Epicureanism and Horace

Author(s): Philip Merlan

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jun., 1949), pp. 445-451
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2707047
Accessed: 16-11-2018 11:29 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and

extend access to Journal of the History of Ideas

This content downloaded from 194.153.96.22 on Fri, 16 Nov 2018 11:29:00 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

EPICUREANISM AND HORACE

BY PHILIP MERLAN

"Now is the time to enjoy the gentle pleasures of life''1-every reader

of Horace is well acquainted with this invitation of the poet so convincingly
expressed in his Odes. And why is the time now? Often it may be the
spring,2 or the winter,3 or some particular event4 which suggests the Now,
but oftener an afterthought reminds us that it is only in nature that every-
thing which is lost is brought back by the quick change of the seasons5-this
is not so, however, with man. With him, it is the certainty of the pallid
death that gives true urgency and full force to the Now, the certainty of
death which knows of no difference between poor and rich,6 high or low.
Or, with a slight turn: Life is short and to be wise is to spin no long yarn of
hope. Time is a-fleeing and, grudgingly, gives us only a short respite.7 To
the Now there corresponds a warning: As long as we may.8 Thus, it is the
certainty of death and the shortness of life which urge us to enjoy what we
have as long as we are permitted to have it. Life should be lived in con-
formity with the certainty that death is impending.
Because man is mortal, his lot is miserable, indeed. Ancestry, eloquence,
wisdom, piety, sacrifices, cautious avoidance of dangers, care of one's h
none of them will ward off implacable death and its sadness. Everyone is
doomed to see the slowly flowing, slowly winding rivers of the netherworld,
everyone is doomed to eternal exile, everyone must join the flock of shadows.
We shall have to leave all the beautiful things of life, its flowers, its oint-
ments, its dainty cups, our home and our little beachhouse, all the persons
whom we love and cherish. Of all our favorite trees the hated cypress alone
will follow us, to adorn our tomb.9
Thus, awareness of the sadness of the life to come and our impending
death shapes the whole course of our lives. It is this awareness which im-
peratively demands that we enjoy the to-day, or it may be too late; it is this
1 Such an impressive "now' we find in Od. I iv; I ix 18.21; I xxvii 1.2.
2 Od. I iv.

3 Od. I ix; Ep. XIII.

4 Od. I xxxvii; III viii; III xviii. Cf. L. E. Lord. "Horace as an Occasional
Poet," Classical Journal XXXI (1935), 152-166.
5 Od. IV vii.
6 Od. I iv; II iii; II xviii; III i.
7 Od. I xi; II xi.
8 Such an impressive As-long-as (dum or donec) we find in Od. II xi 16; IV
xii 26; I ix 17; II iii 15; IV xii 26; Ep. XIII 4.
9 Od. I xxiv; I xxviii; II iii; II xiv; III ii; IV vii.
445

This content downloaded from 194.153.96.22 on Fri, 16 Nov 2018 11:29:00 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 446 PHILIP MERLAN

awareness which permeates the very pleasures of our lives-we can hardly
enjoy them, but we must think of their transitoriness.
All this is, esthetically, very impressive. Salt seasons some dishes so as
to bring out their sweetness more fully, more completely. The idea of death
is applied by Horace to life, with similar effects. By reminding us of death,
the poet makes life and its goods more desirable.10 When the idea of death
is applied to them they reveal a peculiar, melancholy, and morbid charm, the
charm of mortal life. Don't ever forget death-carpe diem.
All this is very Horatian no doubt, or, to be more general, very Anacre-
ontic. Certainly it is not at all Epicurean.'1
To see this we have only to compare one or two passages in Lucretius with
the corresponding passages in Horace.'2 It is very natural with a man who
is afraid of death to express this fear by complaining that soon he will have
to leave his home and wife. Both Lucretius and Horace lend their most
expressive language to this complaint. However, Horace does So, because
he shares the melancholy feeling; Lueretius in order to scorn it. For, he
adds mockingly: "Yes, it is bitter to miss your wife and home; only, people
forget to add that you are not going to miss all these things once you are
dead. "
And, no less than Horace, Lucretius is well aware that when people are
sitting over a festive cup of wine they are likely to complain that life is short
and its joy transient. But the scoffer is quite unimpressed and adds: "Of
course, these people imagine that, though dead, they still will be thirsty."'3
Thus, even where they describe the same situation in almost identical
words, they do it for opposite reasons.14 It is Epicurus's philosophy to
which this obvious difference between Lucretius and Horace is due.'5
10 May I who know no Chinese modestly suggest that some Chinese lyrics,
known to me only in translation, convey the same mood with incomparable im-
pressiveness ?
11 This we find said forcefully in C. Martha, Le poiime de Lucrece5 (1889),
143f. and 169f., or, after him, in J. F. D'Alton, Horace and His Age (1917). It is
strange how often Martha's interpretation is forgotten, or watered down, a good
example of the latter being K. Beek, Das Verhaltnis des Horaz zum Epikureismus
in historischer Entwicklung (1919) 40. This is perhaps the place to quote two
recent papers and a book on Horace which I found partieularly inspiring: P.
Hanozin, "Le triomphal eGhee," Etudes classiques IV (1935), 28-43; and H. Bardon,
"Carpe diem," Revue des Iftudes anciennes XLVI (1944), 345-355; L. P. Wilkin-
son, Horace and His Lyric Poetry (1945), esp. 34-43.
12 Luer. De rer. nat. III 894; Horace Od. IT xiv.
13 Luer. i.e. III 913. Quite correctly Martha, l.e. interprets these and the
preceding verses as expressing true Epicureanism, as over against Horace's easy
one.
14 Sometimes, however, both use the same language to express the same idea.
In De rer. nat. III 1053-1069 Lucretius explains the futility of one's changing his

This content downloaded from 194.153.96.22 on Fri, 16 Nov 2018 11:29:00 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 EPICUREANISM AND HORACE 447

Epicurus's "death does not concern us at all"'16 is so well known that it

is not quite easy to realize the boldness of this maxim. We shall have, there-
fore, to translate it into modern terms, though they can not be found in
Epicurus.
What this maxim amounts to is this. The two propositions, one "We
are mortal," the other "We never die," far from contradicting each other,
are both true and in complete agreement. We are mortal, to be sure, as
everything is that has come into existence ;17 however, we never die, because
we are no longer when death comes.18 It is only through an illegitimate
shifting of our point of view that we are confusing death as an objective
event with the selfsame death as a subjective event. The We of which we
speak when we say that "we" are mortal, is an instance of an abstract sub-
ject which, together with its mortality, exists only for an onlooker, an out-
side observer. But I can never become for myself an instance of this mortal
subject, just because I am mortal. Every man dies-but for myself I can
never become an instance of Everymanness. I am I-and only by a strange
confusion of two points of view can I interpret my Iness as an instance of
Everymanness. Death exists for me only as an objective event-but as an
objective event it does not exist for me.
From here we can take one more step. Only if death should be a sub-
jective event, could it concern us at all. But it turns out that death is for
nobody a subjective event. However, a being who can die only in the eyes
of somebody else, the observer, and never for himself, is immortal-if the
word immortality is to have any meaning at all.
True, we usually connect the idea of immortality with the idea of an
infinite time. But this is entirely wrong. A being not aware of his ex-
istence, could not be called immortal, even if he were to exist for infinite
time. We can see this easily. But we should see also that, conversely, a
being who can never become aware of his non-existence, can not be called

place as if he could by so doing, escape himself, anticipating Horace Od. II xvi

(Cf. III i; Epi. I xi) with its "noone who flees his country flees himself; black
Dame Care sits right behind the horseman" and both conclude that people misjudge
the demands of nature. See W. A. Merrill, On the Influence of Lucretius on Horace
(1905), 123.
15 On the problem how seemingly Epicurean ideas change their complexion in
Seneca or Horace, see T. Kuiper, Philodebus Over clen Dood (1925), 26-28; 52f.
16 Ad Men. 125; ef. ibid., 124 and K. A. II. Some of the subsequent ideas were
expressed by me first in "Zwei Fragen der Epikureisehen Theologie," Hermes
LXVIII (1933), 196-217, esp. 214 ff.
17 Gnom. 30 (Metrodorus fr. 53 Korte): we all have been instilled with the
deadly filter of birth. Ronsard will say later naissans nous mourons (Manilius:
nascentes morimur).
18 Ad Men. 124: When we are, death is absent; when death is present we are
not.

This content downloaded from 194.153.96.22 on Fri, 16 Nov 2018 11:29:00 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 448 PHILIP MERLAN

mortal in the proper sense of the word. I can measure the length of other
lives, and others can measure the length of my life, but I can never fathom
the length of my own life, precisely because once I am dead I can not meas-
ure at all. In other words, we are immortal, for, to be immortal can not
mean anything else but this: Not to be able to measure out one's life's length.
If such is the case it does not matter at all how long we live. If by im-
mortality we mean an infinite time, it does not matter at all whether we are
immortal in this way. We become immortal if and as long as we are per-
fectly sure that death is the absolute end.
It is against the background of such considerations only that we can
really understand some Epicurean passages which will be paraphrased
rather than translated in what follows. Without such a background they
would sound like senseless boasting or rhetorical exaggerations.
If we really convince ourselves that death does not concern us at all, life,
in all its mortality becomes enjoyable.'9 We no longer desire immortality20
-quite obviously because the objective length of our lives can add nothing
to the true, subjective length of it, this length being, subjectively, infinite.21
In other words, a long life has no advantages whatsoever over a short
one.22 This is true for pleasure, too.23 Some would be inclined to think
that a longer life is desirable because it would contain a greater amount of
pleasure. But no life can contain more pleasure than its length-and the
comparison of the lengths of two lives can never be made by the person con-
cerned, the one who dies earlier. Only for us, the survivors, does it make
sense to speak of one life as being shorter, another as being longer, but our
measurements are of no interest whatsoever to the person who died.
What can differ more from the point of view of Horace? What he would
desire most would be immortality in the ordinary and erroneous sense of the
word. There is no reason for an Epicurean to desire it, for length of time
does not matter with him. Nay, it does not matter with anybody, because
there is no common measure whatsoever to compare two subjective sections
of time. It is only when I substitute for myself an abstract subject that I
fancy that it is possible to compare my time with anybody's else.
Thus, as death does not concern us at all, the certitude of our impending
death can have no influence on our way of life-not to the slightest extent.
This is just the opposite of Horace's point of view.
9 Ad Men. 124.
20 Ibid.

21 The term "subjectively infinite life" seems definitely foreign to Epicurus.

But I think it conveys the true meaning of his 7ravrEAcs 8tlog (K. A. XX) much
better than the conventional "perfect life."
22 This is obviously the meaning of Gnom. 60 (fr. 495 Us.): "Every man steps
out of life as if he were just born."
23 K. A. XIX: Unlimited time and limited time contain an equal amount of
pleasure.

This content downloaded from 194.153.96.22 on Fri, 16 Nov 2018 11:29:00 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 EPICUREANISM AND HIORACE 449

It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the truth of Epicurus's

philosophy. But even without this investigation we may well say: Its main
message, deliverance from fear of death, is probably the most virile message
contained in any philosophic system, and the attitude of an accomplished
Epicurean would be the most heroic attitude imaginable. Epicurus's mes-
sage, as is well known, does not say: Eat, drink, and be merry for tomorrow
you may die. It says rather: It does not matter at all if and when you die.
Live with the absolute certainty that after your death you will feel nothing
-and your life will be the life of an immortal, if only you understand the
word immortality correctly. In fact, the difference between a long and a
short life does not exist at all, so that you can say: Even when we shall have
lived the longest life, our life and death will not be different from the life
and death of a newly born, nor will his death be any more premature than
ours. Because death is not our coneern, every living being has its full
share of life. And this fullness which nobody can miss is the only kind of
immortality that anybody can have.
There is hardly a passage illustrating the tremendous effect of whole-
hearted acceptance of Epicurean teachings better than one preserved by
Plutarchus from a letter of Epicurus to Colotes. After having listened to
a discourse on the philosophy of nature, Colotes was seized by such a feeling
of reverence for what Epicurus had said, that he cast himself at Epicurus's
knees, embracing them and on the whole acting as is usual in worship. In
other words, Colotes acted as if Epicurus were a god. How did Epicurus
react? As he tells in his letter, he in turn worshipped Colotes as if he were
a god.
Thus, it would be insufficient to assume that Colotes worshipped Epicurus
as his master and only with the devotion of a disciple. Epicurus's reaction
shows clearly that such was not the case. It seems rather that the teachings
of Epicurus had revealed to Colotes the divine character of man. This is
the reason why Epicurus could not only accept Colotes's worship but return
it. The same reasons that had proved the divine character of Epicurus,
proved at the same time the divine character of Colotes-in fact of any
Epicurean. Why should not Epicureans worship one another as if they
were gods? Epicurus had proved that they were. And therefore Epicurus,
continuing his letter to Colotes, says: Walk an imperishable being and con-
sider me to be imperishable, too.24
Strong words, and it is only natural that modern interpreters should try
to tone them down.25 These interpreters are obviously influenced by Plu-
24 Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 1117 B (fr. 141 Us.; fr. 31 Bailey); ef. Non posse
1100 A. It is important to read the passages in their context which is reprinted
in Usener but not in Bailey.
25 This is true even for Bailey, who, following Usener, asserts that the tone
of the passages in Epicurus's letter is probably ironical and that Epicurus wished

This content downloaded from 194.153.96.22 on Fri, 16 Nov 2018 11:29:00 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 450 PHIuIP MERLAN

tarchus who quotes the letter to Colotes only in order to ridicule Epicurean
exuberance. But there is nothing ridiculous in the mutual worship of the
Epicureans. Man is immnortal and therefore divine; there is no difference
between him and beings usually termed gods.26 All that is necessary is to
acquire the insight that death does not concern us at all. With joy rivaling
the joy of a Christian and for exactly opposed reasons an Epicurean can
call out: Death-where is thy sting? He can ask thus, not because he is
confident of a life to come, but because he does not desire any particular
length of life.27
A non-Epicurean will find all this shockingly boastful. But this is still
better than not to take Epicurean claims at their face value. We must do
it if we want to understand the impact of Epicurus's message. This impact
is certainly clearly perceivable in Lucretius28-and yet Lucretius knew only
the writings of the master. The reaction of a contemporary like Colotes is
only a natural expression of a feeling of having been saved, nay, deified.
That his extraordinary claims will hardly appeal to the many, Epicurus
must have known. Proudly he admits that he had never tried to please the
many; proudly he states that he knew nothing that would please them and
that what he knew was far above their heads.29 It is clear that he was fully
aware of the highly paradoxical character of his doctrines. Hle, and he
alone of all philosophers could, quite literally, assure his disciples that they
will live like gods among men.30

to discourage Colote's extravagant signs of devotion and therefore paid them back
to him (Bailey, Epicurus [1926], 394f.; see, however, n. 30 below). Much more
adequate are the important hints which we find in 0. Regenbogen, Lukrez (1936),
28 and 41-49, esp. 46 n. 1, last section.
26 PlUt., Non posse, 7, 1091 B-C, once more reproaches the Epicureans be-
cause they say of themselves that they are imperishable and equal unto gods.
27 K. A. XX. In this fragment, we find the word "flesh" used exactly in the
way in which it will be used in the New Testament, but in Epicurus the man accord-
ing to the flesh is just the one who craves immortality. On the relation between
Epicureanism and Christianity, see e.g., A. D. Simpson, "Epicureans, Christians,
Atheists in the Second Century," TPAPhA LXXII (1941), 372-381, esp. 378f.,
N. W. DeWitt, "Epicureanism and Christianity," U. of Toronto Quarterly XIV
(1944/5), 250-255, esp. 254. On Epicurus as savior, see J. Careopino, Aspects
mystiqutes de la Rome paienne (1942), 225-233, esp. 244f., A.-J. Festugiere, Epi-
cure et ses dieux (1946), 57 n. 1; 61-70.
28 On the problem whether Lucretius was ever actually free from fear of deat
see K. Biiehner's review of Regenbogen's Lukrez in Gnomon XII (1936), 634-643,
esp. 636-638; furthermore, M. Rozelaar, Lukrez (194i), 75; B. J. Logre, L'anxiete
de LIucrece (1946), describing Lucretius as suffering from an intermittent psychosis,
as a result of which he oscillated between depression and elation.
29 Fr. 187 Us.-fr. 43 Bailey.
30 Ad Men. 135. Quite correctly Bailey says (a. 1.) that this is not a mere

This content downloaded from 194.153.96.22 on Fri, 16 Nov 2018 11:29:00 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 NOTES AND DOCUMENTS 451

Thus, if it is necessary to keep the term "Epicureanism" for a type of

philosophy represented by Horace, let there be a clear understanding that
this is a kind of whining Epicureanism if we compare it to the true and
virile Epicureanism. And let us also see clearly that only this true and
virile Epicureanism has a liberating effect. The one who lives in a certain
way because he is influenced by his thinking of death, far from being an
Epicurean, has not understood the meaning of the message of Epicurus.
Scripps College.

BRENTANO AND FREUD-A SEQUEL"

BY PHILIP MERLAN

At my request, Professor Victor Kraft of the University of Vienna

was kind enough to investigate in the University archives what work with
Brentano Freud had taken as a student. The results show that Freud
was enrolled in the following courses given by Brentano: in Freud 's
third, fourth, and fifth semesters (Winter 1874/75, Summer 1875, and
Winter 1875/76 respectively), "Readings of philosophic writings"; in ad-
dition, in his fourth semester (Summer 1875), "Logic"; in his sixth semes-
ter (Summer 1876), "The philosophy of Aristotle."
These were the only non-medical courses taken by Freud during his
whole course of studies (eight semesters). It should be easy and might
prove interesting to find out more about the content of these courses and
Freud's participation in them, particularly in "Readings." But I must
leave this to some one to whom the archives of the University of Vienna
and the literary remains of Brentano and Freud are more easily acces-
sible than they are to me.
The results of Professor Kraft 's investigations are revealing. I am
extremely obliged to him for his communication.
Scripps College.

rhetorical exaggeration and that it explains how later disciples could speak of Epi-
curus hinmself as a god. Why shouldn't Bailey concede Colotes the right to worship
Epicurus accordingly? I should be inclined to ask the same question of Festugiere,
I.c., 69. Cf. also L. Salvestrani, "Sulle orme di Posidonio," Rivista di Storia della
filosofia III (1948), 1-7, esp. 3.
1 Cf. my paper "Brentano and Freud," this Joztrnal VI (1945), 375-377.

This content downloaded from 194.153.96.22 on Fri, 16 Nov 2018 11:29:00 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms