and registered in the name of petitioner) and lots 5-B and 5-D registered under

PRC with the following conditions: earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup

to the sellers and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters. In the sa

me month, Licup assigned his rights over the property to private respondent, Sta

rbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. and informed them of the assignment. Thereafter,

private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos the fulfillment of the assignmen

t; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal

to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake t

he eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter. Private respond

ent counter-proposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, t

he purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per

square meter. Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote

private respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the or

iginal purchase price in cash. Private respondent sent the earnest money back to

the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PR

C, without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana Properties a

nd Development Corporation (Tropicana), as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sa

le, one over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers' t

ransfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and regis

tered in the name of Tropicana. Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell

the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent. P

rivate respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the recon

veyance of the lots, to no avail and private respondent is willing and able to c

omply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to deve

lop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lo
st profits of not less than P30,000,000.00.

ISSUE

W/n tHE HOLY SEE HAS SOVEREiGN IMMUNITY in the sale of the parcel of land (lot 5

-a).

HELD

YES. The Holy See has sovereign immunity in the sale of the parcel of land (lot

5-A).

Claim to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is stated in the Public International

Law. When state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomati

c immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where

it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

The Department of Foreign Affairs was allowed by the Court to intervene on the s

ide of petitioner by filing a memorandum of support for the petitioner s claim of

sovereign immunity.

The Holy See exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is

represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. The petitioner is, therefore

, a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity.

The immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or a

cts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure ge

stionis. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereo

f, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain

or profit. The petitioner s sale of the land is a commercial transaction that is

an act jure imperii. The petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary co

urse of a real estate business, the said transaction can be categorized as an ac

t jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subseq

uent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said

property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippi

nes.

The petition for certiorari was granted and the complaint against petitioner was

dismissed.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION€

GR No. 139465€ January 18, 2000.

FACTS

Petitioner is the secretary of justice who has in his possession the extradition

papers to be filed against private respondent Mark Jimenez. Private respondent

requested the petitioner for copies of such documents against him and asks for a

mple time for him to submit a response to it. Petitioner declined to grant such

a request in line with article 7 of the RP-US Extradition treaty. Private respon

dent filed a petition against the petitioner at the RTC of the National Capital

Judicial Region for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition, with an application f

or the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. His defense is th

at the petitioner's actions violate his basic due process rights upheld by the C

onstitution's due process clause. Respondent judge issued an order on August 10,

1999 favoring the side of the private respondent. Thus, the petitioner elevated

its case to the Supreme Court for certiorari.

ISSUE

W/N UPHOLD A CITIZEN'S BASIC DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OR THE GOVERNMENTS IRONCLAD DUTI

ES UNDER A TREATY

HELD

THE PETITION IS DISMISSED for lack of merit. The court grants that the right to

information is implemented by the right of access to information within the cont

rol of the government. But in the case at hand, the invocation of this right by

the petitioner is premature since no official action of our own government has y

et been done. Only when such formal action is present that the court will favor

the interests necessary for the proper functioning of government The court also

argues that there is no conflict between the RP-US treaty and the Constitution.

All they see is a void in the provisions of the treaty as regards to the basic d

ue process rights of the extraditee. The court disagrees with such provisions of

the treaty.

The court also rejects the petitioner's confidentiality argument as it is overtu

rned by the petitioner's repower to revoke after the appointee has qualified is the latter's equitable
rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be successfully set up in the present situation, considering
the rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and other happenings detracting from that
degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable
relief. The appointees, it might be argued, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the stratagem to
beat the deadline, whatever the resultant consequences to the dignity and efficiency of the public
service. Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has
been issued, it cannot be reconsidered, especially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them
refer to mass ad interim appointments (three-hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing
Chief Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of
exceptional circumstances justifying revocation and if any circumstances justify revocation, those
described herein should fit the exception. IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30, 1998 of HON.
MATEO A. VALENZUELA AND HON. PLACIDO B. VALLARTA A.M. NO. 98-5-01-SC., NOVEMBER9, 1998, CJ.
NARVASA The prohibited appointments contemplated by Article VII section 15 not only applies to the
executive department but also to appointments by the president to the members of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, as an exception appointments to the judiciary can be made during the period of the ban in
the interest of public service.

Facts: The Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta and others were appointed by the president as RTC judges
and to other judicial positions during the prohibited period contemplated by Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution in light of the upcoming elections. The President expressed the view that "the election-ban
provision Article VII, Sec. 15 applies only to executive appointments or appointments in the executive
branch of government," the whole article being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.'" He also observed
that further proof of his theory "is the fact that appointments to the judiciary have special, specific
provisions applicable to them" citing Article VIII, Sec. 4 [1] and Article VIII, Section 9. In view thereof, he
"firmly and respectfully reiterate his request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmit the final list of
nominees for the lone Supreme Court vacancy in order to complete the appointments. On the contrary,
Chief Justice Narvasa is of the contrary view, CJ Narvasa claims that the election ban provision also
applies to appointments in the judiciary. Faced by an important and ripe constitutional question, hence,
the Court En banc was called to decide on the instant Administrative matter. Issues: 1. Whether during
the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President is required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII. 2.
Whether the President can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the
interest of public service. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DEAN’S CIRCLE 2016 86 | Page Ruling: 1. NO. The
Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution "two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term" - the President is
neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9
of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time
frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that the
prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six years. In view of the general
prohibition in Art. VII, sec.15, One interpretation that immediately suggests itself is that Section 4(1),
Article VIII is a general provision while Section 15, Article VII is a particular one; that is to say, normally,
when there are no presidential elections - which after all occur only every six years - Section 4(1), Article
VIII shall apply: vacancies in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days; but when (as now) there
are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the President shall
not make any appointments. The reason for said prohibition, according to Fr. J. Bernas, S.J., an authority
on Constitutional Law and himself a member of the Constitutional Commission, is "In order not to tie the
hands of the incoming President through midnight appointments." In the ultimate analysis of the
provision, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those
made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those
which are declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code. The second type of appointments
prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v.
Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President,
President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a
"caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the
incoming President. Therefore, the appointments by Hon. Valenzuela and Vallarta by the President
during the prohibited period is deemed void. 2. YES. The exception allows only the making of temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety. To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during
the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case
should the membership of the court be so reduced that it will have no quorum or should the voting on a
particularly important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case,
however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Section 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII. The
appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the Office of the Chief
Justice on May 14, 1998) were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Consequently, they
come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be
for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary
is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify
the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed,
there is a strong public policy for the prohivelation that everything it refuses to make available

at that time will be obtainable in trial.

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that the essence of due p

rocess in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one side or to