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International Relations: One World, Many Theories

Author(s): Stephen M. Walt
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Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 29-
32+34-46
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International
Relations:
One World,
Many Theories
M. Walt
byStephen

Why shouldpolicymakersand practitioners

care about the scholarlystudy of interna-
tional affairs?Those who conductforeign
policy often dismiss academictheorists(frequently,
one mustadmit,with goodreason),but thereis an inescapablelink
betweenthe abstractworldof theoryandthe realworldof policy.We
need theoriesto makesenseof the blizzard of information that bom-
bardsus daily.Evenpolicymakers who are contemptuous of "theory"
mustrely on theirown (often unstated)ideasabouthow the world
worksin orderto decidewhatto do. It is hardto makegoodpolicyif
one'sbasicorganizing areflawed,justasit is hardto construct
principles
good without
theories knowing lot abouttherealworld.Everyone
a uses
theories-whetherhe orsheknowsit ornot-and disagreements about
policyusuallyreston more fundamental disagreements about the basic
forcesthatshapeinternationaloutcomes.
Take,forexample,the currentdebateon how to respondto China.
Fromone perspective, China'sascentis the latestexampleof the ten-

S TEPHEN M. WALTisprofessor andmaster

science
ofpolitical of thesocialscience
colle-
giatedivision
attheUniversity He isa member
ofChicago. ofFOREIGNPOLICY'Seditorial
board.

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 Relations
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dencyforrisingpowersto alterthe globalbalanceof powerin poten-

tiallydangerous ways,especiallyas theirgrowinginfluencemakesthem
moreambitious.Fromanotherperspective,the key to China'sfuture
conductis whetherits behaviorwillbe modifiedby its integrationinto
worldmarketsandby the (inevitable?) spreadof democraticprinciples.
Fromyet anotherviewpoint,relationsbetweenChinaand the restof
the worldwill be shapedby issuesof cultureand identity:Will China
see itself(andbe seenbyothers)asa normalmemberof the worldcom-
munityor a singularsocietythatdeservesspecialtreatment?
In the sameway,the debateoverNATO expansionlooksdifferent
dependingon whichtheoryone employs.Froma "realist" perspective,
NATO expansion is an effort
to extendWestern influence-well beyond
the traditionalsphereof U.S. vital interests-duringa periodof Russ-
ian weaknessand is likelyto provokea harshresponsefromMoscow.
From a liberalperspective,however,expansionwill reinforcethe
nascentdemocraciesof CentralEuropeand extendNATO'S conflict-
managementmechanismsto a potentiallyturbulentregion.A third
viewmightstressthe valueof incorporating the CzechRepublic,Hun-
gary, and Polandwithin the Westernsecuritycommunity, whosemem-
berssharea commonidentitythathasmadewarlargelyunthinkable.
No singleapproachcancaptureall the complexityof contemporary
worldpolitics.Therefore,we arebetteroffwitha diversearrayof com-
petingideasratherthan a singletheoreticalorthodoxy.Competition
between theorieshelps reveal their strengthsand weaknessesand
spurssubsequentrefinements,while revealingflawsin conventional
wisdom.Althoughwe shouldtake care to emphasizeinventiveness
over invective,we shouldwelcomeandencouragethe heterogeneity
of contemporary scholarship.

WHERE ARE WE COMING FROM?

The studyof international
affairsis bestunderstoodas a protracted
com-
petitionbetweentherealist,liberal,andradical
traditions.
Realismempha-
sizes the enduringpropensityfor conflictbetweenstates;liberalism
identifiesseveralwaysto mitigatetheseconflictivetendencies; andthe
radicaltradition
describes
howtheentiresystemofstaterelations mightbe
transformed.
The boundariesbetweenthese traditionsaresomewhatfuzzy
and a numberof importantworksdo not fit neatlyinto any of them, but
debateswithin and amongthem have largelydefinedthe discipline.

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 Walt

Realism
Realismwas the dominanttheoreticaltraditionthroughoutthe Cold
War.It depictsinternational affairsas a struggleforpoweramongself-
interestedstatesand is generallypessimisticaboutthe prospectsfor
eliminatingconflictandwar.Realismdominatedin the ColdWaryears
becauseit providedsimplebutpowerfulexplanations forwar,alliances,
imperialism, obstaclesto cooperation, and otherinternational phenom-
ena,andbecauseits emphasison competitionwasconsistentwiththe
centralfeaturesof the American-Soviet rivalry.
Realismis not a singletheory,of course,andrealistthoughtevolved
considerably throughout the ColdWar."Classical" realistssuchasHans
Morgenthauand ReinholdNiebuhrbelievedthat states,like human
beings,hadan innatedesireto dominateothers,whichledthemto fight
wars.Morgenthau alsostressedthe virtuesof the classical,multipolar,
balance-of-power systemandsawthe bipolarrivalrybetweenthe Unit-
ed Statesandthe SovietUnionas especiallydangerous.
By contrast,the "neorealist" theoryadvancedby KennethWaltz
ignored human nature and focused on the effectsof the international
For
system. Waltz,the international systemconsistedof a numberof
greatpowers,each seekingto survive.Becausethe systemis anarchic
(i.e., thereis no centralauthorityto protectstatesfromone another),
each statehas to surviveon its own.Waltzarguedthat thiscondition
wouldlead weakerstatesto balanceagainst,ratherthan bandwagon
with, morepowerfulrivals.And contraryto Morgenthau, he claimed
thatbipolarity wasmorestablethanmultipolarity.
An importantrefinementto realismwas the additionof offense-
defensetheory,as laid out by RobertJervis,GeorgeQuester,and
StephenVan Evera.These scholarsarguedthat warwas morelikely
whenstatescouldconquereachothereasily.Whendefensewaseasier
thanoffense,however,securitywasmoreplentiful,incentivesto expand
declined,and cooperationcould blossom.And if defensehad the
advantage, andstatescoulddistinguish betweenoffensiveanddefensive
weapons, then statescould acquirethe meansto defendthemselves
withoutthreatening others,therebydampening the effectsof anarchy.
Forthese"defensive" realists,statesmerelysoughtto surviveandgreat
powerscouldguaranteetheirsecurityby formingbalancingalliancesand
choosingdefensivemilitarypostures(such as retaliatorynuclearforces).
Not surprisingly,Waltz and most other neorealistsbelieved that the
United States was extremelysecure for most of the Cold War.Their

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principlefearwasthatit mightsquander itsfavorable

positionbyadopt-
inganoverlyaggressiveforeignpolicy.Thus,bytheendof theColdWar,
realismhadmovedawayfromMorgenthau's darkbroodingabouthuman
natureandtakenon a slightlymoreoptimistictone.

Liberalism
The principalchallengeto realismcamefroma broadfamilyof liber-
al theories.One strandof liberalthoughtarguedthateconomicinter-
dependencewould discouragestatesfrom using force againsteach
otherbecausewarfarewouldthreateneachside'sprosperity. A second
strand, often associated with President Woodrow Wilson, saw the
of
spread democracy as the keyto world peace,basedon the claimthat
democraticstateswere inherentlymorepeacefulthan authoritarian
states. A third, more recent theory argued that international
institutionssuch as the InternationalEnergyAgencyand the Inter-
nationalMonetaryFundcouldhelp overcomeselfishstatebehavior,
mainlybyencouraging statesto foregoimmediategainsforthe greater
benefitsof enduringcooperation.
Althoughsomeliberalsflirtedwiththe ideathatnew transnational
actors, especially the multinationalcorporation,were gradually
encroaching on thepowerof states,liberalism sawstatesasthe
generally
centralplayersin international affairs.All liberaltheoriesimpliedthat
cooperation wasmorepervasive thaneventhe defensiveversionof real-
ismallowed,buteachviewoffereda differentrecipeforpromoting it.

RadicalApproaches
Until the 1980s,marxismwasthe mainalternativeto the mainstream
realistand liberaltraditions.Whererealismand liberalismtook the
statesystemforgranted,marxismofferedboth a differentexplanation
forinternational conflictanda blueprintforfundamentally transform-
ing the existinginternationalorder.
Orthodoxmarxisttheorysawcapitalism asthe centralcauseof inter-
nationalconflict.Capitaliststatesbattledeachotheras a consequence
of theirincessantstruggleforprofitsandbattledsocialiststatesbecause
they saw in them the seeds of their own destruction.Neomarxist
"dependency"theory, by contrast, focused on relations between
advancedcapitalistpowersand lessdevelopedstatesand arguedthat the
former-aided by an unholy alliance with the ruling classes of the
developing world-had grown rich by exploiting the latter.The solu-
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tion wasto overthrowtheseparasiticelitesandinstalla revolutionary

governmentcommittedto autonomous development.
Bothof thesetheorieswerelargelydiscredited beforethe ColdWar
even ended.The extensivehistoryof economicandmilitarycoopera-
tion amongthe advancedindustrial powersshowedthatcapitalism did
not inevitablylead to conflict.The bitterschismsthat dividedthe
communistworldshowedthat socialismdid not alwayspromotehar-
mony. Dependencytheorysufferedsimilarempiricalsetbacksas it
becameincreasingly clearthat,first,activeparticipation
in the world
economy was a betterroute to prosperity than autonomous socialist
development;and,second,manydeveloping countriesprovedthem-
selvesquitecapableof bargaining with
successfully multinational cor-
porationsandothercapitalistinstitutions.
As marxismsuccumbedto its variousfailings,its mantle was
assumedby a groupof theoristswho borrowedheavilyfromthe wave
of postmodernwritingsin literarycriticismand social theory.This
"deconstructionist"approachwas openly skepticalof the effortto
devise generalor universaltheoriessuch as realismor liberalism.
Indeed,its proponentsemphasizedthe importanceof languageand
discoursein shapingsocialoutcomes.However,becausethesescholars
focusedinitiallyon criticizingthe mainstream paradigms but did not
offerpositivealternativesto them, they remaineda self-consciously
dissidentminorityformostof the 1980s.

DomesticPolitics
Not allColdWarscholarship on internationalaffairsfit neatlyintothe
realist,liberal,or marxistparadigms.In particular,a numberof impor-
tantworksfocusedon the characteristics of states,governmental orga-
nizations,orindividualleaders.The democratic strandof liberaltheory
fits underthis heading,as do the effortsof scholarssuch as Graham
AllisonandJohnSteinbruner to use organization theoryandbureau-
craticpoliticsto explainforeignpolicybehavior,and thoseof Jervis,
IrvingJanis,andothers,whichappliedsocialandcognitivepsycholo-
gy.Forthe mostpart,theseeffortsdidnot seekto providea generalthe-
oryof international behaviorbut to identifyotherfactorsthat might
lead states to behave contraryto the predictionsof the realistor liber-
al approaches.Thus, much of this literatureshould be regardedas a
complement to the three main paradigmsrather than as a rival
approachfor analysisof the internationalsystemas a whole.

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 Walt

NEW WRINKLES IN OLD PARADIGMS

Scholarshipon internationalaffairshas diversifiedsignificantlysince
the end of the Cold War.Non-Americanvoices are moreprominent,a
wider range of methods and theories are seen as legitimate,and new
issuessuch as ethnic conflict, the environment,and the futureof the
state have been placed on the agendaof scholarseverywhere.
Yetthe senseof dejavu is equallystriking.Insteadof resolvingthe strug-
gle betweencompetingtheoreticaltraditions,the end of the Cold Warhas
merelylauncheda new seriesof debates.Ironically,even as manysocieties
embracesimilaridealsof democracy,freemarkets,and humanrights,the
scholarswho studythese developmentsaremoredividedthan ever.

Realism Redux
Although the end of the Cold War led a few writersto declare that
realismwas destined for the academicscrapheap,rumorsof its demise
have been largelyexaggerated.
A recent contributionof realisttheoryis its attentionto the problem
of relativeand absolutegains.Respondingto the institutionalists'claim
that internationalinstitutionswould enable states to foregoshort-term
advantagesforthe sakeof greaterlong-termgains,realistssuchasJoseph
Grieco and Stephen Krasnerpoint out that anarchyforces states to
worryaboutboth the absolutegainsfromcooperationand the way that
gainsare distributedamongparticipants.The logic is straightforward: If
one state reapslargergains than its partners,it will graduallybecome
stronger,and its partnerswill eventuallybecome morevulnerable.
Realistshave alsobeen quickto explorea varietyof new issues.Barry
Posen offersa realist explanationfor ethnic conflict, noting that the
breakupof multiethnicstatescouldplace rivalethnic groupsin an anar-
chic setting,therebytriggeringintensefearsand temptingeach groupto
use force to improveits relativeposition. This problemwould be par-
ticularlyseverewhen each group'sterritorycontainedenclaves inhabit-
ed by their ethnic rivals-as in the formerYugoslavia-because each
side would be tempted to "cleanse"(preemptively)these alien minori-
ties and expand to incorporateany othersfromtheir ethnic groupthat
lay outside their borders.Realists have also cautioned that NATO,
absent a clear enemy, would likely face increasingstrains and that
expandingits presenceeastwardwouldjeopardizerelationswith Russia.
Finally,scholarssuch as Michael Mastandunohave arguedthat U.S.

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Waiting for Mr. X

The post-ColdWarworldstill awaitsits "X"article.Althoughmany
have tried,no one hasmanagedto pen the sortof compellinganalysis
thatGeorgeKennanprovided foranearlierera,whenhe articulated the
theory of containment. Instead of a singlenew the
vision, most impor-
tantdevelopment in post-ColdWarwritingson worldaffairsisthe con-
tinuingclashbetweenthosewhobelieveworldpoliticshasbeen (oris
being)fundamentally transformed andthosewhobelievethatthefuture
will looka lot likethe past.
Scholarswhoseetheendof theColdWarasa watershed fallinto
two distinctgroups.Manyexpertsstillsee the stateas the mainactor
butbelievethatthe agendaof statesis shiftingfrommilitarycompeti-
tionto economiccompetitiveness, domesticwelfare,andenvironmen-
tal protection.Thus,PresidentBill Clintonhas embracedthe view
that"enlightened self-interest[and]sharedvalues.., willcompelusto
cooperatein moreconstructiveways."Some writersattributethis
changeto the spreadof democracy, othersto the nuclearstalemate,
andstillothersto changesin international norms.
An evenmoreradicalperspective questionswhetherthe stateis
still the mostimportantinternational actor.JessicaMathewsbelieves
that "theabsolutesof the Westphalian system[of]territoriallyfixed
states. . . areall dissolving,"andJohnRuggiearguesthatwe do not
even have a vocabulary that can adequately describethe new forces
that (he believes) are transforming contemporary world politics.
Althoughthereis still no consensuson the causesof this trend,the
view that statesare of decreasingrelevanceis surprisingly common
amongacademics, journalists,andpolicywonks.
Prominent realistssuchasChristopher LayneandKennethWaltz
continueto givethe stateprideof placeandpredicta returnto familiar
patternsof greatpowercompetition.Similarly, RobertKeohaneand
otherinstitutionalists alsoemphasize the centralroleof the stateand
arguethat institutionssuch as the EuropeanUnion and NATO are
important preciselybecausetheyprovidecontinuityin themidstofdra-
maticpoliticalshifts.Theseauthorsallregardthe endof the ColdWar
asa far-reaching shiftin the globalbalanceofpowerbutdo notseeit as
a qualitative transformation in the basicnatureof worldpolitics.
Who is right?Toosoon to tell, but the debatebearswatching
in the yearsto come.
-S.W.
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 Walt

foreignpolicyis generallyconsistentwithrealistprinciples, insofarasits

actionsarestilldesignedto preserveU.S. predominance andto shapea
postwarorderthatadvancesAmericaninterests.
The mostinteresting conceptualdevelopment withinthe realistpar-
adigm has been the emergingsplitbetween the "defensive"and"offen-
sive"strandsof thought.Defensiverealistssuchas Waltz,VanEvera,
andJackSnyderassumedthatstateshadlittleintrinsicinterestin mili-
taryconquestand arguedthat the costs of expansiongenerallyout-
weighedthe benefits.Accordingly, they maintainedthat greatpower
warsoccurredlargelybecausedomesticgroupsfosteredexaggerated per-
ceptionsof threatandan excessivefaithin the efficacyof militaryforce.
Thisviewis nowbeingchallengedalongseveralfronts.First,asRan-
dallSchwellernotes,the neorealistassumption thatstatesmerelyseek
to survive"stackedthe deck"in favorof the statusquobecauseit pre-
cludedthe threatof predatory revisioniststates-nationssuchasAdolf
Hitler'sGermanyor NapoleonBonaparte's Francethat "valuewhat
they covet far more than whattheypossess" arewillingto riskanni-
and
hilationto achievetheiraims.Second,PeterLiberman,in his book
DoesConquest Pay?,usesa numberof historicalcases-such astheNazi
occupation WesternEuropeand Soviet hegemonyover Eastern
of
Europe-to showthatthe benefitsof conquestoftenexceedthe costs,
therebycastingdoubton the claimthatmilitaryexpansionis no longer
cost-effective.Third, offensive realists such as Eric Labs, John
Mearsheimer, and FareedZakariaarguethat anarchyencouragesall
statesto tryto maximizetheirrelativestrengthsimplybecauseno state
can everbe surewhena trulyrevisionistpowermightemerge.
Thesedifferences helpexplainwhyrealistsdisagreeoverissuessuch
as the futureof Europe.FordefensiverealistssuchasVanEvera,waris
rarelyprofitableandusuallyresultsfrommilitarism, hypemrnationalism,
or someotherdistortingdomesticfactor.BecauseVanEverabelieves
suchforcesarelargelyabsentin post-ColdWarEurope,he concludes
that the regionis "primedfor peace."By contrast,Mearsheimer and
otheroffensiverealistsbelievethatanarchyforcesgreatpowersto com-
pete irrespective of theirinternalcharacteristics
andthatsecuritycom-
petition will return to Europeassoonasthe U.S. pacifieris withdrawn.
New Life for Liberalism
The defeatof communismsparkeda roundof self-congratulationin the
West, best exemplified by Francis Fukuyama'sinfamous claim that

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 International
Relations

COMPETING
PARADIGMS REALISM LIBERALISM
CONSTRUCTIVISMI
MainTheoretical Self-interested
states forpower
Concern State
behavior
shaped
Proposition compete for
constantly overridden
byeconomic/ beliefs,
byl61ite
powerorsecurity considerations
political collective
norms,
forprosperity,
(desire andsocial
identities
commitmentto
liberal
values)
MainUnitsof Analysis States States Individuals
(especially
l61ites)
MainInstruments Economic
and Varies
(international Ideas
and
especially
military economic
institutions, discourse
power exchange,
promotion
ofdemocracy)
Modern
Theorists HansMorgenthau, Michael
Doyle, Alexander
Wendt,
Kenneth
Waltz RobertKeohane JohnRuggie
Representative Waltz, of
Theory Keohane, Wendt, Is
"Anarchy
Modern
Works International
Politics After
Hegemony WhatStates
Make ofIt"
"Back
Mearsheimer, to "The
Fukuyama, Endof (International
theFuture:
Instability (National
History?" 1992);
Organization,
inEurope
after 1989)
Interest, Koslowski
&
theCold
War" Kratochwil,
"Under-
(International
Security, standing
Changesin
1990) International
Politics"
(International
1994)
Organization,
Post-Cold
War of
Resurgence Increased
cooperation Agnostic it
because
Prediction overt
great
power asliberal free
values, cannot the
predict
competition markets,interna-
and content
ofideas
tional
institutions
spreac
MainLimitation Does
notaccount
for Tendstoignore
the Better
atdescribing
the
international
change role
ofpower pastthan
anticipating
thefuture

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 Walt

humankind hadnowreachedthe "endof history." Historyhaspaidlit-

tle attention to this boast, but the triumph of the West did give a
notableboostto all threestrandsof liberalthought.
Byfarthe mostinteresting andimportant development hasbeenthe
lively debateon the "democratic peace."Althoughthe most recent
phase of thisdebate had begun even beforethe SovietUnioncollapsed,
it becamemore influentialas the numberof democraciesbeganto
increaseandas evidenceof thisrelationship beganto accumulate.
Democraticpeacetheoryis a refinementof the earlierclaimthat
democracies wereinherently morepeacefulthanautocratic states.Itrests
on the beliefthat althoughdemocracies seemto fightwarsas oftenas
other states,they rarely,if ever,fight one another.Scholarssuch as
MichaelDoyle,JamesLeeRay,andBruceRussetthaveoffereda number
of explanations forthistendency,the mostpopularbeingthatdemocra-
cies embracenormsof compromise that bar the use of forceagainst
groups espousing similarprinciples. is hardto thinkof a moreinfluen-
It
tial,recent academic debate,insofarasthebeliefthat"democracies don't
fight each other"has been an importantjustification for the Clinton
administration's effortsto enlargethe sphereof democratic rule.
It is thereforeironicthatfaithin the "democratic peace"becamethe
basisforU.S. policyjustasadditional researchwasbeginningto identify
severalqualifiersto this theory.First,Snyderand EdwardMansfield
pointedout thatstatesmaybe moreproneto warwhentheyarein the
midstof a democratictransition,which impliesthat effortsto export
democracymightactuallymakethingsworse.Second,criticssuchas
JoanneGowaandDavidSpirohavearguedthatthe apparent absenceof
warbetweendemocracies is due to the waythat democracy has been
definedandto the relativedearthof democratic states(especiallybefore
1945). In addition,ChristopherLaynehas pointedout that when
democracies havecomecloseto warin the pasttheirdecisionto remain
at peaceultimately hadlittledo withtheirshareddemocratic character.
Third, clearcut evidencethatdemocracies donotfighteachotheriscon-
finedto the post-1945era,and,asGowahasemphasized, the absenceof
conflictin thisperiodmaybe duemoreto theircommoninterestin con-
tainingthe SovietUnionthanto shareddemocratic principles.
Liberalinstitutionalistslikewisehave continued to adapttheir own
theories.On the one hand,the coreclaimsof institutionalisttheoryhave
become more modest over time. Institutionsare now said to facilitate
cooperationwhen it is in each state'sinterestto do so, but it is widely

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agreedthattheycannotforcestatesto behavein waysthatarecontrary

to the states'own selfishinterests.[Forfurtherdiscussion,pleasesee
RobertKeohane's article.]On the otherhand,institutionalists suchas
JohnDuffield and Robert McCalla have extended the into
theory new
substantive areas,mostnotablythe studyof NATO.Forthesescholars,
NATO'S highlyinstitutionalized characterhelpsexplainwhyit hasbeen
ableto surviveandadapt,despitethedisappearance of itsmainadversary.
Theeconomicstrandofliberaltheoryisstillinfluential aswell.Inpar-
ticular,a numberof scholarshaverecentlysuggested thatthe "globaliza-
tion" of world markets,the rise of transnationalnetworksand
nongovernmental organizations, andthe rapidspreadof globalcommu-
nicationstechnologyareundermining the powerof statesandshifting
attentionawayfrommilitarysecuritytowardeconomicsandsocialwel-
fare.The detailsarenovel but the basiclogic is familiar: As societies
aroundthe globebecomeenmeshedin a web of economicand social
connections,the costsof disrupting theseties will effectivelypreclude
unilateral stateactions,especiallythe useof force.
This perspectiveimpliesthat warwill remaina remotepossibility
amongthe advancedindustrial democracies.It alsosuggeststhatbring-
ing China and Russiainto the relentless
embrace of worldcapitalismis
the bestwayto promotebothprosperity andpeace,particularly if this
processcreatesa strongmiddleclassin thesestatesandreinforces pres-
suresto democratize. Get thesesocietieshookedon prosperity andcom-
petitionwillbe confinedto the economicrealm.
Thisviewhasbeenchallengedby scholarswho arguethatthe actu-
al scopeof "globalization"is modestandthatthesevarioustransactions
stilltakeplacein environments thatareshapedandregulated bystates.
Nonetheless, the beliefthat economic forces are superseding tradition-
al greatpowerpoliticsenjoyswidespread acceptanceamongscholars,
pundits,andpolicymakers, andthe roleof the stateis likelyto be an
importanttopic forfutureacademic inquiry.
Constructivist
Theories
Whereasrealismandliberalism tendto focuson materialfactorssuchas
powerortrade,constructivist
approaches the impactof ideas.
emphasize
Insteadof takingthe state for grantedand assumingthat it simplyseeks
to survive,constructivistsregardthe interestsand identitiesof statesas
a highly malleable product of specific historical processes.They pay
close attention to the prevailingdiscourse(s)in society because dis-

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coursereflectsandshapesbeliefsandinterests,andestablishes accepted
normsof behavior.Consequently, constructivismis especiallyattentive
to the sourcesof change,andthis approach has largelyreplacedmarx-
ismas the preeminentradicalperspective on international affairs.
The end of the ColdWarplayedan importantrolein legitimating
constructivisttheoriesbecauserealismand liberalismboth failedto
anticipatethis event andhad sometroubleexplainingit. Construc-
tivists had an explanation:Specifically,formerpresidentMikhail
Gorbachevrevolutionized Sovietforeignpolicybecausehe embraced
new ideassuchas "commonsecurity."
Moreover,given that we live in an erawhereold normsarebeing
challenged,once clearboundaries aredissolving,andissuesof identi-
ty arebecomingmoresalient,it is hardlysurprising thatscholarshave
been drawnto approachesthat place these issuesfrontand center.
Froma constructivistperspective,in fact, the centralissue in the
post-ColdWarworldis howdifferentgroupsconceivetheiridentities
and interests.Although power is not irrelevant,constructivism
emphasizes how ideasandidentitiesarecreated,howtheyevolve,and
how theyshapethe waystatesunderstand andrespondto theirsitua-
tion. Therefore,it matterswhetherEuropeans definethemselvespri-
marily in nationalor continentalterms;whether GermanyandJapan
redefinetheirpastsin waysthatencouragetheiradoptingmoreactive
international roles;andwhetherthe UnitedStatesembracesorrejects
its identityas "globalpoliceman."
Constructivist theoriesarequitediverseanddo not offera unified
set of predictionson anyof theseissues.At a purelyconceptuallevel,
AlexanderWendthas arguedthat the realistconceptionof anarchy
doesnot adequatelyexplainwhy conflictoccursbetweenstates.The
realissueis how anarchyis understood-inWendt'swords,"Anarchy
is whatstatesmakeof it."Anotherstrandof constructivist theoryhas
focusedon the futureof the territorialstate,suggestingthat transna-
tionalcommunication andsharedcivic valuesareundermining tradi-
tionalnationalloyaltiesandcreatingradicallynew formsof political
association.Otherconstructivists focuson the roleof norms,arguing
thatinternational lawandothernormativeprincipleshaveerodedear-
lier notions of sovereignty and altered the legitimate purposesfor
which state power may be employed.The common theme in each of
these strandsis the capacityof discourseto shape how political actors
define themselvesand their interests,and thus modifytheir behavior.

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International
Relations

DomesticPoliticsReconsidered
As in the ColdWar,scholarscontinueto explorethe impactof domes-
tic politicson the behaviorof states.Domesticpoliticsareobviously
centralto the debateon the democraticpeace,and scholarssuch as
Snyder,JeffreyFrieden,andHelenMilnerhaveexaminedhowdomes-
tic interestgroupscandistorttheformation of statepreferencesandlead
to suboptimalinternationalbehavior.GeorgeDowns,DavidRocke,
andothershavealsoexploredhowdomesticinstitutions canhelpstates
dealwith the perennialproblemof uncertainty, whilestudentsof psy-
chologyhave appliedprospecttheoryandothernew tools to explain
why decisionmakersfail to act in a rationalfashion.[Forfurtherdis-
cussionaboutforeignpolicydecisionmaking,pleasesee the articleby
Margaret HermannandJoeHagan.]
The pastdecadehas alsowitnessedan explosionof interestin the
conceptof culture,a developmentthatoverlapswiththe constructivist
emphasison the importance of ideasandnorms.Thus,ThomasBerger
andPeterKatzenstein haveusedculturalvariables to explainwhyGer-
and
many Japan have thus far eschewed more self-reliant
militarypoli-
cies;ElizabethKierhas offereda culturalinterpretation of Britishand
Frenchmilitarydoctrinesin the interwar period;andlainJohnstonhas
tracedcontinuitiesin Chineseforeignpolicyto a deeplyrootedformof
"cultural realism."SamuelHuntington's direwarningsaboutan immi-
nent "clashof civilizations"aresymptomatic of thistrendaswell,inso-
faras his argumentrestson the claimthatbroadculturalaffinitiesare
now supplantingnationalloyalties.Thoughthese and other works
defineculturein widelyvaryingwaysand have yet to providea full
explanationof how it worksor how enduringits effectsmightbe, cul-
turalperspectives have been verymuchin vogueduringthe pastfive
years. This trendis partlya reflectionof the broaderinterestin cultural
issuesin the academicworld(andwithinthe publicdebateaswell)and
partlya responseto the upsurgein ethnic,nationalist,andculturalcon-
flictssincethe demiseof the SovietUnion.

TOMORROW'S CONCEPTUAL TOOLBOX

While these debatesreflectthe diversityof contemporaryscholarshipon
internationalaffairs,therearealsoobvioussignsof convergence.Mostreal-
ists recognizethat nationalism,militarism, and other domestic
ethnicity,
factorsare important;liberalsacknowledgethat poweris centralto inter-

42 FOREIGN POLICY

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 Walt

nationalbehavior;and someconstructivists admitthat ideaswill have

greaterimpactwhenbackedbypowerful statesandreinforced byenduring
materialforces.The boundaries of eachparadigm aresomewhatperme-
able,andthereis ampleopportunity forintellectual arbitrage.
Whichof thesebroadperspectives shedsthe mostlighton contem-
poraryinternational affairs,andwhichshouldpolicymakers keepmost
firmly in mind when charting our course into the next century?
Althoughmanyacademics(and morethan a few policymakers) are
loatheto admitit, realismremainsthe mostcompellinggeneralframe-
workforunderstanding international relations.Statescontinueto pay
closeattentionto the balanceof powerandto worryaboutthe possi-
bilityof majorconflict.Amongotherthings,thisenduringpreoccupa-
tionwithpowerandsecurityexplainswhymanyAsiansandEuropeans
are now eagerto preserve-andpossiblyexpand-the U.S. military
presencein their regions.As Czech presidentVaiclavHavel has
warned,if NATO failsto expand,"wemightbe headingfora newglob-
al catastrophe... [which]couldcost us all muchmorethanthe two
worldwars."Thesearenot the wordsof a manwhobelievesthatgreat
powerrivalryhasbeenbanishedforever.
As fortheUnitedStates,thepastdecadehasshownhowmuchit likes
being"number one"andhowdetermined it isto remainin a predominant
position. The United Stateshas taken advantage of itscurrentsuperiori-
ty to imposeitspreferences wherever possible,evenat the riskof irritat-
ingmany of itslong-standing allies.Ithas forceda seriesofone-sidedarms
controlagreements on Russia,dominated theproblematic peaceeffortin
Bosnia,takenstepsto expandNATOintoRussia's backyard, andbecome
increasingly concernedaboutthe risingpowerof China.It has called
repeatedly for greaterrelianceon multilateralism and a largerrolefor
international institutions, but has treatedagenciessuchas the United
Nationsandthe WorldTradeOrganization withdisdainwhenevertheir
actionsdidnot conformto U.S. interests. It refusedto jointherestof the
worldin outlawingthe production of landminesandwaspolitelyunco-
operative at the Kyotoenvironmental summit.AlthoughU.S. leadersare
adeptatcloakingtheiractionsin theloftyrhetoricof"world naked
order,"
self-interest
liesbehindmostof them.Thus,theendof theColdWardid
not bringthe end of powerpolitics,andrealismis likelyto remainthe sin-
gle most usefulinstrumentin our intellectualtoolbox.
Yet realism does not explain everything, and a wise leader would
also keep insights from the rival paradigmsin mind. Liberaltheories

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International
Relations

identify the instrumentsthat states can use to achieve shared inter-

ests, highlight the powerful economic forces with which states and
societies must now contend, and help us understandwhy states may
differ in their basic preferences.Paradoxically,because U.S. protec-
tion reducesthe dangerof regionalrivalriesand reinforcesthe "liber-
al peace"that emergedafter 1945, these factorsmaybecome relatively
more important, as long as the United States continues to provide
securityand stability in many partsof the world.
Meanwhile,constructivisttheoriesare best suited to the analysisof
how identities and interestscan change over time, therebyproducing
subtle shifts in the behavior of states and occasionallytriggeringfar-
reaching but unexpected shifts in international affairs.It matters if
political identity in Europecontinues to shift from the nation-stateto
more local regionsor to a broadersense of Europeanidentity,just as it
matters if nationalism is graduallysupplantedby the sort of "civiliza-
tional" affinitiesemphasizedby Huntington. Realism has little to say
about these prospects, and policymakers could be blind-sided by
change if they ignorethese possibilitiesentirely.
In short, each of these competing perspectivescapturesimportant
aspects of world politics. Our understandingwould be impoverished
were our thinking confined to only one of them. The "compleatdiplo-
mat"of the futureshouldremaincognizantof realism'semphasison the
inescapablerole of power,keep liberalism'sawarenessof domesticforces
in mind, and occasionallyreflecton constructivism's vision of change.

WANT TO KNOW MORE?

For a fair-mindedsurveyof the realist,liberal,and marxistparadigms,
see Michael Doyle'sWays of War and Peace (New York,NY:Norton,
1997). A guide to some recent developmentsin internationalpolitical
thought is Doyle & G. John Ikenberry,eds., New Thinking in Inter-
national Relations Theory (Boulder,CO: Westview,1997).
Those interestedin realismshouldexamine The Perils of Anarchy:
ContemporaryRealism and InternationalSecurity (Cambridge,MA:
MITPress,1995) by MichaelBrown,Sean Lynn-Jones,& Steven Miller,
eds.; "Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their War Aims"
(SecurityStudies,Summer1997) by EricLabs;and "Dueling Realisms"
(International Summer1997) by Stephen Brooks.Foralter-
Organization,

44 FOREIGN POLICY

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 Walt

native realistassessmentsof contemporary worldpolitics,see John

Mearsheimer's "Backto the Future:Instabilityin Europeafterthe
Cold War"(International Summer1990) and RobertJervis'
Security,
"TheFutureof WorldPolitics:WillIt Resemblethe Past?"(Interna-
tionalSecurity,Winter1991-92).A realistexplanationof ethniccon-
flict is BarryPosen's"The SecurityDilemmaand EthnicConflict"
(Survival, Spring1993);an up-to-datesurveyof offense-defense theory
canbe foundin "TheSecurityDilemmaRevisited"byCharlesGlaser
(WorldPolitics,October 1997); and recent U.S. foreignpolicy is
explained in Michael Mastanduno's"Preserving the Unipolar
Moment:RealistTheoriesand U.S. GrandStrategyafterthe Cold
War"(International Spring1997).
Security,
The liberal approachto internationalaffairsis summarized in
AndrewMoravcsik's "Taking Preferences Seriously: A LiberalTheo-
ry of InternationalPolitics" (International Organization, Autumn
1997).Manyof the leadingcontributors to the debateon the democra-
tic peacecan be foundin Brown& Lynn-Jones, eds.,Debatingthe
DemocraticPeace (Cambridge, MA: MITPress,1996) and Miriam
Elman,ed.,Paths to Peace: Is Democracythe Answer?(Cambridge,
MA:MITPress,1997).The contributions of institutionalist
theoryand
thedebateon relativegainsaresummarized in DavidBaldwin,ed.,Neo-
realismand Neoliberalism:The Contemporary Debate (New York,
NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993).An importantcritiqueof the
institutionalist
literature
is Mearsheimer's"TheFalsePromiseof Inter-
nationalInstitutions"(Intemrnational
Security,Winter1994-95),butone
shouldalsoexaminethe responses in the Summer1995issue.Forappli-
cationsof institutionalist
theoryto NATO,seeJohnDuffield's "NATO's
Functionsafter the Cold War"(PoliticalScienceQuarterly, Winter
1994-95) and Robert McCalla's"NATO's Persistenceafterthe Cold
War"(International Summer1996).
Organization,
Authorsquestioningthe roleof the stateincludeSusanStrangein
The Retreatof the State:The Diffusionof Powerin the WorldEcon-
omy(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1996);andJessicaMath-
ews in "PowerShift" (Foreign Affairs,January/February 1997). The
emergenceof the stateis analyzed by Hendrik Spruyt in The Sovereign
Stateand Its Competitors (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,
1994), and its continued importanceis defended in Globalizationin
Question: The InternationalEconomyand the Possibilitiesof Gover-
nance (Cambridge:Polity, 1996) by Paul Hirst and GrahameThomp-

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International
Affairs

son, andGoverningthe GlobalEconomy:InternationalFinanceand

the State (Cambridge, MA:Harvard UniversityPress,1994)by Ethan
Kapstein.Anotherdefense(froma somewhatunlikelysource)is "The
WorldEconomy:The Futureof the State"(TheEconomist, Septem-
ber 20, 1997),anda moreacademicdiscussionof theseissuesis Peter
Evans'"TheEclipseof the State?Reflectionson Statenessin an Era
of Globalization" October1997).
(WorldPolitics,
Readersinterestedin constructivist approachesshouldbeginwith
AlexanderWendt's"AnarchyIs WhatStatesMakeof It: The Social
Constructionof Power Politics"(International Organization,Spring
1992), while awaitinghis Social Theory of InternationalPolitics
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,forthcoming).A diverse
arrayof culturaland constructivistapproaches mayalso be foundin
PeterKatzenstein, ed., The Cultureof NationalSecurity(New York,
NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996) and YosefLapid& Friedrich
Kratochwil, eds.,The Returnof Cultureand Identityin IR Theory
(Boulder:CO:LynneRienner,1996).
Forlinksto relevantWebsites,aswell as a comprehensive indexof
relatedarticles,accesswww.foreignpolicy.com.

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