued by the People, where the dismissal
was ordered upon or with express assent of the accused, he is
deemed to have waived his protection against doubly jeopardy.
In this case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of
petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not attach.
The Court also finds no merit in petitioner's new argument that the prosecution
of her case before the RTC for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 in Criminal
Case No. 07-197750 is barred by res judicata because the MeTC of Manila,
Branch 22, in a Resolution dated August 13, 2012, granted her demurrer to
evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private
document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR. In support of her flawed
argument, petitioner points out that the private complainants [officers and
directors of the Cooperative] and the subject matter [unreported sales profits
of Coca-Cola products] of both cases are the same, and that the case for
violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 is actually and necessarily included in the
case for falsification of private documents.
At the outset, res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on
criminal proceedings. At any rate, petitioner's argument is incidentally related
to double jeopardy which embrace's a prohibition against being tried for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Section 7 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of
double jeopardy may prosper. There is double jeopardy when the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first. As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches
only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites of double
jeopardy are present in view of the MeTC Resolutiondated August 13, 2012
which granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal
case for falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR.
Petitioner's argument dwells on whether the third requisite of double jeopardy
— a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first — is present. Such
question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining
the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements
are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offense involved.
Thus, the remaining question to be resolved is whether the offense charged in
the information for Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in a crime for falsification of private document under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC). The test to determine whether an
offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other is provided
under Section 5, Rule .120 of the Rules of Court:
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter.
After a careful examination of the Informations filed against petitioner for
falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR and for
violation of Section 46, RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, the Court
holds that the first offense for which petitioner was acquitted does not
necessarily include and is not necessarily included in the second offense.
The Information for falsification of private document, on the one hand, alleged
that petitioner, being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, as part of her duty
to prepare financial reports, falsified such report for the School Year 1999-
2000, in relation to the sales profits of Coca-Cola products in violation of Article
172 (2) of the RPC. The elements of falsification of private document under
Article 172, paragraph 2 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender committed any
of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the
falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the
falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was
committed with intent to cause such damage.
The Information for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 alleged, on the other
hand, that being then such officer and director of the Cooperative, petitioner
willfully acquired personal interest or equity adverse to it, in violation of her
duty and of the confidence reposed upon her, by entering into a contract with
Coca-Cola in her own personal capacity, knowing fully well that the sales
profits of such products should have accrued to the Cooperative. The essential
elements of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 are (1) that the offender is a
director, officer or committee member; and (2) that the offender willfully and
lcnowingly (a) votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts; (b) is guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative; or (c)
acquires any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such
directors, officers or committee member.
Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of
the crimes of falsification of private document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC
and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the Informations
filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be said to necessarily
include or is necessarily included in the other, the third requisite for double
jeopardy to attach—a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first—
is, therefore, absent. Not only are their elements different, they also have a
distinct nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as what makes it a felony is
criminal intent on the part of the offender, while the latter is malum prohibitum,
as what makes it a crime is the special, law enacting it.
Moreover, in People v. Doriguez, the Court held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy
may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses.
A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under
one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise,
where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines
two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
 same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not
an essential element of the other.

Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate, and distinct
offenses as discussed above—the first against' Article 172 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code and the second against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA
6938)—one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double
jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be
charged with as many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose
from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but
said act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this
case, the prosecution against one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the
other.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of

Appeals Decision dated August 31, 2011 and its Resolution dated Jan. 31,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.