Department of Music Theory, Jacobs School of Music, Indiana University

Trustees of Indiana University

Some Musical Applications of Phenomenology

Author(s): Judy Lochhead
Source: Indiana Theory Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (SPRING, 1980), pp. 18-27
Published by: Indiana University Press on behalf of the Department of Music Theory,
Jacobs School of Music, Indiana University
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Department of Music Theory, Jacobs School of Music, Indiana University, Indiana

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18 INDIANA THEORY REVIEW

Some Musical

Applications
of Phenomenology
Judy Lochhead

In recent years, some music theorists have adopted ideas

from phenomenology and applied them to various musical ques
tions of a philosophical nature:1 What is the foundation —
the a priori — of musical understanding? Should descrip
tions of music be intuitive or scientific? What is the
relationship between a score and a performance of that
score? Here I shall suggest some ways in which ideas from
phenomenology can also be applied to questions of phrase and
rhythmic structure. Beyond that, I hope the following
introduction to phenomenological concepts will suggest other
applications.

"To the things themselves" is the motto Edmund Husserl,

the discipline's founder, uses to characterize
phenomenology. Husserl formulates not only ideas about the
cognitive significance of phenomena but also a method with

^Some examples are: Thomas Clifton, "Music and the A

Priori," Journal of Music Theory 17 (1973), pp. 66-85, and
"Some Comparisons Between Intuitive and Scientific Descrip
tions of Music," Journal of Music Theory 19 (1975), pp.
66-110; Charles J. Smith, "Toward a Phenomenalistic Account
of Music's Performances," I_n Theory Only 11-12 (Feb.-Mar.
1977), pp. 17-29.
2Husserl articulates the philosophy of phenomenology in
various texts; some of these are Ideas: A General Introduc
tion to Pure Phenomenology, translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson
(New York: Collier Books, 1975); Cartesian Meditations,
translated by Dorian Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1960); and The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology, translated by David Carr
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

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 PHENOMENOLOGY IN MUSIC 19

which one can dig through the "sedimented knowledge"^ of ex

perience in order to get at the "thing itself." Husserl's
ideas about the "things themselves," i.e., the phenomena,
are pertinent to this discussion.
A "phenomenon" is the focus of someone's experience. The
statement, "I see the chair" means "I perceive the chair" or
"I am experiencing the chair" or "I am experiencing the
phenomenon of the chair." Thus, someone's experience of a
chair depends not on the cognitive capabilities of the sub
ject who has the experience nor on the attributes of the
chair, but rather on the thing of experience and the way
that thing is experienced by someone. This relationship
between the thing of experience and the mode of experience
is what Husserl termed intentiona1ity,4 and describes a way
of making sense of the world. The notion "thing of ex
perience" tells us something about the unifying acts of
cognition; for example, if I walk into a room and see a
chair, my perception of the chair arises from a multitude of
"chair appearances" and is singled out of a multitude of
other "room sensations." The notion "mode of experience"
tells us something about the subject's relation to the thing
of experience; after walking all afternoon, I enter a room
and see the chair in which I want to sit and rest. My
perception not of the table or the bureau, which are also in
the room, but rather of'the chair, depends on my desire to
sit and rest. Thus, my perception of the chair is an act of
intentionality.
In characterizing experience, Husserl was most interested
in things which occur in space, i.e., which have a physical
extension. He would assert that our perception of things
like chairs or trees as three-dimensional depends on our
kinesthetic relation to them. For example, the basketball I
see sitting in mid-court before the big game has depth and
roundness. Its spherical attributes depend on my knowledge
that the ball has surfaces which, although unseen, could be
discovered if I were to walk around it or if I were to pick
it up. My kinesthetic relation to the ball expresses itself
in the perception of a sphere. Other phenomenologists have
pointed out that experience does not neatly divide into that
which is spatial and that which is temporal, as Husserl
seemed to imply. Merleau-Ponty has shown that the various

^The notion of "sedimented knowledge" is neatly explained

in Don Ihde's Experimental Phenomenology (New York: Capri
corn Books, 1977, Chapter 4; see especially p. 74) with
respect to the perception of multi-stable phenomena. In
short, past experience layers our knowledge such that
present experiences are rooted in this sedimented knowledge.
4This explanation of intentionality is indebted to Ihde's
in Experimental Phenomenology, p. 42.

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20 INDIANA THEORY REVIEW

senses — sight, touch, hearing, smell, taste — are

ultimately inseparable: one hears space, touches sounds,
tastes colors.® In his book, Listening and Voice, Don Ihde
shows both that sound can supply information about such
diverse things as the real meaning of someone's words or the
trouble with a car and that sound is essential to one's
sense of space.® He would argue that our perception of the
basketball as a sphere also depends on the spatial informa
tion we get from the sounds that fill the gym. The direc
tions of the sounds inform the sense of space; the basket
ball assumes its three-dimensionality as part of the larger
spatial context.
Sound as it informs space is suggestive for us. Musici
ans have long used terms of spatial attributes to describe
musical features: we speak of the shape of a melody, the
highness or lowness of a pitch, the movement of harmony. We
seem to be saying that music is the sounding of shapes. How
are such shapes formed in the temporal flow of music? Hus
serl's concept of temporal unity sheds some light on this
notion of music's space.
In The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness,7 the
concept of temporal unity is bound to Husserl's theory of
time. He argues that "primordial time" is human conscious
ness. This temporal attribute is called the "flux of
consciousness." The temporal flux has a logical priority
because within it "objective time" and "temporal objects"
are constituted; i.e., within it the time of things and the
things of experience are constituted. Let us focus first on
the "flux of consciousness" and then on the "constitution of
temporal objects" in this flow.
The "flux of consciousness" is like the absolute, objec
tive time of Newton in two ways: first, it functions as a
reference against which and in which things happen, and se
cond, its flow is absolute and constant. The flux can flow
neither more swiftly nor more slowly, and, though
characterized as constant alteration, it is not the altera
p
tion of any thing. Husserl's flux differs radically from
Newtonian time, however, in that the former is consciousness
itself. One is not conscious of absolute temporality;
rather, consciousness itself is absolute temporality.

^Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception,

translated by Colin Smith (London and Henley: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1976) pp. 228-30.
®Don Ihde, Listening and Voice: A Phenomenology of Sound
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1976).
7Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Conscious
ness , translated by James Churchill(Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1964).
8Ibid., p. 99.

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 PHENOMENOLOGY IN MUSIC 21

Within the flux of consciousness, the objects of experience

are constituted; within this flux there is a consciousness
of objects.
Of particular interest for us is the constitution of tem
poral objects in the flux of consciousness. Husserl defines
temporal objects as "unities in time....which include tem
poral extension in themselves."^ Tones and melodies are
examples. The philosophical problem of the definition and
conception of temporal objects is most clearly articulated
by Augustine in Book XI of the Confessions.

16

Nevertheless, 0 Lord, we are aware of periods of

time. We compare them one with another and say
that some are longer and others shorter. We even
calculate how much longer or shorter one period is
than another, and the result of our calculations
tells us that it is twice or three times the
length of the one which we take as the unit of
measurement, or that the two are of equal dura
tion. If we measure them by our own awareness of
time, we must do so while it is passing, for no
one can measure it either when it is past and no
longer exists, or when it is future and does not
yet exist — that is, unless he is bold enough to
claim that what does not exist can be measured.
The conclusion is that we can be aware of time and
measure it only while it is passing. Once it has
passed it no longer is, and therefore cannot be
measured.

How is the sounding of a single pitch for a specific dura

tion constituted in the flux of consciousness as an object,
as a tone? How is unity established from the multitude of
appearances — a multitude of now-moments — of the so
called object? Husserl attributes the possibility of unity
to a special type of memory called "retentional conscious
ness." As each now-moment of the sounding tone is pushed
into the past, it is held in retentional consciousness; its
"mode of appearance" changes from "now" to "just-having
been." As each particular moment is pushed farther and
farther back, its mode of appearance is in constant flux.
It is by means of this "retentional modification" that tem
poral relations of before-after and past-present-future
arise, that the tone has a beginning and ending. It is by

9Ibid., p. 43.
-^Augustine, Confessions, Book XI, translated by R. S.
Pine-Coffin (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 266.

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22 INDIANA THEORY REVIEW

means of "retentional consciousness" that the tone has un

ity: all of the moments of its temporal extension are
retained and are related and identified with the original
now-moment, i.e., with the beginning. The retentional
modification "retains" the necessary information for the
constitution of a unity and "modifies" the information ac
cording to the before-after attributes of temporality such
that the unity has temporal extension. Husserl calls this
sort of intuitive memory "primary remembrance."
In contrast to this, "secondary remembrance" is not
intuitive and is identified as "recollection" or "fantasy."
By an act of free will an event or object can be recalled to
consciousness; it can be "present" in consciousness similar
to the way an event or object is "present" in primary
remembrance. In secondary remembrance, however, the object
is "represented" and not "primordially given."
The ideas underlying retentional consciousness and
primary remembrance require further attention. Temporal ob
jects are constituted and held in retentional consciousness

Husserl's "Diagram of Time"

/v.,
O-f

XXtry O

Vo, °?
V' %
Xe
y

OE - Series of now-points
00" - Sinking-down
EO" - Continuation of phases
(Now-point with horizon of the past)

EO - "Running-off" of the temporal object

00" - "Running-off" of a phase of the temporal object^

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 PHENOMENOLOGY IN MUSIC 23

by means of primary remembrance. The perception of temporal

objects depends on the accumulation of temporal information
from a series of now-moments by intuitive memory. Such an
accumulation of information is not additive but really
retentional in the sense that there is a "welling-up" of the
past. This welling-up bears on and shapes the temporal ob
ject. Husserl's diagram of time is helpful here. This dia
gram appears as part of a discussion of the "running-off
phenomenon";^ the term describes the continuous change of a
temporal object's mode of appearance. The diagram is also
used to illustrate how retentional consciousness bears on
the perception of temporal objects. In the phenomenon of
temporal unity, the object component requires some sort of
unity through time, but the temporal component requires some
sort of alteration. In a temporal object, the contents of
its appearances are unified in some way, and this element of
unity is continuously changing its mode of appearance — a
changing which assures the object's temporal extension.
Now let us apply these ideas to a piece of music: the
opening measures in the second movement of Beethoven's
string quartet op. 59, #1. After hearing this much of the
mus i c:

one does not perceive a temporal object. The music does not
provide enough information to define this figure as a unit
or to define any accentual-metrical meaning, i.e., to define
a barring. The possible meanings of this figure are
virtually unlimited. This situation changes, however, when,
as the initial figure is held in retentional consciousness,
another identical one occurs.

Through its repetition, the figure establishes itself as a

temporal object: the accentual-metrical meaning is still
undefined, but a few equally plausible possibilities arise.

1)
m*
".D7JIJTJ]21 J3|J7I|J]" JE IJ
The music does provide enough information for an accentual

■'-■'•Husserl, Time Consciousness, pp. 48-50.

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24 INDIANA THEORY REVIEW

metrical interpretation with the addition of two contrasting

f igur es :

It is important to note that the accentual-metrical meaning

and the identification of temporal units is a relational
phenomenon that requires temporal retention. Of course, the
problematic issue in musical analysis and interpretation
lies in exactly how and on what basis object relations are
determined. We can shed some light on this matter by
considering the element of unity in the first four measures
of the quartet.

Temporal Object

p ••• tb-ddm mlw00m

The temporal object arises from 1) the repeated rhythmic

figure in the first two bars, 2) the elaboration of this
figure in bar three, 3) the slowing of rhythmic activity in
the final bar, and 4) the articulation of a regularly recur
ring duration, i.e., the measure. These recurrent durations
relate to one another functionally:

Unity

Establishing Elaborating Slowing

CN 4

u
man frrrtr r
unis
The welding of the smaller measure units into a larger
phrase unit depends on the functional relationships
established between the measure units.
In the opening of Seymour Shifrin's Fourth String Quartet
(Ex. I), the music defines temporal units in a different
way. If we accept the composer's phrase markings, some sort
of phrase is to be perceived by the listener and projected
by the performer in bars 1-3.
This temporal unity is defined both by composite linear
activity and by the articulation of vertical sonorities.
The composite activity (i.e., the relative number of attack

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 PHENOMENOLOGY IN MUSIC 25

Example 1^2
Example I12

SEYMOUR SHIFRIN
t Gently, delicately, V= ca. 48 1966 /67
r express,
m..lo ma
nn piano
^ 3

Violoncello

* the signs r i and T 1 indicate phrases and sub-phrases

Tt indicate overlap of groupings

points) partitions the phrase into three parts. This sym

metrical division is determined by a process: slow activity
— increased activity — slow activity, or statement —
elaboration — return. (See Example 11 — i.) The phrase is
also partitioned by the recurrence of two vertical
sonorities:
^ andA and
0 S4,
• A*occurs
A once
in m. 1; 3 occurs twice in m. 2. A minus an a^ (which is
in the cello's last 16th in m. 2) and are combined in m.
3: A' + 3 In A and A' + b all the pitches which make up
the sonority are attacked simultaneously. In , however,
the sonority comes into focus gradually; attacks are not
simultaneous. The attack points of these sonorities (in the

S. Shifrin,
12S. Shifrin, String
StringQuartet
QuartetNo.
No.£,copyright
copyright (c) 1977
1977 by
by
C. F. Peters Corp. Reprinted by permission of the
publisher.

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26 INDIANA THEORY REVIEW

Example II

Composiie.Lilinear
Composrte Activity
near Activity

SZou)
SZou> Increased
, Creased S[olJ
$[ou)

Vertical.
Vertical
Sortorrties
Sonorities AAB
B B
B A
A +
+ B
Srmuitaneoas
Simultaneous 014
offset
s ri Offset
Offset Simultaneous
Simultaneous

TW 2'/3 A^k5
-2/ Aitae.ks 2'/,
„i/_ AttaCkS
Attaaks Z'L
01/^ Attacks ^|(/MWS./3
Attacks ^^
I |\Z| I 1 \l/' 1 l 1 1
' ' '2J & 1 ; ' '1 1 }
mm;/
mm-J

case ol , the point where all the pitches are present)

divide the phrase into units of roughly the same duration.
For purposes of discussion, this duration is defined by 2
1/6 - 2 2/3 beats. The experience of this recurrent dura
tion does not, however, depend on the measuring role of a
beat or on the measured equality of durations: "roughly the
same duration" is a significant structural attribute here.13
(See Example Il-ii.)
With respect to these sonorities, the perception of unity
results from the process they articulate: A (simultaneous
attack = statement), ~Q (offset attacks = contrast), and
(simultaneous attack = consolidation). The duration
marked off by these sonorities also contributes to the
perception of unity. An experiential recognition of this
duration as recurrent does not register until the A '+10

am indebted to David Lewin, who helped formalize this

aspect of unity in the Shifrin phrase.

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 PHENOMENOLOGY IN MUSIC 27

sonority is articulated and held for the "proper" duration.

Such recognition strengthens the sense of closure and com
pletion at the end of the phrase.
The primary difference between the types of temporal ob
jects defined by the Beethoven and Shifrin quartets has to
do with the sort of time they project. The Beethoven
quartet utilizes duration as motive: a four-measure duration
acts as a referential temporal object — an object which it
self is measured by the beat, i.e., by a standard unit.
Throughout the movement, temporal unities are heard in rela
tion to this duration motive. Duration as theme is possible
because retentional consciousness can hold a memory of dura
tion as lived experience. As such, the quartet projects ob
jective time because measured time — the four-measure dura
tion — is motivic. The Shifrin quartet projects a time
analogous not to the flux of consciousness but rather to the
consciousness of flux. The temporal object's time is not
measured by a standard unit, but rather its flow is
articulated by things or events which define durational
spans. The temporal object is of a fluxional quality be
cause it occupies and flows in time.
To conclude, I will pose a question. Since duration does
not operate as motive in the Shifrin quartet, it seems that
we ought to look for some other sorts of large scale tem
poral structure. The question is, shall we look for dura
tion units of objective time as the basis of such
structures, or shall we seek alternatives? The preceding
analysis is, I believe, a useful point of departure for such
a search.

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