Kim B.

De Guzman
Remedial Law Review 2

RULE 118- MOTION TO QUASH

GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE v. HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS et al.
G.R. No. 166414, 22 October 2014

FACTS:
On January 18, 2003 a mauling incident involving neighbors transpired outside the house of the petitioners in St.
Francis Subdivision, Barangay Pandayan, Meycauayan Bulacan. Claiming themselves to be the victims in that mauling,
Josefina Guinto Morano, Rommel Morano and Perla Beltran Morano charged the petitioners and one Alfredo Enrile.

The MTC issued its joint resolution whereby it found probable cause and set the arraignment against the
petitioners for less serious physical injuries. The petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said resolution.
However, the MTC denied it. Thereafter, the petitioners presented a manifestation to file a motion to quash. The MTC
denied the motion to quash. Still, the petitioners sought reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash, but it was
likewise denied. Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari before the RTC. However, the
RTC dismissed the petition. The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
orders issued by the RTC.

CA promulgated its assailed resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition for being the wrong
remedy, the proper remedy being an appeal. Hence, this petition before the Court.

In challenging the sufficiency of the complaints, the petitioners insist that the "complaints do not provide any
evidence/s that would tend to establish and to show that the medical attendance rendered on private complainants
actually and in fact lasted for a period exceeding ten (10) days;" and the medical certificates attached merely stated that
"the probable disability period of healing is 10 to 12 days, for Josefina G. Morano, and, 12-15 days, for Perla B. Morano,
hence, the findings of the healing periods were merely speculations, surmises and conjectures. "They insist that the
"private complainants should have presented medical certificates that would show the number of days rendered for
medication considering that they filed their complaint on March 15, 2003 or about two (2) months after the alleged
incident."

ISSUE: Can a motion to quash be given due course on the ground that the complaints against the petitioners clearly and
patently shows that it lacks one of the essential elements of alleged crime for less serious physical injuries?

HELD: NO.
The petitioners’ insistence is utterly bereft of merit. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the
averments in a complaint or information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted,
constitute the elements of the offense. By alleging in their motion to quash that both complaints should be dismissed for
lack of one of the essential elements of less serious physical injuries, the petitioners were averring that the facts charged
did not constitute offenses. However, the complaints sufficiently charged the petitioners with less serious physical
injuries. Indeed, the complaints only needed to aver the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the details of why
and how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were
appropriate for the trial. Hence, the complaints were not quashable.

A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea, challenges the complaint or information
for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects apparent on its face. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the grounds for the quashal of the complaint or information, as follows: ( a) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; ( b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; ( c) the court trying the
case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; ( d) the officer who filed the information had no authority to do
so; ( e) the complaint or information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; ( f ) more than one offense
is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; ( g) the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished; ( h) the complaint or information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification; and ( i) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and
should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion
to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for
certiorari because of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law.

ARIEL M. LOS BAÑOS v. JOEL R. PEDRO

G.R. No. 173588. April 22, 2009.

FACTS:
A day before the elections, Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without authorization
from the COMELEC. He, then filed a Motion to Quash after his Motion for Preliminary Investigation did not materialize.
The RTC granted the quashal. The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings in which Pedro objected to citing Rule
117, Sec. 8 on provisional dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. The public prosecutor
manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case saying that the provision used applies where both
the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the
offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed
upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s arraignment date.

Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandatedreopening. The CA,
at first granted the reopening of the case but through Pedro's Motion for Reconsideration, his argument that a year has
passed by from the receipt of the quashal order, the CA's decision was reversed. Petitioner now argues using the same
argument of the public prosecutor.

ISSUE: Whether the rule on provision dismissal is applicable.

RULING:
The SC granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC. The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and
Provisional Dismissal. Primarily, they are two separate concepts. In Motion to Quash, the Information itself has
deficiency while in Provisional Dismissal, the Information has no deficiencies. It does not follow that a motion to quash
results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies. In the case, the SC finds that the granting of the
quashal of the RTC had no merit on the ground that there is a legal excuse or justification in Pedro's offense. Pedro
misappreciated the natures of a motion to quash and provisional dismissal. As a consequence, a valid Information still
stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.

RULE 126 SEARCH AND SEIZURE

PEOPLE V. LAGUIO
G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner, People of the Philippines filed this petition for review to nullify and set aside the resolution of RTC in
criminal case, granting private respondent, Lawrence Wang Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of 3 charges filed
against him. The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and finding
no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of
evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for
lack of evidence. Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that in as much as it has
been shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms in the
accused possession had been validly made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the warrantless
arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission of
the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful. In effect, the People
now contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an exception to
the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring
the private respondent to open the trunk of his BMW car to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.

ISSUE: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a
warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.

HELD: NO.
The warrantless arrest was illegal, it follows that the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise
unlawful.

The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part
of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking
from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him,
frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to
be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5.

It is settled that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an
in flagrante delicto arrest. Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is
clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information
that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal
transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were
caught with in flagrante delicto.

Upon the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day, May
17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa
Street, the arresting officers conducted surveillance operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person which
will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not
sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of
Section 5. And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO

G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017

Estipona, Jr. accused in Criminal Case, Possession of Dangerous Drugs, (Shabu), Estipona filed a Motion to Allow
the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and instead, to enter a
plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession).

He argued that Section 23(disallowance of plea bargaining) of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law
expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5 (5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.
Prosecution moved for the denial for being contrary to Section 23 which is said to be justified by the Congress'
prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo issued an Order
denying Estipona's motion. Estipona led a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
 ISSUE: Whether Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits Plea Bargaining in all violations of the said law, is
unconstitutional for being vilative of the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

HELD: YES
The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now their
exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. The Court further held that the
separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that
keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The
other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify
any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

PEOPLE v. ROMY LIM Y MIRANDA

[GR No. 231989, Sep 04, 2018]

FACTS:
In an Information dated October 21, 2010, Lim was charged with illegal possession of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu). On even date, Lim, together with his stepson, Eldie Gorres y Nave (Gorres), was also indicted for
illegal sale of shabu. In their arraignment, Lim and Gorres pleaded not guilty. They were detained in the city jail during
the joint trial of the cases.

The prosecution presented Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Albert Orellan, IO1 Nestle Carin, IO2 Vincent Orcales, and
Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Charity Caceres. Aside from both accused, Rubenia Gorres testified for the defense.

After trial, the RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres
for lack of sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator.

With regard to the illegal possession of a sachet of shabu, the RTC held that the weight of evidence favors the
positive testimony of IO1 Orellan over the feeble and uncorroborated denial of Lim. As to the sale of shabu, it ruled that
the prosecution was able to establish the identity of the buyer, the seller, the money paid to the seller, and the delivery
of the shabu. The testimony of IO1 Carin was viewed as simple, straightforward and without any hesitation or
prevarication as she detailed in a credible manner the buy-bust transaction that occurred. Between the two conflicting
versions that are poles apart, the RTC found the prosecution evidence worthy of credence and no reason to disbelieve in
the absence of an iota of malice, ill-will, revenge or resentment preceding and pervading the arrest of Lim. On the chain
of custody of evidence, it was accepted with moral certainty that the PDEA operatives were able to preserve the
integrity and probative value of the seized items.

In so far as Gorres is concerned, the RTC opined that the evidence presented were not strong enough to support
the claim that there was conspiracy between him and Lim because it was insufficiently shown that he knew what the
box contained. It also noted Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM 196 & 197-2010, which indicated that Gorres was
"NEGATIVE" of the presence of any illicit drug based on his urine sample.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE: Whether the accused can be convicted of the crime charged based on the evidences seized.

HELD: NO
In the case at bar, the police failed to follow the technicalities provided by the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically
the requirement in Section 21 of the said law which provides:

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
 from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance,
and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the
house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately conducted the marking and
physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu. To ensure that they were not interchanged, he separately marked the
item sold by Lim to IO1 Carin and the one that he recovered from his possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10
and AEO-RI 10-19-10, respectively, with both bearing his initial/signature.

Evident, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the DOJ and the media to witness the
physical inventory and photograph of the seized items. In fact, their signatures do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.

The above mentioned rule is not absolute because it provides for an exception. The non-observance of the
prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the
law enforcement officers could justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are not tainted.

It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and
photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their
safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate
retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official
themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure
the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who
face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the
anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.

Despite this exception provided by law, the law enforcers in this case, were not able to comply with the
requirements of such exception. IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials arrived at
the crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house. IO2
Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and
there were no available media representative and barangay officials despite their effort to contact them. He admitted
that there are times when they do not inform the barangay officials prior to their operation as they might leak the
confidential information. We are of the view that these justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and
sufficient attempt to comply with the law.

The testimony of team-leader IO2 Orcales negates any effort on the part of the buy-bust team to secure the
presence of a barangay official during the operation.

Due to these procedural lapses on the part of the law enforcement officers, the Supreme Court reversed and set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the earlier decision of the RTC. The accused in this case was
acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt.