1

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. The petitioner moved to quash
the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge. In the present petition for review on certiorari, the
petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the
Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

B. Criminal Cases: 1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

2. Violations of rental law; 3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not exceed six months
imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or
otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by
complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be
signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized
by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:

Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following
rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of law not included in the
Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)

HELD: At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act.
No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of
its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of
the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.

7 Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been conformable to
Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the
instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered
by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with
the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too
late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as
reasonably deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to
be corrected. Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its
alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of
Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30,
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1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of
the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had
already prescribed. WHEREFORE, the petition

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, MANUEL S.
jdhldshaRECTO, RENE S. VILLARICA, PELAGIO RICALDE, ANTONIO REINA, FRANCISCO ANONUEVO, JOSEPH SY and
SANTIAGO TANCHAN, JR., respondents.
FACTS: The Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with GHB (Ganda Holdings Berhad). Under
said memorandum of agreement, IRC acquired 100% of the entire capital stock of GEHI (Ganda Energy Holdings Inc.) which
would own and operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine power generating barge. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the
expanded capital stock of IRC. On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital of PRCI (Philippine Racing Club).
- It is alleged herein that a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent to the Philippine Stock
Exchange through facsimile and the SEC, but the facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it. However, the SEC
received reports that the IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its
directors, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information. For this reason, the SEC required the directors
to appear before the SEC to explain the alleged failure to disclose material information as required by the Rules on
Disclosure of Material Facts. Unsatisfied with the explanation, the SEC issued an order finding that the IRC violated the
Rules in connection with the then Old Securities Act when it failed to make timely disclosures of its negotiations with GHB.
In addition, the SEC found that the directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of the Revised
Securities Act.
- Respondents, however, questioned the authority of the SEC to investigate on said matter since according to PD 902-A,
jurisdiction upon the matter was conferred upon the PED (Prosecution and Enforcement Department) of the SEC –
however, this issue is already moot since pending the disposition of the case, the Securities Regulation Code was passed
thereby effectively repealing PD 902-A and abolishing the PED.
They also contended that their right to due process was violated when the SEC required them to appear before the SEC to
show cause why sanctions should not be imposed upon them since such requirement shifted the burden of proof to
respondents. The case reached the CA and said court ruled in favor of the respondents and effectively enjoined the SEC
from filing any criminal, civil or administrative cases against respondents. In its resolution, the CA stated that since there are
no rules and regulations implementing the rules regarding DISCLOSURE, INSIDER TRADING OR ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF
THE REVISED SECURITIES ACT, the SEC has no statutory authority to file any suit against respondents. The CA, therefore,
prohibited the SEC from taking cognizance or initiating any action against the respondents for the alleged violations of the
Revised Securities Act.

HELD:

Respondents have taken the position that this case is moot and academic, since any criminal complaint that may be filed
against them resulting from the SEC's investigation of this case has already prescribed. They point out that the prescription
period applicable to offenses punished under special laws, such as violations of the Revised Securities Act, is twelve years
under Section 1 of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and Act No. 3763, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin
to Act." Since the offense was committed in 1994, they reasoned that prescription set in as early as 2006 and rendered this
case moot. Such position, however, is incongruent with the factual circumstances of this case, as well as the applicable laws
and jurisprudence.

It is an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts the prescription period.

A preliminary investigation is essentially a determination whether an offense has been committed, and whether there is
probable cause for the accused to have committed an offense:
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare the complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on
the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed or whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.

Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is entitled Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses, the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to "make such investigations as it deems necessary to determine
whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this Act XXX." After a finding that a person has
 3

violated the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution
While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and entails substantially similar duties as the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot simply be disregarded.

In Baviera v. Paglinawan, this Court enunciated that a criminal complaint is first filed with the SEC, which determines the
existence of probable cause, before a preliminary investigation can be commenced by the DOJ. In the aforecited case, the
complaint filed directly with the DOJ was dismissed on the ground that it should have been filed first with the SEC. Similarly,
the offense was a violation of the Securities Regulations Code, wherein the procedure for criminal prosecution was
reproduced from Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act This Court affirmed the dismissal, which it explained thus:

The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule administered
by the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If the Commission finds that there is probable cause, then it should refer the
case to the DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural requirement, the DOJ did not gravely abuse
its discretion in dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229.

A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to
an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not
determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a special law.

Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing
rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the
complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted.

We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his criminal
complaint directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the DOJ in dismissing petitioner's
complaint.
The said case puts in perspective the nature of the investigation undertaken by the SEC, which is a requisite before a
criminal case may be referred to the DOJ. The Court declared that it is imperative that the criminal prosecution be initiated
before the SEC, the administrative agency with the special competence.
It should be noted that the SEC started investigative proceedings against the respondents as early as 1994. This
investigation effectively interrupted the prescription period. However, said proceedings were disrupted by a preliminary
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on 5 May 1995, which effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil, or
administrative case against the respondents herein.79 Thereafter, on 20 August 1998, the appellate court issued the
assailed Decision in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 37036 ordering that the writ of injunction be made permanent and prohibiting the SEC
from taking cognizance of and initiating any action against herein respondents. The SEC was bound to comply with the
aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction and writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining it from
continuing with the investigation of respondents for 12 years. Any deviation by the SEC from the injunctive writs would be
sufficient ground for contempt. Moreover, any step the SEC takes in defiance of such orders will be considered void for
having been taken against an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.

An investigation of the case by any other administrative or judicial body would likewise be impossible pending the
injunctive writs issued by the Court of Appeals. Given the ruling of this Court in Baviera v. Paglinawan,80 the DOJ itself
could not have taken cognizance of the case and conducted its preliminary investigation without a prior determination of
probable cause by the SEC. Thus, even presuming that the DOJ was not enjoined by the Court of Appeals from conducting a
preliminary investigation, any preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ would have been a futile effort since the SEC
had only started with its investigation when respondents themselves applied for and were granted an injunction by the
Court of Appeals.
Moreover, the DOJ could not have conducted a preliminary investigation or filed a criminal case against the respondents
during the time that issues on the effectivity of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act and the PED Rules of
Practice and Procedure were still pending before the Court of Appeals. After the Court of Appeals declared the
aforementioned statutory and regulatory provisions invalid and, thus, no civil, criminal or administrative case may be filed
against the respondents for violations thereof, the DOJ would have been at a loss, as there was no statutory provision
which respondents could be accused of violating.
 4

Accordingly, it is only after this Court corrects the erroneous ruling of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 20 August
1998 that either the SEC or DOJ may properly conduct any kind of investigation against the respondents for violations of
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Until then, the prescription period is deemed interrupted.

To reiterate, the SEC must first conduct its investigations and make a finding of probable cause in accordance with the
doctrine pronounced in Baviera v. Paglinawan.81 In this case, the DOJ was precluded from initiating a preliminary
investigation since the SEC was halted by the Court of Appeals from continuing with its investigation. Such a situation leaves
the prosecution of the case at a standstill, and neither the SEC nor the DOJ can conduct any investigation against the
respondents, who, in the first place, sought the injunction to prevent their prosecution. All that the SEC could do in order to
break the impasse was to have the Decision of the Court of Appeals overturned, as it had done at the earliest opportunity in
this case. Therefore, the period during which the SEC was prevented from continuing with its investigation should not be
counted against it.
The law on the prescription period was never intended to put the prosecuting bodies in an impossible bind in which the
prosecution of a case would be placed way beyond their control; for even if they avail themselves of the proper remedy,
they would still be barred from investigating and prosecuting the case.

Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by commencing the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused. In
criminal cases, this is accomplished by initiating the preliminary investigation. The prosecution of offenses punishable under
the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint with the SEC or by an
investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio. Only after a finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ
instigate a preliminary investigation. Thus, the investigation that was commenced by the SEC in 1995, soon after it
discovered the questionable acts of the respondents, effectively interrupted the prescription period. Given the nature and
purpose of the investigation conducted by the SEC, which is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ in criminal cases, such investigation would surely interrupt the prescription period.

SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED, petitioner, vs. EDGAR C. LIM, doing business as ORIGNAMURA TRADING, respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese corporation, owns the copyright of various animated characters such
as "Hello Kitty," "Little Twin Stars," "My Melody," "Tuxedo Sam" and "Zashikibuta" among others.4 While it is not engaged
in business in the Philippines, its products are sold locally by its exclusive distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated (GGI).
As such exclusive distributor, GGI entered into licensing agreements with JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line
Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation. These local entities were allowed to manufacture certain
products (bearing petitioner's copyrighted animated characters) for the local market
Sometime in 2001, due to the deluge of counterfeit Sanrio products, GGI asked IP Manila Associates (IPMA) to conduct a
market research. The research's objective was to identify those factories, department stores and retail outlets
manufacturing and/or selling fake Sanrio items.7

After conducting several test-buys in various commercial areas, IPMA confirmed that respondent's Orignamura Trading in
Tutuban Center, Manila was selling imitations of petitioner's products Consequently, on May 29, 2000, IPMA agents Lea A.
Carmona and Arnel P. Dausan executed a joint affidavit attesting to the aforementioned facts.9 IPMA forwarded the said
affidavit to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of a search
warrant in the office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.10

After conducting the requisite searching inquiry, the executive judge issued a search warrant on May 30, 2000.11 On the
same day, agents of the NBI searched the premises of Orignamura Trading. As a result thereof, they were able to seize
various Sanrio products.

On April 4, 2002, petitioner, through its attorney-in-fact Teodoro Y. Kalaw IV of the Quisumbing Torres law firm, filed a
complaint-affidavit13 with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
against respondent for violation of Section 217 (in relation to Sections 17714 and 17815) of the Intellectual Property Code
(IPC) which states:
Respondent asserted in his counter-affidavit16 that he committed no violation of the provisions of the IPC because he was
only a retailer.17 Respondent neither reproduced nor manufactured any of petitioner's copyrighted item; thus, he did not
transgress the economic rights of petitioner.18 Moreover, he obtained his merchandise from authorized manufacturers of
petitioner's products.19
On September 25, 2002, the TAPP found that:
 5

Evidence on record would show that respondent bought his merchandise from legitimate sources, as shown by official
receipts issued by JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation. In
fact, in her letter dated May 23, 2002, Ms. Ma. Angela S. Garcia certified that JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line
Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation are authorized to produce certain Sanrio products. While it
appears that some of the items seized during the search are not among those products which [GGI] authorized these
establishments to produce, the fact remains that respondent bought these from the abovecited legitimate sources.
Thus, in a resolution dated September 25, 2002, it dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.22 Hence, it filed a petition for review in the Office of the Chief
State Prosecutor of the DOJ.23 In a resolution dated August 29, 2003,24 the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor affirmed
the TAPP resolution. The petition was dismissed for lack of reversible error.
Thus, in a resolution dated September 25, 2002, it dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence.21

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.22 Hence, it filed a petition for review in the Office of the Chief
State Prosecutor of the DOJ.23 In a resolution dated August 29, 2003,24 the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor affirmed
the TAPP resolution

The petition was dismissed for lack of reversible error.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. On May 3, 2005, the appellate court dismissed the petition on
the ground of prescription. It based its action on Act 3326 which states:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules:

(a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both;
(b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years;
(c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and
(d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason,
which shall prescribe after twenty years; Provided, however, That all offenses against any law or part of law administered by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall prescribe after five years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe
after two months.

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same may
not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. (emphasis supplied)
According to the CA, because no complaint was filed in court within two years after the commission of the alleged violation,
the offense had already prescribed.25
On the merits of the case, the CA concluded that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for review.
HELD: Filing Of The Complaint In the DOJ Tolled The Prescriptive Period
Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special laws starts on the day such offense was
committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings against respondent (i.e., the accused).

Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit on April 4, 2002 or one year, ten months and four days after the NBI
searched respondent's premises and seized Sanrio merchandise therefrom. Although no information was immediately filed
in court, respondent's alleged violation had not yet prescribed.
In the recent case of Brillantes v. Court of Appeals, we affirmed that the filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility.32 Thus, the prescriptive period for the
prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by petitioner's timely filing of the complaint-affidavit before the
TAPP.

In The Absence Of Grave Abuse Of Discretion, The Factual Findings Of The DOJ In Preliminary Investigations Will Not Be
Disturbed
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In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.33 Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. Because a public prosecutor is the one conducting a preliminary investigation, he determines the
existence of probable cause. consequently, the decision to file a criminal information in court or to dismiss a complaint
depends on his sound discretion.

As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
For this reason, courts generally do not interfere with the results of such proceedings. A prosecutor alone determines the
sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information against the
respondent. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly established that the
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise stated, such review is appropriate only when the prosecutor
has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, patent and gross enough to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law.
The prosecutors in this case consistently found that no probable cause existed against respondent for violation of the IPC.
They were in the best position to determine whether or not there was probable cause. We find that they arrived at their
findings after carefully evaluating the respective evidence of petitioner and respondent. Their conclusion was not tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI,
respondents
FACTS: Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. Cawili and his
business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said
loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on
18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner
made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995,
but to no avail.

Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongso for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) Prosecutor's
Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. Tongson claimed that he
had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal
capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was Offered to
be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed
several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and
pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.

To counter these allegations, Panaguiton presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were
purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein
Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and
dismissed the charges against Tongson. Panaguiton filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while
the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was
possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings
submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.

Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring
the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had
already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall
prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20
January 1993 and 18 March 1993.
 7

The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993
to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief
State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor.Finally,
ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner Petitioner appealed to the DOJ.

But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April
2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that
the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.

HELD: Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in
declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is
applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's
office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case
similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, petitioner notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would
result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control.
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts
and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws
which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4
December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the
phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule
at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of
the offense is halted.

The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December
1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices
of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,is that the
prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation
inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.

These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao that the first step taken in the investigation or
examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense.46
Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations
already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, and hence, the prescriptive period should be
interrupted.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court
ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,

the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period. Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the
injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.55 A clear example would
be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive
period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges
againstTongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods.
 8

However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to
the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was
beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995,
only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved
parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay
and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

MANUEL V. BAVIERA, Petitioner, vs. ESPERANZA PAGLINAWAN

Before us are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorariassailing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 873281 and in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078.2

The common factual antecedents of these cases as shown by the records are:

Manuel Baviera, petitioner in these cases, was the former head of the HR Service Delivery and Industrial Relations of
Standard Chartered Bank-Philippines (SCB), one of herein respondents. SCB is a foreign banking corporation duly licensed to
engage in banking, trust, and other fiduciary business in the Philippines. Pursuant to Resolution No. 1142 dated December
3, 1992 of the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), the conduct of SCB's business in this jurisdiction is
subject to the following conditions:

1. At the end of a one-year period from the date the SCB starts its trust functions, at least 25% of its trust accounts must be
for the account of non-residents of the Philippines and that actual foreign exchange had been remitted into the Philippines
to fund such accounts or that the establishment of such accounts had reduced the indebtedness of residents (individuals or
corporations or government agencies) of the Philippines to non-residents. At the end of the second year, the above ratio
shall be 50%, which ratio must be observed continuously thereafter;

2. The trust operations of SCB shall be subject to all existing laws, rules and regulations applicable to trust services,
particularly the creation of a Trust Committee; andcralawlibrary

3. The bank shall inform the appropriate supervising and examining department of the BSP at the start of its operations.

Apparently, SCB did not comply with the above conditions. Instead, as early as 1996, it acted as a stock broker, soliciting
from local residents foreign securities called "GLOBAL THIRD PARTY MUTUAL FUNDS" (GTPMF), denominated in US dollars.
These securities were not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These were then remitted
outwardly to SCB-Hong Kong and SCB-Singapore.

SCB's counsel, Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc and Delos Angeles Law Office, advised the bank to proceed with the
selling of the foreign securities although unregistered with the SEC, under the guise of a "custodianship agreement;" and
should it be questioned, it shall invoke Section 723 of the General Banking Act (Republic Act No.337).4 In sum, SCB was able
to sell GTPMF securities worth around P6 billion to some 645 investors.

However, SCB's operations did not remain unchallenged. On July 18, 1997, the Investment Capital Association of the
Philippines (ICAP) filed with the SEC a complaint alleging that SCB violated the Revised Securities Act,5 particularly the
provision prohibiting the selling of securities without prior registration with the SEC; and that its actions are potentially
damaging to the local mutual fund industry.

In its answer, SCB denied offering and selling securities, contending that it has been performing a "purely informational
function" without solicitations for any of its investment outlets abroad; that it has a trust license and the services it renders
under the "Custodianship Agreement" for offshore investments are authorized by Section 72 6 of the General Banking Act;
that its clients were the ones who took the initiative to invest in securities; and it has been acting merely as an agent or
"passive order taker" for them.

On September 2, 1997, the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order against SCB, holding that its services violated Sections
4(a)7 and 198of the Revised Securities Act.
 9

Meantime, the SEC indorsed ICAP's complaint and its supporting documents to the BSP.

On October 31, 1997, the SEC informed the Secretary of Finance that it withdrew GTPMF securities from the market and
that it will not sell the same without the necessary clearances from the regulatory authorities.

Meanwhile, on August 17, 1998, the BSP directed SCB not to include investments in global mutual funds issued abroad in its
trust investments portfolio without prior registration with the SEC.

On August 31, 1998, SCB sent a letter to the BSP confirming that it will withdraw third-party fund products which could be
directly purchased by investors.

However, notwithstanding its commitment and the BSP directive, SCB continued to offer and sell GTPMF securities in this
country. This prompted petitioner to enter into an Investment Trust Agreement with SCB wherein he purchased
US$8,000.00 worth of securities upon the bank's promise of 40% return on his investment and a guarantee that his money
is safe. After six (6) months, however, petitioner learned that the value of his investment went down to US$7,000.00. He
tried to withdraw his investment but was persuaded by Antonette de los Reyes of SCB to hold on to it for another six (6)
months in view of the possibility that the market would pick up.

Meanwhile, on November 27, 2000, the BSP found that SCB failed to comply with its directive of August 17, 1998.
Consequently, it was fined in the amount of P30,000.00.

The trend in the securities market, however, was bearish and the worth of petitioner's investment went down further to
only US$3,000.00.

On October 26, 2001, petitioner learned from Marivel Gonzales, head of the SCB Legal and Compliance Department, that
the latter had been prohibited by the BSP to sell GPTMF securities. Petitioner then filed with the BSP a letter-complaint
demanding compensation for his lost investment. But SCB denied his demand on the ground that his investment is
"regular."

On July 15, 2003, petitioner filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ), represented herein by its prosecutors, public
respondents, a complaint charging the above-named officers and members of the SCB Board of Directors and other SCB
officials, private respondents, with syndicated estafa, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1059.

For their part, private respondents filed the following as counter-charges against petitioner: (1) blackmail and extortion,
docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1059-A; and blackmail and perjury, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1278.

On September 29, 2003, petitioner also filed a complaint for perjury against private respondents Paul Simon Morris and
Marivel Gonzales, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1278-A.

On December 4, 2003, the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order against SCB restraining it from further offering, soliciting, or
otherwise selling its securities to the public until these have been registered with the SEC.

Subsequently, the SEC and SCB reached an amicable settlement.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

On January 20, 2004, the SEC lifted its Cease and Desist Order and approved the P7 million settlement offered by SCB.
Thereupon, SCB made a commitment not to offer or sell securities without prior compliance with the requirements of the
SEC.

On February 7, 2004, petitioner filed with the DOJ a complaint for violation of Section 8.1 9 of the Securities Regulation Code
against private respondents, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-229.

On February 23, 2004, the DOJ rendered its Joint Resolution 10dismissing petitioner's complaint for syndicated estafa in I.S.
No. 2003-1059; private respondents' complaint for blackmail and extortion in I.S. No. 2003-1059-A; private respondents'
complaint for blackmail and perjury in I.S. No. 2003-1278; and petitioner's complaint for perjury against private
respondents Morris and Gonzales in I.S. No. 2003-1278-A.
 10

Meanwhile, in a Resolution11 dated April 4, 2004, the DOJ dismissed petitioner's complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229 (violation of
Securities Regulation Code), holding that it should have been filed with the SEC.

Petitioner's motions to dismiss his complaints were denied by the DOJ. Thus, he filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85078. He alleged that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing his complaint for syndicated estafa.

He also filed with the Court of Appeals a separate petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ Resolution dismissing I.S. No.
2004-229 for violation of the Securities Regulation Code. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87328. Petitioner
claimed that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the
complaint should have been filed with the SEC.

On January 7, 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing the petition.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

It sustained the ruling of the DOJ that the case should have been filed initially with the SEC.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated May 27, 2005.

Meanwhile, on February 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078 (involving petitioner's
charges and respondents' counter charges) dismissing the petition on the ground that the purpose of a petition
for certiorari is not to evaluate and weigh the parties' evidence but to determine whether the assailed Resolution of the
DOJ was issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Again, petitioner moved for a
reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution of November 22, 2005.

Hence, the instant Petitions for Review on Certiorari .

For our resolution is the fundamental issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the DOJ did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's complaint in I.S. 2004-229 for violation of Securities Regulation
Code and his complaint in I.S. No. 2003-1059 for syndicated estafa.

[G.R. No 168380

Re: I.S. No. 2004-229

For violation of the Securities Regulation Code

Section 53.1 of the Securities Regulation Code provides:

SEC. 53. Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses. -

53. 1. The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigation as it deems necessary to determine whether any
person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this Code, any rule, regulation or order thereunder, or any rule of
an Exchange, registered securities association, clearing agency, other self-regulatory organization, and may require or
permit any person to file with it a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise, as the Commission shall determine, as to
all facts and circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated. The Commission may publish information concerning
any such violations and to investigate any fact, condition, practice or matter which it may deem necessary or proper to aid
in the enforcement of the provisions of this Code, in the prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in securing
information to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation concerning the matters to which this Code
relates: Provided, however, That any person requested or subpoenaed to produce documents or testify in any investigation
shall simultaneously be notified in writing of the purpose of such investigation: Provided, further, That all criminal
complaints for violations of this Code and the implementing rules and regulations enforced or administered by the
Commission shall be referred to the Department of Justice for preliminary investigation and prosecution before the
proper court: Provided, furthermore, That in instances where the law allows independent civil or criminal proceedings of
violations arising from the act, the Commission shall take appropriate action to implement the same: Provided, finally; That
the investigation, prosecution, and trial of such cases shall be given priority.
 11

The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule administered
by the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If the Commission finds that there is probable cause, then it should refer the
case to the DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural requirement, the DOJ did not gravely abuse
its discretion in dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229.

A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to
an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not
determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. 12 The Securities Regulation Code is a special
law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its
implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall
indorse the complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted.

We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his criminal
complaint directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the DOJ in dismissing petitioner's
complaint.

[G.R. NO. 170602

Re: I.S. No. 2003-1059 for

Syndicated Estafa

Section 5, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that all criminal actions, commenced by
either a complaint or an information, shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. This
mandate is founded on the theory that a crime is a breach of the security and peace of the people at large, an outrage
against the very sovereignty of the State. It follows that a representative of the State shall direct and control the
prosecution of the offense.13 This representative of the State is the public prosecutor, whom this Court described in the old
case of Suarez v. Platon,14 as:

[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense a servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffers.

Concomitant with his authority and power to control the prosecution of criminal offenses, the public prosecutor is vested
with the discretionary power to determine whether a prima facie case exists or not.15 This is done through a preliminary
investigation designed to secure the respondent from hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary
investigation is essentially an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is
probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof. 16 In Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman,17 probable cause is defined as
such facts and circumstances that would engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It is the public prosecutor who determines during the
preliminary investigation whether probable cause exists. Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal
complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor.

Given this latitude and authority granted by law to the investigating prosecutor, the rule in this jurisdiction is that courts
will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations or in the determination of what
constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an offender. 18 Courts are not
empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch. 19Differently stated, as the matter of
whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the
corresponding information, upon a complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of
an action in court. In sum, the prosecutor's findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the
courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion. 20
 12

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned
which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be as patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 21

In determining whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion, it is expedient to know if the findings of fact of
herein public prosecutors were reached in an arbitrary or despotic manner.

The Court of Appeals held that petitioner's evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause for syndicated estafa. There
is no showing from the record that private respondents herein did induce petitioner by false representations to invest in
the GTPMF securities. Nor did they act as a syndicate to misappropriate his money for their own benefit. Rather, they
invested it in accordance with his written instructions. That he lost his investment is not their fault since it was highly
speculative.

Records show that public respondents examined petitioner's evidence with care, well aware of their duty to prevent
material damage to his constitutional right to liberty and fair play. In Suarez previously cited, this Court made it clear that a
public prosecutor's duty is two-fold. On one hand, he is bound by his oath of office to prosecute persons where the
complainant's evidence is ample and sufficient to show prima facie guilt of a crime. Yet, on the other hand, he is likewise
duty-bound to protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or malicious prosecution. 22

Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the Petition for Review against private respondents and
in concluding that the DOJ did not act with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On petitioner's complaint for violation of the Securities Regulation Code, suffice it to state that, as aptly declared by the
Court of Appeals, he should have filed it with the SEC, not the DOJ. Again, there is no indication here that in dismissing
petitioner's complaint, the DOJ acted capriciously or arbitrarily.

SR. FIDELIS ARAMBULO, Petitioner, v. HON. HILARION LAQUI, SR. HELEN OJARIO and SR. BERNADINE JUAREZ,
Respondent

FACTS: "On February 2, 1994, . HELEN OJARIO and SR. BERNADINE JUAREZ filed a joint complaint-affidavit for libel against
Arambolo before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City alleging that the latter circulated on December 21, 1993 a
letter containing malicious imputations against them. An information for libel then was filed before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City on May 18, 1994. After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to
Evidence. Without resolving the incident, the Metropolitan Trial Court in its Order dated November 9, 1996 ruled that it had
no jurisdiction over the case as the same falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, and
ordered that the case be forwarded to the RTC for further proceedings. On November 29, 1996, the case was forwarded to
Branch 215 Regional Trial Court of Quezon City docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-6870. On January 3, 1997, petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription of the offense of Libel. The RTC dismissed the case
in an Order dated April 2, 1997 but, stating that the offense had not yet prescribed, ordered the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City to re-file the Information for Libel with the RTC. On April 27, 1997, the Information for Libel was re-filed with
respondent court docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-97-70948. On June 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the
ground of prescription. The motion was denied in the assailed Resolution dated October 3,1997. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied in the other Assailed Order dated December 4, 1997."

Not satisfied with the Resolution and Order of the trial court, Arambulo appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue
of "whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion or grossly erred in holding that the offense of
libel in the instant case has not yet prescribed." The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated March 01, 1999, upheld the
contention of the trial court that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed and consequently, dismissed the said petition.
The appellate court likewise denied herein petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated May 11, 1999.

HELD: Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of libel prescribes in one (1) year, to

ART. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in
twenty years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years. Those punishable by a
 13

correctional penalty shall prescribe in 10 years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall
prescribe in five years. The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year." (Emphasis supplied) The said
prescriptive period is computed under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:

"Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of
the complaint or information, and shall proceed to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not
run when the offender is absent from the Philippines.
In the landmark case of People v. Olarte, this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, finally resolved the then
conflicting views as to whether or not the filing of a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period for the crime.

The Court restated the correct and prevailing doctrine, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "In view of this diversity of
precedents, and in order to provide guidance for the Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after
mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the
decisions holding that the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on the merits.

Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period
of prescription ‘shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information’ without distinguishing whether the
complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even
if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already
represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender.

Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. And
it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription ‘shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted’, thereby indicating that the court in which the
complaint or information is filed must have the power to convict or acquit the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits
usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation
where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused because no
prima facie case had been shown

Subsequently, this Court, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 19 broadened the scope of Olarte by holding that the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal’s office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner insists that the ruling in
Olarte with respect to the interruption of the prescriptive period is not applicable. In the case at bench, the fact that the
period of prescription was interrupted by the filing of private respondents’ joint affidavit with the Quezon City Prosecutor’s
Office is not disputed. The Olarte case, however, makes several other pronouncements that are determinative of the issues
raised by petitioner. It is clear from the Olarte case that the filing of the complaint or information for purposes of
preliminary investigation represents the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. This is one of the reasons why
such filing is deemed as having interrupted the period of prescription for the prosecution of a crime. This period of
prescription commences to run again when the proceedings terminate without conviction or acquittal, "if the court (or
prosecutor) should discharge the accused because no prima facie case has been shown."

It is thus evident that petitioner’s first premise that the period of prescription commenced to run again when the Quezon
City Prosecutor’s Office recommended the filing of a criminal complaint against her is incorrect. When the City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of libel charges against petitioner, the proceedings against her were not terminated, precisely
because a prima facie case for libel was found against her. Instead of terminating the proceedings against petitioner, the
resolution of the city prosecutor actually directed the continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner by the filing of
the appropriate information against her and by the holding of trial on the merits. As such, when the information for libel
was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, the period of prescription for the crime was still suspended. Another important
teaching in Olarte is that "it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control." This is because in criminal prosecutions, the only thing that the victim of the offense may do on
his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. In the case at bench, private respondents were not
 14

remiss in their right to seek grievance against respondent as they filed their complaint before the city prosecutor forty-two
days after the alleged crime of libel occurred.

It was the Office of the City Prosecutor that committed an error when it filed the complaint with the Metropolitan Trial
Court. The error was probably due to the confusion as to the proper venue for the crime of libel brought about by the
passage of R.A. 7691 21 which took effect on April 15, 1994. Under Section 2 of the said Republic Act, the jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded to include all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years. However, libel, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging
from six months and one day to four years 22 is not covered as the said law excludes from its coverage cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. 23 Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the information for libel
should be filed with the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. The confusion was cleared up when this Court
issued Administrative Order No. 104-96 dated October 21, 1996 which categorically stated that "LIBEL CASES SHALL BE
TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CLEMENTE BAUTISTA, Respondent.

FACTS: On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and
private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangayof Malate, Manila, but no settlement was reached.
The barangaychairman then issued a Certification to file action dated August 11, 1999.
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical
injuries against herein respondent and his co-accused. After conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica
Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution recommending the filing of an Information against herein respondent. Such
recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but
the date of such approval cannot be found in the records. The Information was, however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the time the Information was filed, the 60-
day period of prescription from the date of the commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed. The
MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari, but the RTC denied said petition and concurred with
the opinion of the MeTC.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On June 22, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision wherein it held
that, indeed, the 60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint with the OCP of
Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had prescribed by the time the Information
was filed with the MeTC, reasoning as follows:
In the case on hand, although the approval of the Joint Resolution of ACP Junsay-Ong bears no date, it effectively
terminated the proceedings at the OCP. Hence, even if the 10-day period for the CP or ACP Sulla, his designated alter ego,
to act on the resolution is extended up to the utmost limit, it ought not have been taken as late as the last day of the year
1999. Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC only on June 20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months into the next
year. To use once again the language of Article 91 of the RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was "unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him (the accused)" for a time very much more than the prescriptive period of only two (2)
months. The offense charged had, therefore, already prescribed when filed with the court on June 20, 2000. x x x 3(Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the foregoing CA Decision.
HELDD: The Court finds merit in the petition.
It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively interrupted the running of the 60-day prescriptive
period for instituting the criminal action for slight physical injuries. However, the sole issue for resolution in this case is
whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutor's recommendation to file the proper
criminal information against respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor.
The answer is in the negative.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
 15

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philipppine Archipelago. The CA and
respondent are of the view that upon approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of an
information against respondent, the period of prescription began to run again. The Court does not agree. It is a well-settled
rule that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating
prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the
time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or
acquitted by the proper court.
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such mistake or negligence should
not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte,it is unjust to deprive the
injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the
offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by the petitioner in the present petition
considering that the delay occurred not in the conduct of preliminary investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the
Information after the City Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to file the
information.
The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the delay in the filing of the information. The Court
will not be made as an unwitting tool in the deprivation of the right of the offended party to vindicate a wrong purportedly
inflicted on him by the mere expediency of a prosecutor not filing the proper information in due time.
BROCKA vs Enrile
192 SCRA 183

FACTS: This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the release of petitioners on habeas corpus and to
permanently enjoin the City Fiscal of Quezon City from investigating charges of "Inciting to Sedition" against petitioners
Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos, (hereafter Brocka, et al.). On learning that the
corresponding informations for this offense has been filed by the City Fiscal against them on February 11, 1985, a
supplemental petition was filed on February 19, 1985 (p. 51, Rollo) to implead the Presiding Judge, 1 and to enjoin the
prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo) and the issuance of warrants for their
arrests, including their arraignment. Since then President Ferdinand E. Marcos had ordered the provisional release of
Brocka, et al., the issue on habeas corpus has become moot and academic. We shall thus focus on the question of whether
or not the prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to Sedition may lawfully be enjoined.
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police District following the forcible and violent
dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport
Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly.
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was
recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was
ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held.
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al. remained in detention, respondents
having invoked a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985 . Neither the
original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them.
Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to Sedition, without prior notice to their
counsel. The original informations filed recommended no bail The circumstances surrounding the hasty filing of this second
offense are cited by Brocka, et al.
"6. The sham' character of the inquest examination concocted by all respondents is starkly bizarre when we consider that as
early as 10:30 A.M. today, February 11, 1985, Benjamin Cervantes was able to contact undersigned petitioner by phone
informing counsel that said Benjamin Cervantes and the 4 other persons who are the subjects of this petition will be
brought before the Quezon City Fiscal at 2:30 for undisclosed reasons: subsequently, another phone call was received by
petitioning counsel informing him that the appearance of Benjamin Cervantes et al. was to be at 2:00 P.M. When
petitioning counsel arrived in the office of Assistant City Fiscal Arturo Tugonon, the complainants' affidavits had not yet
been received by any of the panel of three assistant city fiscals, although the five persons under detention were already in
the office of said assistant fiscal as early as 2:00 P.M. It was only at 3:00 when a representative of the military arrived
bringing with him alleged statements of complainants against Lino Broka (sic) et al. for alleged inciting to sedition,
whereupon undersigned counsel asked respondent Colonel Agapito Abad 'who ordered the detained persons to be brought
to the office of Assistant Fiscal Arturo Tugonon since there were no charges on file;' and said Colonel Agapito Abad said
aloud: 'I only received a telephone call from Colonel Arzaga about 11:00 A.M. to bring the detained persons today — I am
 16

only the custodian.' At 3:15, petitioning counsel inquired from the Records Custodian when the charges against Lino Broka
(sic) had been officially received and he was informed that the said charges were never coursed through the Records Office.
"7. Under the facts narrated above, respondents have conspired to use the strong arm of the law and hatched the nefarious
scheme to deprive Lino Broka (sic) et al. the right to bail because the utterances allegedly constituting inciting to sedition
under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are, except for varying nuances, almost verbatim the same utterances which
are the subject of and for which said detained persons are entitled to be released on bail as a matter of constitutional right.
Among the utterances allegedly made by the accused and which the respondents claimed to be violative of Article 142 of
the Revised Penal Code are: 'Makiisa sa mga drivers, "Makiisa sa aming layunin, "Digmaang bayan ang sagot sa kahirapan,'
Itigil ang pakikialam ng imperyalismo sa Pilipinas,' 'Rollback ng presyo ng langis sa 95 Centavos.' (See Annex B)
"8. That when petitioning counsel and other members of the defense panel requested that they be given 7 days within
which said counsel may confer with their clients — the detained persons named above, the panel of assistant fiscals
demanded that said detained persons should sign a 'waiver' of their rights under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a
condition for the grant of said request, which is a harassing requirement considering that Lino Broka (sic) et al. were already
under the detention, albeit illegally, and they could not have waived the right under Rule 125 which they did not enjoy at
the time the ruling was made by the panel of assistant city fiscals." (pp. 4-6, Rollo in G.R. 69848-50).
They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then President F. E. Marcos. The circumstances of their
release are narrated in Our resolution dated January 26, 1985, as quoted in the Solicitor General's Manifestation as follows:
"G.R. Nos. 69848-50 (Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, Petitioner, vs. Col. Julian Arzaga, et al., Respondents). — Petitioner Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez filed this petition for habeas corpus in behalf of Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia, Alexander
Luzano, and Rodolfo Santos, who were all detained under a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on January 28, 1985. They were charged in three separate informations of the crime of illegal assembly
under Art. 146, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1834. On February 7, 1985, the Honorable
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Regional Trial Judge of Quezon City, issued a resolution in the above criminal cases, directing the
release of the five accused on bail of P6,000.00 for each of them, and from which resolution the respondent fiscals took no
appeal. Immediately thereafter, the accused filed their respective bail bonds. This notwithstanding, they continued to be
held in detention by order of the respondent colonels; and on February 11, 1985, these same accused were 'reinvestigated,'
this time on charges of 'inciting to sedition' ** under Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code, following which corresponding
cases were filed. The respondents complied with Our resolution requiring them, inter alia, to make a RETURN of the writ of
habeas corpus. In their RETURN, it appeared that all the accused had already been released, four of them on February 15,
1985 and one February 8, 1985. The petitioner, nevertheless, argued that the petition has not become moot and academic
because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition." (p. 395, Rollo).
Hence, this petition.
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient bases for enjoining their
criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one
and the same act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while there may be a
complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing
two informations therefor, further, that they will be placed in double jeopardy.
The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case, since the two other issues raised by
Brocka, et al. are matters of defense against the sedition charge.
We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second offense of inciting to sedition.
HELD:
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.
There are however exceptions, among which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January
25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et
al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA
607);
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
 17

"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited
in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf, Guingona, et al vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128
SCRA 577); and
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied
(Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
"7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners
(Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1958)." (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the criminal proceedings had become a
case of persecution, having been undertaken by state officials in bad faith.
Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s release from detention (before their release
on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This PDA was, however, issued on January 28, 1985, but was invoked only on February 9,
1985 (upon receipt of the trial court's order of release). Under the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours
(in Metro Manila) or 48 hours (outside Metro Manila). (Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 28, 1985, 139 SCRA 349).
Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its production, the prosecution merely presented a
purported xerox copy of the invoked PDA (par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder, p. 367, Rollo).
The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor General's office. In fact they found petitioner's plight
"deplorable" (par. 51, Manifestation, p. 396, Rollo).
The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and inoperational PDA, certainly betrays respondent's bad
faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al.
We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that "individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished
with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the
PDA, at the time of the apprehension" (supra, p. 369).
We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public official's prosecution of criminal offenders. We, however,
believe that this should not be a license to run roughshod over a citizen's basic constitutional lights, such as due process, or
manipulate the law to suit dictatorial tendencies.
We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness against the awesome powers of a dictatorship. Thus, while We agree
with the Solicitor General's observation and/or manifestation that Brocka, et al. should have filed a motion to quash the
information, We, however, believe that such a course of action would have been a futile move, considering the
circumstances then prevailing. Thus, the tenacious invocation of a spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty
preliminary investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the
second offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew.
As a matter of fact the corresponding informations for this second offense were hastily filed on February 11, 1985, or two
days after Brocka, et al.'s release from detention was ordered by the trial judge on February 9, 1985.
Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this gesture is the true sign of democracy. These may not be set aside
to satisfy perceived illusory visions of national grandeur.: nad
In the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Paño, We point out:
"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's
right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution . . ."
(G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438-at p. 448).
We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges, as in the instant
case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed, and where
a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.
JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,
vs.
 18

HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII (Quezon City), HON. JUDGE
RODOLFO ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI (Quezon City) CITY FISCAL SERGIO
APOSTOL of Quezon City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN MADELLA, respondents.

The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging
that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner
asks this Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and
persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The background of this case is a matter of public knowledge.
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On
September 6, 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost
killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the
YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken
sometime in May, 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los
Angeles suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group
pictures together with other guests, including Lovely.
As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical
Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was placed in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all
direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr.
Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives,
and damage to property.
On September 12, 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an
American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of
persons.
On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother
of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. In his interview, Romeo stated that he had driven his elder
brother, Victor, to the petitioner's house in Greenhills on two occasions. The first time was on August 20, 1980. Romeo
stated that Victor did not bring any bag with him on that day when he went to the petitioner's residence and did not carry a
bag when he left. The second time was in the afternoon of August 31, 1980 when he brought Victor only to the gate of the
petitioner's house. Romeo did not enter the petitioner's residence. Neither did he return that day to pick up his brother.
The next day, newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines stating in effect that petitioner had been linked to the
various bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile, on September 25, 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive
care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time.On the night of
October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at three big hotels in Metro Manila, namely: Philippine
Plaza, Century Park Sheraton and Manila Peninsula. The bombs injured nine people. A meeting of the General Military
Council was called for October 6, 1980.
On October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of
the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, a small bomb exploded. Within the
next twenty-four hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons who were apparently
implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them was herein petitioner. Victor Lovely
offered himself to be a "state witness" and in his letter to the President, he stated that he will reveal everything he knows
about the bombings.
On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the Manila Medical Center
where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The
arresting officer showed the petitioner the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him. For
some time, the petitioner's lawyers were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until this Court in the case of
Ordoñez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., (G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980) issued an order directing that the petitioner's right to
be visited by counsel be respected.
On November 2, 1980, the petitioner was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room
without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The petitioner states that he was not informed why he
was transferred and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority.
Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, the petitioner was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and
placed "under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or charges.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a "Notice of Preliminary Investigation" in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that "the preliminary investigation of the
above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o'clock p.m. on December 12, 1980" and that petitioner was given ten (10) days
 19

from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner
states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not
received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's Office to the Ministry of
Justice.
On February 24, 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing petitioner, among others of having violated
Republic Act No. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised Penal
Code. The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for March 17, 1981.
On March 6, 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church conferences and undergo
comprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eye to
save his right eye. Petitioner Salonga almost died as one of the principal victims of the dastardly bombing of a Liberal Party
rally at Plaza Miranda on August 20, 1971. Since then, he has suffered serious disabilities. The petitioner was riddled with
shrapnel and pieces still remain in various parts of his body. He has an AV fistula caused by a piece of shrapnel lodged one
millimeter from his aorta. The petitioner has limited use of his one remaining hand and arms, is completely blind and
physical in the left eye, and has scar like formations in the remaining right eye. He is totally deaf in the right ear and
partially deaf in the left ear. The petitioner's physical ailments led him to seek treatment abroad.
On or around March 26, 1981, the counsel for petitioner was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen.
Prospero Olivas, dated March 12, 1981, charging the petitioner, along with 39 other accused with the violation of R.A. 1700,
as amended by P.D. 885, Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 and P.D. 1736. Hearings for preliminary investigation were conducted. The
prosecution presented as its witnesses Ambassador Armando Fernandez, the Consul General of the Philippines in Los
Angeles, California, Col. Balbino Diego, PSC/NISA Chief, Investigation and Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command
and Victor Lovely himself.
On October 15, 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him.
On December 2, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion. On January 4, 1982, he issued a resolution ordering the
filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against forty (40) people, including
herein petitioner.
The resolutions of the respondent judge dated December 2, 1981 and January 4, 1982 are now the subject of the petition. It
is the contention of the petitioner that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an
information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would
be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by the prosecution utterly insufficient to
establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. We grant the petition.
However, before going into the merits of the case, we shall pass upon a procedural issue raised by the respondents.
The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to quash or to dismiss, being
interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari; that since the question of dismissal will again be
considered by the court when it decides the case, the movant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; and that public interest dictates that criminal prosecutions should not be enjoined.
The general rule is correctly stated. However, the respondents fail to appreciate or take into account certain exceptions
when a petition for certiorari is clearly warranted. The case at bar is one such exception.
In the case of Mead v. Angel (115 SCRA 256) the same contentions were advanced by the respondents to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
... Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by an accused in a criminal case shall be denied, the
remedy of the accused-movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or prohibition, the proper recourse being
to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash if an adverse judgment
is rendered against him, in the appeal that he may take therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill v. People, et al.,
101 Phil. 599; Echarol v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309.)
On this argument, we ruled:
There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents. However, it is also recognized that,
under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to question
the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in the interest of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as was so
declared in "Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969."
Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's
right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The
integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on
the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a
victim of the still unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical Center while
 20

hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him. Neither
was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his lawyers be
permitted to visit him (Ordonez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980). Only after four months of
detention was the petitioner informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him. After the preliminary
investigation, the petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge
issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information after finding that a prima facie case had been established against an
of the forty persons accused.
In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, the
initial disregard of petitioner's constitutional rights together with the massive and damaging publicity made against him,
justifies the favorable consideration of this petition by this Court. With former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. now deceased,
there are at least 38 other co-accused to be tried with the petitioner. The prosecution must present proof beyond
reasonable doubt against each and every one of the 39 accused, most of whom have varying participations in the charge for
subversion. The prosecution's star witness Victor Lovely and the only source of information with regard to the alleged link
between the petitioner and the series of terrorist bombings is now in the United States. There is reason to believe the
petitioner's citation of international news dispatches * that the prosecution may find it difficult if not infeasible to bring him
back to the Philippines to testify against the petitioner. If Lovely refused to testify before an American federal grand jury
how could he possibly be made to testify when the charges against the respondent come up in the course of the trial
against the 39 accused. Considering the foregoing, we find it in the interest of justice to resolve at this stage the issue of
whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the questioned resolutions.
The respondents contend that the prosecution will introduce additional evidence during the trial and if the evidence, by
then, is not sufficient to prove the petitioner's guilt, he would anyway be acquitted. Yes, but under the circumstances of this
case, at what cost not only to the petitioner but to the basic fabric of our criminal justice system?
The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the
proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a
conviction. The question raised before us now is: Were the evidences against the petitioner uncontradicted and if they
were unexplained or uncontradicted, would they, standing alone, sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence and
warrant his conviction?
We do not think so.
The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent judge relied only on the testimonies of Col.
Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when called upon to testify on subversive organizations
in the United States nowhere mentioned the petitioner as an organizer, officer or member of the Movement for Free
Philippines (MFP), or any of the organizations mentioned in the complaint. Col. Diego, on the other hand, when asked what
evidence he was able to gather against the petitioner depended only on the statement of Lovely "that it was the residence
of ex-Senator Salonga where they met together with Renato Tañada, one of the brains of the bombing conspiracy ... and
the fact that Sen. Salonga has been meeting with several subversive personnel based in the U.S.A. was also revealed to me
by Victor Burns Lovely; 11 and on the group pictures taken at former Congressman Raul Daza's birthday party. In concluding
that a conspiracy exists to overthrow by violent means the government of the Philippines in the United States, his only
bases were "documentary as well as physical and sworn statements that were referred to me or taken by me personally,"
which of course negate personal knowledge on his part. When asked by the court how he would categorize petitioner in
any of the subversive organizations, whether petitioner was an organizer, officer or a member, the witness replied:
A. To categorize former Senator Salonga if he were an organizer, he is an officer or he is a member, your Honor, please, we
have to consider the surrounding circumstances and on his involvement: first, Senator Salonga wanted always to travel to
the United States at least once a year or more often under the pretext of to undergo some sort of operation and participate
in some sort of seminar. (t.s.n., April 21, 1981, pp- 14-15)
Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of
subversion. It should not have been given credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, -has no probative value as the affiant could not have been cross-examined on the facts stated therein. (See People v.
Labinia, 115 SCRA 223; People v. Valero, 112 SCRA 661). Moreover, as Victor Lovely, himself, was personally examined by
the court, there was no need for the testimony of Col. Diego. Thus, the inquest judge should have confined his investigation
to Victor Burns Lovely, the sole witness whose testimony had apparently implicated petitioner in the bombings which
eventually led to the filing of the information.
Lovely's account of the petitioner's involvement with the former's bombing mission is found in his sworn statement made
before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella and taken on October 17, 1980 at the AFP Medical Center. Lovely was not presented
as a prosecution or state witness but only as a defense witness for his two younger brothers, Romeo and Baltazar, who
were both included in the complaint but who were later dropped from the information. Victor Lovely was examined by his
counsel and cross-examined by the fiscal. In the process, he Identified the statement which he made before Col. Diego and
 21

Lt. Col. Madella. After Lovely's testimony, the prosecution made a manifestation before the court that it was adopting
Lovely as a prosecution witness.

Apparently, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by limiting the petitioner's alleged
"participation" in the bombing mission only to the fact that petitioner's house was used as a "contact point" between
Lovely and Tañada, which was all that Lovely really stated in his testimony.
However, in the questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, the respondent judge suddenly included the "activities" of
petitioner in the United States as his basis for denying the motion to dismiss:
On the activities of Salonga in the United States, the witness, Lovely, in one of his statements declared: 'To the best of my
recollection he mentioned of some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not
instituted by President Marcos immediately.
It is therefore clear that the prosecution's evidence has established facts and circumstances sufficient for a finding that
excludes a Motion to Dismiss by respondent Salonga. The Movement for Free Philippines is undoubtedly a force born on
foreign soil it appears to rely on the resources of foreign entities, and is being (sic) on gaining ascendancy in the Philippines
with the use of force and for that purpose it has linked itself with even communist organizations to achieve its end. It
appears to rely on aliens for its supporters and financiers.
The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in subversive activities in the United States is
not only inexplicable but without foundation.
The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner Salonga to actual acts of violence or
terrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of subversion. However, he is tagged as a leader of
subversive organizations for two reasons-
(1) Because his house was used as a "contactpoint"; and
(2) Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not
instituted by President Marcos immediately."
The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by association" theory is too tenuous a basis
to conclude that Senator Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a person simply because
some plotters, masquerading as visitors, have somehow met in his house or office would be to establish a dangerous
precedent. The right of citizens to be secure against abuse of governmental processes in criminal prosecutions would be
seriously undermined.
The testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of inconsistencies. Senator Salonga and Atty. Renato Tañada
could not have whispered to one another because the petitioner is almost totally deaf. Lovely could not have met Senator
Salonga at a Manglapus party in Washington, D.C. in 1977 because the petitioner left for the United States only on
November, 1978. Senator Salonga denies having known Mr. Lovely in the United States or in the Philippines. He states that
he has hundred of visitors from week to week in his residence but cannot recall any Victor Lovely.
The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party in Los Angeles where Senator Salonga was
a guest is not proof of conspiracy. As stated by the petitioner, in his many years in the turbulent world of politics, he has
posed with all kinds of people in various groups and various places and could not possibly vouch for their conduct.
Commenting on the matter, newspaper columnist Teodoro Valencia stated that Filipinos love to pose with important
visitors and the picture proves nothing.
It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator Salonga's stature can expect guests and visitors
of all kinds to be visiting his home or office. If a rebel or subversive happens to pose with the petitioner for a group picture
at a birthday party abroad, or even visit him with others in his home, the petitioner does not thereby become a rebel or
subversive, much less a leader of a subversive group. More credible and stronger evidence is necessary for an indictment.
Nonetheless, even if we discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony and dismiss the refutations and arguments of the
petitioner, the prosecution evidence is still inadequate to establish a prima facie finding.
The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could positively link the petitioner to any
proscribed activities of the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint.
Lovely had already testified that during the party of former Congressman Raul Daza which was alleged to have been
attended by a number of members of the MFP, no political action was taken but only political discussion. Furthermore, the
alleged opinion of the petitioner about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are not
instituted, assuming that he really stated the same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and
expression. No man deserves punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationis poenam memo meretur. And as the late Justice
Oliver W. Holmes stated in the case of U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, " ... if there is any principle of the Constitution that
more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought not free thought for those who
agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."
We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and, therefore, stands on a higher level
than substantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a
 22

fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained by
Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal,
illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom.
Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made
that restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential
to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments.
The United States Supreme Court in Noto v. United States (367 U.S. 290) distinguished between the abstract teaching of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence and speech which would prepare a group for
violent action and steel it to such action. In Watts v. United States (394 U.S. 705), the American court distinguished
between criminal threats and constitutionally protected speech.
It stated:
We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory term. For we must
interpret the language Congress chose against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254).
The language of the political arena, like the language used in labor disputed is often vituperative abusive, and inexact. We
agree with petitioner that his only offense was a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the
President.
In the case before us, there is no teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to violence, much less an advocacy of force or a
conspiracy to organize the use of force against the duly constituted authorities. The alleged remark about the likelihood of
violent struggle unless reforms are instituted is not a threat against the government. Nor is it even the uninhibited, robust,
caustic, or unpleasantly sharp attack which is protected by the guarantee of free speech. Parenthetically, the American case
of Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444) states that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. The words which petitioner
allegedly used according to the best recollections of Mr. Lovely are light years away from such type of proscribed advocacy.
Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of freedom of
speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a
subversive organization. Under Presidential Decree No. 885, Section 3, paragraph 6, political discussion will only constitute,
prima facie evidence of membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to:
(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise
thereof.
As stated earlier, the prosecution has failed to produce evidence that would establish any link between petitioner and any
subversive organization. Even if we lend credence to Lovely's testimony that a political discussion took place at Daza's
birthday party, no proof whatsoever was adduced that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the
government through illegal means. The alleged opinion that violent struggle is likely unless reforms are instituted by no
means shows either advocacy of or incitement to violence or furtherance of the objectives of a subversive organization.
Lovely also declared that he had nothing to do with the bombing on August 22, 1980, which was the only bombing incident
that occurred after his arrival in Manila on August 20, and before the YMCA explosion on September 6, 1980. (See TSN, pp.
63-63, July 8, 1981). He further testified that:
WITNESS:
Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing against the government. My bombing mission was directed
against the particular family (referring to the Cabarrus family [TSN, p. 11, July 9, 1981] [Rollo, p. 10].
Such a statement wholly negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment which Lovely was supposed to have
been commissioned to perform upon the orders of his co- accused and which was the very reason why they answer charged
in the first place. The respondent judge also asked Lovely about the possible relation between Cabarrus and petitioner:
COURT:
Q. Did you suspect any relation between Cabarrus and Jovito Salonga, why did you implicate Jovito Salonga?
A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga.
It should be noted that after Lovely's testimony, the prosecution manifested to the court that it was adopting him as a
prosecution witness. Therefore, the prosecution became irreversively bound by Lovely's disclaimers on the witness stand,
that it was not his intention "to do some kind of bombing against the government" and that he "did not try to implicate
Salonga", especially since Lovely is the sole witness adopted by the prosecution who could supposedly establish the link
between the petitioner and the bombing incidents.
The respondent court should have taken these factors into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exists
against the petitioner. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People v.
 23

Dayad, 56 SCRA 439). In the case at bar, the prosecution cannot even present a credible version of the petitioner's role in
the bombings even if it ignores the subsequent disclaimers of Lovely and without relying on mere affidavits including those
made by Lovely during his detention.
The resolution dated January 4, 1982 suffers from the same defect. In this resolution, Lovely's previous declarations about
the bombings as part of the alleged destabilization plan and the people behind the same were accorded such credibility by
the respondent judge as if they had already been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution,
and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and
also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil.
216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional
due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that
the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A
preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of
freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the
judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the
guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the
same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree
upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before
the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The
judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn
up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears
repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been
before. It should continue to be so. Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93).
The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived at, and a draft
ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the
petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek
the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from
circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court's crowded agenda for further
deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been
rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
Respondent Fiscal Sergio Apostol correctly points out, however, that he is not precluded from filing new charges for the
same acts because the petitioner has not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply. in that sense, the case is not
completely academic.
Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the Supreme Court's functions.
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights
for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at
will is not the totality of the Court's functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It
has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and, therefore,
constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of
his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision and stated:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution
that excessive bail shall not be required.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through
an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's
legislative powers under martial law. Stan, this Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and
development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were
released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder,
subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court
 24

in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the
Reports.
In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a
prima facie case against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or
as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. They have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against the
petitioner. We reiterate the rule, however, that this Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of
evidence against the petitioner found in the records.
PEOPLE VS GREY
2010

FACTS:
Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar, his son, Francis Grey, and two others were charge of the crime of murder
for the death of Rolando Diocton. Judge Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. She directed the
prosecution to present, within five days, additional evidence but later, she inhibited. Judge Navidad continued the
proceedings of the case. After finding that probable cause was supported by the evidence on record, he issued warrants of
arrest against respondents.

The CA held that Judge Navidad failed to abide by the constitutional mandate for him to personally determine the existence
of probable cause. According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed Order did Judge Navidad state his personal assessment of
the evidence before him and the personal justification for his finding of probable cause. It found that the judge extensively
quoted from the Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, and then
adopted these to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of probable cause. The CA held that the
Constitution commands the judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing warrants of
arrest.
HELD: It was only through a review of the proceedings before the prosecutor that could have led Judge Navidad to
determine that "the accused were given the widest latitude and ample opportunity to challenge the charge of Murder
which resulted, among others, (in) a filing of a counter-charge of Perjury." Likewise, his personal determination revealed no
improper motive on the part of the prosecution and no circumstance which would overwhelm the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions. Thus, he concluded that the previous Order, denying the motion for the
issuance of warrants of arrest, was not correct.
These statements sufficiently establish the fact that Judge Navidad complied with the constitutional mandate for personal
determination of probable cause before issuing the warrants of arrest.
The CA likewise overlooked a fundamental rule we follow in this jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine that injunction will
not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and
prosecuted for the protection of society.
However, it is also true that various decisions of this Court have laid down exceptions to this rule, among which are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez v. Albano, et al., L-19272, January
25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et
al. v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez v. Albano, supra; Fortun v. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub[-]judice (De Leon v. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young v. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez v. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where there is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia v. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto v. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in
Rañoa v. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. v. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA
577); x x x
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied
(Salonga v. Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438)[; and]
[k.] Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners
(Rodriguez v. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953).
Respondents insisted that political persecution by their political rivals was the underlying reason for the filing of criminal
charges against them, and used this as basis for asking the appellate court to stop the proceedings in the trial court.
 25

Indeed, this Court has recognized that, in certain instances, political persecution or political motives may have impelled the
filing of criminal charges against certain political rivals. But this Court has also ruled that any allegation that the filing of the
charges is politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to
support the charges.
In this case, the judge, upon his personal examination of the complaint and evidence before him, determined that there
was probable cause to issue the warrants of arrest after the provincial prosecution, based on the affidavits presented by
complainant and her witnesses, found probable cause to file the criminal Information. This finding of the Provincial
Prosecutor was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
To establish political harassment, respondents must prove that the public prosecutor, not just the private complainant,
acted in bad faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself to a scheme that could have no other purpose than to place
respondents in contempt and disrepute. It must be shown that the complainant possesses the power and the influence to
control the prosecution of cases.
Likewise, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated does not serve to justify the nullification of
the informations where the existence of such motive has not been sufficiently established nor substantial evidence
presented in support thereof.
Other than their own self-serving claims, respondents have adduced absolutely no proof of the perceived political
persecution being waged by their rivals. Respondents have not shown any evidence of such a grand design. They have not
alleged, much less proved, any ill motive or malice that could have impelled the provincial prosecutor, the judge, and even
the Secretary of Justice to have respectively ruled in the way each of them did. In short, respondents are holding tenuously
only on the hope that this Court will take them at their word and grant the relief they pray for. This Court, however, cannot
anchor its ruling on mere allegations.
Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth. If, as respondents claim, there is no evidence of
their culpability, then their petition for bail would easily be granted. Thereafter, the credibility of the prosecution’s and the
accused’s respective evidence may be tested during the trial. It is only then that the guilt or innocence of respondents will
be determined. Whether the criminal prosecution was merely a tool for harassment or whether the prosecution’s evidence
can pass the strict standards set by the law and withstand the exacting scrutiny of the court will all be resolved at the trial
of the case.
The criminal Information in this case was filed four years ago and trial has yet to begin. The victim’s kin, indeed, all the
parties, are awaiting its resolution. Any further delay will amount to an injustice.
Section 5. Who must prosecute the criminal action.
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and representative of UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 214 of the Regional
Trial Court
of Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and MARKOS AVGOUSTIS,
Respondents.

The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning agency, while Socrates
Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis (respondents) are some of the listed incorporators of
Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local manning agency.
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City
against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. The petitioner alleged that the respondents
falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment
agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavit’s
allegations. Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter-affidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution,the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for syndicated and
large scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the
corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City presided by Judge Rizalina T.
Capco-Umali.
Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a
motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. The petitioner and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their
opposition and comment to the opposition, respectively.
In an August 1, 2005 resolution, the RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the existence of probable
cause to hold the respondents for trial. Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents.
 26

On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for deferred
enforcement of the warrants of arrest. In a September 2, 2005 order,the RTC denied the omnibus motion, reiterating that
the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed or not.
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to
defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest
On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion to expunge, contending that respondent Alamil,
being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC, in the August 1, 2005 resolution, already
found probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.
In a September 30, 2005 order, the RTC denied respondent Alamil’s motion for being moot and academic; it ruled that it
had already found probable cause against the respondents in the August 1, 2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the
September 2, 2005 order.
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being
biased or partial. On October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition with a motion to expunge, reiterating that
respondent Alamil had no standing to seek relief from the RTC.
In a January 4, 2006 order, Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did not resolve respondent
Alamil’s motion for reconsideration and the petitioner’s motion to expunge. The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214,
presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
The RTC Rulings
In its March 8, 2006 order, the RTC granted respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamil’s
motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to
indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the
POEA; and (2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking
affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to prosecute the
respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC.
On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a prohibited pleading since the motion did
not have the public prosecutor’s conformity.
In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely
reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered the motion expunged from the records since
the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s conformity.
On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not
authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has
the right to appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents’ fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced
him.
In its August 7, 2006 joint order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the petitioner filed it without the
conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed
to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s
March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders.
The CA Ruling
In its November 23, 2006 resolution, the CA dismissed outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality
to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has
the legal personality to represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code. It also held that the petitioner was not the real party in interest to institute the case, him not being a victim of the
crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business. The CA denied the motion for
reconsideration that followed.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since he is the private
complainant and a real party in interest who had been directly damaged and prejudiced by the respondents’ illegal acts;
respondent Alamil has no legal standing to seek any relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice.
The Case for the Respondents
The respondents32 submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the
power to prosecute lies solely with the State, acting through a public prosecutor; the petitioner acted independently and
without the authority of a public prosecutor in the prosecution and appeal of the case.
The Issue
 27

The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioner’s Rule
65 petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit."Interest means
material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real
party in interest, the suit is dismissible.
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before
this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines,
its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
(emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings
pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues to be the
controlling doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own
behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by
the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal
to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal
action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented
by the OSG.
Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction
As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings
seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an
application for bail.

JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE TEOFANIS BONJOC, OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and MARIANO BARTIDO,
petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

In this Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition, petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in
Criminal Cases Nos. CCC—XIII-50-L-S'72 and CCC-XIII-51-L-S'72, 1 to wit: (a) Order of July 21, 1975, denying petitioners'
motion for respondent Judge to disqualify or to inhibit himself from hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial
and/or Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; (b) Order of July 23, 1975, denying petitioners' Motion for
New Trial and/or Reconsidertion and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; and (c) Order of July 25, 1975, ordering the
transfer of the accused (petitioners herein) from Camp Bumpus PC headquarters, Tacloban city, to the Nationial
Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal. It is likewise sought, by way of prohibition, to compel respondent Judge
to desist from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases.
By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent Judge was required to file his answer within ten (10)
days from notice, and in connection therewith, a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent from
further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases. The petition was subsequently amended to include the People
 28

of the Philippines and thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People of the Philippines,
submitted his Comment to the petition. The Solicitor General informed this Court, thus: that they are "persuaded that there
are basis for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were
not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice ... . Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the
charges and counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge
"appeared to have been heedless of the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of
the guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment" and, therefore, it was the submission
of said official "that the case should he remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision and with instruction
to receive additional evidence proferred by the accused with the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as
inay be warranted" and, therefore, they interpose no objection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases "for
the rendition of a new decision by another trial judge, after the parties shall have adduced such additional evidence as they
may wish to make, under such terms and conditions as this Honorable Court may deem fit to impose. 2
On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the
respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case.
On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment"
of the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings before this
Honorable Court and, hence, without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal.
The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take part in the proceedings,
and to adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General.
The issue before Us is whether or not the private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor
General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings.
There are important reasons which support the view that in the present proceedings, the private prosecutors cannot
intervene independently of and take a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General.
To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this
Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer
and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor
General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the
position taken by the Solicitor General.
There is no question that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the
representatives of the State should direct and control the prosecution. As stressed in Suarez v. Platon, et al., 3the
prosecuting officer "is the representative not of. an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one." Thus, it was stressed in People v. Esquivel, et al., 4 that there is an absolute
necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and
meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the
court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished.
Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state." It is for the purpose of
realizing the afore-mentioned objectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed under the direction, control, and
responsibility of the prosecuting officer.
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the offended parts, with respect to the civil action
for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. 'This civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil action or reserves to institute it separately. Thus, "an offended
party may intervene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially in case of offenses which can not be prosecuted
except at the instance of the offended party. The only exception to this is when the offended party waives his right to civil
action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in which case he lost his right to
intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. And in any event, whether an
offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction
and control of the prosecuting official. " As explained in Herrero v. Diaz, supra, the "intervention of the offended party or his
attorney is authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions of section 4 of the same
Rule that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the Fiscal." (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they are not in control of the case, and their
interests are subordinate to those of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal. The right which the procedural
 29

law reserves to the injured party is that of intervening in the prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability
for the criminal action and not of demanding punishment of the accused. As explained in People v. Orais:
the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that of the promotor fiscal because, as promotor fiscal alone
is authorized to represent the public prosecution, or the People of the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution of offenders,
and to control the proceeding, and as it is discretionary with him to institute and prosecute a criminal proceeding, being at
liberty to commence it or not, depending upon whether or not there is, in his opinion, sufficient evidence to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, except when the case is pending in the Court of First Instance, the
continuation of the offended party's intervention depends upon the continuation of the proceeding. Consequently, if the
promotor fiscal desists from pressing the charge or asks the competent Court of first Instance in which the case is pending
for the dismissal thereof, and said court grants the petition, the intervention of the person injured by the commission of the
offense ceases by virtue of the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Consequently, as the offended party is not
entitled to represent the People of the Philippine Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or to control the proceeding
once it is commenced, and as his right to intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's right of control, it cannot be
stated that an order of dismissal decreed upon petiton of the promotor fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his
right to appeal from an order overruling a complaint or information, which right belongs exclusively to the promotor fiscal
by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General Orders, No. 58. To permit a person injured by the commission of an
offense to appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance upon petition of the promotor
fiscal, would be tantamount to giving said offended party of the direction and control of a criminal proceeding in violation
of the provisions of the above-cited section 107 of General Orders, No. 58.
Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not
provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense. 12
There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings
pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. Thus, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers
and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General", provides:
SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer. ... The office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government, and such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers
and functions:
(a) Represent the Governemnt in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions
and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the party.
(k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action
or proceeding which in his opinion, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.
It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the People of the
Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a
stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and
control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.
Moreover, the position taken by the Solicitor General in recommending the remand of the case to the trial court is not
without any plausible justification. Thus, in support of his contention that the rendition of the decision and the resolution
on the subsequent motions by the respondent Judge were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice, the Solicitor
General stated:
In alleging bias and manifest partiality on the part of respondent judge, petitioners assert that:
(a) Respondent judge kept improper contact with and was illegally influenced by the Larrazabals in connection with the
decision of the two cases against petitioners herein;
(b) In the latter part of 1973, with the trial of the Tan cases still in progress, respondent judge received, through one of his
court stenographers, two bottles of whisky from Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, brother and uncle of the deceased victims
Feliciano and Francisco Larrazabal;
(c) On one occasion, Mayor Larrazabal had a short talk with respondent judge, after which the latter received from one of
the private prosecutors a bottle of wine wrapped in a newspaper which was "thick" and "bulky" and which allegedly
contained "something else inside";
(d) Respondent judge prepared the decision in the Tan cases based on the memorandum of the prosecution which was
literally copied in said decision although with some corrections; and
(e) After an alleged meeting with Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, respondent judge amended his already prepared decision in the
two criminal cases involved herein by changing the penalty of double life sentence for the double murder charge against
the petitioners to the death penalty.
 30

The foregoing alleged irregularities are mainly supported by an affidavit executed on June 26, 1975 by Gerardo A. Makinano
Jr., court stenographer of the Circuit Criminal Court, Tacloban City (Annex "E", Petition). The truth of the charges made in
such affidavit are denied by respondent judge (in his answer to the instant petition dated October 11, 1975), who in turn
claims that it was petitioners who tried to bribe him into acquitting them in the aforesaid criminal cases, after they were
illegally furnished a copy of the draft of his decision of conviction by the same court stenographer Gerardo A. Makinano Jr.
(please see Answer of respondent judge, pp. 12-13). Unlike in the cases of Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 191 (1973), and
Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124 (1974) relied upon mainly by herein petitioners, the facts alleged as constituting the grounds
for disqualifying the respondent judge in the instant petition are disputed.
Apart from the sworn statements submitted before this Court in support or in denial of the alleged bribery of respondent
judge, we have been informed of evidence obtained by the National Bureau of Investigation when it cannot appropriate for
us at this time, however, and we are unable to do so, to submit to this Court definite conclusions on the charges and
counter-charges. An exhaustive inquiry and open hearing should perhaps precede the making of categorical conclusions.
But we are persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolutions
on the motions for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice (See Martinez Gironella, 65 SCRA 245 [July
22, 1975]).
Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the nature of
the evidence on hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge appeared to have been heedless to the oft-reiterated
admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent
on prejudice or prejudgment (Fernando, J., Concurring opinion, Martinez Gironella, supra, at 252). ...
It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and impartially without regard to
persons or their circumstances or the opinions of men. A judge, according to Justice Castro, now Chief Justice of this Court,
should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty,
of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. 13 Thus, it has always been
stressed that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. For "impartiality is not a technical
conception, It is a state of mind" 14 and, consequently, the "appearance of impartiality is an essential manifestation of its
reality. 15 It must be obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the
parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality.
It appears, however, that respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial service, hence, the question as to whether or not he
should be disqualified from further proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases has already become moot.
WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby demands the case to the trial court in order that another Judge may
hear anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence. No Special
pronouncement as to costs.
FORTUNATO N. SUAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
SERVILLANO PLATON, Judge of Court of First Instance of Tayabas, The PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF TAYABAS, VIVENCIO ORAIS
and DAMIAN JIMENEZ, respondents.
This is an original petition for the peremptory writ of mandamus filed by Fortunato N. Suarez with this court, to compel the
respondent judge to reinstate criminal case No. 6426 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas so that the case may proceed
to trial in the ordinary course.
It appears on May 9, 1935, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais, of the Philippine Constabulary, one of the respondents in this case,
filed a complaint under oath with the justice of the peace of Calauag, Province of Tayabas, charging the petitioner herein,
Fortunato N. Suarez, and one Tomas Ruedas, with sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint,
upon preliminary examination, was docketed and given due course. While the said case was pending preliminary
investigation, Lieutenant Orais, in obedience to an order of the Provincial Commander of Tayabas, moved for the temporary
dismissal of the case. This motion was granted by the justice of the peace of Calauag on May 20, 1935, and the case thus
dismissed.
At the instance of the petitioner herein, Fortunato N. Suarez, the deputy provincial fiscal of Tayabas, Perfecto R. Palacio, in
turn charged Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Damian Jimenez in the justice of the peace court of Calauag with the crime of
arbitrary detention committed,
The justice of the peace of Calauag, being one of the accused, the preliminary examination was conducted by the justice of
the peace of Lopez, Tayabas, who thereafter bound the defendants over to the Court of First Instance, where the case was
docketed as criminal case No. 6426. While the case was pending in the latter court, on petition, of the accused, the
provincial fiscal of Tayabas, Ramon Valdez y Nieto, reinvestigated the case. After such reinvestigation, he filed on a
motion for the dismissal of the case. Fortunato N. Suarez, the petitioner herein, on asked the court to appoint Attorney
Godofredo Reyes as acting provincial fiscal to handle the prosecution, alleging, among other things, that the provincial fiscal
 31

had no courage to prosecute the accused. On May 11, 1936, Attorney Godofredo Reyes entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, and vigorously objected to the motion of dismissal filed by the provincial fiscal., the then presiding judge of
Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, Hon. Ed. Gutierrez David, after hearing, denied the motion, ruling that
there was prima facie case against the accused. The court, upon petitioner of the provincial fiscal, designated Deputy
Provincial Fiscal Perfecto R. Palacio to handle the prosecution. But Fiscal Palacio, being apparently of the same opinion as
the provincial fiscal, declined to proceed, and moved that a practicing attorney or a competent attorney in the Bureau of
Justice be designated in his stead. Accordingly, the provincial fiscal of Sorsogon, Jacinto Yamson, at the request of the judge
a quo was assigned by the Department of Justice to handle the prosecution of the case. Fiscal Yamson after going over the
case likewise entered a nolle prosequi. So, on September 23 1936, he moved for reconsideration of the court's order of
August 14, 1936, denying the motion for dismissal presented by the provincial fiscal. Attorney Godofredo Reyes again
vigorously objected to this motion on the ground that there was sufficient proof to warrant the prosecution of the accused.
The case in this state when Judge Emilio Pena was appointed to the place of Judge Gutierres David. Later, Judge Serviliano
Platon, one of the respondents herein, was appointed to preside over case No. 6426 corresponded, and the case was thus
transferred to that sala for action. Judge Platon, after consideration of all the facts and proofs submitted in the case,
considered the court's order of August 14, 1936, and dismissed the case, holding that the evidence was insufficient to
convict the accused of the crime charged. From this order, the petitioner herein appealed to this Court and the case was
here docketed as G.R. No. 45431. On June 30, by a closely divided court, the appeal was dismissed.
Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued? We observe that after the filing of the information by the provincial
fiscal of Tayabas for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez, the same fiscal
moved for the dismissal of the case, because
We have not overlooked the fact that this motion for dismissal was denied by Judge Gutierrez David of August 14, 1936. It
appears, however, that subsequently Fiscal Yamsom who, as stated above was assigned by the Department of Justice to
conduct the prosecution of the case, moved for reconsideration of the Court's order of August 14, 1936, denying the
motion for dismissal. Judge Servillano Platon granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case. In this motion
for reconsideration not only does Fiscal Yamson reiterate the arguments advanced by Fiscal Valdez y Nieto in the latter's
motion for dismissal, but adds:
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting officers of all cases handled by
them, but whilst this Court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is
unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which
they have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Mr. Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of
the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one," (69 United States Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6,
p. 309.)
Considering all the circumstances, we cannot say that Judge Servillano Platon, in granting the motion for the dismissal of
the case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez, abused his discretion so
flagrantly as to justify, in the interest of justice, a departure from the well-settled rule that an inferior tribunal in the
performance of a judicial act within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus. This is
especially true in a matter involving the examination of evidence and the decision of questions of law and fact, since such a
duty is not ministerial. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, sec. 156, pp. 173-175). Upon the other hand, it should be
observed that in the case of Lieutenant Orais, in the face of the circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two
motions for dismissal by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas, which facts and circumstances must have been investigated and
duly weighed and considered by the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the arrest effected by
Lieutenant Orais cannot be said to have be entirely unjustified. If, "under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to
obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith, he should
be exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of
themselves violating the law. See generally Voorhees on Arrest

MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
 32

FACTS:
Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl.
Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to
defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the
presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied
in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate
the matter to the appellate court.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court
of Appeals that In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he
recommended that the petition be given due course. a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ
and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until
the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.
A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court,
attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor
was given time to file an opposition thereto.
ISSUE: The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant
the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the
fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party,
according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious
or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant. Prosecuting officers under the
power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the
evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office.
They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence
adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima faciecase.
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a puma facie case that
would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal
prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally
initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. Neither
has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this
would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions.
Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that
grant the same commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the
re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable
doubt.
In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the
offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. On the other hand, neither an injunction,
preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution except in the
extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use
of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner.
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review
to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.
Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an
information be filed in Court.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the
Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
 33

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as
above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal
find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After
such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be
proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, The only qualification is that the
action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. or the right of the People to due process of
law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the
Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may
grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the
Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution?
The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it
is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to
arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not
shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should
he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will
be null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over
the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as
its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the
fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.