CHREA vs.
CHR The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from
G.R. No. 155336
November 25, 2004
FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as
the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional
Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of
these special provisions, the CHR promulgated
Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and
reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR
“collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing
modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and
upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the
request.
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed
personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National
Capital Region Office, through a memorandum,
recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s
disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees
association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and
file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central
Office to affirm the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a
Resolution and reversedthe recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be
censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA,
which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling,
and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the
justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s
fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading,
reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the Commission without the prior approval
of the Department of Budget and Management?
HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the
CA and its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED.
The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the
DBM are disallowed.
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation
and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary
Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that
shall establish and administer a unified Compensation
and Position Classification System.
the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed
considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the
entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in
character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of
others; to direct or superintend the execution,
application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct
public affairs, as to administer the government of the
state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of
compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag,
this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and
other benefits received by PRA officials and employees
without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM
are unauthorized and irregular
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the
sole power and discretion to administer the
compensation and position classification system of the
national government.
In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the
charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the
compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts
PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the
Compensation and Position Classification Office, by
virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation
system established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to
the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of
any PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure
of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that
the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors
and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter.
Rather, the DBM’s function is merely to ensure that the
action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the
requirements of the law, specifically, that PPC’s
compensation system “conforms as closely as possible
with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.” )
3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential
yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be
sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or
upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant
to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987,
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of
Budget and Management shall assist the President in the
preparation of a national resources and expenditures
budget, preparation, execution and control of the
National Budget, preparation and maintenance of
accounting systems essential to the budgetary process,
achievement of more economy and efficiency in the
management of government operations, administration
of compensation and position classification systems,
assessment of organizational effectiveness and review
and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary
or organizational implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to
disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its
finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the
DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of
positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM
requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped
from now claiming that the nod of approval it has
previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the
CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken
premise that the CHR belongs to the species of
constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states
in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC,
and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional
Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal
autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on
Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC,
and the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal
autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is
silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies
including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The
Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent,
are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional
Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance
with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
Commission on Human Rights, and independent central
monetary authority, and a national police commission.
Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may
establish an independent economic and planning agency.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code,
it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class
of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the
oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
the express mention of one person, thing, act or
consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise,
expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed
puts an end to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention
that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal
autonomy entails freedom from outside control and
limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the
freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in
accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and
dispatch its needs may require from time to time.22 In
Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is
understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA,
the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which
enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a
member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable
by membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under
Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the
CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those
offices to which the special provision to formulate and
implement organizational structures apply, but merely
states its coverage to include Constitutional
Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional
creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of
offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant
of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government
offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary
Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the
DBM on its standpoint, thus-
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not
vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade,
and create positions without approval of the DBM. While
the members of the Group are authorized to formulate
and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices and determine the compensation of
their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must
be exercised within the parameters of the Unified
Position Classification and Compensation System
established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law.
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of
respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No.
8522 “that the implementation hereof shall be in
accordance with salary rates, allowances and other
benefits authorized under compensation standardization
laws.”26
NOTES:
1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has
no locus standi considering that there exists no official
written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner
as a bona fide organization of its employees nor is there
anything in the records to show that its president has the
authority to sue the CHR.
On petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we held in a
multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of the act complained of. Here,
petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of
respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and
collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the
upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the
demoralization of the rank and file employees. This
sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR’s
upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially
entails eating up the Commission’s savings or that
portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for
Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the
employees, including those in the rank and file, are
derived.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was

recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the
CHREA’s request to affirm the recommendation of the
CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREA’s
personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA
when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither
should our hands be tied by this technical concern.
Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was
neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice,
and due process.

2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy

behind the Salary Standardization Law of “providing
equal pay for substantially equal work and to base
differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties
and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of
the positions,” the DBM, in the case under review, made
a determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the
reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the
CHR lacks legal rationalization.

The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general

provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998,
which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its
reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that “no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be
authorized unless provided by law or directed by the
President.” Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law
authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office
and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHR’s
proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI,
SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of
Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central
Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change
the context from support to substantive without
actual change in functions.

This view of the DBM, as the law’s designated body to

implement and administer a unified compensation
system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an
administrative government agency, which is tasked to
implement a statute is accorded great respect and
ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In
Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed the basic rule
that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.