Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No.

115455, August 25, 1994

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange

of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA
7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance
its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There
are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because
it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and
S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings as required by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the
Constitution 

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in theHouse

of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not
bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s
power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of
the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from
theHouse of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to
the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in
the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt
of the House bill. 

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings on separate days as required by the Constitutionbecause the
second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because
the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that
of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by
the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing
and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice.

Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission

The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 135 SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon by AIBC and BRII is inapposite to the
facts of the cases at bench. The issue in that case was whether the amount of the death
compensation of a Filipino seaman should be determined under the shipboard
employment contract executed in the Philippines or the Hongkong law. Holding that the
shipboard employment contract was controlling, the court differentiated said case from
Norse Management Co. in that in the latter case there was an express stipulation in the
employment contract that the foreign law would be applicable if it afforded greater
compensation.

In case of Disability/Death Benefits - which law applies?That in the employment

contract.If the contract states compensation should be under RP law or the law of the
country where the vessel is, which ever is greater, then that must be observed. If it is
silent, the amount fixed in contract applies (Norse Management Co. v. NSE, Bagong Fil.
Overseas Corp. v. NLRC

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORP. (PIA), petitioner, vs. Hon.

BLAS F. OPLE, Minister of Labor; Hon. Vicente Leogardo, Jr., Deputy
Minister; Ethelynne B. Farrales & Maria Moonyeen Mamasig, respondents
[1990]
⇒
Dec. 2, 1978: PIA, a foreign corp. licensed to do business in the Philippines,
executed in Manila 2 separate contracts of employments with Farrales &
Mamasig.Terms of the contract:
1.Term #5 Duration of Employment & Penalty: agreement is for a period
of 3yrs. but can be extended by mutual consent of the parties
2.Term #6 Termination: PIA has right to terminate the agreement by giving
the Employee notice in writing in advance 1 month before the intended
termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the employee wages equivalent
to 1 month’s salary.
3.Term #10 Applicable Law: Agreement will be construed & governed
under & by the law of Pakistan and only the courts of Karachi, Pakistan
shall have jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under
agreement.
⇒
Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after
undergoing training. Base station was in Manila.
⇒
Aug. 2, 1980: roughly 1 yr & 4mos prior to the expiration of the contracts, PIA sent separate
letters to the 2 employees informing them that they will be terminated effective Sept. 1, 1980.
⇒
Employees: filed a complaint for illegal dismissal & non-payment of
company benefits & bonuses with the Ministry of Labor & Employment
(MOLE).
⇒
PIA submitted a position paper claiming the employees were habitual
absentees & they had the habit of bringing in from abroad large quantities
of personal effects and the company has been warned by custom officials
to advise employees to discontinue that practice. PIA likewise invoked the
contract of employment.
⇒
MOLE Reg’l director Estrella made the following findings:
1.employees should be reinstated w/full backwages or in the alternative, amounts equivalent to
their salaries for the remaining period of the 3-yremployment agreement should be paid
2.the company should pay Mamasig an amount equivalent to the value of
a round trip ticket Manila-USA-Manila.
3.PIA should pay each employee a bonus equivalent to their one-month
salary.
4.3-yr period null & void since it violates the Labor Code rule on regular &casual employment.
Employees were regular employees after they had rendered more than 1 yr of continued service.
5.Dismissal was illegal because it was carried out w/o the requisite
clearance from the MOLE.
⇒
MOLE Deputy Minister Leogardo affirmed Estrella’s decision except the
alternative in finding #1.
Issues & Ratio:
1.WON MOLE had jurisdiction over the case. – YES.
⇒
Labor Code Art. 278: termination of the services of employees w/at least 1
yr of service can’t be done w/o prior clearance from the DOLE.
⇒
Rule XIV, Book No. 5 of the Labor Code Implementing Rules & Regulations
(IRR) provides that if the termination was done w/o the necessary
clearance, the REGIONAL DIRECTOR was authorized to order the
reinstatement & payment of backwages. This is likewise provided for in
Policy Instruction No. 14 issued by the Sec. Of Labor.
2.WON PIA’s rt to procedural process was violatd. – NO.
⇒
MOLE was ordered to submit a position paper & to present evidence in its
favor. But it only chose to comply with the first order.
⇒
Even if no formal hearing was conducted, it had the opportunity to explain
its side.
⇒
It was able to appeal to the Ministry of Labor & Employment.
⇒
Rule existing at that time provides that a termination w/o the necessary
clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be termination of employment
w/o just cause & Regional Director must order the immediate reinstatement
& payment of backwages. Position paper was not even necessary. It’s a
presumption w/c can’t be overturned by any contrary proof however strong.
3.WON the provisions of the contract superseded the general
provisions of the Labor Code. – NO.
⇒
The principle of freedom to contract is not absolute. CC Art. 1306 provides
that stipulations by the parties may be allowed provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order & policy. Thus, the
principle of autonomy of contracting parties must be counterbalanced w/the
general rule that provisions of applicable law are deemed written into the
contract.
⇒
In this case, the law relating to labor & employment is an area w/c the
parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves & their relationship from by
simply contracting w/each other.
4.WON term #5 in the employment contract was contrary to Arts. 280-
281 of the Labor Code. – YES.
⇒
MOLE held that term no. 5 was contrary to Art. 280 (regular employees
cannot be terminated by the employer except for a just cause or when
authorized by the code) & 281 (any employee who has rendered at least 1
yr of service, whether continuous or broken, shall be considered as a
regular employee) of the Labor Code.
⇒
Brent School vs. Zamora provides that a contract providing for employment w/a fixed period
was not necessarily unlawful. The critical consideration is the presence/absence of a substantial
indication that the period specified in
an employment agreement was designed to circumvent the security of
tenure of regular employees.
⇒
In this case, term #5 should be read alongside term #6, w/c neutralizes the
former term. In effect, the 3-yr period becomes facultative at the option of
PIA. Net effect would be to render the employment of Mamasig & Farrales
at the pleasure of PIA. Thus, terms 5 & 6 were intended to prevent security
of tenure from accruing in favor of the employees even during the limited
period of 3yrs and in effect escape completely the thrust of the Labor Code
provisions.
5.WON only Pakistan’s laws & courts should govern. – NO. Philippine
Courts & administrative agencies are the proper forums for the
resolution of the contractual dispute.
⇒
The relationship between PIA & its employees in this case is very much affected w/public
interest that the applicable RP laws can’t be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing that some
other law should govern their relationship.
⇒
Contract was executed and performed (partially) in RP.
⇒
Employees are Philippine citizens & residents and were based in the
Philippines.
⇒
PIA, although a foreign corp., is licensed to do business in the RP.
⇒
PIA did not plead & prove the applicable Pakistani laws on the matter. Thus,
it’s presumed that these laws are the same as the RP laws.
Holding: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. MOLE order affirmed &
modified.
1.Employees were illegally dismissed.
2.MOLE did not commit any gadalej.
3.Employees are entitled to 3 yrs. backwages w/o qualification or deduction.
4.Petitioners should be reinstated. Should reinstatement not be feasible in
view of the length of time w/c has gone by, PIA should pay separation pays
to employees amounting to 1 month’s salary for ever year of service
rendered by them including the 3 yrs service putatively rendered.

Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 129584, December 3, 1998

 LABOR LAW: Disease as Ground for Dismissal, requisites: (1) the

disease must be such that employee’s continued employment is prohibited by
law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees; and
(2) there must be a certification by competent public authority that the disease is
of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of 6
months with proper medical treatment.
 LABOR LAW: same; The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284
of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the
unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of
the employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of
labor.
 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Lex Loci Contractus: Established is the rule
that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs
in this jurisdiction.  There is no question that the contract of employment in this
case was perfected here in the Philippines.
 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Law of the Forum vis-a-vis Public Policy:
Settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines,employment
agreements are more than contractual in nature.  The Constitution itself, in
Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers.
FACTS:

Osdana, a Filipino citizen, was recruited by Triple Eight for employment with the latter’s
principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The employment contract (originally as “food server” but later changed to “waitress”)
was executed in the Philippines but was to be performed in Riyadh. Once in Riyadh,
however, Osdana was made to perform strenuous tasks (washing dishes, janitorial
work), which were not included in her designation as a waitress. Because of the long
hours and strenuous nature of her work, she suffered from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome,
for which she had to undergo surgery. But during her weeks of confinement at the
hospital for her recovery, she was not given any salary. And after she was discharged
from the hospital, GCC suddenly dismissed her from work, allegedly on the ground of
illness. She was not given any separation pay nor was she paid her salaries for the
periods when she was not allowed to work. Thus, upon her return to the Philippines,
she filed a complaint against Triple Eight, praying for unpaid and underpaid salaries,
among others.

The LA ruled in her favour, which ruling NLRC affirmed. Hence, this petition for
certiorari. 

ISSUE:

 Whether or not Osdana was illegally dismissed

 If so, whether or not she is entitled to award for salaries for the
unexpired portion of the contract

HELD:

The petition must fail.

Disease as a Ground for Dismissal

Under Article 284 of the Labor Code and the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code, for disease to be a valid ground for termination, the following requisites must be
present:

1. The disease must be such that employee’s continued employment is prohibited

by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees
 2. There must be a certification by competent public authority that the disease is of
such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of 6
months with proper medical treatment

In the  first place, Osdana’s continued employment despite her illness was not 
prohibited  by  law nor  was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-
employees.  In fact, the medical report issued after her second operation stated that
“she had very good improvement of the symptoms.”  Besides, “Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome” is not a contagious disease.

On the medical certificate requirement, petitioner erroneously argues that “private

respondent was employed in Saudi Arabia and not here in the Philippines. Hence, there
was a physical impossibility to secure from a Philippine public health authority the
alluded medical certificate that public respondent’s illness will not be cured within a
period of six months.”

Petitioner entirely misses the point, as counsel for private respondent states in the
Comment. The rule simply prescribes a “certification by a competent public health
authority” and not a “Philippine public health authority.”

If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her employment, her employer could
have easily obtained a certification to that effect from a competent public health
authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for illegal dismissal.

The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be

dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination
by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and thus defeat
the public policy on the protection of labor.  As the Court observed in Prieto v. NLRC,
“The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the
foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more
fulfilling future.  Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-
human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the
inhumane acts to which they are subjected by their foreign employers, who probably
feel they can do as they please in their country. While these workers may indeed have
relatively little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage
must not continue to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their
muted complaint.  There is no reason why, in their own land, the protection of our own
laws cannot be extended to them in full measure for the redress of their grievances.”

Which law should apply: Lex Loci Contractus

Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by

 contending that since Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was
subject to the laws of the host country.  Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear
that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any certification by a competent
public health authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.

Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.

First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the
contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction.  There is no question that the contract of
employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor
Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in
this case.  Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce
any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’spublic policy. Here in the
Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature.  The
Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the special protection of
workers.

This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign

employers to determine for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker
may be dismissed on the ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pre-
termination of employment contracts.

Award of Salaries granted but reduced

In the case at bar, while it would appear that the employment contract approved by the
POEA was only for a period of twelve months, Osdana’s actual stint with the foreign
principal lasted for one year and seven-and-a-half months.  It may be inferred,
therefore, that the employer renewed her employment contract for another year.  Thus,
the award for the unexpired portion of the contract should have been US$1,260
(US$280 x 4 ½ months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as adjudged
by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.

As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting to US$1,076
representing seven months’ unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the same
is proper because, as correctly pointed out by Osdana, the “no work, no pay” rule relied
upon by petitioner does not apply in this case.  In the first place, the fact that she had
not worked from June 18 to August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29,
1994, was due to her illness which was clearly work-related.  Second, from August 23
to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as food server and cook for seven days a
week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any salary for the said
period.  Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was confined to quarters and
was not given any work for no reason at all.

Moral Damages granted but reduced

Now, with respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is likewise
proper but should be reduced.  Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are
recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the
dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.

According to the facts of the case as stated by public respondent, Osdana was made to
perform such menial chores, as dishwashing and janitorial work, among others,
contrary to her job designation as waitress.  She was also made to work long hours
without overtime pay.  Because of such arduous working conditions, she developed
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome.  Her illness was such that she had to undergo surgery twice. 
Since her employer determined for itself that she was no longer fit to continue working,
they sent her home posthaste without as much as separation pay or compensation for
the months when she was unable to work because of her illness.  Since the employer is
deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award for attorney’s fees is likewise upheld.

Erie Insurance Exchange v. Heffernan

Insurance, Choice of law: Erie Insurance Exchange v. Heffernan, CA Misc.

No. 2, September Term, 2006. In a case involving a claim for benefits
pursuant to the uninsured/underinsured provisions of an automobile
insurance contract executed in Maryland, where the car accident occurred in
Delaware, Delaware law should be applied to determine what the claimants
would be "entitled to recover"; the law of the situs of the accident controls
the tort aspects of the claim.

On April 18, 2003 at about 6:30 a.m ., Mallory Heffernan , a

minor, was fatally injured in an automobile accident that occurred on
Route 301 in the State of Delaware. Ms. Heffernan (hereinafter
“Decedent”) was transported from the scene and taken to a Delaware
hospital, where she subsequently died. The Decedent and another
minor, Curtis Jones, had been passengers in a vehicle driven by John
McMahon, Jr., also a minor, and owned by his mother, Angela
McMahon. The accident occurred when John McMahon, Jr. apparently
fell asleep at the wheel and collided with a tractor-trailer. At the time
of the accident, the Decedent resided with her parents, Edmund and
Diane Heffernan, in Queenstown, Maryland. The driver, John
McMahon, Jr., and the other passenger, Curtis Jones, were step-brothers
who resided with Mr. McMahon’s father and Mr. Jones’s mother in
Ingleside, Maryland.
The group of teenagers, all Maryland residents, had driven from
Maryland to Pennsylvania after school on April 17, 2003 in order to
attend a concert in Allentown, Pennsylvania that night. After the
concert, they began to make their way back to Maryland. The group
first drove a friend home to Kutztown, Pennsylvania. After doing so,
they became lost and called the Heffernans to help them get directions
back to the highway. The group then drove another friend home to
Swedesboro, New Jersey. The occupants of the McMahon vehicle w ere
on their way back to Maryland, driving through Delaware, when the
accident occurred at approximately 6:30 a.m. As planned prior to the
trip, John McMahon, Jr. was the only individual in the group who drove
the car throughout the entire trip to or from the con cert.
At trial, [Erie] believes that it will introduce evidence that the
Decedent called her parents at home in Maryland at least twice between
midnight and 4:40 a.m., during their drive back to Maryland. Further,
[Erie’s] evidence would show that, during these calls, the Decedent
informed her parents that they were too tired to continue and requested
her parents’ permission to stop traveling f or the night and sleep at the
home of friends in either Kutztown, Pennsylvania or, later, in
Swedesboro, New Jersey. [Erie] believes that it will present evidence
showing that her parents refused these requests and demanded that the
group continue the drive home.
At trial, [the Heffernans] believe that they will introduce
evidence that there were telephone contacts between them and Mallory.
Further, [the Heffernans] believe that they would present evidence that
at no point during the en tire evening were any requests made to them
for permission to stop nor at any point were [the Heffernans] advised
that the driver or any of the other persons in the vehicle being driven by
John McMahon were suffering from fatigue.
At the time of the accident, the Decedent’s parents, Edmund and
Diane Heffernan, carried a Pioneer Family Auto Policy (#Q01 080493
M) and a Personal Catastrophe Policy (#Q31 2350156 M) with [Erie].
These are Maryland policies, designed to comply with Maryland
mandatory insurance requirements, which were issued, sold and
delivered in Maryland to Maryland residents, Edmund and Diane
Heffernan. Their auto policy included underinsured motorists coverage
in the amount of $300,000 per person/ $300,000 per accident; the
catastrophe policy provided $1,000,000 in underinsured motorists
coverage. It is agreed that the vehicle driven by Mr. McMahon was an
underinsured motor vehicle with respect to the Erie policy.
The Heffer ans and Erie were unable to come to an agreement
on issues of liability and the amount of benefits to be paid, and the
Heffernans filed suit against Erie in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, Maryland, seeking dam ages pursuant to the underinsured motorists
coverage. [Erie] then removed the case to the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland. The underinsured motorists
coverage in the Erie policies provided, in part that Erie would pay
damages (up to the applicable limits) “that the law entitles you” to
recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle.
[The Heffernans] have asserted that Maryland’s non-economic damages
cap, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-108, does not limit the
damages available to them. [Erie] contends that § 11-10 8 applies to
limit the damages available. In addition, [the Heffernans] assert that
Delaware’s tort law including the comparative negligence doctrine
should be applied to determine whether, and to what extent, they are
entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist. [Erie] contends that
Maryland law, including the doctrines of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk, should be applied.

The case, Erie Insurance Exchange v. Heffernan, primarily addressed choice-of-law issues. But a
small part of the opinion addresses the rights of an injured driver's insurance company after the
company has signed off on a settlement between the injured driver and an
uninsured/underinsured driver's insurance company. The top court appears to say that if the
victim's insurance company approves the settlement and waives subrogation -- the right to sue
the uninsured driver in the victim's stead -- the insurer cannot then argue about who is liable for
the accident.

Tayag vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

G.R. No. L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968

 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of Shares of Stock: domicile of the

corporation
 SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is proper,
whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile,
property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his
individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
 SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing
the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of
the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among
others, two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled
in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins’ estate in the Philippines, Tayag
now wants to take possession of these stock certificates but County Trust Company of
New York, the domiciliary administrator, refused to part with them. Thus, the probate
court of the Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock certificates as
lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificatesrepresenting
Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock
certificates are not lost as they are in existence and currently in the possession of
County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:

The appeal lacks merit.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all
assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an
earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more
than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in
the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both
countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed
the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary
administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not
ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted.
Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the
[Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in
a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature
of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his
heirs."

Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s
right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the  shares of stocks is in the
Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary
administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in
her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is
equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance
and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot
therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds
application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the
Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above
undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor
could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.
G.R. No. L-12105
January 30, 1960
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased.
PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN,
oppositors-appellants.
Issues:
The oppositors, Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children, question the validity of the
executor/testator C.O. Bohanan’s last will and testament, claiming that they have been deprived
of the legitimate shares that the laws of the form concede to them.
Another, is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia Bohanan, who had
received legacies in the amount of PHP 6, 000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given
their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws, should be two-thirds of the estate
left by the testator.

Facts:
C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state. Notwithstanding his
long residence in the Philippines, he continued and remained to bea citizen of the United States
and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent
residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he
selected Nevada as his domicile and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that
state.

Held:
The first issue refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be
entitled to receive. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is
argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the
testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a
nullity in this jurisdiction. The court refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground
that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his
properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his former (or divorced)
wife. No right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of
Nevada, thus the oppositor can no longer claim portion of the estate left by the testator.
With regards the second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the
testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be
earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, thus the two-third rule
is not enforceable.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen
of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament is fully in
accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions
are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not
disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada which allows a testator
to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court
approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be,
as it is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellants.

Miciano v. Brimo (case where the decedent wanted RP laws instead of his turkish law to
apply to the intrinsic validity of his will and whoever contests it loses his "mana" - note that
in the end, RP laws still applied by the processual presumption as no evidence of turkish
law presented): Although Andre Brimo opposed his brother's will, he's not deemed to have
contested the legacy because the choice-of-law clause in the will was contrary to law
-but since there's a policy of giving primacy to the last will and testament of the testator,
the court should have adopted a policy centered approach instead of the mechanical
application of lex nationalii.
 MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP APPROACH: decedent was a resident of RP,
executed will in RP, intended RP law to apply, will concerned properties located in RP
- can justify application of RP Law
 DISINGENUOUS CHARACTERIZATION (applicable choice-of-law rule is determined
by how the issue was characterized by the court. So if characterize the main issue to
call for the forum's application of its own susbtantive law): here, court could
characterize the main issue as a property case instead of succession to justify the
application of RP laws - lex rei sitae