[Persons and Family Relations - Atty.

Aguila - Block 1]
Be ready to discuss on the first day of class. No laptops/ Ipads during recitation and
discussions.
Articles 1 - 28 New Civil Code
1. Tañada vs. Tuvera (GRN 63915; 146 SCRA 446)
2. Consuji vs. CA (GRN 137873; 20 April 2001)
3. Espiritu vs Cipriano (55 SCRA 533)
4. Government vs. Mun of Binalman (32 Phil 634)
5. People vs. Zeta (L-7140; 22 December 1955)
6. DBP vs CA (96 SCRA 342)
7. Araneta vs. Doronila (72 SCRA 413)
8. Franklin Baker vs Alillana (21 SCRA 1247)
9. San Miguel vs. Cruz (31 SCRA 819)
10. People vs Licera (65 SCRA 270)
11. People vs. Jabinal (55 SCRA 607)
12. Apiag vs. Cantero (79 SCAD 327)
13. Weigel vs. Sempio-Diy (143 SCRA 499)
14. Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation (136 SCRA 136)
15. Republic Flour Mills, Inc. vs. COC (39 SCRA 269)
16. Bello vs. CA (56 SCRA 509)
17. Garvida vs. Sales (271 SCRA 767)
18. Bellis vs. Bellis (20 SCRA 358)
19. Cogeo-Cubao Operators vs. CA (207 SCRA 343)
20. Gashem Shookat Baksh
21. Wassmer vs Velez
22. Constantino vs. Mendez
23. Quimiguing vs. Icao (34 SCRA 133)\
24. Republic vs. Ballocanag
25. Republic vs. Lacup
26. RCPI vs. Verchez
27. Ledesma vs. CA (160 SCRA 449)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184,
197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358,
359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491,
503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050,
1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279,
1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136,
141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204,
205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-
261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303,
309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382,
385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501,
399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615,
641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-
1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-
1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-
1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-
1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889,
1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984,
1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-
492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549,
551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647,
649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51,
59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433,
436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright
on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns
a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual,
as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor
General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of
Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the
proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this
character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule
in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the
case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general
rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule
does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule
may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted
upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround
this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the
relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this
character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to
be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it
would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering
that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the
people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question
contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official
Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article
2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638
provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4]
such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as
the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have
general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication
of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon
the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are
kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such
publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have
actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo
la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales
decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance
and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which
all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and
the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to
obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court,
quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts
done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only
during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's
declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to
their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court
had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County,
118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect
of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private
and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute
and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions
are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that
an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the
right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor
before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences
which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can
be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter
may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented
or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice
Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents
of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of
policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some
criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would
unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for
unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be
admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under
all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me,
raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now
applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my
mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute
or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana.
Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this
case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties
before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement
with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it
requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds
that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would
indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it
is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure
once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of
its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect
of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could
be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance
with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in
the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on
such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could
still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our
decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still
be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm
that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as
to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover,
the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and
cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or
executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin
that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too
far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay
concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable
opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey
before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due
process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil
Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for
the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they
are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only
laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette
for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code
is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has
been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise
that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain
respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity
and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their
effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient
of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will
not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned
in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due
process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by
publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided "
Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with
a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each
law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a
different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere
than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act
to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its
frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director
of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official
Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the
Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important"
ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all
statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of
general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it
will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is
elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall
be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of
such publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a
public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would
unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for
unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be
admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under
all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me,
raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now
applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my
mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute
or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana.
Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this
case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or
before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement
with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it 5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin
requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too
that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2 far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay
indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it concur in this separate opinion.
is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of
its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect
of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could
be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in
the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still
opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey
be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil
Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm
the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as
therewith.
to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover,
the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only
laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette
for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code
is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has
been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise
that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain
respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity
and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their
effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient
of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will
not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned
in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due
process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by
publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided "
Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with
a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each
law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a
different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere
than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act
to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its
frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director
of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official
Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the
Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important"
ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all
statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of
general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it
will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is
elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall
be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of
such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a
public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Footnotes
1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shag be recognized, access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be
afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45
Phil. 345; Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose
Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.
3 16 Phil. 366, 378.
4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs.
Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87
Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17
SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.
5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of
Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.
8 308 U.S. 371, 374.
9 93 Phil.. 68,.
10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director
Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the Government Printing Office, failed to respond
to her letter-request regarding the respective dates of publication in the
Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report has
been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-
publication of other presidential issuances.
11 129 SCRA 174.
Fernando, CJ.:
1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills
connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex
rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of
Indiana, U.S.A
2 Ibid, closing paragraph.
3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).
4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).
5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30,
1982, 111 SCRA 433.
6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24
SCRA 172.
Teehankee, J.:
1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief
Justice Paras.
2 Notes in brackets supplied.
3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.
 Plana, J.:
* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall
provide publication of all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in
force until published." See also S ate ex rel. White vs. Grand Superior
Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a
report dated November 25, 1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro
Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending
physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A.
Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their
work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D,
Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel)
measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable
wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when
suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block
with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the
victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building
under construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2)
companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform
he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform
was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to
the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits
from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff,
as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the
RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE
REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED
NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE
OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR[sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS
PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, AND
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT
IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE
CIVIL CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore,
inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official
records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows
of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception.4 A witness,
therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was
told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions,
sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion
of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-
examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by
cross-examination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among which are entries in
official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facieevidence of
the facts therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice
Moran, enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
 (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by
such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by
him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the
last requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified
before the trial court. In Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire
Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report also testified before the trial
court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving the
truth of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part
of the testimony of the officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for
cross-examination, the portions of the report which were of his personal
knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were not
hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the statements of the
parties based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as
well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of
the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered as independently
relevant statements which were gathered in the course of the investigation and
may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It
has been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has
been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the
statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such statement is
not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his
Report and made himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party,
the Report, insofar as it proved that certain utterances were made (but not their
truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44
of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in
open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the matter as an
exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record
admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The
underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness,
as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed;
the occasions in which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary
duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The public officers are few
in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not
needed from official sources. Were there no exception for official
statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of
their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition
before an officer. The work of administration of government and the
interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in
consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is
accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents.
(3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes
they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and,
therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their duty may be given
in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution
as to the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not
presented to testify on his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of
Rule 143 would have been ripe for determination, and this Court would have
agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the
aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the
sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information,"
there being no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the
statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth
of the statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
testimony of PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of
his personal knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the
elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s remains at the morgue,12 making the
latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the
premises of the building the day after the incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He
observed that the platform was crushed15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3
Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the police
headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting
machine, without any pin or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the
cause of the fall of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is
claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain
exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.19
Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa
loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that
the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the
instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere
happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or
presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for
itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the
facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury
complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that
the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things
would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care,
there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was
caused by the defendant’s want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary
evidence is absent or not available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant
in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of
the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has
no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general
terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to
establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon
the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is
practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which
a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows
or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant
in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the
theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it
is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his
part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power.
Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or
means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be
charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of
the accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:
 There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th floor of a
building to the basement while he was working with appellant’s construction
project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within the exclusive control
and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent,
a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the situation
therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other
hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res
ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not
readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident
was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while
performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the
first requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As
explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human
resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and
management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No
contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband[;]
thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the
rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference
of appellant’s negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur, but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise
since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s
husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated
earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes
the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The
presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under
appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or
innocence, may outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its
defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant
of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the
doctrine has been established. 1âwphi1.nêt
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro
executed before the police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s
sworn statement, the company enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security
of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before
allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in
arguing that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s
employees, also assails the same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are
inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not
only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the
affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared
by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s
statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing
them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any more
than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husband’s death.
Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or
presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish
any defense relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death
benefits provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from
the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the
State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise
 entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The
payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act
Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six
hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four
as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or
by other agencies of the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, provided that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies granted by
this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to
compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act
as well as under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court
finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a
cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging
that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and regulations, failed to
take the required precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the
deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court of First
Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the
Court En Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the
affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs
in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing
themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and
suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual,
moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of
the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company,
32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from
the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but
he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their
suit under the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to
dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the
deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza,
Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to the
Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been
paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs
decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by
herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968
x x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act before they learned of the official report
of the committee created to investigate the accident which established the
criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was
forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a
letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an
action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that
Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners
only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of
said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation.
The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact,
which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should
 therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However,
should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the
payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted
from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated
in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-
Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again
recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the
Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in
the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen’s
Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In
Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants
may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil
Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the
other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will
preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is
where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because
private respondent was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for
death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint
for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the
Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s
personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents in
the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the
"case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of
appellant as early as November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigator’s
report. The appellee merely executed her sworn statement before the police
investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation to the victim,
and her knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellant’s employees. It was the
investigator who recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor referred
the same to the prosecutor’s office. This is a standard operating procedure for
police investigators which appellee may not have even known. This may explain
why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public
prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent
Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence
Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance
to appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following
statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant to
Law waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no
reason for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of
appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed on appellee before she applied for
death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment therefrom.
Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9,
1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991
Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for
insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The death of the victim is not
attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and as
shown by the records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.)
Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellee’s allegation
that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and
received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case
fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her
rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary
school for her educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could
be recovered from the death of her husband; and that she did not know that she
may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to
allege in her complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were
attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial,
the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts
because as early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a
criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s
employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the action in the lower
court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there was
insufficient evidence against petitioner’s employees, the case was "civil in nature." These
purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2,
1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two choices of
remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the
ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent
remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with
the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election
acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to
mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to
hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent
any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election.
Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under
the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The
claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its
rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party
claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the
time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of
all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material
fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under
a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a
right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent
decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right
waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made
knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the
exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to
allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus,
erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On
the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3
of its Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner
to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself
pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her
husband’s death and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In
this case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of
petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the
prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it was
the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of government rules and
regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter,
however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final
say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears,
therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been
misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the
elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for
benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be
days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
November 27, 1990. is AFFIRMED.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her SO ORDERED.
when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified
that she was not aware of her rights. Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law Footnote
excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil 1
Exhibit "A," Records, pp. 60-61.
Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling
in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies. 2
Rollo, pp. 79-80.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and 3
Id., at 19.
prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which,
notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the
laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither
4
Sec. 36, Rule 130.
mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against
her.
5 People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312 (1983).

Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not
631A C.J.S. Evidence § 194. See also Philippine Home Assurance Corp. vs.
indicate the total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 479 (1996).
appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the
accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, 75 J. H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in
according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was Trials at Common Law 3 (3rdEd.).
P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than
the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is subject to 8 San Sebastian College vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 138 (1991).
speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such determination. Should
the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already 9 See Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sections 37-47.
received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial
court'’ award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to 10
16 SCRA 448 (1966). See also People vs. San Gabriel, 253 SCRA 84 (1996).
prevent double compensation.
11
273 SCRA 607 (1997).
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to
determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC.
Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC,
12
TSN, December 20, 1991, p. 9.
13
Id., at 28; TSN, January 6, 1992, p. 29. 29
People vs. Ramos, supra.

14
Id., at 29; Ibid. 30
136 SCRA 141 (1985).

15
Id., at 33. 31
Justices Aquino, Melencio-Herrera, and Gutierrez dissented.

16
Id., at 34. 32
151 SCRA 333 (1987).

17
Id., at 24 and 28. 33
157 SCRA 446 (1988).

18
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sections 49-50. 34
164 SCRA 317 (1988).

19
Id., Sec. 48. 35
Rollo, pp. 90-91. Underscoring by the Court of Appeals.

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 (1988). See
20 36
Id., at 90. Underscoring by the Court of Appeals.
also Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 (1996); Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 657 37
Id., at § 5.
(1986).
38
Id., at § 2.
21
57B Am Jur 2d, Negligence § 1819.
39
Castro vs. Del Rosario, et al., 19 SCRA 196 (1967).
22
Id., at 1824.
40
28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 202.
23
Id., at 1914.
41
Records, pp. 17-18.
24
Rollo, pp. 87-88.
I Tolentino, A.M. Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
42

Whether the doctrine raises a presumption or merely an inference is subject to

25
Philippines 19 (1995).
debate. See 57B Am Jur 2d, Negligence §§ 1925-1928.
43
Records, p. 100.
26
Id., at 1920.

27
Id., at 1947.

People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 (1984); People vs. Quidato, 297 SCRA 1
28

(1998).
 material facts surrounding his case and, therefore, he was not able to fully determine his
defenses; and (2) that prior to the hearing of the case in the lower court he wanted to
Republic of the Philippines cause the filing of an amended answer but was not able to do so for his alleged failure to
SUPREME COURT contact his counsel. The motion to file amended answer was denied by the Court. The
Manila parties eventually submitted a stipulation of facts, the salient provisions of which read as
follows:
FIRST DIVISION
1. The plaintiffs are the owners of the property in question, leased to the
defendant since 1954;

2. The house of the defendant was built on the property with the
G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974
knowledge and consent of the plaintiff pursuant to an oral contract of
lease;
PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners,
vs.
3. Before 1969 the lease of the property was on year-to-year
RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL, BRANCH
arrangement, rentals being then payable at or before the end of the year;
XV, respondents.
4. The following are the rates of rentals:
Concepcion, Victorino, Sanchez and Associates for petitioners.
(a) 1954 to 1957 P12.00 a year
Jose G. Ricardo for respondent Ricardo Cipriano.
(b) 1968 to 1959 P13.20 a year

ESGUERRA, J.:p (c) 1960 to 1961 P14.00 a year

In this petition for certiorari, petitioners seek the review and nullification of two orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, (d) 1962 P16.00 a year
Branch XV, the first, dated August 4, 1970 sustaining private respondent Ricardo Cipriano's motion to dismiss "on the
authority of Republic Act 6126", and the second, dated October 16, 1970, denying the motion for reconsideration of the first
order. The question before Us involves the retroactive application of the provisions of Republic Act 6126, otherwise known (e) 1963 to 1965 P24.70 a year
as the Rental Law.

(f) 1967 to 1968 P48.00 a year

The case originated as one for unlawful detainer instituted on May 30, 1969, by plaintiffs,
now petitioners, in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, against private respondent
5. Effective January 1969 the lease was converted to a month-to-month
Ricardo Cipriano for the latter's alleged failure to pay rentals. An adverse judgment
basis and rental was increased to P30.00 a month by the plaintiffs;
having been rendered against said respondent, he appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 338-M. In the said
Court private respondent sought to amend his Answer filed in the Municipal Court on the 6. The defendant has remained in possession of the property up to the
grounds that (1) for lack of time he was not able to disclose to his former counsel all the present;
 7. Since January 1969 the defendant has not paid rental at the present
monthly rate;
8. A formal notice to vacate, dated March 22, 1969, was sent by
registered mail to, and received by, defendant.
On July 7, 1970, Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an
order giving private respondent herein seven days within which to file his motion to
dismiss. Subsequently, on July 13, 1970, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's
complaint, invoking the prohibitory provision of Republic Act 6126, entitled "An Act To
Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's Dwelling Is Located
For One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof.
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss but respondent Judge issued an order on
August 4, 1970, which reads:
On the Authority of Republic Act 6126, this Court hereby sustains the
Motion for Dismissal filed by the defendant through counsel, dated July
13, 1970.
A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied by respondent Judge.
Hence this petition.
Thrust upon Us, therefore, for resolution is the problem of whether Republic Act 6126
may be held applicable the case at bar. For convenience We reproduce the pertinent
provisions of law in question:
Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another's
dwelling is located shall, during the period of one year from March 31,
1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and
the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not
exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved June 17, 1970.
It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar
is covered by the aforecited law. We rule otherwise. Established and undisputed is the
fact that the increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January,
1969,1 while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one
year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected. Private respondent,
however, puts forward the argument that there was no perfected contract covering the
increased rate of rentals and conversion thereof into monthly payments of P30.00
effective January 1969, as he did not give his consent thereto. In his brief he alleges:
Defendant (respondent) herein also begs to disagree with the contention
of plaintiffs. We believe and respectfully submit that there would be no
impairment of obligation of contract if Republic Act 6126 were to be
applied to the present case. The alleged new contract of lease and
subsequent increase in the amount of rental were not effected as of
January 1969 with respect to the defendant. He did not accept the new
rate of rental. The eloquent testimonies on record to show that defendant
never accepted the new rate of rental imposed upon him by the plaintiffs
were the pretrials on the case wherein defendant offered to accept the
increase to the tone of 100%. Hence, the new contract of lease
increasing the rental had never been agreed upon by both the plaintiffs
and the defendant because the defendant never gave his consent to the
new rate of rental. In effect, therefore, the alleged new contract of lease
was not a contract at all since it did not have the consent of the other
party, the defendant.
Private respondent's contention is devoid of merit. There is nothing in the stipulation of
facts to show that his consent to the increase in rentals and change in the manner of
payment was essential to its validity. There was no more subsisting yearly contract of
lease at a fixed amount. It had already expired when the increase and conversion into
monthly payments took effect in January, 1969. The lessor was free to fix a higher
amount than that previously paid by the lessee (private respondent herein) and if the
latter did not agree to the increased amount, he could have vacated the premises and
thus rendered himself free from liability. Respondent Cipriano, therefore, cannot invoke
lack of consent on his part as basis for declaring the contract of lease ineffective.
Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be
given retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far
from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and
prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that
laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the
law is clear, Our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found.2 The law
being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation",3 it had a limited
period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that
"No lessor of a dwelling unit or land ... shall, during the period of one year from March 31,
1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to
the approval of this Act." Hence the prohibition against the increase in rentals was
effective on March, 1970, up to March, 1971. Outside and beyond that period, the law did
not, by the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law, did not, by its
express terms, purport to give a retroactive operation. It is a well-established rule of
statutory construction that "Expressium facit cessare tacitum"4 and, therefore, no
reasonable implication that the Legislature ever intended to give the law in question a
retroactive effect may be accorded to the same. A perusal of the deliberations of
Congress on House Bill 953 which became Republic Act No. 6126, as recorded its
Congressional Records of March 5, 1970 reveals the sponsors of the Rental Law did not
entertain for a moment that a retroactive operation would be given to this enactment. We
quote pertinent portions of the discussion:
Remarks of sponsor, Mr. Roces:
Mr. Roces — Mr. Speaker, the President is still observing the effect of the
newly established floating rate. In the meantime we feel that, in line with
the policy that those who have less in life should have more in law,
apartment dwellers are entitled to protection. Therefore this bill proposes
that the rentals paid today will not be increased in the next 18 months.
and on pages 66 and 72 respectively of the same Congressional Record We likewise
find the following:
Mr. Gonzales — Will the gentleman from Manila interpret for us the
phrase "during the period of 6 months preceding the approval of this Act"
in Section 2?5
Mr. Roces. — My interpretation is that the rent being paid during that
period not before will be the one considered.
Mr. Montano — ... The term moratorium as utilized by the gentleman from
Manila at the start of his sponsorship was applied not in its legal
acceptance but generally. For purposes of the bill, the term is construed
as suspension of increasing rents in the meantime that we have not yet
determined the real value of the currency ... .
Respondent's tenacious insistence On the retroactive operation of Republic Act 6126
represents a last ditch effort on his part to hold on to the premises while at the same time
escaping the obligation to pay the increased rate. We can not countenance such a
situation, for to permit the same to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity and
causing injustice to the petitioner herein. Well-settled is the principle that while the
Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of
contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be
construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings,
unless such intent in expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the
language of the enactment,6Similarly, in the case of La Previsora Filipina, Mutual Building
and Loan Association v. Felix Ledda, 66 Phil. 573, 577, this Court said:
It is a principle generally recognized that civil laws have no retroactive
effect unless it is otherwise provided therein (Manila Trading & Supply
Co. v. Santos, G.R. No. 43861). Act No. 4118 does not state that its
provisions shall have retroactive effect, wherefore, it follows, as it is
hereby declared, that it is not applicable to the contracts entered into by
the parties, and, hence the trial court erred in granting possession to the
petitioner.
The petitioner contends that said law is applicable because when the
property in question was sold at public auction said law was already in
force. This contention is in our opinion untenable. The date which should
be taken into account in order to determine the applicability of the law is
the date when the contracts were entered into by the parties and not the
date of the public sale, ... .
Under the circumstances of this case, We, therefore, rule that Republic Act 6126 is not
applicable to the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it
must be held to mean what it plainly says.
WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby
nullified and set aside. The court a quo shall proceed with the prompt disposition of Civil
Case No. 338-M (12285) on the merits in accordance with Republic Act 6031 if
applicable, otherwise under the prevailing procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court.

Costs against respondent.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Stipulation of Facts, paragraph 5, March 3, 1970, 24 of Rollo.

2 Cf. People v. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v.
CB, 22 SCRA 917; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Gracia, 30 SCRA 111.

3 Explanatory Note (RA 6126) H. No. 853 Congressional Record of the

House, 1970 Vol. I, Part I, March 5, 1970.

4 "That which is expressed puts an end to that which is implied."

(Sutherlands Statutory Construction, Vol. 2. Section 4945 p. 412.)

5 "Section 2. It is unlawful for any owner, administrator, agent or any

person, within a period of 18 months from the approval of this Act, to
increase the rental of any building, part or unit thereof for residential
purposes, or to collect any amount in excess of the rental paid for such
building, part or unit thereof during the period of six months preceding the
approval of this Act." ... .

6 Jones v. Summers, 105 Cal. App. 51, 286 Pac. 1093; U.S. v. Whyel 28
F (2d) 30.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8243 December 24, 1915
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINALONAN, objector-appellee, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA, objector-appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for the Government.
No appearance for the other appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is a registration proceedings instituted by the Director of Lands under the provisions
of section 61 of Act No. 926, seeking to compel the registration of all private property
within a prescribed area in the municipality of Binangonan, Province of Pangasinan. This
appeal is brought by one of the private claimants to two parcels of land within that area.
A question has arisen in the discussion of this case as to whether section 61 of Act No.
926 authorizes the institution of compulsory registration proceedings against private
owners or whether it is not confined exclusively to public lands. It is said that Act No. 926
is not applicable to any other than public lands, or, at most, lands claimed by the
Government, In other words, it is said that the Act does not touch upon the compulsory
registration of private titles. Reference is made to the Cadastral Act (No. 2259), which
specifically authorizes the Director of Lands to institute compulsory registration
proceedings against all owners and claimants of property within any area which has
been regularly surveyed and platted under the procedure prescribed in the Act, and the
inference is drawn that section 61 of Act No. 926 does not permit of similar proceedings,
else the Legislature would not have fund it necessary to enact Act No. 2259. Attention is
also directed to the title of the Public Land Act, which contains no mention of compulsory
registration proceedings. No reference is made in Act No. 2259 to the repeal or
amendment of section 61 of Act No. 926, and the inference to be drawn from this is that,
in the view of the Legislature, the latter did not concern the subject-matter of the new Act.
Thus, we have arguments based upon the supposed exclusive subject-matter of the
Public Land Act, upon the failure of the title of that Act to indicate that it contains anything
relating to compulsory registration, and upon a subsequent statute providing for
compulsory registration of privately owned lands without expressly referring to any
previous legislation relating thereto, all of which point to the absence in Act No. 926 of
any provision for the compulsory registration of such privately owned lands. These are
but inferences, however, as to what section 61 of Act No. 926 contains. They do not
afford a conclusive test as to the scope of that Act. Their effectiveness depends upon the
relative clearness of the language used in the Act.
So far as the title is concerned, the Philippine Legislature is not required by the Organic
Act to make the title of a public or general Act a complete index of its contents.
(U.S. vs. Fonseca and Magno, 20 Phil. Rep., 191.) Our present law of perjury is found in
two sections of an Act entitled "An Act authorizing the appointment of commissioners to
make official investigations and fixing their powers, for the payment of witness fees, and
for the punishment of perjury in official investigations." We have held that,
notwithstanding the failure of the title to express an intention to define and punish the
crime of perjury generally, the language of the Act admitted of no other interpretation. It
is well settled that in the absence of constitutional requirements the title of an Act is only
to be used as a guide to ascertaining the legislative will when the language of the Act
does not clearly express its purpose.
Chapter VI of the Public Land Act, wherein is included section 61, is the only chapter of
the Act containing provisions for the compulsory registration of titles by means of judicial
proceedings. It is entitled "Unperfected titles and Spanish grants and concessions." It is
clear that section 54 relates exclusively to public lands to which private persons have
one or the other of the inchoate titles specified in that section. Section 55 to 60, inclusive,
may also be conceded to treat of certain incidents arising out of the attempted
enforcement of the rights granted by section 54. So that thus far, the entire chapter is
devoted to questions relating to the public lands. Section 61 reads:
It shall be lawful for the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, whenever the
opinion of the Chief Executive the public interests shall require it, to cause to be
filed in the Court of Land Registration, through the Attorney-General, a petition
 against the holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant of any land in the Philippine
Islands who shall not have voluntarily come in under the provisions of this
chapter or the Land Registration Act,stating in substance that the title of such
holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant is open to question, or stating in
substance that the boundaries of any such land which has not been brought into
court as aforesaid are open to question, and praying that the title to any such
land or the boundaries thereof or the right to occupancy thereof be settled and
adjudicated. Such petition shall contain all the data essential to furnish a full
notice thereof to the occupants of such land and to all persons who may claim an
adverse interest therein, and shall be accompanied by a plan of the land in
question. The court shall cause service of notice to be made as in order cases,
and shall proceed to hear, try, and determine the questions stated in such
petition or arising in the matter, and settle and determine the ownership of the
land and cause certificate of title to be issued therefor, as in other cases filed
under this chapter.1aw phil.net
Of the italicized words, we note first the expression "any land in the Philippine Islands."
Taken alone, it cannot be said to relate exclusively to public lands any more than it could
be said to relate exclusively to private lands. Taken alone, it must be held to include
both. This interpretation of the phrase receives further confirmation from the fact that it
must be land whose holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant "shall not have voluntarily
come in under the provisions of this chapter or the Land Registration Act." Assuming
without conceding that chapter 6 of the Public Land Act is devoted entirely to public
lands, nothing can be more certain than that the Land Registration Act (No. 496)
provides for the voluntary registration of public lands. There can only be in the Philippine
Islands public or private lands. Unless the reference to those who do not come in
willingly under the Land Registration Act is surplusage, section 61 refers to privately
owned land as well as public land. Whether we consider the phrase "any land in the
Philippine Islands" by itself or with the descriptive phrases "under the provisions of this
chapter or the Land Registration Act," the argument that chapter 6 of Act No. 926 and,
specifically, section 61, does not refer to privately owned lands, falls flat in this view of
the matter. We therefore conclude that section 61 applied to all land in the Philippine
Islands, whether public or private.
Now, what was the occasion for the enactment of the Cadastral Act (No. 2259)? The
inference sought to be drawn is that the necessity of providing a method for requiring the
compulsory registration of private lands is what induced its passage. But there is no
language in the Act that can make it apply exclusively to private property. The first
section begins with language almost identical with the first lines of section 61 of Act No.
926, quoted supra: "Whenever, in the opinion of the Governor-General, the public
interests require that the titles to any lands be settled and adjudicated, upon the order of
the Governor-General, the Director of Lands or the private surveyor named by the
landowners, if the Director of Lands approves, shall make a survey and plan of such
lands." Here we have the same phrase "any lands" as is contained in section 61. But the
new Act outlines a very comprehensive procedure to be followed in such proceeding.
Some of its important features are: a cooperative survey of the entire tract affected by
the proceedings and the proportional distribution of the cost, three-tenths of which borne
by the central and local governments, the remainder being equitably distributed among
the property owners, who may have five years within which to pay the same, and held to
be a tax lien upon the land. While a joint survey may be impliedly authorized under
section 61, nothing is said as to the distribution of the costs, and no method is provided
for their collection. The Cadastral Act requires due notice of the time a survey is to be
commenced; requires all persons interested to give the surveyor any information they
can concerning boundary lines, and makes it a misdemeanor to decline to give such
information upon request, or to obstruct the surveyor in his work; requires the plan to be
prepared with uniform instructions to be issued by the Director of Lands, and provides
that the various parcels shall be designated on the plans by consecutive numbers or, in
the case of cites and towns, by block and lot numbers; requires appearance and answer
within certain specific limits after service of notice of the filing of the petition; provides in
detail for specific and general notice as well as posting of notice in the municipal building,
both of the intended survey and of the filing of the petition by the Director of Lands;
prescribes certain information which every answer to the petition must contain; provides
that a person appointed by the Government shall assist claimants in preparing their
answers without fees; permits a new trial or an appeal to the Supreme Court as to some
of the parcels without disturbing the judgment of the court as to the remainder; taxes
registration fees in accordance with a sliding scale of property values; and makes
provision for the partition of property held pro indiviso while the proceedings are pending.
Even if one or two of these features of the new Act might be deemed by implication to be
contained in section 61 of Act No. 926, it is clear that the new Act solves many questions
and difficulties arising under the old, as well as conferring benefits upon the property
owners in the affected areas not enjoyed under section 61 of the Public Land Act.
Hence, it is much more reasonable to suppose that Act No. 2259 was enacted, not to fill
a void, but to remedy the shortcomings of existing legislation on the same subject. The
fact that the new Act does not expressly state that it amends or repeals section 61 of Act
926 does not necessarily rebut this conclusion. If reference be made to the reports,
scores of cases will be found where legislatures have substituted for inadequate or
imperfect statutes later ones overcoming the difficulties and shortcomings of the former
without reference to them. We have in mind the road laws of Arkansas and New York,
which were wholly inadequate for the regulation of motor vehicles which have so rapidly
increased in numbers and speed within the past few years. In both States the legislature
enacted a brand-new motor vehicle law without reference to the road law. It was held by
the high courts of both States that the road law must be considered repealed so far as
motor vehicles were concerned. (Helena vs. Dunlap, 102 Ark., 131; City of
Buffalo vs. Lewis, 12 N.Y., 193.) In Holmes vs. Mason, 80 Neb., 448), it was said: "The
act in question is a special statute covering the whole subject of homestead, and is
complete in itself. It takes that special subject out of the provisions of the general statute
of descent without amending that statute, and according to our former decisions on this
point is not unconstitutional."
itc-a1f
An act relating to drainage was held to have repealed a prior act providing that public
drains within cities and towns should be maintained "by such authority or town" in
Milligan vs. Arnold (50 Ind. App., 559). The court said: "Having determined that the act
now under consideration fully includes section 10, supra (other than the provision
apparently intended to be omitted), and adds new provisions and provides certain
additional penalties, the present question for decision is controlled by the well-settled law
"that when a new statute was intended to furnish the exclusive rule on a certain subject,
it repeals by implication the old law on the same subject, or when a new statute covers
the whole subject-matter of an old one, and adds new provisions and makes changes,
and where such new law, whether it be in the form of an amendment or otherwise, is
evidently intended to be a revision of the old, it repeals the old law by implication.'"
(Finding vs. Foster, 170 Ind., 325.)
In Thornton vs. State (5 Ga. App., 397), a revision of the banking law was under
consideration. The court said: "Where the later of two acts covers the whole subject-
matter of the earlier one, not purporting to amend it, and plainly shows that it was
intended to be a substitute for the early act, such later act will operate as a repeal of the
earlier one, though the two are not repugnant."
The interpretation placed upon statutes by the executive department is often of great
assistance in determining the intention of the legislature. This is especially true under our
own Government, where the executive heads of the various Departments are also
members of the Upper House of the Legislature. The Secretary of the Interior, in his
annual report for the fiscal year 1910, p. 69, said: "The Director of Lands has elaborated
a plan for compulsory registration of private holdings in entire districts under the
provisions of section 61 of the Public Land Act."
In the Governor-General's annual report for the fiscal year 1912, it is said; "Although fair
results have been obtained in the general cadastral surveys in Cebu and Pangasinan,
made under the provisions of section 61 of the Public Land Act, No. 926, the survey and
settlement of titles in Zamboanga, under the General Cadastral Survey Law, Act No.
2075, passed by the Commission in 1911, has proved beyond a shadow of a doubt the
wisdom of this Act."
In the annual report of the Secretary of the Interior for the same year, we find the
following: "Hearings have been had in three cases of compulsory registration brought
under the provisions of section 61 of the Public Land Act. ... While the cases thus far
adjudicated have been very successful and the results are highly gratifying the provisions
of section 61 are neither complete nor comprehensive, and it is a matter of very great
importance to property holders that a cadastral survey act identical with, or similar to,
that submitted to the Legislature at its last session should be passed."
In the Governor-General's message to the Third Philippine Legislature, October 16,
1912, (Commission Journal, vol. 6, p. 33) it is said: "I have the honor to recommend the
passage of a law providing for a method of general cadastral surveys. Such a law is of
vital importance to the welfare and prosperity of the Islands. Although fair results have
been obtained in the general cadastral surveys in Cebu and Pangasinan under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, and although by Act No. 496 a method of settling titles
guaranteed by the Government has been provided, the costs of registering land and the
delays caused by faulty surveys have so great that land titles are still generally unsettled
and but a minimum of the benefits of the torrens system has been received."
Act No. 2334 provides that certain provisions of the Cadastral Act shall apply to the
compulsory registration proceedings theretofore instituted under the provisions of section
61 of Act No. 926, of which this case is one. This act is what is called a curative statute.
It does not pretend to confer jurisdiction upon the courts to certain compulsory
registration proceedings. On the contrary, it assumes jurisdiction to have been granted
under section 61 of Act No. 926 and merely provides that certain incidental matters
arising in those proceedings shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of the
Cadastral Act. A legislature "has no power to make a decree or judgment rendered
without jurisdiction a valid and binding decree or judgment." (2 Lewis' Southerland Stat.
Const., sec. 676, citing Willis vs. Hodson, 79 Md., 327; 29 Atl., 604.) But the legislature
has power to pass healing Acts which do not impair the obligation of contracts nor
interfere with vested rights. They are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means
of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing
omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or
made harmless, is something which the legislature might have dispensed with by a
previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one. If the irregularity consists in doing
some act, or doing it in the mode which the legislature might have made immaterial by a
prior law, it may do so by a subsequent one. These rules are supported by numerous
cases. (2 Lewis' Southerland Stat. Const., sec. 675.) We conclude that section 61 of Act
No. 926 conferred jurisdiction upon the land court to entertain compulsory registration
proceedings against private property owners.
It is urged that compulsory registration is unconstitutional. But this is no longer an open
question. So far as this court is concerned, the constitutionality of such statutes has been
affirmed in Jose vs. Commander of Philippine Squadron (16 Phil. Rep., 62).
General has certified that the public interests demand the prosecution of compulsory
registration proceedings, the allegations of the Director of Lands in his petition to the
court are mainly for the purpose of requiring all claimants to present their proofs of
ownership in an orderly and methodical manner.
Upon the merits we must affirm the judgment of the trial court. The fact that both lots are
bounded on all sides by public streets; that no portion of either is included within the wall
surrounding the church property; that one of the lots has always served as a public
plaza, there being no other in the poblacion; that the other has been the site of the public
school since 1877, at least; that there is no indication of the church ever having
administered the property, while there is testimony showing that it has been administered
by the municipality; all these facts are well established by the testimony of record. The
fact that portions of these lots were used at times for the forming of religious processions
is not sufficient to justify an award of the land to the appellant in view of the evidence in
favor of the municipality.

As an argument against the validity a judgment under section 61, it is said that the Land For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs of this
Court has no power to enforce its judgment as to the costs of the proceedings, saying appeal against the appellant. So ordered.
that nowhere in the land Registration Act (No. 496) is there authority granted for that
purpose. This objection is now best answered, so far as this case is concerned, by Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
section 18 of the Cadastral Act, made applicable to this case by Act No. 2334, which Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., dissent.
provides that the costs taxes against each parcel shall be considered as a special tax
assessment and shall constitute a first lien upon the land.

It is further objected that section 61 requires five requisites to a valid proceedings

thereunder, to wit: First, that in the opinion of the Governor-General the public interests
demand such action; second, that the action be directed against the holder, possessor,
or occupier of land in the Philippine Islands; third, that such person shall not have
voluntarily come in under the provisions of the Land Registration Act; fourth, that the title
of such occupant is open to question; and fifth, that the boundaries of such land are open
to question. The record establishes all the first four of these requisites. We do not
understand that both title and boundaries to a given parcel need be in doubt in order to
institute compulsory registration proceedings. The section states it in the alternative:
when the title is open to question or to boundaries are open to question. Much depends
upon the Governor-General. It is for him to decide whether the public interests require
the institution of such a proceeding. The public interests may require the compulsory
registration of all property within a given area when some particular parcel is endowed
with a fairly good title and definite boundaries. We take it that when the Governor-
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7140
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. ESTEBAN ZETA, Defendant-Appellant.
Quimbo, Mendiola & Quimbo for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Querube Makalintal and Solicitor
Ramon L. Avancena for appellee.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Samar, finding Esteban Zeta guilty of a violation of Republic Act
No. 145 (which took effect on June 14, 1947), for having solicited,
charged demanded and collected a fee or compensation of P300 for
assisting on Eugenio Albiza in the preparation, presentation and
prosecution of his claim for benefits under the laws of the United
States.chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry c hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
Eugenio Albiza, an enlisted man of the Philippine Army and later of
the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), suffered
disability in the course of rendering services for the army in Aparri,
Cagayan in the year 1942. On November 6, 1946, he promised to
pay Mr. Esteban Zeta 5 per cent of any mount he may receive as a
result of his claim for backpay, insurance or any other privileges
granted by law (Exhibit 1). Zeta prepared the necessary papers for
disability compensation and as a result Albiza received the sum of
P5,919 from the United States Veterans Administration. In
pursuance of the contract, Albiza paid Zeta the sums of P200 on
June 7, 1951 and P100 on June 11, 1951.
December 22, 1955
chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary
The law in force at the time of the execution of that agreement
(Exhibit 1) was Commonwealth Act No. 675, section 11 of which
provides as follows:
No attorney, agent, or other person in charge of the preparation,
filing, or pursuing of any claim for arrears in pay and allowances
under this Act shall demand or charge for his services fees more
than five per centum of the total money value of such arrears in
pay and allowances, and said fees shall become due and
demandable only after the payment of the said arrears in pay and
allowances is received by the widow or orplan entitled thereto. The
LABRADOR, J.: retention or deduction of any amount from any such arrears in pay
and allowances for the payment of fees for such services is
prohibited A violation of any provision of this section shall be
punished by imprisonment of from 6 months to 1 year, or by a fine
of from six hundred to one thousand pesos, or by both such
imprisonment and fine,
But on June 14, 1947, Republic Act No. 145 was passed. It
provides:
Any person assisting a claimant in the preparation, presentation
and prosecution of his claim for benefits under the laws of the
United States administered by the United States Veterans
Administration who shall, directly or indirectly, solicit, contract for,
charge, or receive,m or who shall attempt to solicit, contract for,
charge, or receive any fee or compensation exceeding twenty pesos
in any one claim, or who shall collect his fee before the claim is
actually paid to a beneficiary or claimant, shall be deemed guilty of
an offense and upon conviction therof shall for every offense be
fined not exceeding one thousand pesos or imprisonment not
chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
exceeding two years or both, in the discretion of the court.
The trial court held that upon the passage of Republic Act No. 145,
the agreement for the payment of a 5 per cent fee on the amount
collected was voided and compliance therewith became illegal; so it
sentenced the defendant-appellant to pay a fine of P200, to
indemnify Eugenio Albiza in the sum of P280, or suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
On this appeal, defendant-appellant's counsel contends that the
application of Republic Act No. 145 to the defendant-appellant for
having charged and collected the fee of 5 per cent is an
infringement of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws. And the case of U.S. vs. Diaz Conde, et al., 42 Phil., 766, is
cited for the principle that law impairing the obligations of a
contract is null and void; that a law must be construed
prospectively, not retroactively, so that if it is legal at its inceptionit
can not be declared illegal by subsequent legislation, otherwise the
sanctity of contracts will be impaired in violation of the organic law.
In this case the defendant-appellant had collected interest in the
years 1915 and 1916 at the rate of 5 per cent per month, an
interest in excess of that authorized by the Usury Law (Act No.
2655), which took effect In May, 1916, and the court held that the
collection of the said interest was legal at the time it was made and
that it cannot be declared illegal by any subsequent legislation. This
case is not exactly in point, because when the Usury Law was
passed the interest had already been collected; whereas in the case
at bar the collection of the fee was effected after Republic Act No.
145 had been passed. The claim that said Act is an ex post
facto law is not fully justified because although the services were
rendered before the Act took effect, collection for said services did
not take place until after the law became effective. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry
In defense of the judgment of conviction, the Solicitor General
argues that contracts are not beyond the reach of legislation by
Congress in the proper exercise of the police power of the State,
and as Republic Act No. 145 was enacted in pursuance thereto, its
applicability to the appellant must be sustained; that the rights of
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry defendant-appellant under the contract, Exhibit 1, had not become
absolute at the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 154,
because the agreed fee had not been collected, so that the non-
impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution is not applicable
thereto. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
Without passing upon the above arguments of both parties, we note
that it does not appear from the language of the law itself, or from
any other circumstances, that the Legislature had intended to give
its provisions any retroactive effect such as to affect contracts
entered into under the sanction of the previous law (Commonwealth
Act No. 675). We must, therefor, consider it prospective, not
retroactive.
. . . The presumption, however, is that all laws operate
prospectively only and only when the legislative has clearly
indicated its intention that the law operate retroactively will the
courts so apply it. Retroactive operation will more readily be
ascribed to legislation that is curative or legalizing than to
legislation which may disadvantageously, though legally, effect past
relations and transactions. (2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, p.
243.).chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary
. . . Beginning with Kent's dictum in Dash vs. Van Kleeck, it has
c hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
been continuously reaffirmed that 'The rule is that statutes are
prospective, and will not be construed to have retroactive
operation, unless the language employed in the enactment is so
clear it will admit of no other construction.(Id., p. 135.).
Besides, it should not be interpreted in a manner that would render
its application violative of a constitutional inhibition.
Strict construction to prevent retroactive operation has often been
applied in order that the statute would not violate contract
obligations or interfere with vested rights. The principal explanation
offered by the courts, however, is that the statute must be
construed so as to sustain its constitutionality and thus prospective
right to accrue is one thing; enforcement thereof by actual payment
is another. The subsequent law enacted after the rendition of the
services should not as a matter of simple justice affect the
agreement, which was entered into voluntarily by the parties as
expressly directed in the previous law. To apply the new law to the
case of the defendant-appellant such as to deprive him of the
agreed fee would be arbitrary and unreasonable as destructive of
the inviolability of contracts, and therefore invalid as lacking in due
process; to penalize him for collecting such fees, repugnant to our
sense of justice. Such could not have been the legislative intent in
the enactment of Republic Act 145. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s vi rt ual law lib rary

operation will be presumed where a retroactive operation would

produce invalidity. (2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra, p.
135.).
It is also argued that the right of appellant to collect the 5 per cent
fee was contingent merely and did not become absolute, complete
and unconditional until the compensation benefits had been
In resume, we hold that Republic Act No. 145 must be given
prostective application only, and may not be given retroactive effect
such as to affect rights that had accrued under a contract expressly
sanctioned by a previous law (C. A. 675). The judgment appealed
from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant, acquitted,
with costs de oficio. So ordered.chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

collected and said right is not protected by the non-impairment

clause of the Constitution. A renowned authority on statutory Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo,
construction, however states that the distinction between vested Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.
and absolute rights is not helpful, and that "a better way to handle
the problem" is "to declare those statutes attempting to affect
rights which the court finds to be unalterable, invalid as arbitrary
and unreasonable, thus lacking in due process" some courts having
recognized that the real issue in the reasonableness of the
particular enactment (Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, pp.
121-122). The 5 per cent fee fixed in Commonwealth Act No. 675 is
to Us not unreasonable. Services were rendered thereunder to
complainant's benefit. The right to the fees accrued upon such
rendition. Only the payment of the fee was contingent upon the
approval of the claim; therefore, the right was not contingent. For a

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28774 February 28, 1980
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, and SPOUSES HONESTO G. NICANDRO and ELISA F.
NICANDRO, respondents.
ANTONIO, J.:
Petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 dated February
29, 1968, in Honesto G. Nicandro, et al. v. Development Bank of the Philippines and
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (CA-G.R. No. 34518-R), affirming the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-6091.
The facts are summarized as follows:
On March 18, 1955, the Board of Governors of petitioner-appellant DBP (hereinafter
referred to as petitioner or simply DBP for brevity and convenience), Under its Resolution
No. 2004, appropriated the sum of P1,204,000.00 to purchase land for a housing project
for its employees. It was contemplated that the Bank itself will build houses on the land to
be acquired and these will then be sold to employees who do not yet own homes and
who shall pay for them in monthly installments over a period of twenty (20) years. 2
Pursuant thereto, on October 20, 1955, the DBP bought 91,188.30 square meters of
land, consisting of 159 lots, in the proposed Diliman Estate Subdivision, West Triangle,
Quezon City, of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC). Of the price of
P802,155.56, the DBP paid the amount of P400,000.00 as down payment. The area sold
was then part of a bigger parcel embraced under TCT No. 1356 and because the
subdivision plan for the area (including the 159 lots sold to the DBP) was still pending
approval by the Bureau of Lands, the sales agreement between the DBP and the PHHC
was not presented immediately for registration by the DBP. Lots 2 and 4, which form part
of said 159 lots, are the properties involved in the instant litigation. 3
In a memorandum to the Auditor General dated December 6, 1955, Mr. Isidro Buñag, the
DBP Auditor, expressed his doubts as to whether the DBP could acquire the property in
question for the intended purpose of a housing project in the light of the then Section 13
of Republic Act No. 85 (Exhibit 12A-DBP).
The Auditor General endorsed the matter to the Office of the President, Malacañang,
Manila, and on July 30, 1957 the Executive Secretary, in turn referred the question (re
legality of the acquisition of the lots in question by the DBP) to the Secretary of Justice
for opinion (Exhibit 13-DBP).
Meanwhile, on June 24, 1957, without the knowledge of the DBP, a portion of the
property covered by the master title, TCT No. 1356, including the 159 lots sold to the
DBP, were segregated therefrom and a separate certificate of title, TCT No. 36533, was
issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHHC. However, the subdivision plan
on which the segregation was based was not annotated on the master title, TCT No.
1356, nor was the fact that the latter was cancelled pro tanto by TCT No. 36533 as to the
159 lots (Exhibit 15-DBP).
Atty. Roman Cariaga, Chief of the Sales Division of the PHHC, testified that on or before
September 29, 1958, he was summoned by Benjamin Gray, Secretary to the Board of
Directors of the PHHC, and, while in the latter's room was introduced to respondent-
appellee, Honesto G. Nicandro. Gray then requested Cariaga to prepare the order of
payment for Lots 2 and 4 in favor of Honesto G. Nicandro. Cariaga informed them (Gray
and Nicandro) forthwith that both lots were part of those already sold to the DBP.
On September 29, 1958, Mr. Sergio Ortiz Luis, a PHHC Director, and, at the time, Acting
Manager of the PHHC, wrote to the Chairman of the DBP that Lots 2 and 4, Block WT-
21, had been inadvertently included among the lots sold to the DBP and for said reason
requested that the two lots be excluded from the sale (Exhibit 1-DBP).
In his reply letter dated October 16, 1958, Chairman Gregorio S. Licaros of the DBP
refused to exclude Lots 2 and 4 as requested, insisting that they form part of the 159 lots
sold to the DBP as shown in the Sales Agreement dated October 20, 1955 and for which
DBP has made a partial payment of P400,000.00 (Exhibit 2-DBP). On October 14, 1958,
Acting Manager Sergio Ortiz Luis, without waiting for the reply of DBP Chairman Licaros,
approved the order of payment for Lots 2 and 4, Block WT-21, in favor of appellees
Honesto G. Nicandro and Elisa F. Nicandro who paid the sum of P700.56 and P660.00
as down payment, representing 10% of the price of the lots.
On October 28, 1958, Mr. Angel G. de la Paz, Chairman of the DBP Housing Project
Committee, also wrote to the Board of Directors of the PHHC, as follows:
In connection with your inquiry whether this bank will proceed with the
purchase of the employees housing project site in tile West Triangle
Subdivision, Quezon City, please be advised that this Bank will definitely
purchase the area allocated to it by that Corporation.
During a convocation held yesterday, at which Mr. G.S. Licaros, our new
Chairman, spoke, this question was brought by Chairman Licaros that
this housing project will go through, to be financed either by this Bank or
by other financial institutions in case the Secretary of Justice renders an
adverse opinion as to its legality. (Exhibit 3-DBP).
On October 31, 1958, without the knowledge of the DBP, Bernardo Torres, the General
Manager of the PHHC, also approved the Order of Payment for 39 lots (comprised also
in the 159 lots already sold to the DBP) in favor of the so-called Garcia Group. Among
these was an Order of Payment for Lot 2, Block WT-21 (which was already re-awarded
to respondent-appellee Honesto G. Nicandro) in favor of Bernabe G. Garcia, who paid
also the 10% down payment of P700.50 (Exhibits 7-DBP and 11-DBP )
On November 3, 1958, the PHHC accepted payment in full of Lots 2 and 4 from
respondents spouses Honesto G. Nicandro and Elisa F. Nicandro (hereinafter referred to
simply as respondent spouses).
On November 6, 1958, Honesto G. Nicandro went to see Atty. Roman Cariaga, Chief of
the Sales Division, PHHC, and demanded that the corresponding deeds of sale for Lots
2 and 4 be executed in their favor. Atty. Cariaga accompanied him to the General
Manager, Bernardo Torres, and in the presence of Mr. Nicandro, the former asked Mr.
Torres whether the deeds of sale for the two (2) lots requested by Mr. Nicandro should
be prepared considering that the DBP has not yet relinquished its right thereon.
However, the General Manager told him to go ahead and prepare the deeds of sale.
On November 7, 1958, a deed of sale over Lot 2 in favor of Honesto G. Nicandro and
another deed of sale over Lot 4 in favor of his wife, Elisa F. Nicandro, were prepared by
the Sales Division of the PHHC under Atty. Cariaga.
On November 13, 1958, Mr. Bienvenido C. Olarte Homesite Management Chief, PHHC,
wrote to the General Manager a memorandum which in part reads as follows:
Respectfully forwarded to the Board of Directors PHHC, Quezon City, for
its information and consideration.
The memorandum was prepared in view of the sale of Lots 2 and 4,
Block WT-21 to Honesto and Elisa Nicandro who have paid in full their
purchase prices, and the acceptance from Gov. Garcia of deposits for 10
lots in Block WT-21, 14 lots in WT-22, notwithstanding previous sale of all
these lots to the DBP under conditional contract to sell. The DBP made
initial payment of P400,000.00 on the 159 lots in the RFC (DBP) area,
leaving an unpaid balance of P402,155.56. The employees of the DBP
will definitely push through the purchase as confirmed in the letters of
Messrs. Licaros, DBP Chairman and Angel de la Paz, DBP Housing
Project Committee Chairman, both dated October 16 and 29, 1958,
respectively.
The deposits made for the 39 lots are subject to final arrangement of the
purchase of the 159 lots by the DBP employees. However, as to the sale
of Lots 2 and 4, Block WT-21, it is recommended that the execution of the
final deeds of sale be suspended until after the aforestated arrangement
shall have been determined (Exhibit 7- DBP. Emphasis supplied.)
Despite the aforesaid recommendation of Mr. Olarte, the deeds of sale for Lots 2 and 4
in favor of respondent spouses were prepared and submitted to the board of Directors of
the PHHC on December 17, 1958.
Thereafter, the General Manager, Mr. Bernardo Torres, signed the deeds of sale over
Lots 2 and 4 in favor of respondent spouses. Notwithstanding this fact, however, the
originals of said deeds of sale (Exhibits 10-DBP and 10-A-DBP) were retained at the
PHHC and were never released to the respondent spouses.
On January 15, 1959, the Sales Agreement dated October 20, 1955 between the PHHC
and the DBP (covering the 159 lots including Lots 2 and 4 in question) was presented for
registration to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. It was entered in the day book and
annotated on TCT No. 1356 as a "sale of an unsegregated portion" with the note "new
titles to be issued upon presentation of the corresponding subdivision plan and technical
descriptions duly approved by the authorities." (Exhibit 15.)
On January 20, 1959, pursuant to the Executive Secretary's reference of the matter to
the Secretary of Justice for an opinion, as mentioned earlier, the latter issued Opinion
No. 16, s. of 1959, holding that —
Premises considered, it is our opinion that the RFC (DBP) has no
express or incidental power to undertake the housing project under
consideration and that the same is incongruous with, if not a clear
violation of, the prohibition contained in Section 13 of Republic Act No.
85. (Annex "A", Complaint.)
On February 16, 1959, respondent Honesto G. Nicandro attempted to register the sale of
Lots 2 and 4 in his favor by presenting copies of the deeds of sale in their favor (as
mentioned earlier, the originals were retained by the PHHC and were never released)
before the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, but registration was denied because: (1)
the deeds of sale were only photostatic copies; (2) the consent of the GSIS (to whom the
whole property was mortgaged) to the sale is not shown therein; and (3) the deeds of
sale lacked the necessary documentary stamps. On the following day, February
17, affidavits of adverse claims on Lots 2 and 4 were filed by the respondents and these
were registered and annotated on TCT No. 36533 (Exhibit 15-DBP).
On February 17, 1959, on the basis of the afore-mentioned Opinion No. 16, s. of 1959, of
the Secretary of Justice, the Office of the President addressed a memorandum to the
Board of Governors of the DBP directing it to revoke Resolution No. 2004 dated March
18, 1955. 4
On March 6, 1959, upon teaming that the required subdivision plan of the 159 lots sold to
it were already submitted and duly recorded on TCT No. 36533, the DBP forthwith
requested the annotation of its sales agreement dated October 20, 1955 covering the
lots in question on TCT No. 36533, and as a consequence, the Register of Deeds
transferred the annotation of said sales agreement appearing on TCT No. 1356 to the
new certificate of title, TCT No. 36533. 5
As the DBP's request for issuance of new certificates of title for Lots 2 and 4 was being
opposed by the respondent spouse and unable to decide as to who should be issued
certificates of title for the two lots, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City referred the
matter on consulta to the Land Registration Commission, where it was docketed as In Re
Consulta No. 250. In a resolution dated July 25, 1959, the Land Registration Commission
held that respondent spouse Honesto G. Nicandro and Elisa F. Nicandro were better
entitled to the issuance of certificates of title for Lots 2 and 4. After its motion for
reconsideration of the resolution was denied, the DBP promptly appealed the decision to
this Court.
On April 29, 1961, resolving DBP's appeal of In Re Consults No. 250, 6 this Court held
that the annotation made on January 15, 1959 of the sales agreement in favor of the
DBP on TCT No. 1356 constituted sufficient registration to bind third parties, thereby
reversing the resolution of the Land Registration Commission of July 25, 1959, to the
effect that the annotation on TCT No. 1356 of the sales agreement between the PHHC
and the vendee DBP did not constitute sufficient registration to bind innocent third parties
(referring to the Nicandros), in favor of the appellees.
Meanwhile, prior to the aforesaid decision of this Court, on March 14, 1960, in reply to
the query of the Board of Governors of the DBP whether the Bank can sell the 159 lots
on a cash basis to its employees, the Secretary of Justice issued Opinion No. 40, holding
that the deed of sale covering said lots is not only ultra vires but is also illegal and void
and, for that reason, the DBP cannot sell the same to its employees even for cash.
On June 17, 1961, Republic Act No. 3147 was enacted, amending certain provisions of
the DBP Charter (Republic Act No. 85), among which was Section 13 which, as Section
23 in the amended law, now reads as follows:
No officer or employee of the bank nor any government official who may
exercise executive or supervisory authority over the said bank either
directly, or indirectly, for himself or as representative or agent of others
shall, except when the same shall be in the form of advances
 appropriated or set aside by the Bank itself in order to provide for housing
for the benefit of its officials and employees, borrow money from the
Bank, nor shall become a guarantor, indorser or surety for loans from the
said bank to the others, or in any manner be an obligor for moneys
borrowed from the said Bank. Any such officer or employee who violates
the provisions of this section shall be immediately removed by competent
authority and said officer or employee shall be punished by imprisonment
of not less than one year nor exceeding five years and by a fine of not
less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos. (Emphasis
supplied.) 7
On November 10, 1961, respondent spouses then filed the case at bar against the DBP
and the PHHC, to rescind the sale of Lots 2 and 4 by PHHC in favor of DBP, to cancel
the transfer certificate of title that may have been issued covering the two lots to DBP,
and to order DBP to pay damages to the plaintiffs. It was alleged that the acquisition of
Lots 2 and 4 by the DBP is not only in excess of its corporate powers but also a violation
of the express prohibition of Section 13 of its Charter, Republic Act No. 85, as amended.
Against the PHHC, respondent spouses alleged that in the alternative event that the
case against the DBP will not prosper, that PHHC be adjudged to pay to the plaintiff the
"value which the said properties may have on the date of decision ...".
It is important to note that the PHHC alleged as defenses the actuations of the plaintiffs
(Nicandro spouses) which have been characterized by bad faith. thus:
(a) that notwithstanding the information given by the defendant to the plaintiffs that the
question of legality of the acquisition by the DBP of lots has not been resolved, plaintiffs
insisted in paying on November 3, 1958, the full purchase price of the lots in question;
(b) that notwithstanding the understanding between the defendant and the plaintiffs that
no final deed of sale over the lots in question will be executed until the question of
legality of the acquisition of lots by the DBP is resolved, the plaintiffs insisted in the
execution of the final deed of sale to which the defendant agreed with the understanding
that the latter will be given until about December 12, 1959 to obtain a clearance from the
GSIS of the mortgage on the lots in question, and that, in the meantime, the final deed of
sale will not be presented to the Register of Deeds for registration; and
(c) that without a copy of the final deed of sale being officially released, the plaintiffs, one
way or another, succeeded in obtaining a signed copy of the aforesaid deed of sale
which they presented to the Register of Deeds for registration in violation of the
understanding mentioned in the immediately preceeding paragraph (b) above.
In its decision, the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal held that the sale of Lots 2
and 4, Block WT-21 of the Diliman Estate Subdivision, to the DBP is null and void, for
being in violation of Section 13 of the DBP Charter, ignoring in toto the other defenses.
No provision at all was made for return of the price that was paid to PHHC for the two
lots in question. A motion for reconsideration having been filed and denied, the DBP
appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On February 29, 1968, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
In their brief, the DBP maintains:
(1) that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the respondent spouses have legal
personality to question the legality of the sale in question because:
(a) the spouses have no relation to the contracting parties not to the
property itself at the time the transaction took place; 8
(b) the question of whether or not a corporation has acted without
authority or has abused its authority or has acted in contravention of law
cannot be raised by one whose rights accrued subsequent to the
transaction in question; 9
(c) rescission of contract requires mutual restitution. Hence, since the
respondent spouses are neither principally nor subsidiarily bound under
the sales agreement between the PHHC and the DBP, they are not in a
position to make any restitution on the questioned contract and,
consequently, they have no right to ask for its annulment; 10 and
(d) the respondent spouses, being second vendees of Lots 2 and 4,
merely stepped into the shoes of the vendor, PHHC, and their right to
question the transaction cannot rise above that of the PHHC. Since the
contract between the PHHC and the DBP has been fully executed and
 the DBP's right thereto has been perfected by the registration of the sales
agreement in its favor, the PHHC is now in estoppel to question the
transaction. A fortiori the spouses are similarly bound from doing so; and
(2) that when Congress amended Section 13 of its Charter on June 17, 1961, five (5)
years after the questioned transaction, it in effect ratified the DBP acquisition of said lots
from the PHHC, and dispelled whatever doubts existed as to the power of the DBP to
acquire the lots in question, unless some interest or right which would be adversely
affected has accrued in favor of third parties. On the latter question, the DBP claims that
since the Supreme Court itself has recognized the rights of the DBP over and above
those of the respondent spouses over the two lots, the latter have no interest that will
bring it out of the curative effects of the amendment.
The general rule is that the action for the annulment of contracts can only be maintained
by those who are bound either principally or subsidiarily by virtue thereof. 11 There is,
however, an exception to the rule. This Court, in Teves v. People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation, 12 held that "a person who is not obliged principally or subsidiarily in
a contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights
with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the detriment which could
positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention." We applied this
exception to the rule in Yturralde v. Vagilidad,13 De Santos v. City of Manila; 14and Bañez
v. Court of Appeals. 15 It cannot be denied that respondent spouses stand to be
prejudiced by reason of their payment in full of the purchase price for the same lots
which had been sold to the petitioner by virtue of the transaction in question. We,
therefore, hold that respondent spouses have sufficient standing to institute the action in
the case at bar.
Since the case may be resolved on the issue of retroactivity of the amendment of Section
13 of Republic Act No. 85, by Republic Act No. 3147, this Court does not find it
necessary to resolve whether or not the sale to the DBP was void, pursuant to Section
13 of Republic Act No. 85. Even assuming that the DBP had no authority initially to
acquire the lots in question for the housing project of the corporation for its employees,
the important issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not granting
retroactive effect to Republic Act No. 3147 amending Republic Act No. 85. which
authorizes the DBP to provide for housing for the benefit of its officials and employees.
The Court of Appeals, in effect, held that the amendment "cannot validate the sale of
Lots 2 and 4 in favor of the DBP because the rights of the plaintiffs have already accrued
before its amendment" and section 13 as subsequently amended contains no express
provision of retroactive application. It necessarily follows that such amended section
cannot be given retroactive effect.
It may be stated, as a general rule, that curative statutes are forms of "retrospective
legislation which reach back on past events to correct errors or irregularities and to
render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the
purpose the parties intended." They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect
that which they have designed and intended, but which has failed of expected legal
consequences by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their action. They
thus make valid that which, before enactment of the statute, was invalid. 16 There cannot
be any doubt that one of the purposes of Congress when it enacted Republic Act No.
3147, by amending Section 13 of Republic Act No. 85, was to erase any doubts
regarding the legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the
housing project which it intended to establish for its employees who did not yet have
houses of their own. This is obvious from the fact that Republic Act No. 3147 was
enacted on July 17, 1961, at a time when the legality of the acquisition of the lots by the
DBP for its housing project was under question. It is, therefore, a curative statute to
render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC. Since such
curative statute may not be given retroactive effect if vested rights are impaired thereby,
the next question then is whether or not the respondent spouses have any vested right
on the property which may be impaired by the statutory amendment. It is admitted in the
partial stipulation of facts that after the second sale of Lots 2 and 4 to Honesto and Elisa
Nicandro on November 7, 1958 by the PHHC, the question arose as to who between the
DBP, which purchased three (3) years earlier the afore-mentioned lots on October 20,
1955, and the Nicandro spouses were better entitled to the issuance of the certificates of
title for Lots 2 and 4 on the basis of entries made on the day book and annotations on
the old and new certificates of title covering the lots in question.
In the decision of this Court of April 29, 1961, in Register of Deeds of Quezon City v.
Nicandro, et al., 17 it held that: (a) the deed of sale of October 20, 1955 by the PHHC to
the DBP of the 159 lots is "clearly, a registerable document"; and (b) that the annotation
of the deed of sale in favor of the DBP on TCT No. 1356 on January 15, 1959 constituted
sufficient registration to bind third parties and, consequently, ordered the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City to issue the corresponding certificate of title in favor of appellant
DBP. This Court further stated:
Neither can it be claimed that the annotation of the deed of sale in favor
of the DBP on TCT No. 1356, under date of January 15, 1959, does not
constitute sufficient registration to bind third parties. True it may be that
when the instrument was presented to the Register of Deeds for
registration, and in fact it was so inscribed in the day book, the 159 lots
subject of the sale were already covered by separate certificate. of title,
TCT No. 36533. It must be remembered, however, that on said date,
January 15, 1959, TCT No. 1356 which originally covered the whole tract
of land, including the 159 lots, was yet uncancelled nor any inscription
appeared thereon to the effect that a new certificate was already issued
in respect to the said 159 lots. Evidently, when the DBP presented the
deed of sale for registration, there were two subsisting titles covering the
159 lots subject of the sale. As TCT No. 1356, being uncancelled, did, for
all intents and purposes, still cover the 159 lots, the annotation thereon of
the sale to the DBP is valid and effective. For this reason, the Register of
Deeds acted correctly in transferringthe inscription from TCT No. 1356 to
TCT No. 36533 upon discovery that the subdivision plan had already
been approved, submitted and annotated, and a new certificate of title
issued. Even on this score alone, considering that the adverse claim of
the Nicandros was annotated on TCT No. 35633 only on February 17,
1959, whereas the sale to the DBP was registered as of January 15,
1959, the certificate of title on the two lots in controversy should be
issued in favor of the first registrant, the DBP.
There is, however, another reason why the Commissioner's ruling must
be set aside.
Although admittedly we have here a case of double sale, actually this is
not an instance of double registration. As above stated, only the deed of
sale in favor of appellant was inscribed on the certificate of title covering
the lots in question. The Nicandros were not able to register their deeds
of sale; instead, informed of the prior registration by the DBP, they sought
to protect their right by filing adverse claims based on the said deeds of
sale under Section 110 of Act 496, which provides:
SEC. 110. Whoever claims any right or interest in
registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if
no other provision is made in this Act for registering the
same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his
alleged right or interest, and how or under whom
acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the
certificate of title of the registered owner, and a
description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed. ...
It is clear from the above quotation that for this special remedy (adverse
claim) to be availed of, it must be shown that there is no other provision in
the law for registration of the claimant's alleged right or interest in the
property. The herein claim of the Nicandros is based on a perfected
contract of sale executed in their favor by the lawful owner of the land.
Considering that the Land Registration Act specifically prescribes the
procedure for registration of a vendee's right on a registered property,
(Section 57, Act 496) the remedy provided in Section 110, which was
resorted to and invoked by appellees, would be ineffective for the
purpose of protecting their said right or interest on the two lots.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution appealed from is hereby set aside, and
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City ordered to issue the corresponding
certificate of title in favor of appellant DBP. Without costs. So ordered. (At
pp. 1341-1342. Emphasis supplied.)
There is evidence to the effect that prior to or during the preparation of the corresponding
deeds of sale for lots 2 and 4 in their favor, the private respondents knew of the previous
acquisition of said property by the DBP. Sometime in September 1958, the Chief of the
Sales Division of the PHHC informed Honesto G. Nicandro. that Lots 2 and 4 were part
of the 159 lots previously sold by the PHHC to the DBP, On November 6, 1958, when
Nicandro. asked that the corresponding deeds of sale over Lots 2 and 4 be prepared, the
same Chief of the Sales Division expressed his misgivings by telling the General
Manager of the PHHC, in the presence of Nicandro, that the two lots that the Nicandros
wanted to buy had already been sold to the DBP and the latter had not yet relinquished
its right over said property. 18 In any event, the Nicandros were not able to register their
deeds of sale over Lots 2 and 4. Before the registration of a deed or instrument, a
registered property is not bound thereby insofar as third persons are concerned.
Registration is the means whereby the property is made subject to the terms of the
instrument. It is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon
the land. 19 In Register of Deeds of Quezon City v. Nicandro, supra, this Court held that
the registration of the sales agreement between the PHHC and the DBP and the
annotation thereof on the old TCT No. 1365 constituted a prior valid registration of its Justice Vicente Abad Santos is on leave.
rights to the properties sold.
Justices Pacifico P. de Castro and Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Members of the First
Under such circumstances, since under the Torrens system, registration is the operative Division were designated to sit in the Second Division.
act that gives validity to the transfer, 20 and it was the sale to the DBP that was registered
and transfer certificate of title issued to the DBP, private respondents could not have,
therefore, acquired any complete, absolute and unconditional right over the property.
They had no vested rights on the property at the time of the enactment of Republic Act Footnotes
No. 3147. A "vested right is one which is absolute, complete, and unconditional, to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
1 Composed of Justice Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. (now Associate
dependent upon a contingency," 21 To be vested in its accurate legal sense, a right must
Justice of this Court) as ponente,and Justices Juan p. Enriquez and
be complete and consummated, and one of which the person to whom it belongs cannot
Angel H. Mojica.
be divested without his consent. 22
2 Partial Stipulation of Facts, Record on appeal, p. 45.
During the pendency of this case, the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC) has been dissolved and its powers, functions, balance of appropriations,
records, assets, rights and choses in action, subject to certain conditions, were 3 Ibid, Record on Appeal, p. 43.
transferred to the National Housing Authority. 23 Considering that this case has been
pending in the courts since 1961, and the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy 4 Partial Stipulation of Facts, Record on Appeal. p. 48.
disposition of their case, the Court hereby renders judgment herein, without awaiting the
substitution of the PHHC by the National Housing Authority. 5 Ibid, Record on Appeal. p. 45.

WHEREFORE, in view hereof judgment is hereby rendered: (1) reversing the judgment 6 L-16448, April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 1334.
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34518-R, dated February 29, 1968, and
dismissing the complaint filed by the respondent spouses for rescision of the sale"; and 7 Partial Stipulation of Facts, Record on Appeal, p. 48.
(2) ordering the Development Bank of the Philippines to reimburse to the Nicandro
spouses the payments which they made to the PHHC in connection with said lots, with 8 Cook v. McMicking, No. 8913, March 3, 1914, 27 Phil. 10; Harding v.
interest at the legal rate from November 6, 1958 until fully paid, which amount shall be Commercial Union Assurance Co., No. 12707, Aug. 10, 1918, 38 Phil.
deducted from the balance of the purchase price of the property. No special 464.
pronouncement as to costs.
9 19 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp. 441-443.
SO ORDERED.
10 Santander, et al. v. Villanueva, et al., L-6184, Feb. 28, 1958, 103 Phil.
Barredo (Chairman) and Aquino, JJ., concur. 1.

Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., took no part. 11 Article 1397, Civil Code.
12 L-21498, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 1141, 1147-1148.
13 L-20571, May 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 393, 398.
14 L-21677, June 29, 1972, 45 SCRA 409, 416.
15 L-30351, Sept. 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 15. 21.
16 Wichelman v. Minser, 83 NW 2d 890; Earnik v. Board of County of
Com'rs of Uncle County, 341 P. 2d 467, 471; Fullilone v. U.S. Cas.
Co., 129 So. 2d 816, 827; 10 A, Words & Phrases 420,
17 L-16448, April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 1334.
18 Thus, Atty. Roman Cariaga, Chief, Sales Division, of the PHHC,
testified as follows: ...
COURT:
P. You also claim that when you called the attention of the Manager that
these two lots here which the PHHC wanted to sell to the Nicandros have
already been sold, you claim to have given that manifestation in the
presence of the Nicandros and within their hearing?.
A. Yes, Your Honor.
P. What was his reaction, did he comment anything, did he say 'I am
willing to buy it at my own risk?' You claim that Mr. _Nicandro. was
present when you have informed the
Manager and called his attention that these two lots that the Nicandros
wanted to buy have already been sold to the Development Bank of the
Philippines?
R. That is right.
P. What was the reaction of the Nicandros?
R. He was there and he argued with the Manager. That is the reaction of
Mr. Nicandro. He explained his arguments to the Manager why the deed
of sale should be given due course.
P. Inspite of the information given by you that the two lots were already
sold to the DBP?
R. Yes, Your Honor.
P. What was the reason he alleged why the People's Homesite &
Housing Corporation should proceed with the sale?
R. I cannot remember his exact words but in substance I think he said
that if the deeds of sale were executed and released to him it would give
him more bargaining power with the DBP. ' (T.s.n. pp. 31-33, Hearing of
Feb. 8, 1963)" (Page 47, Brief for Defendant- Appellant DBP, in CA-G.R.
No. 34518-R, page 36, Rollo).
19 Section 51, Act No. 496; Vargas v. Tancioco and Guerrero, No.
45899, April 12, 1939, 67 Phil. 308.
20 Paraiso v. Camon, L-13919. Sept. 18, 1959, 57 O.G. 1229.
21 Hutton v. Autoridad Sobre Hogares a la Capital (DC Puerto), 78 F,
Supp 988, 6 Am.,. Jur. 2d 421
22 Merchants Bank v. Garrad, 158 G. 867, 124 SE 715, 38 ALR, 102.
23 Section 5. Presidential Decree No. 157.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34882 August 24, 1976
J. AMADO ARANETA, Petitioner, vs. ALFONSO DORONILA, A.
DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., and COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-35643 August 24, 1976
ALFONSO DORONILA and A. DORONILA RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT, INC., Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL AS TRIBUNAL, JUDGE BENJAMIN H.
AQUINO, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS, and J. AMADO ARANETA, Respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for J. Amado Araneta. chan roble s virtual law lib rary
Mariano Aguilar and Alfonso A. Doronila for Alfonso Doronila and A.
Doronila Resources Development, Inc.
BARREDO, J.:
Two separate but related petitions, that in G.R. No. L-34882 being
for certiorariand prohibition against the Court of Appeals alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of said court in refusing to
dismiss the appeal of private respondents from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in a civil action between the private
parties herein, notwithstanding allegedly that the record on appeal
of said private respondents, Alfonso Doronila et al. does not show
on its face, in violation of Section 6 of Rule 41 and Section 1 of Rule
50, that their appeal was made on time, and that in G.R. No. L-
35643 being also one for certiorari and prohibition against the same
Court of First Instance of Rizal for having issued a writ of execution
of the decision, the finality of which is in issue in G.R. No. L-34882,
said Court of First Instance having assumed that because of the
restraining order of this Court in said G.R. No. L-34882 enjoining
the appellate court from enforcing its resolutions refusing to dismiss
the appeal of the Doronilas and from further acting on said appeal
until further orders, the result was that the judgment of said trial
court could already be executed. chan roble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
In connection with the second petition (G.R. No. L-35643), on
November 23, 1974, counsel for therein private respondent J.
Amado Araneta f filed a motion for dismissal of the petition upon
the ground basically that said private respondent "would prefer to
wait for the finality of the decision before availing of the execution
thereof." The Doronilas opposed such dismissal, unless it is coupled
with a final injunction of this Court against the questioned execution
orders of the trial court. Accordingly, said petition may be disposed
of without elaborate discussion.chan roble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry
As regards the first petition (G.R. No. L-34882), it appears that in
Civil Case No. 9856 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, an action
filed by J. Amado Araneta for specific performance of an exclusive
option to buy granted by him to Alfonso Doronila, for himself and
for A. Doronila Resources Development Corporation, over two big
parcels of land situated in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
Rizal, at a total price of P13,071,215.00, and for damages, the said
court, after due trial, rendered on April 28, 1971 a decision the
dispositive part of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
1. Ordering the defendant Alfonso Doronila to clear the cadastral
survey of Montalban, Rizal, covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 7924 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, of all liens and
encumbrances, including the mining claims of Republic Cement
Corporation and Silangan Mining Association, and the claim of
Cesario C. Bandong over the 13.6420 hectares thereof;
2. Ordering defendant A, Doronila Resources Development, Inc. to
clear the San Mateo, Rizal property, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 42999, Register of Deeds of Rizal, of squatters within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, and thereafter, within
thirty (30) days, to execute in favor of plaintiff, a deed of sale of
said properties, free from all liens and encumbrances upon the
payment of P4,071,215.10, minus the P40,000.00 option money, in
accordance with the option contract dated February 10, 1966;
3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P63,448.00 as
actual damages and P7,242,250.00 for damages arising from
unrealized profits, with legal interest, from the filing of the
complaint; chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
4. Dismissing the counterclaim, with costs against the
defendants. chan roble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
SO ORDERED. (Pp. 168-169, Rec. on Appeal )
From this judgment, the Doronilas took steps to appeal to the Court
of Appeals, but in the said appellate court, J. Amado Araneta moved
to dismiss said appeal. Acting on that motion, the Court of Appeals
resolved as follows:
Plaintiff Appellee, J. Amado Araneta, filed before us a motion to
dismiss appeal of defendants-appellants on the ground that the
record on appeal does not show on its face that the appeal was
perfected on time. Acting upon said motion to dismiss, this Court in
its resolution dated January 27, 1972, required the defendants
chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary appellants to comment thereon within 10 days from notice. On
January 26, 1972, defendants- appellants thru counsel filed a
manifestation asking for a 20-day period within which to file an
answer, which manifestation was favorably granted by this Court in
its resolution dated January 28, 1972.chanrob lesvi rtual awlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary
On February 10, 1972, defendants-appellants filed their answer
alleging among others that they filed their appeal on time. In
support thereof, they submit a copy of notice of the trial court
chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary (Annex A, Answer) giving them an additional ten day period within
which to file their amended record on appeal. c han roblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary
An examination of the record shows that on April 28, 1971, the
Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of J.
Amado Araneta, copy of which was received by the defendants
appellants on May 14, 1971. As a consequence, defendants-
appellants immediately filed on May 31, 1971, a notice of appeal
and an appeal bond in the amount of P120.00. However, due to
some deficiencies, the original record on appeal was ordered
amended. So that it was only on June 22, 1971, that the amended
record on appeal was filed by the defendants-appellants. On July
19, 1971, the trial judge approved the amended record on appeal,
thus -
It appearing that the defendants have already included the motion
to dismiss, opposition filed thereto and the resolution of the court
thereon, in the amended Record on Appeal filed by the defendants,
and for want of any further objection on the part of the plaintiff, AS
PRAYED FOR, the amended record on appeal filed by the defendants
is hereby approved. (R.A. p. 172).
From the foregoing data submitted by the defendants-appellants,
we could reasonably infer that the approval was perfected on time,
not to mention in this connection that plaintiff did not object to the
approval of the record on appeal. The statement of the trial court
that 'for want of any further objection on the part of the plaintiff', is
of vital significance which cannot just be ignored, especially, since,
as in this case, the supreme interest of justice is at stake,
considering that the subject matter of the appeal consist of big
parcels of land, with an aggregate are of 21, 549, 183 square
meters, excluding 8 mineral rights and claims of limestones, shale,
etc.
chan roble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
WHEREFORE, considering that the paramount interest of justice
would be best served if we allow the parties to litigate the facts in
issues, the instant motion to dismiss appeal is hereby denied. (Pp.
33-35, Record.)
And when Araneta moved to reconsider the foregoing resolution,
the motion was denied thus:
Acting upon plaintiff-appellee's 'Motion for Reconsideration' filed on
March 9, 1972 of the is Court's resolution dated February 24, 1972
denying the motion to dismiss appeal; the Court RESOLVED to
DENY the motion for reconsideration. The instant case can well be
an exemption to the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the
cases cited by the appellee because of the nature of the issues
involved in this litigation. (p. 46, Record.)
In the present petition with Us, Araneta maintains that under this
Court's rulings in Valera vs. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 80, Reyes
vs. Carrascoso, 38 SCRA 311, Dominguez vs. Court of Appeals, 38
SCRA 316, The Director, Bureau of Building and Real Property
Management vs. Court of Appeals, 38 SCRA 317, De Guia vs. Court
of Appeals, 40 SCRA 333, Imperial Insurance Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 42 SCRA 97, Luzon Stevedoring vs. Court of Appeals, and
other cases of similar vein, the respondent Court of Appeals should
have dismissed the appeal of the Dornilas, there being no showing
on the face of their amended record on appeal as to when their
original record on appeal was filed, hence said amended record
"fails to show on its face that their appeal was perfected within the
period fixed by the rules", pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 50. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry
Under date of July 29, 1976, however, with commendable
candidness, Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales, counsel for Araneta, filed a
manifestation taking not only of the later more liberal rulings of this
Court in Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 228, Pimentel
vs. Court of Appeals, 64 SCRA 475 andRodriguez vs. Court of
Appeals, 68 SCRA 262, cited by the Dornilas in their motion in this
Court of May 3, 1976, but also of Our decisions in Heirs of Serafin
Morales vs. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 309, Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 67 SCRA 322 and Krueger vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA
50, which abandoned the strict line pursued in the earlier cases
cited by him, albeit insisting just the same that the impugned
resolution of the Court of Appeals is erroneous in the light of the
following observations:
As may be seen, Berkenkotter and Pimentel and subsequent cases
have overruled Valera vs. Court of Appeals, Reyes vs.
Carrascoso,and other cases adhering to the strict construction of
material data rule.chan roble svi rtualaw l ibra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
But Berkenkotter and Pimentel were promulgated only on
September 28, 1973 and June 25, 1975 respectively, hence, it can
only operate prospectively and will not affect previous cases
appealed before that date, relying on the old doctrine.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form
part of this jurisdiction's legal system.These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean.
The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is
part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since
the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that construed law purports to
carry into effect.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law libra ry
At the time of Liceria's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at
the time of his apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle
without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule - the Court's interpretation of section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code - formed part of our jurisprudence
and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the
Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new
doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate
prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by
the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the
faith thereof. (People vs. Licera, L-39990, July 22, 1975, 65 SCRA
270, 272, 273)
Therefore, Berkenkotter and Pimentel cannot retroactively affect the
present case, whose appeal was perfected on June 21, 1971.
Leaving aside for the moment, the well thought of issue thus rather
ingeniously raised by distinguished counsel, it is Our considered
opinion that in the particular case on hand, the omission in the
Doronila amended record on appeal of any reference to the date of
the filing of their original record on appeal is not fatal, even from
the point of view of the former rule of strict "literal adherence to the
'material data rule'", to borrow Justice Munoz Palma's expression in
Krueger, supra. For here, there is no dispute that within seventeen
days, from May 14, 1971, when Doronila's co-counsel was served
with the decision to May 31, 1971, the date the notice of appeal
and appeal bond were filed, the Doronilas already clearly
manifested their determination to appeal from the evidently
onerous decision which ordered them not only to comply with the
option given them by Araneta but to additionally pay over P7.8 M to
their adversary for actual damages and unrealized profits, so much
so that when an objection was filed to their original record on
appeal, they lost no time in amending the same by inclusion of the
papers referred to in the objection without waiting for any
corresponding order of the court. 1 cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
Now under the rules (Sec. 7 of Rule 41), unless the court fixes a
period for the filing of the amended record on appeal, the same
may be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the order for
amendment. We take judicial notice of the fact that ordinarily,
appellants are given not less than said period of ten days within
which to comply with an order to amend the record on appeal and
that it would take at least one week before the court can consider
and rule on the objection of appellee plus another one week to
issue and serve the corresponding order. So, assuming that the
Doronilas filed their original record on appeal as early as May 31,
1971, which is already rather extraordinary, since generally, the
record on appeal is filed some days later, they still had a total of 24
days from May 31 to make a timely appeal by filing their amended Anent the ruling in Liceria relied upon by Araneta, We hold that the
record on appeal. In other words, their reglementary period would same is not applicable to matters involving controversies regarding
have expired on June 24, 1971. And since the Doronila amended the application of the Rules of Court, if only for the reason that it is
record on appeal was filed on June 22, 1971, it is almost Beyond within the power of this Court to excuse failure to literally observe
question that their appeal was perfected on time. Surely, matters of any rule to avoid possible injustice, Particularly in cases where, as
judicial notice constitute part of whatever data is required under here, the subject matter is of considerable value and the judgment
Section 1 of Rule 50 and Section 6 of Rule 41. And taking the being appealed from, at least the portion thereof sentencing the
circumstances of judicial notice already referred to together with Doronilas to Pay over P7.2 M of supposedly unrealized profits., is by
the absence of any further objection in the Part of Araneta to the its very nature, reasonably open to possible modification, if not
amended record on appeal in Question as well as the failure of reversal. Liceria was predicated on the principle that changes in
Araneta to alleged Categorically that the original record on appeal substantive law may not be applied retroactively, specially when
of the Doronila was filed out of time or to deny that it was filed prejudice will result to the party that has followed the earlier law.
within the reglementary period, We are persuaded that the That principle does not obtain in remedial law. 2 chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

amended record on appeal here in dispute sufficiently complies with

the requirements of the rules. c han roblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary
WHEREFORE, the petitions in the above two cases are hereby
dismissed, without any pronouncement as to costs, and the appeal
It may be added here that when Araneta objected to the original of the Doronilas in CA-G.R. No. 49139-R, subject of the petition in
record on appeal. It was only on the ground of omission of certain G.R. No. L-34882, may now proceed in its regular course, and the
papers therein, not for its being out of time. Under the omnibus orders of execution issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 9856
motion rule, "he objection of untimeliness was waived by Araneta is hereby set aside and its enforcement is in consequence enjoined
and it is reasonable to assume that he would not have raised such a permanently.
clearly jurisdictional fatality if in fact the original Doronila record on
appeal had been filed out of time. Since the Purpose of the strict Fernando, Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

rule of literal compliance with the "material data rule" is to avoid

debate on the timeliness of the appeal, and there is here no Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part. cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

occasion for such debate, such timeliness being a matter no longer

disputable by Araneta, it should follow that the amended record on Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
appeal may be read in the sense that the order of the court
approving the same includes the finding that the original thereof
had been filed on time. We hold that thus read, said amended
record on appeal sufficiently complies with the rules.
(Berkenkotter supra, and subsequent rulings analogous thereto.) cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary
 cause examination of the condition of the disabled laborer, with a view to extending, if
necessary, the period of compensation (Avecilla Building Corporation v. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, L-10668, Sept. 26, 1957).

2. ID.; WAIVER; CASE AT BAR. — That the disabled employee has signed a satisfaction receipt
does not result in waiver; the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less
compensation than what the worker is entitled to recover under the Act (Sec. 29).

DECISION

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Franklin Baker Co. of the Philippines, a domestic corporation engaged in producing copra, on
July 19, 1947 took Mauricio Alillana into employment, as truck loader. In 1956 he was assigned
as washer. Four months later, he became shell collector therein, performing duties of this
nature: To pick up unshelled coconuts from a moving conveyor; place them in a "caritilla" and
EN BANC hand them to the shelters; four times during the 8-hour work, he and some assistants had to
personally rotate the pulley to keep the conveyor running when it gets stuck up by coconut
[G.R. No. L-25245. December 11, 1967.] shells.

FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MAURICIO ALILLANA On April 21, 1958, Alillana suffered from pains at the ribs; he was found with bronchitis and
and WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Respondents. went on leave. On May 9, 1958, however, he was allowed by the company to resume his work.

Paulino Manongdo for Petitioner. Starting May 31, 1958, he from time to time complained of cough, with chest and back pains,
for which he was treated. Referred for physical and X-ray examinations, on July 6, 1958, his
Paciano C. Villavieja and M.E. Lanzona, Jr., for Respondents. condition was found to be as follows: "Far advanced pulmonary tuberculosis at the left lung,
associated with bronchitis." The next day, on July 7, 1958, he retired from the company.
Franklin Baker Co. paid him P188.16 under its non-occupational sickness and disability benefit
SYLLABUS plan for the period from July 7, 1958 to October 29, 1958; and P669.12 as retirement benefits.

Alillana subsequently filed a claim for disability compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. On February 28, 1963, the Regional Office hearing officer awarded disability
1. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT; EXTENSION OF DISABILITY PERIOD; CASE AT BAR. —
benefits. Franklin Baker Co. elevated the case to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.
The only issue in this case is whether or not the Workmen’s Compensation Commission has the
power under Section 18 to extend the period of disability under Section 14 of the Workmen’s
The Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, on October 11, 1963, affirmed the award, slightly
Compensation Act. HELD: This Court has already ruled that said maximum period of 208 weeks
reducing the amount to P3,015.06. Section 14 was applied, on temporary total disability, i.e.,
as fixed in Section 14 can be extended under Section 18, as amended by Rep. Act 772. The
60% of his average weekly wage of P27.01, times the maximum of 208 weeks less a brief
right of the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner to reopen a case already decided by him is
period when he had "odd-lot" or sporadic employment.
an innovation introduced by Rep. Act 772 particularly, Sec. 13 thereof, amending Sec. 18 (last
par.) of the original Workmen’s Compensation Law, Act 3428 and is solely for the benefit of the
On July 25, 1964, Franklin Baker Co. paid said award of P3,015.06. Satisfaction thereof was
employee as may be gathered from the proviso that the Commissioner may from time to time
acknowledged by Alillana in writing (Annex "C" to petition).

Thereafter, on August 10, 1964, alleging continuing disability from his ailment, Alillana filed a
motion in the same case for additional compensation. The Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, on September 16, 1964, ordered a physical examination of Alillana. And on
September 7, 1965, after said physical examination by one of the Commission’s doctors, finding
Alillana still suffering from temporary total disability due to his ailment, the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission issued an order for additional compensation of P984.94, thus raising
the total award to the then statutory maximum of P4,000.
Franklin Baker Co. moved for reconsideration. On October 13, 1965, the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission en banc denied the motion, stating that the period of disability can
be extended beyond 208 weeks under Sec. 18 of the Act.
Hence, this petition was filed by the Franklin Baker Co., to raise on appeal from the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission’s orders the issue: Does the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
have power under Sec. 18 to extend the period of disability under Sec. 14 of the Act?
Section 14 provides: jgc:c hanro bles. com.ph
"Sec. 14. Total disability. — In case the injury or sickness causes total disability for labor, the
employer, during such disability but exclusive of the first three days shall pay to the injured
employee a weekly compensation equivalent to sixty per centum of his average weekly wages;
but not more than thirty-five pesos nor less than ten pesos per week, except in the case
provided for in the next following paragraph. Such weekly payments shall in no case continue
after the disability has ceased, nor shall they extend over more than two hundred and eight
weeks, nor shall the aggregate sum paid as compensation exceed in any case four thousand
pesos. But no award of permanent disability shall take effect until after two weeks have elapsed
from the date of injury." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary
In Avecilla Building Corporation v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-10668, September
26, 1957, this Court already ruled that said maximum period of 208 weeks can be extended
under Section 18, as amended by Republic Act 772: jgc:chan robles. com.ph
"Speaking of this right of the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner to reopen a case already
decided by him, it is an innovation introduced by Rep. Act 772, particularly, Sec. 13 thereof,
amending Section 18 (last par.) of the original Workmen’s Compensation Law, namely, Act
3428. Before amendment, the last paragraph of Section 18 read thus:
"‘The total compensation prescribed in this and the next preceding section and the total
compensation prescribed in sections fourteen and fifteen of this Act shall, together, not exceed
the sum of three thousand pesos.’
As amended, the said last paragraph now reads as follows:
"‘The total compensation prescribed in this and the next preceding section and the total
compensation prescribed in sections fourteen and fifteen of this Act, shall, together, not exceed
the sum of four thousand pesos: Provided, however, that after the payment has been made for
the period specified by the Act in each case, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner may
from time to time cause the examination of the condition of the disabled laborer, with a view to
extending, if necessary, the period of compensation which shall not, however, exceed the said
amount of four thousand pesos.’
"One change introduced is the increase from P3,000 to P4,000 of the total compensation
provided in the original provision. The more important change, however, is that contained in the
proviso, which is the last part of the paragraph. This legal provision empowering Workmen’s
Compensation Boards or Commissioners to reopen a case is contained in the Workmen’s
Compensation Acts of many of the States of the American union, including the Territory of
Hawaii. The reason for this legal provision is explained by Arthur Larson in his authoritative
work entitled, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, Vol. 2, page 330, as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com. ph
"‘In almost all states, some kind of provision is made for reopening and modifying awards. This
provision is a recognition of the obvious fact that, no matter how competent a commission’s
diagnosis of claimant’s condition and earning prospects at the time of hearing may be, that
condition may later change markedly for the worse, or may improve, or may even clear up
altogether. Under the typical award in the form of periodic payments during a specified
maximum period or during disability, the objectives of the legislation are best accomplished if
the commission can increase, decrease, revive or terminate payments to correspond to
claimant’s changed condition. Theoretically, then, commissions ought to exercise perpetual and
unlimited jurisdiction to reopen cases as often as necessary to make benefits meet current
conditions. But the administrative problem lies in the necessity of preserving the full case
records of all claimants that have ever received any kind of award, against the possibility of a
future reopening. Moreover, any attempt to reopen a case based on an injury ten or fifteen
years old must necessarily encounter awkward problems of proof, because of the long delay and
the difficulty of determining the relationship between some ancient injury and a present
aggravated disability. Another argument is that insurance carriers would never know that kind
of future liabilities they might incur, and would have difficulty in computing appropriate
reserves.’
"It will be noticed, however, that while in the several states of the union, the reopening is
intended for the benefit of both employer and employee in the sense that, in case of
aggravation or deterioration of the disability of the employee, the period of compensation
jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph should be extended up to a certain limit, or in case the condition of the employee improves or
the disability disappears altogether, the period of compensation is shortened or compensation
stopped, our law, under Section 18, is a little one-sided and is all for the benefit of the
employee, for the reason that as may be gathered from the proviso the Commissioner may
from time to time cause examination of the condition of the disabled laborer, with a view to
extending, if necessary, the period of compensation. In this respect there is room for
jgc:chan roble s.com.p h improvement of the law as to make it more equitable to both parties, labor and management.
Furthermore, while in the several states of the American Union, the time within which the
Commissioner or Board may reopen a case is limited anywhere from one year to several years,
our law contained in the proviso in question, sets no time limit. The disadvantage of making this
period within which the case may be reopened, too long, or as in our law, with no limit at all, is
touched upon by Larson in the latter part of his commentary, as above-reproduced, namely,
that in case such a period is too long, there may be difficulty in completing and preserving the
record of the injury, or determining the relationship, if any, between the aggravation or
deterioration of the employee’s disability and some ancient injury, to say nothing of the fact
that insurance companies which are interested in similar cases by having insured employees of
companies against injuries, may find difficulty in adjusting their finances, such as putting up
reserve funds to take care of future liabilities.

"But there is no question that under Section 18 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as
amended, the Commissioner was authorized to reopen the case of Carpeso and to direct that
the compensation to him by petitioner be increased or continued. The claim of petitioner that it
had not been given an opportunity to traverse the claim that Carpeso’s condition had
deteriorated, is not supported by the record."cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibra ry

Clearly, therefore, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission did not incur in any error in
extending to cover beyond 208 weeks the period of Alillana’s disability compensation, up to a
total of not more than P4,000.

Alillana’s having signed a satisfaction receipt can not result in waiver; the law does not consider
as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what the worker is entitled to recover
under the Act (Sec. 29).

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission are hereby
affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27828 February 27, 1970
THE SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (Formerly San Miguel Brewery, Inc.), petitioner,
vs.
MACARIO CRUZ and the COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo Belo and Ongsiako for petitioner.
Gonzalo A. Tejada for respondent Macario Cruz.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petition filed by the San Miguel Corporation (formerly San Miguel Brewery, Inc.) for
review of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations (in Case No. 2870-ULP),
finding it guilty of unfair labor practices and ordering the reinstatement with back wages
of complainant Macario Cruz.
The records of the case show that sometime in October, 1957 the "Pagkakaisa
Samahang Manggagawa sa S.M.B. (Paflu)", a labor organization in the San Miguel
Corporation, staged a strike against the latter. After said strike ended and the strikers
resumed their work, Macario Cruz, a driver-employee and member of the Union, was
called by one Mr. Camahort, a company official, and was shown a newspaper clipping
carrying a picture depicting him (Cruz) as one of the strikers. According to Cruz, he was
told by Camahort that he would be dismissed if he would not desist from union activities.
A few months thereafter, or on 17 March 1958, Cruz was advised of the company's
decision to retire him from the service for physical disability, effective 31 March
1958.1 Cruz must have already received information thereof before it could be sent by the
company because under date of 15 March 1958 said employee wrote the company
requesting that the benefits due him on account of his retirement be given in only one
installment.2 Accordingly, on 10 April 1958, Cruz, received from the company HSBC Cheeks
Nos. K905357 and K905358 in the total sum of P3,019.46 as "full and complete payment of
all my (his) retirement benefits."3
On 12 June 1958, Cruz also filed with the Social Security System an application for
disability benefit,4 wherein he affirmed having retired from employment on 31 March 1958.
This claim, however, was denied for the reason that the case properly falls under sickness
benefits, to which claimant was not yet entitled, he having been a member of the System for
less than one year.5
Three years after he was retired, on 27 May 1961, Macario Cruz charged the San Miguel
Company before the Court of Industrial Relations with unfair labor practices for his
dismissal in 1958, allegedly for union activities. The formal complaint against the
company was filed by the Acting Prosecutor of the Court on 12 October 1961 (Case No.
2870-ULP). After hearing, the trial Judge rendered decision sustaining the charges and
ordering therein respondent Company to reinstate the complainant with back, wages, but
deducting there from the amounts already received by him as retirement benefits. The
company sought reconsideration thereof before the court en banc, and when the same
was denied on 5 June 1967 (with two judges dissenting) the present petition for review
was filed.
The primary question posed in this proceeding is whether or not a former employee who
has accepted retirement benefits may still contest the regularity and validity of his
retirement 3 years thereafter.
In disposing of the company's defense of estoppel and ruling that the acceptance by
complainant of retirement benefits did not preclude the latter from assailing the validity of
the termination of his employment, the respondent Court cited the case of Cariño vs.
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration,6 wherein we said:
Acceptance of those benefits (separation pay and terminal leave benefits)
would not amount to estoppel. The reason is plain. Employer and
employee, obviously, do not stand on the same footing. The employer
drove the employee to the wall. The latter must have to get hold of
money. Because, out of job, he had to face the harsh necessities of life.
He thus found himself in no position to resist money proferred. His, then,
 is a case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is that
petitioners did not relent on their claim. They pressed it. They are
deemed not to have waived any of their rights.
The above pronouncement relied upon by the Industrial Court is not controlling in the
present case. In the first place, as distinctly stated in the Cariño case, therein petitioners
were improperly dismissed and never relented in their efforts to assert the illegality of
their separation 'from employment and to demand reinstatement. By contrast, the herein
complainant not only specified, and obtained, payment of retirement gratuities due him in
a lump sum but even applied for disability benefits with the Social Security System.
Moreover, he never protested his alleged illegal dismissal nor demanded reinstatement.
It took him more than 3 years to question the validity of his said retirement. The original
posture taken by the complainant, indeed, can be nothing but an agreement, or at least
acquiescence, to the decision of the company to have him retired for physical disability.
Thus, even assuming that there was ground to declare his separation from the service
invalid, complainant's receipt of all the benefits arising therefrom, with full knowledge of
all the facts surrounding the same, amounts to waiver of the right to contest the validity of
the company's act.7
Secondly, the petitioner company's cause is not only premised on estoppel, but also on
complainant's right having lapsed into a stale demand. For, truly, all the elements for the
operation of the principle of laches are here present: (a) conduct on the part of the
employer that gave rise to the situation on which the complaint is made, which is the
retirement of the complainant for physical disability; (b) delay in the assertion of
complainant's right — the lapsing of a period of 3 years which is neither explained nor
justified; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the respondent employer that the
complainant would assert the right on which the present suit is based; and (d) injury or
prejudice to the employer in the event relief is awarded to the complainant.8
Herein private respondent tries to remove this case from the operation of the laches
principle by alleging that the matter of unfair labor practice involves public interest, and
that the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875)did not prescribe any period within which
a right provided thereunder may be enforced. There can be no quarrel on this point; but it
must be realized that, unlike prescription, the defense of laches is not dependent on the
existence of a statutory period of limitation. It can be invoked without reckoning any
specific or fixed period; it is sufficient that there be an unreasonable and unexplained
delay in bringing the action that its maintenance would already constitute inequity or
injustice to the party claiming it. As this Court succinctly declared in previous cases:
... Laches is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is
concerned with the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the
effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a
question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity
being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the
relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches
applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is
based on fixed time; laches is not. (Nielson & Co., Inc. vs. Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601, 17 December 1966).9
Laches in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of
public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement
of stale claims, and unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness
of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. (Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, L-21456, 15 April 1968). 10
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations under review is hereby
reversed, and the complaint for unfair labor practices against herein petitioner, dismissed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Exhibit "G", page 84, CIR record.
2 Exhibit "2", page 116, CIR record.
3 Exhibit "1", page 115, id.

4 Exhibit "5", page 87, CIR record.

5 Exhibit "7" page 83, id.

6 G. R. No. L-19808, 29 September 1966, 18 SCRA 183.

7 Misa vs. National Marketing Corporation, L-20701, 27 April 1967, 19

SCRA 1017, Lopez vs. Board of Directors, 101 Phil. 349.

8 Go Chi Gun, et al. vs. Go Cho, et al., 96 Phil. 622.

9 18 SCRA 1040.

10 23 SCRA 29; also Z. E. Lotho, Inc. vs. Ice and Cold Storage Industries
of the Philippines,
L-16563, 28 December 1961, 3 SCRA 744.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-39990. July 22, 1975.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL LICERA, Defendant-
Appellant.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and
Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Romeo Mercado (Counsel de Oficio), for Defendant-Appellant.
SYNOPSIS
In the municipal court, defendant was charged with the offenses of illegal possession of firearm
and assault upon an agent of a person in authority. Found guilty of the first charge, he appealed
to the Court of First Instance of the province. The second case against him was forwarded to
the same court where the parties agreed to a joint trial of the two cases but was only convicted
of illegal possession of firearm. Plaintiff brought the case to the Court of Appeals invoking as his
legal jurisdiction for his possession of firearm his appointment as a secret agent by the
Governor of Batangas. He claimed that as secret agent he was a "peace officer" and, thus,
pursuant to People v. Macarandang (L-12081, Dec. 23, 1959), he was exempt from the
requirements relating to issuance of license to possess. He alleged that the lower court erred in
relying on the later case of People v. Mapa (L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967), which held that Section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret
agents by provincial governors for the requirements relating to firearms licenses. The case was
certified to this Court on the ground that a question of law was involved.
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time
of defendant’s appointment as secret agent, which appointment included a grant of authority to
possess the firearm, but as well as at the time of his apprehension, defendants incurred no
criminal liability for possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance with the
legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.
SYLLABUS
1. COURT DECISIONS; PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS. — Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution
form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. These decisions, although in themselves are not
laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into
effect.
2. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; DOCTRINE EXEMPTING SECRET AGENTS FROM THE
FIREARM LICENSE REQUIREMENT, ABANDONED. — The rule enunciated in Macarandang (106
Phil. 713) to the effect that the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within
the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent to a member of the municipal police" whom Section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearms
licenses, had been revoked by the rule in Mapa (L-22301, August 30, 1967) which held that
said section provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial
governors from the firearm license requirement.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EX POST FACTO LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST EX
POST FACTO LAW APPLIED TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINES. — Where a new doctrine abrogates an old
rule, the new doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those
favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This
holds more especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal
law, for, in this area, more than in any other it is imperative that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
4. ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; DOCTRINE OBTAINING AT THE TIME OF
POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY SECRET AGENT APPLIES. — Where the rule obtaining not only at
the time of his appointment as secret agent, but as well as at the time of his
apprehension, Accused as such secret agent was exempt from the firearm license requirements
under Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code and therefore incurred no criminal
liability for possession of the firearm, a subsequent rule holding that said law does not exempt a
secret agent from the firearm license requirement shall not adversely affect said accused who
was favored by the abandoned doctrine.
DECISION
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August 14,
1968 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We reverse the
judgment of conviction, for the reasons hereunder stated.
On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint,
subscribed and sworn to by him, with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging
Rafael Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August 13,
1966 the municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged,
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one day to six years
and eight months of imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Mindoro.
In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal
possession of firearm and another case, likewise filed against Licera with the municipal court
but already forwarded to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person
in authority, the two offenses having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by
the Chief of Police and a patrolman of Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the
Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor.
On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of
assault upon an agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of
firearm, sentencing him to suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of the
Winchester rifle in favor of the Government.
Licera’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as
involving only one question of law.
Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his
appointment as secret agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas.
He claims that as secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People v.
Macarandang, 1 was exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to
possess firearms. He alleges that the court a quo erred in relying on the later case of People v.
Mapa 2 which held that section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption
for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating
to firearm licenses.
The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to
the case at bar — that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.
The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date "December 11,
1961" includes a grant of authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23,
1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm . . . for use in connection with the performance
of your duties." Under the rule then prevailing enunciated in Macarandang, 3 the appointment
of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent
even to a member of the municipal police" whom section 879 of the Revised Administrative
Code exempts from the requirement relating to firearm licenses.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. These
decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of
the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. 4
At the time of Licera’s designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension
for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965,
the Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative
Code — formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction’s legal system. Mapa
revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an
old rule, the new doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect
those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith
thereof. This holds more especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the
field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any other, it is imperative that the punishability
of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. 5
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera’s appointment as
secret agent, which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle,
but as well at the time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession
of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance with the legal requirements relating to
firearm licenses.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs de
oficio.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz, Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
Endnotes:
1. L-12088, December 23, 1959, 106 Phil. 713.
2. L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.
3. Vide People v. Lucero, L-10845, April 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 500.
4. People v. Jabinal, L-30061, February 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 607. Vide Senarillos v.
Hermosisima, L-10662, December 14, 1956, 100 Phil. 501.
5. People v. Jabinal, ibid.
 Republic of the Philippines ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary
SUPREME COURT permit or license to possess the same.
Manila
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty,
SECOND DIVISION after which trial was accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver
and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit.
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974 He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license
or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander,
vs. and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant. the firearm in question.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by
plaintiff-appellee. him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant. Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that
you will be an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the
preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas, especially
with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal
ANTONIO, J.:p cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed
firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as
finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties
indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the
provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People
v. Mapa.1 preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports
thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood that
The complaint filed against the accused reads: any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground
for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the
the poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- have the right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in
named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there connection with the performance of your duties.
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and
direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your
duties by taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.
 FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: — ROHM-Revolver
Make: — German
SN: — 64
Cal:— .22
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander
of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling
activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that
might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with
these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8
SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the
firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the
Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang2 and People vs. Lucero.3 The trial
court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really
been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the
PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry
the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision
dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases
of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra.
The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero,
supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's
judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he
was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had
an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and
carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the
Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from
the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and
Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the
circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the
accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion
commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the
doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment
of conviction on the following ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall
be unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of
firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised
Administrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and
ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of
provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative
Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent.
As such he is not exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the
prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v.
Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v.
Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this
appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete Footnotes
reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of
the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment. 1 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of 2 106 Phil. (1959), 713.
what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
3 103 Phil. (1958), 500.
of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way,
a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid
down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the
land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when
he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case
in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the
construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability
of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret
Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the
prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal
liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license
and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is

acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

 THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070. February 12, 1997]
MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO
CANTERO, complainants, vs. JUDGE ESMERALDO G.
CANTERO, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than
plausible, and more advised than confident. Above all things,
integrity is their portion and proper virtue.1
chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
The eminent Francis Bacon wrote the foregoing exhortation some
400 years ago. Today, it is still relevant and quotable. By the
nature of their functions, judges are revered as models of integrity,
wisdom, decorum, competence and propriety. Human as they are,
however, magistrates do have their own weaknesses, frailties,
mistakes and even indiscretions. In the case before us, respondent
Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero was charged administratively in the
twilight of his government service, as a result of a failed love affair
that happened some 46 years ago. After an otherwise unblemished
record, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of 70
years on August 8, 1997 had death not intervened a few months
ago on September 26, 1996. Notwithstanding his death, this Court
still resolved to rule on this case, as it may affect his retirement
benefits.
Antecedent Facts
In a letter-complaint2 dated November 10, 1993, Maria Apiag
Cantero with her daughter Teresita A. Cantero Sacurom and son
Glicerio A. Cantero charged the respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G.
Cantero of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pinamungajan-
Aloquinsan, Cebu, with gross misconduct for allegedly having
committed bigamy and falsification of public documents.
After receipt of the respondent's Comment, the Court on February
5, 1996, referred this case3 to Executive Judge Gualberto P.
Delgado of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu for
investigation, report and recommendation. The latter submitted his
Report and Recommendation4 dated July 26, 1996. Thereafter, the
Court referred this case also to the Office of the Court
Administrator5 for evaluation, report and recommendation.
According to the complainants:
"Sometime in August 11, 1947, defendant (should be respondent)
and plaintiff (should be complainant) Maria Apiag, joined together in
holy matrimony in marriage after having lived together as husband
and wife wherein they begot a daughter who was born on June 19,
1947, whom they named: Teresita A. Cantero; and then on October
29, 1953, Glicerio A. Cantero was born. Thereafter, defendant left
the conjugal home without any apparent cause, and leaving the
plaintiff Maria Apiag to raise the two children with her meager
income as a public school teacher at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte.
Plaintiffs suffered a lot after defendant abandoned them for no
reason whatsoever. For several years, defendant was never heard
of and his whereabout unknown.
Few years ago, defendant surfaced at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte,
whereupon, plaintiffs begged for support, however, they were
ignored by defendant. x x x"6 chan roble svirtual lawlib rary
On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Atty. Redentor G.
Guyala, wrote a letter to respondent as follows:
"Judge Esmeraldo Cantero
Pinamungajan, Cebu
Dear Judge Cantero:
We are writing in behalf of your legal wife, Maria Apiag, and your
two legitimate children by her, Teresita (Mrs. Sacurom) and
Glicerio.
It appears that sometime in the 1950's for reasons known only to
you, you left your conjugal home at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte,
and abandoned without any means of support your said wife and
children. Since then and up to now, they have not seen or heard
from you.
They would wish now that you do them right by living up to your
duty as husband and father to them, particularly that expressly
provided under Art. 68 and Art. 195 of the Family Code (Art. 109
and 195 of the Civil Code) in relation to Art. 203 of the same Code.
You will please consider this letter as a formal demand for
maintenance and support for three of them, and a request that they
be properly instituted and named as your compulsory heirs and
legal beneficiaries in all legal documents now on file and to be filed
with the Supreme Court and other agencies or offices as may be
required under applicable laws, such as, the insurance (GSIS) and
retirement laws.
We hope this matter can be amicably settled among you, your wife
and children, without having to resort to judicial recourse.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) REDENTOR G. GUYALA"7 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
The letter elicited no action or response from the respondent.
Subsequently, complainants learned that respondent Judge had
another family. In their own words,
"x x x The plaintiffs later on learned that defendant has another
wife by the name of Nieves C. Ygay, a Public School teacher from
Tagao, Pinamungajan, Cebu. According to some documents
obtained by plaintiffs, the herein defendant and Nieves C. Ygay
have children of their own, named as follows with their date of
births: Noralyn Y. Cantero -- May 19, 1968; Ellen Y. Cantero --
February 4, 1970; Erwin Y. Cantero -- April 29, 1979; Onofre Y.
Cantero -- June 10, 1977; and Desirie Vic Y. Cantero -- December
2, 1981.
It was shocking to the senses that in all of the public documents
required of defendant Judge Cantero to be filed with the Supreme
Court such as his sworn statement of assets and liabilities, his
personal data sheet (SC Form P. 001), income tax returns and his
insurance policy with the Government Service Insurance System,
defendant misrepresented himself as being married to Nieves C.
Ygay, with whom he contracted a second marriage. The truth of the
matter is that defendant is married to plaintiff Maria Apiag with
whom they have two legitimate children, namely: Teresita A.
Cantero and Glicerio A. Cantero."8 chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
The respondent Judge, in his Comment, explained his side as
follows:
"x x x I admit the existence and form of Annex 'A' of the said
complaint, but vehemently deny the validity of its due execution,
for the truth of the matter is that such alleged marriage was only
dramatized at the instance of our parents just to shot (sic) their
wishes and purposes on the matter, without my consent freely
given. As a matter of fact, I was only called by my parents to go
home to our town at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party
celebration of my sister's birthday from Iligan City, without patently
knowing I was made to appear (in) a certain drama marriage and
we were forced to acknowledge our signatures appearing in the duly
prepared marriage contract(.) That was 46 years ago when I was
yet 20 years of age, and at my second year high school days."9
Furthermore, Judge Cantero related that:
"x x x sometime in the year 1947, when both respondent and
complainant, Maria Apiag were still in their early age and in their
second year high school days, they were engaged in a lovely affair
which resulted to the pregnancy of the said complainant, and then
and there gave birth to a child, named Teresita Apiag, having
(been) born out of wedlock on June 19, 1947, now Mrs. Teresita
Sacurom, one of the complainants. That in order to save name and
shame, parents of both the respondent and the complainant came
to an agreement to allow the respondent, and the complainant (to)
get married in the (sic) name, but not to live together as husband,
wife for being close relatives, thereby forcing the respondent to
appear in a marriage affair where all the pertinent marriage papers
were all ready (sic) prepared (sic), and duly signed by somebody;
that after the said affair both respondent and the complainant
immediately separated each other (sic) without living together as
husband, and wife even for a day, nor having established a conjugal
home. From that time respondent and the complainant have never
met each other nor having (sic) communicated (with) each other for
the last 40 years; that respondent continued his studies at Cebu
City, and eventually became member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examination in the year 1960, that is 14 years after
the affair of 1947; that in 1964, respondent was first connected in
the government service as Comelec Registrar of the Commission on
Elections, assigned at Pinamungajan, Cebu(,) that is 16 years after
the affair of 1947; that in the year 1982, respondent was appointed
as CLAO lawyer, now PAO, of the Department of Justice, that is 35
years after the after the affair of 1947; and finally, on October 3,
1989, respondent was appointed to the Judiciary as Municipal
chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Circuit Trial Judge (MCTC) of the Municipalities of Pinamungajan
and Aloguinsan, province of Cebu, that is 42 years from August 11,
1947; that respondent is (sic) already 32 years in the government
service up to the present time with more than 6 years in the
Judiciary; that respondent is already 69 years old, having been born
on August 8, 1927, and retirable by next year if God willing; that
respondent has served in the government service for the last 32
years, faithfully, honestly and judiciously without any complaint
whatsoever, except this instant case; that respondent as member
of the Judiciary, has live-up (sic) to the standard required by the
(sic) member (sic) of the bar and judiciary; that the charges
against the respondent were all based or rooted from the incedent
(sic) that happened on August 11, 1947 and no other; that the
complainants are morally dishonest in filing the instant (case) just
now, an elapsed (sic) of almost 42 years and knowing that
respondent (is) retirable by next year, 1997; that this actuation is
very suspicious, and intriguing;
xxx
That complainant Maria Apiag has been living together with another
man during her public service as public school teacher and have
begotten a child, name (sic) Manuel Apiag and respondent promised
(sic) the Honorable Court to furnish a complete paper regarding this
case in order to enlighten the Honorable (Court) that, he who seek
(sic) justice must seek justice with cleab (sic) hand;
That respondent did not file any annullment (sic) or judicial
declaration (of nullity) of the alleged marriage because it is the
contention and honest belief, all the way, that the said marriage
was void from the beginning, and as such nothing is to be voided or
nullified, and to do so will be inconsistent with the stand of the
respondent; that this instant case (was) simply filed for money
consideration as reflected in their letter of demand; (t)hat as a
matter of fact, respondent and the complainant have already signed
a compromised (sic) agreement, copy of which hereto (sic)
attached as Annex '1', stating among other things that respondent
will give a monthly allowance to Terecita (sic) Sacurom in the
(amount) of P4,000.00 and the complainant will withdraw their
complaint from the Supreme Court., and that respondent had
already given the said allowance for three consecutive months plus
the amount of P25,000.00 for their Attorney to withdraw the case,
and that respondent stop (sic) the monthly allowance until such
time the complainant will actually withdraw the instant case, and
without knowledge of the respondent, complainant proceeded (sic)
their complaint after the elapsed (sic) of three (3) years."10
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Relevant portions of said compromise agreement which was
executed sometime in March 1994 by Esmeraldo C. Cantero and
Teresita C. Sacurom and witnessed by Maria Apiag and Leovegardo
Sacurom are reproduced thus:
"That this COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is executed and entered into
by ESMERALDO C. CANTERO, of legal age, married, Filipino, and
with residence and postal address at Pinamungajan, Cebu,
Philippines, otherwise called as the FIRST PARTY, and TERESITA C.
SACUROM, also of legal age, married, Filipino, representing her
mother and her brother, and a residence (sic) of 133-A J. Ramos
Street, Caloocan City, after having duly swirn (sic) to in accordance
with law do hereby depose and say:
1. That the First Party is presently a Municipal Circuit Trial Judge of
Pinamungajan-Aloguinsan, Cebu, is charged by Second Party for
Misconduct before the Office of the Court Administrator of the
Supreme Court now pending action;
2. That the parties have came (sic) to agreement to have the said
case settled amicably in the interest of family unity and
reconciliation, and arrived at compromise agreement based on law
of equity, as follows:
(a) That both parties have agreed voluntarily, the Second
Party will get ONE FOURTH (1/4) of the retirement that
the First will receive from the GSIS, and the rest of it will
be for the First Party;
(b) That the Second Party and his brother will be
included as one of the beneficiaries of the First Party, in
case of death;
 (c) That the Second party and his only brother will inherit
the properties of the First party inherited from his
parents;
(d) That the Second Party, representing her brother, is
authorized to receive and collect P4,000.00, monthly out
of the second check salary of the First Party (The second
half salary only);
3. That it was further voluntarily agreed that the Second Party will
cause the withdrawal and the outright dismissal of the said pending
case filed by her and her mother;
4. That it was also agreed that the above agreement, shall never be
effective and enforceable unless the said case will be withdrawn and
dismiss (sic) from the Supreme Court, and said dismissal be
received by the First Party, otherwise the above-agreement is void
from the beginning; and the Second Party must desist from further
claining (sic) and filing civil abd (sic) criminal liabilities.
5. That this agreement is executed voluntarily, in good faith, and in
the interest of good will and reconciliation and both parties is (sic)
duty bound to follow faithfully and religiously."11
chanrob lesvi rtual lawlib rary
In line with the foregoing, the respondent wrote a letter dated 14
March, 1994 addressed to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) designating Teresita Cantero Sacurom and Glicerio
Cantero as additional beneficiaries in his life insurance policy.12
The Issues
The respondent Judge formulated the following "issues":
"1. That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria Apiag on
August 11, 1947 is void;
2. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag for more
than seven (7) years raise the presumption that she is already
dead, that there was no need for any judicial declaration;
3. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to him because
assuming that he committed the offense, he was not yet a member
of the judiciary;
4. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already prescribed;
5. The charges have no basis in fact and in law."13 chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry
Report and Recommendation of Investigating Judge and Court
Administrator
Investigating Judge Gualberto P. Delgado recommended in his
report that:
"After a careful perusal of the evidence submitted by the parties,
this Office finds respondent Guilty of the crime of Grave Misconduct
(Bigamy and Falsification of Public Documents) however,
considering his length of service in the government, it is
recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year without
pay."14chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
The Office of the Court Administrator also submitted its
report15recommending respondent Judge's dismissal, as follows:
"After a careful review of all the documents on file in this case, we
find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the investigating
judge.
Extant from the records of the case and as admitted by respondent,
he was married to complainant Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 and
have (sic) two (2) children with her. Respondent's contention that
such marriage was in jest and assuming that it was valid, it has lost
its validity on the ground that they never met again nor have
communicated with each other for the last 40 years cannot be given
a (sic) scant consideration. Respondent's argument that he was not
yet a lawyer, much more, a member of the bench when he
contracted his first marriage with the complainant, is unavailing for
having studied law and had become a member of the Bar in 1960,
he knows that the marriage cannot be dissolved without a judicial
declaration of death. Respondent's second marriage with Nieves
Ygay was therefore bigamous for it was contracted during the
existence of a previous marriage.
We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion of the respondent
that he cannot be held liable for misconduct on the ground that he
was not yet a lawyer nor a judge when the act(s) complained of
were committed. The infraction he committed continued from the
time he became a lawyer in 1960 to the time he was appointed as a
judge in October 23, 1989. This is a continuing offense (an unlawful
act performed continuously or over and over again, Law Dictionary,
Robert E. Rothenberg). He can therefore be held liable for his
misdeeds.
On the charge of falsification, it was shown with clarity in his
Personal Data Sheet for Judges, Sworn Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Networth, Income Tax Return (pp. 99-102, rollo),
that he had committed a misrepresentation by stating therein that
his spouse is Nieves Ygay and (had) eight (8) children (with her)
which is far from (the) truth that his wife is Maria Apiag with whom
he had two (2) children.
Aside from the admission, the untenable line of defense by the
respondent presupposes the imposition of an administrative
sanction for the charges filed against him. 'A judge's actuation of
cohabiting with another when his marriage was still valid and
subsisting - his wife having been allegedly absent for four years
only constitutes gross immoral conduct' (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran Jr.,
249 SCRA 447). It is evident that respondent failed to meet the
standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While deceit employed by respondent, existed prior to his
appointment as a x x x Judge, his immoral and illegal act of
cohabiting with x x x began and continued when he was already in
the judiciary. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and
in his everyday life. These are judicial guidepost to(sic) self-evident
to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary (Atienza vs. Brilliantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32-33).
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
judge be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave
and retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-appointment in any
branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations."
As earlier indicated, respondent Judge died on September 27, 1996
while this case was still being deliberated upon by this Court.
 The Court's Ruling
In spite of his death, this Court decided to resolve this case on the
merits, in view of the foregoing recommendation of the OCA which,
if affirmed by this Court, would mean forfeiture of the death and
retirement of the respondent.
Gross Misconduct Not Applicable
The misconduct imputed by the complainants against the judge
comprises the following: abandonment of his first wife and children,
failing to give support, marrying for the second time without having
first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage,
and falsification of public documents. Misconduct, as a ground for
administrative action, has a specific meaning in law.
"'Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal
meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as
affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only
as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has
been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of
man from the character of an officer. x x x It is settled that
misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from
office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be connected
with the performance of official duties x x x.' More specifically, in
Buenaventura vs. Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against a
judge of the court of first instance, the present Chief Justice defines
misconduct as referring 'to a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer.' That is to abide by the
authoritative doctrine as set forth in the leading case of In re
Horilleno, a decision penned by Justice Malcolm, which requires that
in order for serious misconduct to be shown, there must be 'reliable
evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt
or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent
disregard of well-known legal rules.'"16
The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain
to his personal life and have no direct relation to his judicial
function. Neither do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge
of his official responsibilities. Therefore, said acts cannot be deemed
misconduct much less gross misconduct in office. For any of the
aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero" x x x (t)o warrant
disciplinary action, the act of the judge must have a direct relation
to the performance of his official duties. It is necessary to separate
the character of the man from the character of the officer."17 chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry
Nullity of Prior Marriage
It is not disputed that respondent did not obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Maria Apiag prior to
marrying Nieves C. Ygay. He argued however that the first marriage
was void and that there was no need to have the same judicially
declared void, pursuant to jurisprudence then prevailing. In the en
banc case of Odayat vs. Amante,18 complainant charged Amante, a
clerk of court, with oppression, immorality and falsification of public
document. The complainant Odayat alleged among others " x x x
that respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom
he begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena Abella is
still alive x x x." In order to rebut the charge of immorality, Amante
" x x x presented in evidence the certification (of the) x x x Local
Civil Registrar x x x attesting that x x x Filomena Abella was
married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondent's
contention is that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab
initio, because of her previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales."
This Court ruled that "Filomena Abella's marriage with the
respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of the New Civil
Code, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity
of void marriages."19
Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs
x x x a judicial declaration of such fact"20 before any party thereto
"can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be
void."21 This was expressly provided under Article 4022 of the Family
Code. However, the marriage of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took
place and all their children were born before the promulgation of
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante applies in favor of
respondent.
On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not prosper either
because it is based on a finding of guilt in the bigamy charge.
Since, as shown in the preceding discussion, the bigamy charge
cannot stand, so too must the accusation of falsification fail.
Furthermore, the respondent judge's belief in good faith that his
first marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up these
public documents, a valid defense in a charge of falsification of
public document,23 which must be appreciated in his favor.
Personal Conduct of a Judge
However, the absence of a finding of criminal liability on his part
does not preclude this Court from finding him administratively liable
for his indiscretion, which would have merited disciplinary action
from this Court had death not intervened. In deciding this case, the
Court emphasizes that "(t)he personal behavior of a judge, not only
upon the bench but also in his everyday life, should be above
reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety. He should
maintain high ethical principles and sense of propriety without
which he cannot preserve the faith of the people in the judiciary, so
indispensable in an orderly society. For the judicial office
circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a
number of restrictions thereon, which he has to observe faithfully as
the price he has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted
position in the administration of justice."24 It is against this
standard that we must gauge the public and private life of Judge
Cantero.
The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short
of this standard because the record reveals he had two families.
The record also shows that he did not attend to the needs, support
and education of his children of his first marriage. Such is conduct
unbecoming a trial magistrate. Thus, the late Judge Cantero
"violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates
that '[a] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance
of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday
life, should be beyond reproach,' and Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which provides that '[a] judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.'"25
chanroblesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted
Finally, the Court also scrutinized the whole of respondent's record.
Other than this case, we found no trace of wrongdoing in the
discharge of his judicial functions from the time of his appointment
up to the filing of this administrative case, and has to all
appearances lived up to the stringent standards embodied in the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering his otherwise untarnished 32 SO ORDERED.
years in government service,26 this Court is inclined to treat him
with leniency. Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo and
Francisco, JJ., concur.
Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a
mistake. But we should not look only at his sin. We should also Endnotes:
consider the man's sincerity in his repentance, his genuine effort at
restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation of his life.
1 Bacon, Francis (1561-1626), Essays: Of Judicature. See also Handbook for Judges, p. 276, The American
This respondent should not be judged solely and finally by what Judicature Society, 1975.
took place some 46 years ago. He may have committed an
indiscretion in the past. But having repented for it, such youthful 2 Rollo, pp. 6-7.

mistake should not forever haunt him and should not totally destroy 3 Ibid., p. 21.
his career and render inutile his otherwise unblemished record.
Indeed, it should not demolish completely what he built in his public 4 Ibid., pp. 138-143.
life since then. Much less should it absolutely deprive him and/or 5
Ibid., p. 149.
his heirs of the rewards and fruits of his long and dedicated service
in government. For these reasons, dismissal from service as 6
Memorandum for Plaintiffs, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 104-105.
recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator would be too
harsh. Ibid, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 103-104.
7

8 Ibid, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 104-105

However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss
in attending to the needs of his children of his first marriage -- 9
Comment for the Respondent, p. 1; Rollo, p. 13.

children whose filiation he did not deny. He neglected them and 10

Memorandum for the Respondent, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 52-54.
refused to support them until they came up with this administrative
charge. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty. 11 Rollo, p. 51.
But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision,
dismissal of the case is now in order. Ibid, p. 115.
12

13
See Evaluation, Report, and Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, p. 3; Rollo, p. 152.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is
hereby DISMISSED. 14 Rollo, p. 143.
15 pp. 5-8; Rollo, pp. 154-156.

16Amosco v. Magro, 73 SCRA 107, pp.108-109, September 30, 1976; citing Lacson v. Roque, 92 Phil. 456,
(1953), Buenaventura v. Benedicto, 38 SCRA 71, March 27, 1971, and In re Impeachment of Horilleno, 43
Phil. 212, (1922).

17Babatio v. Tan, 157 SCRA 277, p. 280, January 22, 1988; citing Salcedo v. Inting, 91 SCRA 19, June 29,
1979.

18
77 SCRA 338, June 2, 1977.

19 Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338, 341, June 2, 1977

20
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499, 501, August 19, 1986.

21
Sempio-Diy, Alicia V., The Family Code of the Philippines, p. 46, 1988.

22 "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

23Reyes, Luis B., Criminal Law, p. 211, Thirteenth Edition, 1993; citing People v. Unico, et al., C.A., 56 O.G.
1681.

24
Agpalo, Ruben, Legal Ethics, p. 465, Fourth Edition, 1989; citing Canon 3, Canon of Judicial Ethics;
Candia v. Tagabucba, 79 SCRA 51, Sept. 12, 1977; Canon 1, Canons of Judicial Ethics; and
Jugueta v. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27, Sept. 30, 1974.

25
Alfonso v. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239, 254-255, December 7, 1993.

26 Except perhaps his occasional ungrammatical language and typographical errors.

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ
WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein)
asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy
Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein
petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of
Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been
performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while
admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was
null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced
to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both
parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted
against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting
the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to
present evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first
husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married
to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of
force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence,
the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge-
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the
case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present
evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be
void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still
validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID
(Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void
still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders
complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO
and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S.
FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S.
FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez;
and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO,
JR. all surnamed LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed
ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of
Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.
Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XIII, dated December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground
operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried
them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation
of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the
required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground.
Portion of the complaint reads:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant
PHILEX, with gross and reckless negligence and imprudence and
deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due protection of
the lives of its men working underground at the time, and in utter violation
of the laws and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the
Government pursuant thereto, allowed great amount of water and mud to
accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which
seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and rock
below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at
its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in
the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such
enormous pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores
rocks, mud and water, accompanied by surface boulders, blasted through
the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a matter of approximately five
(5) minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber supports and
carried off materials, machines and equipment which blocked all avenues
of exit, thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above referred to,
including those named in the next preceding paragraph, represented by
the plaintiffs herein;
 10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant
PHILEX's mine on the said date, five (5) were able to escape from the
terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest,
21 in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove,
were left mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then,
a great many of them were still alive, entombed in the tunnels of the
mine, but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's decision to
abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden legal and
moral duties in the premises;
xxx xxx xxx
13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and
regulations duly promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out
by the Special Committee above referred to, in their Report of
investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed completely to
provide its men working underground the necessary security for the
protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it had vast financial
resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total operating
income of P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of
P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual Report for the year ended
December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00
as of December 31, 1966;
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 42-44, rec.)
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of
action of petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former
Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition
dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are
not based on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of
the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a
quasi-delict.
(b) Art. 1173—The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and
of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles
1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated
June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the said order, respondent Judge, on September 23, 1968,
reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27, 1968 and allowed Philex to file an
answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was
opposed by petitioners.
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and
ruled that in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's
Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or
compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees,
irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's
negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to
Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to
50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I Act, which read:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS-
PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
A
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over
the cause of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on
damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint
alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take the necessary
security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. They also
assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the
allegations in their complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed
admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to
see the distinction between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and the claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex
under the Civil Code. They point out that workmen's compensation refers to liability for
compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or death of the working man
through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or negligence of the
employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in
the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence
resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate the same.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable
exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.—The rights and remedies
granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling
him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing
to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of
kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of
said injury ...
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction.— The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal
to the Supreme Court, ...
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was
held that "all claims of workmen against their employer for damages due to accident
suffered in the course of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case
from the exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act;
because Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in case the
employer fails to comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent
accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the
petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased miners,
except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater
amount of damages under the Civil Code.
In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty.
Edgardo Angara, now President of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel
Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs
Department, and Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan
Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective
memoranda.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:
Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in
case of his death under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive,
selective or cumulative, that is to say, whether his or his heirs' action is
exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under
the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of
selection or choice of action between availing of the worker's right under
the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under
the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from
the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his
other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions,
i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured
employee or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover
damages (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular
court on the basis of negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions.
Atty. Angara believes otherwise. He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for
work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is
selective. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right of
choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation
Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the
employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of
Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the Act,
they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil
Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with
respondent Philex. In the resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition
only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it appearing that there are other
petitioners in this case.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the
Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and
moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos.
Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle
them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that
the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments.
The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on
the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in
occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule
that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's
compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code,
the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill,
Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a
contractual relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure
that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it
may be held liable for damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of
contract when there is fraud or bad faith, read:
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award
exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the
obligor who acted in good faith is able shall be those that are the natural
and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which
the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time
the obligation was constituted.
 In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation.
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of
damages, as assessed by the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs
from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on
a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under
the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53).
Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the
workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not
since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of
actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation
benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or
work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer
(Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as
a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a
person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through
the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal
relation between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the
damages suffered. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a
presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death or injury is
work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden to prove
otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551;
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the
fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any
provision for an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided
was merely the right of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the
amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred
(P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13,
Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50% if the
complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety
appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational
disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is
over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and
which cannot be granted by the Commission.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be
paid to an employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities
in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his
employer. Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of
contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford
protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation designed to give relief to
the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or
injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case
of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the
worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the
employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may
avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32
SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an
ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both
courses of action simultaneously.
In Pacaña WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the
application of Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act on the
injured workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors in the regular courts,
 Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that
the injured worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both
courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the relative
advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as
against an ordinary action.
As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for
damages against the respondents (defendants below), because he has
elected to seek compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law,
and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission) was
being processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First
Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as the damages recoverable
under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the amounts that
may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they should
not be deemed incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer
was initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not
as profitable, the smaller indemnity obtainable by the first course is
balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of proving the
causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting
injury, and of having to establish the extent of the damage suffered;
issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having
staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded from
pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by
the Compensation Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6
aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by
derivative action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the
compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess
accrues to the latter.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies
to third-party tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition
has been dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable
settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss
dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees,
namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino
Martinez submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of
the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25,
1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments
(pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition
to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but
they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation
Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the
accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and
which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary
Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.).
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action
before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been
remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government
rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought
redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser
amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case
should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However,
should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments
made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages
that may be decreed in their favor.
B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the
instant case. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees
of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the
1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION
OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as
implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New
Civil Code of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State
(Art. II).
Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working
women, and minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner
and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture.
The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure
the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition
of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish,
maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field of education, health,
housing, employment, welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the
people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution);
"... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and
employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of
work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of
Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article
3 of the New Labor Code, thus:
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.—The State shall afford protection to
labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work. (emphasis supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles
of the New Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article
173 of the New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it
was amended by R.A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New
Labor Code, has been superseded by the aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code,
a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional
mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their
employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights of the
workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and
the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.
The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973
Constitution are statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts.
Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs.
Barnette, with characteristic eloquence, enunciated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis
supplied).
In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code,
both the New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in
favor of the workers and employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter,
provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this
Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to
prevail. "
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of
doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety
and decent living of the laborer."
Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act provided:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies
granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling
him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing
to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of
kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of
said injury (emphasis supplied).
Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work
outside the same may stipulate with such laborers that the remedies
prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside
the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance
of the duties of the employment; and all service contracts made in the
manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed to include such
agreement.
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428,
was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies
granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling
him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing
to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of
kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of
said injury.
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside
the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed
by this Act shall apply to injuries received outside the Island through
accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the
employment. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers
to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where
the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to them (As
amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable
provisions of the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the
liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and
in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his
dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of
the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under
this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699
of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered One
hundred eighty- six, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six
hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred
Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered
by the System during the period of such payment for the same disability
or death, and conversely (emphasis supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section
699 of the Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as
amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws
whose benefits are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS).
Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the
New Labor Code does not even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil
Code provisions heretofore quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from
negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages
recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for
by the New Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the Government
Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the
New Labor Code).
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form
part of the law of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
 Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of
this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves
not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or
interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the
date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or
interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-
273 [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the
statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before
and after it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the
right of recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured employee to the compensation
provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the
Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442)
when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an
ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot pursue
both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice
Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's
Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila Yacht
Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma
(104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred
in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor.
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of
the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and
does not even refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject
to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra
aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and
advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the
American Federal Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the American
Union. Consequently, the restrictive nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's
Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own
laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New
Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the
employer. The right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the
Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers arising
from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his
employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in underground mining, is
to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss
of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law.
The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton neglect
on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures
for the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint
alone, such attitude is un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution,
as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power
of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and
the implementing legislation aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the
New Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased
mining employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the
New Labor Code are retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the obsolete
laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations
(Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which has been discarded soon after the
close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines
and other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and
Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are
dangerous to life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-
and-let-live is now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others
to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation
that he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's
keeper. No man is an island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian
as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent,
The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of economic royalists and robber
barons of America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries
continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates man
and debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant"
and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his
inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE only
have to restate the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the
servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the
servant than he may reasonably be expected to do himself." This is the very selfish
doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which generated so much hatred and
drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of
the law insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the
letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
C Constitution and all statute books."
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No
judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws. "
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes
that in certain instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must
legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human
beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may
apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of
the American Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may
have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American
Constitution and the statutes.
'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified
but denies that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial
tyranny (The Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went
farther to concede that the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs.
American Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).
Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same
view. Chief Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the
Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127 1803),
which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what
the judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted by President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced
that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He
fills the open spaces in the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In the
language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the
restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view
is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric of
Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or
injury caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It
is correctly termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as
amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of
the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the
safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the
workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay
compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment or injury is work-
connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety
measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee.
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of
Mr. Justice Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the
precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff
Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo
warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has threatened for an interval to rob
the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents established in those items exert an unhappy
influence even now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law
Review 383, 387).
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted,
although with a cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they can do
so only interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific
Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs.
Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853), Justice Holmes
pronounced:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields
of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate
in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. x x x.
When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that
they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not
go on.
To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such
action would be free from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do
whenever they determine which of two competing principles of policy
shall prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may
disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction
between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and
divide the branches into waterlight compartments, were it ever so
desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the
Constitution requires.
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but
grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the
assumption by the courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate
into Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice
Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin
Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who
either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law, or decry the
exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of
such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific
cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has
not protected public interest or individual welfare, particularly the lowly workers or the
underprivileged.
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and
statutory enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights.
Foremost among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436
1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which
guaranteed the accused under custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to
counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him against the use of
force or intimidation to extort confession from him. These rights are not found in the
American Bill of Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism
of the American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision
was developed by American judicial decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on
double jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And
these judicial decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court. In both provisions, the second offense is the same as the first offense if the
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first offense.
The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also courts is limited by the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on political
developed by judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the doctrines
people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853). of separation of powers and political questions and invoking American precedents.

Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson
(163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which doctrine
was revoked in the case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294),
holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the
same schools attended by the whites-equal facilities in the same school-which was
extended to public parks and public buses.
De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs.
Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting
maternity leave to working women-according primacy to property rights over human
rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no longer the rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937,
949), Justice Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the
guarantee of due process to protect property rights as against human rights or social
justice for the working man. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated.
Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish
(300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court upheld the rights of
workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed minimum wage for women and
minors, working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for women
employees.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions
expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality
of any legislative enactment or executive act.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN
FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM
PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED.
NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.

The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule
on political questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by Separate Opinions
judicial decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed.
1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).

It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
separate concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the
doctrine of political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in A
both the American and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX
Mining Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself,
however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in
Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title XVIII-Damages that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN
CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL
LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muñoz Palma, etc., et al.,
104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is
but a play on words. The term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812
and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered,
being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the
course of employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which
has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference
to the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's Compensation
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of
remedies, as the majority rules, both options cannot be exercised simultaneously, and
the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had already
exercised their option to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have
already received compensation payable to them under that Act. Stated differently, the
remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already become a "finished
transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed
to exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings
under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to" the
"election of remedies", because those proceedings had become a "finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election
of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer
be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to make a
second election, in disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the
second election he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election,
This was not done in the case before the Court.
B.
'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez
upholding "the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further
add:
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10,
1927 and took effect on June 10, 1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii
statutes.
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and
some sections of the law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and
Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925). [Morabe &
Inton, Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the
remedy under the Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's
Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.
Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all
industrial employment' and employees of the territory and its political
subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful
intention to injure himself or another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482,
S.S., p. 713.)
When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec.
7483, S.S., p. 714.)
2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act,
the Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies
granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury
(Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and
intention of the law-making body must be sought, first of all in the words
of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural, ordinary,
commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to good
and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle
construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law-
making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of
grammar. Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be
presumed to yield its correct sense. (Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98)
[Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside
the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed
by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands
through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties
of the employment. (Italics supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the
Act, subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other
than within the Act itself. Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for
which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides
his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to
claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other
person for damages, in accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured
employee to sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have
formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Section 6.
That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to allow any option to an
employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the
Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or
employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have
independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to the liability
of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions when the legislator had the
opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies under the
Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of
Section 5 unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside
the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed
by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries received outside the
Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of
the duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the
 manner prescribed in this section be presumed to include such
agreement).
On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with
the elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence
at the end of the paragraph:
Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits
of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident
occurs, should such law be more favorable to them. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended.
At that time, if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph
of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue the employer under the
Act, or under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable to him.
(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to
an injured employee without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part
of the employer. The compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry
(Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689 [1938]).
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of
compensation, caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same
amount payable when the employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-
A 1 was included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A
increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there was negligence on the part of
the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an
option to an employee, injured with negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the
latter under the provisions of the Civil Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The
legislator was again given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to an
employee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker,
the Court is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the
Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits
based on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the
long history of workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature
and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on employees'
compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the
early years of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage
suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to
prove in a tort suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury
was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he was not guilty of
contributory negligence. The employer could employ not only his wealth in defeating the
claim for damages but a host of common law defenses available to him as well. The
worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he accepted employment. As
stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided
in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on
the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be
expected to do of himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker was
deemed to accept the risks of employment that he should discover and guard against
himself.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption
of risk doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so
easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby
workers had only to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury arising
from employment in order to be compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and
made compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or the
fault of the employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to have
simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of
industrial accidents could more readily, if not automatically, receive compensation for
work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers' liability
acts were a major step in the desired direction. However, employers liability legislation
proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a
compromise. In return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the
injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts
of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre-
determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain cases, the
actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the total damages for his pain
and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required to
act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program.
And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation
system, individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield
to the interests of their entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to
an understanding of the acts and the cases interpreting them.
By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial
accidents of both the avoidable and unavoidable variety had become
enormous, and government was faced with the problem of who was to
pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry.
If the accident was avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness
of the employer, existing tort principles offered some measure of redress.
Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was
manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed
the employee at a substantial disadvantage. So long as liability depended
on fault there could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been
pointed officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the
facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses, who were usually fellow
workers of the victim, were torn between friendship or loyalty to their
class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the employer, on the other.
The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured employee
to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his
claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted, a large share of the
proceeds of the judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel.
Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often paid a
substantial damage bill, while only a part of this enured to the benefit of
the injured employee or his dependents. The employee's judgment was
nearly always too little and too late.
xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those
persons who enjoy the product of a business- whether it be in the form of
goods or services- should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or
deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution
of the product. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears
entirely or is subordinated to broader economic considerations. The
employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially; it is expected
that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the
form of increase price until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate
consumers. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is
uniformly affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive
advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general
adoption of the compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with
fairness to all parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be
predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently
the traffic in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability and
moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint.
....
Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two
important respects: Fault on the part of either employer or employee is
eliminated; and compensation payable according to a definitely limited
schedule is substituted for damages. All compensation acts alike work
these two major changes, irrespective of how they may differ in other
particulars.
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and
employee represents a compromise in which each party surrenders
certain advantages in order to gain others which are of more importance
both to him and to society. The employer gives up the immunity he
otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault, and the
employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts instead
a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by compensation.
The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be
overemphasized. The statutes vary a great deal with reference to the
proper point of balance. The amount of weekly compensation payments
and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid are
matters concerning which the acts differ considerably. The interpretation
of any compensation statute will be influenced greatly by the court's
reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the Act. If the
court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer, it will
be tempted to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an
interpretation that favors the worker. In this way, a compensation act
drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a
sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument; and conversely, an act
that greatly favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that
employers can have little reason to complain. Much of the unevenness
and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the various
jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's
Compensation American Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and
diseases, the premiums paid by employers to the present system, the actuarial stability
of the trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied before
the integrated scheme was enacted in to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh
harmonious with one another if it is to succeed. The basic theory has to be followed.
If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts
some parts of the system without touching the related others, the entire structure is
endangered. For instance, I am personally against stretching the law and allowing
payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be compensable when
the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the principle of workmen's
compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to receive employment
compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. It was precisely
for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies
granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling
him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing
to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of
kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of
said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:
ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.—Unless otherwise provided, the
liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and
in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee his
dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of
the employee or his dependents.
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial
studies and public hearings. If employers already required to contribute to the State
Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that
purpose, a major study will be necessary. The issue before us is more far reaching than
the interests of the poor victims and their families. All workers covered by workmen's
compensation and all employers who employ covered employees are affected. Even as I
have deepest sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to dissent from
the majority opinion.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
A of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX
Mining Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself,
however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in
Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title XVIII-Damages that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN
CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL
LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muñoz Palma, etc., et al.,
104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is
but a play on words. The term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812
and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered,
being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the
course of employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which
has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference
to the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's Compensation
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of
remedies, as the majority rules, both options cannot be exercised simultaneously, and
the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had already
exercised their option to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have
already received compensation payable to them under that Act. Stated differently, the
remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already become a "finished
transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed
to exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings
under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to" the
"election of remedies", because those proceedings had become a "finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election
be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to make a
second election, in disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the
second election he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election,
This was not done in the case before the Court.
B.
'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez
upholding "the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further
add:
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10,
1927 and took effect on June 10, 1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii
statutes.
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and
some sections of the law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and
Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925). [Morabe &
Inton, Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the
remedy under the Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's
Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.
Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all
industrial employment' and employees of the territory and its political
subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful
intention to injure himself or another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482,
S.S., p. 713.)
When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec.
7483, S.S., p. 714.)
2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act,
the Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies
granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury
(Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and
intention of the law-making body must be sought, first of all in the words
of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural, ordinary,
commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to good
and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle
construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law-
making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of
grammar. Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be
presumed to yield its correct sense. (Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98)
[Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside
the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed
by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands
through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties
of the employment. (Italics supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the
Act, subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other
than within the Act itself. Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for
which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides
his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to
claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other
person for damages, in accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured
employee to sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have
formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Section 6.
That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to allow any option to an
employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the
Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or
employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have
independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to the liability
of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions when the legislator had the
opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies under the
Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of
Section 5 unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside
the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed
by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries received outside the
Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of
the duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the
manner prescribed in this section be presumed to include such
agreement).
On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with
the elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence
at the end of the paragraph:
Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits
of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident
occurs, should such law be more favorable to them. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended.
At that time, if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph
of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue the employer under the
Act, or under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable to him.
(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to
an injured employee without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part
of the employer. The compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry
(Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689 [1938]).
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of
compensation, caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same
amount payable when the employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-
A 1 was included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A
increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there was negligence on the part of
the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an
option to an employee, injured with negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the
latter under the provisions of the Civil Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The
legislator was again given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to an
employee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker,
the Court is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the
Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits
based on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the
long history of workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature
and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on employees'
compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the
early years of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage
suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to
prove in a tort suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury
was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he was not guilty of
contributory negligence. The employer could employ not only his wealth in defeating the
claim for damages but a host of common law defenses available to him as well. The
worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he accepted employment. As
stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided
in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on
the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be
expected to do of himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker was
deemed to accept the risks of employment that he should discover and guard against
himself.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption
of risk doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so
easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby
workers had only to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury arising
from employment in order to be compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and
made compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or the
fault of the employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to have
simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of
industrial accidents could more readily, if not automatically, receive compensation for
work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers' liability
acts were a major step in the desired direction. However, employers liability legislation
proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a
compromise. In return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the
injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts
of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre-
determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain cases, the
actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the total damages for his pain
and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required to
act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program.
And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation
system, individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield
to the interests of their entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to
an understanding of the acts and the cases interpreting them.
By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial
accidents of both the avoidable and unavoidable variety had become
enormous, and government was faced with the problem of who was to
pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry.
If the accident was avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness
of the employer, existing tort principles offered some measure of redress.
Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was
manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed
the employee at a substantial disadvantage. So long as liability depended
on fault there could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been
pointed officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the
facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses, who were usually fellow
workers of the victim, were torn between friendship or loyalty to their
class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the employer, on the other.
The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured employee
to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his
claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted, a large share of the
proceeds of the judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel.
Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often paid a
substantial damage bill, while only a part of this enured to the benefit of
the injured employee or his dependents. The employee's judgment was
nearly always too little and too late.
xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those
persons who enjoy the product of a business- whether it be in the form of
goods or services- should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or
deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution
of the product. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears
entirely or is subordinated to broader economic considerations. The
employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially; it is expected
that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the
form of increase price until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate
consumers. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is
uniformly affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive
advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general
adoption of the compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with
fairness to all parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be
predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently
the traffic in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability and
moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint.
....
Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two
important respects: Fault on the part of either employer or employee is
eliminated; and compensation payable according to a definitely limited
schedule is substituted for damages. All compensation acts alike work
these two major changes, irrespective of how they may differ in other
particulars.
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and
employee represents a compromise in which each party surrenders
certain advantages in order to gain others which are of more importance
both to him and to society. The employer gives up the immunity he
otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at fault, and the
employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts instead
a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by compensation.
The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be
overemphasized. The statutes vary a great deal with reference to the
proper point of balance. The amount of weekly compensation payments
and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid are
matters concerning which the acts differ considerably. The interpretation
of any compensation statute will be influenced greatly by the court's
reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the Act. If the
court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer, it will
be tempted to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an
interpretation that favors the worker. In this way, a compensation act
drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a
sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument; and conversely, an act
that greatly favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that
employers can have little reason to complain. Much of the unevenness
and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the various
jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's
Compensation American Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and
diseases, the premiums paid by employers to the present system, the actuarial stability
of the trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied before
the integrated scheme was enacted in to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh
harmonious with one another if it is to succeed. The basic theory has to be followed.
If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts
some parts of the system without touching the related others, the entire structure is
endangered. For instance, I am personally against stretching the law and allowing
payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be compensable when
the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the principle of workmen's
compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to receive employment
compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. It was precisely
for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies
granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling
him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing
to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of
kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of
said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:
 ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.—Unless otherwise provided, the
liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and
in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee his
dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of
the employee or his dependents.

I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial
studies and public hearings. If employers already required to contribute to the State
Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that
purpose, a major study will be necessary. The issue before us is more far reaching than
the interests of the poor victims and their families. All workers covered by workmen's
compensation and all employers who employ covered employees are affected. Even as I
have deepest sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to dissent from
the majority opinion.

Footnotes

1 SEC. 4-A. Right to additional compensation.- In case of the employee's

death, injury or sickness due to the failure of the to comply with any law,
or with any order, rule or regulation of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission or the Bureau of Labor Standards or should the employer
violate the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred seventy-
nine and its amendments or fail to install and maintain safety appliances,
or take other precautions for the prevention of accidents or occupational
disease, he shall be liable to pay an additional compensation equal to fifty
per centum of the compensation fixed in this Act.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38161 March 29, 1974
JUAN BELLO, FILOMENA C. BELLO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, * HON. FRANCISCO LLAMAS, as Judge of Pasay City Court, and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Martinez and Martinez for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General, Dept. of Justice, for respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court holds that the court of first instance of Pasay City in an appeal erroneously taken to it from the city court's
judgment convicting petitioners-accused of the charge of estafa within the concurrent original jurisdiction of said courts
should grant petitioners-accused's timely petition for certifying their appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court rather
than peremptorily grant the prosecution's motion for dismissal of the appeal and order the remand of the case to the city
court for execution of judgment. The appellate court's decision denying the relief sought by petitioners of compelling the
elevation of their appeal to it as the proper court simply because of the non-impleader of the court of first instance as a
nominal party notwithstanding that it was duly represented by the respondent People as the real party in interest through the
Solicitor General who expressed no objection to the setting aside of the court of first instance's dismissal order is set aside
as sacrificing substance to form and subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality.
Petitioners spouses were charged on August 25, 1970 for estafa before the City Court of
Pasay1 for allegedly having misappropriated a lady's ring with a value of P1,000.00
received by them from Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After
trial, they were convicted and sentenced under respondent city court's decision of
February 26, 1971 to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional and to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1,000.00 with costs of suit.
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of First
Instance of Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a "petition to dismiss appeal" on the
ground that since the case was within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the
court of first instance and the trial in the city court had been duly recorded, the appeal
should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals as provided by section 87 of the
Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as amended.2
Petitioners opposed the prosecution's dismissal motion and invoking the analogous
provision of Rule 50, section 3 directing that the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously
brought to it "shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court,
with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor," prayed of the court of first
instance if it should find the appeal to have been wrongly brought before it, to certify the
same "to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court."3
The court of first instance per its order of October 29, 1971 did find that the appeal
should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the
appeal and remand of the records to the city court "for execution of judgment."4
Petitioners aver that they were not notified of the order of dismissal of their appeal and
learned of it only when they were called by the Pasay city court for execution of the
judgment of conviction. Hence, they filed with the city court their "motion to elevate
appeal to Court of Appeals" of December 7, 1971 stating that "through inadvertence
and/or excusable neglect" they had erroneously filed a notice of appeal to the court of
first instance instead of to the Court of Appeals as the proper court and prayed that the
city court, following precedents of this Court remanding appeals before it to the proper
court instead of dismissing appeals, "elevate the records ... to the Court of Appeals for
proper review."5
Respondent city court per its order of December 11, 1971 denied petitioners' motion "for
having been erroneously addressed to this court" instead of to the court of first
instance6 ignoring petitioners' predicament that the court of first instance had already
turned them down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal without notice to them and
that as a consequence it was poised to execute its judgment of conviction against them.
Petitioners spouses then filed on January 14, 1972 their petition for prohibition and
mandamus against the People and respondent city court to prohibit the execution of the
judgment and to compel respondent city court to elevate their appeal to the Court of
Appeals.7
The Solicitor General filed respondents' answer to the petition manifesting that "we shall
not interpose any objection whichever view point is adopted by this Honorable Court in
resolving the two apparently conflicting or clashing principles of law — finality of judicial
decision or equity in judicial decision," after observing that "(F)rom the view point of
equity considering that petitioners' right to appeal lapsed or was lost through the fault,
though not excusable, of their counsel, and compounded by the alleged error of
judgment committed by the Court of First Instance to which the appeal was erroneously
brought, we sympathize with petitioners' plight."
The Court of Appeals, however, per its decision of December 17, 1973 dismissed the
petition, after finding that the city court's judgment was directly appealable to it. Although
recognizing that the "CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its
inherent powers directed appeal to be endorsed to this Court of Appeals" it held that
since petitioners did not implead the court of first instance as "principal party respondent"
it could not "grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to
deserve some equities," as follows:
... therefore, when they appealed to CFI, that was procedurally wrong; of
course, CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of
its inherent powers, directed appeal to be endorsed to this Court of
Appeals, but when instead of doing so, it dismissed, it also had power to
do so, and correction of it is difficult to see to be remediable
by mandamus, but ignoring this altogether, what this Court finds is that
since it was CFI that dismissed the appeal and according to petitioners,
wrongly, it must follow that if CFI was wrong, this plea for mandamus to
compel it to act "correctly" should have been directed against said CFI, it
should have been the CFI, Hon. Francisco de la Rosa, who should have
been made under Rule 65 Sec. 3, herein principal party respondent, but
he was not, this being the situation, this Court can not see how it can
grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said
to deserve some equities.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration on January 2, 19748 and for elevation of their
appeal to the Court of Appeals, stressing the merits of their appeal and of their defense
to the charge, viz, that the offended party Atty. de Guzman had represented their son
who was a suspect with two others for robbery before the Pasay city fiscal's office and
upon dismissal of the charge demanded payment from them as parents the sum of
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, and since they had no money to pay him required them to
sign the receipt dated June 25, 1970 in his favor for an imaginary lady's ring to sell "on
commission basis" for P1,000.00 (their "commission" to be any overprice) to assure
payment of the sum by the stated deadline of July 9, 1970 under penalty, of criminal
prosecution for estafa; and that they had then newly met Atty. de Guzman, whose
services had been secured not by them but by the family of one of the other suspects,
implying the incredibility of his entrusting a lady's ring to both of them (husband and wife)
for sale on commission basis when his only association with them was his demand of
payment of his P1,000-attorney's fee for having represented their son-suspect.
Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court "for lack of sufficient merit,"
petitioners filed the present petition for review.9 The Court required the Solicitor General's
comment on behalf of the People of the Philippines, and upon receipt thereof resolved to
consider the case as a special civil action with such comment as answer and the case
submitted for decision in the interest of justice and speedy adjudication.
The Court finds merits in the petition and holds that the court of first instance acted with
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners-accused's appeal which was
erroneously brought to it and ordering remand of the records to the city court for
execution of judgment instead of certifying and endorsing the appeal to the Court of
Appeals as the proper court as timely prayed for by petitioners-accused in their
opposition to the prosecution's motion to dismiss appeal. We find that the Court of
Appeals also acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their petition instead of
setting aside the challenged order of the court of first instance peremptorily dismissing
the appeal pursuant to which respondent city court was poised to execute its judgment of
conviction simply because the court of first instance which is but a nominal party
had not been impleaded as party respondent in disregard of the substantive fact that the
People as plaintiff and the real party in interest was duly impleaded as principal party
respondent and was represented in the proceedings by the Solicitor General.
The appellate court while recognizing that petitioners' appeal taken to the court of first
instance was "procedurally wrong" and that the court of first instance "in the exercise of
its inherent powers could have certified the appeal to it as the proper court instead of
dismissing the appeal, gravely erred in holding that it could not "correct" the court of first
instance's "wrong action" and grant the relief sought of having the appeal elevated to it
since said court's presiding judge "who should have been-made under Rule 65, sec.
3 10 herein principal party respondent, but he was not." The Court has always stressed as
in Torre vs. Ericta 11 that a respondent judge is "merely a nominal party" in special civil
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and that he "is not a person "in interest"
within the purview (of Rule 65, section 5 12)" and "accordingly, he has no standing or
authority to appeal from or seek a review on certiorari" of an adverse decision of the
appellate court setting aside his dismissal of a party's appeal and issuing the writ
of mandamus for him to allow the appeal.
It is readily seen from the cited Rule that the court of first instance or presiding judge who
issued the challenged order or decision is but a nominal party, the real parties in interest
being "the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court" and
who are charged with the duty of appearing and defending the challenged act both "in
their own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings." Hence,
theformal impleading of the court of first instance which issued the challenged order of
dismissal was not indispensable and could be "overlooked in the interest of speedy
adjudication." 13
Since the real party in interest, the People as plaintiff in the criminal proceeding against
petitioners-accused was duly impleaded and represented by the Solicitor General to
defend the proceedings in the court of first instance and had expressed no objection to
the appellate court's setting aside of the court of first instance's dismissal order, in the
interest of justice and equity the appellate court's act of dismissing the petition and
denying the relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court simply because of
the non impleader of the court of first instance as a nominal party was tantamount to
sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of
procedural technicality. The procedural infirmity of petitioners mis-directing their appeal
to the court of first instance rather than to the Court of Appeals, which they
had timely sought to correct in the court of first instance itself by asking that court to
certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court, should not be over-
magnified as to totally deprive them of their substantial right of appeal and leave them
without any remedy.
The Court therefore grants herein the relief denied by respondent appellate court of
mandamus to compel respondent city court to elevate petitioners' appeal to the Court of
Appeals as the proper court as being within the context and spirit of Rule 50, section 3,
providing for certification to the proper court by the Court of Appeals of appealed cases
erroneously brought to it, 14 particularly where petitioners-accused have shown prima
facie (and without this Court prejudging the merits of their appeal) that they have a valid
cause for pursuing in good faith their appeal (as against a manifestly dilatory or frivolous
appeal) and to have a higher court appreciate their evidence in support of their defense
that they were prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment (for estafa) for failure to pay a
purely civil indebtedness (the attorney's fee owed by their son to the complainant).
Here, petitioners-accused's counsel, misdirected their appeal to the court of first
instance, confronted with the thorny question (which has confused many a
practitioner) 15 of concurrent criminal jurisdiction of city courts and municipal courts of
provincial and sub-provincial capitals with courts of first instance under sections 44 (f)
and 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act where the appeal from the municipal or city court's
judgment should be taken directly to the Court of Appeals as held in Esperat vs.
Avila 16 as distinguished however from judgments of ordinary municipal courts in similar
cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of first instance where as held by
this Court in People vs. Valencia 17 the appeal should nevertheless be brought to
the court of first instance which retains its appellate jurisdiction under section 45 of the
Judiciary Act.
It certainly was within the inherent power of the court of first instance in exercise of its
power to "control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice" 18 to grant petitioners-accused's timely plea to endorse their appeal to the Court of
Appeals as the proper court and within the context and spirit of Rule 50, section 3. In
a mis-directed appeal to the Court of Appeals of a case that pertains to the court of first
instance's jurisdiction, the said Rule expressly provides that the Court of Appeals "shall
not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court" viz, the court of first
instance in the given example. There is no logical reason why in
all fairness and justice the court of first instance in a misdirected appeal to it should not
be likewise bound by the same rule and therefore enjoined not to dismiss the appeal but
to certify the case to the Court of Appeals as the proper court. The paucity of the
language of the Rule and its failure to expressly provide for such cases of misdirected
appeals to the court of first instance (owing possibly to the fact that at the time of the
revision of the Rules of Court in 1963 section 87 (c) had been newly amended under
Republic Act 2613 approved on June 22, 1963 to enlarge the jurisdiction of city courts
and municipal courts of provincial capitals and provide for their concurrent jurisdiction
with the courts of first instance and direct appeal from their judgments in such cases to
the Court of Appeals) should not be a cause for unjustly depriving petitioners of their
substantial right of appeal.
This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned
against "narrowly" interpreting a statute "as to defeat the purpose of the legislator"
" 19 and stressed that "it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to
avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity)" 20 and that therefore
"a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results". 21 In
the construction of its own Rules of Court, this Court is all the more so bound to liberally
construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void —
that is certainly within the spirit and purpose of the Rule to eliminate repugnancy and
inconsistency — by holding as it does now that courts of first instance are equally bound
as the higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to
the proper appellate court.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition is hereby
set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered granting the petition for
prohibition against respondent city court which is hereby enjoined from executing its
judgment of conviction against petitioners-accused and further commanding said city
court to elevate petitioners' appeal from its judgment to the Court of Appeals for the
latter's disposition on the merits. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez,
Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ESGUERRA, J., dissenting:
I beg to dissent from the opinion that Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court may be
applied by analogy to this case, considering that the dispositive portion of the draft
decision commands the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Under
Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act No. 296), "all cases erroneously brought to
the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which
shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it." Section 3 of Rule 50
provides that "when the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the Court of
Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with
a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor." These are the only legal
provisions governing the handling and disposition of erroneous appeals. Neither the
Legislature nor the Rules of Court has provided the rules for erroneous appeal to the
Court of First Instance from the judgment of a City Court or the Municipal Court of a
provincial or sub-provincial capital in cases falling within their concurrent jurisdiction
under the Judiciary Act, as amended. I do not think the Supreme Court, by judicial fiat,
can supply the deficiency unless it formally promulgates a rule governing transfer or
certification of cases erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance from judgments
of inferior courts in cases directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. The void in the law
is in the certification by the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in such cases.
We cannot apply Section 31 of the Judiciary Act and Section 3 of Rule 50 by analogy
because We have to compel the Court of First Instance to certify the case to the Court of
Appeals. We cannot also compel the City Court of Pasay City to do the same because
the case was not appealed to it as it was its decision which was erroneously appealed to
the Court of First Instance. The proper court to certify and to be commanded to do so by
mandamus is the Court of First Instance, but this Court is not a party to this case and
cannot be bound by any judgment rendered herein.
That the People of the Philippines was impleaded as a party and represented by the
Solicitor General is of no significance to me. The People is not the one to be compelled
to perform the act but the Judge of First Instance that dismissed the appeal; and neither
said Court nor the Judge thereof is a party respondent in these proceedings.
The petitioners here should have known, through their counsel, that the People of the
Philippines and the Court of First Instance of Pasay City are not one and the same entity,
and that the former may not be compelled to perform the act of certifying the case to the
Court of Appeals while the latter can be. The respondent-appellate Court was right in
dismissing the petition to prohibit the execution of the judgment and to compel the City
Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners should have known that the
Court of First Instance is an indispensable party to these proceedings. For their counsel's
fatal error, they should pay the price of having the judgment of conviction become final.
 to perform the act but the Judge of First Instance that dismissed the appeal; and neither
said Court nor the Judge thereof is a party respondent in these proceedings.

The petitioners here should have known, through their counsel, that the People of the
Separate Opinions Philippines and the Court of First Instance of Pasay City are not one and the same entity,
and that the former may not be compelled to perform the act of certifying the case to the
ESGUERRA, J., dissenting: Court of Appeals while the latter can be. The respondent-appellate Court was right in
dismissing the petition to prohibit the execution of the judgment and to compel the City
Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners should have known that the
I beg to dissent from the opinion that Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court may be
Court of First Instance is an indispensable party to these proceedings. For their counsel's
applied by analogy to this case, considering that the dispositive portion of the draft
fatal error, they should pay the price of having the judgment of conviction become final.
decision commands the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Under
Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act No. 296), "all cases erroneously brought to
the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which Footnotes
shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it." Section 3 of Rule 50
provides that "when the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the Court of * Third Division composed of Magno S. Gatmaitan, Guillermo S. Santos
Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with and Ricardo C. Puno, JJ.
a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor." These are the only legal
provisions governing the handling and disposition of erroneous appeals. Neither the 1 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 60761.
Legislature nor the Rules of Court has provided the rules for erroneous appeal to the
Court of First Instance from the judgment of a City Court or the Municipal Court of a 2 Annex D, petition. See Esperat vs. Avila, 20 SCRA 596 (1967) and
provincial or sub-provincial capital in cases falling within their concurrent jurisdiction People vs. Tapayan, 30 SCRA 529 (1969) and cases cited.
under the Judiciary Act, as amended. I do not think the Supreme Court, by judicial fiat,
can supply the deficiency unless it formally promulgates a rule governing transfer or 3 Annex E, idem.
certification of cases erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance from judgments
of inferior courts in cases directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. The void in the law
4 Annex F, idem.
is in the certification by the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in such cases.
5 Annex G, idem.
We cannot apply Section 31 of the Judiciary Act and Section 3 of Rule 50 by analogy
because We have to compel the Court of First Instance to certify the case to the Court of
Appeals. We cannot also compel the City Court of Pasay City to do the same because 6 Annex H, idem.
the case was not appealed to it as it was its decision which was erroneously appealed to
the Court of First Instance. The proper court to certify and to be commanded to do so by 7 Annex I, idem.
mandamus is the Court of First Instance, but this Court is not a party to this case and
cannot be bound by any judgment rendered herein. 8 Annex L, idem, emphasis supplied.

That the People of the Philippines was impleaded as a party and represented by the
Solicitor General is of no significance to me. The People is not the one to be compelled
9 The petition was filed on February 14, 1974 within the extended ten-day
period from expiration of reglementary period on February 4, 1974,
granted per the Court's resolution of February 7, 1974.
10 This Rule provides for petitions for mandamus.
19 Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., 32 SCRA 553, 558
(1970), per Fernando, J.
20 Automotive Parts & Equipment Co., Inc. v. Lingad, 30 SCRA 248, 256,
(1969), per Fernando, J.; notes in parenthesis and emphasis supplied.

11 38 SCRA 296, 315 (1971), per Concepcion, C.J. 21 Idem, at p. 255, emphasis supplied.

12 "SEC. 5. Defendants and costs in certain cases. — When the petition

filed relates to the acts or omissions of a court or judge, the petitioner
shall join, as parties defendant with such court or judge, the person or
persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court. and it shall
be the duty of such person or persons to appear and defend, both in his
or their own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge affected by the
proceedings, and costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the
petitioner shall be against the person or persons in interest only, and not
against the court or judge." (Rule 65)

13 See Valenzuela vs. CFI of La Union, 91 Phil. 906 (1952).

14 See also section 31, R.A. 296 providing that "Transfer of cases from
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals to proper court. — All cases which
may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of
Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if
it has originally been brought before it." (Judiciary Act).

15 See "a dozen cases" cited in People vs. Tapayan, 30 SCRA 529
(1969).

16 20 SCRA 596 (1967).

17 29 SCRA 252 (1969), per Castro, J. which expressly distinguished the

ruling from that in Esperat vs. Avila, supra.

18 Rule 135, section 5 (g).

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI
PIPO, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996
of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her
proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was
scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for
registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her
application on the ground that petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten (10)
months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid
down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang
Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-
Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found
petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. 1 The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte. 2 The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself
from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner. 3
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui,
Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer
Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, 4 disapproved
petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age. 5 Petitioner, however, appealed
to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of
respondents and allowed petitioner to run. 6
On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of
her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should
not be disapproved. 7 Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials,
private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for falsely
representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by
facsimile 8 and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National
Office, Manila.
On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner,
the COMELEC en bancissued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board
of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the
event she won in the election. The order reads as follows:
Acting on the Fax "Petition for Denial And/Or Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy" by petitioner Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against Lynette G.
Garvida, received on April 29, 1996, the pertinent allegations of which
reads:
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the said respondent is disqualified to become a voter and a
candidate for the SK for the reason that she will be more than twenty-one
(21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was born on June 11, 1974 as
 can be gleaned from her birth certificate, copy of which is hereto attached
and marked as Annex "A";
6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as candidate for SK of Bgy.
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, she made material representation
which is false and as such, she is disqualified; that her certificate of
candidacy should not be given due course and that said candidacy must
be cancelled;
xxx xxx xxx
the Commission, it appearing that the petition is meritorious, hereby
DIRECTS the Board of Election Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to suspend the proclamation of
Lynette G. Garvida in the event she garners the highest number of votes
for the position of Sangguniang Kabataan [sic].
Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit immediately ten (10)
copies of his petition and to pay the filing and legal research fees in the
amount of P510.00.
SO ORDERED. 9
On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private
respondent's votes of 76. 10 In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the
COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the
winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner
for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 11 The
proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on
Elections or any other interested party." 12 On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the
Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui,
Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the
Pederasyon. 13
Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC en banc to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy;
the second, the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has
exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK.
I
Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the
SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the
Omnibus Election Code. 14 The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs
the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before election.
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective
office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that
the candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate. The
petition may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by the
COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself. 15
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of
candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a
Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number
of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division.
Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the
COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. 16 It is therefore the
COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. This is clear from
Section 3 of the said Rules thus:
 Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit
in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary
actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt
and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms of the
Commission. 17
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions
upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996. 18
II
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not
comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. These requirements are:
Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every pleading, motion and other papers
must be filed in ten (10) legible copies. However, when there is more than
one respondent or protestee, the petitioner or protestant must file
additional number of copies of the petition or protest as there are
additional respondents or protestees.
Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents referred to in the immediately
preceding section must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of
the Commission personally, or, unless otherwise provided in these Rules,
by registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is the date of
filing and the requirement as to the number of copies must be complied
with.
Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. — (a) All pleadings allowed by these
Rules shall be printed, mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond
paper and shall be in English or Filipino.
xxx xxx xxx
Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or
typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies.
Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC
personally, or, by registered mail.
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the
petition were filed with the COMELEC. 19 Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its
Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction
of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time,
and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric
current. 20 The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via
microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area
in the proper position and the correct shade. 21 The receiver is equipped with a stylus or
other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. 22
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic
pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. 23 Without the
original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in
fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading
should have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing
the questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the
petition filed by registered mail.
III
To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve the issue of petitioner's age.
The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in
1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all
residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of
age. 24 The Kabataang Barangay sought to provide its members a medium to express
their views and opinions and participate in issues of transcendental importance. 25 Its
affairs were administered by a barangay youth chairman together with six barangay
youth leaders who were actual residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years but
less than 18 years of age. 26 In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local
Government Code, raised the maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay members from
"less than 18 years of age" to "not more than 21 years of age."
The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in
B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. 27 The affairs of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman
and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 28 The chairman
automatically becomes ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay. 29 A member of
the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or
becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. 30
Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down
by the Local Government Code of 1991, viz:
Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. — The katipunan ng kabataan shall
be composed of all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the
barangay for at least six (6) months, who are fifteen (15) but not more
than twenty-one (21) years of age, and who are duly registered in the list
of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody
of the barangay secretary.
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the
Sangguniang Kabataan if he possesses the following qualifications:
Sec. 428. Qualifications. — An elective official of the sangguniang
kabataan must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the
katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at least one (1)
year immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but not more
than twenty-one (21) years of age on the day of his election, able to read
and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, and must not have been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least
six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of
the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code
requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino
citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not
more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f)
must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member
of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official. Thus:
Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. — To be qualified to register as a voter
in the SK elections, a person must be:
a) a citizen of the Philippines;
b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day that is, he must have been born between May 6, 1975 and May 6,
1981, inclusive; and
c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and actually
residing in the barangay wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6)
months immediately preceding the elections.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. — An elective official of the
SK must be:
a) a qualified voter;
b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to
the elections; and
c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or
English.
 Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be
decided by the city/municipal Election Officer (EO) whose decision shall
be final.
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6,
1996 SK elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than 21 years
of age on election day, i.e., the voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and
May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1)
year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately
preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing
qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter
in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Petitioner
's age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No.
2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is
unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide that the
voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges that so long as she did
not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years of age on election day
and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as
candidate for the SK elections.
A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the
maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an
elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years
only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of
age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK
official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The addition of the phrase "or the day
of his election" is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of
age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election.
The distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more
qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. 31 The courts may distinguish when there are
facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or
qualification. 32
The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of age
on the day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local Government Code
of 1991. In fact the term "qualified voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No.
2824. 33 Since a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an elective official, then it may be
assumed that a "qualified voter" is a "member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section
424 of the Code does not provide that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan is determined on the day of the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a voter for
the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the day of the election.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age
on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not
months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365
days each. 34 One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one
year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. 35 In computing years,
the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the
first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the
person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21
years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he
has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day
cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next
365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21
years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or
a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than
21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims.
The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.
In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age qualification of a
barangay youth official was expressly stated as ". . . at least fifteen years of age or over
but less than eighteen . . ." 36 This provision clearly states that the youth official must be
at least 15 years old and may be 17 years and a fraction of a year but should not reach
the age of eighteen years. When the Local Government Code increased the age limit of
members of the youth organization to 21 years, it did not reenact the provision in such a
way as to make the youth "at least 15 but less than 22 years old." If the intention of the
Code's framers was to include citizens less than 22 years old, they should have stated so
expressly instead of leaving the matter open to confusion and doubt. 37
Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and principal author of the Local
Government Code of 1991 declared that one of the reasons why the Katipunan ng
Kabataan was created and the Kabataang Barangay discontinued was because most, if
not all, Kabataang Barangay leaders were already over 21 years of age by the time
President Aquino assumed power. 38 They were not the "youth" anymore. The Local
Government Code of 1991 fixed the maximum age limit at not more than 21 years 39 and
the only exception is in the second paragraph of Section 423 which reads:
Sec. 423. Creation and Election. —
a) . . . ;
b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall
have passed the age of twenty-one (21) years shall be allowed to serve
the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected.
The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not
be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is
when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423
[b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he
was elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have "been
elected prior to his 21st birthday." 40 Conversely, the SK official must not have
turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] together with
Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21
years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must
therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section
6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the
maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his election.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day
she registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21)
years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months
and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11
months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old.
Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely,
petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local
Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was
ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public
policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared
ineligible. 41 In the same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of
the election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the
age requirement directory, nor will it validate his election. 42 The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. 43
The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared
elected. 44 A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. 45 Moreover,
despite his claims, 46 private respondent has failed to prove that the electorate
themselves actually knew of petitioner's ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for
her with the intention of misapplying their franchises and throwing away their votes for
the benefit of her rival candidate. 47
Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government Code
petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the
next highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. 48 Section 435 applies when a
Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, 49 is
convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed
from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive
months."
The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility.50 Being "eligible" means
being "legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen." 51 Ineligibility, on the other hand,
refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office. 52 Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435
for succession of the SK Chairman.
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order
that the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves.
The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of
the term, and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges 6 Annex "D" to the Petition, Rollo, p. 19; Annex "H" to the Comment of
appurtenant to said office. Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, p. 64.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is 7 Annex "I" to the Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli
declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 Pipo, Rollo, p. 66.
elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 8 Through the PT & T.
The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from among the
incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos 9 Annex "L" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 71-73.
Norte shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.
10 Comment of Private Respondent Florencio Sales, Jr., p. 14, Rollo, p.
101.
SO ORDERED.
11 Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, par. 18, Rollo, p.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, 41.
Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
12 Annex "R" to the Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave. Pipo, Rollo, p. 82.

Footnotes 13 Annex "S" to the Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli

Pipo, Rollo, p. 83.
1 Annex "D" to Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli
Pipo, Rollo, pp. 57-58; Annex "A" to Petition, Rollo, pp. 15-16. 14 Section 532 (a) of the Code (B.P. 881) was amended by R.A. 7808
which in pertinent part reads:
2 Annex "3" to the Comment for the Private Respondent, Rollo, pp. 109-
112. Sec. 1. . . . .

3 The judge was then boarding in the house of petitioner (Comment for The conduct of the sangguniang kabataan elections shall be under the
the Private Respondent, p. 2, Rollo, p. 89). supervision of the Commission on Elections.

4 Annex "F" to the Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli The Omnibus Election Code shall govern the elections of the
Pipo, Rollo, pp. 61-62. sangguniang kabataan.

5 Annex "C" to the Petition, Rollo p. 18; Annex "G" to the Comment of 15 Rule 23 provides:
Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, p. 63.
"Sec. 1. Ground for Denial of Certificate of Candidacy. — A petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for any elective
office may be filed with the Law Department of the Commission by any
citizen of voting age or duly registered political party, organization, or
coalition of political parties on the exclusive ground that any material
representation contained therein as required by law is false.
Sec. 2. Period to File Petition. — The petition must be filed within five (5)
days following the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy.
19 One copy was filed by registered mail and the other by facsimile. Third
and fourth copies were sent by registered mail to petitioner Garvida and
the COMELEC officer (Annex 5-B to the Comment of Private
Respondent, Rollo, p. 116).
20 "Facsimile Transmission," The New Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 651,
vol. 4, 15th ed. [1992].
21 Id.

Sec. 3. Summary Procedure. — The petition shall be heard summarily
after due notice.
Sec. 4. Delegation of Reception of Evidence. — The Commission may
designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to
hear the case and to receive evidence."
16 Section 5 [b] and [c], Rule 3, COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
"Sec. 5. . . . .
22 "Facsimile," The New Webster's International Encyclopedia, p. 375
[1996]; "Facsimile," Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 813
[1971].
23 Black's Law Dictionary, p. 531, 5th ed. [1979].
24 Sections 1 and 4, P.D. 684.
25 Whereas clauses, Sec. 1, P.D. 684; Mercado v. Board of Elections
Supervisors of Ibaan, Batangas, 243 SCRA 422, 426 [1995].

(b) When sitting in Divisions, two (2) Members of a Division shall 26 Section 2, P.D. 684
constitute a quorum to transact business. The concurrence of at least two
(2) Members of a Division shall be necessary to reach a decision, 27 Section 423, Chapter 8, Title I, Bk. III, R.A. 7160.
resolution, order or ruling. If this required number is not obtained the case
shall be automatically elevated to the Commission en banc for decision or
28 Sections 423, 428, Chapter 8, Title I, Bk. III, R.A. 7160.
resolution.
29 Section 430, Id.
(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on
interlocutory orders of the Division which shall be resolved by the Division 30 Section 429, Id.
which issued the order."
31 Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar.
17 See also Section 3, Article IX [C] of the Constitution.
32 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 142-143 [1990].
18 Sarmiento v. Commission On Elections, 212 SCRA 307, 131-134
[1992].
33 The Local Government Code speaks of the requirements for
membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan, not the qualifications of a
voter.
34 Civil Code, Article 13; National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, 29
SCRA 70, 74; [1969].
35 Erwin v. Benton, 87 S.W. 291, 294; 120 Ky. 536 [1905].
36 Section 2, P.D. 684.
37 Feliciano v. Aquino, 102 Phil. 1159-1160 [1957].
38 Pimentel, A.Q., The Local Government Code of 1991, The Key to
National Development, p. 440 [1993].
39 It is worth noting that it is only in the case of SK candidates that the
Local Government Code sets a maximum age limit. It sets a minimum
age for the rest of the elective officials, e.g., members of the sangguniang
barangay, sangguniang panglungsod or bayan, sangguniang
panlalawigan, mayor and governor (Sec. 39, Chapter I, Title II, Bk. I,
Local Government Code of 1991).
40 Pimentel, supra, at 440.
41 Castaneda v. Yap, 48 O.G. 3364, 3366 [1952].
42 Sanchez v. del Rosario, 1 SCRA 1102, 1106 [1961]; Feliciano v.
Aquino, Jr., 102 Phil. 1159, 1160 [1957].
43 Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245, 255 [1989].
44 Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 241 SCRA 400, 423, 429 [1996];
Labo, Jr. v. Commission on elections, 211 SCRA 297, 311 [1992];
Sanchez v. del Rosario, supra, at 1105.
45 Id.
46 Comment of Private Respondent Florencio Sales, Jr., pp. 14-
15, Rollo, 101-102.
47 cf . Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, supra, at 311.
48 Section 435 of the Local Government Code provides:
"Sec. 435. Succession and Filling of Vacancies. — (a) In case a
Sangguniang kabataan chairman refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently
incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without leave
for more than three (3) consecutive months, the sangguniang kabataan
member who obtained the next highest number of votes in the election
immediately preceding shall assume the office of the chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and duties,
and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to the office. In case the
said member refuses to assume the position or fails to qualify, the
sangguniang kabataan member obtaining the next highest number of
votes shall assume the position of the chairman for the unexpired portion
of the term.
xxx xxx xxx"
49 "Failure to qualify" means a public officer's or employee's failure to
take the oath and/or give the bond required by law to signify his
acceptance of the office and the undertaking to execute the trust confided
in him (Martin and Martin, Administrative Law, Law of Public Officers and
Election Law, p. 140 [1983]; Mechem, A. Treatise on the Law of Public
Offices and Officers, Sec. 253, p. 162; Words and Phrases, "Failure to
Qualify," citing State v. Boyd, 48 N.W. 739, 751, 31 Neb. 682).
50 Gaerlan v. Catubig, 17 SCRA 376, 378 [1966]; Feliciano v. Aquino,
Jr., supra.
51 People v. Yanza, 107 Phil. 888, 890 [1960].
52 Separate Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-
Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300, 398 [1995].
 Republic of the Philippines On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
SUPREME COURT directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
Manila distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
EN BANC children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each
and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967 seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry
A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and
Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
1äwphï1.ñët

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.

MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
vs. U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees. September 15, 1958.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by
the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.
1äwphï1.ñët
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time
according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed
by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and
filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition"
wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the
delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos

The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and
Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00
each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the
"Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate
into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his
first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which
is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving
the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on
June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which
law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963.
Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a
domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile)
should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law,
but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found
in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore
not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it
in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this
and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as
Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second
paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must
be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's
intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not
with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard
to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national
law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as
one of the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to
the project of partition; to submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in
the expenses incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to
adopt the briefs filed by his sisters — but this Court resolved to deny the motion.

2 San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.

3 Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 100727 March 18, 1992
COGEO-CUBAO OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, LUNGSOD SILANGAN TRANSPORT SERVICES, CORP.,
INC., respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court awarding damages in
favor of respondent Lungsod Silangan Transport Services Corp., Inc. (Lungsod Corp. for
brevity).
The antecedents facts of this case are as follows:
It appears that a certificate of public convenience to operate a jeepney
service was ordered to be issued in favor of Lungsod Silangan to ply the
Cogeo-Cubao route sometime in 1983 on the justification that public
necessity and convenience will best be served, and in the absence of
existing authorized operators on the lined apply for . . . On the other
hand, defendant-Association was registered as a non-stock, non-profit
organization with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October
30, 1985 . . . with the main purpose of representing plaintiff-appellee for
whatever contract and/or agreement it will have regarding the ownership
of units, and the like, of the members of the Association . . .
Perturbed by plaintiffs' Board Resolution No. 9 . . . adopting a Bandera'
System under which a member of the cooperative is permitted to queue
for passenger at the disputed pathway in exchange for the ticket worth
twenty pesos, the proceeds of which shall be utilized for Christmas
programs of the drivers and other benefits, and on the strength of
defendants' registration as a collective body with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, defendants-appellants, led by Romeo Oliva
decided to form a human barricade on November 11, 1985 and assumed
the dispatching of passenger jeepneys . . . This development as initiated
by defendants-appellants gave rise to the suit for damages.
Defendant-Association's Answer contained vehement denials to the
insinuation of take over and at the same time raised as a defense the
circumstance that the organization was formed not to compete with
plaintiff-cooperative. It, however, admitted that it is not authorized to
transport passengers . . . (pp. 15-16, Rollo)
On July 31, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent Lungsod
Corp., the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the Court
hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
1. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P50,000.00 as
actual damages;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P10,000.00
as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. (P. 39, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner Association appealed with the Court of Appeals.
On May 27, 1991, respondent appellate court rendered its decision affirming the findings
of the trial court except with regard to the award of actual damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00. The Court of Appeals
however, awarded nominal damages to petitioner in the amount of P10,000.00.
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioner assigning the following errors of the
appellate court:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN MERELY MODIFYING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONER USURPED THE PROPERTY RIGHT OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
III. AND THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
Since the assigned errors are interrelated, this Court shall discuss them jointly. The main
issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the petitioner usurped the property right of
the respondent which shall entitle the latter to the award of nominal damages.
Petitioner contends that the association was formed not to complete with the respondent
corporation in the latter's operation as a common carrier; that the same was organized
for the common protection of drivers from abusive traffic officers who extort money from
them, and for the elimination of the practice of respondent corporation of requiring
jeepney owners to execute deed of sale in favor of the corporation to show that the latter
is the owner of the jeeps under its certificate of public convenience. Petitioner also
argues that in organizing the association, the members thereof are merely exercising
their freedom or right to redress their grievances.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Under the Public Service Law, a certificate of public convenience is an authorization
issued by the Public Service Commission for the operation of public services for which
no franchise is required by law. In the instant case, a certificate of public convenience
was issued to respondent corporation on January 24, 1983 to operate a public utility
jeepney service on the Cogeo-Cubao route. As found by the trial court, the certificate
was issued pursuant to a decision passed by the Board of Transportation in BOT Case
No. 82-565.
A certification of public convenience is included in the term "property" in the broad sense
of the term. Under the Public Service Law, a certificate of public convenience can be sold
by the holder thereof because it has considerable material value and is considered as
valuable asset (Raymundo v. Luneta Motor Co., et al., 58 Phil. 889). Although there is no
doubt that it is private property, it is affected with a public interest and must be submitted
to the control of the government for the common good (Pangasinan Transportation Co. v.
PSC, 70 Phil 221). Hence, insofar as the interest of the State is involved, a certificate of
public convenience does not confer upon the holder any proprietary right or interest or
franchise in the route covered thereby and in the public highways (Lugue v. Villegas, L-
22545, Nov . 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 409). However, with respect to other persons and other
public utilities, a certificate of public convenience as property, which represents the right
and authority to operate its facilities for public service, cannot be taken or interfered with
without due process of law. Appropriate actions may be maintained in courts by the
holder of the certificate against those who have not been authorized to operate in
competition with the former and those who invade the rights which the former has
pursuant to the authority granted by the Public Service Commission (A.L. Ammen
Transportation Co. v. Golingco. 43 Phil. 280).
In the case at bar, the trial court found that petitioner association forcibly took over the
operation of the jeepney service in the Cogeo-Cubao route without any authorization
from the Public Service Commission and in violation of the right of respondent
corporation to operate its services in the said route under its certificate of public
convenience. These were its findings which were affirmed by the appellate court:
The Court from the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses as well as the
documentary evidences presented is convinced that the actions taken by
defendant herein though it admit that it did not have the authority to
transport passenger did in fact assume the role as a common carrier
engaged in the transport of passengers within that span of ten days
beginning November 11, 1985 when it unilaterally took upon itself the
operation and dispatching of jeepneys at St. Mary's St. The president of
the defendant corporation. Romeo Oliva himself in his testimony
confirmed that there was indeed a takeover of the operations at St.
Mary's St. . . . (p. 36, Rollo)
The findings of the trial court especially if affirmed by the appellate court bear great
weight and will not be disturbed on appeal before this Court. Although there is no
question that petitioner can exercise their constitutional right to redress their grievances
with respondent Lungsod Corp., the manner by which this constitutional right is to be, Narvasa, C.J., Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
exercised should not undermine public peace and order nor should it violate the legal
rights of other persons. Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who wilfully Bellosillo, J., took no part.
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The provision covers a situation
where a person has a legal right which was violated by another in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. It presupposes loss or injury, material or
otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of such violation. It is clear form the facts of
this case that petitioner formed a barricade and forcibly took over the motor units and
personnel of the respondent corporation. This paralyzed the usual activities and earnings
of the latter during the period of ten days and violated the right of respondent Lungsod
Corp. To conduct its operations thru its authorized officers.

As to the propriety of damages in favor of respondent Lungsod Corp., the respondent

appellate court stated:

. . . it does not necessarily follow that plaintiff-appellee is entitled

to actual damages and attorney's fees. While there may have been
allegations from plaintiff-cooperative showing that it did in fact suffer
some from of injury . . . it is legally unprecise to order the payment of
P50,000.00 as actual damages for lack of concrete proof therefor. There
is, however, no denying of the act of usurpation by defendants-appellants
which constituted an invasion of plaintiffs'-appellees' property right. For
this, nominal damages in the amount of P10,000.00 may be granted.
(Article 2221, Civil Code). (p. 18, Rollo)

No compelling reason exists to justify the reversal of the ruling of the respondent
appellate court in the case at bar. Article 2222 of the Civil Code states that the court may
award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in
Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded. Considering
the circumstances of the case, the respondent corporation is entitled to the award of
nominal damages.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the respondent
appellate court dated May 27, 1991 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and
set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256
which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the
issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on
the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is
twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian
citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City;
before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married
after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then
visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their
approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live
with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a
week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of
Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already
married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment
ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs,
and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of
the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or
because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He
thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to
live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place
because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport;
and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain.
Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a
result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur
expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for
an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident
 (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987
up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern,
Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,
Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and
a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of
the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to
the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered
on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus
ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner
and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose
morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner,
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent,
d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered
by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture
and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court
and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was
false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the
evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent
Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and
that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just
a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several
times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on
August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown
of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and
inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The
photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with
members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on
that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters
that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October,
1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted
him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they
likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during
the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant
later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987,
defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and
he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this
live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her
some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with
defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he
told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl
 in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to
her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to
the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her
godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to
talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant
insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl
in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-
trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for
sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking
for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and
friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial
court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in
ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the
trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who
was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose
morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate
experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described
by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of
modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive
promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the
lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so
the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for
otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted
in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress
at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he
went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least
thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18,
1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of
the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April
1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to
marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left
Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to
go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic)
some kind of special relationship between them? And this special
relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of
marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her
parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her,
also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to
plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from
her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal
(pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good
moral character and must think so low and have so little respect and
regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in
Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before
he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife
in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in
Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to
plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young,
innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise
to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to
him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would
keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
 living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these
acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good
customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory
and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has
been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-
appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had
caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this
case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he
raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the
case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed
any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not
professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never
maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not
conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he
is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable
because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which
purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character.
Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had
been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could
be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be
faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if
it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent
and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the
special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition
and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in
support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the
credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate
courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter
court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of
substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower
court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2)
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible
(Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting
(Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
 (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate
courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the
Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to
marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De
Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United
States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-
called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of
justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces
the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has
not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under
the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of
age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be
filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed,
and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage,
she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil
law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is
much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by
 the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal
Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in
the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills
that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs;
it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on
torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and
to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief
that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered
her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but
because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the
private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger
than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and
as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of
first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of
clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if
there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not
convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and
conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth
in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor
who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is
more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage;
it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil.
595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some
sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must
yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig.
tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart
from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and
do have that effect, and which result in her person to
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces
of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
 And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the
enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the
injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to
warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness
arises out of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and
the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity
for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized
that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to
the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses
would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult
age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts
of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the
deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to
fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we
conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no
other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court
of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently
retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been
carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was
due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30,
1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be
the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is
a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of
moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be
no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for
the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense
of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit
or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the
woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot
be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic),
the action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act
which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit
as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if
the act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have
been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that
granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the
latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto;
hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The
latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury
or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a
doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school
graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p.
51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a
man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of
financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been
offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account
of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by
him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at
all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances
could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise
to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive
the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his
life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their
women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant
disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent
may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the
petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she
is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where
his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue
influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself
procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be
no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is
literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros,
40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be
said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and
the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and
infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition
is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
# Footnotes
1 Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, 53-62. Per Associate Justice Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy, concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and
Jaime M. Lantin.
2 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 20-22.
3 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 23-24.
4 Annex "C", Id.; Id., 25.
5 Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 26-33. Per Judge Antonio M. Belen.
6 Id., 33.
7 Rollo, 31-33.
8 Rollo, 54-55.
9 Exhibit "E" of Petition; Rollo, 34-50.
10 Annex "G", Id.; Id.; 53-62.
11 Rollo, 58-59.
12 Rollo, 61.
13 Id., 11.
14 In support thereof, he cites Despi vs. Aliosco, [CA] 64 O.G.; Wassmer
vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 [1964]; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109
Phil. 629 [1960]; and Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].
15 People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440 [1979]; People vs. Bautista, 92
SCRA 465 [1979]; People vs. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503 [1979]; People vs.
Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs. Marzan, 128 SCRA 203 [1984];
People vs. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280 [1985]; People vs. Sanchez, 199 SCRA
414 [1991]; and People vs. Atilano, 204 SCRA 278 [1991].
16 191 SCRA 218 [1990], footnote omitted; see also, Remalante vs. Tibe,
158 SCRA 138 [1988].
17 Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; Estopa vs.
Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].
18 58 Phil. 866 [1933].
19 Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, 14 May 1949, 2352.
20 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978].
21 Report of the Code Commission, 39-40. This passage is quoted,
except for the last paragraph, in Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 18 SCRA
994, 996-997 [1966]; the Article 23 referred to is now Article 21.
22 Report of the Code Commission, 161-162.
23 TOLENTINO, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 72.
24. Rollo, 61.
25. Supra.
26. Supra.
27 At pages 997-999.
28 Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, vol. I, Eleventh ed., (1984),
91-92.
29 Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
vol. 1, 1985 ed., 76-77, omitting footnotes.

30 7 Phil. 156 [1906].

31 Article 21.

32 Supra.

33 Rollo, 16.

34 Id., 16-17.

35 Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004.

36 37 Am Jur 2d, 401, omitting citations.

37 11 SCRA 158 [1964]; see also, Liguez vs. Court of Appeals 102 Phil.
577 [1975].
 Republic of the Philippines NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON
SUPREME COURT APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
Manila
PAKING
EN BANC
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955,
vs. judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages;
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant. P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee. On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut.
BENGZON, J.P., J.: But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear
before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the
appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
worse, complete public humiliation.
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de
1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be: Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court
granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Dear Bet —
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired
on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on
the Convair today.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6,
1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would
however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case
only create a scandal.
amicably were nil.
Paquing
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition.
Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram: quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by
default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a
valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached
to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against
plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due
to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like
this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun
Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29,
1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary,
or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it
having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province
of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is
sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's
consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in
default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court
of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the
judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil
Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa
vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not
an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft
of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may
be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license
to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was
set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends
and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the
maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories,
was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then,
with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left
a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... "
He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never
returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive.
No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really
assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of
P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary
damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because
under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The
argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case
defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's
judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 57227. May 14, 1992.]
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein
by the former, his mother and natural guardian, Petitioners, v. IVAN MENDEZ and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas, for Petitioners.
Bienvenido D. Carriaga for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURT OF APPEALS; DUTY THEREOF IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS APPELLATE
JURISDICTION. — It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have
only a persuasive and not a conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court of Appeals to review the factual findings of the
trial court and rectify the errors it committed as may have been properly assigned and as could
be established by a re-examination of the evidence on record. It is the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals, not those of the trial court, that as a rule are considered final and conclusive
even on this Court (Hermon v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]).
2. ID.; ID.; AS A GENERAL RULE, ONLY ERRORS OF LAWS COMMITTED THEREOF ARE
REVIEWABLE BY THE SUPREME COURT. — This being a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, this Court will review only errors of law committed by the Court of Appeals.
It is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over again the oral and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is not
supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts
(Remalante v. Tibe, Et Al., 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 149
SCRA 97 [1987]).
3. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; AS A GENERAL RULE, MERE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE IS NOT BY
ITSELF A BASIS FOR RECOVERY; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — As regards Amelita’s claim for
damages which is based on Article 19 & 21 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan’s
promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of
Appeals that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only
be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the
time she met Ivan at Tony’s Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted
that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the
reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she induced or deceived because of a
promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was
informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man.
Her declaration that in the months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated
their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was
the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
DECISION
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision 1 dated April 30, 1981 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed petitioner’s complaint and set aside
the resolution 2 dated October 21, 1976 of the then Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th
Judicial District, amending the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 and
ordering private respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as
his illegitimate child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child, (3) to pay
complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral damages; and (4)
to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.
It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for
acknowledgment, support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. The case was
filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial District and docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In
her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges, among others, that sometime in the month of
August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony’s Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where
she worked as a waitress; that the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine
with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and
courted Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan’s proposal; that at about 11:00
o’clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on
the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a
promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter; that after the
sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man; that they repeated their
sexual contact in the months of September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila,
as a result of which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears;
that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the
child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that because of her pregnancy,
Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of
Davao City with a monthly income of P5,000 to P8,000.00. As relief, Amelita prayed for the
recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees plus costs. chanrobles v irt ualawli brary chan robles .com:cha nrob les.c om.ph
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony’s Cocktail
Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. By way of counterclaim, he further prayed
for the payment of exemplary damages and litigation expense including attorney’s fees for the
filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint
impleading as co-plaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was born on August 3, 1975. In its
order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court admitted the amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint reiterating his
previous answer denying that Michael Constantino is his illegitimate son.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21, 1976, the dispositive portion of
which reads, viz: jgc:chan roble s.com. ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita
Constantino and against defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino
the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages; and, the sum of P3,000.00, as and
by way of attorney’s fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry
From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration. Ivan
Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not supported by
evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand, sought the recognition and support of her
son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.
In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita Constantino’s motion
for reconsideration, and amended the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 to
read as follows, viz: jgc:cha nrob les.com. ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita
Constantino and plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino, and against defendant Ivan Mendez
ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral
damages and the sum of P200.00 as and by way of payment of the hospital and medical bills
incurred during the delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino; to recognize as his own
illegitimate child the plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino who shall be entitled to all the rights,
privileges and benefits appertaining to a child of such status; to give a permanent monthly
support in favor of plaintiff Michael Constantino the amount of P300.00; and the sum of
P5,000.00, as and by way of attorney’s fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit. chanrob les.co m:cralaw: red
Let this Order form part of the decision dated June 21, 1976.
SO ORDERED." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision was set aside and the
complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.
Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court and in dismissing the
complaint.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual findings of the trial
court and in not affirming the decision of the trial court. They also pointed out that the appellate
court committed a misapprehension of facts when it concluded that Ivan did not have sexual
access with Amelita during the first or second week of November, 1976 (should be 1974), the
time of the conception of the child.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have only a persuasive
and not a conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
it is the duty of the Court of Appeals to review the factual findings of the trial court and rectify
the errors it committed as may have been properly assigned and as could be established by a
re-examination of the evidence on record. It is the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, not
those of the trial court, that as a rule are considered final and conclusive even on this Court
(Hermo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]). This being a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court will review only errors of law
committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over
again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of facts
of the Court of Appeals is not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe, Et Al., 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court
of Appeals, Et Al., 149 SCRA 97 [1987]).
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that Amelita
Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the
father of her son Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based on the evaluation of the evidence
on record is controlling on this Court as the same is supported by the evidence on record. Even alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
the trial court initially entertained such posture. It ordered the recognition of Michael as the
illegitimate son of Ivan only when acting on the motions for reconsideration, it reconsidered, on WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
October 21, 1976, its earlier decision dated June 21, 1976. Amelita’s testimony on cross-
examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of SO ORDERED.
November, 1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is inconsistent with her response that she
could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November, 1974 (Ibid, p. 106). Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial
point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had Endnotes:
sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974. chanro bles lawl ib rary : red nad

Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so that as correctly
pointed out by private respondent’s counsel, citing medical science (Williams Obstetrics, Tenth
Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of 1 Penned by Associate Justice Simeon Gopengco and concurred in by Associate Justices Oscar
conception must be close to 267 days", the conception of the child (Michael) must have taken Victoriano and Jose Melo.
place about 267 days before August 3, 1375 or sometime in the second week of November,
1974. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November, 1974, 2. Issued by Judge Antonio M. Martinez.
nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated
February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez requesting for a conference, prepared by her own 3. Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
counsel Atty. Roberto Sarenas to whom she must have confided the attendant circumstances of duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that Amelita is four (4) months
pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of actual pregnancy, the child was 4. Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
conceived on or about October 11, 1974. contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.

Petitioner’s assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 65) is
belied by Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason for
her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She also
confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work. An
order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant
in the family or lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her
affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.

As regards Amelita’s claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code
on the theory that through Ivan’s promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot
but agree with the Court of Appeals that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for
recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness
and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony’s Restaurant, Amelita was already 28
years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 83). Her
attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or
deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation
with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that
he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and
November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and
JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a
complaint for support and damages, and another order denying amendment of the same
pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court
below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City,
and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married,
succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and
intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite
efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she
claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the
complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the
trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining
defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this
Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child,
although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the
purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;"
just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by
Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may
result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir,
even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be
accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they were
already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring
that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate
support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40
prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from
the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of
the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely
useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding
Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself
had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order
dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision.
Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo
en el sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica and Villamor, JJ., conc
sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en
estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones
previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos
(que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene
efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to
force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this
case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and

analogous cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

xxx xxx xxx

 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 163794 : November 28, 2008]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Romeo T.
Acosta (formerly Jose D. Malvas), Director of Forest
Management Bureau, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Petitioners, v. HON. NORMELITO J.
BALLOCANAG, Presiding Judge, Branch 41, Regional Trial
Court, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro and DANILO
REYES,Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court
of
Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated June 4, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No.
52261, which affirmed the Joint Order3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, dated
December 28, 1998.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in 1970, [private respondent Danilo] Reyes bought the
subject 182,941-square-meter land at Bgy. Banus, Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro [subject land] from one Regina Castillo (or
Castillo) in whose name it was titled under Original Transfer
Certificate of Title No. P-2388 issued pursuant to Free Patent No. V-
79606. Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced improvements
and planted the land with fruit trees, including about a thousand
mango[es], more than a hundred Mandarin citrus, and more than a
hundred guyabanos. He also had the title transferred in his name
and was issued TCT No. 45232.
Reyes so prized this land which he bought in good faith.
Unfortunately, it turned out that about 162,500 square meters of
this land is part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro and,
therefore, cannot be subject to any disposition or acquisition under
any existing law, and is not registrable.
Thus, in the Complaint (Annex "A", pp. 15 to 21, rollo) for
"Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion" filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (or OSG) in behalf of the Republic [petitioner], as
represented by the Bureau of Forest Development (or BFD), it was
explained that the source[,] Original Transfer Certificate of Title No.
P-2388 of Castillo, issued pursuant to Free Patent No. V-79606, is
spurious, fictitious and irregularly issued on account of:
a) ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(162,500) SQUARE METERS, more or less, of the land covered by
OCT No. P-2388 was, at the time it was applied for patent and or
titling, a part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro, per BFD Land
Classification Map Nos. 2319 and 1715. Copy of said maps are
attached hereto as Annexes "B" and "C";
b) The 162,500 square meters covered by OCT No. P-2388 are
entirely inside the 140 hectares Agro-Forestry Farm Lease
Agreement No. 175 in favor of Atty. Augusto D. Marte4 [Atty.
Marte], copy of the Map of AFFLA No. 175 and AFFLA No. 175 are
attached hereto as Annexes "D" and "E";
c) Neither the private defendant nor his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property because the rightful
occupant is Atty. Augusto D. Marte by virtue of the Agro-Forestry
Farm Lease Agreement [AFFLA] No. 175, issued to him by the
Ministry of Natural Resources in 1986 to expire on December 21,
2011;
d) Since the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 45232, in the name
of defendant Danilo Reyes, is a part of the timberland of Oriental
Mindoro, per BFD Land Classification Map Nos. 2319 & 1715, the
same cannot be the subject of any disposition or acquisition under
any existing law (Li Hong Giap v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil.
693; Veno v. Gov't of P.I. 41 Phil. 161; Director of Lands v.
Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5). (pp. 18 to 19, rollo)
Aside from the documentary evidence presented to support these
allegations, the Republic presented as well and called to the witness
stand:
a) Armando Cruz, the supervising cartographer of the DENR, who
explained that based on Land Classification Map No. 1715 (Exh.
"A") which was later amended to LC Map No. 2319 (Exh. "B"), the
plotting shows that the 162,000 square meters covered by OCT No.
2388 are entirely inside the 140 hectares of the Agro-Forestry Farm
Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of Atty. Marte and the alienable
and disposable area of Castillo's land is only around two (2)
hectares;
b) Alberto Cardiño, an employee of the DENR who conducted the
survey on the land under litigation, corroborated the testimony of
Cruz that only two hectares is alienable and disposable land; and c ralawli bra ry
c) Vicente Mendoza, a Geodetic Engineer, who expounded on the
procedure before the title could be issued to an applicant for a
disposable and alienable public land. He clarified that he did not
make the survey for Castillo but upon presentation to him of the
carpeta in open court he noticed that, while it appears to be valid, it
however has no certification of the Bureau of Forestry - an essential
requirement before title could be issued.
For his side, Reyes presented evidence showing his extensive
development of and investment in the land, but however failed to
traverse squarely the issue raised by the Republic against the
inalienability and indisposability of his acquired land. His lame
argument that the absence of the Certification by the Bureau of
Forestry on his carpeta does not necessarily mean that there was
none issued, failed to convince the court a quo.
Hence, Judge Edilberto Ramos, the then Presiding Judge of Branch
41 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,
held5 that:
The defendants in this case did not assail the evidence of the
plaintiff but concentrated itself to the expenses incurred in the
cultivation and in the planting of trees in that disputed areas. Aside
thereto, the plaintiff cited that it is elementary principle of law that
said areas not being capable of registration their inclusion in a
certification of ownership or confer title on the registrant. (Republic
of the Philippines, et al. v. Hon. Judge Jaime de los Angeles of the
Court of First Instance of Balayan, Batangas, et al., G.R. No. L-
30240) It is also a matter of principle that public forest [are non-
alienable public lands. Accession of public forests] on the part of the
claimant, however long, cannot convert the same into private
property. (Vano v. Government of PI, 41 Phils. 161)
In view thereof, it appears that the preponderance of
evidence is in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants and therefore it is hereby declared that Free
Patent No. V-79606 issued on July 22, 1957 with Psu No.
155088 and OCT No. P-2388 in the name of Regina Castillo
and its derivative TCT No. 45232 in the name of Danilo Reyes
is hereby declared null and void; and the defendant Danilo
Reyes is hereby ordered to surrender the owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 45232 and to vacate the premises and
directing the defendant Register of Deeds of Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, to cancel the title as null and void ab initio;
and declaring the reversion of the land in question to the
government subject to the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease
Agreement No. 175, to form part of the public domain in the
province of Oriental Mindoro.
The two-hectare lot, which appears disposable and alienable,
is declared null and void for failure to secure certification
from the Bureau of Forest Development.
The counter-claim of the defendant is hereby denied for lack
of merit, with cost against the defendant.6
Reyes appealed the aforementioned RTC Decision to the CA. In its
Decision7dated September 16, 1996, the CA affirmed the RTC
Decision. His motion for reconsideration was denied.8
Thus, Reyes sought relief from this Court via a Petition for Review
on Certiorari. But in our Resolution9 dated June 23, 1997, we
resolved to deny his petition for failure to sufficiently show that the
CA had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment.
On November 24, 1997, this Court denied with finality Reyes'
motion for reconsideration.10
On February 4, 1998, Reyes filed a Motion11 to Remove
Improvements Introduced by Defendant Danilo D. Reyes on the
Property which is the Subject of Execution in Accordance with Rule
39, Section 10, paragraph (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
(motion).12 There he averred that: he occupied in good faith the
subject land for around thirty years; he had already spent millions
of pesos in planting fruit-bearing trees thereon; and he employed
many workers who regularly took care of the trees and other
plants. Reyes prayed that he and/or his agents be given at least
one (1) year from the issuance of the corresponding order to
remove his mango, citrus and guyabanotrees, and that they be
allowed to stay in the premises within that period to work on the
cutting and removal of the said trees. He also asked the RTC that in
the meantime that these trees are not yet removed, all the
unharvested fruits be appropriated by him, as provided for by law,
to the exclusion of all other persons who may take advantage of the
situation and harvest said fruits.
Petitioner opposed the motion, citing the principle of accession
under Article 44013 of the Civil Code. It further argued that the
subject land, being timber land, is property of public dominion and,
therefore, outside the commerce of man and cannot be leased,
donated, sold, or be the object of any contract. This being the case,
there are no improvements to speak of, because the land in
question never ceased to be a property of the Republic, even if
Reyes claimed that he was a purchaser for value and in good faith
and was in possession for more than thirty (30) years. Moreover,
petitioner averred that, assuming Reyes was initially a
planter/sower in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot be
of absolute application since from the time the reversion case was
filed by the petitioner on May 13, 1987, Reyes ceased to be a
planter/sower in good faith and had become a planter/sower in bad
faith.14
Meanwhile, on March 2, 1998, Atty. Marte filed a Complaint for
Injunction With an Ancillary Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order against Reyes for allegedly
encroaching upon and taking possession by stealth, fraud and
strategy some 16 hectares of his leased area without his permission
or acquiescence and planted trees thereon in bad faith despite the
fact that the area is non-disposable and part of the public domain,
among others.
But the respondent RTC dismissed the said complaint in the assailed
Joint Order and ruled in favor of Reyes, finding Rule 39, Section 10,
paragraph (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable. The
RTC ratiocinated:
Under the circumstance, it is but just and fair and equitable that
Danilo Reyes be given the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of his
labor on the land which he honestly believes was legally his. He was
not aware that his certificate of title which was derived from OCT
No. P-2388 issued in 1957 by the government itself in the name of
Regina Castillo contained legal infirmity, otherwise he would not
have expoused (sic) himself from the risk of being ejected from the
land and losing all improvements thereon. Any way, if the court will
grant the motion for the defendant's (sic) Danilo Reyes to remove
his improvements on the disputed property, it will not prejudice
Augusto Marte, otherwise, as the court sees it, he will immensely
[benefit] from the toils of Danilo Reyes.
and then disposed, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to remove
improvements filed by defendant Danilo Reyes dated January 28,
1998 is hereby GRANTED pursuant to the provisions of section 10,
paragraph (d) of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
he is given a period of one (1) year from the issuance of this
ORDER to remove, cut and appropriate the fruit-bearing trees which
he had planted in the property in disputes (sic).
The COMMENT filed by the Office of the Solicitor General dated
August 11, 1998 is hereby denied for lack of merit.
The [C]omplaint for Injunction filed by Augusto D. Marte on March
2, 1998 against Danilo Reyes is hereby ordered dismissed for lack
of merit.
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed its Motion for
Reconsideration15 which was denied by the RTC.16 Aggrieved,
petitioner went to the CA via Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure17 ascribing to the RTC grave abuse of discretion
and acting without jurisdiction in granting Reyes' motion to remove
improvements.
However, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, and affirmed
the ruling of the RTC, in this wise:
It is notable that in the course of the suit for "Cancellation of Title
and/or Reversion" there was not an iota of evidence presented on
record that Reyes was in bad faith in acquiring the land nor in
planting thereon perennial plants. So it could never be said and
held that he was a planter/sower in bad faith. Thus, this Court holds
that Reyes sowed and planted in good faith, and that being so the
appropriate provisions on right accession are Articles 445 and 448
also of the Civil Code.18
Hence, this Petition based on the sole ground that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT HOLDING THAT THE MOTION TO REMOVE
IMPROVEMENTS FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS BUT AN
INCIDENT OF THE REVERSION CASE OVER WHICH THE TRIAL
COURT STILL HAS JURISDICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
DECISION IN THE REVERSION CASE HAD LONG BECOME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY.19
The OSG posits that Reyes' assailed motion is barred by prior
judgment under Section 47, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure because said motion merely sprang from the civil case of
reversion tried and decided on the merits by the RTC, and the
decision is already final, after it was duly affirmed by the CA and by
this Court. The OSG stresses that one of Reyes' assigned errors in
the reversion case before the CA was that the RTC "erred in not
granting his (Reyes') counterclaims as well as his claims for
improvements." The OSG claims that such assigned error was duly
resolved by the CA when it held, to wit:
The non-award of appellant's "counterclaims" is understandable.
To begin with, no evidence whatsoever was presented by the
appellant to sustain his plea for damages. In fact, appellant never
testified to prove his allegations as regards his counterclaims.
Then, too, there is no showing that appellant paid the docket fees
for the court to acquire jurisdiction over his purported
counterclaims (Metal Engineering Resources Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 203 SCRA 273).
Lastly, the allegations made in the Answer in support of the so-
called "counterclaims" clearly negate the nature of the claims as
compulsory counterclaim like that of reimbursement of the useful
expenses (Cabangis v. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 414).20
Thus, the OSG posits that the issue of the improvements cannot be
made the subject of the assailed motion on the pretext that such
removal of improvements is merely incidental to the reversion case.
The OSG submits that the consideration of the issue is now barred
by res judicata. Lastly, the OSG argues that: the RTC and CA
cannot vary a decision which has already attained finality; for
purposes of execution, what is controlling is the dispositive portion
of the decision; the RTC, except to order the execution of a decision
which had attained finality, had long lost jurisdiction over the case;
and the RTC erred and acted without jurisdiction when it granted
Reyes' motion to remove the improvements when the dispositive
portion of the decision in the reversion case did not provide for the
removal of the same.21
In his Comment22 on the OSG petition, Reyes avers that the points
raised by the OSG are merely rehashed arguments which were
adequately passed upon by the CA. He fully agrees with the ruling
of the CA that: he is a planter/sower in good faith, as such, Articles
445 and 448 of the New Civil Code are applicable; his motion is not
entirely a new case, but merely an incident to the reversion case, a
consequence of its grant and a legal solution to an important issue
overlooked, if not ignored by the State and by the courts in their
decisions in the reversion case; under Section 10, Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, he is allowed to remove the
improvements; and the instant Petition failed to abide with the
proper manner as to the "proof of service" required under Section
13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Most importantly,
Reyes avers that the land on which about 1,000 mango trees, 100
mandarin citrus trees and 100 guyabano trees are planted, was
leased by the government to Atty. Marte, who entered into the
possession of the subject land when the trees were already bearing
fruits. Thus, if said trees are not removed, Atty. Marte would be
unduly enriched as the beneficiary of these fruits without even
spending a single centavo, at the expense of Reyes. Reyes posits
that it is a well-established fact, unrebutted by the petitioner, that
he planted these trees and to deny him the right to remove them
would constitute a grave injustice and amount to confiscation
without just compensation which is violative of the Constitution.
The OSG counters that copies of the instant Petition were properly
served as shown by the photocopies of the registry return cards.
Moreover, the OSG avers that granting, without admitting, that
another person would stand to be benefited by the improvements
that Reyes introduced on the land is beside the point and is not the
fault of the petitioner because the particular issue of the
improvements was already resolved with finality in the reversion
case. The OSG claims that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside
decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so will negate the
principle of hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review - a
final judgment, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.23
The instant Petition lacks merit.
In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint
would admit State ownership of the disputed land.24 Indeed, the
ownership over the subject land reverted to the State by virtue of
the decisions of the
RTC and CA and our Resolution on the matter. But these decisions
simply ordered the reversion of the property to the State, and did
not consider the improvements that Reyes had introduced on the
property or provide him with any remedy relative thereto. Thus,
Reyes was left out in the cold, faced with the prospect of losing not
only the land which he thought he owned, but also of forfeiting the
improvements that he painstakingly built with his effort, time and
money.
We cannot agree with the OSG that the denial by the CA of Reyes'
counterclaim in the reversion case had the effect of completely
foreclosing whatever rights Reyes may have over these
improvements. We note that the counterclaim was denied because
Reyes failed to prove that it was in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim, and he did not pay docket fees thereon, even as the
CA found that Reyes "never testified to prove his allegations as
regards his counterclaims." Yet, the records of the reversion case
reveal that Reyes adduced ample evidence of the extent of the
improvements he introduced and the expenses he incurred therefor.
This is reflected in the findings of the CA in the case at bench, and
we concur with the appellate court when it said:
But this Court notes that while Reyes was half-hearted in his
opposition to the reversion, he instead focused on proving the
improvements he has introduced on the land, its extent and his
expenses. Despite these proofs, the Decision of April 13, 1992
made no mention nor provision for the improvements on the land.
With this legal vacuum, Reyes could not exercise the options
allowed the sower and planter in good faith. This thus left him no
other alternative but to avail of Paragraph (d) of Section 10 of Rule
39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order to collect or get a
return of his investment as allowed to a sower and planter in good
faith by the Civil Code.
Correlatively, the courts in the reversion case overlooked the issue
of whether Reyes, vis - à-vis his improvements, is a builder or
planter in good faith. In the instant case, the issue assumes full
significance, because Articles 44825 and 54626 of the Civil Code
grant the builder or planter in good faith full reimbursement of
useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made. A builder or planter in good faith is one
who builds or plants on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof, unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he
builds or plants on it.27
On this issue, we are disposed to agree with the CA that Reyes was
a planter in good faith. Reyes was of the belief that he was the
owner of the subject land; in fact, a TCT over the property was
issued in his name. He tilled the land, planted fruit trees thereon,
and invested money from 1970. He received notice of the Republic's
claim only when the reversion case was filed on May 13, 1987. The
trees are now full-grown and fruit-bearing.
To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in
favor of the State - - because the decision in the reversion case
declaring that the land is part of inalienable forest land and belongs
to the State is already final and immutable - - would inequitably
result in unjust enrichment of the State at the expense of Reyes, a
planter in good faith.
Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest.28 This basic
doctrine on unjust enrichment simply means that a person shall not
be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's
expense.29 There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience.30 Article 22 of the Civil Code
states the rule in this wise:
ART. 22. Every person who, through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him.
The requisites for the application of this doctrine are present in the
instant case. There is enrichment on the part of the petitioner, as
the State would come into possession of - - and may technically
appropriate - - the more than one thousand fruit-bearing trees
planted by the private respondent. There is impoverishment on the
part of Reyes, because he stands to lose the improvements he had
painstakingly planted and invested in. There is lack of valid cause
for the State to acquire these improvements, because, as discussed
above, Reyes introduced the improvements in good faith. Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not commit any error in ruling that Reyes is
entitled to the benefits of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
Thus, even if we accept the OSG's submission that Reyes'
entitlement to these benefits is not absolute because he can no longer claim
good faith after the filing of the reversion case in 1987, still, there is no gainsaying
that prior to that ― all the way back to 1970 ― he had possessed the land and
introduced improvements thereon in good faith. At the very least, then, Reyes is
entitled to these benefits for the 17 years that he had been a planter in good faith.
However, we are mindful of the fact that the subject land is currently covered by
Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement (AFFLA) No. 175 issued by the Ministry of
(now Department of Environment and) Natural Resources in favor of Atty. Augusto
D. Marte, which will expire on December 21, 2011. By the terms of the AFFLA, the
lessee shall, among others, do all in his power to suppress fires, cooperate with the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) in the protection and conservation of the forest
growth in the area and undertake all possible measures to insure the protection of
watershed and environmental values within the leased area and areas adjacent thereto.
This obligation to prevent any damage to the land subject of the lease is consonant
with fundamental principles and state policies set forth in Section 16,31 Article II and
Section 4,32Article XII of the Constitution.
To allow Reyes to remove the fruit-bearing trees now full-grown on the subject land,
even if he is legally entitled to do so, would be risking substantial damage to the land.
It would negate the policy consideration underlying the AFFLA - - to protect and
preserve the biodiversity and the environment, and to prevent any damage to the land.
Further, it would violate the implicit mandate of Article 547 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without damage to the
principal thing, the possessor in good faith may remove them unless the person who
recovers the possession exercises the option under paragraph 2 of the preceding
article.
In this light, the options that Reyes may exercise under Articles 448 and 546 of the
Civil Code have been restricted. It is no longer feasible to permit him to remove the
trees he planted. The only equitable alternative would be to order the Republic to pay
Reyes the value of the improvements he introduced on the property. This is only fair
because, after all, by the terms of the AFFLA, upon the expiration of the lease or
upon its cancellation if there be any violation or breach of its terms, all permanent
improvements on the land shall pass to the ownership of the Republic without any
obligation on its part to indemnify the lessee.
However, the AFFLA is not due to expire until December 21, 2011. In the interim, it
is logical to assume that the lessee, Atty. Augusto D. Marte, will derive financial gain
from the fruits that the trees planted by Reyes would yield. In fact, Atty. Marte may
already have profited therefrom in the past several years. It is, therefore, reasonable to
grant the Republic the right of subrogation against the lessee who may have benefited
from the improvements. The Republic may, thus, demand reimbursement from Atty.
Marte for whatever amount it will have to pay Reyes for these improvements.
As to the OSG's insistent invocation of res judicata and the immutability of final
judgments, our ruling in Temic Semiconductors, Inc. Employees Union (TSIEU)-
FFW, et al. v. Federation of Free Workers (FFW), et al.33 is instructive:
It is axiomatic that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it
be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. Any act
which violates such principle must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle
of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the
judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon
which judicial powers had been conferred.
The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of a final judgment are: (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
In the exercise of our mandate as a court of justice and equity,34 we rule in favor of
Reyes pro hac vice. We reiterate that this Court is not precluded from rectifying errors
of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.35 Indubitably, to
order the reversion of the subject land without payment of just compensation, in
absolute disregard of the rights of Reyes over the improvements which he, in good
faith, introduced therein, would not only be unjust and inequitable but cruel as well.
 7
Particularly docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 39105; penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (a retired member of this Court), with
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 4, 2004 of Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Artemio G. Tuquero, concurring; id. at 84-98.
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that:
8 CA Resolution dated January 24, 1997; id. at 102-104.
1) The Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, is hereby 9 Id. at 105.
DIRECTED to determine the actual improvements introduced on the subject land,
their current value and the amount of the expenses actually spent by private 10
Id. at 106.
respondent Danilo Reyes for the said improvements thereon from 1970 until May 13,
1987 with utmost dispatch. 11 Id. at 107-110.

12
SEC. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.
2) The Republic, through the Bureau of Forest Development of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, is DIRECTED to pay private respondent Danilo xxx
Reyes the value of such actual improvements he introduced on the subject land as
determined by the Regional Trial Court, with the right of subrogation against Atty. (d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. - When the property subject of execution contains improvements
constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements, except
Augusto D. Marte, the lessee in Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175. upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove
the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.

No costs. 13 ART. 440. The ownership of property gives the right of accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or
attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.

SO ORDERED. 14
OSG Comment dated August 11, 1998; rollo, pp. 111-114.

Endnotes: 15 Id. at 119-130.

16 RTC Order dated February 17, 1999; id. at 131.

17
1 Petition for Certiorari dated April 5, 1999; id. at 132-144.
Rollo, pp. 26-51.

18 Rollo, p. 63.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios (now deceased), with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and Magdangal M. De
Leon, concurring; id. at 53-66.
19 Id. at 36.
3
Penned by public respondent Judge Normelito J. Ballocanag; id. at 115-118.
20 Supra note 7, at 97-98.
4
Also referred to as Atty. Augusto Sarte in other pleadings and documents.
21
Supra note 1.
5 RTC Decision dated April 13, 1992; rollo, pp. 80-83.
22 Rollo, pp. 195-200.
6 Rollo, pp. 54-57. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

23
OSG's Reply dated March 21, 2005; id. at 207-213, citing Manila Electric Co. v. Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., 374 SCRA
262 (2002).
24
Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 744, 764, citing Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of
Honorio Dacut, 378 SCRA 206, 214-215 (2002).

25Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to
buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such a case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after the proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease
and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

26Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he
has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in
the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have
acquired by reason thereof.

27Florentino v. Supervalue, Inc., G.R. No. 172384, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 156, 171, citing Lopez v. Sarabia, 439 SCRA 35, 49
(2004).

28 No one shall enrich himself at the expense of another.

29
Almocera v. Ong, G.R. No. 170479, February 18, 2008, 546 SCRA 164, 176-177.

30Allied Banking Corporation v. Li, Sio Wan, G.R. No. 133179, March 27, 2008, 549 SCRA 504, 524, citing Reyes v. Lim, 408 SCRA
560 (2003).

31
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.

32SEC. 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine by law the specific limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly
their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may not be increased or
diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide, for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered
forests and watershed areas.

33 G.R. No. 160993, May 20, 2008. (Citations omitted).

34
Chieng v. Santos, G.R. No. 169647, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 730, 748, citing National Development Company v. Madrigal Wan
Hai Lines Corporation, 458 Phil. 1038, 1055 (2003).

35 Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, G.R. No. 147082, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 406, 421-422.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the name and style CARWIN
CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated April 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga (RTC) in Civil Case No. 10538,
granting the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages filed by Carlito Lacap
(respondent) against the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner).
The factual background of the case is as follows:
The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To Bid"
dated January 27, 1992. Respondent, doing business under the name and style Carwin
Construction and Construction Supply (Carwin Construction), was pre-qualified together
with two other contractors. Since respondent submitted the lowest bid, he was awarded
the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.3 On November 4, 1992, a Contract
Agreement was executed by respondent and petitioner.4 On September 25, 1992, District
Engineer Rafael S. Ponio issued a Notice to Proceed with the concreting
of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.5 Accordingly, respondent undertook the works, made advances for
the purchase of the materials and payment for labor costs.6
On October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the District Engineer of San Fernando,
Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the project and found it 100% completed in
accordance with the approved plans and specifications. Accordingly, the Office of the
District Engineer issued Certificates of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance.7
Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project.8 The DPWH
prepared the Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner.9 However, the DPWH withheld
payment from respondent after the District Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA)
disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of
respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the contract. The District Engineer
sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal Department on whether the contracts of Carwin
Construction for various Mount Pinatubo rehabilitation projects were valid and effective
although its contractor’s license had already expired when the projects were contracted.10
In a Letter-Reply dated September 1, 1993, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the DPWH
Legal Department opined that since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise
known as the Contractor’s License Law, does not provide that a contract entered into
after the license has expired is void and there is no law which expressly prohibits or
declares void such contract, the contract is enforceable and payment may be paid,
without prejudice to any appropriate administrative liability action that may be imposed
on the contractor and the government officials or employees concerned.11
In a Letter dated July 4, 1994, the District Engineer requested clarification from the
DPWH Legal Department on whether Carwin Construction should be paid for works
accomplished despite an expired contractor’s license at the time the contracts were
executed.12
In a First Indorsement dated July 20, 1994, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal
Department, recommended that payment should be made to Carwin Construction,
reiterating his earlier legal opinion.13 Despite such recommendation for payment, no
payment was made to respondent.
Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages against petitioner before the RTC.14
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no
cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since
respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove
the claim.15
Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,16 the RTC
issued an Order dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss.17 The OSG filed a
Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated
May 23, 1996.19
On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State.20
Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter, thru its District
Engineer at Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, to pay the following:
a) ₱457,000.00 – representing the contract for the concreting project of Sitio 5 road,
Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga plus interest at 12% from demand until fully paid; and
b) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC held that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has
accepted the completed project and enjoyed the benefits thereof; to hold otherwise
would be to overrun the long standing and consistent pronouncement against enriching
oneself at the expense of another.22
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. On April 28, 2003, the CA rendered
23
its Decision sustaining the Decision of the RTC. It held that since the case involves the
application of the principle of estoppel against the government which is a purely legal
question, then the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply; that
by its actions the government is estopped from questioning the validity and binding effect
of the Contract Agreement with the respondent; that denial of payment to respondent on
purely technical grounds after successful completion of the project is not countenanced
either by justice or equity.
The CA rendered herein the assailed Decision dated April 28, 2003, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in
that the interest shall be six percent (6%) per annum computed from June 21, 1995.
SO ORDERED.24
Hence, the present petition on the following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS NO
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT:
(a) RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; AND
(b) IT IS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH HAS THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION
TO RESOLVE RESPONDENT’S MONEY CLAIM AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.25
Petitioner contends that respondent’s recourse to judicial action was premature since the
proper remedy was to appeal the District Auditor’s disapproval of payment to the COA,
pursuant to Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D. No. 1445), otherwise known
as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; that the COA has primary
jurisdiction to resolve respondent’s money claim against the government under Section
2(1),26 Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2627 of P.D. No. 1445; that non-
observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the principle of
primary jurisdiction results in a lack of cause of action.
Respondent, on the other hand, in his Memorandum28 limited his discussion to Civil Code
provisions relating to human relations. He submits that equity demands that he be paid
for the work performed; otherwise, the mandate of the Civil Code provisions relating to
human relations would be rendered nugatory if the State itself is allowed to ignore and
circumvent the standard of behavior it sets for its inhabitants.
The present petition is bereft of merit.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should
first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes.29 The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from
them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the
opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.30
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.31
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c)
where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;32 (f) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot;33 (j) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo
warranto proceedings.34Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the present case.
Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal Department rendered in 1993 and
1994 that payment to a contractor with an expired contractor’s license is proper,
respondent remained unpaid for the completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly,
there was unreasonable delay and official inaction to the great prejudice of respondent.
Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution of
its contract is entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law.
It does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts.35 Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative
authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of
justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done.36 The issue does not require technical
knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application
of law.
Thus, while it is undisputed that the District Auditor of the COA disapproved respondent’s
claim against the Government, and, under Section 4837 of P.D. No. 1445, the
administrative remedy available to respondent is an appeal of the denial of his claim by
the District Auditor to the COA itself, the Court holds that, in view of exceptions (c) and
(e) narrated above, the complaint for specific performance and damages was not
prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve, despite the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. As the Court aptly stated in Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu
(Branch VIII):38
The plaintiffs were not supposed to hold their breath and wait until the Commission on
Audit and the Ministry of Public Highways had acted on the claims for compensation for
the lands appropriated by the government. The road had been completed; the Pope had
come and gone; but the plaintiffs had yet to be paid for the properties taken from them.
Given this official indifference, which apparently would continue indefinitely, the private
respondents had to act to assert and protect their interests.39
On the question of whether a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for
completed projects, Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or
attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or
assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of
this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this
country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence
of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license,
impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be
deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of
not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. (Emphasis
supplied)
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 is AFFIRMED. No
without interpretation.40 This rule derived from the maxim Index animi sermo est (speech pronouncement as to costs.
is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from SO ORDERED.
construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words,
to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
are found in the statute.41 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute Associate Justice
there should be no departure.42
WE CONCUR:
The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as
void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus,
Associate Justice
respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is
Chairperson
without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius (On Leave)
incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury) ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
states: Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter Associate Justice
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
ATTESTATION
This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of
which were formulated as "basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
between human beings and for the stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience, x x x guides human
conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice."43 The rules Associate Justice
thereon apply equally well to the Government.44 Since respondent had rendered services Chairperson, Third Division
to the full satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner, then the former should be
compensated for them. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost CERTIFICATION
would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of
respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the 13 Id.
Court’s Division.
14 Id. at 1.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice 15 Id. at 37.

16 Id. at 48.

17 Id. at 50.
Footnotes
18 Id. at 58.
1Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and concurred in by
Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, CA 19 Id. at 67.
rollo, p. 167.
20 Id. at 78.
2 Original Records, p. 120.
21 Id. at 125.
3 Id. at 7.
22 Id. at 124-125.
4 Id. at 8.
23 CA rollo, p. 17.
5 Id. at 12.
24 Id. at 273.
6 CA rollo, p. 268.
25 Id. at 33.
7 Original Records, p. 12-A.
26SEC. 2 (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty
8 Id. at 13. to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts
of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
9 Id. at 14. pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
10 Id. at 15. original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commission
and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
11 Ibid. autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental
entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
12 Id. at 16.
Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to 33 Carale v. Abarintos, 336 Phil. 126, 137 (1997).
such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal
control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt 34 Castro v. Sec. Gloria, 415 Phil. 645, 651-652 (2001).
such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and
appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the 35 Castro v. Sec. Gloria case, id. at 652.
Government and for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the
vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
Espina v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 15, 21 (1998); Prudential Bank v.
36

Gapultos, G.R. Nos. 41835 & 49293, January 19, 1990, 181 SCRA 159, 168.
27 Section 26. General jurisdiction. – The authority and powers of the Commission
shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, 37Section 48. Appeal from the decision of auditors. – Any person aggrieved by
systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government,
the decision of an auditor of any government agency in the settlement of account
the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the
or claim may within six months from receipt of a copy of the decision appeal in
examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those
writing to the Commission.
accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting
funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as
the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due
38 Supra note 32.
from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or
39 Id. at 624-625.
controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-governing
boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, G.R.
40

including non-governmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded
by donation through the government, those required to pay levies of government
share, and those which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those
partly funded by the government.
28 Rollo, p. 152.
ACWS, Ltd. v. Dumlao, 440 Phil. 787, 801-802 (2002); Zabat v. Court of
29
No. 159647, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 414, 443; National Federation of Labor v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 383 Phil. 910, 918 (2000); Ruben E.
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2003 Ed., p. 124.
41Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers
Corporation, G.R. No. 158540, July 8, 2004, 434 SCRA 65, 93; Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 359 Phil. 530, 602 (2000).

Appeals, 393 Phil. 195, 206 (2000). 42Enjay, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 315 Phil. 648, 656 (1995);
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. National Labor Relations
30
ACWS case, id. at 802. Commission, G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992, 206 SCRA 701, 711.

31Paloma v. Mora, G.R. No. 157783, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 711, 725;
Fabia v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 389, 403 (2002).
32Rocamora v. Regional Trial Court-Cebu (Branch VIII), No. L-65037, November
23, 1988, 167 SCRA 615, 623.
43Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation v. New World
Properties and Ventures, Inc., G.R. Nos. 143154 & 143177, June 21, 2006, 491
SCRA 557, 578; Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 312,
317 (1995), citing Report of the Code Commission, p. 39, cited in Padilla,
Ambrosio, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. 1, 1975.
44Palma Development Corp. v. Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga Del Sur,
459 Phil. 1042, 1050 (2003); Republic v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31303-04, May
31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),Petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE,
ZENAIDA VERCHEZ-CATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO CATIBOG, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon
Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On even date, her daughter Grace Verchez-Infante
(Grace) immediately hied to the Sorsogon Branch of the Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she engaged to send a telegram to her sister
Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) who was residing at 18 Legal St., GSIS Village,
Quezon City1 reading: "Send check money Mommy hospital." For RCPI’s services, Grace
paid P10.502 for which she was issued a receipt.3
As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida no response
was received from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru JRS Delivery
Service, reprimanding her for not sending any financial aid.
Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida, along with her husband
Fortunato Catibog, left on January 26, 1991 for Sorsogon. On her arrival at Sorsogon,
she disclaimed having received any telegram.
In the meantime, Zenaida and her husband, together with her mother Editha left for
Quezon City on January 28, 1991 and brought Editha to the Veterans Memorial Hospital
in Quezon City where she was confined from January 30, 1991 to March 21, 1991.
The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on February 15, 1991.4 On
inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, a messenger of RCPI replied that he
had nothing to do with the delivery thereof as it was another messenger who previously
was assigned to deliver the same but the address could not be located, hence, the
telegram was resent on February 2, 1991, and the second messenger finally found the
address on February 15, 1991.
Editha’s husband Alfonso Verchez (Verchez), by letter of March 5, 1991,5 demanded an
explanation from the manager of the Service Quality Control Department of the RCPI,
Mrs. Lorna D. Fabian, who replied, by letter of March 13, 1991,6 as follows:
Our investigation on this matter disclosed that subject telegram was duly processed in
accordance with our standard operating procedure. However, delivery was not
immediately effected due to the occurrence of circumstances which were beyond the
control and foresight of RCPI. Among others, during the transmission process, the radio
link connecting the points of communication involved encountered radio noise and
interferences such that subject telegram did not initially registered (sic) in the receiving
teleprinter machine.
Our internal message monitoring led to the discovery of the above. Thus, a repeat
transmission was made and subsequent delivery was effected. (Underscoring supplied)
Verchez’s lawyer thereupon wrote RCPI’s manager Fabian, by letter of July 23,
1991,7 requesting for a conference on a specified date and time, but no representative of
RCPI showed up at said date and time.
On April 17, 1992, Editha died.
On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their
respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia,
the delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of the late Editha to
their damage and prejudice,8 for which they prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
damages9 and attorney’s fees.10
After its motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue11 was denied12 by Branch 5
of the RTC of Sorsogon, RCPI filed its answer, alleging that except with respect to
Grace,13 the other plaintiffs had no privity of contract with it; any delay in the sending of
the telegram was due to force majeure, "specifically, but not limited to, radio noise and
interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the
telegraphic message";14 the clause in the Telegram Transmission Form signed by Grace
absolved it from liability for any damage arising from the transmission other than the
refund of telegram tolls;15 it observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees; and at all events, any cause of action had been barred by laches.16
The trial court, observing that "although the delayed delivery of the questioned telegram
was not apparently the proximate cause of the death of Editha," ruled out the presence
of force majeure. Respecting the clause in the telegram relied upon by RCPI, the trial
court held that it partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion.
Finding that the nature of RCPI’s business obligated it to dispatch the telegram to the
addressee at the earliest possible time but that it did not in view of the negligence of its
employees to repair its radio transmitter and the concomitant delay in delivering the
telegram on time, the trial court, upon the following provisions of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 2176 – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being at
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 1173 defines the fault of (sic) negligence of the obligor as the "omission of the
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time, or the place."
In the instant case, the obligation of the defendant to deliver the telegram to the
addressee is of an urgent nature. Its essence is the early delivery of the telegram to the
concerned person. Yet, due to the negligence of its employees, the defendant failed to
discharge of its obligation on time making it liable for damages under Article 2176.
The negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to the presumption of negligence
on the part of the employer.17 (Underscoring supplied),
rendered judgment against RCPI. Accordingly, it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, to wit:
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the following amount:
1. The amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages;
2. The amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees; and
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.18
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of February 27, 2004,19 affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
Hence, RCPI’s present petition for review on certiorari, it raising the following questions:
(1) "Is the award of moral damages proper even if the trial court found that there was no
direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts?"20 and (2) "Are the
stipulations in the ‘Telegram Transmission Form,’ in the nature "contracts of adhesion"
(sic)?21
RCPI insists that respondents failed to prove any causal connection between its delay in
transmitting the telegram and Editha’s death.22
RCPI’s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or
breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-plaintiffs-
herein-co-respondents.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages. (Underscoring supplied)
Passing on this codal provision, this Court explained:
In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of
its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing
the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any
kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor
thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for
recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve
the interests of the promissee that may include his "expectation interest," which is his
interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed, or his "reliance interest," which is
his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put
in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made; or
his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that
he has conferred on the other party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for
their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every
infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been
injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence x x x or of
the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing
liability.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible
time. It took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it.
RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and interferences which
adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message.
Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not locate the address of Zenaida and it
was only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper,
x x x it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have
occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed
to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One’s
negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to
another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or
injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is
found to be partly the result of a person’s participation – whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to act – the whole occurrence is humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
xxxx
Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous
event that could not be foreseen or, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words,
there must be an exclusion of human intervention from the cause of injury or
loss.24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering the
telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of the non-
transmission and the non-delivery so that she could have taken steps to remedy the
situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.
In an earlier case also involving RCPI, this Court held:
Considering the public utility of RCPI’s business and its contractual obligation to transmit
messages, it should exercise due diligence to ascertain that messages are delivered to
the persons at the given address and should provide a system whereby in cases of
undelivered messages the sender is given notice of non-delivery. Messages sent
by cable or wireless means are usually more important and urgent than those which
can wait for the mail.25
xxxx
People depend on telecommunications companies in times of deep emotional
stress or pressing financial needs. Knowing that messages about the illnesses or
deaths of loved ones, births or marriages in a family, important business transactions,
and notices of conferences or meetings as in this case, are coursed through the
petitioner and similar corporations, it is incumbent upon them to exercise a greater
amount of care and concern than that shown in this case. Every reasonable effort to
inform senders of the non-delivery of messages should be undertaken.26
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RCPI argues, however, against the presence of urgency in the delivery of the telegram,
as well as the basis for the award of moral damages, thus:27
The request to send check as written in the telegraphic text negates the existence of
urgency that private respondents’ allegations that ‘time was of the essence’ imports. A
check drawn against a Manila Bank and transmitted to Sorsogon, Sorsogon will have to
be deposited in a bank in Sorsogon and pass thru a minimum clearing period of 5 days
before it may be encashed or withdrawn. If the transmittal of the requested check to
Sorsogon took 1 day – private respondents could therefore still wait for 6 days before the
same may be withdrawn. Requesting a check that would take 6 days before it could be
withdrawn therefore contradicts plaintiff’s claim of urgency or need.28
At any rate, any sense of urgency of the situation was met when Grace Verchez was
able to communicate to Manila via a letter that she sent to the same addressee in Manila
thru JRS.29
xxxx
As far as the respondent court’s award for moral damages is concerned, the same
has no basis whatsoever since private respondent Alfonso Verchez did not accompany
his late wife when the latter went to Manila by bus. He stayed behind in Sorsogon for
almost 1 week before he proceeded to Manila. 30
When pressed on cross-examination, private respondent Alfonso Verchez could not give
any plausible reason as to the reason why he did not accompany his ailing wife to
Manila.31
xxxx
It is also important to consider in resolving private respondents’ claim for moral damages
that private respondent Grace Verchez did not accompany her ailing mother to Manila.32
xxxx
It is the common reaction of a husband to be at his ailing wife’s side as much as
possible. The fact that private respondent Alfonso Verchez stayed behind in Sorsogon
for almost 1 week convincingly demonstrates that he himself knew that his wife was not
in critical condition.33
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RCPI’s arguments fail. For it is its breach of contract upon which its liability is, it bears
repeating, anchored. Since RCPI breached its contract, the presumption is that it was at
fault or negligent. It, however, failed to rebut this presumption.
For breach of contract then, RCPI is liable to Grace for damages.
And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace’s co-respondents following Article 2176 of
the Civil Code which provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
RCPI’s liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it could prove that it
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Article 2180 of the
Civil Code so provides:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (Underscoring supplied)
RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
Respecting the assailed award of moral damages, a determination of the presence of the
following requisites to justify the award is in order:
x x x firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological
suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually
established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is
predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article
2220 of the Civil Code.34
Respecting the first requisite, evidence of suffering by the plaintiffs-herein respondents
was correctly appreciated by the CA in this wise:
The failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram containing the message of appellees on time,
disturbed their filial tranquillity. Family members blamed each other for failing to respond
swiftly to an emergency that involved the life of the late Mrs. Verchez, who suffered from
diabetes.35
As reflected in the foregoing discussions, the second and third requisites are present.
On the fourth requisite, Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides:
Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
After RCPI’s first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it did not inform Grace of the non-
delivery thereof and waited for 12 days before trying to deliver it again, knowing – as it
should know – that time is of the essence in the delivery of telegrams. When its second
long-delayed attempt to deliver the telegram again failed, it, again, waited for another 12
days before making a third attempt. Such nonchalance in performing its urgent obligation
indicates gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The fourth requisite is thus also
present.
In applying the above-quoted Article 2220, this Court has awarded moral damages in
cases of breach of contract where the defendant was guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation.36
As for RCPI’s tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention,
and other relief:
xxxx
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another. (Emphasis
supplied)
RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the
peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the
appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them as they blamed each other
"for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions
complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26
of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may award
moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is in order, as is
the award of attorney’s fees, respondents having been compelled to litigate to protect
their rights.
Clutching at straws, RCPI insists that the limited liability clause in the "Telegram Costs against petitioner.
Transmission Form" is not a contract of adhesion. Thus it argues:
SO ORDERED.
Neither can the Telegram Transmission Form be considered a contract of adhesion as
held by the respondent court. The said stipulations were all written in bold letters right in CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
front of the Telegram Transmission Form. As a matter of fact they were beside the space Associate Justice
where the telegram senders write their telegraphic messages. It would have been
different if the stipulations were written at the back for surely there is no way the sender WE CONCUR:
will easily notice them. The fact that the stipulations were located in a particular space
where they can easily be seen, is sufficient notice to any sender (like Grace Verchez-
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Infante) where she could manifest her disapproval, leave the RCPI station and avail of
Associate Justice
the services of the other telegram operators.37 (Underscoring supplied)
Chairperson
RCPI misunderstands the nature of a contract of adhesion. Neither the readability of the
stipulations nor their physical location in the contract determines whether it is one of
adhesion. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties imposes a ready-
made form of contract, which the other party may accept or reject, but which the latter DANTE O. TINGA
cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in the contract, while the other party Associate Justice
merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto, giving no room for negotiation
and depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.38 (Emphasis ATTESTATION
and underscoring supplied)
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
While a contract of adhesion is not necessarily void and unenforceable, since it is the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
construed strictly against the party who drafted it or gave rise to any ambiguity therein, it
is stricken down as void and unenforceable or subversive of public policy when the LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is Associate Justice
reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity Chairperson
to bargain on equal footing.39
CERTIFICATION
This Court holds that the Court of Appeals’ finding that the parties’ contract is one of
adhesion which is void is, given the facts and circumstances of the case, thus well- Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s
taken. Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
 ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN 15 Id. at 61-62. See also p. 30.
Chief Justice
16 Id. at p. 62.

17 Id. at 393 (citations omitted).

Footnotes 18 Id. at 394.

1 RTC records, p. 2. Penned by Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, with the concurrence of Justices
19

Rodrigo V. Cosico and Vicente Q. Roxas.

2 Exhibit "A," RTC records, p. 7; Exhibit "C," records, p. 9.
20 Rollo, p. 9.
3 Exhibit "A," supra note 2.
21 Ibid.
4 Supra note 1.
22 Id. at 12.
5 Exhibit "D," RTC records, pp. 10-11.
23FGU Insurance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation, 435 Phil.
6 Exhibit "E," RTC records p. 12. 333, 341-342 (2002) (citations omitted).

7 Exhibit "F," RTC records, p. 13. 24Mindex Resources Development v. Morillo, 428 Phil. 934, 944-945 (2002)
(citations omitted).
8 RTC records, p. 4.
25Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 83768,
9 Id. February 28, 1990, 182 SCRA 899, 905 (citations omitted).

10 Id. at 4-5.
26 Id. at 908 (citations omitted).

11 Id. at 19-30.
27 Rollo, pp. 12-15.

12 Id. at 42.
28 Id. at 13.

13 Id. at 60-61.
29 Id.

14 Id. at 61.
30 Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
31 Id. (citations omitted).

32 Id.

33 Id. at 15.

34Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil.

76, 84 (2002); see also Gamboa, Rodriguez, Rivera & Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 117456, May 6, 2005, 458 SCRA 68 (citations omitted).

35 CA rollo, p. 97 (citations omitted).

36 See Sarmiento v. Sun-Cabrido, 449 Phil. 108, 116-117 (2003).

37 Rollo, p. 55.

38Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 588,

597 (1996).

39Saludo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95536, March 23, 1992, 207 SCRA
498, 528; Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of
Appeals, supra; Sweet Lines, Inc. v. Teves, G.R. No. L-37750, May 19, 1978, 83
SCRA 361 (citations omitted).
 Republic of the Philippines Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. against
SUPREME COURT Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma, petitioner herein, before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office,
Manila docketed as I.S. No. 92-5433A. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit to the complaint.

THIRD DIVISION Finding "sufficient legal and factual basis," the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed on
July 6, 1992 an Information for libel against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104.3 The Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Augustine
A. Vestil reads:4
G.R. No. 113216 September 5, 1997
That on or about the 27th day of June 1991, in Quezon City, Metro
RHODORA M. LEDESMA, petitioner, Manila, Philippines, the said accused, acting with malice, did, then and
vs. there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously send a letter addressed to Dr.
COURT OF APPEALS and HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, in his capacity as Esperanza I. Cabral, Director of Philippine Heart Center, East Avenue,
Presiding Judge of RTC, Quezon City, respondents. this city, and furnished the same to other officers of the said hospital, said
letter containing slanderous and defamatory remarks against DR. JUAN
F. TORRES, JR., which states in part, to wit:

PANGANIBAN, J.: 27 June 1991

When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral
probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the Director
trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having
acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is Subject: Return of all
required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary's ruling professional fees due Dr.
is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error Rhodora M. Ledesma,
or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation Nuclear Medicine
and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already Specialist/Consultant,
acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action. Philippine Heart
Center, from January 31,
This principle is explained in this Decision resolving a petition for review on certiorari of 1989 to January 31,
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals,2 promulgated on September 14, 1993 in CA-G.R 1991.
SP No. 30832 which in effect affirmed an order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City denying the prosecution's withdrawal of a criminal information against petitioner. Respondents: Dr. Juan F.
Torres, Jr., Chief, Nuclear
The Antecedent Facts Medicine Section

From the pleadings submitted in this case, the undisputed facts are as follows:
 Dr. Orestes P. Monzon,
Staff Consultant
Dear Dr. Cabral,
This is to demand the return of all professional fees due
me as a consultant in Nuclear Medicine, this Center, since
January 31, 1989 until my resignation effective January
31, 1991, amounting to at least P100,000.00 for the year
1990 alone. Records in the Nuclear Medicine Section will
show that from January 1989 to January 1991, a total of
2,308 patients were seen. Of these, I had officially
supervised, processed, and interpreted approximately a
total of 1,551 cases as against approximately 684 and 73
cases done by Dr. Monzon and Dr. Torres respectively.
Until my resignation I had received a monthly share of
professional fees averaging P1,116.90/month supposedly
representing 20% of the total monthly professional fees.
The rest were divided equally between Dr. Monzon and
Dr. Torres. There was never any agreement between us
three consultants that this should be the arrangement and
I am certain that this was not with your approval. The
burden of unfairness would have been lesser if there was
an equal distribution of labor and the schedule of duties
were strictly followed. As it was, the schedule of duties
submitted monthly to the office of the Asst. Director for
Medical Services was simply a dummy to comply with
administrative requirements rather than a guideline for
strict compliance. Both consultants have complete daily
time records even if they did not come regularly. Dr.
Torres came for an hour every week, Dr. Monzon came
sporadically during the week while I was left with
everything from training the residents and supervising the
Techs to processing and interpreting the results on a
regular basis. I had a part time appointment just like Dr.
Monzon and Dr. Torres.
In the interest of fairness and to set a precedent for the
protection of future PHC Nuclear Medicine Alumni I am
calling your attention to the unfair and inhuman conditions
I went through as a Consultant in that Section. I trust that
your sense of professionalism will put a stop to this
corruption.
I suggest that a committee be formed to make an audit of
the distribution of professional fees in this Section. At this
point, let me stress that since professional fees vary
according to the type of procedure done and since there
was no equity of labor between us I am not settling for an
equal percentage share. I demand that I be indemnified of
all professional fees due me on a case to case basis.
Let me make clear my intention of pursuing this matter
legally should there be no favorable action in my behalf.
Let me state at this point 6 that the actions of Dr. Torres
and Dr. Monzon are both unprofessional and unbecoming
and are clearly violating the code of ethics of the medical
profession and the Philippine Civil Service Rules and
Regulations related to graft and corruption.
Thank you.
and other words of similar import, when in truth and in fact, as the
accused very well knew, the same are entirely false and untrue but were
publicly made for no other purpose than to expose said DR. JUAN F.
TORRES, JR. to public ridicule, thereby casting dishonor, discredit and
contempt upon the person of the said offended party, to his damage and
prejudice.
A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Vestil was filed by
petitioner before the Department of Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended by P.D.
No. 911.
The Department of Justice gave due course to the petition and directed the Quezon City
prosecutor to move for deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the entire records
of the case. 5 Accordingly, a "Motion to Defer, Arraignment" dated September 7, 1992
was filed by Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before the court a quo.6 On September 9, 1992,
the trial court granted the motion and deferred petitioner's arraignment until the final
termination of the petition for review.7
Without the consent or approval of the trial prosecutor, private complainant, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Lift the Order dated September 9, 1992 and to Set the Case for
Arraignment/Trial.8
On January 8, 1993, the trial court issued an Order setting aside its earlier Order of
September 9, 1992 and scheduling petitioner's arraignment on January 18, 1993 at two
o'clock in the afternoon. 9
In a resolution dated January 27, 1993, then Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon
reversed the Quezon City investigating prosecutor. Pertinent portions of Drilon's ruling
read: 10
From the circumstances obtaining, the subject letter was written to bring
to the attention of the Director of the Philippine Heart Center for Asia and
other responsible authorities the unjust and unfair treatment that Dr.
Ledesma was getting from complainants. Since complainants and
respondent are government employees, and the subject letter is a
complaint to higher authorities of the PHCA on a subject matter in which
respondent has an interest and in reference to which she has a duty to
question the same is definitely privileged (US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 131).
Moreover, in Ang vs. Castro, 136 SCRA 455, the Supreme Court,
citing Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, ruled that "A communication made
in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party making the
communication has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is
privileged. . . although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter
which, without the privilege, would be libelous and actionable.
The follow-up letter sent by respondent to the director of the PHCA, is a
direct evidence of respondent's righteous disposition of following the rule
of law and is a clear indication that her purpose was to seek relief from
the proper higher authority who is the Director of PHCA.
The same interpretation should be accorded the civil and administrative
complaints which respondent filed against complainants. They are mere
manifestations of her earnest desire to pursue proper relief for the alleged
injustice she got from complainants. If she was motivated by malice and
ill-will in sending the subject communication to the Director of the PHCA,
she would not have sent the second letter and filed the administrative and
civil cases against complainants.
Moreover, it is unbelievable that it took complainants one year to realize
that the questioned letter subjected them to public and malicious
imputation of a vice or omission. It is beyond the ordinary course of
human conduct for complainants to start feeling the effects of the alleged
libelous letter — that of experiencing sleepless nights, wounded feelings,
serious anxiety, moral shock and besmirched reputation — one year after
they read the communication in question.
The claim that the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 is applicable
to the instant case is unfounded. In the first place, the instant cases are
not being reinvestigated. It is the resolutions of the investigating
prosecutor that are under review. Further, the record shows that the court
has issued an order suspending the proceedings pending the resolutions
of the petitions for review by this Office. In the issuance of its order, the
court recognizes that the Secretary of Justice has the power and
authority to review the resolutions of prosecutors who are under his
control and supervision.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed resolutions are hereby reversed.
You are directed to withdraw the Informations which you filed in Court.
Inform this Office of the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.
In obedience to the above directive, Quezon City Trial Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero filed a
Motion to Withdraw Information dated February 17, 1993, 11 attaching thereto the
resolution of Secretary Drilon. The trial judge denied this motion in his Order dated
February 22, 1993, as follows: 12
The motion of the trial prosecutor to withdraw the information in the
above-entitled case is denied. Instead, the trial prosecutor of this court is
hereby directed to prosecute the case following the guidelines and
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Crespo
vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 13 was denied by the trial judge in the Order dated
March 5, 1993, as follows: 14
Finding no cogent reason to justify the reconsideration of the ruling of this
Court dated February 22, 1993, the Motion for Reconsideration dated
March 1, 1993 filed by the accused through counsel is hereby denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court.
In a Resolution dated March 31, 1993, this Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals for proper determination and disposition pursuant to Section 9, paragraph 1 of
B.P. 129. 15
Respondent Court dismissed the petition "for lack of merit," holding that it had no
jurisdiction to overturn the doctrine laid down in Crespo vs. Mogul — once a complaint or
information has been filed in court, any disposition of the case, i.e., dismissal, conviction
or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. 16
Hence, this recourse to this Court.
The Issues
For unexplained reasons, petitioner failed to make an assignment of errors against the
appellate court. Her counsel merely repeated the alleged errors of the trial court: 17
I. The Orders, dated February 22, 1993 and March 5, 1993, of
respondent Judge Asuncion relied solely on the "Crespo vs. Mogul" (151
SCRA 462) decision. It is respectfully submitted that said case is not
applicable because:
1. It infringes on the constitutional separation of powers between the
executive and judicial branches of the government;
2. It constitutes or it may lead to misuse or misapplication of "judicial
power" as defined in the Constitution;
3. It goes against the constitutional proscription that rules of procedure
should not diminish substantive rights;
4. It goes against the principle of non-delegation of powers;
5. It sets aside or disregards substantive and procedural rules;
6. It deprives a person of his constitutional right to procedural due
process;
7. Its application may constitute or lead to denial of equal protection of
laws;
8. It deprives the secretary of justice or the president of the power to
control or review the acts of a subordinate official;
9. It will lead to, encourage, abet or promote abuse or even corruption
among the ranks of investigating fiscals;
10. It does not subserve the purposes of a preliminary investigation
because —
(10.a) It subjects a person to the burdens of an unnecessary trial,
specially in cases where the investigating fiscal recommends no bail for
the accused;
(10.b) It subjects the government, both the executive and the judiciary, to
unnecessary time and expenses attendant to an unnecessary trial;
(10.c) It contributes to the clogging of judicial dockets; and
 11. It has no statutory or procedural basis or precedent.
II. On the assumption that "Crespo vs. Mogul" is applicable, it is
submitted that —
1. Respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when he denied the Motion to Withdraw
Information since he had already deferred to, if not recognized, the
authority of the Secretary of Justice; and
2. The facts in "Crespo vs. Mogul" are different from the instant case.
Hence, respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when he relied solely on said case in
denying the Motion to Withdraw Information.
In sum, the main issue in this petition is: Did Respondent Court commit any reversible
error in affirming the trial court's denial of the prosecution's Motion to Withdraw
Information?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit. We answer the above question in the affirmative.
Preliminary Matter
Before discussing the substance of this case, the Court will preliminarily address a
procedural matter. Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on July 1,
1997, Section 2 of Rule 45, which governed appeals from the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court, provided:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. — The petition shall contain a concise
statement of . . . the assignment of errors made in the court below . . . .
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 requires a concise statement of the
errors committed by the Court of Appeals, not of the trial court. For failure to follow this
Rule, the petition could have been dismissed by this Court motu proprio, considering that
under Section 4 of the same Rule, "review is not a matter of right but of sound
discretion."
We take this occasion to stress the need for precision and clarity in the assignment of
errors. Review under this rule is unlike an appeal in a criminal case where the death
penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed and where the whole case is
opened for review. Under Rule 45, only the issues raised therein by the petitioner will be
passed upon by the Court, such that an erroneous specification of the issues may cause
the dismissal of the petition. We stressed this in Circular No. 2-90, entitled "Guidelines to
be Observed in Appeals to the Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court," as follows:
4. Erroneous Appeals. . . . .
e) Duty of counsel. — It is therefore incumbent upon every attorney who
would seek review of a judgment or order promulgated against his client
to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, whether
these be of fact or of law; then upon such basis to ascertain carefully
which Court has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to follow scrupulously
the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or
imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to his client's cause.
FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE.
Be that as it may, the Court — noting the importance of the substantial matters raised —
decided to overlook petitioner's lapse and granted due course to the petition per
Resolution dated July 15, 1996, with a warning that henceforth petitions which fail to
specify an assignment of errors of the proper lower court may be denied due
course motu proprio by this Court.
Determination of Probable Cause
Is an Executive Function
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is judicially
recognized as an executive function and is made by the prosecutor. The primary
objective of a preliminary investigation is to free a respondent from the inconvenience,
expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial,
until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed upon in a more or less
summary proceeding by a competent officer designated by law for that purpose.
Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of
unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials
arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges. 18
Such investigation is not a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the
parties' evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 19 By
reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges
as a result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no
double jeopardy attaches.
In declaring this function to be lodged in the prosecutor, the Court distinguished the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant from a preliminary investigation proper, in this wise: 20
. . . Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary
inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest from a preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether
the offender should be held for trial or released. . . . The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The
preliminary investigation proper — whether . . . there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and,
therefore, whether . . . he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial — is the function of the prosecutor.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to
whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground
for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part
of the prosecutor's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation
which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature
and is lodged with the judge.
Sound policy supports this distinction. Otherwise, judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. The Separate Opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals stressed that the
determination of the existence of probable cause properly pertains to the public
prosecutor in the "established scheme of things," and that the proceedings therein are
"essentially preliminary, prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative
judgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or a crime." 21
In Crespo vs. Mogul, 22 the Court emphasized the cardinal principle that the public
prosecutor controls and directs the prosecution of criminal offenses thus:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or
information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party,
according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason
for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the
fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private
persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant. Prosecuting officers
under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but
also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence
received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime
committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the
legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become
convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima
facie case.
In the same case, the Court added that where there is a clash of views between a judge
who did not investigate and a fiscal who conducted a reinvestigation, those of the
prosecutor should normally prevail: 23
. . . . The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of
the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court
to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him
on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is
insufficient for conviction. Neither has the Court any power to order the
fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time,
 since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal
prosecutions. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for
insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the
same commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate a case and
subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show
either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be
established beyond reasonable doubt. In a clash of views between the
judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal
and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscal's should
normally prevail. . . . . .
Appeal as an Exercise of the Justice
Secretary's Power of Control Over Prosecutors
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice
who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify
their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the
Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief
Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of
supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of
the Code:
(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units; . . . . .
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of
Act 4007, which read:
Sec. 3. . . . .
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the
Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall . . . perform
such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice
in the interest of public service.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or
activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the
same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department
Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to
review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau,
office, division or service.
"Supervision" and "control" of a department head over his subordinates have been
defined in administrative law as follows: 24
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control,
on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and
prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which
holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an
administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher
administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative
remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.
Appeal to the Secretary of Justice Is Not
Foreclosed by the Ruling in Crespo
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, 25 the Court clarified that Crespo 26 did not foreclose the
power or authority of the secretary of justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in
criminal cases. The Court recognized in Crespo that the action of the investigating fiscal
or prosecutor in the preliminary investigation is subject to the approval of the provincial or
city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Thereafter, it may be appealed to the secretary of
justice.
The justice secretary's power of review may still be availed of despite the filing of an
information in court. In his discretion, the secretary may affirm, modify or reverse
resolutions of his subordinates pursuant to Republic Act No. 5180, as
amended, 27 specifically in Section 1 (d):
(d) . . . Provided, finally, That where the resolution of the Provincial or
City Fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor is, upon review, reversed by the
Secretary of Justice, the latter may, where he finds that noprima
facie case exists, authorize and direct the investigating fiscal concerned
or any other fiscal or state prosecutor to cause or move for the dismissal
of the case, or, where he finds a prima facie case, to cause the filing of
an information in court against the respondent, based on the same sworn
statements or evidence submitted without the necessity of conducting
another preliminary investigation.
Pursuant thereto, the Department of Justice promulgated Circular No. 7 dated January
25, 1990 governing appeals in preliminary investigation. Appeals under Section 2 are
limited to resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint. However, Section 4 provides an
exception: appeals from resolutions finding probable cause upon a showing of manifest
error or grave abuse of discretion are allowed, provided the accused has not been
arraigned. In the present case, petitioner's appeal to the secretary of justice was given
due course on August 26, 1992 pursuant to this Circular.
On June 30, 1993, Circular No. 7 was superseded by Department Order. No. 223;
however, the scope of appealable cases remained unchanged:
Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed. — Only resolutions of the Chief State
Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor
dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the
Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
Appeals from the resolutions of provincial/city prosecutors where the
penalty prescribed for the offense charged does not exceed prision
correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, shall be made to the
Regional State Prosecutors who shall resolve the appeals with finality,
pursuant to Department Order No. 318 dated August 28, 1991 as
amended by D.O. No. 34 dated February 4, 1992, D.O. No. 223 dated
August 11, 1992 and D.O. No. 45 dated February 2, 1993. Such appeals
shall also be governed by these rules.
Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken
from a resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State
Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable cause except
upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion.
Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had
already been arraigned. If the appellant (is) arraigned during the
pendency of the
appeal, . . . appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of
Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable
cause, however, shall not hold the filing of the information in court.
Apart from the foregoing statutory and administrative issuances, the power of review of
the secretary of justice is recognized also by Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Duty of investigating fiscal.— . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the
resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall
direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without
conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for
dismissal of the complaint or information.
This appeal rests upon the sound discretion of the secretary of justice arising from his
power of supervision and control over the prosecuting arm of the government, not on a
substantial right on the part of the accused as claimed by petitioner.
Appeal Did Not Divest the
Trial Court of Jurisdiction
Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only after an information
has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings
until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment or suspension, however, does not signify
that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of justice.
Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the
secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.
Judicial Review of the Resolution
of the Secretary of Justice
Judicial power is defined under the 1987 Constitution as the duty of courts to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
Such power includes the determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. 28 Under this definition, a court is without power to
directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of Congress or of the President. It may, however, look into the question
of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.
Judicial review of the acts of other departments is not an assertion of superiority over
them or a derogation of their functions. In the words of Justice Laurel in Angara
vs. Elertoral Commission: 29
. . . [W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument sources and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of the judicial review under the Constitution. . . . .
It is not the purpose of this Court to decrease or limit the discretion of the secretary of
justice to review the decisions of the government prosecutors under him. In Crespo, the
secretary was merely advised to restrict such review to exceptionally meritorious cases.
Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which recognizes such power, does not,
however, allow the trial court to automatically dismiss the case or grant the withdrawal of
the information upon the resolution of the secretary of justice. This is precisely the import
of Crespo, Marcelo, Martinez vs. Court of Appeals30 and the recent case
of Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, which all required the trial court to make its own
evaluation of the merits of the case, because granting the motion to dismiss or to
withdraw the information is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case itself.
The Marcelo and Martinez
Cases Are Consistent
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, 31 this Court ruled that, although it is more prudent to
wait for a final resolution of a motion for review or reinvestigation from the secretary of
justice before acting on a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw an information, a trial
court nonetheless should make its own study and evaluation of said motion and not rely
merely on the awaited action of the secretary. The trial court has the option to grant or
deny the motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal, whether before or after the
arraignment of the accused, and whether after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of
the secretary who reviewed the records of the investigation; provided that such grant or
denial is made from its own assessment and evaluation of the merits of the motion.
In Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 32 this Court overruled the grant of the motion to dismiss
filed by the prosecuting fiscal upon the recommendation of the secretary of justice
because, such grant was based upon considerations other than the judge's own
assessment of the matter. Relying solely on the conclusion of the prosecution to the
effect that there was no sufficient evidence against the accused to sustain the allegation
in the information, the trial judge did not perform his function of making an independent
evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case.
Despite the pronouncement in Marcelo that a final resolution of the appeal to the
Department of Justice is necessary, both decisions followed the rule in Crespo
vs. Mogul: Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case
such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Trial
judges are thus required to make their own assessment of whether the secretary of
justice committed grave abuse of discretion in granting or denying the appeal, separately
and independently of the prosecution's or the secretary's evaluation that such evidence
is insufficient or that no probable cause to hold the accused for trial exists. They should
embody such assessment in their written order disposing of the motion.
The above-mentioned cases depict two extreme cases in complying with this rule.
In Marcelo, the dismissal of the criminal action upon the favorable recommendation of
the Review Committee, Office of the City Prosecutor, was precipitate in view of the
pendency of private complainant's appeal to the secretary of justice. In effect, the
secretary's opinion was totally disregarded by the trial court. In contrast, in Martinez the
dismissal of the criminal action was an "erroneous exercise of judicial discretion" as the
trial court relied hook, line and sinker on the resolution of the secretary, without making
its own independent determination of the merits of the said resolution.
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of
the correctness of the justice secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in
petitioner's letter, the information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to
dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in the motion for reconsideration — all of
which were submitted to the court — the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied the motion to withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and
ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent with our repetitive
calls for an independent and competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the
motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary's
recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable
for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his
reasons for disregarding the secretary's recommendation.
Had he complied with his judicial obligation, he would have discovered that there was, in
fact, sufficient ground to grant the motion to withdraw the information. The documents
before the trial court judge clearly showed that there was no probable cause to warrant a
criminal prosecution for libel.
Under the "established scheme of things" in criminal prosecutions, this Court would
normally remand the case to the trial judge for his or her independent assessment of the
motion to withdraw the information. However, in order not to delay the disposition of this
case and to afford the parties complete relief, we have decided to make directly the
independent assessment the trial court should have done. The petitioner has attached as
annexes to the present petition for review the information, which contains a complete and
faithful reproduction of the subject letter, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the
prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the trial court's Order of February 22, 1993,
and even the private complainant's opposition to said motion. The records below have
been reproduced and submitted to this Court for its appreciation. Thus, a remand to the
trial court serves no purpose and will only clog the dockets.
We thus proceed to examine the substance of the resolution of the secretary of justice.
The secretary reversed the finding of probable cause on the grounds that (1) the subject
letter was privileged in nature and (2) the complaint was merely a countercharge.
In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur:
(a) it must be defamatory;
(b) it must be malicious;
(c) it must be given publicity; and
(d) the victim must be identifiable.
At the preliminary investigation stage, these requisites must show prima facie a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused
probably committed it. A cursory reading of the information immediately
demonstrates a failure on the part of the complainant to establish the foregoing
elements of libel.
Every defamatory imputation, even if true, is presumed malicious, if no good intention or
justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the author of the
imputation is prompted by personal ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but
merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed. 33 In this
case, however, petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance against
the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment
in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center. It is a qualified
privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
xxx xxx xxx
The rule on privileged communication is that a communication made in good faith on any
subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a
duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it
contains incriminatory matter which, without the privilege, would be libelous and
actionable. Petitioner's letter was a private communication made in the performance of a
moral duty on her part. Her intention was not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the private
complainant, but to present her grievance to her superior. The privileged nature of her
letter overcomes the presumption of malice. There is no malice when justifiable motive
exists; and in the absence of malice, there is no libel. We note that the information itself
failed to allege the existence of malice.
Thus, we agree with the ruling of the secretary of justice: 34
. . . (T)he subject letter was written to bring to the attention of the Director
of the Philippine Heart Center for Asia and other responsible authorities
the unjust and unfair treatment that Dr. Ledesma was getting from
government employees, and the subject letter is a complaint . . . on a
subject matter in which respondent has an interest and in reference to
which she has a duty to question the same is definitely privileged (US vs.
Bustos, 37 Phil. 131). Moreover, in Ang vs. Castro, 136 SCRA 455, the
Supreme Court, citing Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, ruled that "a
communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the
party making the communication has an interest or concerning which he
has a duty is privileged although it contains incriminatory or derogatory
matter which, without the privilege, would be libelous and actionable.
The follow-up letter sent by respondent to the director of the PHCA, is a
direct evidence of respondent's righteous disposition of following the rule
of law and is a clear indication that her purpose was to seek relief from
the proper higher authority . . . .
The same interpretation should be accorded the civil and administrative
complaints which respondent filed against complainants. They are mere
manifestations of her earnest desire to pursue proper relief for the alleged
injustice she got from complainants. If she was motivated by malice and
ill-will in sending the subject communication to the Director of the PHCA,
she would not have sent the second letter and filed the administrative and
civil cases against complainants.
In Alonzo, the settled rule is that, when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her
official duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who
have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such
communication does not amount to publication within the meaning of the law on
defamation. 35 Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been
written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. 36 The
reason for such rule is that "a communication of the defamatory matter to the person
defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A man's
reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others
hold him." 37 In this case, petitioner submitted the letter to the director of said hospital;
she did not disseminate the letter and its contents to third persons. Hence, there was no
"publicity" and the matter is clearly covered by paragraph 1 of Article 354 of the Penal
Code.
Further, we note that the information against petitioner was filed only on July 27, 1992 or
one year after June 27, 1991, the date the letter was sent. It is obviously nothing more
than a countercharge to give Complainant Torres a leverage against petitioner's
administrative action against him.
Ineluctably, Judge Asuncion's denial of the motion to withdraw the information and the
reconsideration thereof was not only precipitate but manifestly erroneous. This is further
compounded by the fact that he did not explain his grounds for his denial inasmuch as he 9 Annex "I," rollo, pp. 66.
did not make an independent assessment of the motion or the arguments in the
resolution of the secretary of justice. All in all, such rash action did not do justice to the 10 Annex "J," rollo, pp. 68-69.
sound ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul upon which, ironically, he supposedly rested his action,
or to the directive in Marcelo and Martinez where this Court required trial courts to make 11 Annex "K," rollo, p. 71.
an independent assessment of the merits of the motion.
12 Annex "L," rollo, p. 73.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Motion to Withdraw the Information dated February 17, 1993 filed before the trial court is
13 Annex "M," rollo, pp. 74-91.
GRANTED. No costs.
14 Annex "O," rollo, pp. 97.
SO ORDERED.
15 Annex "P," rollo, p. 98.
Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
16 Rollo, pp. 44-49.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part.
17 Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 6-8; rollo, pp. 182-184.
Footnotes
18 Cf. People vs. Magpale, 70 Phil. 176, 179-180 (1940).
1 Rollo, pp. 39-49.
19 Ibid.; Mayuga vs. Maravilla, 18 SCRA 1115, 1119, December 17,
2 The Special Eighth Division is composed of JJ. Corona Ibay-
1966, per Bengzon, J.
Somera, ponente, and Arturo B. Buena and Buenaventura J. Guerrero.
20 Ibid., pp. 344-345.
3 Presided by then Judge (now Justice of the Court of Appeal)
Maximiano C. Asuncion.
21 254 SCRA 307, 349-350, March 5, 1996.
4 Rollo, pp. 53-55.
22 151 SCRA 462, 467, June 30, 1987, per Gancayco, J.
5 Annex "D," rollo, p. 56.
23 Ibid., pp. 468-469.
6 Annex "E," rollo, p. 57.
24 Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 148 (1955).
7 Annex "F," rollo, p. 58.
25 235 SCRA 39, 48-49, August 4, 1994, per Davide, Jr., J.
8 Annex "G," rollo, pp. 59-62.
26 Supra, p. 469.
27 Otherwise known as "An Act Prescribing a Uniform System of
Preliminary Investigation by Provincial and City Fiscals and Their
Assistants, and by State Attorneys or Their Assistants."

28 Article VIII, Section 1, 2nd paragraph.

29 63 Phil. 134.

30 Infra; see note 32.

31 235 SCRA 39, August 4, 1994.

32 237 SCRA 575, October 13, 1994, per Narvasa, C.J.

33 Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 51, 59-60, February 1, 1995.

34 Rollo, pp. 68-69.

35 Ibid., p. 65, citing 53 C.J.S. § 81 (1948).

36 Id., p. 60.

37 Id., pp. 60-61.