SPE/IADC-184730-MS

Well Collision Avoidance Management and Principles

S. J. Sawaryn, Consultant

Copyright 2017, SPE/IADC Drilling Conference and Exhibition

This paper was prepared for presentation at the SPE/IADC Drilling Conference and Exhibition held in The Hague, The Netherlands, 14–16 March 2017.

This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE/IADC program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s).
Contents of the paper have not been reviewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers or the International Association of Drilling Contractors and are subject to correction
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Abstract
The well collision avoidance management and principles presented in this paper are a culmination of the
work and consensus of industry experts from both operators and service companies in the SPE Wellbore
Positioning Technical Section (WPTS). This is not a new subject, but current guidance is disparate,
company specific and occasionally contradictory. As a result, the guidance can be difficult to understand
and implement. A further aim was to drive standardization of the well collision avoidance rules, process
and nomenclature throughout the industry. Standardisation improves efficiency and reduces implementation
errors.
The consequences of an unplanned intersection with an existing well can range from financial loss to a
catastrophic blow-out and loss of life. The process of well collision avoidance involves rules that determine
the allowable well separation, the management of the associated directional planning and surveying
activities and assurance and verification. The adoption of a particular minimum allowable separation rule,
no matter how conservative, does not ensure an acceptably low probability of collision. Many other factors
contribute, such as the level of compliance by office and rig personnel with collision avoidance procedures,
and the completeness and correctness of the directional database. These factors are all connected.
The material is split into eight sections, each dealing with a critical element in the collision avoidance
process. Examples are presented to highlight good implementation practice. This aligned approach will
dispel some of the current confusion in the industry over well collision avoidance; improve efficiency when
planning and executing wells and build industry focus on the associated collision risks when drilling. The
Technical Section is also supporting the current development of API RP78.
This is the first of two papers. The second paper will cover the minimum allowable separation rule and
its application, assurance and verification.

Introduction
The SPE Wellbore Positioning Technical Section (WPTS) was established as an SPE Technical Section
in 2004. Prior to this it was referred to as the Industry Steering Committee on Wellbore Survey Accuracy
(ISCWSA). The ISCWSA was founded in 1995 to address both the use and accuracy of directional survey
instruments. Although this acronym is still in common use, the section's remit has expanded to address other
related issues such as collision avoidance, well intercepts and industry education, (De Wardt et. al., 2013).
2 SPE/IADC-184730-MS

Specialist sub-committees comprising both operator and service company representatives collaborate within
the WPTS to address these and extensive use of the well collision avoidance sub-committee's material has
been made throughout this paper.
The consequences of an unplanned intersection or collision with an existing well can range from financial
loss to a severe impact on health, safety or the environment (HSE), such as a catastrophic blow-out and
loss of life. These collision extremes are referred to as non-HSE and HSE risk well collisions respectively,
(Williamson, 1998). The distinction between these two categories is an important one. Risks associated
with non-HSE well collisions may be addressed solely in financial terms, comparing the acceptability of
the possible loss associated with both the collision and subsequent remediation activities against any gains.
This is not the case when managing potential HSE risk collisions. In these cases the requirements are much
more stringent.
Currently, collision avoidance practices differ widely across the industry, between both operators and
service companies. This situation adds unnecessary complexity, reconciling the differences between partners
in operating licences and in preparing the interface documents with service companies. The differences
also cause confusion when developing and executing well plans, particularly when personnel move or work
across multiple operations. Some of these differences are quite subtle in their appearance, but they may
have adverse, far-reaching consequences.
Directional planning and surveying involves an extensive and specialised terminology. The terminology
used throughout this paper is based on the ISCWSA Collision Avoidance Lexicon (2017) which addresses
both position uncertainty and collision avoidance activities. Importantly, the well being drilled is termed
the Reference Well and the adjacent wells are termed the Offset Wells.
This document describes a process, which, if executed will help ensure well placement integrity and
thereby avoid well collisions.

HSE Risk Wells

An offset well is termed an HSE risk well if a collision with it could result in an uncontrolled release of
material such as hydrocarbons, chemical, nuclear, biological or physical matter, or undermine facilities. The
release does not have to be at surface. Sub-surface blowouts and sea bed discharges can also represent an
HSE risk. Some common examples are:

• Hydrocarbons at pressures above that in the reference well

• H2S (e.g. plugged and abandoned well in a field known to produce H2S)

• Wells under injection (e.g. gas or water)

• Radioactive material (e.g. lost-in-hole LWD tool)

• High pressure steam (e.g. geothermal well)

Mine workings should be treated as offset wells and working mines treated as HSE risk hazards, (Brahic,
2008). For lost-in-hole radioactive sources, the offset well should be classified as being a HSE risk over
the MD interval between the shallowest and deepest possible positions of the sources, allowing for the
possibility of the BHA having slipped downhole after being lost and with the addition of 100 ft (30 m)
up hole and downhole. Offshore, platform piles should be included in scans to avoid intersecting them or
washing way their supporting formations.
Temporal Risks. It is also necessary to consider the possibility that the risk may endure for some time
after a close approach or collision has been passed. Contact with an offset well represents a risk even if
penetration does not occur. The offset casing may be damaged immediately as a direct result of the collision
or it may be damaged by subsequent drilling and tripping activities prior to casing being set in the reference
SPE/IADC-184730-MS 3

well. The extent of this kind of damage is unpredictable, but it can be severe enough to render the offset
well unserviceable or reduce its structural integrity and be the cause of failure later.
Where there is a risk of collision, consideration should also be given to the possible remediation activities
that would be required should a collision occur, particularly in situations where access to the offset well
may be limited or take time. Ongoing reservoir re-pressurization could change the pressure seen by the well
over the intervening period.

Well Collision Frequency

Data on well collisions is sparse, but these incidents occur relatively infrequently. Extracts from a
commercial database (SINTEF, 2000; Scandpower, 2001) containing well collision data for offshore
operations in the North Sea, U.S. Gulf of Mexico and Canada show that three collisions leading to some
sort of uncontrolled flow to surface were recorded in the period between 1970 and 1980, reducing to
one collision in the period 1980 to 1998. Based on the number of development wells drilled during these
periods, the probabilities of an unintended well collision are 1 in 2150 and 1 in 16330 respectively. No well
collisions leading to some sort of uncontrolled flow to surface were recorded in the 10 years up to 1998 and
it was concluded that the apparent improvement was likely due to the introduction of computer-based well
trajectory management techniques and the increased accuracy of directional survey instruments.
Since this study, land based drilling activity levels have increased dramatically, involving greater use of
drilling pads, closer well spacing at surface and encountering old, often poorly surveyed well stock during
infill drilling. The same is true for offshore developments where economic pressures on topside's costs
encourage smaller slot spacings, conductor sharing and the addition of slots to existing platforms. More
recently, the introduction of steerable systems has made complex well geometries affordable. These are now
common and close approaches can be encountered along the whole well path. A more detailed account of
these trends and how they influence collision risk is presented by Poedjono et. al., 2009.
Because the database referred to above is restricted to incidents that caused some sort of uncontrolled
flow to surface, there may be more, unreported collisions that have not caused an uncontrolled flow. By
pooling the knowledge of the diverse membership of the well collision avoidance sub-committee it has been
possible to outline a number of HSE and non-HSE well collisions recorded over the previous 15 years,
together with their causes and the management and practices that would likely have avoided them. These
are summarized in Table 1. The cases were provided anonymously from various locations around the globe
and because of their nature, the responses may not be either comparable or complete and inferences may
not be statistically robust. However, together they provide some valuable insights which will be developed
throughout the rest of this paper.

Table 1—Well collision examples including both HSE and non-HSE events.

Case Description Cause Avoiding Action

Offshore: Standard practice was to drive the conductor on this platform and then to Poor collision avoidance Attention to surveying
drill-out the shoe-track. Previous experience indicated that shoes occasionally became procedures. wellbore position and
1 ovalled during the piling operation. When the operator experienced difficulty in drilling collision monitoring.
it was assumed that the assembly was contacting the reference well's ovalised conductor
when in fact it was milling through an offset well's casing.

Unstated: A well collision between a reference well and a producer occurred while Failure to follow procedures. Adhere to required practices.
drilling with a motor assembly with GWD/MWD sensors. The quality of the surveys Failure to stop the job.
was acceptable and wellplans and collision avoidance plots were available on the rig.
Cement was seen at surface but the decision was made by the rig to carry on. Town
was not informed. A few hours later erratic torque, metal and cement on shakers and
2
loss of drilling fluid was observed. Drilling stopped and town was informed. The
plan and collision avoidance diagram were never consulted. The directional drillers
(DDs) did not stop the job and over-rule the company man drilling ahead. As part of
the investigation, when surveys were plotted it was clear to see that the reference well
initially bounced off the producing well until it was intersected.
4 SPE/IADC-184730-MS

Case Description Cause Avoiding Action

Offshore: While batch setting and drilling an upper hole section at relatively low Financial loss only. Risk of Collision consequence
inclination with a bent motor and PDC assembly, an intersection was made with a non- collision was accepted. mitigation may have helped.
HSE offset well. The operator accepted there was a collision risk and the offset's casing
3
had just been run during the same batch setting operation. Within 30 seconds of the
DD noting torque fluctuations while drilling the control room phoned the rig floor to
question why pressure was seen in the offset wellbore.

Offshore: A long reach, near horizontal well was drilled from a platform. While drilling Failure to adjust survey north Procedural assurance and
the horizontal section the well took a significant kick, causing all of the drilling fluid reference directions. communication.
to be routed to the diverter. The DD was reading True North referenced gyro surveys Failure to stop the job.
4 from a computer screen and entering them into his database as Grid North. This error Poor communication.
moved the long tangent section sideways intersecting a neighboring well. There were
clear signs of magnetic interference but the MWD personnel did not inform the other
team members that they saw anomalies in the measured magnetic field.

Land: A rotary assembly with a tri-cone bit drilled through multiple casings in an Failure to follow procedures. Adhere to required practices.
5 adjacent well. The offset well was not included in the collision scan and the reference
wellpath was different from what was planned.

Offshore: While drilling top hole in a fast drilling section a collision occurred between Not stated.
two wellbores. This was recognized at surface with erratic torque and a decrease in
ROP. The BHA was pulled to surface where it was discovered that one blade of the
6 PDC bit had broken off. The well was plugged back and sidetracked. Subsequently
the offset well's casing was recovered and clear gouges corresponding to the shape of
individual cutters were seen. While no penetration of the casing was made its integrity
was impaired and it could no longer function as a barrier.

Unstated: Two DDs were working back to back, managing their well's proximity to Failure to plot and manage Adhere to required practices,
plan and its position relative to a deeper offset well. The offset well was not considered anomalous readings. after each survey and project
a "close approach". One morning at change out when routinely reviewing progress and ahead.
next steps, the off-shift DD shared that some steering issues had been encountered.
7 Shortly after, the well hit a hard spot. After updating the collision avoidance plot the
DDs confirmed they were on a collision course with the offset well and then realized
the significance of the hard spot within a zone not noted for such. The DD had the
driller pull off bottom. Upon tripping out of the hole, chunks of casing were pulled from
the bit.

Unstated: A well collision occurred with an offset well that was missing from the Failure to follow procedures. Adhere to required practices.
database. The offset well had been drilled by a different contractor a few months Failure to stop the job.
8 previously but the information was not passed on. The DD wanted to stop the job Human factors - fear.
but the company man elected to drill ahead. A relief well was required following the
collision.

Unstated: When drilling limestone with a rock bit the penetration rate decreased from Failure to follow procedures. Follow collision avoidance
a fairly low ROP to barely anything. The DD patiently worked the assembly, picking procedures.
up and re-starting the BHA several times. An offset casing was eventually penetrated,
9
junking the offset well. Despite a collision avoidance plot being available with a
knowledge of offset wells in the vicinity, the DD was not performing any collision
monitoring.

Offshore: An intersection was made with an abandoned open-hole sidetrack that was Financial loss only. Risk of A more detailed risk
assumed to have collapsed with time. A risk-assessment had shown that any collision collision was accepted. assessment may have revealed
10 with this wellbore would be non-HSE. However the financial consequences were more the potential consequences of
significant than expected because the LCM that was pumped to help cure the resulting a collision.
losses entered the platform's production train, requiring remediation.

Offshore: An unintended collision between two wells did not result in any noticeable Not stated. After confirming contact
damage to the offset well following jetting. The operator decided to drill ahead with the between wells, plug back and
11 reference well. This appeared to be a situation where one well glanced off the other with sidetrack.
no serious damage until the added wear caused by rotating on the outside of the offset
well's casing wore a hole. The offset well was junked.

Land: The operator drilled two medium radius, opposed laterals from the same pad. Poor communication. Communicate and ensure that
These wells both had deep kick-offs. The planning of each well was done without any Incomplete directional the directional database is
reference to each other. The directional drilling company was only on site for curve database. complete and up to date.
and lateral sections and the operator did not share the offset wellbore's location with
12 the directional drilling company. By chance, the same DD was on site for both wells
and recognized the potential for a collision and considered the need for proximity
calculations. Having drilled less than 100ft an intersection was made junking the offset
and requiring a sidetrack to be performed on the reference wellbore. At the depth of the
kick off the positional uncertainty ellipsoids were already overlapping.
SPE/IADC-184730-MS 5

Case Description Cause Avoiding Action

Unstated: While drilling, a planned trajectory would pass close to an offset well. Not stated. Case the reference well before
The offset well was shut-in to prevent the HSE consequences of a well collision. The the offset well is placed back
planned approach separation was close enough that the rig team actively monitored in service.
the conventional warning indicators for any sign of well to well contact e.g. metal
shavings or cement in the mud, torque changes, weight changes, vibration etc. The
13 indicators were monitored prior to and long after the expected close approach distance.
No indicators of collision were identified. After the bit was deemed sufficiently past
the offset well it was put back into service and drilling continued. Prior to TD of
the section, the well took a kick and it was confirmed that the offset well had been
penetrated through multiple casings and into the tubing. The offset well was able to be
shut-in again, reducing the extent of the damage and before any ignition.

Offshore: A vertical well drilled through a producing well it was crossing. The original Failure to conduct elevation Maintain directional database
well was drilled with rotary table elevation approximately 20ft lower than the rotary adjustment between the two integrity.
table elevation of the larger jackup rig used to drill the new well. The penetration wells.
14
caused the pressure to drop on the offset producing well. The reference well was shut in
after taking a significant kick. The producing well was damaged beyond repair and was
plugged and abandoned.

Offshore: A wellplan that passed the operator's acceptance criteria was being drilled. Poor communication. Communication and
The plan required the DD to remain within about 20 ft of the plan. This had not Drilling to the incorrect administrative control of the
been communicated to the DD and despite there being live wells in the vicinity, wellplan. wellplan.
proximity calculations were not performed. The well was about 100 ft off plan when
15
two sequential MWD surveys showed unexplained magnetic interference. Drilling
continued until it was discovered that the DD was not using the approved wellplan
at which point an investigation into the well's placement uncovered that it had been
substantially inside a no-go zone with a live well.

Unstated: A new well was to be threaded between a known loss zone and an offset well. Financial loss only. Making Conduct MoC with Risk
The offset well was shut-in to prevent HSE consequences. During drilling, data implied changes on the fly with no Assessment.
the well may be approaching the zone of losses earlier than expected. Following MoC.
16
consultation between the rig and town, the decision was taken to go off plan slightly and
steer further towards the offset well. After drilling a couple of stands it was confirmed
that an intersection had occurred.

Land: A horizontal well drilled into another horizontal well that had been drilled just Deficient process. Timely and accurate
four months earlier. The offset wells provided to the directional drilling contractor Incomplete directional communication. Ensure that
failed to include the recently drilled wells. The same directional drilling contractor database. the directional database is
17 drilled both wells however the agreed process required all offsets to be provided by complete and up to date.
the operator. The directional drilling contractor alerted the operator to MWD surveys
showing magnetic interference however the operator was unable to provide the offset's
location.

Offshore: Whilst drilling a fast ROP top hole section with a recognised collision risk, Failure to plot, and manage Adhere to required practices,
the well built angle faster than expected. The first few MWD surveys failed QA\QC due anomalous readings. after each survey and project
to suspected magnetic interference. The rig crew rejected them entirely and continued ahead.
18 to drill blind. They drilled into an offset well causing a kick, throwing the drillstring
out of the hole. When investigated, plotting the rejected MWD surveys showed the
well heading straight towards the offset. Had the crew used these surveys, or used the
inclinations on the worst possible heading they would have seen the problem.

Onshore: An operator purchased a field which included six horizontal, producing wells Later measurements showed Adhere to required practices.
drilled from the same pad and running to the south-east. They wished to drain reservoir there was a significant
between these wells by drilling a new pad with wells running north-west between the declination anomaly, rotating
19 existing wells. The first of these wells was aborted halfway along the lateral section due the wells towards each other.
to high levels of observed magnetic interference. Tools and procedures were checked.
The second well was also aborted in the middle of the lateral but now drilling fluid was
observed at surface of one of the existing producers.

Although collisions are clearly still relatively rare, expanding the reporting criteria indicates that they are
less rare than the more restricted criteria would suggest. Further, as offshore work is generally the higher
dollar activity one might expect a lower frequency of these events in offshore drilling. This seems not to
be the case and the results suggest that well density is the major influencing factor. If this is so, then from
a collision avoidance perspective the continued increase in well density resulting from the greater use of
pads and infill drilling on land should be a prompt for added care.
6 SPE/IADC-184730-MS

Leading Indicators
Leading indicators might also provide additional insight to possible changes in the risk profile. One possible
indicator is the percentage of wells for which drilling exemptions are required. Poedjono et. al., (2009)
presented North American data, showing both an increase in drilling activity levels and an increase in this
percentage over the period 2003 to 2008. The proportion of HSE wells for which exemptions were applied
for also increased in this same period.
Updating the statistics globally shows that the proportion of wells requiring exemptions has been greatly
reduced, Fig. 1. In this case, this is largely a result of introducing more appropriate tool codes for wells in
which there were few, or no surveys. Monitoring and addressing leading indicators in this way can help
detect "weak signals" and provides greater opportunity to respond.

Figure 1—Monitoring of exemptions as a leading indicator can help detect "weak signals".

Minimum Allowable Separation Distance (MASD)

Well collisions are avoided by maintaining a suitably conservative separation distance from an offset well.
This distance is referred to as a Minimum Allowable Separation Distances (MASD) and it varies with depth,
taking into account the measurement uncertainties associated with the well trajectories. Offset wells that
could represent an HSE risk are subject to the most stringent MASDs. The distance from the plan to the
MASD is termed the allowable deviation from the plan (ADP) although in practice the ADP may be further
restricted to avoid collision problems deeper in the well.

Separation Factor
The separation rule is often expressed as a dimensionless number, a ratio of an adjusted centre to centre
distance between wells divided by a function of the relative positional uncertainty between the two. This
ratio is referred to as a separation factor (SF) and customarily the ratio is scaled so that the threshold SF =
1 indicates a critical condition. At this point, drilling should cease whilst the situation is referred to higher
authority and scrutiny. Further SF thresholds may be defined that trigger other actions before this situation
is reached. This topic is intimately connected with the separation rule and will be addressed in detail in
the second paper.
The adoption of a particular minimum allowable separation rule, no matter how conservative, does not
ensure an acceptably low probability of collision. Many other factors contribute and these are addressed in
the following eight collision avoidance elements, (ISCWSA, 2014a).
SPE/IADC-184730-MS 7

Collision Avoidance Elements

The requirements of the eight elements: Data Structure Integrity and Management, Position Uncertainty,
Well Reference Point, Wellbore Survey Program, Collision Avoidance Management, Wellbore Survey
Operations, Quality Assurance and Effective Communication have been identified, Fig. 2. All are necessary
for successful collision avoidance management. Together, they enforce the MASD and failure to meet any
one of them can result in an unintentional collision with a well or other hazard. These requirements are also
important to the successful achievement of all other well positioning objectives such as target intersection
and the timely drilling of a relief well intersection should one be required.

Figure 2—The eight collision avoidance elements supporting the minimum allowable separation distance (MASD)

It is instructive to sort the collision examples presented in Table 1 according to the collision avoidance
element(s) in which the failure occurred, Table 2. There are three main categories: data related, collision
avoidance management related and communication related. Significantly, none relate to the collision
avoidance separation rule itself.

Table 2—Categorisation of the collision examples against the collision avoidance elements.

Collision Avoidance Element Collision Examples

Data Structure Integrity and 5, 8, 12, 15

Management

Position Uncertainty –

Well Reference Point 14

Wellbore Survey Program –

Collision Avoidance Management 1, 2, 3, 5, 7,

9, 10, 15, 18

Wellbore Survey Operations 4

Quality Assurance –

Effective Communication 12, 15, 17

8 SPE/IADC-184730-MS

Human Factors. A range of cognitive issues that underpin the assessment of risk and safety-critical
decision-making in our industry has been discussed by the OGP (2012). Compliance with collision
avoidance procedures by office and rig personnel is vital for success. From the examples it appears that
risk habituation has played a significant part in a number of the cases, perhaps based on an erroneous belief
that such occurrences are so rare that they will never happen. Retaining a sense of vulnerability, driven by
mandatory training, competence assessment and audit is therefore essential. A company's STOP WORK
authority which requires and empowers every employee to stop work if they are concerned about the safety
of an operation can be a valuable preventive mechanism, but it requires continual reinforcement. Unsafe
acts can remain hidden, and design and planning activities can also lead to unsafe conditions.

Data Structure, Integrity and Management

The directional database is a 3D digital map of all the wells in an area. Processes should be in place to assure
that it is free from errors and remains so as new data are added over the life of the field. Optimally there
should be only one Master Database, containing all wellbores, including potentially interfering wells from
adjacent leases. It should be accompanied by a written plan for its use, maintenance and disaster recovery
for the life of field. This plan should specify:

• Where the data are stored

• Who has responsibility for maintaining the content

• Who has responsibility for the physical management of the database(s)

• How safety critical software standards are honored

The plan should specify the global and local coordinate reference systems and define how to translate
between the two. The plan also defines all reporting needed to monitor any well or structure that has been
added, edited or deleted. The master database set-up should:

• Manage offset well data integrity

• Describe all wellpaths that represent potential collisions in a common coordinate system with
positions calculated according to the Minimum Curvature Calculation Method, (Sawaryn and
Thorogood, 2005).
• Define a single Well Reference Point (WRP) for each wellpath (see the section below).

• Use only approved survey Instrument Performance Models (IPMs).

• Manage wellpath plan and actual revisions ensuring that a single planned and single actual
trajectory are clearly identified and defined.
In many cases the stand-off of wells from lease boundaries was established in times when nominally
vertical wells were the norm. The possibility of a well collision has increased substantially with the added
positional uncertainty associated with high step out wells. Obtaining and maintaining data from adjacent
leases may be problematic and some legislative support may be required to facilitate the free flow of
information between the adjacent lease holders if safety is to be preserved.

Position Uncertainty
Measurement uncertainties are often significant with respect to well construction position tolerances. All
planned and actual facility and wellpath positions should be assigned valid position uncertainty estimates.
The IPMs used to generate such estimates should include all significant error sources and err on the side
of conservatism. Similarly, the selection of the most appropriate model from those available should err on
SPE/IADC-184730-MS 9

the side of conservatism. The directional software should include position uncertainty in a well to well
clearance scan, applying the calculation methods defined in the relevant collision avoidance policy. Reliance
on manual calculations should be avoided.

Well Reference Point (WRP)

Well surface location surveys should be referenced to the same datums used for the field set-up in the
directional database and a Well Reference Point (WRP) should be established for each well. The WRP is the
deepest, recoverable point in the well for which coordinates are known without the use of downhole wellbore
surveying. The uncertainty associated with the survey method should be reported and entered into the
directional database. The well location should be defined in the appropriate mapping system and converted
to local drilling coordinates using the appropriate translation method. Locations should be surveyed to an
approved accuracy standard and managed to allow updates as better position information becomes available
during the well life cycle. The uncertainty associated with the location should be recorded as part of the
well record. Revised surface locations and WRPs should be communicated to all appropriate personnel and
data archives. At this time there is no commonly accepted method of addressing changes in location or
WRP due to subsidence or regelation in ice flows. Specialist assistance should be sought if either of these
situations is encountered.

Wellbore Survey Program

As part of the well planning phase, a surveying program should be defined that demonstrably provides
sufficient accuracy and reliability to meet the well's directional objectives to a prescribed confidence level.
These objectives include:

• Satisfy legislative requirements

• Avoid collision with nearby wellbores, structures or hazards

• Satisfy well control contingency requirements e.g. facilitate the drilling of relief wells

• Achieve the safe intersection of targets (e.g. landing the correct side of a sealing fault)

To ensure that the above objectives are met, survey programs should:

• Be based on the prescribed survey tools with valid IPMs

• Specify running procedures and quality control tests necessary to assure compliance with IPM
assumptions
• Include survey redundancy to help identify and eliminate gross error

Collisions can be caused by procedural errors far back in the supply chain, by people who are unaware
of their contribution to safe drilling, e.g. failure to demagnetise BHA component connections following
magnetic particle non-destructive testing (NDT).

Collision Avoidance Management

Database integrity and adherence to survey programs are prerequisites for successful collision avoidance.
In addition, suitably conservative MASD rules and monitoring procedures should be established,
communicated and adhered to by all involved. Collision avoidance procedures should define how safe
separation is managed during both the planning and execution of the drilling program. They should include
categorization of risk and the separation rules applied to each classification. Since HSE risk is associated
with collision, the procedures should be jointly agreed between the Operator and the relevant contractors.
10 SPE/IADC-184730-MS

Collision avoidance scans, also referred to as anti-collision scans should be run against the Master
Database. The planning phase should result in a collision monitoring program to be followed by both
office and rig personnel during the execution phase. Clearance data should be presented to users in usable,
meaningful numerical and graphical formats. These should aid correct interpretation and actions by office
and rig site personnel.
All personnel involved in wellbore construction activities should be trained in the collision management
process and the detailed procedures appropriate to their role. Survey programs should be executed in
accordance with their design. Any changes should be subjected to the appropriate management of change
(MoC) processes.
The directional software, survey tool error models and running procedures should be assessed and agreed
with the Operator prior to their use. All software used should be auditable against appropriate safety critical
software standards, (Sawaryn, Sanstrom and McColpin, 2006). Software outputs should contain references
to enable details of safety critical calculations and applicable versions, e.g. software engine and build to
be identified.
Collision avoidance management should also include:

• Classification of offset wells in terms of cost of intersection

• Minimum separation criteria per well classification

• Requirement for collision avoidance scan

• Design approval prior to drilling

• Presentation of safe separation tolerances for both planning and execution

• Verification of position relative to tolerances including timeliness while drilling

• Required actions in the event of failure to maintain safe separation

• Identification of abandoned radioactive sources and other hazards

• Retention of the approved scan and associated materials for audit (e.g. workbook format)

Management of Change. Last minute changes or changes made on-the-fly frequently cause difficulties.
Management of Change procedures are often cited as the barrier against failure in such circumstances, but
first the need for MoC has to be recognised and staff must know how to manage the change. There is also
a tendency to bias evaluation of data towards the desired outcome or decision, (OGP, 2012; Klayman and
Ha, 1987). In that sense, it is good practice to seek advice from others who are not so intimately involved
in the task.

Wellbore Survey Operations

The survey program defined in the planning phase are designed to meet the well's directional objectives and
should be followed exactly during the drilling phase. Where this proves not to be possible, the exceptions
should be managed appropriately to ensure that the directional objectives are achieved. Failure to execute
the program means that the objectives may not be met and where HSE risk offset wells are involved a MoC
should be invoked prior to making the changes. Good practice requires:

• Inclusion of the Survey Program in the Drilling Program

• Adherence to the Survey Program

• Compliance with recommended running procedures

SPE/IADC-184730-MS 11

• Application of quality control tests designed to validate surveys against IPM specification. The
strongest validation is via overlapping independent surveys.
• Exclusion of failed surveys from the survey log

• Management of deviations from program to ensure directional objectives are satisfied

• Checking for possible unintended sidetracks (e.g. when hole-opening)

Surveying Interval. The following recommendations for the maximum survey interval are intended only
for safe-separation and collision avoidance, Table 3. They do not address the requirements for routine
drilling and meeting other well objectives such as targets. To be valid, all surveys are required to pass the
quality control criteria appropriate to the survey tools and the applied IPMs. In general, the survey frequency
increases with increasing dog-leg severity (DLS) and decreasing SF. The intervals may be adjusted for non-
standard tool joints or stands (Double, Triple, Quad and Range I, II, III). The intervals may also be extended
where the continued divergence of the reference well from all the offset wells has been firmly established.

Table 3—Recommended maximum survey interval for safe-separation and collision avoidance

Maximum DLS [deg/100ft MD]

Survey
Interval [ft] <1 1–5 >5

>2 200 100 33

SF [-] 1.5 – 2 100 100 33

<1.5 33 33 33

For any steered section, a maximum survey interval of 100ft is recommended. Consideration should
be given to taking additional surveys at the end of a steered interval to ensure trajectory trends and
BHA directional tendency are understood. Note that these trends may change as the well profile, drilling
parameters or formation changes, or the BHA wears. If a survey indicates unexpected magnetic interference
then it is prudent to pull back and survey rather than drilling forward and surveying. A ladder plot showing
the equivalent magnetic field contributed by the adjacent wells, referred to later in this paper can be helpful
in assessing the situation.
A recent report commissioned by the US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement (BSEE) has recommended a blanket maximum survey interval of 100ft, (ICF International,
2016).

Quality Assurance
Procedures such as managed access, periodic audit and competency assessments are necessary to assure
the integrity of the software and database and the competency of all involved personnel over the life of the
field. The quality assurance plan should also define periodic assessment and audit of drilling and surveying
tools and procedures:

• Software used to prepare directional plans, collision scans and final survey calculations
specifically:

◦ Compliance with Safety Critical Software standards

◦ Consistency of algorithms and clear definition of limitations

◦ Availability of redundant data e.g. sub-surface (even though there is only one definitive
database)
12 SPE/IADC-184730-MS

• Instrument Performance Models (IPM's)

• Calculation methods employed

• Planning and operations personnel training and frequency

• Training systems that support the tasks outlined in this document

The WPTS runs a "Hits and Misses" workshop periodically, addressing a wide range of directional
planning, surveying and collision avoidance topics, (De Waart et. al., 2013). It also supports the publication
of a surveying e-book, (Jamieson, 2016).

Effective Communication
The preceding seven elements fail in the absence of effective communication between those involved in all
stages of the planning, execution and associated administrative processes. Personnel involved in these stages
should be clearly defined and engaged in a timely manner. Candidates include, but may not be limited to:

• Sub-surface personnel

• Drilling/rig, directional and surveying contractors

• Drilling, production and facilities engineering personnel

• Operations personnel

• Environmental, permitting and regulatory compliance personnel

The complexity and volume of information that is available on this critical topic can make assimilating
it a challenge. The situation can be much improved by the careful structuring of corporate documents,
segregating what must be achieved and what the boundaries are from how they are to be achieved. Fine
technical detail and the underlying physics should be in separate guidance documents. In crews with diverse
ethnic backgrounds language can be an obstacle and should be addressed.
Graphical Representation of Well Separation. The graphical representation of the well separation from
the offset wells play an important role in both the planning and execution phases. They are key devices for
depicting the drilling tolerances and supporting the effective review and approval of the drilling program.
During execution they should be used to monitor progress, project ahead and assess closure between wells.
The plots are also an important communications aid for achieving common situational awareness between
all the stakeholders. To satisfy all these requirements the plots should be simple, consistent and unambiguous
and be the minimum set to achieve the desired goals. Human factors issues such as colour blindness should
also be borne in mind.
It is recommended that the north-referenced, normal plane travelling cylinder diagram (Thorogood and
Sawaryn, 1991) be used in conjunction with a ladder plot, showing 3D distances and the expected positional
error for each of the offset wells. The ladder plot can also be used to display the depth sections in the
plan beyond which the effect of magnetic interference should be negligibly small, (Thorogood, 1980).
Used together, these plots have proved to be an effective minimum toolset. Interactive tools such as 3D
presentation have become important supplementary tools for planning, collaboration and training.
Travelling Cylinder Diagram
The north referenced, normal plane travelling cylinder diagram remains the simplest method to present
complex 3D inter-well tolerances on the allowable position of the borehole trajectory unambiguously,
although training is recommended in its use. A common oversight when implementing the method is to scan
down the reference well, rather than the offset well. Scanning down the reference well is likely to cause near
orthogonal crossings to be missed, (Thorogood and Sawaryn, 1991). Horizontal and designer wells were
SPE/IADC-184730-MS 13

still novel at the time that this paper was published. Now, orthogonal crossings are much more common and
qualifications or refinements to the published algorithm are required.
The published algorithm does not detect either a near-orthogonal or end-to-end approach, where the
reference well stops short of the offset well.
The situation can be remedied by artificially extending the TD of the reference well's planned trajectory
by some margin. A linear extension equivalent to 3σ of the largest dimension of the 1σ error ellipse at the
planned TD will suffice. Note that this distance can be quite large, particularly in designer wells where a
well is turned at right angles to the sail azimuth angle and then landed horizontally into a target, Fig. 3. In
this case the azimuth error accumulated over the sail section appears as a measured depth error at TD. The
ladder plot described in the following section is also useful for detecting such situations.

Figure 3—A near-orthogonal approach stopping short of the object well

can be detected by artificially extending the TD of the reference well.

Additional difficulties arise when the distance to the point is the same magnitude or exceeds the radius
of curvature of the arc, (Sawaryn and Thorogood, 2005). In most circumstances this is of little practical
significance, but it may be so for short radius drilling. For further details, see the appendix.
Ladder Plot
The ladder plot, Fig. 4 shows the closest 3D distance from the reference well at the MD shown on the
horizontal axis to each of the offset wells. For each well, the distance to the well is the line on the upper edge
of each ladder and the lower edge is the allowable separation consistent with the MASD. A line showing
the approximate zone of expected magnetic interference caused by offset casings can be superimposed on
the plot. This can be used as a rule of thumb to determine the depth to which gyro surveys are required.
Thorogood, (1980) proposed a method using an equivalent distance based on the sum of the inverse square
distances from the adjacent wells, Eq. 1. Note that the 50ft limit has increased over time, based on field data
and the improved sensitivity of the survey instruments now in use.

…(1)
14 SPE/IADC-184730-MS

Figure 4—A ladder plot showing magnetic interference is expected down to approximately
2430 ft MD in the reference well. Gyro surveys may be required down to this depth.

The ladder plot does distinguish the direction in which the minimum separation occurs. Because of this
toolface dependency, during drilling the reference well can go behind a boundary shown on this plot and
still be safe.

MASD Dispensations
Various circumstances and actions, sometimes referred to as mitigations are commonly assumed to reduce
the probability of penetration and are often proposed as arguments to justify a reduction in the MASD, Table
4. Whilst such measures are acceptable for non-HSE offset wells they should not be used as justification
for dispensation against the MASD criteria applied to HSE risk offset wells.

Table 4—Actions that are not recommended for use as justification for
dispensation against the MASD criteria applied to HSE risk offset wells.

Collision
Proposed Mitigation
Examples

Multiple casing strings protecting the tubing 5

Jetting instead of drilling 11

Rotary drilling instead of motor drilling 5

Drilling with a mill-tooth bit instead of a PDC bit 5, 9

Drilling with a dull or "shirt tail" bit 11

Drilling with low ROP 9

Monitoring the shakers for cement/steel 13

Monitoring offset wellhead vibration 3, 13

Monitoring offset casing annular pressure 14

Low angle of incidence between wells 3

Soft formation 6
SPE/IADC-184730-MS 15

A detailed statistical argument, based on the probabilities of well-to-well contact and then penetration
can be made, but the conclusion is that the effectiveness of these actions is not predictable, (ISCWSA,
2014b). Energy is still being put into the system and should contact be made, they cannot reliably ensure
that penetration will not occur. Penetration can be rapid and the circumstances involved in the collision
examples in Table 1 emphasise these points.
For HSE risk situations the only acceptable mitigations are those which reliably quantify the relative
well separation and so reduce the probability of well-to-well contact. Unlike the mitigations listed in Table
4, techniques such as magnetic ranging may provide additional information about the relative positions of
the offset and reference well, and thereby modify the probability of well-to-well contact rather than the
probability of penetration. However, the success of the job is highly dependent on the validity and reliability
of the service and considerable confidence is required in both the method and the data before it is applied.
The safe separation distance specified for HSE risk wells should not be compromised.

Workflows
The collision avoidance elements are applied as part of a systems approach in both the planning and
execution workflows, Figs. 5 and 6 respectively.

Figure 5—Planning Phase Workflow

16 SPE/IADC-184730-MS

Figure 6—Execution phase workflow

Planning
Referring to Fig. 5, the inference of an engineered well path in step A is that issues such as target sizing,
torque and drag, BHA design and hydraulics are solved at the same time as the geometric requirements.
The flow chart can then be restricted to what is required for collision avoidance analysis.
In step B there are two crucial operations. The first is the selection of all offset wellbores that have the
potential to be regarded as collision candidates, while the second is the initial classification of the wellbores
into one of two mutually exclusive categories, HSE or non-HSE. At this stage it is most important to make
sure that the original set of wellbores from which the offsets are picked is complete. For each well, the
depth ranges of potential intersection should be identified and if there is any doubt then the offset should
be classified as HSE.
Steps C and D are normally performed at the same time. This is the calculation and analysis of the
separation factor, identifying those HSE offset wellbores where the separation factor is acceptable and any
wellbores where this is not the case.
If the separation factor is not acceptable for any HSE offset wellbore then action needs to be taken and
these actions are listed in step H. If SF = 1 then by definition the allowable deviation from the plan (ADP)
is zero and in order to have a positive ADP then SF > 1. The actions then determine those which will affect
the allowable deviation so that it can be made positive. The other actions include re-evaluation of the offset
well's classification by choosing to plug and depressurize the offset well below the deepest potential point
of intersection, the use of ranging technology as would be applied to a relief well situation where the offset
is classified as HSE or by some other compliant action sanctioned by the operator.
If none of the actions described in step H are possible then the well plan should be abandoned and an
alternative plan sought, step K. If all of the SF values to the HSE offset wellbores are acceptable then the
tolerance lines showing the ADP are developed in step E based on the SFs. Step F is included to encourage
both improvements to the well plan or other actions which may reduce the probability of penetration in the
event of a collision. This step is shaded to emphasise that none of the improvements may be permitted to
SPE/IADC-184730-MS 17

alter any of the conditions or assumptions on which the collision avoidance scan and SF determination was
based. Any changes of this nature must cause the process to revert to step B. Once the well plan is ready
for execution then the only remaining action is to control and communicate the revision to help ensure that
the intended operations are carried out, step G.
Subsurface Safety Valves. If the potential depth of collision is above the subsurface safety valve (SSSV)
the valve is commonly used to shut-in a well prior to drilling, to change its status from an HSE risk well
to a non-HSE risk well. Some margin of depth error in the possible collision depth is also allowed for. The
well is then depressurized and the well head pressure is monitored while the drilling takes place until the
well has drilled completely clear of the potential collision zone. These actions must be clearly stated within
the drilling programme and coordinated with production operations. It is usual for the SSSV to undergo a
preliminary test several weeks ahead, and a plug set in the well if it fails. This may be impractical in some
circumstances, such as with sub-sea wells and the only remaining option is to replan the reference well.
It is important to bleed off the pressure as the SSSV may not shut in the event of a collision. Although the
SSSV is failsafe, it is held open by a control line under pressure. The collision may penetrate the well but it
may not damage the control line which would otherwise automatically close the SSSV. The SSSV closure
then depends on manual activation once the collision is detected by the rig. This is neither a dependable nor
desirable scenario. An overview of the workings of SSSVs is given by Garner et. al, 2002. There is a school
of thought that the SSSV is primarily a safety device and as such, it should not be used for routine, albeit
infrequent operational use. Further analysis and clarification is needed.

Execution
The starting point for the execution workflow Fig. 6 is the successful completion of the planning workflow.
Step A requires that all the preconditions are met, confirming offset wellbores have the status they were
assigned in the planning phase, confirming that the wellplan version is correct and approved and confirming
that operations are set to conform to the plan, particularly with respect to the tolerance lines. Operational
conformance requires honoring all the conditions set for these.
Active collision monitoring then starts at step B with the acquisition of a directional survey measurement
that passes quality control. This measurement is used in step C to calculate the position of the wellbore at the
measuring instrument and projecting this, first down to the bit and then further ahead by a length required
by the collision avoidance plan. Drilling stops if TD has been reached, step D.
Step E is the comparison of the measured and projected reference wellpath against the tolerance lines. In
step F, determine whether it is safe to drill ahead to the next survey point and that there are no anticipated
problems based on the projection ahead. Drilling parameters such as WOB or toolface settings may have
to be adjusted in Step G, in which case the wellbore proximity analysis in step E must be repeated. If
acceptable, then drilling continues in step I before repeating this cycle from step B.
If the plan indicates that an excursion, outside the prescribed tolerance lines cannot be avoided then
drilling must be halted and referred to higher authority and scrutiny according to company rules, step H. In
these circumstances it is usual to refer back to the planning workflow, then either drill to the new plan or
plug back and sidetrack. Either way a MoC is recommended.
The flow chart has been constructed assuming that collision monitoring is being performed throughout
the process of acquiring directional survey measurements. However, it is common practice to identify and
apply collision monitoring to only the intervals where there is a recognised collision risk. While this is an
acceptable practice, controls should be put in place to identify situations where the reference well is drilled
significantly off-plan such that it might pose a collision risk. Ideally, the possibility of these gross departures
from the plan should be identified in the planning process and limits established. If there is any doubt the
default should be to perform collision monitoring.
18 SPE/IADC-184730-MS

Further Work
These recommendations have been developed using published, predominantly peer reviewed methods and
material. The goal has been to establish a sound foundation on which further developments can be based.
During the course of this work, gaps have been identified which provide ample opportunities for further
work. Some of the more significant ones are the presentation of the recommendations in terms of barriers and
barrier management; and the need for tools and technologies that can both reliably and accurately measure
the actual well-to-well separation and orientation while drilling, with minimal impact on the operation's
progress.

Conclusions
Well collisions remain an operational risk in both land and offshore drilling and rigorous application of the
management elements outlined in this paper will help avoid unintended well collisions.

• The well collisions outlined in this paper can be placed in three main categories: data related,
collision avoidance management related and communication related.
• Risk habituation has played a significant part in a number of these cases.

• Remediation costs for non-HSE collisions are generally more severe than was initially assessed.

• Because well collisions occur infrequently and operators are reluctant to share data, detailed
analysis of collision events is difficult.

Recommendations
It is acknowledged that where local regulations are more conservative they take precedence over anything
stated in this paper.

• To avoid collisions, continued vigilance and attention to detail is required in all aspects of the
planning and execution.
• Mandatory training, competence assessment and audit are necessary to create awareness and
address risk habituation.
• In some cases, consideration should be given to applying the more stringent criteria applicable to
HSE risk wells to non-HSE wells to reduce potential cost outlays.
• In many jurisdictions operators are required to report details of well collisions. These should be
made publically available to aid learning and help avoid recurrence of these events.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge the efforts and contributions to this paper made by the officers of
the SPE Wellbore Positioning Technical Section (WPTS), the members of the Collision Avoidance Sub-
Committee and the generosity of the member's respective companies for supporting their participation and
attendance at meetings.

Nomenclature
= Negative unit normal vector
= Unit binormal vector
= Position vector in N, E, V coordinates, L, ft
= Unit direction vector
N = Number of offset wells, dimensionless
R = Radius of curvature, L, ft
SPE/IADC-184730-MS 19

S = Course length, L, ft
α = Subtended angle, radians
η = Substitution for a dot product, L, ft
σ = Standard deviation, L, ft

Subscripts and Superscripts

n = Index denoting the nth offset well
r = Index denoting the reference well
x = Position of a defining point
A = First point to be considered
B = Second point to be considered
1,2,3,4 = First, second etc. point, arc or property
* = Component to be determined

SI Metric Conversion Factors

degrees × 1.745329 E-02 = rad

ft × 3.048;* E-01 = m
in. × 2.54;* E-02 = m

* Conversion factor is exact

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SPE/IADC-184730-MS 21

Appendix
The calculation of the closest distance of a point to a circular arc is the key to the construction of both the
normal plane travelling cylinder diagram and the ladder plot. The angle α subtending the arc may assume
values such that 0 ≤ α* ≤ α ≤ < π. It is also assumed the start and end points of the arc are not coincident,
Fig. A-1. The closest approach is reached when the vector is normal to the curve, (Thorogood and
Sawaryn, 1990).

Figure A-1—If the distance to the arc is greater than the radius of
curvature, either of the two solutions α* or (α* + π) can be valid.

The subtended angle α* to this point is calculated using expressions A-1, A-2 and A-3. However, (α* +
π) is also a solution to A-3 and represents a maximum distance from the point to the arc. When constructing
the travelling cylinder diagram, if the distance is greater than the radius of curvature, the correct solution
may correspond to either the minimum or maximum distance.

…(A-1)

…(A-2)

…(A-3)

The corresponding position on the arc is determined by interpolating on the subtended angle α* and
then using the minimum curvature equation. Lastly, the distance is calculated from the magnitude of the
vector .