Energy Policy 129 (2019) 1132–1142

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Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Colombian energy planning - Neither for energy, nor for Colombia T

1 ∗,1
Martínez Viviana , O.L. Castillo
Department of Rural and Regional Development, Faculty of Environmental and Rural Studies, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: In the layperson's imagination, energy is an abstract concept, disconnected from social and ecological realities,
Socio-energy systems while in reality it is the cornerstone of all human and natural interactions; thus, energy policy can be seen as a
National energy plans representation of how part of nature has been appropriated, managed, and represented. This article offers an
Energy justice analysis of Colombian energy policy through its National Energy Plans, and an examination of the energy
transitions that the country has experienced in the last forty years. The analysis of the Colombian case de-
monstrates that the central objective of energy planning and its institutional framework has been the ad-
vancement and maximization of the exploitation of energy resources for export purposes, instead of providing a
guide to reorganize the system towards the reduction of energy consumption, the progressive replacement of
non-renewable resources in favor of renewable sources, or energy justice.

1. Introduction The disconnection between energy policies and socio-cultural di-

The way a society appropriates, transforms, and discards energy
reflects its interaction with nature. Therefore energy, besides being
essential for life, is the cornerstone of the many aspects and strategies in
which society functions (Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 2000). However,
energy is usually understood as an abstract concept that refers to a
quantifiable substance, which in transnational capitalism is limited to
circulating as a commodity in international markets (Bertinat, 2013).
In fact, the current model of energy appropriation for human so-
cieties dates to the Industrial Revolution, and is characterized as a
concentrated and abstract generation scheme, based on fossil resources,
with increasing consumption (Fouquet and Pearson, 2012). It is con-
centrated because it works with energy generation centers of enormous
power, generally not close to the sources of raw material that make
them work (coal, gas, oil, uranium), but above all, far from the main
centers of consumption of this energy. It is abstract, because the con-
sumption of energy has been increasingly concerned with considera-
tions of efficiency, and the understanding of activities such as its ex-
ploration, exploitation, distribution and consumption has been stripped
of the social, political and ecological relationships in which they are
imbedded.
mensions is well known and documented (Sovacool et al., 2015; Spreng,
2014). However, in a context of increasing energy demand as well as
social symmetries in Latin America, and particularly in Colombia, very
few studies are dedicated to understanding the negative impacts of the
market-oriented planning for political, practical and economic reasons.
In addition, academic studies on energy policy are scarce, and they treat
environmental and energy conflicts as economic problems (FEDESAR-
ROLLO, 2011). Also, the academics and institutes dedicated to the
subject are few and isolated, and energy statistical information is lim-
ited (Fontaine and Puyana, 2008); finally, there is great difficulty in
integrating the relationships between energy, environment and society
in a discipline or an academic environment, which should have ana-
lytical tools and categories that facilitate interdisciplinarity (Sovacool,
2014).
While most academics and decision-makers still do not address
these issues, in Latin America extractivism has been reactivated, giving
two fundamental roles to energy exploitation2: i) as an exportable re-
source that generates foreign currency, and ii) as the main support of
other extractive industries, since with the increasing depletion of nat-
ural resources, their extraction requires greater energy and water
consumption (Svampa, 2011). Indeed, in 2011, 42% of the total energy

∗
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: vivianamartinez@javeriana.edu.co (M. Viviana), olga.castillo@javeriana.edu.co (O.L. Castillo).
1
Postal address: Departamento de Desarrollo Rural y Regional, Facultad de Estudios Ambientales y Rurales, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Transversal 4, No.
42-00 (Piso 8), Bogotá, Colombia.
2
“… we will use the term extractivism to refer to those activities which remove large quantities of natural resources that are not processed (or processed only to a
limited degree), especially for export. Extractivism is not limited to minerals or oil. Extractivism is also present in farming, forestry and even fishing” (Acosta, 2013,
p.61).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.03.025
Received 28 April 2018; Received in revised form 13 March 2019; Accepted 14 March 2019
Available online 21 March 2019
0301-4215/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M. Viviana and O.L. Castillo
Fig. 1. Production and export of primary energy in Colombia in TCal Source: Based on Energy Balance Data – BECO (UPME, 2018).
consumed in the world was used in power generation and it is estimated
that by 2030 this participation will be approximately 46% (BP, 2011).
Regarding the geopolitics of energy resources, the role of Latin
America and the Caribbean has changed. In the case of oil, despite
having a minor role in production (barely 9% worldwide), their re-
serves have varied significantly in recent decades: from having 7.5% of
total proven world oil reserves in 2005, in 2015 they reached 19.4%. In
the case of renewable or decarbonized energy, the region's potential is
also relevant, especially in biofuels and hydroelectricity; in the former,
the region was responsible for 28% of the world production in 2015
(BP, 2016) and, in hydroelectric generation, Latin American water re-
sources are diverse in addition to abundant, due to the different rain
regimes and geographical relief conditions. Although all the countries
of the region have a high hydroelectric potential, Brazil and Colombia
stand out with 260,000 Mw and 93,085 Mw respectively. (OLADE,
2006). In addition, Colombia's primary energy production has had an
average annual growth of 5%, explained by an increase in fossil energy
production, while exports have grown at an average annual rate of
48%. This has led to more than half of the primary energy produced in
the country being exported since 1998 (Fig. 1).
In this context, the objective of this article is to examine the energy
transitions in the last forty years, through the analysis of the National
Energy Plans (PEN for its Spanish acronym), highlighting the link that
exists between the Colombian extractivsm -as the model of energy ex-
ploitation and appropriation- and the social and political relations in-
volved in this dynamic.
Therefore, in addition to this introduction, the second section pre-
sents our conceptual approach to the present public energy policy; in
the third one, we identify and describe the Colombia Energy Planning
processes and examine the evolution of the PENs and the transforma-
tions of its energy matrix in the last forty years. Then, we offer a dis-
cussion section that provides results; in the last section, we arrive at
some conclusions and provide some energy policy implications.
2. Conceptual approach to energy policy
In the words of André Roth (2002), public policy is “the existence of
a group, consisting of one or several collective objectives considered
necessary or desirable, that, at least partially, are treated through
means and actions by an institution or governmental organization with
the purpose of guiding the behavior of individual or collective actors in
order to modify a situation perceived as unsatisfactory or problematic”
(p. 27). Concepts like this one go beyond the classic model based on
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Energy Policy 129 (2019) 1132–1142
regarding the State as independent of civil society, and open a political
panorama that, in the case of energy, includes the global and en-
vironmental dynamics that determine States and also varied other so-
cial groups with different interests.
In the specific case of energy policies, their primary component has
been the planning of its supply and demand, so the objective of energy
planning studies is to accurately estimate the future demand for energy
and establish the sources to satisfy it. To approximate the consumption
and production of energy, socio-economic factors such as the popula-
tion growth, the economy, consumer preferences, technological devel-
opment, and the evolution of the world energy markets have been in-
corporated (Dincer, 1999).
According to Pohekar and Ramachandran (2004), two moments can
be distinguished in worldwide energy planning: one in the Seventies,
characterized by the need to substitute oil for cheaper alternatives, with
a planning oriented exclusively towards cost minimization. The second,
towards the end of the Eighties, when ecological and social con-
siderations were incorporated into energy planning, and multicriteria
models were developed to estimate demand and supply (Nijkamp and
Volwahsen, 1990).
In fact, and given the impossibility of renewing fossil energy sources
to satisfy the increasing demand, the objectives of a modern energy
policy are broader, and include minimizing the cost of energy, produ-
cing and distributing enough to satisfy demand, simultaneously invol-
ving some environmental goals such as reducing atmospheric carbon
emissions and other pollutants (Corderch, 2009). Market conditions
(including prices, agents and reserves, among others) have also evolved
and some environmental protection criteria have been incorporated in
recent years (Álvarez and Sánchez, 2004).
Even so, energy policy (e.g. Colombian energy plans), have re-
mained profoundly technical and focused on economics, neglecting
environmental, social and cultural considerations that should be de-
terminant in the analysis of the model of energy appropriation.
Energy planning is, then, understood as an indispensable instrument
through which public policy directs energy transitions. However, to the
same extent that it has been limited to a technical exercise based on a
concept of abstract energy, social and ecological considerations are only
included through variables that greatly reduce the complexity of “the
way the material exchange takes between society and its physical en-
vironment” (Sieferle and Marquardt, 2009, p. 14). Likewise, energy
planning reproduces a socially and environmentally unsustainable en-
ergy model, characterized by unequal economic and ecological ex-
changes in the exploitation, distribution and use of energy resources.
M. Viviana and O.L. Castillo
(Heinberg and Fridley, 2016).
For example, the planning conducted by the International Energy
Agency (2013) estimates that by 2035, global energy consumption will
increase by 48% compared to 2010, and that China will be the world's
largest consumer of energy, although its per capita consumption will be
less than half the consumption of a US citizen. All this, while 16% of the
world population (approximately 1.6 billion people, that is almost five
times present USA population) will continue without access to elec-
tricity. More disturbing still is the estimation that by 2040 carbon di-
oxide emissions will increase by 46% in relation to 2010 (EIA, 2013).
Therefore, from this discourse, a socially and environmentally un-
sustainable energy system is planned and presented as inevitable.
And we continue in the vicious circle because to consider this un-
sustainable energy system as inevitable derives from the fact that en-
ergy itself is not yet understood as a concept that, besides the economic
and technical aspects, inevitably also involves social and political dy-
namics. Some analysts like Lohmann and Hildyard (2014) warn “En-
ergy is often thought of as a physical entity that, in itself, has no poli-
tics. When we talk about kilowatts and fuel efficiency, it is said, you are
talking about science, not expressing an ideology. You are stating facts,
not conveying an outlook. You are describing a given reality shared by
all, not taking sides in a social struggle” (p. 25).
Although this depoliticized concept of energy and the practices as-
sociated with it are not universal, its hegemony has been present
through two main mechanisms: the development of industrial capit-
alism, based on fossil fuels, that has served the interests of the elites,
and derived from it, the predominance of economic perspectives on
energy, which ignore the social and ecological relationships involved
(TNI, 2016).
In this article, on the contrary, energy policy is conceived specifi-
cally as a representation of the way in which part of nature has been
appropriated, administered, and represented. And it is the concept of
socio-energy systems which contest this reality, recognizing that the
process of energy appropriation is imbued in social, cultural and poli-
tical contexts: “In the context of large-scale energy transitions, current
approaches to energy policy have become too narrowly constrained
around problems of electrons, fuel, and carbon, the technologies that
provide them, and the cost of those technologies. Energy systems are
deeply enmeshed in broad patterns of social, economic, and political
life and organization, and significant changes to energy systems in-
creasingly are accompanied by social, economic, and political shifts.
Energy policy is therefore, in practice, a problem of socio-energy system
design” (Miller et al., 2015, p. 1). Under this lens, energy policy must be
an exercise including various social agreements simultaneously, and
inviting the redefinition of its main objectives based on two central
ideas: transition and energy justice. (Miller et al., 2015).
Thus, from the perspective of socio-energy systems, energy transi-
tions are redefined by understanding not only new technologies for
exploration and exploitation that are incorporated, but also the social,
political, ecological, cultural and economic places in which these
transitions take place, paying special attention to the socio-economic
micro-scale where they are projected, in particular to the social
agreements that already exist in those places (Farrell, 2012).
The social changes and risks that would be able to result from en-
ergy transitions need to be considered, which led us to concept of en-
ergy justice: “energy justice involves the following key elements: costs,
or how the hazards and externalities of the energy system are imposed
on communities unequally, often the poor and marginalized; benefits or
how access to modern energy systems and services are highly uneven;
and procedures, or how many energy projects proceed with exclu-
sionary forms of decision-making that lack due process and re-
presentation.” (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015, p. 437). In a socially-just
energy system, social and environmental objectives prevail over profit
(TNI, 2016), and the distribution of power and a say in energy decision-
making are included, which consolidates the relationship between en-
ergy and the type of society that is built on it (Miller et al., 2015).
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Energy Policy 129 (2019) 1132–1142
3. Main facts of the Colombia energy planning in the last forty
years
As energy planning has determined the Colombian transitions in its
energy matrix, in this section we have identified the set of objectives,
means and actions defined by the State in the national energy plans
(PENs), which have modified Colombian society through the programs
undertaken to replace sources in the energy matrix in the last forty
years. Therefore, this section will describe what happened, based on the
analysis of the National Energy Plans (PENs) and after identifying main
facts derived from the implementation of these planning processes the
next section will explain why it happened.
The Colombian energy sector had been historically cataloged as an
‘archipelago’, due to the lack of connection between its subsectors
(electricity, coal, oil and gas), and also due to the evident tensions
between the central and regional levels of this country (Wiesner and
Bogotá, 1992).
In the early Seventies, 60% of the primary energy produced in the
country corresponded to oil. However, when the international crisis of
1973 came about, Colombia experienced an important internal shortage
and had to import hydrocarbons at very high prices, which led to a
significant increase in the national external debt.
In fact, until 1990, a quarter of Colombia's public investment went
to this sector and, given the scarcity of the country's resources, in-
vestments were financed entirely with external credits (World Bank,
IBRD and IDB), to the point that “the debt of the electric sector went
from US $ 860 million in 1980 to US $ 5200 million in 1990, the latter
figure amounting to one third of the country's external public debt.”
(Fainboim and Rodriguez, 2000). Consequently, between 1970 and
1979, the share of oil in primary energy production in the country was
reduced by 25% (Fig. 2).
The oil panorama was reverted radically in 1984, when the
Occidental Petroleum Company discovered important deposits of light
oil in Caño Limón, which doubled the country's reserves. Two years
later, Elfy Houston discovered the deposits of Cusiana and at the end of
this decade, the Cupiagua field in the foothills of the Llanos Orientales
region added one billion barrels to the crude reserves, and almost four
tera-cubic feet (TCF) to the gas reserves (Barrios, 2003).
These scenarios of energy scarcity and abundance motivated the
first energy studies in the country; the initial diagnosis was done by the
National Energy Resources Commission in 1974, and years later it was
complemented by a series of studies of the National Planning
Department (DNP). The starting point for these analyses was that
Colombia was endowed with a wide range of energy resources, which
allowed the central concern of energy policy to find the best way for a
contribution to a rapid development, which was, however, only un-
derstood as economic growth: “the key aspects are focused on export
strategies, public investment and financial needs, as well as internal
pricing to meet these needs and, finally, to promote economic growth”
(DNP, 1986, p. 4).
The first integral energy-planning attempt in Colombia was the
National Energy Study (ENE) done between 1978 and 1980, which
besides being a pioneer in Latin America, raised a diagnosis of in-
sufficient institutional capacity to carry out comprehensive planning.
Comprehensive planning was seen as a prevailing need in the sector,
since the disconnection of the subsectors until the Nineties, each energy
subsector (electricity, coal, oil and gas) was managed independently in
all aspects (financing, regulation, expansion, among others), which
deepened the differences of the activities that each one performed.
It is only in 1994, when integral energy planning appeared in
Colombia with Law 143, creating a regime for the generation, trans-
mission, distribution and commercialization of electricity and an in-
stitutional framework in energy matters. Among them, the Energy
Mining Planning Unit (UPME), was created and assigned the prepara-
tion and updating of the National Energy Plan and the Expansion Plan
of the Electricity Sector.
M. Viviana and O.L. Castillo
Fig. 2. Primary energy production in Colombia by source (% share) Source: Based on Energy Balance Data – BECO (UPME, 2018).
In the same year, and in the middle of the implementation of the
neoliberal precepts followed as a development model, the first PEN took
shape: “By the early 1980s, neoliberalism was used in a very different
way, as it came to describe the wave of market deregulation, privati-
zation and welfare-state withdrawal that swept the first, second and
third worlds. It then went on to expand accretively as a concept to
signify not just a policy model, but a broader political, ideological,
cultural, spatial phenomenon” (Venugopal, 2015, p. 168).
The 1994 PEN has been updated regularly (in 1997, 2003, 2007,
2010 and 2015); the 1997 PEN presented in the discourse two objec-
tives: to achieve energy self-sufficiency and to increase exports; how-
ever, when those objectives came into practice, their strategies were
aimed only to help exports increase The PEN of 2003 only reinforced
what was already proposed in the 1997, as its objectives were: “i)
guarantee the contribution to the trade balance and the income of the
country; ii) consolidate the competitive scheme in the different mar-
kets; iii) deepen the development of the gas plan; iv) expand and
guarantee the supply of energy with efficient prices and adequate
quality; v) favor local and regional development; and vi) incorporate
new sources and technologies” (UPME, 2003, p. 8).
Unlike the PEN of 2003, in 2006 the necessity to satisfy domestic
demand for natural gas was given greater importance, and a contractual
framework for exploration and exploitation was proposed which had
this resource as a priority. At the same time, coal participation at the
national level was also encouraged.
In the PEN 2010 an important break in the energetic planning was
noticeable, because it has been the unique report that was not designed
directly by the Unit of Mining and Energetic Planning (UPME), but was
entrusted to a temporary association between the National Colombian
University and the Bariloche Foundation.3 The main objective was de-
fined as “Exploiting the potential of the country as an exporter of en-
ergy, based on local value-added chains, and guaranteeing national
energy supply in the short, medium and long term, with criteria of
quality, safety, reliability, competitiveness and viability” (UPME, 2010,
p. 252). Despite the focus was on the strengthening of the value chain of
hydrocarbons and mineral coal, it had only a marginal weight. Its ob-
jectives also addressed the diversification of sources for natural gas, the
3
The Bariloche Foundation is a private and non-profit institution, which
promotes teaching and scientific research in all fields, giving priority to aca-
demic freedom. It was created on 1963, in the city of San Carlos de Bariloche,
Argentina., while the National University of Colombia has been characterized
since its foundation for looking for equality and justice.
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Energy Policy 129 (2019) 1132–1142
advancement of non-conventional renewable energies, the review of
the biofuels policy, the strengthening of regional energy integration,
and the increase of competitiveness through adequate prices of the
energy mix.
However, the most recent PEN, issued in 2015, retraces the steps of
PEN 2006, influenced by a context of low oil prices, and addressing the
strengthening of exports in two of its central objectives. The first was to
guarantee a reliable supply and diversify the energy mix, which is fo-
cused on export alternatives. It established as a strategy the advance-
ment of unconventional hydrocarbons and to materialize the develop-
ment of unconventional oil and gas deposits through incentives; these
incentives consisted of reducing royalties and created free-trade zones
in coastal areas.
The 2015 PEN also developed better the topic of diversification of
the internal energy mix, with the promotion of non-conventional re-
newable energies through tax incentives, supported by Law 1715 of
2014. This law promoted the integration of unconventional sources for
the national energy system, mainly those of renewable character.
Currently, it has been only partially implemented, and Decree 2143/
2015 on the issue of incentives established a long and complicated
process to access the benefits.
Reflecting the policies expressed in the energy plans, within
Colombia's energy matrix, two segments can be distinguished: the first
corresponds to the role of energy exporter, and the second to the in-
ternal consumption segment, with substantial differences and with
production having more abrupt changes than the internal offer.
Within the growing production of primary energy in Colombia per
source coal, natural gas and oil are the sources that have grown fastest
and are also the sources of major exports (Fig. 3).
Also, the increase of energy extraction in Colombia has been verti-
ginous, much faster than the growth rate of domestic supply. In the case
of coal, production has had a constant growth during the last two
decades; particularly in 2003, production grew by 27% and in 2012, the
highest production peak was reached (Fig. 4). However, in a country
globally recognized for the diversity of its natural resources, it is sur-
prising that 92% of this production comes from only two departments
of the 32 dividing the national territory (Guajira and Cesar) and is
concentrated in 8 municipalities of the existing 1122.4
Finally, and this time reflecting the official narratives expressed in
4
These municipalities are Agustín Codazzi, Becerril, Chiriguaná, El Paso, La
Jagua de Ibirico, Albania, Barrancas, and Hatonuevo
M. Viviana and O.L. Castillo
Fig. 3. Production of primary energy in Colombia per source (TCal.) Source: Based on Energy Balance Data – BECO (UPME, 2018).
Fig. 4. Production and internal offer of primary energy in Colombia per source (TCal.) Source: Based on Energy Balance Data – BECO (UPME, 2018).
the energy plans within the primary energy production and supply
statistical data, three segments can be distinguished within Colombia's
energy matrix (Fig. 5):
The first period (Energy substitution) corresponds to the situations
that drove Colombia from a pre-modern to a modern society in energy
terms (Transition to development); the second corresponds to the
substitution of some energy sources for internal consumption, mainly
from oil to hydro; and the third segment corresponds to the transition
towards Sustainable Development, though as it will be explained later
this happened only at a superficial and weak level.
4. Analyzing the evidence on main energy policy implications
This section is of explanatory nature, because we also want to reveal
why the Colombian energy matrix transformation happened, delving
into the objectives of State action and transcending the official narra-
tives.
In general terms, Colombia PENs revision have showed that a
common objective is the maximization of the contribution of energy
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Energy Policy 129 (2019) 1132–1142
exports to the economic development of the country. The commitment
to the export model has been present since the first report, as it is de-
cisive to the economic stability of the country, joint to foreign invest-
ment in the extractive sector.
In consequence, planning has been basically geared towards de-
regulation and privatization. Some authors affirm that the liberalization
in the energy sector was not more than a fire sale of public goods, since
a significant part of hydroelectric power plants were sold for amounts
much lower than their valuation, and in some cases did not even go
through proper processes of valuation.5
5
A few examples about the absolute lack of political and legal control over
that fire sale are: Termotasajero, a coal-fired thermal power plant with 179 MW
installed, that was valued by UPME at US $ 800,000 per MW, which was sold at
US $ 80,000 MW, that is, one-tenth of its commercial value; Termocartagena, a
similar plant to the previous one in installed capacity that was sold at a similar
price, that is, to US $ 84,000 MW; The two hydrological plants Betania and
Chivor, with 1500 MW installed, although the average per MW, was US $
799,000, the replacement cost of a similar plant exceeded at the time US $
M. Viviana and O.L. Castillo
Fig. 5. Official Narratives within primary energy production and supply Source: Based on Energy Balance Data – BECO (UPME, 2018).
However, there were differences in the strategies proposed over
time to achieve the objective of increasing energy exports. In the first
plans (1994 and 1998) importance was given to institutional moder-
nization and deregulation of the sector, as the means to allocate re-
sources and promote investment in the sector, accompanied by a State
focused on the promotion of competition and price regulation where
the market could not operate.
The PEN 2003, meanwhile, proposed some strategies to boost ex-
ports which did not change significantly in 2006: increasing oil pro-
duction by simultaneously improving the exploratory activity of ECO-
PETROL (the Colombian State oil company)6; mitigating the restrictions
that hindered this production, for example, speeding up environmental
licenses,7 becoming more flexible in favor of private companies' in-
vestment (FNA, 2011); promoting exports of natural gas and electricity;
and improving the conditions for foreign investment in thermal coal8:
“While not perfect, in many ways Colombia could be considered a
model for energy management in the region. Under President Álvaro
Uribe, Colombia implemented economic reforms that led to increased
growth and attracted foreign investors. An overall improvement in
Colombia's security situation during Uribe's presidency also restored
investor confidence. Changes to the investment framework for oil and
(footnote continued)
1,200,000; meaning that it was sold for 67% of its value. Finally, the valuations
of ISA (a mixed utility company, that is, of a commercial nature but linked to
the Ministry of Mines and Energy) and ISAGEN (a Colombian company of state
origin) were sold for approximately one third of their commercial value. At that
time, some First Boston Credit Suisse officials were facing charges of fraud in a
New York court due to bad practices in advising clients. (Alvarez, 2002).
6
“Therefore, through Decree Law 1760 of 2003, the government split off
ECOPETROL and created the National Hydrocarbons Agency (ANH). Some of
the functions of the latter are: administer the Nation's hydrocarbon areas and
assign them to the exploration and exploitation; evaluate the country's hydro-
carbon potential; Represent the Nation before the oil companies and other
groups interested in the oil activity of Colombia; design, promote, negotiate,
celebrate, follow up and manage the new exploration and exploitation contracts
of hydrocarbons owned by the Nation and agree with the contractors the terms
and conditions and manage the State participation in the volumes of hydro-
carbons that correspond to them. The new exploration and production con-
tracts” (Castro Agudelo and Rey Carazo, 2004, p. 37).
7
While in 1994 the time taken for studies to grant an environmental license
was around one year, in 2005 it was 145 days, and in 2011 it was 130 days
(Rojas, 2013, p. 69).
8
“In relation to FDI in the extraction of coal, lignite and peat in Colombia, in
the period from 2004 to 2013 were invested about US $ 18,649 million, which
represented 18% of the total national FDI” (Plazas, 2015, p. 72).
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Energy Policy 129 (2019) 1132–1142
gas have resulted in greater investment in a sector that was on the
decline just a decade ago and now boasts growing reserves and pro-
duction” (Americas Society and Council of the Americas Energy Action
Group, 2010: 4).
During the boom in high oil prices, which coincided with the next
PEN (2007) the advancement of the natural gas massification plan
disappeared and the diversification of the export basket lost relevance.
This plan, as the previous ones, was aimed at fulfilling its central ob-
jective: “to strengthen the contribution of the energy sector to en-
vironmentally sustainable growth and economic development, without
limiting itself to maximizing production and exporting energy re-
sources” (UPME, 2007, p. 140). Therefore, the strategy focused on lo-
cating all available resources in the Colombian subsoil through the
increase of investments in regions of low exploration and in levels of
exploratory drilling9: regarding Uribe's administration, the same orga-
nization enthused that “In the oil and gas sector, the government sought
to revive investment by restructuring the regulatory framework and
revising the fiscal take to reflect Colombia's less competitive geology.
Royalties were cut from a flat 20 percent to a sliding scale of 8–25
percent, depending on production levels. Overall, the state's share of
revenue through royalties and taxes was reduced to 50 to 55 percent
from a previous 70 percent” (Americas Society and Council of the
Americas Energy Action Group, 2010, p. 7).
Additionally, the guarantee of the viability and opportunity of the
companies in the exploration was a vital point of the proposal, as
government-industry agreements were promoted in matters of security
and cooperation of the military authorities: “BP, like other oil compa-
nies operating in Colombia at the time, paid a government tax of $1 a
barrel to help finance army and police protection of oil facilities.
According to journalists who carried out an investigation into BP's se-
curity provision in 1995, the company signed a three-year collaborative
agreement with the Colombia defense ministry worth $11.6 m, of which
BP would provide $2.2 m” (Carson et al., 2015).
We cannot lose sight of the fact that the development of the
Colombian energy sector has been closely linked to the violence
9
“The Delegate Comptroller for the Environment analyzed, legally and
technically, the process of environmental licensing in the 24 years of existence
of this figure (…) since it was regulated in 1993 this administrative instrument
has undergone numerous changes that have blurred it. The continuous mod-
ifications, instead of improving and strengthening this instrument of environ-
mental control, have enabled projects, works and activities that, although they
have a serious impact on natural resources and the environment, do not have
any type of study for their execution” (Revista Semana, 2017, p. 18).
M. Viviana and O.L. Castillo
processes that this country has experienced, particularly during Uribe's
presidential administration (Avellaneda, 2004). Thus, in the last dec-
ades, particularly since the year 2000, the role of the resurgence of
violence in the territories of energy mining expansion is relevant. Re-
cently, it was estimated that 80% of human rights violations that occur
in Colombia have occurred in mining and energy municipalities; 87% of
forced displacement has taken place in municipalities that receive
royalties for mining-energy production, and 78% of crimes against
trade unionists, 89% against indigenous people, and 90% against Afro-
Colombian communities have been committed in mining-energy areas
(Garay, 2013). At the same line, the strengthening of military presence
to safeguard mining energy assets exacerbated the expressions of war of
the Colombian armed conflict, and the presence of paramilitary groups
or the hiring of “semi-armed" companies as custodians of the energy
mining infrastructure has been an unfortunate constant in the expan-
sion of the sector (Ramiro et al., 2007; PAX, 2014).
In the domestic sphere, energy policies focused on the replacement
of the scarcest resources, which were at the same time the most sig-
nificant in national consumption. For example, in 1975 the share of coal
in the production of primary energy did not even exceed the con-
sumption of firewood. The same happened with gas, which, despite
having reserves and prospects for important discoveries, had a low
participation in the nation's energy balance; as a result, hydrocarbon
national substitution programs were launched. Even though coal, oil
and natural gas continue to be the most significant exports in recent
years, as “decarbonified” energies begin to be demanded in the global
scenario (e.g. biofuels and hydroelectric energy), they have been added
to the country's export profile.
On the other hand, patterns of energy consumption in Colombia
show that since the mid-Eighties, the growth of the primary energy
supply in the country has been slower than its production (Fig. 6). This
is explained, largely, because the energy institutional framework in the
country functions more as a promoter of energy exports rather than as
an internal planner.
Also, domestic supply in Colombia has varied significantly in its
composition. In terms of energy substitution, the sources that have lost
participation since 1975 are firewood and coal. The firewood that in
1975 satisfied 20% of the country's energy consumption now con-
tributes only 6%, even though that this figure is still high as an energy
source cataloged as pre-modern.
In the Seventies, two specific energy substitution programs were
Fig. 6. Colombian Primary energy production vs. Internal offer of primary energy (TCal.) Source: Based on Energy Balance Data – BECO (UPME, 2018).
1138
Energy Policy 129 (2019) 1132–1142
promoted: the first was related to the massive use of bottled natural gas
for urban residential use. It is noteworthy that the use of natural gas
was one of the results of the first national energy diagnosis, because
until the Sixties this resource was burned in the air in oil wells. The
second was the Rural Areas Electrification Program, whose objective
was to replace the use of firewood in particular; however, the coverage
was finally extended to the urban areas of the “golden triangle”: Cali,
Medellín and Bogotá, which are the main Colombian cities.
The results of these programs were modest because, in the country's
oil context, natural gas and hydroelectricity replaced hydrocarbons
more than firewood. As shown in Fig. 7, firewood does not decrease its
participation in domestic consumption below 10% until 2008.
During the Eighties, with the side effects of the internal shortage of
oil, other substitution programs were promoted: substitution of solar
energy for water heating in the urban residential sector, substitution of
fuels for cooking use in the residential sector, and the possibilities of
substitution of various fuels in caloric processes in the industrial sector,
especially in the cement, steel, and paper production industries.
The options contemplated in this period were substitutions between
fossil resources, motivated not only by the relative scarcity of these, but
also because they were considered energy sources not associated with
modern development and urban growth. However, the definitive ar-
gument for the selection of sources to substitute was economic profit;
for example, the production of ethanol from cane to mix with gasoline
was not considered viable because it was not economically attractive
compared to alternative options, such as increasing ECOPETROL's di-
rect oil exploration, or the production of methane from natural gas
(DANE et al., 1982). In the same sense, the ‘Gas for Change’ program
(DNP, 1991) that promoted the massive use of domestic natural gas in
Colombia had as its main justification that “the replacement of elec-
tricity by gas would bring an economic benefit close to US $ 555.1
million, of which 79.5% corresponds to the residential sector” (Acosta,
1995, p. 26).
However, as shown in Fig. 6, these programs were once again lim-
ited and produced changes in consumption only until the Nineties. To
the extent that the substitution policy was justified by prices, important
oil discoveries, and the collapse of the price of coal in the second half of
the Eighties, which displaced the promotion of natural gas. This gained
weight in domestic consumption only in the late Nineties, to the point
that in 1999 the use of firewood was still higher than natural gas.
One aspect that has received special attention in Colombia is the low
M. Viviana and O.L. Castillo
Fig. 7. Composition of the internal offer by energy source (%) Source: Based on Energy Balance Data – BECO (UPME, 2018).
Fig. 8. Primary energy consumption per capita (Kgoe/capita) Source: Based on Energy Balance Data – BECO (UPME, 2018).
per capita energy consumption. Starting in the Eighties, in the first
debates around the use of energy, and in line with the dominant ideas
about the growing energy consumption as a vehicle of progress
(Altvater, 1992), it was problematic that per capita energy consumption
in Colombia did not exceed 6 giga calories. This not only was 13 times
less than the consumption of a US citizen, but was considerably lower
even compared to some countries in the region, like Argentina, whose
inhabitants consumed more than twice the Colombian's amount
(Fig. 8).
The trend in energy consumption in Colombia has not changed
significantly, and today it is the South American country with the
lowest energy consumption per capita. Nevertheless, the paradigm of
sustainability has led to this half-empty glass starting to look half-full,
as nowadays it is considered positive to have low energy consumption,
because it presumes less pressure on natural resources and lower
emissions of greenhouse effect gases.
Colombia is not considered as majorly responsible for global emis-
sions of CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions, occupying place 40 at
the world ranking. However, according to the National Inventory of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Colombia (2016), emissions increased in
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Energy Policy 129 (2019) 1132–1142
the country by 20% between 1992 and 2012. Within this 20%, emis-
sions from energy and mining sector grew annually to 2.5% between
1990 and 2006, and to 1,6% between 2006 and 2010, and the greatest
increase came from the oil and natural gas production (IDEAM & PNUD,
2016).
It also is noticeable that certain issues that accompany the central
objective of maximizing production are constantly repeated. This is the
case of the energization of rural areas and the contribution to regional
development: this topic, which appears since 1994 and 2003, was made
explicit in 2006. However, the insisting repetition has been made
without carrying out a critical or in-depth analysis of the reasons why
access and guarantee to energy has not improved. Only in the 2015 PEN
was the issue of energy equity raised with some depth, understood not
only as availability of the service, but also as the monetary capacity to
meet the energy needs of a home. Although there is no concrete strategy
to achieve this objective, there is a proposed methodology that defines
the parameters to calculate the levels of energy poverty in the country
(UPME, 2015).
And another reiterative objective that remains unsolved is the vul-
nerability in the supply of natural gas. Since 2003, when the gas
M. Viviana and O.L. Castillo
massification plan was raised to the position a central objective, the
uncertainty regarding the country's capacity to self-supply domestic
demand was noted. In 2006 the program continued, but the need for an
analysis of the possibilities of importing natural gas was suggested. In
2010, the vulnerability of the system and the urgency of advancing the
construction of two regasification plants that enable importation were
stressed. In 2015, the critical situation appears again, and it is pointed
out that in the best scenario it is only possible to be self-sufficient in
natural gas until 2019, and again it urges the construction of re-
gasification plants. More than a decade, then, has passed with the
natural gas gauge in the red, and yet no actions to reduce the vulner-
ability of domestic consumption have been taken.
5. Conclusions
The reforms inspired by the Washington Consensus focused on im-
proving the competitiveness of Colombian contracts in the hydro-
carbons sector, and an important objective has been to make the
country attractive for foreign investment in mining and oil: “The
countries that are rich in natural resources, and whose economy is
based primarily on extracting and exporting those resources, find it
more difficult to develop (…) ‘The situation becomes even more com-
plicated for those economies that are dependent on oil and minerals for
their income. In the IDB's judgement, the richer a country is in natural
resources, the slower it will develop and the greater its internal in-
equalities will be’ (Gudynas, 2009). It would seem that the only option
is to resign ourselves to this geographical and environmental de-
terminism. But the IDB does offer a way out. As Gudynas sums it up in
his analysis of the IDB's proposals, this way out “is the market and even
greater emphasis on the [neoliberal] reforms.” (Acosta, 2013, p. 61).
The evidence provided shows that the advancement of exports and
foreign investment in the energy sector has been one of the objectives of
the PEN that has achieved greater success. However, the success in this
utilitarian objective has been a catalyst of territorial and social con-
flicts, since with the extractive dynamization new actors appear or
become visible that demand the appropriation and control of the ter-
ritories in which either the “new” or the traditional (but not exploited
before) energy resources are located.
There is no doubt that the dependence on these revenues has been a
determining factor in the country's energy planning in positive and
negative terms. Positive, only in economic terms, because in the last ten
years, the industry of hydrocarbons, energy and mining has contributed
an average of 9% to the GDP and, during the same period, oil and
mining exports have represented more than 63% of total foreign sales.
Data shows that exports from the extractive sector went from 14% in
1994 to 54% in 2017, followed by 6.2% from the famous Colombian
coffee (Trading economics, 2017).
Fig. 9 shows the increasing foreign investment in the oil and mining
sectors, but also the strong differences between results for these ex-
porting commodities and energy domestic supply.
In negative terms because the more competitive policies towards
foreign investment has driven to: (a) neglect genuine socio-ecological
studies to reduce environmental licensing times because they generate
extra costs to production; (b) strengthen the militarization of explora-
tion and exploitation areas of hydrocarbons to avoid attacks on the
infrastructure. In 2014, Colombia had 21 battalions dedicated to
mining-energy situations, composed by almost 80.000 troops, that is,
almost 30% of the total of the Colombian Armed Forces10 (Gisbert and
Pinto, 2014); (c) a major increase of the demands, protests and block-
ades of the communities located in the areas of influence of the projects,
10
It is important to remember that the Havana Peace Agreements were signed
between the last government and the FARC guerrillas; however, peace talks
with the armed group called National Liberation Army (ELN) have not pro-
gressed and this guerrilla is still active.
1140
Energy Policy 129 (2019) 1132–1142
which fueled an already bloody conflict; (d) finally, to insist in a State
oil policy that does not increase the government's share of oil revenues
as did years before (Fig. 10).
The energy transitions that the country has experienced have not
been the product of a proper energy planning, but the result of ad-
vancing extractivism to sustain the country's trade balance. While do-
mestic supply has had a modest growth, its transformations are basi-
cally reduced to the diminishment of firewood within the energy inputs,
and the expansion of natural gas and electricity in the final consump-
tion of Colombians that can afford them; today, approximately ten
million of Colombian citizens have no access to electricity in a daily
basis. Another clear impact in policy terms is the standardization of the
environmental impact assessment protocols to speed the negotiation
processes with local communities protected under the C169 convention
(MinAmbiente, 2010).
The Colombian energy institutions seem to insist on an unsustain-
able environmental and social model, and precepts of sustainability
have been incorporated only superficially, promoting biofuels and hy-
droelectricity as decarbonized export sources, while ignoring the ter-
ritorial conflict that this expansion is generating. Additionally, and in
accordance with the energy ideology prepared by UPME up to 2040,
Colombia's internal consumption by then will be more than double that
of 2010, and 75% of that consumption will come from the use of diesel,
electricity (mostly hydroelectricity), natural gas, and gasoline. It is a
discouraging scenario in terms of socio-environmental sustainability,
equity, and energy justice.
Finally, we highlight the conventional and uncritical reading that is
made of the Colombian energy consumption in terms of the renewal of
the sources. In the first instance, consumption is reduced to the use of
electricity, and in the second instance, no attention is paid to the fact
that it is based mainly on a single renewable source, hydroelectricity. In
this analysis there is no mention of, for example, the vulnerability of
hydroelectric power generation to some climatic phenomena (e.g. El
Niño and La Niña) and the increase in socio-environmental conflicts
resulting from the installation of dams (Siciliano et al., 2015).
Unfortunately, Colombian energy planning is a sample of an
ideology disconnected from the social, ecological and political relations
of the energy system. It is based on a conventional and apolitical per-
spective of energy in which the economic dimension has been prior-
itized. It is only very recently that the difficulty in integrating the re-
lationships between energy, environment and society has been
addressed by the Colombian government, but leading to increase the
local demand via legalization of users and not expanding the grid to
isolated and not-economically-developed areas (MinMinas, 2018).
In addition, the way that the Colombian society appropriates,
transforms, and discards energy reflects an interaction with nature in
which energy is only a commodity. The central objective of Colombian
energy planning has been, and continues to be, the advancement and
maximization of the exploitation of energy resources for export pur-
poses and the institutional framework has been designed and reformed
to promote exports and not to lead a reorganization towards the re-
duction of energy consumption, the progressive replacement of sources
and energy justice.
In short, since the first national energy diagnoses, it was established
that the most important question that energy planning had to solve was
the contribution that the energy sector should make to economic
growth. The PENs developed in the last 22 years have revolved around
this question, which follows the narrow view on energy as an ex-
portable resource. For this reason, Colombian energy planning has been
sterile in all the objectives other than the financial, and even in that
aspect, the vertiginous growth of exports has not been translated into
improvements in social welfare.
And in the current scenario, with the price of oil plummeting and
that of coal stagnant, the already minimal benefits of this energy
planning disappear, while at the same time demands for justice and
energy equity grow, among other uncertainties that have arisen from
M. Viviana and O.L. Castillo
Fig. 9. Foreign investment in selected sectors of economy (Million US$) Source: Banco de la República, Deputy Manager of Economic Studies - Balance of Payments.
Fig. 10. Oil revenues as percentage of the GDP Source: World Bank (2018).
the implementation of the peace agreements. Unfortunately, Colombia
energy institutions have nothing to say about this.
Acknowledgments
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: this work
was supported by the Programa Nacional de Formación de
Investigadores [Convocatoria COLCIENCIAS 528]; and the Proyecto de
Investigación ‘Land, culture and energy’, Departamento de Desarrollo
Rural y Regional, Facultad de Estudios Ambientales y Rurales,
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
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