What Ghazill Denies And

Does Not De ny About Caus ality

Dr. Ramazan ERTURK

Assistant Professor, Erciyes University, School of Divinity.

Introduction

One of the issues widely disputed among scholars is wlıat kind of posirion

Ghazali, the meclievallslaınic thinker, takes regarding the principle of causaliry.

Some scholars hold that he denies the existence of the principle of causality1

while so me daim that he denies the necessity of a causal connection, not the

existence of it; he admits the existence of causality which is placed in nature by

God.1 Another scholar puts foıward the view t:hat Ghazali accepts a logical ca-

usa! necessity although he rejects an ontological one.; Yet, another asseıtion

about the issue tn question is that Ghazali holds causaliry, but not that of the phi-

losophers.'' According to Al on, Ghazali tries to reconcile the two opposing views

of causalily; name1y, the philosophers' view and the mutakallim:ün's view.5 So-

me scholars even maintain that Ghazali explains the issue differently in his vari-

ous works and, therefoJe, sets forth contradictory statements on the issue."

Now, the existence of this dispute among sdıolars and the different-even the

opposit~-claims about Ghazali's position on the issue indicate, on the one hand,
that the issue at hand is an im portant question. The implications of the views an-

1 Shanab, R., "Giıazali and Aquinas on Causaıion ", pp. 143-144; Shanab daims that GlıazaJi re-

jecısthe principle of ca usalion in his ai-Taha}ill wlıereas he admits it in his M(yar a l- 'Jim. see Sha-

nab, p. 146.

2 Courte ney. \YI. ).. "The Critique on Nanıral Causaliıy in ıhe Mu ıakaJiimun and Nomjnalism", pp.

85-86.

3 Fakhri, M., ls/amic Occasiona/ism. p . 60.

4 Goodnıaıı, L. E., "Did Al·Ghazali deny CausaJity'". p. ı 1 1.

5 Alon, 1., .. AI-Ghazali on Causality", p. 397.

6 See, for example, Abrahamov, B., "Al-Ghazali's Theory of Causality", p . 92.

232 tasal'l'llj

ributed to Ghazali -especially the implication.of the view that Ghazali denies the

principle of causality- causes same serious problems that Ghazali cannot appro-

ve. For instance, it can be said that the denial of the principle of causality impli-

es, in sorne sense, stopping all kinds of scienrific investigations. For the princip-

le of causality is the foundation of all scientific investigations. In other words,

scientific investigations all presuppose that there are causal relations among

events happening in nature. We want to inquire an earthquake because we

think that we can know something about its causes and effects -Le. we presup-

pose that there is a causal relation between some natural event and the earthqu-

ake-and thus can do something to avoid irs negative effects on us. But if we

think that there is no caı.ısal relation in nature-nan.ırally this means that we can-

not know anydüng with regard to neither causes oor effects of the events eecur-

ring in namre like the earthquake-why should we try to investigat.e why, when,

how, and ete. of these events. ln that case, if it is tnıe that Ghazali denies the

principle of causality in nature, this means that Ghazali wants us to stop all kinds

of scientific investigations. But that is a quite serious implication of the denial

that cannot be artribured to Ghazali as far as we know him.

On the other hand, the dispute among the scholars and the variety of the vi-

ews attributed to Ghazali motivate our natural curiosity to investigate both wbat

Ghazali's position on the issue really is and what the reason(s) for the diversity

of the asseıtions by the scholars about Ghazali's position are.

Therefore, in this paper, we wi!l attempt to present a re -exanıination of the

issue. Our examination will be based on Ghazali's views in the chapter on ca-

usality in hiş Tahafut; tlüs is so both because Ghazali's most striking views on

causality are pm for·ward in tlıis clıapter and because this chapter involves the

most dispured and misconstn.ıed views of Ghazali's on causality. However, ot-

her texts will be appealed to when needed.

Let us begin with the famous passage on which some scholars rely when they

daim that Ghazali denies causality:,

Ibe coincidence (al-iqtiran) hetween what ·is hahitual~y helieved to he a ca-

use and what is belieued to be an effect ı:ç not necessary; on the contrary, from

two coirıcidents, neither this is that noı· that is this.7

7 Ttıbajiıt, senıence literally. it will be as follows: •(from) ıwo

p. 195; lf we transiate the last

rlıings, neidıer ılıis

is ılıaı nor ıhaı is ıhls'. Buı we ıranslaıe ıhe ıernı 'ıwo thiııgs' as 'ıwo coincidenıs'

because Ghazali's expressions ·and so on for all observed coincidenıs (min al-nnıqıaranat)' after his

enuıneration of exaınples !ike quenclıing tlıirsı and drinking ete., indicare tlıaı ıhe ıvio tlıings nıen­

tioned above and illustrated by the exaınples are coincidents.

 wbat ghazlili denies aı·ıd 233

Now, some problemsarise when scholars inrerpret this passage. lt is tıue that

the passage is highly obscure and diffkult to understand. Buc this does not me-

an tJıatit cannot be truly undersroad The t1rst problemishow to understand the

terın ' al-iqtiraı1' here. Tmeresüngly, most scholars transiate the terqı as 'the con-

nection'." It is tıue that the tenn 'iqtiran' deseribes a relation or a connection. But

it is also true that there are different kinds of relations berween a cause and an

effect; for exaınple, a spatial or a temporal relation is different from a causal one.

Therefore, the issue here is what kinci of relation the tenn 'al-iqtiran' states or

means.

The rennin question may be translated as 'coincidence, concomitance, co-

existence or being together with something else' and so on.9 Now, fırst, as it is tın­

derstood from the implications of the meanings of the terın, the relation meant

here by the teım is a spatio -temporal relation between causes and rheir effects.

If one misses this point, one will veıy likely miss the most important point Gha-

zali wants to make by this treatment. Provided that this is the case, !et us carefully

examine the passage above and try to understand what GhazaH means here.

It is clear in the senten ce itself that what is denied is not the existence of such

a relation, bu.t Us rrecessity. Indeed, since the denial is that of iıs necessity, this

denial presupposes the existence of the relation itself. For if one does not accept

that lhere is a relation likc this, why should one need to deny its necessity? Thus,

we can reach the conclusion that Ghazali does not deny the exı:stence of causal

relations in nature, and those who attribute such a eleniallike this to Ghazali mi-

sunderstand him. '

 But the question arising in the mind at this point is 'why does Ghazali need

to make such a eleniallike this -i.e. , the denial of the necessity? Whar is the mo-

tiVe behind his effort of the denial?'. If we answer these questions, <..;Iıazali 's po-

int of view and his aim will be understood ınore correctly and more properly.

Por Ghazali is aware of the implications of the theory daiming the necessity of

al-iqtiran between a cause and irs effect. Therefore, the first thing for us to do is

to lay down these implications and their threat for Ghazali's thought as the mo-

tives behind his denial.

The first and the most important iınplication of the necessity of al-iqliran is

that this daim excludes Gocl from the realm of causes. For the necessily of al-iq-

tiran requires that God must be spatio -temporally together (spatio-teınporally

8 See, for instance, A. Hyınan . "The ı neoherence of the Philosophers". p. 283; L. E. Goodıııan.

p. 85; M E. Ma rınura, "Al-Ghaıali on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in Tahanıt and The fqlisad",

p 60.

9 For the ıııeanings of the ternı 'al- iqtiran' in Arabic, see Ibn Manzur, Umn al- 'Amh, vol. 13. pp.

335-336.
234 tasawı((

coexistent) with the events happening in nature if He be the cause of these

events. But, according to GhazaH's thought, such a thing like this is impossible

becau.se God transcends space and time and, therefore, cannot have spatio-teın ­

poral coexistence with natural events. In other words, accepting the view that

the relarion called al-iqtiran between an event and its cause(s) means affirining

the view that cause(s) of a natural event can be only something wh.ich spatio-

temporally coincides with it; but this means that God-which is a being beyond

(or above) space and time-is out of the realm of the causes of natural events.

Ghazali expresses this implication of the necessity daim in the first ·maqaın' as

he deseribes the opponent's daim as follows:

Tbe .first leı;el (maqam) is the opponent's claim that the doer (fa'il) q( hur-

ning is solely (faqat) fire andfire is naturally (bi't tab'i) the doer, not by

choice; therefat·e, it is impossible tbat .fire can ı-efrairı from hei.ng as its natııre

{wquires, R.E.} qfter its contact wiıh someıbin,g receptive of it."'

The te rm jaqat here explicitly states the exclusion of God rnentioned above. ''

The tenn al-tah' also supports this exclusion. We will see below how this sup-

port comes tn.ıe. But first we want to makean im portant point here. It should be

noted that Ghazali makes a distinction between the rerm c,t f-sabab and the term

al7fa 'il. By the first term he means what we call secondary causes in nature

(among creatures) while by the second he means a Cause who does -i.e., a Ca-

use who creates consciously, willingly and knowingly. Therefore, when the act

of diong ( al:fil) is attributed to fire together with the denial of cho ice by the op-
ponent, Ghazali denies this attribution in the following manner:

Tb is ı:ç one q( the tbı:rıgs we deny; to the contmry we s~v that the doer of bur-

ning hycreating (hi halqi) hlackness in the cotton and separation in its parts and

making it get bunıed and ashes, either hy means of angeLç or without any means,

is Ciod. As to .fire. it is inanimate and has no aci o.fdoiP~g (lafila laha) .'ı

Now, if the starement of the opponent's view and that of Ghazali's, and the

rerms in these srateınents are compared, it is seen that the opponent ascribes the

act oj doing to fire whereas Ghazali, first, derıies this ascription and, secondly,

attribures it to God. It is important to note that the terms in these two staternentS

are chosen so carefully that each has its own implication and supports the main

idea of the statement in wbich it is. In the opponent's daim that fire is the doer,

the adverb explaining this act of doing is 'naturally'; this is a term which irnpli-

es an uncreared (i.e., 'natural' in naturalistic sense) necessary (i.e., performed

automaticaly asa consequence of the nature of performer, not by choice) act.

10 Tahafııt, p. 196; translaıions are my own; 1 do not use other translations because the terms

ıısedin these sıatenıents need more careful exanıinations than they usually receive.

11 1 wantıo point out that A. Hyman righrly tı:anslaıes the ıerm 'faqaı' as 'exclıısively', p. 284.

12 Tabaflıt, p. 196.
 wbat ghazali derıies anel 235

But jn Ghazali's daim that God is the doer, the term doer is used together with

the terms by creating and by making These terms explain what kind of act 'do-

ing' -artrlbuted to Gocl by Ghazali- is. Furthermore, Ghazali gives another reason

for not ascribing any 'doing' -not any act, as daimeel by some scholars- to fire; it

is the fact that tl.re is inanimate. It is coocluded form this that, according to Gha-

zali, 'doing' is the kincl of act arilinare beings alone can perform.

From these considerations, it is understood that being a secondary ca use (aJ-

sabab) is differenr from being a doer (al-fa'iD. Therefore, fire can be a secondaıy

cause bur not a doer; for, according to GhazaU, the larter includes the meaning

of the term Oreator, but being Creator is reserved in Ghazali's thought for God

alone. ,; However, some scholars,'" without making this distinction, transiate the

last sentence of the passage above as 'fire has no action'; such a translationisa

mı:sirıterpretation of the passage leading to the condusion that Ghazali gives no

place to the secondary causes in his system and, thus, denies causaJity in natu-

re. We think that Ghazali's desetiption of the tenn a17fa 'il, in the third chapter of

Tahafut as he ~xplains the self-contradiction of philosophers when they accept

both theory of emanation and God's being the doerof the universe, will enligb-

ten our point. The description is as follows:

As to their contradiction in Ibe doer, he [the ·doer, R.E.J must (la bııd) have

a choosing will and the kno wledge ()[ whc11 he wflts, so that he he the doer ()( what

he wills; wheı-eas God, accm-ding to t.henı {Philosopbers, R.E.l, does not have will,

even He {God, R.E.] never has any attrihutes."

In this description, the term 'la bud' states that having a free will and the
knowledge of what is willed are necessary conditions of being ad oer. So, wha-

tever does not have these conditions -!ike fire, for example- cannot be a doer. In

this context, what Ghazali denies is not the principle of causality, but the misatt-

ribution; i.e., the att.ribution of being a doer to secondaıy causes (al-asbab) ins-

tead of God.

Another ırusconstrued passage leading to the conclusion that Ghazali denies

the principle of causality in nature is the one in which Ghazali examines the pro-

of of the opponent. The passage is read as follows:

Wbat is the prooffor that fire is the doer? 7bere is n o prooffor birn [the oppo-

nent, R.E.l except the ohservation of the occurrence q( hurning togetber with the

contact with fire. But the ohseroation proves that the occurrence is tt:~getbeı·

ıvitb it {fire, R.E./, hut does not prove that tbe occurreııce is by it (fire, R.E.J and

that there is no other cause ('ille) than it (fire, R.E./.'6 •

13 Marmura, p. 68, quoıing from Ghazali's al-!qtisad

H See, for in.~tance, A. Hyınan, p. 284; M. Mamıura, p. 61; L. E. Goodnıaıı, p. 90; Nonetlıeless,

Goodnıan coıııes closer to our poinı when he pnints out ı he Arisıotelian argunıent that 'all nıaner, by

its ioırinsic nawre is inanimate and ıJıerefore incapable of initiaıing aııy process.'; Goodnıan, op. ciı.

15 Tahafit.t, p. 89.

16 Taha:fitt, p. 196.
236 taSCiliVI!{

Hyman translates the last sentence as "Indeed, there is no other cause bur

God" _,- Such a translation is emirely misleading and not appropriate because of

the foJiowing reasons:

a) lt is nm the case that the sentenc.e ends with the term 'by it (bihi)' and a

new sentence begins; for the Arabic letter 'va' connects the subordinate ciause

to the main clause. Therefore, the subordinate etause cannot be taken as an in-

dependenr sentence and thus translated as Hyman does.

b ı The pronoun 'it' throughout the who le sentence is the same pronoun and

used for the same purpose; namely, it isa substitute for 'fire', not for 'God' as

H yına n takes it in his translation of the subordinate etause mentioneel above.

c ) Ir is a rule of Arabic grammar that a pronoun is anribured to the dosesr su-

irable no un in the sentence, and here it is 'fire' .

d) There is neither rhe word 'God' nor any~dication neitl1er in this senten-

ce itself nor in the earlier semences of the paragraph in order to attribute the pro-

noun 'it' at the end of the term 'siva' to God. Now, it is impossible to understand

ho·w Hyman and the others imerpreting the passage like him make it possible

that God comes in the sentence.

e) H Ghazali denies, as claimed, all other causes except God at the very be-

ginning of the chapter, how can he struggle la ter on ro show that. w hat is cal!ed

causality between secondary causes and rheir effects is not necessary; it is inte-

resting that this later stn.ıggle consritutes almosr eighty percent of the whole
chapter.

We want to note here that we are not alone in undersranding the issue at

hand in this way. Two other scholars, Shanab and Goodman, also understands

it as w e do. 18

The seconditnportant implication of the theory daiming the necessity of the

relation -not only the spatio- temporal relation but also the causal relation- bet-

ween secondaıy causes and their effects ınay be stated in the following manner:

When a necessary real ~fftcacy is attributed to a secondary cause by saying 'this

effect necessarily foUows from that secondary ca use', such an attribution indica-

tes a view adınitring secondary causes as partners of God in the act of creating.

For, giving a necessary sufficient causality to secondary causes [Qgether with ac-

cepting God as the First Ca use, as the ınoderate form of the rheory in quesrion

does, implies the view that God has nothing to do with the things and events in

the uruverse after He once created them, and that eveıy event has its own suffi-

cienr ca use from which it necessarily follows. In rhis case, either God is the First

17 Hynıan, p. 284.

18 Shanab, p. 143; Goodınan, p. 91; Goodınan poinL~ out in the fooınote on page 91 that V:ın

Den Berglı also ınjsconstnıes the clatıse as Hynıan does.

 ıubat ghazlili. denies and 237

Mover, 'as in the Aristotelian understanding, who causes only the fırst molion

and after that each motion necessarily caı.ıses anather one and so on; or God is

only the First Crearor and Planner of the events, and He does not-even cannot-

lnteıvene in the plan or the course of events after it begins, and second<ıry ca-

uses necessaıily perform all o dı er acts; such a view is sunilar to the deist vi e w of

God which leads-so to speak-ro an u nderstanding of a retired God. Such an un-

derstanding goes against Ghazali's way of understanding both God and secon-

dary caı.ıses. First of all, the act of creating is reserved, as we said earlier,19 only

for God and secondaıy causes have nothing to dowith such an act; i.e., they

cannot in any way be the partners of God in this act. Ghazali never pennits the

view implying such a partnership because it is emirely contrary to the basic prirı­

ciples-even essence-of Islam, the view agairıst wh.ich there are many explicit

verses in the Qu.r'an.ı•ı Secondly, Ghazali cannot accept the deist view of God

and creat.ion mentioneel above because in SuHsm -which means Islamic mysti-

cism-God performs his act of creating in every moment- i.e. , everything is cre-

ated anew by God in every ınomenel -and Ghazali is accepted as a member of

Sufism.

The th.ird iınpl.ication of theory of necessary relation, as Ghazali himself sta-

tes, u is the den.ial of mirades and of God's oınnipotence. For, the necessity de-

fended by philosophers is so strict, according [O Ghazali, thar it does not allow

any exception; even God cannot interfere with it. Ghazali deseribes the strength

of the necessity in question as follows:

U'le object to them /philosophers, R.E.} in four issues from tbese sciences /natu-
 ral sciences, R.E.l 7befirst fs theirjudgment that the coincidence seen between se-

condary caıtses and their e.ffects in existence isnecessarily a necessary coinci-

dence (fqtiran talaztım hi'd darura); neither bringing a secondary ca use into be-

ing withow aıı e.f(ect nor the exı~<;tence q( an e.f(ect without a secorıdary ca use are

neitber in the (realm qj] destined tbings ( al-maqdur) nor in that ofJX>Ssibles. 13

Ghazali uses here both the term 'talazum' and 'al-darura' to emphasize the

strengrh of the necessity in question. The last sentence alsamakes any interven-

19 See fo9tnote 12 above.

20 An explidı sıaıeınent of God's being ılıe o nly Creator and the rejection of adınitling partners

is fou ııd . for instance, in the following verses of ıhe Qut·'an: 13/16; 16/17 and 20; 25/3; 35/ 3

21 For a deıailed exaıııination of God's acı of perpetual erealion in Jslanıic Mysıicisnı, see, for

instance. Toshi hiko lzuısu's arıide ent i ıled "TIJe Concept of Perperu al Creation in Jslamic Mysıicisın

and Zen Budd lıisnı ," in Melange o.ffarıs ·a He-nry Corbin, ed. S.H. Nasr (Tehran: Iranian Academy of

Plıilosopby. 1977), pp. 11 S-48. Tiıis article is also published in the collecıion of arıicles by Izutsu on

lslanıic Mystical Philosophy tınder ıhe ıitle Creation and Time/es..~ Order ofThings: Eçsay' in Jslamic

ı\~ysti.cal Pbilosopby(Ashland, Oregon: White Cloud Press, 1994), pp. 141-173.

22 Tahafttt, p. 194.

23 Tahafut, p. 191.
238 rasat~l1tj

tion or excepüon out of the question, even out of the reach of God's power, by

excluding thern from the realm of possibles. Therefore, what Ghazali denies is

this htındred percent strict determinisrn bernreen secondary causes and thcir ef-

fects, which denies God's omnipotence and miracles.

The fourth implication of the necessiry theory is the denial of God's being a

voluntary agent by appealing to the ıheory of emanation in order to explain the

necessity in question. Ghazali severely criticizes this endeavor of the philosop-

hers in the first and third chapters of the Tahaju( and expliciı:ly denies it in the

chapter we are examining.24

There is another implication of the necessity theory for those who accept

God as the cause of universe. It is this: Since a cause and its effect are necessa-

rily simultaneous or coexisting, according to the theory, and since God is the

· etemal ca use of u ni verse, it necessarily follows that universe is eternal, too. But

that is not acceptable for Ghazali because universe is a created temporal being

and the only eternal being is God.

Now, because of its threatening implications we have enumerated up to the

point, Ghazali denies the necessity -not the existence- of the relation between

causes (al-asbab) and their effects (al-musabbabat) .

On the other hand, there are several indications and statements in various
passages of this chapter to show that Ghazali accepts the principle of causality

in the sense of a law or an expectation which has a very high percemage of pro-

bability bm cannot reach an absolute necessity because it permits some excep-

tions. The most striking passage is expressed in the following way:

7be second way in wbich tbere is a salvation from these abominations is our

accepting that .fit-e is created in such a nature (hilqa) that it burns two simi/ar

/pieces oj, R.E.} cottorı when they contact with it, and does not make distinction

between them if they are simi/ar in every a.spect.')

In these stateınents, the meaning of the tenn 'hilqa' is disputed; but we trans-

Iate it as 'natu.re' because the teıms 'hilqa' and 'fitra' in Arabic express the cre-

aıed nature of things. Of course, Ghazali consciously and pmposively prefers it

to the term 'tab" which irnplies self -sufficiency and being uncreated instead of

being created. The statemenl that the principle of causality, asa law put in nattı­

re by God, is accepted is veıy dear in this passage. However, Ghazali's follo-

wing sentence darifies the nature and character of this law. His following sen-

24 TahaJi.u, p. 198.

25 Tahafut, p. 200.
 wbat ghazali denies and 239

tence is this: "But, we, ıogether with [accepting, R.E.l this, allow a prophec's be-

ing thrown into fire but not burned". 21' The passage quoted above is taken from

the discussion bel\veen Ghazali and the philosophers who deny the possibility

of mJracles. Philosoplıers clairn that if there is the principle of causality in naru-

re and if fire burns rwo pieces of cotton without making any distinction berwe-

en them, thenit is not possible that a Inırnan ):ıeing is thrown into fire but not

burn~d; this is so simply because buming is the nature of fire and it cannot be

conrrary to its nature. At this point Ghazali takes the intermediate position and

admits that fire has the created nature (hilqa) of burning; but he claims that it do-

es oor prevent miracles-i.e., a prophet's being thrown into fire but not burned.

In the sentence quoted above Ghazali says 'together with accepting this [that fi-

re has a created naturel'; this isa cJear statement of the fact that Ghazali adınits

that there is the principle of causality in the created natural occurrence called

burning. But the validity of the law called the prindple of causality is not hund-

red percent lt happens inaccordance with the will of and orders given by its

Creator; when the Creator wills that it be not come tnı e, it does not come true

and thus allows exceptions !ike mirades.

In another passage, when he denies that fire is the doer (fa'il) of burning, that

breaci is that of satisfying hunger, that medicine is that of health, and so on, Gha-

zali calls all of them ·secondary canses (aJ-asbab)'. The statement in question re-

ads as follows:

Through this {argument, R.E./ becoınes invalid the assertian ofthose who cia-

im that fire is the doer (fa'it) t?! burning, bread thal~~ sati!ffying hunger, medi-
 cine that ofhealth, and so on so forıh .fm· othersecondary cau.ses ( al-asbab) .'"

In rhis statement, both the distinction Ghazali makes between being ·a doer'

and 'a secondary cause', and what Ghazali denies is very clear. Here Ghazali

uses the term 'seconda·r y ccıııses (al-asbab) ' for the group consisting of fire . bre-

ad, medicine and otlıers while he denies their being 'doers'. Now, it is impossib-

le to understand how one can daim that Ghazali denies the principle of causa-

lity in nature in the face of Ghazali's dear statements like the ones mentioneel

and not mentioned here.

Conclusion

As we conclude, we may recapitulate Ghazali's position on causality as this:

i) Ghazali makes a distinction between Doer or Creator of an event and its

secondary cause;

26 Tabafıu, p. 200.

27 Tabajı11, p. 197.
240 tasattt't!/

ii) There are secondary causes (al-asbab) and their effecrs (al-musaboabat)

among crearures, accorcling to Ghazali, and therefore rJıere is a principle of ca-

usaliry working here;

iii) The relation -both the spatio- temporal and the ca usa] one -between se- ·

condary causes and their effects is not a hundred percent strict determinism

challenging God's omnipotence and the eXistence of miracles. nıerefore, God

can intervene in rhe course of evems. and mirades are real;

iv) The only Creator of alleventsis God; secondary causes have nothing to

do with the act of creatiog. Unaided secondary causes are neither suftkient nor

efficient on events; they obtain their etlkacy from God's aid w them.

After recapitulating thus Ghazali's position on causality, r will attempt now to

give a possible answer to the question I raised at the beginning of this artide; na-

mely, rhe question 'why do scholars .interpret. Ghazali in various ways -even in

the way as if he denies causaliry?'. ı th.ink, asa first reason for this, that Ghazali's

imporrant way of e.xplaining the issue is not carefull)' examined and clearly un-

derstood. That is why be is usually pm by scholars eitber on the si de of eecasi-

onalist philosophers !ike Mulbransch and some of mutakaltimun or that of tho-

se who deny causaliry in nature !ike Hume. Not only this, he is also put-though

rarely -on the side of Aristotelian philosophers. The .Aristotelian and the Hume-

an approaches are two e.xtremes non ofwhich Ghazali goes to. As to occasiona-

Jism, I thin k that Ghazali cannot put in this category, eid\er. For Ghazali does not

think that secondary canses are mere instrı.ıments in the hand of God; to the

contrary, secondaıy causes are really causes.

 Another reason for misinterpreting Ghazali is interpretive natuı·e of (or the

background factor in) understanding. By 'interpretive nature of understanding' ı

mean this: Every understanding is (or involves)-more or less-an interpretation;

and one of the dominant factor in understandiog or interpreting an issue is the

background of the reader. Therefore, when various scholars having different

backgrounds read Ghazali, they natı.ırally understand him differently in accor-

dance with their backgrounds. The scholars putting Ghazali on either this or that

· side -like AJon, Goodman and Marmura, for instance- are the ones mostly grown

up in Western culture nourished mostly by either Judeo-Christian or naturalistic

sources. Therefore, they naturally interpret Ghazali in the light of their scholarly

backgrounds sustained by these sources instead of u nderstanding him -of co ur-

se, if it is possible for theın to do rbis- in wide conte.xt of Islamic principles and

culture. That is why they try to place him underthis or that category in \Xfestern

thought. That is why it is easy for a scholar coming from the Humean hackgro-

und to interpret Ghazali as if he denies causaliry when he reads Ghazali saying

that the relation between a cause and an effect is not necessary. (1)

@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@

(1)

There is an other reason for the misconception about Gh:aza:li, which

is not mentioned in this article.
Ibn Rushd made a false allegation about Gh:a:za:li: that he denies the
Causality.
 wbaı ghazali denies and 241

Works Cited

GHAZALI, Tahafut al-Falasifa, (ed. ) by S. Dunya ( Beirut, 1982>.

ABRAHAMOV, B., "Al-Ghazali's Theory o f Causa lity,'' Studia Lslamica, 67 0 9881, pp.

75-98.

ALl, A. Y., 1l1e Meaning of7be Holy Qur'arı, Brentwood, 1992.

ALON, ı. , "AJ-Ghazali on Causality," j ournal qf the American Orierı tal Society, 100

(1980), pp. 397-405.

COURTENEY. W . J., "The Critique on Natural Causality in the MutakaHimun and No-

ın.inalism," Tbe Han~ard 1beological Reuiew, 66 (1973), pp. 77-94.

FAK.HRI, M ., lç/amic Occasiona/ism, London , 1958.

GOODMAN, L. E., "Did Al·Ghazali den y Causalüy?", Studia lslamietı, 47 (1978>. pp.

83-120.

HYMAN, A., "The ı:ncoherence of the Philosopbers," in Philosophy in the Middle

Ages, ed. A. Hyman &J.J. Walsh Ondianapolis,Ind.: Hackett Publishing Company, 1973),

pp. 283-91 .

IBN MANZUR. lisarı al- 'Arab, vol. 13, Be irut, 1956.

IZUTSU, Toshihiko, "The Concept of Perpet u al Creation in Islamic Mysticism and Zen

Buddhisnı," in Melange Offem 'a Hemy Corbirı, ed. S. H. Nasr (Tehra n: Iranian Academy

of Philosophy, 19771, pp. 115-48.

MARMURA, M., "AJ-Ghazali on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in Tahafut a nd 11ıe

Iqtisad," Aligarb journal of Jslamic Tbougbt, 2 09891, pp. 46-75.

SHANAB, R., "Ghazali and Aquinas o n Ca usa tion," Monist, 58 0974), pp. 140-1 50.