NORMATIVE ETHICS

Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr.

Ethics is one of the main branches of philosophy. It basically deals with philosophical
issues concerning morality, which usually involve the principles, nature, and practical applications
of our moral judgments. Accordingly, we have three general divisions of ethics, namely,
normative ethics, meta-ethics, and applied (or practical) ethics. Normative ethics studies the
various moral principles that serve as bases for our moral judgments or standards by which we
form our moral judgments. Meta-ethics examines the nature of our moral judgments in terms of
their (a) relationship with facts, (b) meaningfulness, and (c) knowability.1 Applied ethics examines
the practical or concrete applications of our moral judgments in certain complex circumstances2,
which usually occur in the areas of biomedicine, business, natural environment, computing, and
law. Consequently, we have the following standard forms of applied ethics: bioethics (or
biomedical ethics), business ethics, environmental ethics, computer ethics, and legal ethics.
These three general divisions of ethics are interrelated and it is usual for an ethical theory to
contain elements of them. In this light, what ultimately classifies an ethical theory as normative,
meta-ethical, or applied is simply the degree of focus.

In this essay, we shall, however, focus on normative ethics. We shall examine ethical
theories that have advanced what they regard as the appropriate moral principles for judging the
morality of actions. We shall, however, limit our discussion to the three fundamental forms of
normative ethical theories, namely, consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. These
ethical theories are based on three basic morally relevant features of human actions; namely: (a)
that these actions lead to certain consequences; (b) that they follow certain rules; and (c) that
they are performed by an agent of a certain character trait.3 They are morally relevant in that
they are what are being considered in making moral judgments; and they are basic in that they
are what are usually being considered in making such judgments. The question that gives rise to
the three fundamental forms of normative ethical theories is which of these three basic morally

1
These three aspects of the nature of moral judgments that meta-ethics critically examine respectively concern
these judgments’ metaphysics, semantics, and epistemology. A basic example of a metaphysical question in this
regard is whether or not moral judgments refer to moral facts (the debate between moral realism and non-realism).
A basic example of a semantic question is whether moral judgments are meaningful by virtue of their being true or
false, being expressions of approval or disapproval, or being prescriptive (the debate between moral cognitivism and
non-cognitivism). And a basic example of an epistemological question is whether we arrive at our moral judgments
through reasoning or intuition (the debate between, among others, moral rationalism and intuitionism).
2
Judging the morality of killing, for instance, becomes a complicated matter when it involves a severely-damaged
fetus, a brain-dead person, a terminally-ill person who is experiencing severe pain, or an animal belonging to an
endangered species. The same is true of judging the morality of dishonesty in the context of a business negotiation
or advertising or of a legal battle, or the morality of stealing in the context of software-copying.
3
Other considerations include the feminist concern for the ethical consequences of gender inequalities.

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relevant features should be regarded as primary, such that its consideration outweighs other
considerations.

Accordingly, consequentialism regards the consequences of actions as the primary

morally relevant consideration in making moral judgments, such that this theory generally claims
that an action is morally good if it results in good or desirable consequences, while it is morally
bad if it results in bad or undesirable consequences. Deontology regards the rules that actions
follow as the primary morally relevant consideration in making moral judgments, such that this
theory generally claims that an action is morally good if it conforms to a good rule (or violates a
bad rule) while it is bad if it conforms to a bad rule (or violates a good rule). And virtue ethics
regards the character trait of the agent as the primary morally relevant consideration in making
moral judgments, such that this theory generally holds that an action is morally good if it is done
by a virtuous person or person of good character, while it is morally bad when it is done by a
vicious person or person of bad character. The following sections shall look more closely into the
claims of these ethical theories and the variations that they have taken.

I. CONSEQUENTIALISM

Consequentialism looks at the value of the consequences of an action in determining the

moral worth of such an action, such that if the consequences of the action is good then the action
is morally good but if the consequences are bad then the action is morally bad. There are two
critical considerations here. The first is whether or not we should regard the pleasure and pain
that consequences bring about as the primary standards for determining the value of these
consequences. The second is whether or not, in determining the value of consequences, we
should always give priority to those consequences that relate to the agent (or that the agent
values). The results of these two considerations are two general divisions among consequentialist
ethical theories. The first gives rise to a distinction between hedonistic and non-hedonistic types
of consequentialism. The second question gives rise to a distinction between agent-relative and
agent-neutral types of consequentialism.

A. Hedonism and Non-hedonism

As pleasure is naturally desirable and pain is naturally undesirable, the pleasure and pain
that consequences bring about surely form part of what gives value to these consequences—as
either good or bad, desirable or not. The question, however, is whether pleasure and pain should
be regarded as the primary standards for determining the value of an act’s consequences.
Another way of putting this question is whether the following thesis is correct: consequences are
good only in so far as they produce pleasure and avoid pain, and bad only in so far as they produce
pain or avoid pleasure. Hedonistic consequentialim, or hedonism for short, affirms the said thesis;
whereas non-hedonistic consequentialim, or non-hedonism for short, rejects it.

The rejection of non-hedonism of the said thesis actually comes in two forms: (a) the
rejection of the view that pleasure and pain are primary standards for determining the value of
consequences; (b) the rejection of the view that pleasure and pain are the only primary standards

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for determining the value of consequences. We can, for our purposes, call the view of the first
rejection strong non-hedonism, while the view of the second rejection weak non-hedonism.
Consequently, strong non-hedonism claims that it is not pleasure and pain that ultimately
determine the value of consequences but something else, such as power and preference-
satisfaction. On the other hand, weak non-hedonism claims that in addition to pleasure and pain
other things also determine the value of consequences, like power, truth, beauty, and
knowledge. On the whole, while it is not possible for hedonism for an action to be morally good
if its consequences do not bring about pleasure and pain, it is possible for non-hedonism.

An important distinction made in consequentialism is between intrinsic value and

instrumental value. In general, intrinsic value is valuable in itself, for it is not derived from some
other value. In contrast, an instrumental value is not valuable in itself, for it is derived from some
other value. In the context of ethical discussions, something that has intrinsic value does not
derive such a value from being a means to attain some other value, while something that has
instrumental value derives such a value from being a means to attain some other value. If x has
intrinsic value y, x does not derive y from x being a means to some other value. But if x has
instrumental value z, x derives z from x being a means to some other value. For instance, if the
act of helping the needy has intrinsic value, that value is not derived from the act being a means
to attain some other value, say making the needy person happy. But if the same act has
instrumental value, then that value is derived from the act being a means to attain some other
value, say making the needy person happy.

In light of this distinction, we can differentiate hedonism from its rivals as follows.
Hedonism regards pleasure and pain as the only ones that have intrinsic value, and all other
things only have instrumental value. All other things that we regard as good or bad are good or
bad only in so far as they serve as means to attain or avoid pleasure or pain. Strong hedonism
does not regard pleasure and pain as having intrinsic value but something else. One view under
this type of hedonism claims, for instance, that it is power that has intrinsic value; and thus all
other things, including pleasure and pain, only have instrumental value. Weak hedonism regards
pleasure and pain as only among those that have intrinsic value. Others that have intrinsic value
as well include power, truth, beauty, and knowledge.

B. Agent Relativity and Neutrality

The consequences of one’s action may not only involve the agent but other people as
well. In this consideration, the question is, should we only value, or give the highest value, to
those consequences that relate to the agent or that the agent values. Agent-relative
consequentialism gives a positive answer to the said question; while agent-neutral
consequentalism, which gives a negative answer to it.4 Agent-relative consequentialism,
sometimes also referred to as egoistic consequentialism, thus makes an essential reference to
the agent in evaluating the moral worth of an action; while agent-neutral consequentialism,
sometimes also referred to as non-egoistic consequentialism, does not.

4
See Brad Hooker 2010, 445-46; Derek Parfit 1984, 143; and Thomas Nagel 1986, 152-3.

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 Agent-relative consequentialism gives priority to consequences that relate to the agent
in the following ways: first, these consequences benefit the agent; second, these consequences
benefit other people with whom the agent has special connections (such as the agent’s family
and friends); and third, these consequences result from the action of the agent. In the first way,
between an action that benefits the agent and an action that benefits other people, agent-
relative consequentialism takes the first action to be the morally preferable one. In the second
way, between an action that benefits other people with whom the agent has special connections
and an action that benefits other people with whom the agent has no special connections, agent-
relative consequentialism takes the first action to be the morally preferable one. And in the third
way, between two actions both resulting in good consequences but where one is performed by
the agent while the other is not, the action performed by the agent is the morally preferable one
for the agent (see Brad Hooker 2010, 446).

It shall be observed that so-called altruistic acts, act in which the agent sacrifices his or
her own welfare in order to promote the welfare of another, cannot be agent-related only in the
first way. In the second way, between two altruistic acts, one towards a person with whom the
agent has special relations and another towards a stranger, agent-relative consequentialism
considers the former as the morally preferable one. In the third way, between two altruistic acts,
one performed by the agent and another performed by another person, the former is the morally
preferable one for the agent.

In contrast, agent-neutral consequentialism does not always or necessarily give priority

to consequences that relate to the agent in any of these ways. That the consequences of an action
relate to the agent in any of these ways is not what determines the value of these consequences.
Agent-neutral consequentialism is impartial to all affected person in its determination of the
value of the consequences of one’s action. It gives equal consideration to the consequences of
an action to all affected persons. What decides which action is morally good or which
consequences are morally preferable is an impartial principle, which is best represented by the
moral principle advanced by the ethical theory called utilitarianism, which we shall examine later
on. Utilitarianism generally claims that the morally good action is the one that promotes the
greatest good for the greatest number of people. Under this principle, the relation of an action
to the agent has no role to play in determining the value of the action’s consequences or, for that
matter, the moral worth of the action.

C. Emergent Divisions and Some Representatives

The two general divisions of consequentialism cut across each other, such that either they
qualify or combine with one another to form further divisions. If we take the second general
division as the one qualifying the first general division, we have the following four emergent
divisions: (a) agent-relative hedonism, (b) agent-relative non-hedonism, (c) agent-neutral
hedonism, and (d) agent-neutral non-hedonism. Let us, in what follows, briefly examine some
representatives of the first two emergent forms of consequentialism (agent-relative hedonism
and agent-relative non-hedonism). As agent-neutral consequentialism is best represented by

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utilitarianism, the last two ones (agent-neutral hedonism and agent-neutral non-hedonism) are
likewise best represented by certain versions of utilitarianism. Since utilitarianism is one of the
most influential ethical theories, it shall require a more detailed treatment. For this reason, we
shall deal with it and its different versions in a separate section.

Agent-relative hedonism only gives value to the consequences of an action that bring
pleasure and pain to the agent of the action. In Ancient Greek philosophy, two good
representative ethical theories for agent-relative hedonism are the ethical theory of Aristippus,
called Cyrenaicism, and that of Epicurus, called Epicureanism. Both Aristippus and Epicurus
believe that pleasure and pain are the only ones that have intrinsic value: pleasure being the
intrinsic good; and pain the intrinsic evil. Furthermore, they both believe that the pleasures and
pains that an action bring to the agent are the morally relevant ones in judging the morality of
such an action. Consequently, they both believe that an action is morally good insofar as it brings
pleasure to the agent, and morally bad insofar as it brings pain to the agent.

Aristippus and Epicurus, however, differ with regard to the kind of pleasure that must be
preferred. Aristippus considers the more intense pleasures of the senses, though shorter in
duration, as the more important pleasures; while Epicurus considers the longer lasting pleasures
of the mind, though less intense, as the more important pleasures. Connected to the difference
in their preference for the morally relevant pleasures is their different conception of which of the
following kinds of pleasure is more fundamental: the active or positive kind, which comes from
the gratification of specific wants and desires; and the passive or negative kind, which comes
from the absence of pain. For Aristippus, the active pleasures are more fundamental; while for
Epicurus the passive ones are more fundamental (see Denise et al., 49).

Epicurus disagrees with Aristippus for “[e]xperience shows us that the desire for life filled
with intense pleasures will be frustrated, because there are not enough of them in the ordinary
course of events” (Denise et al., 49). Epicurus thus claims that happiness is gained not through “a
constant succession of intense sensual pleasures” but through “the state of serenity,” which
characterizes “freedom from trouble in the mind and pain in the body” (Denise et al., 49). Thus,
given that too much of intense sensual pleasures often lead to greater pains, we sometimes need
to sacrifice immediate pleasures of the body if in doing so we will achieve greater pleasures of
the mind. As mental tranquility is a pleasure of great value for Epicurus, Epicurus offers ways to
properly deal with certain things that threaten to disrupt it. For instance, Epicurus says that it is
futile to worry about things beyond our control and comprehension, like how the gods intervene
in our practical lives. Another, Epicurus says it is of no use to fear death since we never really get
to experience death anyway, for while alive we are not yet dead and when already dead we are
no longer alive to experience the pain of death.

Agent-relative non-hedonism, on the other hand, does not limit the value of
consequences to the pleasure and pain that such consequences give to the agent. In a certain
respect, Friedrich Nietzsche’s ethical theory, whose fundamental value is power or, more

5
specifically, will to power, exemplifies this type of consequentialism.5 By will to power, Nietzsche
generally means the will to overcome the challenges of life or those that tend to weaken our will
or determination to live. Accordingly, for Nietzsche, all other things that we call good, including
pleasure or happiness, are good only in so far as they enhance our will to power. As Nietzsche
(1987, 231) remarks: ““What is good?—All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power,
power itself in man. What is bad?—All that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness?—The
feeling that power increases—that a resistance is overcome.”

Nietzsche thus rejects hedonism by denying that pleasure and pain are the ultimate
determinants of the value of the consequence of our actions. Ultimately, for Nietzsche, “man
does not seek pleasure and does not avoid displeasure”6; what he seeks is power. Will to power
or the feeling of power is the most fundamental value for humans, such that everything else has
value only in so far as they enable us to attain or experience power. As Nietzsche (1987, 221)
states: “Not necessity, not desire—no, the love of power is the demon of men. Let them have
everything—health, food, a place to live, entertainment—they are and remain unhappy and low-
spirited: for the demon waits and waits and will be satisfied. Take everything from them and
satisfy this, and they are almost happy—as happy as men and demons can be.” This makes
Nietzsche’s view of morality a form of non-hedonism.

But as a form of non-hedonism, Nietzsche’s consequentialism is an agent-relative type,

for the feeling of power to be had is one’s own feeling of power. It is an individual feeling of
power, that of the agent, and not a collective one. Neither is it an aggregate one in which one
would sometimes need to sacrifice one’s own feeling of power to maximize the aggregate feeling
of power of all affected individuals. One may sacrifice one’s own pleasure, perhaps to bring
pleasure to others, but only if this increases one’s own will to power. In sum, this version of agent-
relative non-hedonism can be put as follows: an action is morally good if it leads to consequences
that enhance the agent’s will to power while it is morally bad if it leads to consequences that
weaken the agent’s will to power.

D. Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is not just the best representative of agent-neutral consequentialism, but

of consequentialism as a whole as well. Because of the latter, some equate consequentialism
with utilitarianism—which, of course, is inaccurate given that utilitarianism is just one version of

5
Nietzsche’s ethical theory is also regarded by some scholars as a form of virtue ethics (see Welshon 1992), for
Nietzsche is also advocating a certain kind of human development by the acquisition of certain virtues. The
cultivation of these virtues, however, can also be seen as a means to achieve power, which then makes Nietzsche a
consequentialist. See the essay of Steven Hales, “Was Nietzsche a Consequentialist?” (1995). Hales (1995, 32), for
instance, writes: “Nietzsche recommends for the maximal enhancement of power. In this way his consequentialism
is more refined than that of someone like Bentham, who famously held that “pushpin is as good as poetry.” Any
technique that maximized the good was fine for Bentham. Not so for Nietzsche—he endorses a specific strategy
for power enhancement…”

6
Quoted in Hales 1995, 29.

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consequentialism, though the most dominant one. Utilitarianism generally claims that an action
is morally good if it maximizes the aggregate good or welfare of all affected persons. To better
understand the claim of utilitarianism, let us examine its three main components:
consequentialism, welfarism, and aggregationism (Hare 2009, 85-90).

Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory for it determines the morality of an action

based on its consequences. It is a welfarist theory because the consequences that it considers to
be relevant in determining the morality of an action are consequences that increase or diminish
the welfare of all affected persons. Welfare here generally means whatever that improves the
quality of life all persons affected by an action. What welfare specifically means, whether it is
pleasure alone, something other than pleasure like satisfaction of desires or preferences, or
pleasure plus something else like truth and power, is one main basis for the division of
utilitarianism into various forms.

And utilitarianism is an aggregationist theory since the welfare that it considers to be

morally relevant is the maximum aggregate or sum total of welfare of all affected persons. How
does one determine which action produces the maximum aggregate welfare of all affected
persons? For convenience in explanation, let us suppose at this point that welfare means
pleasure (the process is the same if we think of welfare in terms of something else like
preference-satisfaction). Thus, first we get the sum total of pleasures that an action brings to all
affected persons. Second, we get the sum total of displeasures or pains that the same action
brings to the same persons. And third, we subtract the sum total of pains from the sum total of
pleasures to get the net sum total of pleasures that the action brings to all affected persons. We
do the same to the alternative action; after which, we compare the net sum total of pleasure
produced by the first action with the net sum total of pleasure produced by the second action.
The action that produces the greater net sum total of pleasure is the action that maximizes the
aggregate good or welfare of all affected persons; and is thus the morally good action.

Suppose we are choosing between two courses of action, X and Y, which affect persons
A, B, and C. Again, for purposes of convenience in explanation, let us suppose we can talk of
pleasures and pains in terms of units. Suppose then that X will give A, B, and C five units of
pleasure each but two units of pain each; whereas Y will give them six units of pleasure each but
two units of pain each. Since the net total of pleasure that Y gives to A, B, and C (the total amount
of their pleasures minus their total amount of pains) is higher than the net total of pleasure that
X gives to the same persons (the total amount of their pleasures minus their total amount of
pains), then Y is the morally correct choice.

Giving moral relevance to the aggregate welfare of all persons affected by an action is
what is meant by maximizing the over-all good of an action or promoting the “greatest happiness
of the greatest number of people”—also known as the “greatest happiness principle.”
Aggregationism makes utilitarianism an impartial form of consequentialism, and thus an agent-
neutral form of consequentialism, in the following way. The welfare of all affected persons are
given equal consideration in the process of determining the net total of welfare of these persons.
This means that no affected person, such as the agent, is privileged in this process. If the action

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that has the higher net total of welfare happens to be the one not beneficial to the agent, then
the agent has the moral duty to sacrifice his/her own welfare to promote the morally correct
course of action. Given the equal consideration of welfare of all affected persons, the distribution
of welfare for all affected persons, however, is not a relevant consideration in calculating the
maximum net total of welfare of all affected persons.

Let us go back to our illustration above regarding actions X and Y, which affect persons A,
B, and C. We supposed then that the distribution of pleasures and pains was equal: for action X,
all persons received an equal amount of pleasure and pain; likewise for action Y. The same
process of calculating the net total amount of pleasure, however, should work even if the said
distribution is unequal. Say, for instance, for action X, person A shall receive 5 units of pleasure
and 3 units of pain, person B shall receive 3 units of pleasure and 2 units of pain, and person C
shall receive 4 units of pleasure and no unit of pain; and for action Y, person A shall receive 4
units of pleasure and 5 units of pain, person B shall receive 2 units of pleasure and 3 units of pain,
and person C shall receive no unit of pleasure and 5 units of pain. It is plain here that action X is
what will maximize overall welfare. Still, the same process works if actions X and Y do not affect
the same people, say action X affects persons A, B, and C; but action Y affects only persons A and
B.

There are two general divisions of utilitarianism. The first general division is between
hedonistic utilitarianism and non-hedonistic utilitarianism. As utilitarianism is an agent-neutral
type of consequentialism, the hedonistic and non-hedonistic forms of utilitarianism thus serve as
examples, respectively, of hedonistic and non-hedonistic types of agent-neutral
consequentialism. In general, hedonistic utilitarianism defines the good that needs to be
maximized solely in terms of pleasure, whereas non-hedonistic utilitarianism does not. The other
general division is between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. In general, act utilitarianism
considers the consequences of an act in determining whether the act is morally good or bad. On
the other hand, rule utilitarianism considers the consequences of conforming to the rule that an
act follows in determining whether the act is morally good or bad. These two general divisions
intersect such that we have the following four resulting versions of utilitarianism: hedonistic act
utilitarianism, hedonistic rule utilitarianism, hedonistic act utilitarianism, and non-hedonistic rule
utilitarianism.

1. Hedonistic Utilitarianism

Hedonistic utilitarianism is best represented by the ethical views advanced by Jeremy

Bentham and John Stuart Mill. While being both hedonistic and utilitarian, these ethical views,
however, have some important differences. Generally, as Bentham’s version of hedonistic
utilitarianism highlights the quantitative differences among types of pleasure, Mill’s version
highlights their qualitative differences. For quantitative utilitarianism, there is no significant
difference between physical and mental pleasure; while for qualitative utilitarianism, there is. As
such, for Bentham there is no significant difference, for instance, between the pleasure one
derives from playing a simple children’s game (Bentham gives the game of pushpin as an
example) and the pleasure one derives from reading a poem; but for Mill there is. Consequently,

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Bentham’s version is called quantitative utilitarianism (short for quantitative hedonistic
utilitarianism) while Mill’s version is called qualitative utilitarianism (short for quantitative
hedonistic utilitarianism).

a. Quantitative Utilitarianism

Bentham is famous for coming up with the so-called hedonistic calculus, which consists of
a set of criteria for deciding on which among possible pleasures should be preferred to maximize
over-all pleasure; namely:

1. Intensity --How engaging is the experience of pleasure? The more intense a pleasure is,
the greater is the pleasure (the same with pain).
2. Duration --How long does the pleasure last? The more lasting a pleasure is, the greater is
the pleasure (the more lasting a pain is the greater is the pain).
3. Certainty --What is the probability that the pleasure will occur? The higher the probability
that a pleasure will occur, the greater is the pleasure (the same with pain).
4. Propinquity (nearness or remoteness) --How far off in the future is the pleasure? The
farther off in the future a pleasure is, the lesser is the pleasure (same with pain).
5. Fecundity --What is the probability that the pleasure will lead to other pleasures? The
higher is the probability that a pleasure will lead to other pleasures, the greater is the
pleasure.
6. Purity --What is the probability that the pain will lead to other pains? The higher is the
probability that a pain will lead to other pains, the greater is the pain.
7. Extent --How many persons are affected by the pleasure? The more persons who will be
affected by the pleasure, the greater is the pleasure (same with pain).

Once we put all these criteria into consideration, the result is the utilitarian moral
principle called the Greatest Happiness Principle, according to which the morally good action is
that which maximizes happiness or which, in particular, results in the greatest happiness for the
greatest number of people—happiness here defined as pleasure. The phrase “greatest
happiness” in the said principle accounts for the maximization of pleasure in terms of intensity,
duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, and extent of happiness; while the phrase “greatest
number of people” accounts for the maximization of pleasure in terms of extent or the number
of people affected by the action.

b. Qualitative Utilitarianism

For his part, Mill develops his version of utilitarianism in the course of answering certain
objections raised against utilitarianism. One such objection states that utilitarianism endorses a
“swinish doctrine,” for in taking pleasure and pain, respectively, as the only fundamental or
intrinsic good and evil there are, it in effect puts humans and animals on a par in terms of values.
The idea is that since both humans and animals are capable of experiencing pleasure and pain,
making pleasure and pain as the fundamental bases of human values is tantamount to saying
that in terms of values humans are equal to animals. Mill answers this, following Epicurus, by

9
pointing to a difference between bodily and mental (or between physical and intellectual)
pleasures. Accordingly, while it is true that humans and animals are both capable of bodily
pleasures, it is, however, only humans who are capable of mental pleasures. This is so because
while animals and humans are both sentient beings, it is, however, only humans who are rational
as well. As mental pleasures are qualitatively higher than bodily pleasures (in terms of greater
permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc.)—as reason is a higher faculty than the senses—humans
therefore maintain their superiority over animals in terms of values in preferring mental
pleasures over the bodily ones. This, in essence, is what makes Mill’s version of utilitarianism
qualitative in contrast to the quantitative version of Bentham’s utilitarianism. The “greatest good
for the greatest number of people,” for Mill, should therefore be determined mindful of the
qualitative superiority of mental over bodily pleasures.

Let us examine two of the other objections. Another objection, which also relates to the
one discussed above, states that utilitarianism is bound to fail because there is no way by which
we can objectively decide on which type of pleasure is superior or more valuable than other
types. For this objection, Mill gives two answers. The first relates to human nature: that human
nature tells us that mental pleasures are superior to bodily ones. Again, because humans are
endowed with the higher faculty of reason, the pleasure that one derives in the exercise of this
faculty is higher in value compared to the pleasure that one gets in the exercise of our faculty of
sentience. Mill’s other answer points out that the only competent and final judges on this matter
are those who have experienced the entire spectrum of pleasures.

Still another objection states that utilitarianism cannot account for what makes acts of
martyrdom or self-sacrifice good, for if the experience of pleasure is what makes an act good
how can an act that renounces pleasure be good? Mill answers that this objection misinterprets
utilitarianism to be a doctrine that gives priority to the pleasures of the person who does the
action in question (or that, in our language, it misinterprets utilitarianism as an agent-relative
type of hedonism). Utilitarianism, Mill clarifies, is after maximizing pleasure for the greatest
number of people, and not just necessarily for the agent of the action in question. In this light, it
will sometimes be necessary to sacrifice one’s own pleasures to promote the greatest happiness
for the greatest number of people.

2. Non-Hedonistic Utilitarianism

Non-hedonistic utilitarianism rejects the view of hedonistic utilitarianism that the “good”
that needs to be maximized or that is promoted in the greatest happiness principle—“the
greatest good for the greatest number of people.” This rejection comes in two ways. The first
accepts that pleasure is a fundamental or intrinsic good but holds that there are other
fundamental or intrinsic goods in addition to pleasure. The second claims that pleasure is not
what is fundamentally or intrinsically good but something else. A representative of non-
hedonistic utilitarianism that rejects hedonistic utilitarianism in the first way is the so-called ideal
(or pluralist) utilitarianism, which was advanced by G. E. Moore. On the other hand, a
representative of non-hedonistic utilitarianism that rejects hedonistic utilitarianism in the second

10
way is the so-called preference utilitarianism, which was advanced by Richard Hare and Peter
Singer.

a. Ideal Utilitarianism

G. E. Moore claims that the experience of pleasure is not all there is to life. For in addition
to pleasure, there are other things that are worth pursuing for their own sake and thus are good
regardless of whether they result in pleasure or not. Such things include knowledge, beauty,
good relationships, and others. As such, for Moore, the good in “the greatest good of the greatest
number of people” may refer to any of these inherent goods depending upon the situation.

b. Preference Utilitarianism

Preference utilitarianism, as advanced by Richard Hare and Peter Singer, claims that what
is inherently good is not pleasure itself but what is behind the desire to experience pleasure,
which is the satisfaction of a preference, want, or interest. The idea is that the desire to
experience pleasure is merely a kind of preference or want; and one wants to experience
pleasure in order to satisfy a preference. In this regard, the “greatest good of the greatest number
of people” means for Hare and Singer as “the greatest satisfaction of preferences (or wants) of
the greatest number of people.” It follows, however, that the desire to experience pleasure is
not the only kind of preference that needs to be satisfied. It just so happens that animals and
people being both sentient beings regard the experience of pleasure as an important preference
to satisfy. But there are other preferences that are also important and need to be satisfied.
(Singer builds on this idea to formulate the principle that we should give equal consideration to
the interests of animals to seek pleasure and to avoid pain)]. People have preferences or interests
that they want to satisfy; and these preferences or interests are not necessarily those that will
give them pleasure.

3. Act and Rule Utilitarianism

According to act utilitarianism, an action is morally good if it directly promotes the

greatest happiness principle. On the other hand, according to rule utilitarianism, an action is
morally good if it conforms to a rule the general conformity to which promotes the greatest
happiness principle. Followers of one version of utilitarianism usually point to certain weaknesses
of the other version. For instance, followers of rule utilitarianism give a scenario similar to what
follows. Suppose an act utilitarian seeks the services of a plumber for a certain fee. After
successfully performing such services, an act utilitarian, before paying the plumber, will first
consider whether there is an alternative use of the money due the plumber which will promote
the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. If there is such an alternative use, then
he should not pay the plumber. Rule utilitarians resolve this absurdity by considering the rule
“honor one’s contract with another”: since it has been proven in the past that general conformity
to this rule promotes the greatest happiness principle, then one should follow the rule and pay
the plumber. Followers of act utilitarianism, however, claim that rule utilitarianism has the

11
danger of resulting into “rule worship,” wherein rules are just being followed even if in doing so
one brings about unhappiness to certain people.

II. DEONTOLOGY

Deontological ethical theories, as earlier noted, regard the rules followed or violated by
actions as the relevant consideration in judging the morality of these actions. These theories are
also sometimes referred to as “duty-based ethical theories” or as “right-based ethical theories.”
And this is due to the close relationship among law, duty, and right. Accordingly, laws create
duties and rights. Duties are actions required by laws; while rights are entitlements provided by
laws. Furthermore, duties necessarily correlate with rights in that one’s right imposes certain
duties on other people and one performs a duty to respect another person’s right. In this
consideration, deontological ethical theories can also be described as ethical theories which
judge the morality of actions on the basis of whether such actions are done to perform moral
duties or to respect moral rights.

The best example of a deontological ethical perspective is the ethical perspective found
in religions, which we may call religious deontology. According to religious ethics, an action is
morally right or wrong depending on whether it conforms with or violates the commandments
or laws of God. Killing and telling a lie, for instance, are morally wrong because it violates the
commandments “Thou shalt not kill” and “Thou shall not bear false witness,” respectively. Based
on these laws, respect for life and honesty are therefore moral duties. And what makes these
laws binding is the simple fact that God made them.

In this essay, we shall, however, only examine what we shall call rational deontology, in
which laws are made binding by human reason alone. The laws of human reason may coincide
with (or are even based, ultimately, on) the laws of God7, but rational deontological theories
formulate their theories independent of religious considerations. In the ensuing discussion, we
shall thus mean by deontology the one of the rational type. We shall consider two versions of
deontology: the version of Immanuel Kant and the version of W. D. Ross. Kant’s version can be
regarded as an absolute form of deontology for it calls for an unconditional adherence to moral
duties. For Kant, a moral duty is binding whatever are the circumstances. On the other hand,
Ross’s version can be regarded as a non-absolutist form of deontology for it calls for a conditional
adherence to moral duties. For Ross, a moral duty is binding only under the condition that there
is no conflicting moral duty that can override it.

A. Kantian Deontology

One’s respect for a law is actually not the only way that makes one’s action obligatory or
a duty. There is another one, which is one’s desire for the consequences of his/her action.
According to the latter, because we desire the consequences of an action the action becomes

7
Kant, for instance, says that we should treat moral duties as if they are divine commands.

12
obligatory or a duty for us. Because we see the action as a necessary means to attain something
that we so desire, the action becomes obligatory for us. Take, for instance, the duty not to kill a
person. This is a duty for the reason that there is a law that we recognize and respect that
prohibits the act of killing person. Another reason is that we desire to be free from the negative
consequences of such an act, which may include being put to jail for the rest of our life and a
possible retaliation from people close to the person that will be killed.

To distinguish between these two ways by which actions become duties, Kant
distinguishes between two kinds of imperative or command: the hypothetical and the
categorical. The hypothetical imperative is the kind of command in which the sense of obligation
to perform an action results from a desire for the consequences of the said action; the categorical
imperative, on the other hand, is the kind of command in which the sense of obligation to
perform an action results from respect for a law. Consequently, Kant holds that the imperative
at work in morality, the sense of obligation to perform moral duties, is categorical and not
hypothetical. This makes it clear that Kantian ethics is deontological, for to say that the moral
imperative is hypothetical is to subscribe to consequentialism.8

If moral imperatives are categorical and moral duties arise from respect for laws, what
then are the kinds of laws that would make actions done (in the course of performing duties)
morally good or bad? Kant provides several formulas for determining these kinds of laws; but the
following two are the most fundamental: the principle of universalizability and the principle of
respect for persons.

The principle of universalizability states that an action is morally good if its maxim can be
made universal, or as a law for everyone, without contradiction. A maxim is a law that we make
for ourselves when we have decided on what course of action to take. A maxim, in this regard, is
a subjective or personal law. For instance, when we decide to keep our promise to someone we
create a law for ourselves saying we ought to keep this promise. This maxim is what makes the
act of keeping the promise a duty for us. Universalizing our maxim would mean making it as a
law not just for us but for everyone else who is under the same circumstances as we are. So if
our maxim says we ought to break our promise, universalizing this maxim would mean making a
law that states that everyone ought to break his or her promise. Now whether this resulting
universal law runs into a contradiction is a question of whether it can be held consistently, or,
more specifically, when the act that the law is supposed to regulate is rendered pointless by the
law itself. In this regard, it appears that universalizing our maxim of breaking a promise would
create a contradiction. The reason is that the universal law would render the act of making
promises a meaningless act—for why would one make a promise when it is should be broken. If
the act of making promises is a meaningless act, then the law itself, that everybody ought to
break his or her promise, becomes a meaningless law. And this makes the act of breaking a
promise morally wrong. Another example, consider the maxim that states “I ought to steal
another person's properties”. When universalized, this maxim becomes “Everybody ought to

8
This also explains why deontology considers moral rights as inherent while consequentialism regards them as
derivative or instrumental.

13
steal another person's properties”. This law is contradictory because the whole point of having
properties is rendered pointless by the law itself. Consequently, this makes the act of stealing
morally wrong.

The principle of respect for persons, on the other hand, states that one’s act is morally
good if it does not merely use persons as means but also treats them as ends at the same time.
Here, treating persons as ends is tantamount to respecting their choices and preferences. One
concrete way to find out whether or not person A respects person B in his act towards person B
is if person B voluntarily and knowingly gives his consent to person A to perform such an act
towards him. Thus, one’s stealing of the other person’s property is morally wrong because it is
done without the other person’s voluntary and informed consent. Without such a consent, the
other person is treated merely as a means.

It should be noted that these two formulas are two different ways of arriving at the same
morally correct course of action. An action whose maxim is universalizable respects persons, and
an action that respects persons follows a maxim that is universalizable.9 The act of stealing, for
instance, is morally wrong because its maxim cannot be universalized without contradiction and
it does not respect persons--it uses persons merely as means to some personal ends.

A person who acts according to these two moral principles has a will that is good; that is,
she exercises his ability to make choices correctly (that is, according to reason). The good will,
the correct or rational exercise of such an ability, is what accounts for the goodness of things like
intelligence, power, and health. These things are good only if the will that makes use of them is
good; and they are bad if otherwise. Thus, intelligence is good if and only if a person, through his
will, uses it (his intelligence) to perform actions whose maxims are (consistently) universalizable
and that respect persons. Furthermore, since what makes a person’s will good is acting according
to the two principles, the goodness of the good will is not affected by the results of its actions.
That is to say, if the action that springs from the good will happens to have desirable
consequences, the goodness of the good will is not increased; nor is it decreased if it happens
that these consequences are undesirable.

B. Rossian Deontology

Ross’ deontological ethics differs from Kant’s in two ways: contrary to Kant, Ross believes
that moral duties are not absolute and are not known through reason. Ross believes that moral
duties are prima facie duties, and thus are not absolute duties, in that they are binding only in
the absence of an overriding conflicting duty. Our binding moral duties in a given situation are
called by Ross our actual moral duties in that situation. These moral duties are not known
through reason but through intuition. For Ross, the nature of the situation will make it clear what
our prima facie and actual moral duties are in that situation. For instance, if one makes a promise
to someone, one has a prima facie moral duty to fulfill such a promise. We get to know this moral
duty immediately or intuitively given the situation. There is no need for some principles, like

9
Another test for universalizability is reversibility of positions….

14
Kant’s principle of universalizability, to know that this is our moral duty given the situation.
Likewise, for Ross, if one prima facie duty conflicts with another prima facie duty, it will also be
clear in the situation which duty should override which duty. Thus, in a conflict between the
moral duty of telling the truth and the moral duty of beneficence, it would be clear which duty
overrides which duty.

Ross identifies a list, though not a complete one, of our primary moral duties naturally
arising from certain situations. This list is as follows:

A. Duties arising from one's own past actions:

1. Duty of fidelity – the duty to fulfill (explicit and implicit) promises and agreements
or contracts one has entered into, and not to engage in deception.
2. Duty of reparation – the duty to make up for wrongful acts or injuries one has
previously done to others.

B. Duties arising from the previous actions of others towards oneself:

3. Duty of gratitude – the duty to repay other people for the past favors they have
done for oneself or for the benefits one has received from them.

C. Duties arising from the (possibility of) a mismatch between persons' pleasure or
happiness and their "merit":
4. Duty of justice – the duty to prevent or correct such a mismatch, or to act in such a
way that one distributes benefits and burdens fairly.

D. Duties arising from the possibility of improving the conditions of others with respect to
virtue, intelligence, or pleasure:
5. Duty of beneficence – the duty to improve the conditions of others in these
respects; duty to do good to others: foster their health, security, wisdom, moral
goodness, or happiness.

E. Duties arising from the possibility of improving one's own condition with respect to
virtue or intelligence:
6. Duty of self-improvement – the duty to improve one's own condition in these
respects; to act so as to promote one’s own good, i.e., one’s own health, security,
wisdom, moral goodness, and happiness.

F. Duties arising from the possibility of preventing harm on others:

7. Duty of nonmaleficence - duty not to injure others, the duty not to harm others
physically or psychologically: to avoid harming their health, security, intelligence,
character, or happiness.

One advantage of Ross’ deontology is that it is able to deal with situations in which Kant’s
deontology does not seem to be the appropriate ethical framework to adopt without resorting
to consequentialism. For instance, in moments in which the moral duty to keep a promise does

15
not seem to be the correct action, one need resort to consequentialism, saying for instance that
keeping a promise in this situation does not maximize happiness. Ross’ solution is to say that
keeping a promise, in this situation, is simply overridden by another moral duty, say the duty of
beneficence. In case, however, there is no overriding conflicting moral duty, and not keeping a
promise will maximize happiness, Ross would insist that the prima facie duty to keep a promise
becomes the actual moral duty.

III. VIRTUE ETHICS

Again, for virtue ethics, what will make an action good or bad will be the character trait
of the agent. If the character trait of the agent is good, in which case the agent is a virtuous agent,
then the action is morally good; if it is not, the action is morally wrong. This description, however,
needs qualification in light of the possibility that a person of good moral reputation can also
perform a morally wrong action, and a person of bad moral reputation can also perform a morally
correct action. Such a possibility is due to the fact that its agent may or may not act “in character.”
That is to say, when a person known to be virtuous (presumably because of his previous actions)
performs a morally wrong action, this means that this person acts out of his character of being a
virtuous person. The same is true of a person not known to be a virtuous person but performs an
action that is morally right. And so, when we say that action is morally good if its agent has a
good character trait, we assume that the agent acts in character. Hursthouse (1999, 23) thus
states the principle of virtue ethics as a guide for moral action as follows: “An action is right iff it
is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the
circumstances.”

Virtue ethics has been upheld in various ways by different philosophers. But it was
Aristotle who first gave a systematic version of it and this version has become the standard model
such that later versions are often qualified as Neo-Aristotelian. Aristotle first notes that the
ultimate end or goal of humans is to be happy or to flourish (what Aristotle calls “eudaimonia”)
(see Hursthouse 1999, 10-11). According to him, of all the goals of humans, happiness is the
ultimate for it is self-sufficient, final, and attainable. Now happiness is achieved through virtue,
which Aristotle defines as the excellence of a thing in terms of the exercise of its proper functions.
For instance, the excellence of a guitar is its good sound when played—which is its proper
function. But what about the humans, what are their proper functions? In Aristotle’s analysis,
what differentiate humans from the rest of nature are their capacities of reason and will, which
thus constitute their proper functions. Consequently, the excellence of reason requires
intellectual virtues, while that of the will requires practical or moral virtues. Intellectual virtues
are acquired through study or instruction and are shown by or manifested through knowledge;
while moral virtues are acquired through practice and habit and are shown by or manifested
through practical actions.

Moral virtues are, more specifically, character traits which would enable us to live a happy
or flourishing life. But how do we identify the moral virtues or the good character traits? In the
face of some situation, say one which requires confidence, how would we determine the

16
appropriate character trait that one must have to properly face this situation? Aristotle gives us
a guide, which has come to be known as the principle of the golden mean. According to this
principle, the good character trait is that which lies in between two extreme traits relevant to the
situation: one is an excessive form; the other the deficient form. Thus, for instance, with regard
to the feeling of confidence, the mean is courage, the excess is rash, and the deficiency is
cowardice. This makes courage as the good character trait in facing situations that would require
the feeling of confidence. Other examples are as follows: with regard to giving and taking of
money, the mean is liberality, the excess is prodigality, and the deficiency is meanness; and with
regard to honor and dishonor, the mean is proper pride, the excess is empty vanity, and the
deficiency is undue humility.

Three things must be noted with regard to the principle of the golden mean. First, there
is no mean for an excess or a deficiency; for instance, there is no mean for greed, which is an
excess, or for cowardice, which is a deficiency. Second, the mean is not absolute in that it is
relative to an individual and circumstance. For instance, what is courageous may vary from one
person to another, from one circumstance to another. Third, the principle of the mean is
intended solely to serve as a guide for determining the appropriate character trait in a given
situation. This means that it will not be accurate to extend it to other forms of human endeavor
such as in the areas of sports, academics, and others, which may have different standards for an
excellent performance.

As moral virtues, such as courage, kindness, honesty, and others, are traits that we need
to acquire in order to live a happy or flourishing life, virtue ethics is often distinguished from
consequentialism and deontology in the following related ways. As consequentialism and
deontology are act-centered ethical theories, virtue ethics is an agent-centered ethical theory.
As consequentialism and deontology primarily focus on the question of what actions we ought
to perform (a question of doing), virtue ethics primarily focuses on the question of how we ought
to live (a question of being) (see Hursthouse 1999, 21). These differentiations, however, are
misleading if one would take them to mean that virtue ethics, unlike consequentialism and
deontology, does not provide a guide for what actions to take in a given situation. As earlier
noted, for virtue ethics, the morally good action is the one that a virtuous agent, acting in
character, would do in the circumstances.

REFERENCES

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Denise, Theodore, et al. 1996. Great traditions in ethics. Eight edition. California: Wadsworth
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Hales, Steven. 1995. Was Nietzsche a consequentialist? International Studies in Philosophy 27
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Hare, R. M. 2009. A utilitarian approach. In A companion to bioethcs. Edited by Helga Kuhse and
Peter Singer. West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. On virtue ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Smart, J.J.C., 2004. Defending utilitarianism. In Ethics contemporary readings. Edited by Harry
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