ASSIGNMENT ON BUSINESS LAW

MBA(2017-2019)

Submitted By: Guided By:

Nasar Masood Miss Khusbu Prasad
A35101917028
 The Case
Shreya Singhal Vs. Union of India is a judgement
delivered on 24 March, 2015 by a two-judge bench of
J. Chelameswar, Rohinton Fali Nariman of the Supreme
Court of India in 2015, on the issue of online speech
and intermediary liability in India. The Supreme Court
struck down Section 66A of the Information
Technology Act, 2000, relating to restrictions on online
speech, unconstitutional on grounds of violating the
freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution of India. The Court further held that
the Section was not saved by virtue of being
'reasonable restrictions' on the freedom of speech
under Article 19(2).This assignment discusses the
various aspects related to the case as follows:
 Name Of The Parties
 Facts
 Issues Related To Case
 Argument
 Judgement
 NAME OF THE PARTIES
SHREYA SINGHAL
(Petitioner)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA
(Respondent)

FACTS
The apex court judgment came on a batch of petitions filed under Article
32 of the Constitution of India challenging the constitutional validity of
Section 66A of the IT Act on the grounds of its vague and ambiguous and
was being misused by the law enforcing authorities. The section gave
police the powers to arrest anyone for sending offensive messages from
mobiles and computers with up to 3 years in jail. The Petitioners have
raised a large number of points as to the constitutionality of Section 66A.
According to them, first and foremost Section 66A infringes the
fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed
by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of Indi and is not saved by any of
the eight subjects covered in Article 19(2). The first PIL on the issue was
filed in 2012 by a law student Shreya Singhal, who sought amendment in
Section 66A of the Act. This was filed after two girls - Shaheen Dhada and
Rinu Srinivasan - were arrested in Palghar in Thane district as one of them
posted a comment against the shutdown in Mumbai following Shiv Sena
leader Bal Thackeray's death and the other 'liked' it.
There have been several cases wherein Section 66A of the Act were
misused and appeals seeking an amendment have been demanded.
 Jadavpur University professor Ambikesh Mahapatra was arrested
for forwarding caricatures on Trinamool Congress chief Mamata
Banerjee on Facebook in 2012.
 Activist Aseem Trivedi was also arrested in 2012 for drawing
cartoons of Parliament and the Constitution to depict their
ineffectiveness. He was arrested on charges of sedition leading to
huge protests.
 In another instance in 2012, Air India employee Mayank Sharma and
KV Rao from Mumbai were arrested for allegedly posting offensive
comments against politicians on their Facebook group.
 Businessman Ravi Srinivasan was also charged in 2012 by
Puducherry Police for allegedly tweeting against Karti Chidambaram,
son of then union minister P Chidambaram. he had allegedly called
Karti 'corrupt' in his tweet.
 In 2012, three youngsters from Kishtwar district - Kishori Sharma,
Bansi Lal and Moti Lal Sharma - were arrested and sent to jail for 40
days after they were tagged in an allegedly blasphemous video
posted on Facebook. One of them had commented on the post.
They were charged with desecrating religious symbols and inciting
communal hatred by using information technology.
 A tourism officer in Varanasi was arrested for uploading
"objectionable" pictures of Samajwadi Party chief Mulayam Singh
Yadav, Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav and senior SP
leader Azam Khan on Facebook.

These are only few cases to show the misuse of the section 66A.
 ISSUES RELATED TO CASE
Section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000 was not in the Act
as originally enacted, but came into force by virtue of an Amendment
Act of 2009 with effect from 27.10.2009.The section states punishment
for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc. any
person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication
device:
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or

(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of
causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury,
criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use
of such computer resource or a communication device; or

(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of
causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the
addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years and with fine.

The Constitution of India under Article 19(1)(a) provides protection of

citizens rights to freedom of speech and expression. Also, the Preamble
of the Constitution of India inter alia speaks of liberty of thought,
expression, belief, faith and worship. It also says that India is a sovereign
democratic republic. It cannot be over emphasized that when it comes to
democracy, liberty of thought and expression is a cardinal value that is of
paramount significance under our constitutional scheme.

At the same time Article 19(2) states protection of certain rights

regarding freedom of speech, etc. shall affect the operation of any
existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such
law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred
by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of
India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States,
public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court,
defamation or incitement to an offence.

Hence, main issue concerned with the case can be confined to the
following points:

 Whether section 66A of IT Act 2000 is curtailing the Right to speech

and expression ?
 Whether section 66A of IT Act 2000 is saved under Article 19(2)?

ARGUMENT
The following arguments have been put by both the parties in the case:

 The petitioners' various counsel raised a large number of points as

to the constitutionality of Section 66A. According to them, first and
foremost Section 66A infringes the fundamental right to free speech
and expression and is not saved by any of the eight subjects covered
in Article 19(2). According to them, the causing of annoyance,
inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal
intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill- will are all outside the purview
of Article 19(2). Further, in creating an offence, Section 66A suffers
from the vice of vagueness because unlike the offence created
by Section 66 of the same Act, none of the aforesaid terms are even
attempted to be defined and cannot be defined, the result being
that innocent persons are roped in as well as those who are not.
Such persons are not told clearly on which side of the line they fall;
and it would be open to the authorities to be as arbitrary and
whimsical as they like in booking such persons under the said
Section. In fact, a large number of innocent persons have been
 booked and many instances have been given in the form of a note to
the Court. The enforcement of the said Section would really be an
insidious form of censorship which impairs a core value contained
in Article 19(1)(a). In addition, the said Section has a chilling effect
on the freedom of speech and expression. Also, the right of viewers
is infringed as such chilling effect would not give them the benefit of
many shades of grey in terms of various points of view that could be
viewed over the internet.The petitioners also contend that their
rights under Articles 14 and 21 are breached inasmuch there is no
intelligible differentia between those who use the internet and
those who by words spoken or written use other mediums of
communication. To punish somebody because he uses a particular
medium of communication is itself a discriminatory object and
would fall foul of Article 14 in any case.
 In reply, Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General
defended the constitutionality of Section 66A. He argued that the
legislature is in the best position to understand and appreciate the
needs of the people. The Court will, therefore, interfere with the
legislative process only when a statute is clearly violative of the
rights conferred on the citizen under Part-III of the Constitution.
There is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an
enactment. Further, the Court would so construe a statute to make
it workable and in doing so can read into it or read down the
provisions that are impugned. The Constitution does not impose
impossible standards of determining validity. Mere possibility of
abuse of a provision cannot be a ground to declare a provision
invalid. Loose language may have been used in Section 66A to deal
with novel methods of disturbing other people's rights by using the
internet as a tool to do so. Further, vagueness is not a ground to
declare a statute unconstitutional if the statute is otherwise
legislatively competent and non-arbitrary.
 JUDGMENT
The bench delivered a 52-page judgment, which extensively discussed
Indian, English and US jurisprudence on free speech. The Supreme Court
struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, read down
Section 79 of the Information Technology Act and the related rules, and
affirmed the constitutionality of Section 69A of the Act.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Nariman discussed the various standards
which are applicable to adjudge when restrictions on speech can be
deemed reasonable, under Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution. The
Court held that Section 66A was vague and over-broad, and therefore fell
foul of Article 19(1)(a), since the statute was not narrowly tailored to
specific instances of speech which it sought to curb. Importantly, the
Court also considered the 'chilling effect' on speech caused by vague and
over-broad statutory language as a rationale for striking down the
provision. Further, the Court held that the 'public order' restriction under
Article 19(2) of the Constitution would not apply to cases of 'advocacy',
but only to 'incitement', specifically incitement which has a proximate
relation to public disorder.
Of the challenge on the grounds under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, the Court held that "we are unable to agree with counsel for the
petitioners that there is no intelligible differentia between the medium of
print, broadcast and real live speech as opposed to speech on the
internet. The intelligible differentia is clear – the internet gives any
individual a platform which requires very little or no payment through
which to air his views."
The Supreme Court further read down Section 79 and Rule 3(4) of the
Intermediaries Guidelines, under the Act, which deals with the liability of
intermediaries, mostly those which host content and provide online
services. Whereas the Section itself uses the term 'receiving actual
knowledge', of the illegal material as the standard at which the
intermediary is liable for removing content, the Court held that it must be
read to mean knowledge received that a Court order has been passed
asking it to take down the infringing material.
Finally, the Court also upheld the secret blocking process under Section
69A of the Act, by which the Government can choose to take down
content from the Internet, holding that it did not suffer from the
infirmities in Section 66A or Section 79, and is a narrowly drawn provision
with adequate safeguards.