BUYCO V BARAQUIA

Petioner: PURISIMO BUYCO

Respondent: NELSON BARAQUIA
Cittion: G.R. No. 177486
Date of Promulgation: December 21, 2009
Ponente: Carpio Morales, J

FACTS:
 Baraquia filed a complaint before the RTC of Iloilo against the Buycos for the establishment of a
permanent right of way, injunction and damages with preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, to enjoin the Buycos from closing off a private road within their property which
was used by him to access his poultry farm from the public highway.
 The petitioner, Buyco, substituted The Buycos during the pendency of the case (the original
petitioners died).
 On February 14, 2007, RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to establish the requisites for right
of way under Art. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, thus, the preliminary injunction as lifted.
 A notice of appeal was filed by Baraquia, while Buyco filed a notice of partial appeal on the non-
award of the prayer for damages.
 Baraquia filed a motion to cite Buyco and his brother in contempt for closing the road which
violated the writ of preliminary injunction.
 On March 13, 2007, RTC resolved the issue by saying that the writ of preliminary injunction
remained to be valid, efficacious and obligatory, when Buyco closed the road on March 1, which
is an indirect contempt of court.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration contending that a preliminary injunction, once quashed,
ceases to exist, and that they cannot be held guilty of indirect contempt by a mere motion.
 April 18, 2008: The trial court set aside the March 13 Resolution and granted the petitioners
motion for reconsideration stating that there must be a verified petition for them to be held in
contempt.
o RE: lifetime of the preliminary injunction – the matter of whether a writ of preliminary
injunction remains valid until the decision annulling the same attains finality is not firmly
entrenched in jurisprudence.
 Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lifting of a writ of preliminary injunction due to the dismissal of the complaint
is immediately executor, even if the dismissal of the complaint is pending appeal. (YES)

HELD:
A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior
to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular
act or acts. It is merely a provisional remedy , adjunct to the main case subject to the latters outcome. It
is not a cause of action in itself. Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency
of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests
therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case.
The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the
action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main
action.

It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard . It is usually granted when it is made to
appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act
or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status
quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case .
Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the lower court upon
respondents showing that he and his poultry business would be injured by the closure of the subject road.
After trial, however, the lower court found that respondent was not entitled to the easement of right of
way prayed for, having failed to prove the essential requisites for such entitlement, hence, the writ was
lifted.

The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of
preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the
appeal therefrom notwithstanding. There being no indication that the appellate court issued an injunction
in respondents favor, the writ of preliminary injunction issued on December 1, 1999 by the trial court was
automatically dissolved upon the dismissal of Civil Case No. 26015.

WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The Resolution dated April 18, 2007 of the trial court is REVERSED
. The writ of preliminary injunction which Branch 39 of the Iloilo Regional Trial Court issued on December
1, 1999 was automatically dissolved upon its dismissal by Decision of February 14, 2007 of Civil Case No.
26015 .

PNB v RITRATTO
Petioner: Philippine Nationa BAnk
Respondent: RITRATTO GROUP INC., RIATTO INTERNATIONAL, INC., and DADASAN GENERAL
MERCHANDISE
Cittion: G.R. No. 142616
Date of Promulgation: July 31, 2001
Ponente: Kapunan, J

FACTS:
 Petitioner PNB is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the Philippine law.
Respondents Ritratto Group, Inc., Riatto International, Inc. and Dadasan General Merchandise are
domestic corporations organized and existing under Philippine law.
 On May 29, 1996, PNB International Finance Ltd. (PNB-IFL), a subsidiary company of PNB,
organized and doing business in Hongkong, extended a letter of credit in favor of the respondents
in the amount of US$300,000 secured by real estate mortgages constituted over four parcels of
land in Makati City.
o This credit facility was later increased successively to US$1,290,000 in November 1996;
to US$1,425,000 in February 1997; and decreased to US$1,421,316.18 in April 1998.
Respondents made repayments of the loan incurred by remitting those amounts to their
 loan account with PNB-IFL in Hongkong. As of April 30,1998, their outstanding obligations
stood at US$1,497,274.70.
 PNB-IFL, through its attorney-in-fact PNB, notified the respondents of the foreclosure of all the
real estate mortgages and that the properties subject thereof were to be sold at a public auction.
 Respondents filed a complaint for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or TRO before the RTC of Makati.
 Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action and the
absence of any privity between the petitioner and respondents.
 TC issued an order for the issuance of writ of prelim injunction. Motion to Dismiss denied.
 CA dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not preliminary injunction must be lifter (YESS
RULING:
Anent the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the same must be lifted as it is a mere provisional
remedy but adjunct to the main suit. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive remedy
that may only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action. The dismissal of the principal action thus results in
the denial of the prayer for the issuance of the writ. Further, there is no showing that respondents are
entitled to the issuance of the writ. Section 3, Rule 58, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.—A preliminary injunction may be granted when
it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the acts or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring
or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.21 Respondents do not deny
their indebtedness. Their properties are by their own choice encumbered by real estate mortgages. Upon
the non-payment of the loans, which were secured by the mortgages sought to be foreclosed, the
mortgaged properties are properly subject to a foreclosure sale. Moreover, respondents questioned the
alleged void stipulations in the contract only when petitioner initiated the foreclosure proceedings.
Clearly, respondents have failed to prove that they have a right protected and that the acts against which
the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.22 The Court is not unmindful of the findings of both
the trial court and the appellate court that there may be serious grounds to nullify the provisions of the
loan agreement. However, as earlier discussed, respondents committed the mistake of filing the case
against the wrong party, thus, they must suffer the consequences of their error.

All told, respondents do not have a cause of action against the petitioner as the latter is not privy to the
contract the provisions of which respondents seek to declare void. Accordingly, the case before the
Regional Trial Court must be dismissed and the preliminary injunction issued in connection therewith,
must be lifted.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED. The Orders dated June 30, 1999 and October 4, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 147 in Civil Case No. 99-1037 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the
complaint in said case DISMISSED.

BEOCKA v ENRILE
Petioner: Lino Brocka et al
Respondent: Juan Enrile e al
Cittion: G.R. No. 69863-65
Date of Promulgation: December 1990
Ponente: Kapunan, J

 Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) demonstration
held in sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed a petitioners arrested by Northern
Police District Officers
 Petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par.3 in 3 crim cases filed before RTC QC
 All petitioners released on bail – P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben Cervantes, Cosme
Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et al.), who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal
Assembly for whom no bail was recommended
 Urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC a daily hearings held between Feb.1-7 1985 .
 On Feb. 7 or 9 ’85, RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered Brocka, et al’s provisional
release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each. Brocka, et al filed respective bail bonds.
 Despite service of release order, Brocka, et al remained in detention a respondents-police officers
invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 1985
o Neither original nor certified true copy of this PDA was shown to Brocka, et al.
 On Feb 11 1985, Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 crim cases; hasty and spurious
filing of this second offense as follows:
o 10:30 AM counsel informed by phone that Brocka, et al will be brought before the QC
Fiscal at 2:30PM for undisclosed reasons a another phone call subsequently received
informing counsel that appearance of Brocka, etal was to be at 2:00PM
o 2:00PM Brocka, et al arrived at office of Asst. City Fiscal a complainants’ affidavits had not
yet been received
o 3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged statements of complainants
against Brocka, et al for alleged inciting to sedition
o 3:15PM counsel inquired from Records Custodian when the charges against Brocka, et al
had been officially received a informed that said charges were never coursed through the
Records Office
o \\ALSO, utterances allegedly constituting Inciting to Sedition under RPC142 are, almost
verbatim, the same utterances which are the subject of the crim cases for Illegal Assembly
for which Brocka, et al are entitled to be released on bail as a matter of Constitutional
right a appears that respondents have conspired to deprive Brocka, etal of the right to
bail
o AND, panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver of their rights
under RPC125 as a condition for the grant of the counsel’s request that they be given 7
 days within which counsel may confer with their clients a no such requirement required
under the rules
 Brocka, et al was released provisionally on Feb.14 1985 on orders of then Pres. Marcos a release
narrated in Court’s resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed by Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of
Brocka, et al:
o In Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had already been
released a four on Feb15’85 and one on Feb.8 , 1985
o Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become moot and academic
because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of
inciting to sedition.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined (YES)

RULING:
The general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,
preliminary or final. There are however exceptions, among which are:

"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano,
et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);

"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs.
Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);

"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);

"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);

"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33
Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);

"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);

"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October
29,1966,18 SCRA 616);

"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760,
March 25, 1960);

"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs.
Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8,1962; Cf.
Guingona, et al.

"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
"7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953)." (cited in Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188,1988 Ed.)

In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the criminal
proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by state officials in bad faith.

Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s release from detention
(before their release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This PDA was, however, issued on January 28,
1985, but was invoked only on February 9, 1985 (upon receipt of the trial court's order of release).
Under the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours
(outside Metro Manila). (Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 28, 1985, 139 SCRA 349).
Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its production, the prosecution
merely presented a purported xerox copy of the invoked PDA (par. 4, CounterRejoinder, p. 367, Rollo).

The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor General's office. In fact they found
petitioner's plight "deplorable" (par. 51, Manifestation, p. 396, Rollo).

The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and inoperational PDA, certainly
betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al.

We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that "individuals against whom PDAs have been issued
should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by
the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension" (supra, p. 369).

We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public official's prosecution of criminal
offenders. We, however, believe that this should not be a license to run roughshod over a citizen's
basic constitutional rights, such as due process, or manipulate the law to suit dictatorial tendencies.

We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness against the awesome powers of a dictatorship.
Thus, while We agree with the Solicitor Greneral's observation and/or manifestation that Brocka, et
al. should have filed a motion to quash the information, We, however, believe that such a course of
action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing. Thus, the
tenacious invocation of a spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty preliminary
investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al. in detention until
the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing
a warrant of arrest anew. As a matter of fact the corresponding informations for this second offense
were hastily filed on February 11, 1985, or two days after Brocka, et al.'s release from detention was
ordered by the trial judge on February 9, 1985.

Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this gesture is the true sign of democracy. These
may not be set aside to satisfy perceived illusory visions of national grandeur.

In the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Paño, We point out:

"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is
respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from
unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. x x x." (G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438-
at p. 448)

We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal
charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional release until
such time that charges were filed, and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted,
charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No costs.