Illusorio v.
Bildner Issue: Whether or not Petitioner may secure a
Facts: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio, about 86 years of age
and possessed extensive property and was
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club for many years. They had six (6)
children.
The couple lived together for thirty (30) years. In
1972, they lived separately for undisclosed
reasons. Potenciano lived in a Condominium in
Makati City when he was in Manila and at
Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when
he was in Baguio City while, Erlinda lived in
Antipolo City.
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s
arrival from the United States, he stayed with
Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City.
The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that
during this time, their mother gave Potenciano
an overdose of Zoloft, an antidepressant drug
prescribed by his doctor in New York which
caused Potenciano’s health to deteriorate.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition for
guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced
age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate
meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did
not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at
the Condominium in Makati.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have
the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She
alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s
demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo City.
The Court of Appeals rendered decision ordering
the respondents to allow visitation rights to the
wife and ordering the writ of habeas corpus
previously issued be denied and dismissed for
lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the
subject of the petition.
Hence, the two petitions, which were
consolidated and are herein jointly decided.
writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to
live with her.
Held:
NO, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention, or by which
the rightful custody of a person is withheld from
the one entitled thereto. The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint,
and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint
of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal
restraint of liberty must be actual and effective,
not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and
effective detention or deprivation of
Potenciano’s liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. There was no unlawful
restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the
administrator of the Cleveland Condominium
not to allow his wife and other children from
seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he
did not object to seeing them.
As to Potenciano’s mental state, the CA observed
that he was of sound and alert mind, having
answered all the relevant questions to the
satisfaction of the court, and thus possessed
with the capacity to make choices.
In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
residence and the people he opts to see or live
with. The choices he made may not appeal to
some of his family members but these are
choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano.
He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that
he was not prevented from leaving his house or
seeing people. The CA exceeded its authority
when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for
habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed
for such right. The ruling is not consistent with
the finding of subject’s sanity.
In case the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without
threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of
his right. No court is empowered as a judicial
authority to compel a husband to live with his
wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried
out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process.
That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit
and GRANTS the petition and nullifies the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY vs. MAR
TIERRA CORPORATION, G.R. No. 143382,
November 29, 2006
Facts: On May 7, 1980, respondent Mar Tierra
Corporation president, Wilfrido C. Martinez,
applied for a ₱12,000,000 credit accommodation
with petitioner Security Bank and Trust
Company. Petitioner approved the application
and entered into a credit line agreement with
respondent corporation. It was secured by an
indemnity agreement executed by respondents
Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and
Ricardo A. Lopa.
On July 2, 1980, the credit line agreement was
amended and increased to ₱14,000,000. A new
indemnity agreement in favor of the bank to
secure the increased credit line was executed.
On September 25, 1981, respondent corporation
availed of its credit line. However, respondent
corporation was not able to pay the balance as it
suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing
operations in 1984.
Unable to collect the balance of the loan,
petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money
with a prayer for preliminary attachment against
respondent corporation and individual
respondents in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati.
Subsequently, however, petitioner had the case
dismissed with respect to individual respondents
Lacson and Lopa, leaving Martinez as the
remaining individual respondent.
On August 10, 1982, the RTC issued a writ of
attachment on all real and personal properties of
respondent corporation and individual
respondent Martinez. As a consequence, the
conjugal house and lot of the spouses Wilfrido
and Josefina Martinez in Barrio Calaanan,
Caloocan City was levied on.
The RTC rendered its decision. It held
respondent corporation and individual
respondent Martinez jointly and severally liable
to petitioner and, it ordered the lifting of the
attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the
spouses Martinez, for the obligation contracted
by individual respondent Martinez did not
redound to the benefit of his family.
Petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal partnership of the
Martinez spouses could not be held liable for the
obligation incurred by individual respondent
Martinez.
Ruling: NO. SC upheld the CA.
Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the
conjugal partnership is liable for "all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." We ruled as
early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de
Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for
another, the husband does not act for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit
is clearly intended for a third party.
In Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if
the husband himself is the principal obligor in
the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the
money and services to be used in or for his own
business or profession, the transaction falls
within the term "obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership." In other words, where
the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of
the family business, there is a legal presumption
that such obligation redounds to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.
In this case, the principal contract, the credit line
agreement between petitioner and respondent
corporation, was solely for the benefit of the
latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity
agreement) under which individual respondent
Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for
respondent corporation was similarly for the
latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of
proving that the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Martinez benefited from the
transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.
To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an
obligation pertaining to the husband alone
defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect
the solidarity and well being of the family as a
unit.15 The underlying concern of the law is the
conservation of the conjugal partnership.16
Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal
partnership only to debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. The petition is hereby
DENIED.