University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro

Author(s): Richard R. Fagen
Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, Part 1 (Jun., 1965), pp. 275-284
Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association
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 CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY AND THE LEADERSHIP
OF FIDEL CASTRO
RICHARD R. FAGEN

Stanford University

N O PART of Max Weber's sociology has been as thoroughly overworked in

discourse about politics as has his concept of charisma. The appellation
"charismatic"has been applied to leaders as different as Stalin, Nkrumah,
Hitler, and Gandhi, and there has been a general tendency to equate the charismatic
in politics with the demagogic, the irrational, the emotional, and the "popular."
This luxuriance of meanings and attention is not, as one commentator has
already pointed out, simply a result of intellectual faddism.1 Rather, it represents
in part a very genuine groping about for a conceptual framework which might be
of service in the analysis of twentieth-century politics. However, if the concept of
charisma is to serve in scientific political inquiry, it cannot refer in blanket fashion
to leadership styles as disparate as those mentioned above. There is a need for ex-
plication and parsimony. This paper attempts to provide a first step toward that
explication and to indicate, by example, how the concept might be used in empirical
inquiry.
WEBER'S FORMULATION OF CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY
As conceptualized by Weber, charisma (the gift of grace) referredto "a certain
quality of an individual personalityby virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary
men and treated as endowed with supernatural,superhuman, or at least specifically
exceptional powers or qualities." 2 The concept was, of course, taken from the idiom
of early Christianity, and in Weber's sociology charismatic authority was one of the
three pure types of legitimate authority - the other two being rational-legal and
traditional.3
There are at least five elements of Weber'sformulation of charismaticauthority
which must be taken into account in any political research using the concept. These
elements, stated in propositionalform, follow:
1. The charismatic leader is always the creation of his followers. That is,
charismatic authority (in common with all other types of legitimate authority) is
rooted in the belief system of the followers rather than in some transcendental char-
acteristicsof the leader.4 When no one is disposed or able to believe in the omnipo-
'Carl J. Friedrich, "PoliticalLeadershipand the Problemof the CharismaticPower,"Journal
of Politics, 23 (1961), 3-24.
2
Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,trans. A. M. Henderson and
Talcott Parsons(Glencoe: Free Press, 1947), p. 358.
3Weber's
three-parttypology of legitimate authorityhas been discussedso frequentlythat there
seems to be no need to summarizeit here. For a particularlycompactand cogent explica-
tion of the typology see Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations,A
ComparativeApproach (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), pp. 30-36. The most recent
critique of Weber's typology is Peter M. Blau, "Critical Remarkson Weber's Theory of
Authority,"APSR, 57 (1963), 305-16. Blau's essay contains a useful listing of earlier
critical appraisalsof the typology.
4
"It is recognitionon the part of those subject to authoritywhich is decisive for the validity of
charisma." Weber, op. cit., p. 359; see also p. 382. This aspect of the charismaticrela-
275
276 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

tence, omniscience, and moral perfection of the leader, he cannot be said to exercise
charismaticauthority no matter how strong, wise, or moral he perceiveshimself to be.
2. An "individual personality" or leader capable of generating a charismatic
authority relationship in one context may fail completely to generate that relation-
ship in some other context. There are no universal charismatics. This is clearly a
corollary of the first proposition and suggests that the set of followers is always
bounded by at least two factors. There are some who are never reached (physically)
by the messages of the leader and thus remain at best what we shall call potential
followers. And there are others who, although reached, do not for a variety of rea-
sons respond in the prescribed manner. These individuals we shall call the non-
followers.
3. The leader does not regardhimself either as chosen by or as solely dependent
on his followers,but rather as "elected"from above to fulfill a mission.5 He perceives
his followers as having obligations and duties toward him and he perceives himself
as deriving his morality and legitimation from his special relationship with some
more abstract force such as God or history. Furthermore,those who resist or ignore
him - the non-followers - are regarded as "delinquent in duty." 6
4. The behavior of the charismatic leader in power is anti-bureaucratic-
7
"specificallyoutside the realm of everyday routine and the profane sphere." Daily
affairs,whether economic, political or administrative,are treated with disdain by the
leader. He surrounds himself with disciples chosen for their devotion rather than
a staff selected by more formal means.
5. Charismatic authority is unstable, tending to be transformed (routinized)
9
through time.8 This "natural entropy of the hero's charisma" occurs in part be-
cause his image of infallibility cannot be maintained in the face of inevitable failures,
and in part because the demands of ruling cannot be met through time without more
rationalized involvement in the mundane affairsof state.'0

tionship was stressedin an importantarticle by James C. Davies, "Charismain the 1952

Campaign,"APSR, 48 (1954), 1083-1102. Using data from the SurveyResearchCenter
of the University of Michigan, Davies identified and analyzed 32 respondents (out of
1,799), who perceived Eisenhoweras a charismaticleader. Davies' insights and approach
do not seem to have been followed up by scholarsinterestedin the rapidlychanging politi-
cal environmentswhere the concept would be of more researchvalue.
Weber, op. cit., pp. 359-61.
6Ibid., p. 360.
7Ibid., p. 361.
8 See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds. and trans.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
(New York: Galaxy, 1958), pp. 248-50.
9The
phrase is from Immanuel Wallerstein, "Evolving Patterns of African Society," in Im-
manuel Wallerstein et al., The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (Washington,
D.C.: George WashingtonU., 1959), p. 6.
10Notice that our five propositionssay nothing about the social and political conditions con-
ducive to the establishment of charismatic authority. This reflects a gap in Weber's
thought structure which has been succinctly pointed out by Blau: "In short, Weber's
theory encompassesonly the historicalprocessesthat lead from charismaticmovementsto
increasingrationalizationand does not include an analysisof the historicalconditionsand
social processesthat give rise to charismaticeruptions in the social structure. He has no
theory of revolution." Blau, op. cit., p. 309. Davies, op. cit., discussesthe genesis of the
"charismaticphenomenon,"but only in the context of politics in the large modern state.
 CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY 277

These five propositions serve to direct us toward a set of empirical questions

which should prove useful when confronted with a suspected instance of charismatic
authority in the real world. The first proposition focuses our attention on the atti-
tudes and perceptions of the followers as crucial determinants of the existence or
non-existence of the charismatic relationship. The second proposition suggests that
deeper understandingof the relationshipwill result if we can map these perceptions
and attitudes against the distribution of social and personality characteristicsin the
society. The third directs us to an examination of the leader'sperceived relationship
both to his mission and to his followers. The fourth and fifth propositionsare predic-
tive; the former states that the leader in power will behave in certain ways, and the
latter states that the charismatic relationship will inevitably be transformed.
This is clearly a mixed bag of propositions, and any thorough investigation of
one or more cases would of necessity have to concentrate on some elements to the
partial or complete exclusion of others.l1 Nevertheless in the following examination
of the Cuban case whatever data were at hand - no matter how unsatisfactory-
are presented in order to offer at least a brief exploration and discussion of each
proposition. This exploratory posture is assumed because it best serves the twin
purposes of suggesting investigatory strategies appropriate to the propositions and
of organizingwhat little we actually know about the leadership of Fidel Castro.

THE CUBAN CASE

1. The charismaticleader is the creation of his followers

There is no lack of reports which mention that in the early stages of the Cuban
Revolution Castro was regarded by large segments of the population as the heaven-
sent savior of the nation.'2 The religious overtones of this relationship have been
emphasized by many commentators, and one prominent Presbyterian minister in
"
Except for the first proposition which cannot be ignored because it is at the core of the defini-
tion under which we are operating.
Among the book-length studies in English which stress the charismatic elements of Castro's
12

relationship with his followers I would mention the following ten: Teresa Casuso, Cuba
and Castro (New York: Random House, 1961) ; Jules Dubois, Fidel Castro (Indianapo-
lis: Bobbs Merrill, 1959); Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, Cuba, Anatomy of a
Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960) ; Herbert L. Matthews, The Cuban
Story (New York: Brasiller, 1961); Warren Miller, 90 Miles from Home (New York:
Crest, 1961); C. Wright Mills, Listen Yankee (New York: Ballentine, 1960); R. Hart
Phillips, Cuba, Island of Paradox (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959); Nicolas
Rivero, Castro's Cuba, An American Dilemma (Washington, D.C.: Luce, 1962); Jean-
Paul Sartre, Sartre on Cuba (New York: Ballentine, 1961) ; William Appleman Williams,
The United States, Cuba, and Castro (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962). These
books, which otherwise represent a wide range of interpretations of the Revolution, are
in consensus on the charismatic basis of the leader-follower relationship - at least in the
first year or two of Castro's rule. For two brief scholarly analyses which make the same
point see Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "The Revolution Next Door: Cuba," Annals, 334 (1961),
113-22, and George I. Blanksten, "Fidel Castro and Latin America," in Morton A. Kap-
lan (ed.), The Revolution in World Politics (New York: Wiley, 1962). The two most
scholarly sources on the Revolution and its antecedents are Wyatt MacGaffey and Clifford
R. Barnett, Cuba, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1962),
and Dudley Seers (ed.), Cuba, The Economic and Social Revolution (Chapel Hill: U.
of N. Carolina Press, 1964). A critical and well-documented treatment of many aspects
of the Revolution can be found in International Commission of Jurists, Cuba and the Rule
of Law (Geneva: The Commission, 1962).
278 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Cuba published an article in which he wrote: "It is my conviction which I state now
with full responsibilityfor what I am saying, that Fidel Castro is an instrumentin the
hands of God for the establishmentof His reign among men." 13
Only one study, however, is actually based on the type of systematicdata needed
for a more thorough analysis of the charismatic elements in the relationship of
Cubans to Castro during the first few years of the Revolution. This is a sample
survey conducted by Lloyd Free in Cuba in April and May of 1960.14 Under the
direction of Free, a Cuban research organization interviewed a cross section of 500
residents of Havana and another cross section of 500 residents of other urban and
semi-urban centers. The 40 per cent of the Cuban population living in rural areas
was not representedin Free'ssurvey.
Free classified86 per cent of his respondents as supportersof the regime. Of all
supporters,one-half (or 43 per cent of all respondents) were sub-classifiedas fervent
supporters. In "more-or-lesstypical quotations from the interviews" Free suggests
the articulated content of fervent support: " 'Fidel has the same ideas as Jesus Christ,
our protector and guide.' 'I would kiss the beard of Fidel Castro.' '[My greatest fear
is:] That some mean person might kill Fidel. If this happens, I think I would die.' 15
Now these are clearly responseswith charismaticovertones. But it would be an
unwarranted inference simply to assume that all of the fervent supporters are also
charismatic followers. Rather, in the absence of an analysis specifically designed
to identify the sub-set of charismaticswe can only speculate on how closely it might
coincide with the set of all fervent supporters. In any event, two points stand out:
First, in the early stages of the revolution Castro was perceived as a charismatic
leader by some "sizable" fraction of the Cuban population. Second, in the absence
of survey research designed especially for the purpose, it is impossible to determine
with exactitude just how sizable this fraction was, or how it might have changed in
size and composition through time.16
2. The distribution of charismatic followers illuminates important characteristics
of the relationship
One striking aspect of the Cuban Revolution is the thoroughness and frequency
with which the voice and visage of Fidel Castro have blanketed the island. Through

"Rafael Cepeda, "Fidel Castro y el Reino de Dios," Bohemia (July 17, 1960), p. 110 (my
translation). An American observer noted: "In many Cuban homes a picture of Fidel
has an honored place; in some of them it is a photograph of a bearded youth who seems
to be wearing a kind of halo; the resemblance to portraits of Christ is notable." Irving
P. Pflaum, "By Voice and Violence," Part I, American Universities Field Staff Reports,
Series V, No. 3 (August 1960), p. 16. See also MacGaffey and Barnett, op. cit., pp.
284-85.
14
Lloyd A. Free, Attitudes of the Cuban People Toward the Castro Regime (Princeton: Insti-
tute for International Social Research, 1960).
15
Ibid., p. 6. Free makes the point that such expressions of devotion were not dictated by the
political exigencies of the open-ended interview situation. If a respondent simply wanted
to give a "safe" answer, it would have been quite sufficient simply to express admiration
for Castro and the regime.
16Of course the
problems of conducting survey research in areas undergoing rapid political and
social change are immense. Free mentions that the Cuban organization which originally
promised to undertake the field work backed out at the last moment when informed by a
government leader that it would be "suicidal." The organization which finally undertook
the research did so only because it felt its days in Cuba were already numbered. Ibid.,
p.i.
 CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY 279

the extensive television systemand the mass rallies - which have on occasion drawn
as many as one million of Cuba's seven million inhabitants into the plaza of Havana
- the messages of the maximum leader have been brought to almost 100 per cent
of the population.17 In our terminologythis suggeststhat there is only an insignificant
number of potential followers (persons not reached by the leader's messages) in
Cuba. We can therefore direct our entire attention to the non-followers, those who
have been reached but do not respondin a charismaticmanner.
Once again we must return to Free's data as the best available for an analysis
of the distribution of charismatic followers in Cuba. As before, we cannot identify
the sub-set of charismaticsfrom the set of all fervent supporters,but the patterning
of fervent support by education, social class, and place of residence is revealing. The
tendency for fervent support to be associated with low education, low social class,
and semi-urban residence is clear."' If rural respondents had been included in the
sample, we would expect the associations to emerge even more strongly. Finally,
Free found that the distribution of fervent supporters was sharply skewed toward
the lower end of the age continuum - 43 per cent of all fervent supporters were
between 20 and 29 years of age.19

TABLE 1
SUPPORT FOR CASTRO IN 1959 BY EDUCATION, SOCIAL CLASS, AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE*
(in percentages)

Moderate Supporters
Fervent Supporters and Non-supporters
(N= 1,000) (43 per cent) (57 per cent)

Education:
Elementary or no schooling ........................ 49 51
Secondary schooling .................................... 35 65
University training .............................. 29 71
Social class:
Lowest socioeconomic class ...................... 48 52
Lower-middle class ....................................... 39 61
Upper-middle and upper class ...................... 34 66
Place of Residence:
Outside of Havana ...................................... 49 51
In Havana ......-....... ............................ ..... 34 66

* Adapted from Lloyd A.

Free, Attitudes of the Cuban People Toward the Castro Regime
(Princeton: Institute for International Social Research, 1960), p. 7.

17I have developed and documented this theme of the modernity and pervasiveness of the
Cuban communication system in two other papers. See Richard R. Fagen, "Calculation
and Emotion in Foreign Policy: The Cuban Case," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6
(1962), 214-21, and "Television and the Cuban Revolution" (Stanford: Dept. of Politi-
cal Science, 1960), mimeo. For a useful evaluation of Castro's television talents see Tad
Szulc, "Cuban Television's One-Man Show," in CBS (ed.), The Eighth Art (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 197-206.
S Our inability to isolate the charismatics from the fervent
supporters is not too crucial here
for it seems safe to assume that, if anything, the charismatics would exhibit these tend-
encies to a greater degree than the fervent supporters do.
19
Free, op. cit., p. 8.
280 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Confirmation of this pattern of support for Castro also emerges from data on
a systematicsample of Cuban refugees in Miami - a group which is presentlyunani-
mous in its expressed hatred of Fidel.20 When asked how they originally had felt
about Castro when he came to power in 1959, 42 out of 191 refugees replied that
they thought "he was the savior of Cuba." Since the refugee community repre-
sents a highly skewed sample of Cubans, a sample comprised substantiallyof mem-
bers of the middle and upper classes,Table 2 is of special interest. Thus, even in this
refugee sample the association of strong support with lower education, semi-urban
and rural residence, and lower age is found.

TABLE 2
REFUGEE SUPPORT FOR CASTRO IN 1959 BY EDUCATION, PLACE OF RESIDENCE, AND AGE*
(in percentages)

"Castro was Savior All other responses

(N= 191) of Cuba" (N-=42) (N=1 49)

Education:
High school or less .............................. ....... 25 75
At least some college .................... ............. 12 88
Place of Residence:
Outside of Havana ................-...................... 27 73
Havana ............................................ ........ 19 81
Age:
40 or younger .. .......................................... 26 74
41 or older ......1..... .... ........................ 18 82

* All
respondents currently in exile in Miami.

But should we expect these particular socio-demographic patterns of fervent

support (and the less frequentlyencountered - though similar- patterns of charis-
matic support) to be found in all cases of charismatic leadership? That is, when-
ever a charismatic political relationship is identified will the followers tend to come
from among the rural, the younger, the less educated, and the lower classes? There
is no simple answer to this question, but at least three points should be noted:
First, as emphasizedpreviously,the communication system of Cuba has brought
all members of the society into contact with Fidel, giving them at least the oppor-
tunity to become charismatic followers. In less developed and less homogeneous
societies, it would be precisely the lower classes, the rural, and the poorly educated
who would tend to be cut off from the national channels and therefore from the
messages through which the leader might establish his claim to legitimacy. Second,
both the ideological focus and the actual accomplishmentsof the Cuban Revolution
20This derives from an unpublished study by the author and Professor Richard
Brody of Stan-
ford University. As part of the study, a self-administered questionnaire was given to a
pre-selected sample of male Cuban heads of household living in Miami (in March 1963).
The data in Table 2 are taken from the completed questionnaires. Complete demographic
data on the refugees are reported in Richard R. Fagen and Richard C. Brody, "Cubans
in Exile: A Demographic Analysis," Social Problems, 11 (1964), 389-401.
 CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY 281

have come to center on the rural and less privileged sectors of the society.21 It is
natural to assume that those who perceive themselves as the prime beneficiaries of
Castro'sleadership should also tend to relate most frequently to him in a charismatic
manner. However, just as all nations do not have Cuba's well-developed communi-
cation system, so all charismatic political movements do not necessarily benefit the
rural, the poorly educated, and the lower classes. Finally, the social groupingsmost
likely to relate charismaticly to Castro may well contain a disproportionatenum-
ber of persons who as individuals are predisposed to make a charismatic response.
Davies, for instance, hypothesizes four characteristicsof the "charismaticaspect of
personality structure,"22 and Doob has suggested that the less educated and less
westernizedmembersof a society perceive and behave toward authority figuresquite
differently than do their more educated and westernizedcountrymen.23It is perhaps
at this level of "personalityin social structure"that the Cuban experience will prove
to be most similarto other instancesof political charisma.
3. The leader regards himself as elected from above to fulfill a mission
Only a close analysis of Castro's published and unpublished thought could
supply the richnessof detail which a full investigationof his self-imagewould require.
In the absence of such an analysis,we can only note a few recurringand interrelated
themes.
First, Castro perceives the Revolution as part of a greater historical movement
against tyranny and oppression. Castro developed this theme long before he became
a professed Marxist-Leninist. More recently, of course, capitalism and imperialism
have replaced (domestic) tyranny and oppression as the prime obstacles to a revo-
lutionary cleansing of the world's political landscape. Second, the Cuban leadership
and Castro in particular are seen as blessed and protected by the larger historical
movement of which the Revolution is a part. Castro'sfamous speech ending, "con-
demn me, it doesn't matter. History will absolve me," is a classic, early articulation
of this idea.24 Finally, because the leader is seen as acting in concert with larger
historical forces not always visible to more ordinary men, he alone retains the right
to determine "correct"behavior in the serviceof the Revolution.

1 By actual accomplishments of the Cuban Revolution we refer to such social gains as the edu-
cational, health and welfare, and housing facilities which have been built since 1959. For
examples of the manner in which the Revolutionary Government uses the themes of
egalitarianism and social welfare, see Richard R. Fagen, Cuba: The Political Content of
Adult Education (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1964).
2Davies, op. cit.
"2Leonard W. Doob, Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological Exploration (New Haven:
Yale U. Press, 1960).
24This
speech was delivered by Castro at his trial for leading an attack on the Moncada Army
Barracks in 1953. It is available in English under the title, History Will Absolve Me
(New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961). The attack and the trial are well treated in Dubois,
op. cit. The theme of historical blessedness and protection received popular reinforce-
ment from the circumstances surrounding Castro's return to Cuba from Mexico in 1956
with 82 men and the avowed purpose of overthrowing Batista. Only Castro and 11 others
escaped to the Sierra Maestra where they launched the guerrilla action which culminated
in the downfall of Batista two years later. All the elements of high drama and miraculous
escape were attached to the story of the guerrilla band during these two years. At one
time, Castro was reported dead, and subsequently a price of $100,000 was set on his head.
282 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

It is important to realize that these overtones of intellectual Marxism and

political authoritarianism preceded by many months the introduction of Marxist
economic determinism and Soviet bloc alliances into the vocabulary and practice
of Cuban politics. Castro'sgrowing impatience during 1959 with his political opposi-
tion was only one early manifestation of this particular self-perception. More re-
cently, as is suggested by his attack on Anibal Escalante and the "old-line" Havana
Communists,he has exhibited much the same determinationto maintain his position
as chief interpreterof the correct meaning and interrelatednessof events.25However,
now it is (some) Communists in addition to (all) anti-Communistswho are being
rudely schooled in what it means to be a follower in Castro'sCuba.26
4. The behavior of the leader in power is anti-bureaucratic
Once again we find striking agreement among the various interpretersof the
Revolution that Castro is (or at least was) highly disdainful of and uninterested in
the routine processes of public administration. Friends and foes of the Revolution
differ on whether this disinterestis "good" or "bad," "creative"or "uncreative,"but
few deny its existence.
This characteristic of Castro is thrown into ironic relief by the immensity and
pervasivenessof the bureaucratic structureswhich have been created to direct the
reorganization of Cuban society. For instance, the National Institute of Agrarian
Reform (INRA), once headed by Castro and often called the heart of the Revolu-
tion, directly or indirectly controls 80 per cent of the farm land on the island.27 But
Castro's behavior, both while chairman of INRA and after, hardly fits Weber's
model of rational-legal leadership. On the contrary, his leadership was highly per-
sonalized and un-hierarchical, and his choice of second-level administrators was
based primarilyon ascription (is he a trusted follower from the Sierra?) rather than
achievement criteria.
Nowhere is the personalized and un-hierarchical nature of Castro's leadership
better drawn than in an episode reported by Jean-Paul Sartre. In a chapter called
"A Day in the Country with Fidel," Sartre tells how on a stopover at a rural tourist
center Castro became upset because his soft drink was warm.28 According to Sartre,
Castro's ire was not aroused by his personal inconvenience but rather by his gen-
eralized irritation with a bureaucratic structure which was created to serve "the
people" but which frequentlysucceeded only in frustratingthem. After "rummaging
passionately around in a refrigeratorthat was out of order.. ." and being unable to
fix it himself, "He closed with this growled sentence: 'Tell your people in charge that

2The crucial document here is Castro's television speech of March 26, 1962. This is available
in English under the title Fidel Castro Denounces Bureaucracy and Sectarianism (New:
York: Pioneer, 1962). See also the discussion in Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution
(New York: Praeger, 1962), Appendix Three.
2I am simplifying a very complex and poorly understood relationship (between Castro and the
old-line Communists) for purposes of emphasis. However, I think that the essential point
remains valid; i.e., Castro has fought very hard to maintain his position as the prime
interpreter of the larger historical importance and meaning of events in Cuba, and thus
he sees himself as a leader who is not obligated to accept the interpretations of others with
regard to what his or their political roles should be.
27 International Commission of
Jurists, op. cit., p. 61.
2"Sartre, op. cit., see pp. 122-3.
 CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY 283

if they don't take care of their problems, they will have problems with me.'" And
this, Sartre maintains, was typical of the manner in which the "maximum leader"
invested his energiesin the administrationof Cuba.
5. Charismaticauthority is unstable, tending to be routinized through time
Now we come to a set of questions which we have in part glossed over by pre-
tending that the legitimacy of Castro's rule has been relatively stable since 1959.
This is not the case, for there have been changes along at least two dimensions. First,
there has been some shrinkageof the set of followers, both the charismatic and the
non-charismatic. Most simply, Castro's rule is not now as legitimate for as many
Cubans as it once was. However, we lack the data needed to document and quantify
the extent and distributionof this partial disintegrationof legitimacy.
Second - and this bears most directly on Weber's concerns- there has been
at least a partial shift as predicted from authority relationshipsbased on charisma to
relationshipsbased on rules, law, and a nascent "revolutionarytradition." This shift
cannot be adequately describedin brief compass,but central to the partial routiniza-
tion of charisma in Cuba has been a movement away from Castroas the prime popu-
lar symbolof the Revolution and a concomitant movement toward a heterogeneityof
symbols which includes other leaders, a whole spectrum of martyrs, revolutionary
organizations,and achievements. This movement away from Castro as the organiz-
ing symbol of the Revolution incarnate is illustrated in Table 3, which compares the
frequency with which Castro'spicture appeared in two successivesets of INRA, the

TABLE 3
PICTURESOF CASTROIN 22 AVAILABLE
ISSUES OFINRA

First 11 Issues No. of Pictures Second 11 Issues No. of Pictures

Vol. I (1960) Vol. II (1961)

# 1 .........-................-.. 11 # 2 ............5........... . 5
2 ........................... 6 3 ... ... ..1........... .
3 .............. ......... ... 4 ... ........................ 2
5 ..... ..........................8 5 .............................. 4
6 ......... ...................... 5 6 ...................... ... 8
7 .................... 6 7 .............................. 1
8 .............................. 7 8 ............ .................. 5

10 ------------ - 9 10 .............................. 0
11 - .......................... 6 11 .............................. 1
Vol. II (1961) 12 ..... 0
# 1 .............................. 12

Total -92 Total = 3 1

Mean*= 8.36 Mean* =2.82

*
For differencebetween the means, t= 3.85, d.f. 20, p =.001.
284 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

official monthly magazine of the National Institute of AgrarianReform.29 Although

these data do not constitute a test of Weber's hypothesis, they do suggest that his
statement that "in its pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist only in
the processof originating. It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized
or rationalized, or a combination of both" 30 may be susceptible to more rigorous
investigation than it has hitherto received.
Certainly our understanding of politics and political change in the emerging
nations of the world would be much enhanced by systematic research designed to
explore the validity of this and other segments of Weber's model of charismatic
authority. This paper has attempted to explicate that model in a way which might
prove useful for research. A brief look at the leadership of Fidel Castro leads to
cautious optimism regarding the usefulness of Weber's ideas for the investigation of
charismatic politics. But much work is still needed before we can claim with any
confidence to understand the processesby which politicians like Castro bind to them-
selves and their causes the men and women who as charismatic followers constitute
the primaryresourceof such regimes.

29 INRA is a large-format popular magazine of 108 pages. It contains both pictures and text
much in the manner of LIFE. Although INRA concentrates rather heavily in the areas
of current events and recent history, it does publish essays, reviews, fiction, and poetry.
The original intent was to compare Volume I (1960) with Volume II (1961), but two
issues of Volume I could not be located so the 22 remaining issues were split into two
equal sets of 11 each.
30
Weber, op. cit., p. 364.