Spain's foreign and
the year of the “attempted” and declared “re-founding”
security policy in 2009:
the search for "Spain's
place" in international
relations
Günther Maihold,
Deputy Director of the German Institute for
International Security Affairs/SWP
“Spain’s participation in the G-20 summit in London
on the international economic crisis, in the NATO sum-
mit on its 60th anniversary in Strasbourg-Kehl, in the EU-
US summit in Prague (which featured the participation
of President Barack Obama) and finally, Spain’s joint
presidency of the 2nd Forum of the Alliance of Civilisa-
tions in Istanbul, has all represented an historic period in
terms of Spain’s role in international relations, one that is
unprecedented in our contemporary history, and which
has finally located Spain in its proper place” (Moratinos,
2009a).
This declaration by Miguel Ángel Moratinos, minister
of foreign affairs and cooperation, could well be a nice
summary of Spain’s foreign and security policy in 2009,
in what could be called the “foreign affairs spring” or the
“big April” of Spain’s external influence throughout the
course of the country’s history.1 However, this euphoria
that Moratinos’ words express fails to clarify the exact
coordinates of “Spain’s place” in international relations,
particularly as a member of the European Union and
with respect to Spain’s EU presidency in the first half of
2010. This ‘search for its place’ is one of the central pillars
of Spain’s overseas action, and which cannot be disassoci-
ated from internal conflicts, on one hand, and from its
relative weight in major international issues, on the other
(Maihold, 2009). Therefore, the task of Spanish policy on
the regional and international stage must be duly ana-
lysed, and in greater depth, in order to highlight what
Spain’s true achievements and the country’s role in the
international sphere were during the “blossoming” 2009,
of the bases that have governed the international eco-
nomic system over the past 60 years.
Despite Spain’s increasing presence as an international
actor – something that is undeniable, whether it be at the
aforementioned summits or in promoting and leading
multilateral operations to fight against piracy in Soma-
lia (Operation Atalanta of the European Union’s naval
forces – EUNAVFOR), a debate exists over the impact
that Spain has succeeded in generating through its inter-
national presence, in terms of “power over outcomes” as a
central criterion of political action. The general impres-
sion that the Spanish government might be more inter-
ested in merely attending international meetings without
generating any impact or shaping the agenda or results
of these events has dominated not only the debate within
Spain, but also international perceptions of a country
that has been badly hit by the international financial cri-
sis. This may have limited Spain’s ability to project itself
as an important actor in international relations. Thus,
in Spain’s current policy on foreign affairs and security,
three factors have emerged once again that have become
an essential deficit for said policy, and for the “place” that
Spain is attempting to define as its own on the interna-
tional stage:
• The first factor is the lack of consensus between the two
main national political parties for the purpose of estab-
lishing basic guidelines on foreign and security policy,
so that the policy could be considered “a State policy,
not subject to the changes of government that result
from a change in the parliamentary majority” (Arenal,
2008: 348).
Examples of this dissent include the criticism of the Za-
patero government over the handling of the “passport
crisis” between Spain and Morocco caused by the Saha-
raui activist Aminatu Haidar (who, in passing, brought
the thorny and interminable issue of the self-determi-
nation of the Western Sahara back onto Spain’s political
agenda), Spain’s “active neutrality” (Kausch, 2010) and
the fragile balance of Spanish-Moroccan relations. Fur-
thermore, there was the controversy that broke out in
July 2009 over an issue that is highly sensitive in terms
of domestic policy (Gibraltar) and the official visit made
by Moratinos to the Rock of Gibraltar – the first such
visit by a Spanish minister in the past 300 years. This
provoked further dissent between the two main politi-
cal parties over the advisability of the trip, and whether
it would implicitly strengthen the Gibraltar govern-
ment’s position regarding Spain’s historic claims. Fur-
thermore, we should not forget the confrontation be-
tween the PSOE and the PP that arose over the hijack-
ing of the Alakrana fishing vessel by Somali pirates in
the Indian Ocean. The subsequent handling of the res-
cue mission by the different Spanish ministries involved
– who were accused of a lack of coordination – and the
alleged payment of a ransom to free the vessel’s crew, all 9
Spanish Foreign Policy
sparked fresh controversy on the national political stage.
The consequence is that Spain’s foreign policy is con-
stantly being checked and influenced by a domestic
policy that exposes it to a “law of the pendulum... with
each change of government” (Duran i Lleida, 2009),
and which hinders the creation of a consensus or the
setting of basic guidelines for external action.
• The second factor is based on the current PSOE govern-
ment’s very conception of international relations. The
government is attempting to achieve a leading role as an
international actor through a foreign affairs policy with
a high ethical-value component and a strategy of chang-
ing alliances on the world stage. Without claiming to
(or being able to) anticipate the possible results of the
government’s current management strategy, it is worth
considering certain queries over the possible success of
the path that the Zapatero government has chosen to
follow. On one hand, there is a clear lack of internal
conciliation between the ethical aspirations expressed in
Zapatero’s speeches (in which he attempts to position
Spain as a “synonym of solidarity, justice and humanity
"A in all four corners of the world” (Rodríguez Zapatero,
clear 2008: 2), and Spain’s actual national interests, as dem-
asymmetry onstrated by the country’s good relations with the
regimes of Gaddafi in Libya and Ben Ali in
continues to Tunisia, the government’s relations with
exist between the role Chávez’s Venezuela, and the trips
that Spain wishes to play made by Moratinos to Equato-
rial Guinea (which includ-
as a medium-sized power, ed a meeting with Teodoro
and the instruments and Obiang) and Cuba (also featur-
resources it has ing an important meeting with Raúl
Castro) in July and October, respectively.
available" In all these cases, the defence of Spain’s eco-
nomic interests took precedence over the promotion
of human rights and democracy.
• Finally, a clear asymmetry continues to exist between
the role that Spain wishes to play as a medium-sized
power, and the instruments and resources it has availa-
CIDOB International Yearbook 2010
ble to develop this role within the current international
system. In this respect, it is worth asking whether Spain
really has the means available to be able to sustain an
activist foreign policy with respect to both its diplomatic
resources and its capacity for response and initiative in
international politics. One example of this is the analy-
sis by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
of the ambitious Plan África (Africa Plan) for the pe-
riod 2009-2012. The Africa Plan (AECID and MAEC,
2008), which covers the sub-Saharan area, identifies ten
countries as priorities: Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Ni-
geria and Senegal in Central and West Africa; Angola,
Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa in southern
Africa; and Ethiopia and Kenya in East Africa. Fur-
thermore, the Plan includes the category of “countries
for special monitoring”, comprised of Chad, Ivory
Coast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan
10
and Zimbabwe, and which examines them with respect
to both their potential over the medium term and as
situations of instability that represent a risk for regional
peace and security. In addition, the Plan declares that
on a bilateral level, efforts will be intensified to com-
plete a network of accords on migration and readmis-
sion policy with the countries deemed to be priorities in
this sense, and which include Cape Verde, Cameroon,
Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Conakry, Mali
and Senegal, in addition to those already included with
Nigeria and Guinea Bissau. Or rather, this signifies a
total of 19 countries; 19 priorities that are to be covered
through a diplomatic redeployment that involves the
creation of embassies and technical offices for coopera-
tion. Obviously, it will be hard to organise a foreign af-
fairs policy that is coherent and at the same time effec-
tive with so many destination countries.
These characteristics limit the development of the po-
tential of Spain’s external action and mean that the coun-
try has become one of the international political actors
that have yet to succeed in developing their own identity
that identify them as a stable, reliable counterpart in in-
ternational relations. Moreover, it is worth mentioning
that a reflection should be carried out in Spain on the
importance of foreign policy, not only at the level of the
country’s political classes in general, but also among civil
society, so as to try and prevent (for example) the analy-
sis of Prime Minister Zapatero’s first official visit to the
United States in October from being reduced to a family
snapshot taken at the White House, and preventing us
from being able to assess the actual visit in itself. There-
fore, all the actors and parties should carry out a rigor-
ous examination of national interests to generate greater
consensus, legitimacy and support for the work of the
government in power at the time.
The search for “Spain’s international
place” as a foreign policy objective in
2009
What has been demonstrated in Prime Minister Za-
patero’s second term of office, and exemplified in 2009,
is the search for greater international protagonism as
compared to Spain’s low profile in external action dur-
ing his first term of office. During this first term, fol-
lowing the controversial and unilateral withdrawal of
Spanish troops from Iraq, Zapatero had been hoping for
a multipolar world, one without George Bush as presi-
dent and with Spain having a decisive influence on de-
cision-making in the European Union, in tandem with
the France-Germany axis. However, what happened was
that the US president won a second term of office, which
reduced transatlantic relations to the absolute minimum
on the agenda, while the changes of government from
Schröder to Merkel in Germany and from Chirac to
Sarkozy in France all served to “distance” Spain from

the European power centre. This external “solitude” ex-
perienced by Spain with respect to the major powers, for
four long years, reached its peak and maximum impact
with the image of Prime Minister Zapatero “isolated” at
the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, just one
month before his re-election as prime minister.
Unquestionably, there has been a clear change in the
orientation of Spain’s foreign policy for the government’s
second term of office, a policy that would be more “in-
ternational” and have a greater external focus. The most
tangible proof of this is the fact that Zapatero attended
the G-20 summits, which were devised as an organ of
global governance to overcome the grave world economic
crisis and reformulate the international financial system.
Without breaking with the ethically-based elements that
shaped “Marca España” (Brand Spain) during Zapatero’s
first term of office, with the Alliance of Civilisations and
the expansion of cooperation with development, the Span-
ish government has used arguments of “hard power” such
as Spain’s spectacular economic growth over the past 20
years, and its position as third-largest world investor, in
order to attend the summits in Washington (2008), and
London and Pittsburgh in 2009, albeit as a guest nation
and under the auspices of the European Union. In this way,
Zapatero has added economic power to the ethical con-
tinuum of a foreign policy based on the concept of Spain
as a regulatory and cultural power (Torreblanca, 2010).
This search for a place at the table with the major powers
in international politics is not a new feature of the PSOE
government’s management, but rather one that forms
part of the continuities that can sometimes be glimpsed
between the domestic tensions in Spain (Maihold, 2007).
Nevertheless, Spain still lacks visible power to influence
the decisions made by these powers, something that could
become intensified by the fact that Spain is undergoing a
serious economic crisis, which reduces the credibility of
any initiative put forward by the Zapatero government
within the G-20. Furthermore, the support received from
certain countries (including the granting of a seat by tem-
porary EU presidencies, such as France) is never given
away for nothing, and in the future we will see what kind
of compensation Spain is called upon to provide. In fact,
as Torreblanca points out, “Spain’s participation in the
G-20, by invitation albeit not formally, obliges the country
to become politically indebted in order to be granted an
invite each time they meet” (Torreblanca, 2010).
The “new relationship” with the USA
Another factor that led to greater external activity in
the Zapatero government in 2009 was the election of a
new US president. The arrival of Barack Obama at the
White House has opened the door to the possibility of re-
activating transatlantic relations and the agenda between
the two states. While some analysts believe that there is
still considerable distance between Washington and Ma-
Spain's foreign and security policy in 2009
drid (Areilza and Torreblanca, 2009), the rebuilding of
relations with the USA and how to move on from the
stance of ‘balancing’ adopted by the PSOE government
with the previous Bush Administration was one of the
challenges of 2009, and continues to be so in 2010.
One determining factor in the recovery of bilateral rela-
tions is the good relationship that Zapatero and Obama
seem to have on a personal level, something that became
clear in the meeting they held in the White House in Oc-
tober, and regarding certain international relations issues
such as the Obama Administration’s posture to multilat-
eral action and the stance on the new military strategy
drafted for Afghanistan. Naturally, this orientation by
Washington creates spaces for initiatives by the PSOE
government, and may represent an opportunity for Spain
in international relations. However, Spain’s foreign policy
cannot be based on a position of bandwagoning toward
the United States, or by focusing solely and exclusively on
cue-taking actions or blank cheque policies toward the
US, as some of Zapatero’s actions (Encarnación, 2009),
seem to be suggesting, such as attending a prayer break-
fast and even giving a reading from the Bible. US foreign
policy is also patently subject to the dynamics of the coun-
try’s domestic policy, as was made clear by the Obama’s
more than predictable (or at least foreseen) non-attend-
ance of the EU-US summit under Spain’s presidency of
the EU in the first half of 2010. His absence, owing to
issues on the domestic and international agenda (he chose
to visit Southeast Asia instead of Madrid) may represent
a setback to Spain’s aspirations to become the USA’s valid
interlocutor in Europe, though at the same time it should
help to ensure that the US does not forget its European
partners, and to boost Spain’s European aspirations. In
fact, greater links with Obama also signify, in contrast,
taking on more commitments with the USA with is-
sues such as accepting prisoners from Guantanamo and
“peace” missions in locations such as Afghanistan.
Furthermore, certain divergences exist with the USA
that did not help to strengthen Madrid’s position in
the eyes of the new US administration in 2009, such as
Spain’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence; in-
stead, Spain sided with the pro-Serbian group comprised
of the Russian Federation, Albania, Romania and Greece,
an affiliation justified by Moratinos as a decision that
complied with international legality. Moreover, the uni-
lateral decision announced by Defence Minister Carme
Chacón in March to gradually withdraw Spanish troops
from the international peacekeeping mission in Kosovo
(KFOR) gave rise to a certain confusion among NATO
members as to the motives behind Spain’s foreign policy.
This withdrawal – completed in September and initially
explained as a decision that was coherent with the non-
recognition of the old Serbian province – brought harsh
criticism both from the US Administration and from the
secretary general of NATO.
The lack of coherence between, on one hand, a multi-
lateralist discourse and a defence of international insti-
tutions, and on the other, making unilateral decisions of
11
Spanish Foreign Policy
this magnitude (Powell, 2009) is not unusual in Spanish
foreign policy, but it does not help to facilitate the inter-
national trust that is required to achieve greater projec-
tion and presence in this sphere.
Participation in international missions
Despite the ambiguity between discourse and action, it
must be acknowledged that one of the most outstanding
aspects of Spain’s foreign policy is the country’s participa-
tion in different peacekeeping operations. This presence
was particularly increased by the Zapatero government
in 2009 after the abolition of the maximum quota of 3,000
Spanish troops permitted to take part in international
missions, a rule that had been in force until 2008. This
fact denotes Spain’s commitment and will to intervene
overseas in the new challenges to security. Proof of this
was the presence of Spanish troops in missions to stabilise
post-war situations in the Balkans (EUFOR-ALTHEA
in Bosnia-Herzegovina), Lebanon (as part of UNIFIL)
and the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission in Chad and the
"All Central African Republic, which concluded in
the April. Furthermore, Spain took on a leadership
actors and role (together with France) in the deploy-
ment of the EUNAVFOR Operation
parties should Atalanta, off the coast of Somalia
carry out a rigor- and in the Indian Ocean, to
ous examination of fight against piracy. Even
national interests to though in the latter situ-
ation, and as Carme Chacón
generate greater mentioned, Spain’s commitment
consensus" derived from the defence of its eco-
nomic interests.
But perhaps the most significant example of
Spain’s commitment to external action in 2009 took
the form of the “new” strategy for Afghanistan (basi-
cally, sending in more troops) as promoted by President
Obama at the request of General McChrystal’s report.
Minister of Defence Carme Chacón expressed Spain’s
CIDOB International Yearbook 2010
commitment to this new process of “Afghanisation” and
at the NATO summit in April, Zapatero committed
more Spanish troops (currently totalling more than 1,500)
to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan. Thus Spain responded affirmatively to
Obama’s request to the countries of Europe for greater
troop presence, and attempted to build bridges on the
path towards re-establishing bilateral relations between
the two states. Furthermore, this represents an attempt
to gain credibility in international politics in the eyes of
the other NATO members, following the announcement
of the withdrawal from Kosovo and the accusation of the
Spanish government’s lack of involvement in the fight
against terrorism in Afghanistan. This contrasts with the
praise given to the Spanish troops for their work both
at the Forward Support Base (FSB) in Herat, and in the
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).
12
As for Spain’s presence in Afghanistan, the debate in
2009 revolved around three points:
• The idea that the Zapatero government should admit
to Spanish public opinion that the “peace” operation
in Afghanistan is, in fact, a situation of open warfare
against groups of insurgents and international terror-
ism. In this respect, it would be advisable for the Zapa-
tero government to stop referring to it as a peace mis-
sion and to redefine it as a counter-insurgency operation
(Burke, 2010).
• It would also be advisable to strengthen Spain’s call –
made at the security summits during the course of 2009
– for greater numbers of troops from Muslim countries
in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.
• In terms of international security, there have been signs
of increasing presence of the Al-Qaeda Organisation in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) in the Sahel area. AQMI
is a term under which diverse heterogeneous groups
operate, who have an explicit territorial claim for Al-
Andalus, and represent a challenge for Spanish security.
The possible links between AQMI and other factions
connected with the terrorist organisation that originat-
ed in the region of Af-Pak and Somalia (Al Shaabab)
could create a corridor of Islamist terrorism that would
seriously affect both the region and Spain’s interests.
We should not forget that the operations against Islam-
ic terrorism carried out in Spain by the security forces
over the past three years have demonstrated the exist-
ence of links between these regions and some of the dis-
mantled cells.
That is why, from the point of view of foreign and se-
curity policy, Spain’s presence in Afghanistan becomes a
matter of state, in the same way that the region of West
Africa must become a priority area on Spain’s agenda,
just like the classic spheres of influence of Europe, the
Mediterranean and South America.
Africa as an area of expansion for
Spanish presence
In fact, the Zapatero government showed great inter-
est in West Africa during 2009, both in terms of politi-
cal dialogue and in the broadening of cooperation with
development in the region, the highpoint of which was
the holding of the first Spain-Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) summit in June.
Regarding cooperation with development, Spain is
continuing to significantly increase its bilateral invest-
ments in sub-Saharan Africa. The total has risen from
€158 million in 2004 to over a billion in 2008 (60% of
which arrived through multilateral channels). In fact,
Africa now represents 35% of Spanish cooperation, and
the western part of the continent is gaining importance
in foreign policy. Also, the Africa Plan 2009-2012 is
a good indicator of the relationship that Spain wants
to achieve with the African continent, though the Za-

patero government should define more specific objec-
tives, in addition to exercising control and transpar-
ency in giving aid for development to African states,
to prevent it from becoming “suit and tie” cooperation,
as well as taking into account the resources available
for carrying such programmes out, in order to fight
against the subversion of these states by drug traffick-
ing, and strengthening governance skills in the region
(Brombacher and Maihold, 2009). Furthermore, there
is an alarming increase in the region in people traffick-
ing, organised crime and the perceived terrorist threat,
with the kidnapping of European citizens by AQMI
(including three Spanish aid workers). This means that
international security in terms of terrorism, irregular
immigration and people trafficking should be placed
on the same level as determined by Spain in the Alli-
ance of Civilisations, and in compliance with the Mil-
lennium Goals (the first of which is the eradication of
poverty).
With respect to international security, the fight against
poverty and the creation of forums for dialogue between
cultures and different Weltanschauung are important ele-
ments that could help to curb the expansion of Islamist
terrorism. That is why Spain, in passing its Guideline
Plan for Cooperation with Development 2009-2012, has
made a commitment to reach 0.7% of the GDP in 2012
in development aid, even though the execution of the aid
very clearly reveals the effects of the economic crisis from
which the country is suffering.
The “star project”: the Alliance of
Civilisations
Regarding the Alliance of Civilisations, which has been
called “Spain’s first theoretical contribution to the United
Nations agenda” (Valenzuela, 2007: 275), the Alliance’s
second forum was held in Istanbul in April, organised by
its co-president, Recep Erdogan, prime minister of Tur-
key. But after this event, we should still consider whether
the star initiative of the ethical continuum of Zapatero’s
first term of office has opened up new opportunities for
Spain’s foreign policy, whether the initiative has brought
the country sufficient international protagonism, and
whether it has been granted enough funds to generate
feasible proposals (Barbé, 2006: 6). The project to make a
“cosmopolitan democracy” effective in the international
sphere, inspired by a universalist vision and through an
international policy that is fundamentally multilateralist
in its design, appears to be a project that is “excessive-
ly ambitious and beyond the objective possibilities of a
country such as Spain” (Barreñada, 2005: 84). After Is-
tanbul, and in spite of receiving backing from the UN
General Assembly in its Resolution A/RES/64/14, cer-
tain elements remain that highlight the limitations of the
project. Though it has a long list of over 60 governments
and institutions, only 19 of them have, to date, drafted
Spain's foreign and security policy in 2009
their own National Plans2. Furthermore, the financial
situation of the Alliance is still unstable. Spain does not
appear to be receiving sufficient support from the inter-
national community to make such a large scale project
operative, a fact that demonstrates that initiatives of a
global nature such as the Alliance require greater prepa-
ration and generation of substantial cooperation with
other countries around the world.
These initiatives need to be framed within the agendas
of the big international actors, to ensure that they do not
end up as isolated events of a foreign policy without a
suitable international framework. And this support from
the international community – which is necessary for
dialogue forums and understanding, to eradicate poverty
and to create effective security structures in Spain’s for-
eign and security policy – inexorably takes place through
the classic regions of Spain’s sphere of influence: Europe,
the Mediterranean and South America.
The preparations for Spain’s European
Presidency
The European and Europeist emphasis of the Zapatero
government faces the challenge of Spain’s presidency
of the EU in the first half of 2010, the first in which a
state has applied the new Lisbon Treaty, following the
“forced” Irish “yes” vote. During the years of 2008 and
2009, Spain’s diplomatic corps prepared very thoroughly
for this event, in which the idea is to highlight the impor-
tance of Spain’s role within Europe, as well as the coun-
try’s role as a valid and effective interlocutor in South
America, and especially so in the attempt to push forward
negotiations for association agreements between the EU
and MERCOSUR, Central America and the Andean
countries, and to act as a bridge for dialogue between
Cuba and Europe, and the Mediterranean. The aim of all
this is for Spain to regain greater specific weight within
the EU, and to culminate the attempted journey back “to
the heart of Europe”, a journey that has been in progress
since 2008. But so far, Spain has not succeeded in the ob-
jective of relocating the country within the hard nucleus
and in the centres of power and decision-making (Duran
i Lleida, 2009: 328).
Furthermore, the agenda for Spain’s presidency in 2010
looks to be very difficult for several reasons: the first of
these is the leadership role being played by Germany and
France to overcome the economic crisis within the EU,
and particularly in the euro zone, a factor that may cause
Spain’s presidency to lose visibility and prominence. In
addition to this, there is the problem of overlapping agen-
das between Zapatero and the newly appointed president
of the EU, in the form of Herman Van Rompuy, and the
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy of the EU, Catherine Ashton, both posts having
been created following the entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty. Finally, the actual agenda for implementing the
13
Spanish Foreign Policy
new treaty, the economic crisis (which is hitting Spain
very hard), energy security and climate change (follow-
ing the failure of the conference on this subject held in
Copenhagen in December) will all require enormous ef-
forts by Spain to seek the maximum consensus in a con-
text in which nations prefer to place their own national
interests before those of the EU.
Furthermore, with respect to the EU, Spain has de-
veloped a foreign policy that is very much focused on
access to, and maintenance of regional and structural
funding, while the Berlin-Paris axis is calling upon
Spain to become a net contributor to the EU. That is
why some analysts view Spain as an ‘outlier’ in its for-
eign affairs in Europe, because they believe that the
country could possess greater weight within Europe,
but cannot manage to achieve it (Grant, 2009). Spain
does seek to achieve this weight, incidentally, in its
relations with the Russian Federation in what has be-
come Zapatero’s habitual annual trip (in September) to
Russia to discuss issues concerning the economy, inter-
national security and energy security. Within Europe,
one aspect that went virtually unnoticed was Spain’s
presidency of the Council of Europe (November 2008
"One to May 2009), which resulted in Spain’s foreign
of he most policy taking greater interest in areas such as
East Europe and the post-Soviet areas. One
outstanding example of this was the first trip to
aspects of Spain's Byelorussia in March.
foreign policy is the
country’s participation in
The Mediterranean
different peacekeeping scenario
operations"
In the Mediterranean region, Spain has
achieved its aim – with the help of other Euro-
pean partners – of making Barcelona the headquarters
of the Union for the Mediterranean, in spite of losing po-
litical initiative in the region to France, the country that
launched this proposal which was, at first, unconnected
with the Barcelona Process. However, the slowness and
CIDOB International Yearbook 2010
inertia of the progress call for a consideration of what in-
struments the country could use to generate greater com-
mitment with this political process in the Arab world, on
one hand, and the EU on the other.
While some observers have noted “too many years of
European bilateral failures” (Areilza and Torreblanca,
2009), and are calling for an effort to be made by the EU
as a whole, the reality is that Spain continues to possess
strong bilateral profiles in the region. Indeed, one third of
Spain’s energy resources are imported from North Africa
and the Middle East. In this consideration between EU-
based and bilateral approaches, it is important to weigh
up not only the increase in funding and the integration of
the Union for the Mediterranean into the instrumentality
of the Neighbourhood Policy, but also the supply which,
in the interests of Spain, could be mobilised to generate a
different dynamic in this relationship.
14
The bilateral profile of Spain’s relations with Morocco
and Algeria does not necessarily facilitate progress of
a European nature – a situation that equally applies to
other EU protagonists in the region, such as France, Italy
and Great Britain. In fact, in foreign policy in the Medi-
terranean, national interests prevail above EU interests,
and Spain is no exception in this respect.
This idea of bilateral agreements being more impor-
tant than EU ones also serves to explain Dialogue 5+5
(made up of Algeria, Spain, France, Italy, Libya, Malta,
Morocco, Mauritania, Portugal and Tunisia) and the 5+5
Initiative for the defence ministers of the aforementioned
nations.
As for the Middle East, 2009 commenced with Israel’s
intervention in the Gaza Strip, which brought criticism
from the Spanish government. However, in Spain’s for-
eign policy (and in that of many other European states),
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is yet another source of
contradiction between the ethical-value factor and the
defence of Spain’s national interests. One example of
this is the sale of military and police equipment to Israel
during the first quarter of 2008 (six months before what
was called the “Gaza War”), to the value of €1,551,933,
94% of which was destined for the Israeli military forces.3
Prime Minister Zapatero and Foreign Affairs Minister
Moratinos (who in the past acted as special EU envoy to
the region) have always shown great interest in acting as
a bridge for dialogue between the two parties in the con-
flict, but all attempts have ended in failure, and 2009 was
no exception.
South America and the Caribbean: a
scenario without any major progress
for Spain’s foreign policy
South America was, unquestionably, one of the great
failures of Spain’s foreign policy in 2009. In spite of the
fact that one-third of Spanish cooperation and a quarter
of overseas investment goes to South America (Gratius,
2010), and despite the efforts made to regain an organis-
ing role in relations between Europe and South Amer-
ica (particularly evident in the case of Cuba), the fact is
that Spain has clearly lost its influence and international
weight in the American continent. Brazil, Mexico and
South America in general all need Spain less and less
(Areilza and Torreblanca, 2009). One great example is
the secondary role played by Zapatero’s government in
the handling of the political crisis in Honduras in June,
following the destitution of the President Manuel Zelaya,
and his replacement by Roberto Micheletti. As a conse-
quence, some analysts believe that South America no
longer needs Spain to have access to the globalised world,
but that Spain, in contrast, does need South America to
be a global actor (Torreblanca, 2010).
Furthermore, with each passing year, the Ibero-Amer-
ican summits (such as the 19th summit held in Estoril)

seem to be losing specific weight on the agendas of the
participating states, which are more interested in organi-
sations of a regional nature that can better represent their
interests. Thus it is of vital importance for Spain to de-
velop an innovative cooperation and political dialogue
based on new instruments if the country aims to continue
to be attractive to these countries. However, invoking the
historical foundations of relations in the framework of
the Ibero-American Community will not be sufficient,
especially in view of the Bicentennial celebrations that
are taking place in a region that contains a collection of
governments with a doubtful commitment to democracy
and strong populist overtones, and which could result in
difficult situations with respect to the observance of hu-
man and civil rights. It is in this context that we find once
more the tensions inherent in a policy with a strong ethi-
cal foundation and a universal validity of values, which
the government will have to face up to. The case of Cuba
– in spite of the latest decisions by the Obama Admin-
istration to facilitate contact between the island and the
USA – will continue to be a point of generalised dissent
with the PP opposition party. Furthermore, Spain, and
specifically in its relations with Cuba, is coming to realise
that the dynamics of Europeising or “bilateralising” rela-
tions with the island, depending on the situation, cannot
be successful in the longer term in establishing Spain’s
protagonism in its relations with South America. The in-
tention to broaden the country’s role of special interlocu-
tor with Cuba (Arenal, 2008: 342) could be affected by
the growing Europeisation of relations and the posture
– sometimes provocative, other times condescending – of
the regime in Havana. Finally – after the government’s
agreement with the opposition in parliament on the pro-
gramme for Spain’s Presidency – the subject of Cuba
was withdrawn from the agenda with respect to South
America, and the summit with the region in May 2010
went to the head of the list.
Seeking coordination with Asia
One continent that Spain’s foreign policy views as a pri-
ority is Asia. Hence the trips to India by Deputy Prime
Minister De la Vega and Moratinos’ trips to the Philip-
pines and South Korea, the institutionalisation with the
latter country of an annual meeting with Spain, and the
drafting of the third Asia-Pacific Plan for 2009-2012
which sets Spain’s objectives and priorities in the region.
Two main characteristics of Spain’s overseas action in
Asia should be stressed: the first is the priority given to
national interests over human rights and the promotion
of democracy (for example, we should mention the visit
to Spain by the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who
took part in negotiations to consolidate economic rela-
tions between the two countries). What appears to be
true is that this pragmatism in the seeking and defence of
Spain’s economic interests in Asia’s new markets has ena-
Spain's foreign and security policy in 2009
bled the country to broaden its presence beyond the tra-
ditional areas of access, such as Ibero-America. Though
there is a need for a greater diversification of Spanish
investments in the world, the country has a very advan-
tageous base with which to achieve a very wide accept-
ance among the political actors at a global level, and Asia
is an example of this. The second outstanding feature is
the visibility of Spain’s “soft power” in Asia, for example
through cultural promotion by means of opening new
Cervantes Institutes, which enable the country to widely
penetrate the social strata. The great asset that Spain can
contribute in this respect is the country’s culture and
its worldwide visibility, not only in terms of culture on
the peninsula, but also in the broader sense of culture in
Spanish. In addition, the sub-region of central Asia and
all its potential in terms of energy security seems to have
awoken the interest of Spanish external action, with the
visit paid by Moratinos to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan during 2009.
Conclusions: Spain’s foreign policy in
times of crisis
Moratinos’ declaration concerning “...four historical
events that reveal the inevitable process of transforma-
tion of the international order, in which Spain has not
been a mere spectator, but an active and substantial par-
ticipant, with the leadership of the prime minister of the
government” (Moratinos, 2009a) appears to be rather
over-optimistic, given the reality of Spain’s foreign policy
in 2009. The debate –indirect, incidentally, between the
minister and academic observers (Areilza and Torre-
blanca, 2009; Moratinos, 2009b) – on the scope of Spain’s
foreign policy have brought to public notice the different
coordinates from which Spain’s location in international
politics is being analysed. In spite of the Zapatero gov-
ernment’s new orientations in international affairs in the
second term of office, the criticism regarding the absence
of a strategic approach that will “make it reactive, or even
merely intuitive” (Areilza and Torreblanca, 2009) contin-
ues to exist. Though this criticism may be motivated by
very different interests, it represents a clear message con-
cerning the absence of multidimensional external action,
such as the consequence of acting in very different fields
and without a recognizable common denominator.
In fact, as we saw during 2009, Spain is still seeking its
place in international politics, not only to achieve a suit-
able image of the country in the eyes of other actors but,
perhaps, as a consequence of insufficient contributions
with respect to the substantial nature of the contribu-
tions that are expected from Spain to solve the problems.
This potential has not, to date, been put to reasonable use
in order to promote Spain in the international system.
Spain’s Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2010, the
re-launching of transatlantic relations and of the recently
commenced associations with West Africa, and a new
15
Spanish Foreign Policy
impetus in Ibero-America, where the aim is to produce
a “quantum leap” for EU-South America links in 20104,
and the fight against international terrorism may prove to
be fundamental for the future positioning of Spain’s for-
eign policy as a medium-sized power. However, the way
in which the economic crisis evolves in Spain will also
prove decisive in defining overseas action and its cred-
ibility in the eyes of other international actors, implying
restrictions beyond the voluntarism that the government
wants to demonstrate. In this perspective, it seems even
more urgent for Spain to move towards the object of po-
tentiating its “committed external policy” and strength-
ening the search for consensus in the design of basic ar-
eas of foreign policy as a matter of state, “... by including
all the possible public and private actors” (Rodríguez
Zapatero, 2008: 2), the reform of public diplomacy and
greater ministerial political coordination in the handling
of Spain’s overseas action.
It is also necessary to consider the characteristics of
the international sphere in which the Zapatero govern-
ment’s foreign policy is being deployed, and how to suc-
ceed in making compatible the ethical discourse with
the country’s material interests, as well as how these
could be ingredients in a specific action plan in the dif-
ferent thematic areas and regions that must be dealt
with. The answers to these questions are very different
in terms of their scope, but it might be useful for debate
in the future. As one can imagine, the heads of Spain’s
government have a long road ahead of them if they
want Spain to make a profound impact as a “medium-
sized power that occupies a singular strategic space in
the current multipolar world” , “a nation that is being
called on to possess greater weight in the international
community if it knows how to assert – with a capac-
ity for dialogue and persuasion – its status as a bridge
between regions, between cultures, between rich and
poor countries” (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2008: 1).
Notes
CIDOB International Yearbook 2010
1. The four summits to which Moratinos refers take
place at the beginning of April, hence the name pro-
posed.
2. Go to: <http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/228/218/
lang,english> (last viewed: 05.05.10 ).
3. Go to: <http://www.publico.es/internacional/189676/
espana/vendio/armas/tel/aviv/seis/meses> and
<www.comercio.mityc.es/NR/rdonlyres/7F4503DA-
4395-4C9E-806E-3BDD6A7A00F4/0/Informeanualesta
d%C3%ADsticas2008.pdf>(last viewed 05.05.10).
4. Declarations by the secretary of state for Ibero-
America Juan Pablo de Laiglesia in Montevideo on 11
June 2009: <http://www.casamerica.es/es/actualidad-efe/
espana-impulsara-un-salto-cualitativo-en-los-lazos-ue-
america-latina-en-2010-75133> (last viewed: 28.07.09)
16
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