In Political Liberalism, Rawls attempts to demarcate political from moral (or

ethical) autonomy more clearly, while continuing to insist that political

liberalism includes only the former. He continues to concede that the capacity for
a conception of the good is a moral component of justice as fairness, as indicated
in his contrast between ��the moral values of a comprehensive doctrine and the
(moral) political values of a political conception�� (1993, xliv). Political
liberalism respects political autonomy which is ��the legal independence and
assured political integrity of citizens�� but is unable to endorse moral autonomy
which ��critically examines our deepest ends and ideals�� (Rawls 1993, xliv�xlv,
cf. 77�78).

Moreover, without the widespread exercise of individual moral autonomy, the

pluralism of modern western societies would not be ineradicable. As his stipulation
of the relevant power of personhood indicates, Rawls envisages conceptions of the
good being developed and possibly amended or abandoned at the individual, rather
than the corporate, level. Political liberalism imagines each individual to be
equally free to devise and revise such conceptions: conceptions of the good are not
developed by churches, schools, families, groups, and then simply handed down
wholesale to their individual members. This sort of transmission can, of course,
occur in a free society but the clear implication of Rawls�s position is that
continuing adherence to any corporate conception of the good must be voluntary and
subject to the individual�s own conscience. A powerful commitment to individual
moral autonomy is thus embedded not just in Rawls�s own idea of personhood but also
in the wider condition of pluralism to which political liberalism responds.

Mill�s conception of the person is not a purely political one: on the contrary, he
invokes the ideal of human nature as having the potential to be in a constant state
of development in order to criticize and hopefully reform the political culture of
his day which, by his diagnosis, exhibited powerful tendencies toward conformity,
mediocrity, and stasis (Mill 1997, 93, 95). Mill sought a political and cultural
atmosphere that would allow those who wanted to develop their individuality to do
so; perhaps, even, an atmosphere where this was encouraged. But he accepted that
some, and perhaps many, would not avail themselves of this opportunity and tried to
appeal to their sense of selfinterest to tolerate that which benefits others.
Mill�s defense of individuality is in the service of diversity rather than a threat
to it: ��To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that
different persons should be allowed to lead different lives�� (1997, 90, cf. 94).
He shares Rawls�s goal of protecting reasonable diversity�differences in lifestyles
and beliefs that cause no harm to others.

Mill�s commitment to individual autonomy does not trump his commitment to

diversity, just as his moral and political doctrine prevents him from requiring all
individuals to subscribe to a single conception of the good or a single way of
relating to their values and beliefs. His related argument about state power also
ensures that diversity would flourish in a Millian state. His admiration for
autonomy did not lead him to suggest that the state impose it. On the contrary, he
worried that too powerful a state would abuse its power, imposing uniformity,
spreading conformity, and stifling individuality.

Rawls and Mill have similar views about autonomy, and both argue that the state
should not impose a particular way of life on citizens. But one important
difference between them, which Rawls does not directly note, is how they view the
relationship between justice and the state. Mill clearly wanted the state to help
work toward some policy goals, but his anxiety about too much power being
concentrated in the state led him to argue that the state should have an important
but limited role. The state should enforce a core aspect of justice, protecting the
rights of citizens. But Mill was clear that not every aspect of justice is a matter
for state coercion.
By contrast, Rawls has a more expansive role for the state in the imposition of
justice. Rawls�s political conception of justice does not structure how individuals
treat one another, but applies to a society�s ��basic structure.�� The basic
structure includes the main institutions in society: its constitutional
arrangements, economic institutions, the family, and its legal apparatus (Rawls
1993, 11). When Rawls declares that ��justice is the first virtue of institutions,
as truth is to systems of thought�� (1971, 3), he focuses our attention on the idea
that in a well-ordered society, justice emanates from the basic structure. When
citizens imagine themselves in the original position, their considered judgments
will lead them to agree on principles of justice. But in their everyday actions,
they will often be guided by self-interest. For Rawls, this is acceptable and
understandable: to have to constantly think about justice in all of one�s actions
would be exhausting. Since the institutions of the basic structure will secure
justice, citizens need not be guided by the dictates of justice in the everyday
actions and interactions. It is only when these principles need to be adjusted do
citizens need to reflect upon the meaning of justice. The institutions of the basic
structure have rules that are to be obeyed, so justice can be achieved (Rawls 1993,
68; 2001, 10). Embedded in the basic structure, justice also becomes a matter of
coercion.

Rawls suggests that the disjuncture between people�s considered judgments and their
everyday actions is rather small, since the 130 ruth abbey and jeff spinner-halev
more citizens see justice as fairness as good for themselves (by living in such a
regime), ��the less they will be prompted by the special attitudes of envy, spite,
the will to dominate, and the temptation to deprive others of justice�� (Rawls
2001, 202). It is not only that citizens agree to the principles of justice in an
abstract way, but living under a just system, they resist the ��normal tendencies
to injustice". Living under just institutions will influence them to want to act in
a just manner, as both reasonable and rational.

Mill�s insistence on rights protection as a core duty of the state does not exhaust
his view of the role of the state or of justice. In what he calls ��civilized��
states, there were many issues that were not a matter of right, but the state could
intervene in as a matter of policy. He says that government action is for the
benefit of the community, but he clearly thought that one had to balance the
dictates of individual liberty and diversity on the one hand with the need to
ensure justice on the other. Mill also thought there were matters of justice that
the state should not intervene in. We can disapprove of unjust behavior, and we can
try to use public opinion to look sternly upon injustice, but there are limits to
what the state should enforce. As this intimates, Mill took justice to be also a
matter of interaction between citizens and not just part of what Rawls calls the
basic structure. Mill�s views on how justice evolves beyond the state are best seen
through his views on progress. He thought that progress would enable justice to
increase its scope.

The statehad a role in encouraging this progress but did not and should not enforce
it. This is not only because Mill wanted state power to be limited, but also
because people would progress as they were ready. It would happen organically,
altering people�s view of justice and the common good, and the institutions they
inhabited. Cooperation and progress would expand slowly, as people moved to a
higher moral plane. As progress continued, more people would be driven more by the
common good than by self-interest. Mill was confident that people�s horizons would
expand beyond narrow self-interest, though he was unsure how much self-interest
could be trumped�only time would tell. However expansive Mill�s moral doctrine is,
his political conception of justice is relatively narrow. Justice certainly went
beyond what Rawls calls the basic structure, but Mill accorded only a limited role
to the state in imposing justice. Whatever the problems with this progressivist
view of history, its presence in his thinking helps to explain why Mill does not
rely too heavily in the state to promote and enforce justice.
Rawls thinks that Mill relies too heavily on a moral psychology based on an
optimistic view of progress and not enough on institutions enforcing justice. When
justice is embedded in and enforced through state institutions, it assumes an
educative role. This is a large part of the difference between the Mill and Rawls:
when Rawls thinks of justice, he looks to institutions to impose it; when Mill
thinks of justice, he thinks of state institutions to some degree, but in
��civilized�� democratic states, justice is intertwined with progress and rests in
important ways on a moral psychology based in a virtuous circle of cooperation
among citizens. So while there are real differences, along with similarities,
between these two towering liberal thinkers, the difference that Rawls draws
between political and comprehensive liberalism is not useful in illuminating them.

Rawls�s version of political liberalism does not always differ as dramatically from
Mill�s supposed comprehensive liberalism as Rawls suggests. Even after his putative
political turn, Rawls has a similar view to Mill about the importance of autonomy,
harbors a more comprehensive view of the state than Mill does, and demands more
agreement from citizens about the content of justice. Mill is more suspicious of
state power than is Rawls and does not place justice as a focal point of the basic
structure. But if Rawls is too ready to assume that (near) agreement on
distributive justice is possible, Mill is too optimistic about how justice will get
caught in the upward winds of moral progress. Rawls observes that Mill�s principles
may seem an excessively optimistic view of our nature. This strikes us as an
understatement: Mill�s optimism about human nature and progress may have made sense
in the nineteenth century, but it is hard to share that today.

Part of the difference between Rawls and Mill is due to the different question they
ask. Mill asks: given the incredible pressures to conform and the alarming decrease
in diversity, how can we structure society to encourage pluralism and
individuality? Rawls asks: given the vast pluralism of modern democracies, how can
people who disagree on what is good in life agree on a conception of political
justice? Rawls�s question leads him to argue for the importance of a shared
conception of justice within the state and within what he calls the basic
structure. Mill�s question leads him to both need the state to ensure basic
conditions of justice are in place (protecting rights) but also to be suspicious of
too much state power, which he worries will impose too much uniformity on the
citizens.