THE DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS

Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr. v. Atty. Isidro L. Caracol

(A.C. No. 7325, 21 January 2015)

Facts:
The case involves a parcel of land, OCT No. 433, which was covered by a homestead
patent. Such patent was granted to Micael Babela who had two legal heirs, Fernando and
Efren. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCTs) were issued in their respective names.

When the agrarian reform law was enacted on October 21, 1972, emancipation patents
and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danila Nipotnipot who sold the parcels of land to
Raymunda Villaherosa, Domiciano’s spouse.

On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)

issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from
OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was
appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals.

On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as “Add’l Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant,” filed
a motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full
implementation of the March 2, 1994 decision.
On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of
Execution and Demolition which he signed as “Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela”

Villahermosa alleged that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he
obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. He claimed that certain
Ernesto Aguirre was the client of Atty. Caracol.

Atty. Caracol insisted that he was given authority by Efren and Ernesto.

In its Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct. It
found that respondent did not present credible evidence to controvert the allegation that he
was not authorized by plaintiff or counsel of record. Respondent admitted that at the time of
the filing of the second motion, Efren was dead. It noted that Atty. Caracol did not explain how
he obtained the authority nor did he present any proof of the authority.

Issue:
Whether Atty. Caracol is liable for representing Efren without authority.
Held:
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s
appearance on behalf of his client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized
to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to
authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either
party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the
right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to
disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may
thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in court for a
person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as
an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.

If a lawyer corruptly or wilfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority,
he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved
in his official transaction.

It must be taken into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an attorney-
client relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer.

In view of his actions of contravening his lawyer's oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from
the practice of law for a period of one year.

AREOLA vs. ATTY. MENDOZA

A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014
This refers to the administrative complaint filed by Edgardo D. Areola a.k.a. Muhammad
Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, from the Public Attorney s Office (PAO) for
violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In the letter-complaint addressed to the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the
complaint in behalf of his co-detainees.
Areola alleged that, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Jail and called all
detainees with pending cases before the RTC, where she was assigned, to attend her lecture.
Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal
sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang
ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang
bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga
babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na
kayo. Malambot ang puso noon.”

Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their
pleadings and filing motions before the RTC, Atty. Mendoza undermined his capability. Atty.
Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the administrative complaint against her is a harassment
tactic by Areola.
The Investigating Commissioner stated that Areola is knowledgeable in the field of law.
While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he must, however, be subservient to the
skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. The commissioner however, found no convincing
evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from Areola’s co-detainees as alleged.
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and
their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would
be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating
Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the
image of and lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is liable for giving improper advice to her clients in violation
of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule
15.07 states that: a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness.
Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal
system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or
factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice.
To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s
cause, is condemnable and unethical.
The Court held that the penalty of suspension for two (2) months as excessive and not
commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the
most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in
those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the
bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. The Court notes that when Atty.
Mendoza made the remark “Iyakiyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark
was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as to
cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.
Thus, Atty, Mendoza was reprimanded with stern warning.
 ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG V ATTY. ROGELIO CELERA
AC NO. 5581 January 14, 2014

FACTS:
On May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan, sister of complainant,
entered into a contract of marriage. Respondent however contracted another marriage with a
certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba. Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and
Gracemarie was still valid when he contracted his second marriage, and that the first marriage
had never been annulled or rendered. Bansig alleged that respondent’s act renders him unfit to
continue his membership in the Bar.

During the proceedings, the respondent repeatedly failed to file his comment claiming
that he was not receiving the complaint. Bansig however averred that the Show Cause Order
always came back unserved because of respondent’s change of address which the latter failed
to confer with the court. Thus, the court referred the complaint to IBP and ordered his arrest.
However the return of warrant showed that the respondent cannot be located. Respondent
also failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings. The IBP declared the
respondent in default which the respondent failed to take action on. IBP recommended that he
be suspended for a period of 2 years.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice.

RULING:
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is
rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. An administrative
proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the
charges against him despite numerous notices.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by

substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of
the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a

second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. Both marriages were proved by
certified Xerox copies which are sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages. The
Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence
to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the
Bar.
 The respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 7, and Rule 7.03. His act of contracting
a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and
is a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for
respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take
notice of and the rest he will just ignore. Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.

Respondent is thus ordered disbarred.

FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO versus ATTY. PABLO BERNARDO

AC. NO. 6368

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and
Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for
deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his duties and
oath as a lawyer.
FACTS:
That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo
Bernardo with the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat [wilfully]
and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein complainants Fidela G.
Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect that he
would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are
the acquaintance of complainants herein and they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they
will finance and deliver to him the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money he would
expedite the titling of the subject land and further by means of other similar deceit like
misrepresenting himself as lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the subject
land, who is the owner of Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is
the one handling William Gatchalians business transaction and that he has contracts at
NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were
false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainant[s] to give and deliver the said
amount ([P]495,000.00) and once in possession of said amount, far from complying with his
obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his personal use and benefit
and despite demand upon him to return the said amount, he failed and refused to do so, which
acts constitute deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of
Duties and Oath as a lawyer.

Respondent:
He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April 15, 1997 to July
22, 1997 for purposes of getting from them the amount of [P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat
whom they contacted and who in turn sought the legal services of the respondent. It was Andy
Magat who received the said money from them. There was no connivance made and entered
into by Andy Magat and respondent. The arrangement for titling of the land was made by
Teresita N. Bengco and Andy Magat with no participation of respondent. The acceptance of the
respondent to render his legal service is legal and allowed in law practice.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference.
The respondent failed to appear; thus, the IBP considered the respondent in default for his
failure to appear and for not filing an answer despite extensions granted. The case was then
submitted for report and recommendation.

In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed a

complaint for Estafa against the former before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of Sto.
Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the
said court, it finds sufficient grounds to hold respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of
Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was
transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for appropriate action as
per Order dated 7 December 1998.

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of

Pampanga conducted a re-investigation of the case. During the re-investigation thereof, Magat
was willing to reimburse to complainants the amount of [P]200,000.00 because according to
him the amount of [P]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by respondent considering that the
said amount was turned over to respondent for expenses incurred in the documentation prior
to the titling of the subject land. Both respondent and Magat requested for several extensions
for time to pay back their obligations to the complainants. However, despite extensions of time
granted to them, respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their promise to pay back their
obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the offer of compromise was construed to be an implied
admission of guilt.

The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on
several occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to
lawful orders of the court and illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer which
deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.

From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent
committed a crime that import deceit and violation of his attorneys oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which he was bound to obey the laws of the land. The
commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty in
violation of the attorneys oath, grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension
or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).
 The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case only
on 16 April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline,
as amended, dated 24 March 2004, A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional misconduct (Section 1,
Rule VIII).

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

Bernardo be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO YEARS from receipt hereof from the practice of
his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

IBP Board of Governors:

ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby ordered,
the restitution of the amount of [P]200,000.00 and if he does not return the amount with in
sixty days from receipt of this Order then he will be meted the penalty of Suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.

On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Resolution of the IBP. The respondent averred that the IBP resolution is not in accord
with the rules considering that the complaint was filed more than two (2) years from the
alleged misconduct and therefore, must have been dismissed outright.
On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation stating that the RTC rendered a decision in the
criminal case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat guilty of conspiracy in
the commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and both are
sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the IBP resolution is in accord with the rules considering that the complaint was
filed more than 2 years from the alleged misconduct and thus has prescribed?
Whether Atty. Bernardo is liable for violating the CPR?

HELD:
It is first worth mentioning that the respondents defense of prescription is untenable.
The Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of
considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise,
members of the bar would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come
forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative
liability they ought to answer for.

Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for several
extensions of time to file the same, the respondent failed to appear during the mandatory
conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is considered as an officer of the
court who is called upon to obey and respect court processes. Such acts of the respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the courts authority which cannot be countenanced.

It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice.
As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples
faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined whether in
their professional or in their private capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality,
honesty, probity and good demeanor.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications
or legal services.

There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat
regarding the purported titling of land supposedly purchased. While he begs for the Courts
indulgence, his contrition is shallow considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in
order to deceive the complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject
properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants
in the amount of P495,000.00.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of
a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a

criminal action filed against a lawyer despite having involved the same set of facts.
Jurisprudence has it that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a
finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the respondent’s acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively.

As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of
Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day
of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines the respondent’s moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar.

Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of violating the Code of Professional

Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon notice hereof.

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of
P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of this
Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the Court, through the Office of
the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN WARNING that failure to do so
shall merit him the additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants, v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B.

JIMENEZ, Respondent.; A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014
Facts:
-The Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of
the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City.
-On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages
against the Association and Ely Mabanag RTC of Quezon City for building a concrete wall which
abutted their property and denied them of their right of way.
-Respondent’s firm was the legal counsel for the Association with respondent as the handling
lawyer
-After trial and hearing, RTC decided in favour of the Spouses Santander
-On appeal, CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that the period had expired to file the
appellant’s brief for the appeal
-eight years later, complainants Figueras and Victoria filed a complaint for disbarment against
respondent for his negligence in handling the appeal and for wilful violation of his duties as an
officer of the court and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule
12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17 and Canon 18
Respondent’s Contention:
-Respondent claimed that although his firm represented the Association, the case was actually
handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. He only exercised general supervision and
signed the pleadings therein. Respondent added that complainants have no personality to file
the disbarment complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction
over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD:
-The Commissioner found respondent liable for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18
thereof, and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.
Decision:
-the Court finds that the suspension of respondent from the practice of law is proper. Any
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.” The right to
institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person
complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters
of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the
charges.
-The court held that a lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of
protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on
behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule
12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
-Atty. Diosdado Jimenez is found administratively liable and is suspended for one month

ATTY. POLICARPIO I. CATALAN v. ATTY . .JOSELITO M. SILVOSA

FACTS:
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as
public prosecutor in the Esperon case, for the complex crime of double frustrated murder, in
which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private complainants.

Atty. Catalan filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Silvosa based on the following
allegation: that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have
the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accused’s favour by causing
numerous delays in the trial by arguing against the position of the private prosecutor. That after
Atty. Silvosa was relieved from handling the said case he then later on appeared as private
lawyer and counsel for the accused and filed a motion to reinstate bail after the RTC ruled
against the accused on November 16, 2005.

That in a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent,
Pros. Phoebe Toribio downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to less serious physical
injuries. However, Atty. Silvosa allegedly offered her ₱30,000 to reconsider her findings and
uphold the charge of frustrated murder. This is based on the affidavit of Pros. Toribio
That in one homicide case, despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the
complainant in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still
remained in detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa then demanded ₱15,000 from
Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas. That he was convicted of
Direct Bribery by the Sandiganbayan in relation to this case.
Defenses of Atty. Silvosa: that he resigned as prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October
2002. He also claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail
and denies any relationship between himself and the accused.

Pros. Toribio’s allegations is “self-serving”.

He admits his conviction , that he is under probation but asserts that the same does not
involve moral turpitude since the act involved ‘do not amount to a crime.’” He claims that “it is
not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a public officer. He further
points out that complainant has no personal knowledge about the charge of extortion and that
he was not a party in said case nor was he ever involved in it.

IBP Report and Recommendation: guilty only of the first charge ,: SUSPENSION for 2 yrs.
He is only guilty of the first charge for violating the prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As to the claim of bribery that occurred more than seven (7) years
ago, the allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another,
that the veracity of the facts and the existence of the bribe money could not be ascertained
and verified with certainty anymore because of the long period that passed. Lastly, the findings
in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been
presented relating to the alleged extortion case.

RULING; DISBARRED
Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his appearance on the Motion to Post
Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that “A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of facts.

His claim that his subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited only to the
reinstatement of the original bail is unmeritorious.

An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer

or counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he
is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating
his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.
Contrary to the IBP’s ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an
attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a
day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then
President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false
testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the
accusation and dismissed it as persecution. He failed to show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. Moreover, mere delay in
the filing of an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically
exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time
has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the
disciplining arm of the Court.

The contention of the respondent that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in the case
of extortion is of no moment since under Section 1, Rule 139-B, disbarment proceedings may
be initiated by any interested person.

Furthermore, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude and
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment.

Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private

duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.

Moral Turpitude in direct bribery can be inferred by the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is
a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good
morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO

Facts:
Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun was in open and adverse possession of subject land
(Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030) for a period of more than thirty years. His
family’s house was erected on the land. The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own
the same lot. On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued
Resolution No. 26-96 stating that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga consider the lot
under Tax Dec. No. 114 as the new site where the Rural Health Center will rise. On May 24,
1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed with the MTC,
San Luis, Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief. However, Gozun was not served with
summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory relief. Respondent Judge Daniel Liangco
issued a resolution, reasoning:
1. First, the municipality of San Luis, Pampanga through its Sangguniang Bayan may
enact resolutions and ordinances to regulate the use of property within its
jurisdiction.
2. Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is not contrary to law, morals and public policy.
3. Third, the municipal mayor through an executive order may order the Philippine
National Police or any government law enforcement agency to enforce or
implement the resolution, using reasonable force if necessary and justified.
4. Fourth, squatting in government property is considered a nuisance per se.

Furthermore, Liangco said that with the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an
executive order, the municipality may order the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in
San Luis, Pampanga to effect the eviction of Hermogenes Gozun and all other persons who may
be claiming any right. Subsequently, the municipal mayor, Jovito C. Bondoc issued Executive
Order No. 1, series of 1996, ordering the PNP to implement Resolution No. 34-96. Gozun’s
house was demolished.

Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator. He
averred that respondent’s issuance of the resolution amounts to gross misconduct, gross
inefficiency and incompetence. He further accused the municipal mayor of having bribed
respondent judge. Mayor Bondoc told complainant Gozun that the respondent judge is in his
pocket because he has given him a lot of things.

The Court Administrator recommended the dismissal from office of respondent judge.
OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent. OCA charged him with gross
misconduct for acting with manifest bias and partiality towards a party, as well as for
inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedure that challenged his competence to
remain a member of the legal profession.

The investigating commissioner found that there was clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence to warrant the disbarment of respondent. Respondent had exhibited lapses, as well as
ignorance of well-established rules and procedures. The present complaint was not the first of
its kind to be filed against him. Before his dismissal from the judiciary, respondent was
suspended for six (6) months when he assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-four (54)
cases for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 a violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7
dated 23 September 1974. Also, pending with the Supreme Court were three (3) administrative
cases filed against him for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct bribery. In the
bribery case, he was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in an entrapment
operation.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of the
Investigating commissioner.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Liangco should be disbarred.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court resolves to disbar Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for gross misconduct in
violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary and inexcusable ignorance of the law in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun who would
be affected by the action. The records show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had
it docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed
of the matter by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition was filed without
notice and hearing. Moreover, the testimonial evidence on record indicates that he maintained
close relations with the municipal vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, a party-litigant who had
an obvious interest in the outcome of the case. The testimony of Romulo A. Batu, former vice-
mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, showed that respondent denigrated his impartiality as a judge.

In Edao v. Judge Asdala, the Court explained that:

As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are
expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of
the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality;
but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the
peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are
deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal
demeanor of judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process
by which the decision is made.

As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to

entertain a petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his
capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable question.
Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the public’s confidence
in the competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and
responsibility that attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of
the bar should know. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a
lawyer must uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes. Contrary to
this edict, respondent malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of Gozun not to be
deprived of a right or property without due process of law. Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03,
respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules of Procedure and not to misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice. In this case, however, the opposite happened. Respondent
recklessly used the powers of the court to inflict injustice. "A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." (Rule 7.03, Code of
Professional Responsibility.)

In Samson v. Judge Caballero, the Court ruled that because membership in the bar is an integral
qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects the latters
moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates
the lawyers oath.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the following offenses:

1. GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary

2. INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
DISCIPLINE OF FILIPINO LAWYERS PRACTICING ABROAD

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, Complainant, - versus –

ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, Respondent

FACTS: In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the
suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following
grounds:
1) respondent’s alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against
him by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondent’s alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in Administrative
Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

First Ground:
The following facts transpired in the administrative case against the respondent in California:
1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of
California. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who
figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis
(father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was
then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case.
Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his
personal account;
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera
be suspended from the practice of law for three years; and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the
Supreme Court of California. The SC of California did not decide whether Atty. De Vera will be
suspended or not because before the case went up to the Supreme Court, Atty De Vera
surrendered his license.
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds
due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing
Referee of the State Bar of California. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced
to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the
recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the
moral competence necessary to lead the country’s most noble profession.
In his defense, Atty De Vera claims that he was given authority to handle the money by
the father of the insured in the insurance claim.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the recommended suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar
of California should be considered a ground for disbarment or suspension against Atty De Vera.
2. Whether or not, independent of the recommended suspension, Atty De vera should
be held administratively liable for appropriating the funds of his client.

RULING: 1. The recommended suspension against Atty De Vera cannot be given effect in this
jurisdiction.
The SC ruled in previous cases that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a
foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and
suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute
into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts
action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise
held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of
unethical acts as lawyer.
In this case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima
facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial
evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is
successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine
law. However, the complainant failed to do this. Hence the recommended suspension against
Atty De Vera cannot be considered in this case.
2. In the second issue however, The SC held that there is substantial evidence of
malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the recommendation of suspension by
the hearing officer of the State Bar of California. Malpractice ordinarily refers to any
malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. By insisting that he was authorized
by his client’s father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted
the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use. In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny
complainants allegation in the latter’s memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00
intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a
separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes.
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him.
 The unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly unethical. Thus when
Attty De Vera appropriated the funds of his client, he violated the above stated Canon and
hence may be held administratively liable.
The SC suspended Atty De Vera for two years.

Second Ground.
Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera’s transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las
Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of
the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President.
Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold
office therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty de Vera violated the “rotation rule”

RULING: The act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for disqualification for
election as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only
that the transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter
election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his membership, it cannot be
said that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that
a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in
transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule will produce the next IBP EVP
who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of
Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyers Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from
aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such
goal.

IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the
United States of America on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the “Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003” by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the
Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.

Resolution:
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in
fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law.
Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer
who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay,
the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person
who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required, and in compliance thereof, petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral
character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE
Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE.
After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has
met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the
condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to
the payment of appropriate fees.

REINSTATEMENT AFTER DISBARMENT

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO

 A criminal information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan.
 The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries
upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation
rites.
 Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution
and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide
through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court.
 In a judgment, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment.
 Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court.
The application for probation was granted. The period of probation was set at two (2)
years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him.
 Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this
Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status.
He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations.
 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath
of office.
 Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had
terminated his probation period.

Ruling: (Failed to meet the standard of good moral character but was allowed to submit
evidence that he tried to make up for the senseless killing of Raul Camaligan and to prove he is
morally fit to be admitted for the profession of law)
  Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character. He deliberate
(rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which
proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan. Participation in the
prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Camaligan constituted evident
rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character
 The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens
of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.
 It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice
are concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
 Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not
only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and
more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office..
 Mr. Argosino must for its examination and consideration, he must submit relevant
evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for
admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Re; Bar Examinations.(Atty: Danilo De Guzman)

FACTS:
On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law,
Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a
rumored leakage in the examination on the subject. After making his own inquiries, Justice
Vitug reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the other members of
the Court, recommending that the bar examination on the subject be nullified and that an
investigation be conducted forthwith. On 23 September 2003, the Court adopted the
recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law
and to hold another examination on 04 October 2003 at eight oclock in the evening (being the
earliest available time and date) at the De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The
resolution was issued without prejudice to any action that the Court would further take on the
matter.

Issue; Who is liable on the leakage?

Ruling;
 The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos computer without the
latters knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos legal
assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating
Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his secretary
Reynita Villasis, to his fraternity brods, namely, Ronan Garvida, Arlan (whose surname he could
not recall), and Erwin Tan.

In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James
Bugain.Randy Iigo passed a copy or copies of the same questions to another Betan, Alan
Guiapal, who gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigma [Lambdas] Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald
F. Collado, who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQUs 30 bar
candidates.Attorney Danilo De Guzmans act of downloading Attorney Balgos test questions in
mercantile law from the latters computer, without his knowledge and permission, was a
criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual property; the test questions were intellectual
property of Attorney Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal knowledge.Besides
theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos right to privacy of
communication, and to security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search and
seizure - rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3,
Article III, 1987 Constitution).He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.By transmitting and
distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity,
possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them undue advantage over the other examiners in
the mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity
brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar.

MACARUBO VS. MACARUBO

FACTS:
In 2004, Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and DISBARRED
from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline and to SC that he is supporting or has made provisions for the
regular support of his two children by complainant.
Eight years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary
Mercy) seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially
treated the present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for
lack of merit. On December 18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed to this Court by the
Office of the Vice President for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the substantive
merits of the case.

Atty. Macarubo showed evidence has that he has asked forgiveness from his children by
complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them. Records also show that
after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his
time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he
was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed
the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office.
Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas
College. Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors
and friends who are in dire need.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Macarubbo can be reinstated from disbarment.

RULING:
Yes.
The Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise, as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition meritorious.
Respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo
Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the
Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Records further reveal that
respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the
instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support to his children in
compliance with the court.
From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has
sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has productive years ahead
of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the
betterment of society.

IN RE: LETTER OF AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ

533 SCRA 534, 2010

FACTS:
Judge Augustus C. Diaz of MTC Branch 37 of Q.C is seeking judgeship in one of the
vacant RTC Branches in Metro Manila. During his interview with the Judicial Bar Council, he was
suggested to seek Judicial Clemency and in particular to be allowed to again be nominated to
one of the vacant RTC branches. In a subsequent letter, he expressed deep remorse for the
lapse of which he was administratively held liable in a previous case (Alvarez v. Diaz). In that
case, he was found to be guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he granted the following
motions: (1) for an execution which was fatally defective for lack of notice to the defendant and
(2) a motion for demolition without notice and hearing. His action on the motion for demolition
also made him liable for grave abuse of authority. He was fined 20k.
Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial Bar Council provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualification. The following are disqualified from being nominated for
appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case, where
the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than 10k, unless he has been granted
judicial clemency.
Under the said provision, Judge Diaz is disqualified from being nominated for appointment
to any judicial post, until and unless his request for judicial clemency is granted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Diaz should be granted Judicial Clemency.

HELD:
Yes. Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced
with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a
showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are
indispensable.

In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts
and personnel thereof, the Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency:

There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the IBP, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation;

Sufficient time must have elapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reformation;

The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself;
 There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning of legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service; and

There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past malfeasance. He
humbly accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years have elapsed since the
promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that he has learned his lesson and that he has
reformed. His 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his dedication to the
institution. Thus, the Court may now open the door of further opportunities in the judiciary for
him