1.

) ANGELINA FRANCISCO, Petitioner, versus NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, KASEI CORPORATION, SEIICHIRO TAKAHASHI, TIMOTEO ACEDO,
DELFIN LIZA, IRENE BALLESTEROS, TRINIDAD LIZA and RAMON ESCUETA,
Respondents., G.R. No. 170087, 2006 Aug 31.

FACTS:

1995, Petitioner was hired by Kasei Corporation during its incorporation stage. She was
designated as Accountant and Corporate Secretary and was assigned to handle all the
accounting needs of the company. She was also designated as Liaison Officer to the City of
Makati to secure business permits, construction permits and other licenses for the initial operation
of the company.

Although she was designated as Corporate Secretary, she was not entrusted with the corporate
documents; neither did she attend any board meeting nor required to do so. She never prepared
any legal document and never represented the company as its Corporate Secretary. 1996,
petitioner was designated Acting Manager. Petitioner was assigned to handle recruitment of all
employees and perform management administration functions; represent the company in all
dealings with government agencies, especially with the BIR, SSS and in the city government of
Makati; and to administer all other matters pertaining to the operation of Kasei Restaurant which
is owned and operated by Kasei Corporation.

January 2001, petitioner was replaced by a certain Liza R. Fuentes as Manager. Kasei
Corporation reduced her salary, she was not paid her mid-year bonus allegedly because the
company was not earning well. On October 2001, petitioner did not receive her salary from the
company. She made repeated follow-ups with the company cashier but she was advised that the
company was not earning well. Eventually she was informed that she is no longer connected with
the company.

Since she was no longer paid her salary, petitioner did not report for work and filed an action for
constructive dismissal before the labor arbiter. Private respondents averred that petitioner is not
an employee of Kasei Corporation. They alleged that petitioner was hired in 1995 as one of its
technical consultants on accounting matters and act concurrently as Corporate Secretary. As
technical consultant, petitioner performed her work at her own discretion without control and
supervision of Kasei Corporation. Petitioner had no daily time record and she came to the office
any time she wanted and that her services were only temporary in nature and dependent on the
needs of the corporation.

The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was illegally dismissed, NLRC affirmed with modification
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. On appeal, CA reversed the NLRC decision. CA denied
petitioner’s MR, hence, the present recourse.

ISSUES:

1. WON there was an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private

respondent; and if in the affirmative,
2. Whether petitioner was illegally dismissed.
RULING:

1. Generally, courts have relied on the so-called right of control test where the person for whom
the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also
the means to be used in reaching such end. In addition to the standard of right-of-control, the
existing economic conditions prevailing between the parties, like the inclusion of the
employee in the payrolls, can help in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.

There are instances when, aside from the employer’s power to control the employee, economic
realities of the employment relations help provide a comprehensive analysis of the true
classification of the individual, whether as employee, independent contractor, corporate officer or
some other capacity.

It is better, therefore, to adopt a two-tiered test involving: (1) the employer’s power to control; and
(2) the economic realities of the activity or relationship.

The control test means that there is an employer-employee relationship when the person for
whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end achieved but also
the manner and means used to achieve that end.

There has to be analysis of the totality of economic circumstances of the worker. Thus, the
determination of the relationship between employer and employee depends upon the
circumstances of the whole economic activity, such as: (1) the extent to which the services
performed are an integral part of the employer’s business; (2) the extent of the worker’s
investment in equipment and facilities; (3) the nature and degree of control exercised by the
employer; (4) the worker’s opportunity for profit and loss; (5) the amount of initiative, skill,
judgment or foresight required for the success of the claimed independent enterprise; (6) the
permanency and duration of the relationship between the worker and the employer; and (7) the
degree of dependency of the worker upon the employer for his continued employment in that line
of business. The proper standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is dependent
on the alleged employer for his continued employment in that line of business

By applying the control test, it can be said that petitioner is an employee of Kasei Corporation
because she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the corporation’s
Technical Consultant. She reported for work regularly and served in various capacities as
Accountant, Liaison Officer, Technical Consultant, Acting Manager and Corporate Secretary, with
substantially the same job functions, that is, rendering accounting and tax services to the
company and performing functions necessary and desirable for the proper operation of the
corporation such as securing business permits and other licenses over an indefinite period of
engagement. Respondent corporation had the power to control petitioner with the means and
methods by which the work is to be accomplished.

Under the economic reality test, the petitioner can also be said to be an employee of respondent
corporation because she had served the company for 6 yrs. before her dismissal, receiving check
vouchers indicating her salaries/wages, benefits, 13th month pay, bonuses and allowances, as
well as deductions and Social Security contributions from. When petitioner was designated
General Manager, respondent corporation made a report to the SSS. Petitioner’s membership in
the SSS evinces the existence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
respondent corporation. The coverage of Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of
an employer-employee relationship.

2. The corporation constructively dismissed petitioner when it reduced her. This amounts to an
illegal termination of employment, where the petitioner is entitled to full backwages

A diminution of pay is prejudicial to the employee and amounts to constructive

dismissal. Constructive dismissal is an involuntary resignation resulting in cessation of work
resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when
there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to an employee. Petition is GRANTED.

2.) JOSE SONZA vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 138051
June 10, 2004

Facts: In May 1994, ABS-CBN signed an agreement with the Mel and Jay Management and
Development Corporation (MJMDC). ABS-CBN was represented by its corporate officers while
MJMDC was represented by Sonza, as President and general manager, and Tiangco as its EVP
and treasurer. Referred to in the agreement as agent, MJMDC agreed to provide Sonza’s services
exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television. ABS-CBN agreed to pay Sonza a
monthly talent fee of P310, 000 for the first year and P317, 000 for the second and third year.

On April 1996, Sonza wrote a letter to ABS-CBN where he irrevocably resigned in view of the
recent events concerning his program and career. After the said letter, Sonza filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment a complaint alleging that ABS-CBN did not pay his salaries,
separation pay, service incentive pay,13th month pay, signing bonus, travel allowance and
amounts under the Employees Stock Option Plan (ESOP). ABS-CBN contended that no
employee-employer relationship existed between the parties. However, ABS-CBN continued to
remit Sonza’s monthly talent fees but opened another account for the same purpose.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and found that there is no employee-employer
relationship. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. CA also affirmed the decision of
NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not there was employer-employee relationship between the parties.

Ruling: Case law has consistently held that the elements of an employee-employer relationship
are selection and engagement of the employee, the payment of wages, the power of dismissal
and the employer’s power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the work
is accomplished. The last element, the so-called "control test", is the most important element.

Sonza’s services to co-host its television and radio programs are because of his peculiar talents,
skills and celebrity status. Independent contractors often present themselves to possess unique
skills, expertise or talent to distinguish them from ordinary employees. The specific selection and
hiring of SONZA, because of his unique skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by
ordinary employees, is a circumstance indicative, but not conclusive, of an independent
contractual relationship. All the talent fees and benefits paid to SONZA were the result of
negotiations that led to the Agreement. For violation of any provision of the Agreement, either
party may terminate their relationship. Applying the control test to the present case, we find that
SONZA is not an employee but an independent contractor.

The control test is the most important test our courts apply in distinguishing an employee from an
independent contractor. This test is based on the extent of control the hirer exercises over a
worker. The greater the supervision and control the hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is
deemed an employee. The converse holds true as well – the less control the hirer exercises, the
more likely the worker is considered an independent contractor. To perform his work, SONZA
only needed his skills and talent. How SONZA delivered his lines, appeared on television, and
sounded on radio were outside ABS-CBN’s control. ABS-CBN did not instruct SONZA how to
perform his job. ABS-CBN merely reserved the right to modify the program format and airtime
schedule "for more effective programming." ABS-CBN’s sole concern was the quality of the shows
and their standing in the ratings.

Clearly, ABS-CBN did not exercise control over the means and methods of performance of
Sonza’s work. A radio broadcast specialist who works under minimal supervision is an
independent contractor. Sonza’s work as television and radio program host required special skills
and talent, which SONZA admittedly possesses.

ABS-CBN claims that there exists a prevailing practice in the broadcast and entertainment
industries to treat talents like Sonza as independent contractors. The right of labor to security of
tenure as guaranteed in the Constitution arises only if there is an employer-employee relationship
under labor laws. Individuals with special skills, expertise or talent enjoy the freedom to offer their
services as independent contractors. The right to life and livelihood guarantees this freedom to
contract as independent contractors. The right of labor to security of tenure cannot operate to
deprive an individual, possessed with special skills, expertise and talent, of his right to contract
as an independent contractor.

3.) Locsin vs. PLDT

GR No. 185251, October 2, 2009

Facts:

On November 1, 1990, respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)

and the Security and Safety Corporation of the Philippines (SSCP) entered into a Security
Services Agreement (Agreement) whereby SSCP would provide armed security guards to PLDT
to be assigned to its various offices. Pursuant to such agreement, petitioners Raul Locsin and
Eddie Tomaquin, among other security guards, were posted at a PLDT office.

On August 30, 2001, respondent issued a Letter dated August 30, 2001 terminating
the Agreement effective October 1, 2001. Despite the termination of the Agreement,
however, petitioners continued to secure the premises of their assigned office. They were
allegedly directed to remain at their post by representatives of respondent. In support of their
contention,
petitioners provided the Labor Arbiter with copies of petitioner Locsin’s pay slips for the period of
January to September 2002.

Then, on September 30, 2002, petitioners’ services were terminated. Thus, petitioners filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal and recovery of money claims such
as overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave
pay, Emergency Cost of Living Allowance, and moral and exemplary damages against PLDT.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding PLDT liable for illegal dismissal. It was explained in
the Decision that petitioners were found to be employees of PLDT and not of SSCP.
Such conclusion was arrived at with the factual finding that petitioners continued to serve as
guards of
PLDT’s offices. As such employees, petitioners were entitled to substantive and procedural due
process before termination of employment.

Issue:

Is there employer-employee relationship?

Ruling:

Yes. From the foregoing circumstances, reason dictates that we conclude that
petitioners remained at their post under the instructions of respondent. We can further conclude
that respondent dictated upon petitioners that the latter perform their regular duties to secure
the premises during operating hours. This, to our mind and under the circumstances, is sufficient
to establish the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

To reiterate, while respondent and SSCP no longer had any legal relationship with the termination
of the Agreement, petitioners remained at their post securing the premises of respondent while
receiving their salaries, allegedly from SSCP. Clearly, such a situation makes no sense, and the
denials proffered by respondent do not shed any light to the situation. It is but reasonable to
conclude that, with the behest and, presumably, directive of respondent, petitioners continued
with their services. Evidently, such are indicia of control that respondent exercised over
petitioners.

Evidently, respondent having the power of control over petitioners must be considered as
petitioners’ employer–– from the termination of the Agreement onwards
–– as this was the only time that any evidence of control was exhibited by respondent over
petitioners and in light of our ruling in Abella. Thus, as aptly declared by the NLRC, petitioners
were entitled to the rights and benefits of employees of respondent, including due process
requirements in the termination of their services.

Both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC found that respondent did not observe such due
process requirements. Having failed to do so, respondent is guilty of illegal dismissal.

4.) Citibank v. CA, and Citibank Integrated Guards Labor Alliance (CIGLA)
Segatupas/FSM Local Chapter

Facts:

Citibank, situated at 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati, Metro Manila, entered into a contract with El
Toro Security Agency, Inc. for security and protection service. The parties renewed the contract
yearly until April 22, 1990. Citibank Integrated Guards Labor Alliance-SEGA-TUPAS/FSM
(CIGLA), which includes el toro security guards assigned to Citibank, filed with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for preventive mediation against Citibank due to unfair
labor practice, dismissal of union officers/members and union busting. Citibank notified El Toro
that they will not renew their contract with them. CIGLA converted its request for preventive
mediation into a notice of strike for failure of the parties to reach a mutually acceptable settlement
of the issues and alleged as supplemental issue the mass dismissal of all union officers and
members. El Toro security guards formerly assigned to guard Citibank premises loitered around
the bank's premises in large groups and threatened to stage a strike, which would hamper its
operations and the normal conduct of its business and that
the bank would suffer damages should a strike push through. Faced with the prospect of disrup
tion of its business operations, Citibank filed with RTC, Makati, a complaint for injunction and
damages against CIGLA. CIGLA filed a motion to dismiss that this court had no jurisdiction, this
being labor dispute, which was dismissed. The court ruled in favor of Citibank. CIGLA filed a writ
of certiorari which was granted by CA. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether there is a labor dispute between Citibank and the security guards, members of CIGLA?

Ruling:

None. Labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of
employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. El Toro, being
an independent contractor, recruited, hired and assigned the watchmen to their place of work.
Thus, no employer-employee relationship existed between Citibank and the security guard
members of the union in the security agency who were assigned to secure the bank's premises
and property. Hence, there was no labor dispute and no right to strike against the bank.

5.) PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, FERDINAND PINEDA and GODOFREDO
CABLING, respondents.

Facts:
Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service
for their alleged involvement in the currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Aggrieved by said
dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction. The NLRC issued a
temporary mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from enforcing its
Memorandum of dismissal.

In support of the issuance of the writ of temporary injunction, the NLRC adopted the view
that: (1) private respondents cannot be validly dismissed on the strength of petitioner's Code of
Discipline which was declared illegal by this Court for the reason that it was formulated by the
petitioner without the participation of its employees (2) the whimsical, baseless and premature
dismissals of private respondents which "caused them grave and irreparable injury" is enjoinable
as private respondents are left "with no speedy and adequate remedy at law' except the issuance
of a temporary mandatory injunction; (3) the NLRC is empowered not only to restrain any actual
or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts but also to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith,
may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party; and (4) the temporary mandatory power of
the NLRC was recognized by this Court.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that the NLRC erred in granting a temporary
injunction order when it has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or restraining order since this
may be issued only under Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor
disputes.
The NLRC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The now petitioner, for one,
cannot validly claim that NLRC cannot exercise its injunctive power under Article 218 (e) of the
Labor Code on the pretext that what NLRC have here is not a labor dispute as long as it concedes
that as defined by law, Labor Dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or
conditions of employment.

Issue:
WON the NLRC even without a complaint for illegal dismissal filed before the labor arbiter,
entertain an action for injunction and issue such writ enjoining petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc.
from enforcing its Orders of dismissal against private respondents, and ordering petitioner to
reinstate the private respondents to their previous positions.

Ruling:
No. It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the contending
parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no labor dispute between the
petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed
with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner. The petition for injunction
directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal dismissal. Thus, the NLRC exceeded
its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting private respondents' petition for
injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents. Under the Labor Code, the
ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed employee is to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the labor arbiter. In the case at bar, private respondents disregarded this rule and
directly went to the NLRC through a petition for injunction praying that petitioner be enjoined from
enforcing its dismissal orders. Furthermore, an examination of private respondents' petition for
injunction reveals that it has no basis since there is no showing of any urgency or irreparable
injury which the private respondents might suffer.

An injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law considering that it

generally has not proved to be an effective means of settling labor disputes. It has been the policy
of the State to encourage the parties to use the non-judicial process of negotiation and
compromise, mediation and arbitration. Thus, injunctions may be issued only in cases of extreme
necessity based on legal grounds clearly established, after due consultations or hearing and when
all efforts at conciliation are exhausted which factors, however, are clearly absent in the present
case.
Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive rights or interest.
It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is
resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot
be remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the injunctive writ rests upon
the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case be regularly heard.
The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint
alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction and that on
the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect
the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation. Injunction is also a special equitable relief
granted only in cases where there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.
 6.) Pastor Dinisio Austria v. NLRC, Philippine Union Mission Corporation of
the Seventh Day Adventists, et. al.

FACTS:
Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the Seventh-Day Adventists (SDA) for twenty eight (28)
years from 1963 to 1991. He started as a literature evangelist and worked his way up until he
became District Pastor of the Negros Mission of the SDA. In January 1991, Austria was
transferred to Bacolod City. He held the position of District Pastor until his services were
terminated on October 31, 1991. Before his termination, Austria had
received communications from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking
Austria to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by
his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same
to the Negros Mission. Austria reasoned in his written explanation dated October 11, 1991 that
he should not be made accountable for the unremitted collections since it was Pastor Gideon
Buhat and Mr. Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since
Pastor Austria was very sick to do the collecting at that time.

On October 16, 1991, Austria went to the office of Pastor Buhat, who was the president of the
Negros Mission, to persuade Buhat to convene the Executive Committee to settle a dispute
between Pastor Austria and Pastor David Rodrigo. But that meeting ended in a heated altercation
between Austria and Buhat. The next day, the Austria couple received an invitation to attend the
Executive Committee meeting on October 21, 1991 to discuss the non-remittance of the church
collection and the events that transpired on October 16, 1991. A fact-finding committee was
created to investigate Austria. Sensing that the investigation would be one-sided, Pastor Austria
wrote to Pastor Rueben Moralde, president of the SDA and chairman of the fact-finding
committee, to request that certain members of the fact-finding committee be excluded in the
investigation and resolution of the case. Out of the six (6) members requested to inhibit, only two
(2) were actually excluded, namely: Pastor Buhat and Pastor Rodrigo.

On October 29, 1991, Austria received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of

denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of
duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer’s duly authorized
representative as grounds for the termination of his services. Austria filed a complaint on
November 14, 1991 before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal against the SDA and its officers
and prayed for reinstatement with back wages and benefits, moral and exemplary damages and
other labor law benefits.

On February 15, 1993, Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideo rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. The SDA appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC which vacated the
findings of the Labor Arbiter on August 26,1994 and dismissed the case for lack of merit. Austria
filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing its original decision.
The SDA filed a motion for reconsideration saying that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over
the complaint due to the constitutional provision on the separation of church and state since the
case allegedly involved an ecclesiastical affair to which the State cannot interfere. The NLRC,
without ruling on the merits of the case, reversed itself once again, sustained the argument posed
by SDA and, accordingly, dismissed the complaint of Austria. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a manifestation and motion saying it cannot sustain the resolution of the NLRC and
submitting that the termination of petitioner of his employment may be questioned before the
NLRC as the same is secular in nature, not ecclesiastical.
ISSUE:
Was the termination of Pastor Austria’s services an ecclesiastical affair and, as such, involved
the separation of church and state?

HELD:
No. An ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and
relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation.
Examples of so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for
excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, and administration of sacraments. While the
matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister, it does not give the case a religious
significance. What is involved is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister
as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith,
worship or doctrines of the church. Pastor Austria was not excommunicated or expelled from the
membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment. As pointed out by the OSG in its
memorandum, the grounds invoked for Austria’s dismissal are all based on Article 282 of the
Labor Code which enumerates the just causes for termination of employment. It is palpable by
this alone that the reason for Austria’s dismissal from the service is not religious in nature.
Coupled with this is the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with a copy of Austria’s letter of
termination which again is an eloquent admission by the SDA that NLRC has jurisdiction over the
case. Aside from these, SDA admitted in a certification issued by Mr. Ibesate that Austria has
been its employee for twenty-eight (28) years. SDA even registered petitioner with the Social
Security System (SSS) as its employee. As a matter of fact, the worker’s records of Austria have
been submitted by SDA as part of their exhibits. It is clear from all of these that when the SDA
terminated the services of Austria, it was merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an
employee which it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the case and to determine whether the SDA,
as employer, rightfully exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an employee. This is in
consonance with the mandate of the Constitution to afford full protection to labor.

7.) PATRICIA HALAGUEÑA, et. al. v. PAL

G.R. No. 172013; October 2, 2009
Ponente: J. Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) on
different dates prior to November 22, 1996. They are members of the Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a labor organization certified as the sole and
exclusive certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the flight attendants,
flight stewards and pursers of respondent.

On July 11, 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement
incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter
referred to as PAL-FASAP CBA.

Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, provides that:

A. For the Cabin Attendants hired before 22 November 1996:

xxxx
 3. Compulsory Retirement

Subject to the grooming standards provisions of this Agreement, compulsory retirement shall
be fifty-five (55) for females and sixty (60) for males. x x x.
In a letter dated July 22, 2003, petitioners and several female cabin crews manifested that the
aforementioned CBA provision on compulsory retirement is discriminatory, and demanded for an
equal treatment with their male counterparts. This demand was reiterated in a letter by petitioners'
counsel addressed to respondent demanding the removal of gender discrimination provisions in
the coming re-negotiations of the PAL-FASAP CBA.

On July 29, 2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer
for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners' action challenging the legality or
constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA between
respondent PAL and FASAP.

HELD:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint and
the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to such relief.

The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires
the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret
the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction.

In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, this Court held that not every dispute between an
employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the
exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the
NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-
employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor
statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.

Where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other
labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the
jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter
and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor
management relations or in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but
rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of
competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for
granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears
 G.R. No. 179652 May 8, 2009
8.) PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.), Petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and JANDELEON JUEZAN, Respondents.

FACTS: The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the decision and the resolution of
the Court of Appeals.

The petition traces its origins to a complaint filed by Jandeleon Juezan (respondent) against
People’s Broadcasting Service, Inc. (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc) (petitioner) for illegal deduction,
non-payment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day
and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and non-coverage of SSS, PAG-
IBIG and Philhealth (non-diminution of benefits in the amount allegedly 6K) before the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City.2 On the
basis of the complaint, the DOLE conducted a plant level inspection on 23 September 2003. Labor
Inspector wrote under the heading “Findings/Recommendations” “non-diminution of benefits” and
“Note: Respondent deny employer-employee relationship with the complainant- see Notice of
Inspection results.”

PETITIONER’S POSITION: Management representative informed that complainant is a drama

talent hired on a per drama ” participation basis” hence no employer-employeeship [sic] existed
between them. As proof of this, management presented photocopies of cash vouchers, billing
statement, employments of specific undertaking (a contract between the talent director & the
complainant), summary of billing of drama production etc. They (mgt.) has [sic] not control of the
talent if he ventures into another contract w/ other broadcasting industries.

RULING OF DOLE REGIONAL DIRECTOR: respondent is an employee of petitioner, and that

the former is entitled to his money claims amounting toP203,726.30. MR denied; Appeal with the
DOLE Secretary, dismissed the appeal on the ground that petitioner did not post a cash or surety
bond and instead submitted a Deed of Assignment of Bank Deposit.

APPEAL WITH THE CA: claiming that it was denied due process when the DOLE Secretary
disregarded the evidence it presented and failed to give it the opportunity to refute the claims of
respondent. Petitioner maintained that there is no employer-employee relationship had ever
existed between it and respondent because it was the drama directors and producers who paid,
supervised and disciplined respondent. It also added that the case was beyond the jurisdiction
of the DOLE and should have been considered by the labor arbiter because respondent’s claim
exceeded P5,000.00. CA denied.

WITH THE SC: petitioner argues that the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and not
the DOLE Secretary, has jurisdiction over respondent’s claim, in view of Articles 217 and 128 of
the Labor Code.

RESPONDENT’S POSITION: respondent posits that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its
discretion. He invokes Republic Act No. 7730, which “removes the jurisdiction of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives, from the effects of the restrictive
provisions of Article 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, regarding the confinement of jurisdiction
based on the amount of claims.”; and wrong mode of appeal.
ISSUE: WON the Secretary of Labor have the power to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship.

HELD: No
To resolve this pivotal issue, one must look into the extent of the visitorial and enforcement power
of the DOLE found in Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act 7730. It
reads:

Article 128 (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary,
and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor
and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance
orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation
based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers
made in the course of inspection xxx

The provision is quite explicit that the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE comes
into play only “in cases when the relationship of employer-employee still exists.” Of
course, a person’s entitlement to labor standard benefits under the labor laws presupposes the
existence of employer-employee relationship in the first place.The clause signifies that the
employer-employee relationship must have existed even before the emergence of the
controversy. Necessarily, the DOLE’s power does not apply in two instances, namely: (a)
where the employer-employee relationship has ceased; and (b) where no such relationship
has ever existed.

The first situation is categorically covered by Sec. 3, Rule 11 of the Rules on the Disposition of
Labor Standards Cases15 issued by the DOLE Secretary. It reads:

Rule II MONEY CLAIMS ARISING FROM COMPLAINT/ROUTINE INSPECTION

Sec. 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually exists. Where employer-

employee relationship no longer exists by reason of the fact that it has already been severed,
claims for payment of monetary benefits fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
labor arbiters. Accordingly, if on the face of the complaint, it can be ascertained that
employer-employee relationship no longer exists, the case, whether accompanied by an
allegation of illegal dismissal, shall immediately be endorsed by the Regional Director to
the appropriate branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Clearly the law accords a prerogative to the NLRC over the claim when the employer-employee
relationship has terminated or such relationship has not arisen at all. The reason is obvious. In
the second situation especially, the existence of an employer-employee relationship is a matter
which is not easily determinable from an ordinary inspection, necessarily so, because the
elements of such a relationship are not verifiable from a mere ocular examination. The
determination of which should be comprehensive and intensive and therefore best left to
the specialized quasi-judicial body that is the NLRC.

It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power somehow
has to make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Such
prerogatival determination, however, cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement
power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely preliminary, incidental and collateral to the
DOLE’s primary function of enforcing labor standards provisions. The determination of the
existence of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC.
Thus, before the DOLE may exercise its powers under Article 128, two important questions must
be resolved: (1) Does the employer-employee relationship still exist, or alternatively, was there
ever an employer-employee relationship to speak of; and (2) Are there violations of the Labor
Code or of any labor law?

A mere assertion of absence of employer-employee relationship does not deprive the DOLE of
jurisdiction over the claim under Article 128 of the Labor Code. At least a prima facie showing of
such absence of relationship, as in this case, is needed to preclude the DOLE from the exercise
of its power.

Without a doubt, petitioner, since the inception of this case had been consistent in
maintaining that respondent is not its employee. Certainly, a preliminary determination,
based on the evidence offered, and noted by the Labor Inspector during the inspection as
well as submitted during the proceedings before the Regional Director puts in genuine
doubt the existence of employer-employee relationship. From that point on, the prudent
recourse on the part of the DOLE should have been to refer respondent to the NLRC for
the proper dispensation of his claims.Furthermore, as discussed earlier, even the evidence
relied on by the Regional Director in his order are mere self-serving declarations of respondent,
and hence cannot be relied upon as proof of employer-employee relationship.
Petition GRANTED.

Other Issues (Just in case it will be asked, mahaba2 ung case)

 Aside from lack of jurisdiction, there is another cogent reason to to set aside the Regional
Director’s 27 February 2004 Order. A careful study of the case reveals that the said Order,
which found respondent as an employee of petitioner and directed the payment of
respondent’s money claims, is not supported by substantial evidence, and was even made
in disregard of the evidence on record.
 Even if the labor inspector had noted petitioner’s manifestation and documents in the
Notice of Inspection Results, it is clear that he did not give much credence to said
evidence, as he did not find the need to investigate the matter further. The labor inspector
could have exerted a bit more effort and looked into petitioner’s payroll, for example, or its
roll of employees, or interviewed other employees in the premises.
 The Court further examined the records and discovered to its dismay that even the
Regional Director turned a blind eye to the evidence presented by petitioner and relied
instead on the self-serving claims of respondent.

REPONDENT’S CLAIM IN HIS POSITION PAPER: hired by petitioner in September 1996 as a
radio talent/spinner, working from 8:00 am until 5 p.m., six days a week, on a gross rate of P60.00
per script, earning an average of P15,0000.00 per month, payable on a semi-monthly basis xxx In
support of his position paper, respondent attached a photocopy of an identification card
purportedly issued by petitioner, bearing respondent’s picture and name with the designation
“Spinner”; at the back of the I.D., the following is written: ” This certifies that the card holder is a
duly Authorized MEDIA Representative of BOMBO RADYO PHILIPPINES …
Certificates were also submitted by respondent to support his claim.

EXISTENCE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP: Furthermore, respondent’s pieces

of evidence—the identification card and the certification issued by petitioner’s Greman Solante—
are not even determinative of an employer-employee relationship. The certification, issued upon
the request of respondent, specifically stated that “MR. JANDELEON JUEZAN is a program
employee of PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC. (DYMF- Bombo Radyo Cebu),” it is
not therefore “crystal clear that complainant is a station employee rather than a program employee
hence entitled to all the benefits appurtenant thereto,”26 as found by the DOLE Regional Director.
Respondent should be bound by his own evidence. Moreover, the classification as to whether
one is a “station employee” and “program employee,” as lifted from Policy Instruction No.
40,27 dividing the workers in the broadcast industry into only two groups is not binding on this
Court, especially when the classification has no basis either in law or in fact.28
Even the identification card purportedly issued by petitioner is not proof of employer-employee
relationship since it only identified respondent as an “Authorized Representative of Bombo
Radyo…,” and not as an employee.

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: It has long been established that in administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings, substantial evidence is sufficient as a basis for judgment on the existence of
employer-employee relationship. Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in
labor cases, is “that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.”
 In the instant case, save for respondent’s self-serving allegations and self-defeating
evidence, there is no substantial basis to warrant the Regional Director’s finding that
respondent is an employee of petitioner.

RE APPEAL BOND: The purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the period of appeal,
against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees under
the judgment if subsequently affirmed.40 The Deed of Assignment in the instant case, like a cash
or surety bond, serves the same purpose. First, the Deed of Assignment constitutes not just a
partial amount, but rather the entire award in the appealed Order. Second, it is clear from the
Deed of Assignment that the entire amount is under the full control of the bank, and not of
petitioner, and is in fact payable to the DOLE Regional Office, to be withdrawn by the same office
after it had issued a writ of execution. For all intents and purposes, the Deed of Assignment in
tandem with the Letter Agreement and Cash Voucher is as good as cash. Third, the Court finds
that the execution of the Deed of Assignment, the Letter Agreement and the Cash Voucher were
made in good faith, and constituted clear manifestation of petitioner’s willingness to pay the
judgment amount.

MODE OF APPEAL: it is settled, as a general proposition, that the availability of an appeal does
not foreclose recourse to the extraordinary remedies, such as certiorari and prohibition, where
appeal is not adequate or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient xxx
This Court has even recognized that a recourse to certiorari is proper not only where there is a
clear deprivation of petitioner’s fundamental right to due process, but so also where other special
circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action. After all, this Court has previously ruled
that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie if it is satisfactorily1avvphiestablished that the
tribunal had acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to or even
decisive of the controversy
9.) JULIUS KAWACHI and GAYLE KAWACHI vs. DOMINIE DEL QUERO and HON. JUDGE
MANUEL R. TARO, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 43, Quezon City
G.R. No. 163768, March 27, 2007

FACTS:
Private respondent Dominie Del Quero charged A/J Raymundo Pawnshop, Inc., Virgilio Kawachi
and petitioner Julius Kawachi with illegal dismissal, non-execution of a contract of employment,
violation of the minimum wage law, and non-payment of overtime pay. The complaint was filed
before NLRC. The complaint essentially alleged that Virgilio Kawachi hired private respondent
as a clerk of the pawnshop and that on certain occasions, she worked beyond the regular working
hours but was not paid the corresponding overtime pay. The complaint also narrated an incident
on 10 August 2002, wherein petitioner Julius Kawachi scolded private respondent in front of many
people about the way she treated the customers of the pawnshop and afterwards terminated
private respondent’s employment without affording her due process.

On 7 November 2002, private respondent Dominie Del Quero filed an action for damages against
petitioners Julius Kawachi and Gayle Kawachi before the MeTC of Quezon City. The complaint
for damages specifically sought the recovery of moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint in the MeTC on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and forum-shopping. Petitioners argue that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the action
for damages because the alleged injury is work-related. They also contend that private
respondent should not be allowed to split her causes of action by filing the action for damages
separately from the labor case.

The RTC held that private respondent’s action for damages was based on the alleged tortious
acts committed by her employers and did not seek any relief under the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in this instant action

HELD:
NO, the RTC has no jurisdiction in the instant case.

Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original
and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations —
in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor
laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.

Under the reasonable causal connection rule, if there is a reasonable causal connection between
the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction
of our labor courts. In the absence of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.

It is clear that the question of the legality of the act of dismissal is intimately related to the issue
of the legality of the manner by which that act of dismissal was performed. But while the Labor
Code treats of the nature of, and the remedy available as regards the first – the employee’s
separation from employment – it does not at all deal with the second – the manner of that
separation – which is governed exclusively by the Civil Code. In addressing the first issue, the
Labor Arbiter applies the Labor Code; in addressing the second, the Civil Code. And this appears
to be the plain and patent intendment of the law. For apart from the reliefs expressly set out in
the Labor Code flowing from illegal dismissal from employment, no other damages may be
awarded to an illegally dismissed employee other than those specified by the Civil Code. Hence,
the fact that the issue—of whether or not moral or other damages were suffered by an employee
and in the affirmative, the amount that should properly be awarded to him in the circumstances—
is determined under the provisions of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code, obviously was not
meant to create a cause of action independent of that for illegal dismissal and thus place the
matter beyond the Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction.

In the instant case, the allegations in private respondent’s complaint for damages show that her
injury was the offshoot of petitioners’ immediate harsh reaction as her administrative superiors to
the supposedly sloppy manner by which she had discharged her duties. Petitioners’ reaction
culminated in private respondent’s dismissal from work in the very same incident. The incident on
10 August 2002 alleged in the complaint for damages was similarly narrated in private
respondent’s Affidavit-Complaint supporting her action for illegal dismissal before the NLRC.
Clearly, the alleged injury is directly related to the employer-employee relations of the parties.

Where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds
from a different source of obligation, the Court has not hesitated to uphold the jurisdiction of
the regular courts. Where the damages claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution,
or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee or
seeks liquidated damages in the enforcement of a prior employment contract, the jurisdiction of
regular courts was upheld. The scenario that obtains in this case is obviously different. The
allegations in private respondent’s complaint unmistakably relate to the manner of her alleged
illegal dismissal.

In the instant case, the NLRC has jurisdiction over private respondent’s complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages arising therefrom. She cannot be allowed to file a separate or
independent civil action for damages where the alleged injury has a reasonable connection to her
termination from employment. Consequently, the action for damages filed before the MeTC must
be dismissed.

Petition is granted.