WWW.LIVELAW.

IN 1

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

In W.P. (C) No. 118 of 2016

Shayara Bano …Petitioner

versus
Union of India & Ors. …Respondent

In the matter of:

Bebak Collective in I.A _______/2016
AND
Centre for Study of Society and Secularism in I.A _______/2016

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF INTERVENORS

BEBAK COLLECTIVE

AND

CENTRE FOR STUDY OF SOCIETY AND SECULARISM

BY SR. ADV. MS. INDIRA JAISING

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INDEX OF ISSUES

Sr. Particulars Page

1. What is Personal Law? Personal law is “law” and “laws in force” 3
within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution of India and
hence Muslim Personal Law is capable of challenge on the ground
of violation of fundamental rights.
2. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 admittedly 10
being a statute, is “law in force” within the meaning of Article 13
(3)(b) and can be challenged under Article 32 for violation of
fundamental rights. This petition is therefore maintainable.
3. Talaq-e-biddat and nikah-halala (impugned practices) that are 12
claimed to be a part of Muslim Personal Law and protected by
Section 2 of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937
(impugned section) violate the fundamental rights of Muslim
women under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India
and therefore the said practices are not entitled to recognition and
the impugned section, to the extent it protects them is void.
4. The impugned practices pertain to matters of marriage and divorce 19
including right to maintenance, alimony and custody of the
children and are secular activities resulting in civil consequences
for women, affecting their status as married women and hence in
the event of their being discriminatory are capable of being
challenged on the touch stone on the Article 14,15 and 21 of the
Constitution of India and not protected by Article 25, Article 26 or
Article 29 of the Constitution of India.
5. Extra judicial divorce is unconstitional. 24

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1. WHAT IS PERSONAL LAW? PERSONAL LAW IS “LAW” AND “LAWS IN

FORCE” WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONSTITUTION

OF INDIA AND HENCE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW IS CAPABLE OF

CHALLENGE ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS.

1.1. It is submitted that the basic defining feature of the expression “law” is that
it is binding on those to whom it applies, is recognised by the State as law
and enforceable by the State. Personal Law has the character of being
binding on those to whom it applies and is enforced by the State, hence it is
law within the meaning of Article 13 of Constitution of India.

1.2. Personal Laws have no precise definition. Fairly workable though not
comprehensive definitions have been provided by different authors, the Privy
Council, High Court, Supreme Court, and pre-constitution legislations as
follows:

i. A.M Bhattacharjee [Matrimonial Laws and the Constitution: 2ed., Eastern

Law House (2017) at Pgs. 4-7]: “ Personal Laws may be defined as that
body of laws which apply to a person or to a matter solely on the ground of
his belonging to or its being associated with a particular religion.”

ii. Mulla [Principles of Hindu Law, 15ed., at Pg.88] has described Personal
Law as “the Laws and customs as to succession and family relations”.

iii. Cheshire [Private International Law, 4ed., at Pg.150]: Personal Law is the
Law determining the questions affecting status and that “broadly
speaking, such questions are those affecting family relations and the family
property”.

1.3. Entry 5 of List III of the Constitution reads as follows

“Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills, intestacy and
succession; joint family and partition; all matters in respect of which parties in
judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of this
Constitution subject to their personal law”

1.4. Considering that the words “personal laws” appear in the said entry and
they refer to matters relating to marriage and divorce, infants and minors,
wills intestacy and succession, joint family and partition, it must be held
that as mentioned above by Cheshire, status is governed by personal laws .

1.5. It is generally accepted by learned authors that all such matters, persons
are governed by the law of the religion to which they belong. However,
others have disputed the conflation of religion with personal laws and
concluded that not all matters relating to marriage and divorce have their
origin in religion.

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Is personal law “law” or “laws in force” within the meaning of Article 13

1.6. State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84 (Paras.14-17): In the
Bombay High Court decision of Narasu Appa Mali, the question which arose
for consideration before the High Court was “whether the personal laws
applicable to the Hindus and the Muslim are laws in force within the meaning
of Art. 13(1) of the Constitution” and must, in order to survive Art. 372(1) and
Art. 13(1), satisfy the requirements of Arts. 14, 15 and other Articles of Part
III. Both Chief Justice Chagla and Justice Gajendragadkar in their separate,
though concurring, judgments answered the question in the negative. It is
submitted that the said judgment has been wrongly decided to the extent
that it holds that “personal laws” are not law and laws in force within the
meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution of India on the following grounds
and for the following reasons:

i. The Bombah High Court reasoned that Article 372(2) gives to the
President the power to modify laws in force and it was not the intention
of the Constituton to give to the President the power to modify personal
laws.

It is submitted that the Supreme Court has interpreted “laws in force” to

include not only statutory laws but also the entire gamut of common
laws of the land. Hence “personal laws must be incuded in the
expression “laws in force”. It has been held by the Supreme Court in a
series of decisions: Sant Ram v. Labh Singh AIR 1965 SC 314(Para.4),
Builders Supply Corporation v. Union of India AIR 1965 SC 1061
(Para.20), and Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v.
Corporation of Calcutta AIR 1967 SC 997 (Paras. 21-22) that the
expression “law in force” includes not only enactments of the Indian
legislatures but that part of common law of the land which was being
administered by the Courts. Hence, it is submitted that personal laws
must be held to be included within the definition of “laws in force” in
Article 13 as also in Article 372 of the Constitution.

ii. The Bombay High Court fuher held that Article 44 mandates the State to
secure for citizens a uniform civil code, and the State thus recognises the
continuance of personal laws.

It is submitted that whereas it may be that the State does recognise the
continuance of personal laws, it does not follow from that that the laws
are not “laws in force” or that that they are constitutionally valid, on the
contrary the very act of recognition makes them “law” and “laws in force”
subject to the discipline of the Constitution.

iii. The Bombay High Court also held that the existence of Article 17 shows
that untouchability was part of Hindu Personal Laws and it was
specifically prohibited. Thus, according to the Bombay High Court there
would have been no need for Article 17 at all if personal laws were part of
“law” and “laws in force” in Article 13.

With respect, it is submitted that several jurists have recognised the flaw
in this reasoning in that the conclusion does not follow from the premise.
It is submitted that all constitutions over the world have some amount of

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repetition more so as a measure to lay out fundamental rights in as

detail as possible. In Special Courts Bill Reference 1979 1 SCC 380
(Para.49) the Supreme Court has stated that some amount of
repetitiveness or overlapping is inevitable in a constitution like ours.
Article 13(1) itself was held to be found unecessary by the Supreme
Court in A.K Gopalan case AIR 1950 SC 27 (Para.7), by jurists like
D.Basu and Servai. By that logic,Article 15(3) may also seem to be
unecessary to the extent it refers to children and provides a saving
caluse for state legislation specially for children as Article 15(1) does not
in any case prohibit discrimination based on age and thus no saving case
clause is required. Hence, the mere fact that one aspect of Hindu law is
specifically mentioned in Article 17, cannot lead to the conclusion that
all personal law is not law within the meaning of Article 13 of the
Constitution of India.

iv. Thereafter, the Bombay High Court held that in Section 112 of the
Governemnt of India Act 1915, the expression “personal laws” and
“custom” are used separately, and since Article 13 is modeled on
Section 112 of the GOI Act 1915 and hence the expression “personal
laws” has been consciously omitted form Artcle 13 of the Constitution.
Learned authors have pointed out that the Court failed to notice Section
292 of the Government of India Act 1935 which was analogous to Article
372 of the Cosntitution both of which laws used the expression “laws in
force”

It is submitted that the expression “personal laws” appears in Entry 5

List III making it clear that the state can enact legislation in relation of
personal laws. If the State has the power to enact legislation fo personal
law, there is no reason why personal law cannot be subjected to judicial
scrutiny under Part III of the Constitution.

Section 292 reads as:

“Existing law of India to continue in force:
Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of the Government of India Act, but
subject to the other provisions of this Act, all the law in force in British India
immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act shall continue
in force in British India until altered or repealed or amended by a
competent Legislature or other competent authority.”
There are several judgments which while interpreting the expression
“laws in force” in Article 372 have held that the expression includes
statutory and non statutory laws.

Naresh Chandra Bose v. S.N. Deb AIR 1956 Cal 222 (Para.6); the
Calcutta High Court held that while reading Explanation I it has to
remembered that Article 372 uses the word ‘includes’ the obvious
implication being that in the first the definition is not exhaustive. Even
so, as is evident from a comparison of the terms of Article 366(10) and
Article 372(1), while ‘existing law’ as defined in Article 366(10) is limited
to statute law or law embodied in ordinances, orders, bye-laws, rules and
regulations, “all the laws in force” in' Article 372(1) is not so limited and
extends even to customary law, personal law like the Hindu and
Mahommedan law, being thus much more comprehensive than 'existing
law' as defined in Article 366(10). It follows from this that ‘existing

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law’ as defined there is a part of 'all the law in force' in Article 372(1) and
Explanation I of Article 372 by using the word ‘includes’ in defining it
extends rather than restricts its meaning.

Moreover, the Bombay High Court failed to notice the judgment of the
Federal Court in United Provinces v. Atiqua Begum AIR 1941 FC 16
(Pg.421), which held while construing the analogous expression “law in
force” in s. 292 of the Government of India Act 1935, observed that the
expression “applies not only to statutory enactments then in force, but to all
laws, including even personal laws, customary laws and case laws”

v. The learned judges also did not recognise personal laws as “customary
laws” and hence held that personal law cannot come within the meaning
of Article 13(3)(a).

It is submitted that personal laws are to an extent based on customary

law.

A.M. Bahttacharjee points out that David Pearl [Text Book on Muslim
Law, 1970 at Pg, 204] states that laws in Quran were evidently
piecemeal, superseding some, but not near a majority of pre-Islamic
customarly laws. Abdur Rahim [Muhammadan Jurisprudence, Tagore
Law Lectures, 1911, Pg. 136-137] notes that “those customs and usages
of the people of Arabia which were not expressly repealed during the life
time of Prophet, are held to have been sanctioned by the law-giver by his
silence.” Fyzee has approved this view. [Outlines of Muhammedan Law.
4ed., Pg. 6-7] Markby in his work Elements of Law, 5ed., Pg. 52 has
noted that certain amount of the old Arabian customs was no doubt
assumed by Mahommed and “has always remained in force though not
expressly recognized.”

The author also points out that the Punjab Laws Act in S. 5(b), The
Oudh Laws Act in S. 3(2)(b) have clearly directed application of Hindu
and Muslim Law and refered to them as law as has been modified by
custom. He therefore points out and rightly that if personal laws are
modified by custom then logical corollary is that they are also to an
extent based on custom. Moreover, the above mentioned laws applying
Hindu Law and Muslim Law, are themselves statutory laws recognising
such laws as being binding on citizens and hence “law” within the
meaning of Article 13 of the Indian Constitution.

It is submitted that the impugned practices are in any event customs

and thus admittedly fall under the definition of law under Article 13 and
thus can be challenged under Article 32 in case of violation of
fundamental rights.

H.M Seervai in his book Constitutional Law of India (At pg. 677 of 4ed.,
Vol.1, Universal Law Publishing Co.) while discussing the said
judgement takes the view that personal laws are “law” and “laws in
force” within the meaning or Article 13 and Article 372 of the Indian
Constitution in the following words:

“We have seen that there is no difference between the expression “existing
law” and “law in force” and consequently, personal law would be “existing
law” and “law in force. This conclusion is strengthened by the

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consideration that cutsom, usage and statutory law are so inextricably

mixed up in personal law that it would be difficult to ascertain the residue
of personal law outside them: it was, therefore, necessary to treat the
whole of personal law as existing law or law in force under Article 372
and to continue it subject to the provisions of the Constitution and subject
to the legislative power of the appropriate legislature.”

It is therefore submitted that personal laws are laws within the meaning
of Article 13 of the Indian Constitution and capable of being challenged
for violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the
Indian Constitution.

For the reasons aforesaid it is submitted that Narasu Appa Mali case is
wrongly decied and is not binding on this Supreme Court.

1.7. In Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir 1981 3 SCC 689 (Para.17): A two-Judge
bench of the Supreme Court ruled that “Part III of the Constitution does not
touch upon the personal laws of the parties”.

i. It is submitted that the Bench however, in declaring the Personal Laws

to be untouched by the provisions of Part III of the Constitution has not
spelt out any reasons for such view. To that extent the judgement of the
court is not binding. In a subsequent decision of C. Masilamani
Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami 1996 8 SCC 525 (Para.15)
this court held “Personal laws are derived not from the Constitution but
from the religious scriptures. The laws thus derived must be consistent
with the Constitution lest they become void under Art. 13 if they violate
fundamental rights”.

ii. It is submitted that in any event whatever be the position prior to 1937,
Muslim Personal Law is now enforced by the application of the Muslim
Personal Law Shariat Application Act 1937, and is a “law in force”
within the meaning of Articles 13 and Article 372. Thus, such law is
amenable to challenge if they violate fundamental rights to the extent
the impugned practices are recognized by the State in the Muslim
Personal Law Shariat Application Act 1937.

1.8. It is submitted that the following case laws have rightly differed from Narsu
Appa Mali case of and have held personal laws to be falling in the definition
of “laws in force” and thus amenable to challenge under Article 32 for
violation of fundamental rights:

i. Re Smt. Amina AIR 1992 Bombay 214 (Paras 4-10, 12, 23): “According
to my study of the subject, ‘personal laws’ are ‘law’ and ‘laws in force’
under Article 13 of the Constitution of India and are enforceable in
Courts subject to provisions of the Constitution and not otherwise. Even
customs and usages having the force of law are void if found
inconsistent with any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. It could not be the intention of founding fathers of our
Constitution to create any immunity in favour of personal laws…We have
seen that there is no difference between the expression ‘existing law’
and ‘law in force’ and consequently. Personal law would be ‘existing
law’ and ‘law in force’. This conclusion is strengthened by the

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consideration that custom, usage and statutory law are so inextricably

mixed up in personal law that it would be difficult to ascertain the
residue of personal law outside them.”

ii. Sheo Kumar Dubey v. Sudama Devi AIR 1962 Pat 125 (Para. 11):
“These definitions of ‘law’ and laws in force’ are thus comprehensive
enough to include even custom or usage having the force of law.
Therefore, customary law is clearly embraced by those definitions.
Accordingly, if this customary law of pre-emption is in conflict with Part III
of the Constitution, more particularly, as urged in this appeal, is
inconsistent with the provisions of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, it
may be struck down as void”

iii. Saumya Ann Thomas v. UOI and Mr. Thomas WP(C).No. 20076 of
2009(R) (Paras. 18 & 23-24): “a piece of personal law cannot be
assailed on the ground that it offends the fundamental rights guaranteed
under Part-III of the Constitution. Art.13 has no application whatsoever in
such a situation, contends the learned ASGI…We have serious doubts
about the proposition that a piece of personal law - whether statutory or
precedent recognised or otherwise, will not be law or law in force within
the meaning of Art.13 of the Constitution. This would go against the
fundamental and core constitutional values as also the scheme of Art.13
of the Constitution…We find no reason, in a secular republic, to cull out
"personal law" alone and exempt the same from the sweep of Art.13 and
Part III of the Constitution.”

iv. Kunhimohammed v. Ayishakutty (2010) 2 KLT 71 (Paras. 45-46): “It is

perhaps more unfortunate that the courts have not so far tackled the bull
by the horns and had not tested the constitutional validity of these
stipulations which get the mandate for enforcement under the provisions
in the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937…Personal
Law is also, according to us, ‘law’. It is ‘existing law’ and ‘law in force’
as contemplated by the constitutional provisions. Such stipulations in
personal law cannot be out of bounds for Art. 13 of the Constitution. Any
stipulation of personal law which offends the fundamental right to
equality and life under Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution will also have
to be declared void under Art. 13.”

v. Hina v. State of UP Writ - C No. - 51421 of 2016 in All HC /(2016) SCC

OnLine All 994 (Paras. 9-10) :“ Personal laws, of any community, cannot
claim supremacy over the rights granted to the individuals by the
Constitution. I would not like to say anything further for the reason that
the Supreme Court is seized with the matter.”

1.9. High Courts and the Supreme Court have also held that after the advent of
the Constitution, customs and usages have to bow down to constitutional
values of equality and dignity for all, similarly it is submitted that personal
laws too have to bow down to constitutional values.

i. Panch Gujar Gaur Brahmans v. Amar Singh AIR 1954 Raj 100
(Para.15): “…Under Section 13 of the General Clauses Act, a word used
in plural has the same meaning as when it is used in the singular form
and the context in cl. (1) of Article 13 makes it necessary to interpret

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“laws in force” so as to include customs and usages, for, it would be

absurd to think that all customs or usages which were inconsistent with
the provisions of Part 3 of the Constitution which guarantees
fundamental rights should continue to exist, although such customs and
usages if sanctified by incorporation in any Act, order, bye-law, rule,
regulation or notification would become void...”

ii. N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board (2002) 8 SCC 106

(Para.18): “Any custom or usage irrespective of even any proof of their
existence in pre-constitutional days cannot be countenanced as a source
of law to claim any rights when it is found to violate human rights,
dignity, social equality and the specific mandate of the Constitution and
law made by Parliament. No usage which is found to be pernicious and
considered to be in derogation of the law of the land or opposed to public
policy or social decency can be accepted or upheld by courts in the
country.”

1.10. Further, it is pertinent to note that Article 225 of the Indian Constitution
that spells out the jurisdiction of high courts reads as follows:
“Article 225. Jurisdiction of Existing High Courts: Subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate
Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this
Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing
High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the
administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of
Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting
alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the
commencement of this Constitution:
Provided that any restriction to which the exercise of original jurisdiction by
any of the High Courts with respect to any matter concerning the revenue or
concerning any act ordered or done in the collection thereof was subject
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall no longer
apply to the exercise of such jurisdiction.”

1.11. The expression “Subject to the provisions of the Constitution” and “the
jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court”
indicates that the jurisdiction of the High Court and the law administered
by the High Court is subject to the provisions of the Constitution. “Law
administered” by the High Court includes Muslim laws declared by the
Privy Council and the Federal Courts as such laws were being administered
by the High Courts. Thus, it is submitted that all such laws are subject to
the provisions of the Indian Constitution including Part III on fundamental
rights of the Constitution.

1.12. For all the reasons aforesaid, personal law is “law” and constitutes “laws in
force” within the meaning of Article 13 and Article 372 of the Constitution
of India and capable of challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental
rights.

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2. MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW (SHARIAT) APPLICATION ACT, 1937

ADMITTEDLY BEING A STATUTE, IS “LAW IN FORCE” WITHIN THE

MEANING UNDER ARTICLE 13(3)(B) AND ARTICLE 372, THUS CAN BE

CHALLENGED UNDER ARTICLE 32 FOR VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS. THIS PETITION IS THEREFORE MAINTAINABLE.

2.1. It is submitted that The Muslim Personal (Sharia) Law Act, 1937 by
virtue of being a statute falls under the definition of “laws in force” under
Article 13(3)(a) and Article 372 of the Indian Constitution and thus can
be challenged under Article 32 for being violative of fundamental rights of
equality and life.

2.2. Section 2 of The Muslim Personal (Sharia) Law Act, 1937 reads as
follows:

“Section 2 Application of Personal law to Muslims:

Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions

(save questions relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate
succession, special property of females, including personal property
inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of
Personal Law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila, zihar,
lian, khula and mubaraat, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts
and trust properties, and wakfs (other than charities and charitable
institutions and charitable and religious endowments) the rule of decision
in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat).”

2.3. The said Act not being repealed remains in force after the coming into
force of the Constitution and is hence “law in force” within the meaning
of Artice 13 and Article 372.

2.4. It is submitted that the said seciton gives bindng force to Muslim
Personal Law/Sharia Law enforable by the State and the Courts and is
hence “law” within the meaning of Article 13. Being so, it is capable of
challenge although the actual content of the Sharia remains uncodified.
After the passing of The Muslim Personal (Sharia) Law Act, 1937, it is
irrelevant whether the said law is codified or uncodified customary or
non customary, based on religion or otherwise, since it is the said Act
which gives it the character of “ law in force” and recognition by the Sate.
It must therefore pass the test of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the
Constitution of India.

2.5. It is submitted that there can be no governing Muslim Personal Law in

relation to marriage and divorce outside the framework of Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 and to that extent the claim
that the imugned practices are part of Muslim Personal Law is nothing
but a claim that the impugned practices are protected under the Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. The said law is therefore
capable of constitutional challenge.

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i. Mithanlal v. State of Delhi AIR 1958 SC 682 (Para. 8): “Moreover,

when a notification is issued by the appropriate Government
extending the law of a Part A State to a Part C State, the law so
extended derives its force in the State to which it is extended from
Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act enacted by Parliament. The
result of a notification issued under that section is that the provisions
of the law which is extended become incorporated by reference, in the
Act itself, and therefore a tax imposed thereunder is a tax imposed by
Parliament.”

ii. Mary Sonia Zachariah v. Union of India 1995 (1) KLT 644 FB
(Par.39): “So long as the infringed provisions are part of an Act, it
must pass the test of constitutionality even if the provision is based
upon religious principles."

iii. Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasantrao (2002) 7 SCC 657:

(Para.31)
“In a case where a statute is incorporated, by reference, into a second
statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the
second. The later Act along with the incorporated provisions of the
earlier Act constitutes an independent legislation which is not
modified or repealed by a modification or repeal of the earlier Act.
However, where in a later Act there is a mere reference to an earlier
Act, the modification, repeal or amendment of the statute that is
referred, will also have an effect on the statute in which it is referred.
It is equally well settled that the question whether a former statute is
merely referred to or cited in a later statute, or whether it is wholly or
partially incorporated therein, is a question of construction.”

2.6. It is submitted that Muslim Personal Law is incorporated by reference in

the said Act and no part of the law can be found outside the permissions
of the Act, making it statutory and capable of challenge if it does not
comply with Part III of the Indian Constitution.

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3. TALAQ-E-BIDDAT AND NIKAH-HALALA (IMPUGNED PRACTICES) THAT

ARE CLAIMED TO BE A PART OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW AND

PROTECTED BY SECTION 2 OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW (SHARIAT)

APPLICATION ACT, 1937 (IMPUGNED SECTION) VIOLATE THE

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF MUSLIM WOMEN UNDER ARTICLES 14, 15

AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AND THEREFORE ARE VOID.

3.1. It is submitted that the impugned section 2 is violative of the

fundamental rights of Muslim women guaranteed under Articles 14, 15,
and 21 in as much as it gives protection to the impugned practices.

Triple Talaq violates Articles 14 and 21

3.2. The impugned practcie of talaq-ul/e-bidat is violative of the right to

equality of Muslim women guaranteed under Articles 14 and 15 to the
extent that a Muslim man exercises power to declare a unilateral divorce
and the Muslim woman has no control over such unilateral arbitrary
extra judicial divorce and her marital staus.

3.3. It is submitted that marriage being a matter or status its termination

which has civil consequences must be declared by a competent court of
law alone and not by one of the parties to the marriage namely the
husband unilaterally.

3.4. It is submitted that the impact of such practice of talaq-ul/e-biddat is

that Muslim women lose their right to residence, are driven to claim
maintainance and custody of their children in a court of law which is
often denied to her at the stage of unilateral divorce. This violates their
right to life and dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India.
i. Hina vs. State of UP Writ - C No. - 51421 of 2016 /(2016) SCC
OnLine All 994 (Paras. 9-10):“The instant divorce (Triple Talaq)
though has been deprecated and not followed by all sects of muslim
community in the country, however, is a cruel and the most demeaning
form of divorce practised by the muslim community at large. Women
cannot remain at the mercy of the patriarchal setup held under the
clutches of sundry clerics having their own interpretation of the holy
Quoran.”

3.5. Further it is submitted that marriage is a contract that entails change in

life and a commitment that two people make to each other out of natural
love and affection to share and care for each other. The rights conferred
by virtue of the marriage are legitimacy of children, custody of children,
right to reside in matrimonial home. It stands to reason that if that
contract has to be terminated, it must be done with good reason and
with due regard to the rights of both the parties to the marriage and by a
judicial forum.

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3.6. In this unilateral form of divorce, Muslim women do not have an equal
role in participating in the decision that vitally concerns them.
Especially, Muslim women who are home-makers lose social and
financial stability as they no longer receive any support from the
husband or family of husband besides mehr which often is a nominal
sum.

3.7. It is submitted that the said law is ex facie discriminatory in that it is a

right to act in an arbitrary manner conferred on a husband to the
detriment of his wife and must be declared unconstitutional as being
discriminatory based on sex. While judging the constitutionality of a law,
this Court must not only look at the text of the law but also its disparate
outcome on women.

3.8. It is submitted that while testing the constitutional validity of a

legislation, it is not the object of the law alone that must be seen but the
impact that it has on the rights of the parties:

i. Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh AIR 1946 PC 66 (Pg.74):

“Beaumont J. holds that in applying the terms of sub-s. 1 of s. 298, it
is necessary for the court to consider the scope and object of the Act
which is impugned, so as to determine the ground on which such Act
is based. Their Lordships are unable to accept this as the correct test.
In their view, it is not a question of whether the impugned Act is
based only on one or more of the grounds specified in s. 298, sub-s.
1, but whether its operation may result in a prohibition only on these
grounds. The proper test as to whether there is a contravention of the
sub-section is to ascertain the reaction of the impugned Act on the
personal right conferred by the sub-section, and, while the scope and
object of the Act may be of assistance in determining the effect of the
operation of the Act on a proper construction of its provisions, if the
effect of the Act so determined involves an infringement of such
personal right, the object of the Act, however laudable, will not
obviate the prohibition of sub-s. 1.”

ii. State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society (1955) 1 SCR 568 :

AIR 1954 SC 561 (Para. 16) :“The object or motive attributed by the
learned Attorney-General to the impugned order is undoubtedly a
laudable one but its validity has to be judged by the method of its
operation and its effect on the fundamental right guaranteed by
Article 29(2). A similar question of construction arose in the case
of Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh [ (1946) LR 73IA 59] . One of
the questions in that case was whether the provision of the new
Section 13-A of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act was ultra vires the
Provincial legislature as contravening sub-section (1) of Section 298
of the Government of India Act, 1935, in that in some cases that
section would operate as a prohibition on the ground of descent
alone. Beaumont, J. in his dissenting judgment took the view that it
was necessary for the Court to consider the scope and object of the
Act which was impugned so as to determine the ground on which
such Act was based, and that if the only basis for the Act was
discrimination on one or more of the grounds specified in Section 298
sub-section (1) then the Act was bad but that if the true basis of the

 WWW.LIVELAW.IN 14

Act was something different the Act was not invalidated because one
of its effects might be to invoke such discrimination.”

iii. R.C. Cooper v. UOI AIR 1970 SC 564 (Para. 49): “…If this be the
true view and we think it is, in determining the impact of State action
upon constitutional guarantees which are fundamental, it follows that
the extent of protection against impairment of a fundamental right is
determined not by the object of the Legislature nor by the form of the
action, but by its direct operation upon the individual's rights.”

iv. Bennett Coleman v UOI AIR 1973 SC 106 (Para. 42): “The ruling of
this Court in Bank Nationalisation case was this:

“… The correct approach should be to enquire what in substance is

the loss or injury caused to the citizen and not merely what manner
and method has been adopted by the State in placing the restrictions.
…Courts have to protect and guard fundamental rights by
considering the scope and provisions of the Act and its effect upon
the fundamental rights. The ruling of this Court in Bank
Nationalisation case is the test of direct operation upon the rights. By
direct operation is meant the direct consequence or effect of the Act
upon the rights...”

Nikah-halala violates Articles 14 and 21

3.9. It is submitted that the impugned practice of nikah-hala is in violation of

Articles 14 and 21 that guarantee the right to gender justice, dignity and
personal autonomy of a Muslim woman who wants to remarry her former
husband.

3.10. It is submitted that such impugned practice of nikah-hala is regressive

and violates both the dignity of Muslim women who wish to remarry their
former husbands who divorced them through the mode of talaq-e-biddat
or triple talaq. It has the effect of stereotyping women as property of her
fomer Muslim husband as she has to pay the price the pronunication of
talaq-e-biddat by her former husband by marrying another man and
consummating such marriage before she can marry her former husband.

3.11. The impugned practices violate the right to dignity guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India:

i. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi &

Ors (1981) 1 SCC 608 (Paras. 6, 8): “Principle of interpretation which
requires that a constitutional provision must be construed, not in a
narrow and constricted sense, but in a wide and liberal manner so as
to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and purposes so
that the constitutional provision does not get atrophied or fossilized but
remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and
challenges, applies with greater force in relation to a fundamental right
enacted by the Constitution. The fundamental right to life which is the
most precious human right and which forms the ark of all other rights
must therefore be interpreted in a broad and expansive spirit so as to
invest it with significance and vitality which may endure for years to

 WWW.LIVELAW.IN 15

come and enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth of the
human person.” “We think that the right to life includes the right to live
with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare
necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and
facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms,
freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human
beings.......... Every act which offends against or impairs human
dignity would constitute deprivation protanto of this right to live and it
would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just
procedure established by law which stands the test of other
fundamental rights.”

ii. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association 2008 (3) SCC 1 (Paras. 36, 39, 40,
41- 43, 45-46, 51): “The present law ends up victimizing its subject in
the name of protection. In that regard the interference prescribed by
state for pursuing the ends of protection should be proportionate to the
legitimate aims.” “Gender equality today is recognized by the
European Court as one of the key principles underlying the Convention
and a goal to be achieved by member States of the Council of Europe.”
“. It is for the court to review that the majoritarian impulses rooted in
moralistic tradition do not impinge upon individual autonomy. This is
the backdrop of deeper judicial scrutiny of such legislations world
over.” “Therefore, one issue of immediate relevance in such cases is
the effect of the traditional cultural norms as also the state of general
ambience in the society which women have to face while opting for an
employment which is otherwise completely innocuous for the male
counterpart. In such circumstances the question revolves around the
approach of state.” “The impugned legislation suffers from incurable
fixations of stereotype morality and conception of sexual role. The
perspective thus arrived at is outmoded in content and stifling in
means.”

iii. Charu Khurana v. Union of India 2015 (1) SCC 192 (Paras. 2, 4, 7,
9, 51-52):“the subordination of one sex to the other ought to be
replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or
privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other"...”“Lord Denning
in his book Due Process of Law has observed that a woman feels as
keenly thinks as clearly, as a man. She in her sphere does work as
useful as man does in his. She has as much right to her freedom-
develop her personality to the full-as a man. When she marries, she
does not become the husband's servant but his equal partner. If his
work is more important in life of the community, her's is more
important in the life of the family. Neither can do without the other.
Neither is above the other or under the other. They are equals.” “The
Court observed that when there is violation of gender justice and
working woman is sexually harassed, there is violation of the
fundamental rights of gender justice and it is clear violation of the
rights Under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.”

3.12. It is submitted that the impugned Section 2 to the extent to which it

recognizes discriminatory impugned practices is liable to be declared
unconstitutional.

 WWW.LIVELAW.IN 16

3.13. It is submitted that marriage among Muslims is admittedly a contract

and hence it cannot be dissolved in a unilateral manner. It is submitted
that any rule of law or custom or contract that permits unilateral
termination of a marriage contract affecting the status of a woman is
unconscionable and against public policy and void within the meaning of
Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872:

i. Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986)

3 SCC 156 (Para. 89) “Should then our courts not advance with the
times? Should they still continue to cling to outmoded concepts and
outworn ideologies? Should we not adjust our thinking caps to match
the fashion of the day? Should all jurisprudential development pass us
by, leaving us floundering in the sloughs of 19th century theories?
Should the strong be permitted to push the weak to the wall? Should
they be allowed to ride roughshod over the weak? Should the courts
sit back and watch supinely while the strong trample underfoot the
rights of the weak? We have a Constitution for our country. Our judges
are bound by their oath to “uphold the Constitution and the laws”. The
Constitution was enacted to secure to all the citizens of this country
social and economic justice. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees to
all persons equality before the law and the equal protection of the
laws. The principle deducible from the above discussions on this part
of the case is in consonance with right and reason, intended to secure
social and economic justice and conforms to the mandate of the great
equality clause in Article 14. This principle is that the courts will not
enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and
unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a
contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining
power. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this
type. No court can visualize the different situations which can arise in
the affairs of men. One can only attempt to give some illustrations. For
instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of
bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic
strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is
the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or
not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position
in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only
upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It
will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful
choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line
in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of
the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a
clause in that contract or form or rules may be. This principle,
however, will not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting
parties is equal or almost equal.”

Impugned Practices violate Article 15

3.14. It is submitted that to the extent that the impugned practices can be
exercised unilaterally by the husband alone, they are violate of Article 15
and the discrimination is based on sex alone. It is also discriminatory
since it has a disparate impact on women alone. The impact of unilateral
triple talaq is to render the wfie instantly homeless, being driven out of

 WWW.LIVELAW.IN 17

the matrimonial home for no reason other than that the husband has
pronounced a unilateral talaq. It also renders her vulnerable to economic
destitution driving her to lengthy litigation for a just and fair
maintenance.

3.15. This Court in Daniel Latifi v. UOI (2001) 7 SCC 740 (Para. 20) noted that
women contribute to the generation and accumulation of household
assets and contribute with their labour and hence, it would be unjust
and unfair to deny them post divorce maintenance which is just and fair
for life:
“In interpreting the provisions where matrimonial relationship is involved,
we have to consider the social conditions prevalent in our society. In our
society, whether they belong to the majority or the minority group, what is
apparent is that there exists a great disparity in the matter of economic
resourcefulness between a man and a woman. Our society is male
dominated, both economically and socially and women are assigned,
invariably, a dependent role, irrespective of the class of society to which
she belongs. A woman on her marriage very often, though highly educated,
gives up her all other avocations and entirely devotes herself to the welfare
of the family, in particular she shares with her husband, her emotions,
sentiments, mind and body, and her investment in the marriage is her
entire life — a sacramental sacrifice of her individual self and is far too
enormous to be measured in terms of money. When a relationship of this
nature breaks up, in what manner we could compensate her so far as
emotional fracture or loss of investment is concerned, there can be no
answer. It is a small solace to say that such a woman should be
compensated in terms of money towards her livelihood and such a relief
which partakes basic human rights to secure gender and social justice is
universally recognised by persons belonging to all religions and it is
difficult to perceive that Muslim law intends to provide a different kind of
responsibility by passing on the same to those unconnected with the
matrimonial life such as the heirs who were likely to inherit the property
from her or the Wakf Boards. Such an approach appears to us to be a kind
of distortion of the social facts. Solutions to such societal problems of
universal magnitude pertaining to horizons of basic human rights, culture,
dignity and decency of life and dictates of necessity in the pursuit of social
justice should be invariably left to be decided on considerations other than
religion or religious faith or beliefs or national, sectarian, racial or
communal constraints. Bearing this aspect in mind, we have to interpret the
provisions of the Act in question.”

3.16. It is therefore submitted that the said impugned practices violate Article
15 being based on sex alone.

Obligations under CEDAW

3.17. India is party to the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW mandates all State
parties to overcome, dismantle and refrain from promoting gender
discrimination. Discrimination against women based on sex and religion
is in direct contrast with the CEDAW mandate of achieving substantive
equality.

 WWW.LIVELAW.IN 18

i. Article 1 defines discriminaitonn as follows:

“discrimination against women shall mean any distinction, exclusion

or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose
of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of
men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.”

ii. Article 2 (c) and (f) mandate State Parties including India to:
“establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis
with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and
other public institutions the effective protection of women against any
act of discrimination”, and to “take all appropriate measures,
including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against
women.”

iii. Particularly, Article 16 of the CEDAW mandates the State Parties

including India to provide for equal protection and equal rights to
men and women in matters relating to marriage and divorce. 1.
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women. Article 16(1) CEDAW read as:“(a) The
same right to enter into marriage; (b) The same right freely to choose a
spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full
consent; (c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and
at its dissolution;..”

3.18. It is submitted that there has been no reservation to Article 2 of CEDAW

by India as indeed there cannot be one by India and hence all laws have
to comply with the guarantee of equality and non-discrimination. In any
event the mere fact that India has made a reservation to Article 16,
cannot prevent this Hon’ble Court from adjudicating its constitutional
validity. It only absolves India from being accountable in an international
forum, without affecting the jurisdiction of this Court.

 WWW.LIVELAW.IN 19

4. THE IMPUGNED PRACTICES PERTAIN TO MATTERS OF MARRIAGE AND

DIVORCE INCLUDING RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE, ALIMONY AND CUSTODY OF

THE CHILDREN AND ARE SECULAR ACTIVITIES RESULTING IN CIVIL

CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN, AFFECTING THEIR STATUS AS MARRIED

WOMEN AND HENCE IN THE EVENT OF THEIR BEING DISCRIMINATORY ARE

CAPABLE OF BEING CHALLENGED ON THE TOUCH STONE ON THE ARTICLE

14,15 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA .They are NOT PROTECTED BY

ARTICLE 25, ARTICLE 26 OR ARTICLE 29 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.

4.1. It is submitted that marriage and divorce are matters of secular nature
and can be regulated by the State.

i. Abdur Rahim Undre v. Padma Adbur Rahim Undre AIR 1982 Bom
341 (Para. 23) :“In Mohammedan Law Marriage is a Civil Contract.
Hence so far as relationship flowing from contract of marriage is
concerned, including its dissolution, the area and field is secular in
nature.”

ii. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 635 (Para.33):

“…Marriage, succession and like matters of a secular character…”

iii. John Vallamattom v. Union of India (2003) 6 SCC 611 (Para. 44): “it
is not a matter of doubt that marriage, succession and the like matters
of secular character ...”

4.2. It is submitted that the Supreme Court time and again has
acknowledged the difference between secualr and religious activities in
context of interpretation of Articles 25 and 26 and has held that the
State can regulate secular matters and secular matters of religion are not
proetected under the said Articles:

i. Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan 1964 1 SCR

561: AIR 1963 SC 1638 (Paras. 58-60): “In this connection, it cannot
be ignored that what is protected under Articles 25(1) and 26(b)
respectively are the religious practices and the right to manage affairs
in matters of religion. If the practice in question is purely secular or the
affair which is controlled by the statute is essentially and absolutely
secular in character, it cannot be urged that Article 25(1) or Article
26(b) has been contravened…. If the practice is a religious practice or
the affairs are the affairs in matter of religion, then, of course, the right
guaranteed by Article 25(1) and Article 26 (b) cannot be contravened.”
“It is true that the decision of the question as to whether a certain
practice is a religious practice or not, as well as the question as to
whether an affair in question is an affair in matters of religion or not,
may present difficulties because sometimes practices, religious and
secular, are inextricably mixed up. This is more particularly so in

 WWW.LIVELAW.IN 20

regard to Hindu religion because as is well known, under the

provisions of ancient Smritis, all human actions from birth to death and
most of the individual actions from day-to-day are regarded as
religious in character. As an illustration, we may refer to the fact that
the Smritis regard marriage as a sacrament and not a contract. Though
the task of disengaging the secular from the religious may not be easy,
it must nevertheless be attempted in dealing with the claims for
protection under Articles 25(1) and 26(b). If the practice which is
protected under the former is a religious practice, and if the right which
is protected under the latter is the right to manage affairs in matters of
religion, it is necessary that in judging about the merits of the claim
made in that behalf the Court must be satisfied that the practice is
religious and the affair is in regard to a matter of religion….If an
obviously secular matter is claimed to be matter of religion, or if an
obviously secular practice is alleged to be a religious practice, the
Court would be justified in rejecting the claim because the protection
guaranteed by Article 25(1) and Article 26(b) cannot be extended to
secular practices and affairs in regard to denominational matters
which are not matters of religion, and so, a claim made by a citizen
that a purely secular matter amounts to a religious practice, or a
similar claim made on behalf of the denomination that a purely secular
matter is an affair in matters of religion, may have to be rejected on the
ground that it is based on irrational considerations and cannot attract
the provisions of Article 25(1) or Article 26(b). This aspect of the matter
must be borne in mind in dealing with true scope and effect of Article
25(1) and Article 26(b).”“A distinction must always be made between a
practice which is religious and a practice in regard to a matter which is
purely secular and has no element of religion associated with it.
Therefore, we, are satisfied that the claim made by the denomination
that the Act impinges on the rights guaranteed to it by Article 25(1) and
26(b) must be rejected.”

ii. Sri Sri Sri Lakshmana Yatendrulu & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Anr.
(1996) 8 SCC 705 (Paras. 11, 43, 44):
“The Act only regulates secular activities of the mathadhipathi in
spending the Padakanukas and that too in his own interest. Therefore,
the regulations are permissible under Article 25 of the Constitution”
“Questions relating to administration of properties relating to math or
specific endowment are not matters of religion under Article 26(b).
They are secular activities though connected with religion enjoined on
the Mahant.”
“Section 50 of the Act which is corresponding provision in the
predecessor Act of 1966 requires the mathadhipathi to maintain
accounts in the manner prescribed therein which is a secular activity
on the part of a mathadhipathi. The intervention of the legislature in
that behalf is in the interest of the math itself. He is, therefore,
enjoined to maintain accounts in the regular course of the
administration and maintenance of the math. Operation of Section 50
is, therefore, a permissible statutory intervention under Articles
25(2)(a) and 26(b) and (d) of the Constitution.”

 WWW.LIVELAW.IN 21

4.3. The impugned practices are not protected by article 25, article 26 or
article 29 of the constitution of india.

4.4. The right to practice religion under Article 25 is subject to other

fundamental rights. It reads as: “(1) Subject to public order, morality and
health, and to other provisions of this part, all persons are equally entitled
to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and
propogate religion”

4.5. It is submitted that the impugned practices are not protected under
Article 25 as they violate the rights of Muslim women guranteed under
Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

i. Bijoe Emmanuel and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors (1986) 3 SCC
615 (Para.19):“We see that the right to freedom of conscience and
freely to profess, practise and propagate religion guaranteed by
Article 25 is subject to (1) public order, morality and health; (2) other
provisions of Part III of the Constitution; (3) any law (a) regulating or
restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity
which may be associated ' with religious practice; or (b) providing for
social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious
institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.
Thus while on the one hand, Article 25(1) itself expressly subjects the
right guaranteed by it to public order, morality and health and to the
other provisions of Part III, on the other hand, the State is also given
the liberty to make a law to regulate or restrict any economic,
financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated
with religious practise and to provide for social welfare and reform,
even if such regulation, restriction or provision affects the right
guaranteed by Article 25(1). therefore, whenever the Fundamental
Right to freedom of conscience and to profess, practise and propagate
religion is invoked, the act complained of as offending the
Fundamental Right must be examined to discover whether such act is
to protect public order, morality and health, whether it is to give effect
to the other provisions of Part III of the Constitution or whether it is
authorised by a law made to regulate or restrict any economic,
financial, political or secular activity which may be associated with
religious practise or to provide for social welfare and reform. It is the
duty and function of the Court so to do.”

ii. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 635 (Para.33):

“…Marriage, succession and like matters of a secular character…”
cannot be brought within the guarantee enshrined under Articles 25,
26 and 27. The personal law of the Hindus, such as relating to
marriage, succession and the like have all a sacramental origin, in the
same manner as in the case of the Muslims or the Christians. The
Hindus along with Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains have forsaken their
sentiments in the cause of the national unity and integration…”

iii. A S Naryana Deekshitulu v. State of AP 1996 (9) SCC 548

(Para.5):“…Though Agamas prescribed class discriminatory
placement for worship in the temples, it became obsolete after the

 WWW.LIVELAW.IN 22

advent of the Constitution of India which, by Articles 14 15 17 25 and

26, prohibits discrimination on grounds only of caste, class, sect etc.”

iv. John Vallamattom v. Union of India (2003) 6 SCC 611 (Para. 44): “it
is not a matter of doubt that marriage, succession and the like matters
of secular character cannot be brought within the guarantee
enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.”

4.6. It is submitted that the right of religious denominations to manage their
own religious affairs guaranteed under Article 26 is subject to morality.
Article 26 reads as: “(1) Subject to public order, morality and health, every
religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right – …(b) to
manage its own affairs in matters of religion.”

4.7. It is submitted that the word “morality” shall be read to mean

constitutional morality which includes gender justice, right to non
discrimiantion, dignity and personal autonomy of women at the very
least. It is submitted that the impugned practices run counter to
constitutional morality and thus cannot be protected under Article 26 of
the Constitution.

i. Manoj Narula v. Union of India 2014 (9) SCC 1 (Paras. 74-76):“The

Constitution of India is a living instrument with capabilities of
enormous dynamism. It is a Constitution made for a progressive
society. Working of such a Constitution depends upon the prevalent
atmosphere and conditions. Dr. Ambedkar had, throughout the
Debate, felt that the Constitution can live and grow on the bedrock of
constitutional morality. Speaking on the same, he said: -
“Constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be
cultivated. We must realize that our people are yet to learn it.
Democracy in India is only a top-dressing on an Indian soil, which is
essentially undemocratic.”“The principle of constitutional morality
basically means to bow down to the norms of the Constitution and not
to act in a manner which would become violative of the rule of law or
reflectible of action in an arbitrary manner. It actually works at the
fulcrum and guides as a laser beam in institution building. The
traditions and conventions have to grow to sustain the value of such a
morality. The democratic values survive and become successful
where the people at large and the persons-in-charge of the institution
are strictly guided by the constitutional parameters without paving the
path of deviancy and reflecting in action the primary concern to
maintain institutional integrity and the requisite constitutional
restraints. Commitment to the Constitution is a facet of constitutional
morality”

4.8. It is submitted that the right under Article 26 is subject to constitutional

goals of securing equality and dignity:

i. Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi v. State

of U.P 1997 (4) SCC 606 (Para. 27): “The denomination sect is also
bound by the constitutional goals and they too are required to abide
by law; they are not above law. Law aims at removal of the social ills

 WWW.LIVELAW.IN 23

and evils for social peace, order, stability and progress in an

egalitarian society. …In secularising the matters of religion which are
not essentially and integrally parts of religion, secularism, therefore,
consciously denounces all forms of supernaturalism or superstitious
beliefs or actions and acts which are not essentially or integrally
matters of religion or religious belief or faith or religious practices. In
other words, non-religious or anti-religious practices are antithesis to
secularism which seeks to contribute in some degree to the process of
secularisation of the matters of religion or religious practices. For
instance, untouchability was believed to be a part of Hindu religious
belief. But human rights denounce it and Article 17 of the Constitution
of India abolished it and its practice in any form is a constitutional
crime punishable under civil Rights Protection Act. Article 15(2) and
other allied provisions achieve the purpose of Article 17.”

It is therefore submitted that to recognise talaq-e-biddat or nikah–halala

goes counter to constitutional morality of equality and gender justice and
is liable to be declared unconstititonal.

4.9. Article 29 reads as: “Protection of interests of minorities: (1) Any section of
the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a
distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to
conserve the same”

4.10. It is submitted that the word “culture” in the said Article msut be read
ejusdem generis with the words “language and script” and cannot
include within it personal laws The Respondent Board cannot in one
breath claim that triple talaq is part of their religion and in the other
breath claim the proteciotn of the right to conserve culture.

4.11. In any event, a cultural practice which goes contrary to Articles 14 and
15 and 21 cannot be preserved but on the contrary must be abolished.
Several examples can be found of practices justified as being based on
religion and culture that have been abolished on being found contrary to
the prevailing ethos of prevailing norms of civilised society including the
abolition of Sati and child marriage.

4.12. It is submitted that the impugned practices that violate the fundamental
rights of eqaulity, life and dignity cannot be held to be protected under
Article 29 of the Constitution of India as being part of “culture”. On an
harmoinous interpretation of Articles 14, 15, 21 on one hand, and Article
29 on the other hand, it is submitted that only culture that does not
violate the indispendable right to equality and life can be preserved as a
matter of right.

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5. EXTRA JUDICIAL DIVORCE IS UNCONSTITITONAL

5.1. It is submitted that divorce alters the civil status of a married woman
and can leave her destitute. In all other communities, divorce can only be
obtained by a judicial forum since it is a decision in rem and alters the
legal status of a person and cannot be given by private parties, nor can
any fatwa be issued recognising a unilateral talaq. Allowing one party to
a marriage to give a unilateral private talaq is against public policy and
is required to be declared unconstitutional. No person’s status resulting
in adverse civil consequence for a person can be altered by a private
person. The grant of divorce is a judicial function and can only be
granted by a court of law. The function of granting a divorce cannot be
performed by any private person and all such divorces are null and void
in law allowing the woman to retain her status as a married woman. In
contrast to unilateral talaq, a Muslim woman is required to approach a
court of law to obtain a divorce on stated grounds under the Dissolution
of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 and for that reason also, the said
impugned practcie of talaq discriminates between Muslim men and
Muslim women and must be declared unconstitutional.

5.2. It is submitted that this court held while discussing the legal validity of
fatwas that they have no legal validity.

i. Vishwalochan Madan v. Union of India & Ors (2014) 7 SCC 707

(Para.15): “The object of establishment of a Muslim court may be laudable
but we have no doubt in our mind that it has no legal status. It is bereft of
any legal pedigree and has no sanction in laws of the land. They are not
part of the corpus juris of the State. A fatwa is an opinion, only an expert is
expected to give. It is not a decree, nor binding on the court or the State or
the individual. It is not sanctioned under our constitutional scheme…the
Muslim Court was neither created nor sanctioned by any law made by
competent legislature..no institution which derives its strength from religion
or is religiously sanctioned or sanctioned by religious or personal law, may
act or issue directions (such as fatwa) as it is in violation of basic human
rights and faith cannot be used as a dehumanising force.”

5.3. For the reasons aforesaid, it is submitted that the Petition must be
allowed.

Date: 07.04.2017 DRAWN BY: Advocate Meher Dev

Place: New Delhi SETTLED BY: Senior Advocate Ms. Indira Jaising

FILED BY: Advocate on Record Purushottam Sharma Tripathi