ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral
component of the delicate system of checks and balances
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)
Carpio Morales, J,:
FACTS:
On November 28, 2001, the 12th Congress of the House
of Representatives (HR) adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the
previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress. Petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he
has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional
impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance,
and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary
changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
introduced by the 12th Congress."
On July 22, 2002, the HR adopted a Resolution, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation,
in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On June 2, 2003, former
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by HR, and
was referred to the House Committee on Justice (HCJ) on August
5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The HCJ ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. Four (4) months and three (3) weeks since the filing of
the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the HCJ
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives
against Chief Justice Davide, founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the HR. Various
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with
the Supreme Court against the HR, most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI
of the Constitution that "no impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year."
ISSUE:
Whether the power of judicial review extends to those
arising from impeachment proceedings.
HELD:
The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the
judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our
present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine
the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of
government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of
the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v.
which, together with the corollary principle of separation of
powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government
and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of
the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to
be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them
to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine
Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while
the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the
Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided
for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct
any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government
branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions
between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows
sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives
without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required
vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of
one and the same official. The people expressed their will when
they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to
leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or
"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of
the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial
review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court
exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that
the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components
of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence
that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR. VS. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES G.R.
No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on
June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed and
was referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that
the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form, but voted
to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment
complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Issues:
1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense?
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Held:
1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six
grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high
crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition.
2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they
give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act
of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was
filed on June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint
filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
GUTIERREZ VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
415 SCRA 44
Certiorari and prohibition
Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2011
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House
Resolutions of Sept. 1 and 7, 2010 finding two impeachment
complaints against the petitioner, simultaneously referred to the
House Committee on Justice, sufficient in form and substance on
grounds that she was denied due process and that the said
resolutions violated the one-year bar rule on initiating
impeachment proceedings for impeachable officers. Court
dismissed the petition.
Facts:
– 22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first
session, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim
and spouses Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment
complaint against Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-List
Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao
– 27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to
House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business
– 3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother
Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand
Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed an impeachment
complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed by
Representatives Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and
De Jesus
– HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on
Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-
Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who
then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to include it
in the Order of Business
– 11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two
complaints to the House Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)
– After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010,
found both complaints sufficient in form
– 2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment
Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published
– After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010
found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation
of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in
substance
– Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition
challenging Resolutions of September 1 and 7 alleging that she
was denied due process and that these violated the one-year bar
rule on initiating impeachment proceedings
Issue/s:
1. Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy
2. Whether the belated publication of the Rules of
Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the
15th Congress denied due process to the Petitioner
3. Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints
violated the Constitution
Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.
Ratio:
1. 1. NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION
– Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a
duty of the judiciary
– the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article
XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required
vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of
one and the same official.
-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language
of Baker v. Carr, “judicially discoverable standards” for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through
the power of judicial review
1. 2. DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode
of promulgation the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment
Proceedings?
– (P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and
substance of the impeachment complaints is tainted with bias as
the Chairman of the HCOJ’s, Rep. Tupas, father has a pending
case with her at the Sandiganbayan
– Presumption of regularity
– The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of
the express grant of rule-making power in the HOR
– the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the
constitutional requirements and providing that there must be
a “verified complaint or resolution”, and that the substance
requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee”
– The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method
of promulgating the Rules.
– impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people
as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender
1. 3. THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE

– (P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days
before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She
posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second
impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to
public respondent.
– INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with
Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint (referral of the
complaint to the Committee on Justice)
– IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate
– Rationale of the one-year bar: “that the purpose of the
one-year bar is two-fold: 1)”to prevent undue or too frequent
harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task
[of] legislation,”
“…that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year,
such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks
can no longer rekindle the candle.” (Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)
Sen. De Lima v. Hon. Guerrero
G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017
FACTS:
The Senate and House of Representatives conducted several
inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the
New Bilibid Prison, inviting inmates who executed affidavits in
support of their testimonies. These legislative inquiries led to the
filing of four complaints against Senator Leila De Lima ("Sen. De
Lima"), et al. with the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). The four
complaints were consolidated.
The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2,
2016. Sen. De Lima filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately
Endorse the Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman and for the
Inhibition of the DOJ Panel and the Secretary of Justice. Sen. De
Lima argued that the Office of the Ombudsman ("Ombudsman")
has exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four
complaints. The case should also be referred to the Ombudsman
because of evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel and
the Secretary of Justice.
Sen. De Lima decided not to submit her counter-affidavit citing
the pendency of her two motions. The DOJ Panel, however, ruled
that it will not entertain belatedly filed counter- affidavits and
declared all pending incidents and the cases as submitted for
resolution. Petitioner moved for but was denied reconsideration
by the DOJ Panel.
On January 13, 2017, Sen. De Lima filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel
over the complaints against her.
In the absence of a restraining order issued by the Court of
Appeals, the DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the
preliminary investigation. In its Joint Resolution dated February 14,
2017, the DOJ Panel recommended the filing of informations
against Sen. De Lima. Accordingly, three informations were filed
against Sen. De Lima and several co-accused before the RTC of
Muntinlupa City.
On February 20, 2017, Sen. De Lima filed a Motion to Quash based
on several grounds including 1) RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the
case; 2) DOJ Panel lacks authority to file the Information; 3) the
Information charges more than one offense; 4) the allegations
and recitals of facts do not allege the corpus delicti of the charge;
5) the Information is based on the testimonies of witnesses who are
not qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and 6) the
testimonies of the witnesses are hearsay.
On February 23, 2017, Judge Guerrero issued an Order finding
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against Sen.
De Lima and her co-accused. On February 24, 2017, the PNP and
CIDG served the warrant of arrest on Sen. De Lima.
On February 27, 2017, Sen. De Lima filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court. The OSG, on behalf of the Republic, filed
its Comment arguing that Sen. De Lima 1) failed to show that she
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and 2) failed
to observe the hierarchy of courts and violated the rule against
forum shopping. The OSG also argued that The OSG argued that
the petition should be dismissed as De Lima failed to show that she
has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Further, the
OSG posited that the petitioner did not observe the hierarchy of
courts and violated the rule against forum shopping. On
substantive grounds, the OSG asserted inter alia that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the offense charged against the petitioner, that
the respondent judge observed the constitutional and procedural
rules, and so did not commit grave abuse of discretion, in the
issuance of the assailed orders and warrant.
ISSUES:
Procedural Issues:
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts considering that the petition
should first be filed with the Court of Appeals.
B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the
Information before the trial court renders the instant petition
premature.
C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated
the rule against forum shopping given the pendency of the
Motion to Quash the Information before the Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 17-165 and the Petition for
Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No.
149097, assailing the preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ Panel.
Substantive Issues:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the
jurisdiction over the violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in
the assailed Information.
B. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in
finding probable cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against
petitioner.
C. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order in the interim until the instant
petition is resolved or until the trial court rules on the Motion to
Quash.
RULING:
It is immediately clear that petitioner De Lima did not sign the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and
Affidavit of Merit in front of the notary public. Such clear breach
of notarial protocol is highly censurable36 as Section 6, Rule II of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires the affiant, petitioner
De Lima in this case, to sign the instrument or document in the
presence of the notary De Lima failed to sign the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping in the presence of the
notary, she has likewise failed to properly swear under oath the
contents thereof, thereby rendering false and null the jurat and
invalidating the Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping. Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of
the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping, there
is no assurance that the petitioner swore under oath that the
allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct, and not merely speculative.
Petitioner disregarded the hierarchy of courts. The rule on
hierarchy of courts is an important component of the orderly
administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical
and arbitrary reasons. Well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this court may be allowed
when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine
issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed
immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental
importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5)
when time is of the essence; ( 6) when the subject of review
involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other
plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8)
when the petition includes questions that may affect public
welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity;
and (10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate
remedy. Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently
established in the present petition so as to convince this court to
brush aside the rules on the hierarchy of courts. This Court cannot
thus allow a precedent allowing public officers assailing the
finding of probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants to be
brought directly to this Court, bypassing the appellate court,
without any compelling reason.
interest in the accountability of public officers is necessary? (Italics
supplied. Citations omitted.)
As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, the CA, in the
present case, gravely erred in disallowing the Ombudsman’s
motion to intervene. It failed to consider the essence of the
Ombudsman’s constitutionally and statutorily conferred powers
establishing its clear legal interest in ensuring that its directive be
implemented.

The present petition is premature. Granting a writ of prohibition

enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge from conducting
further proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash is
resolved with finality; Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the
parties to the status prior to the issuance of the Order and Warrant
of Arrest, both dated February 23, 201 7, thereby recall inf both
processes and restoring petitioner to her liberty and freedom In
the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to Quash -- which
puts the jurisdiction of the lower court in issue -- there is no
controversy for this Court to resolve; there is simply no final
judgment or order of the lower court to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm. As per the block letter provision of the
Constitution, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction in a vacuum
nor issue a definitive ruling on mere suppositions.

UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. PRUDENCIO C. QUIMBO G.R. No.

173277, 25 February 2015, SECOND DIVISION, (Mendoza, J. )

Even if the Ombudsman is not impleaded as a party in the

proceedings, part of its broad powers include defending its
decisions before the Court of Appeals.

Gilda D. Daradal, a clerk in the Provincial Engineering Office of

Catbalogan, Samar filed a complaint for Sexual Harassment and
Oppression against Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo (Quimbo),
Provincial Engineer of Samar with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas alleging that, Quimbo asked her to massage his forehead
and nape and, in the course thereof, he said, “You had been lying
to me you have already seen my manhood. When shall I have to
see yours?” Also, Quimbo ordered her detail to the Civil Service
Commission in Catbalogan, Samar, to perform the tasks of a male
utility personnel. Her name was removed from the payroll of the
personnel of the Provincial Engineering Office because of her
refusal to submit to his sexual advances. Daradal filed a motion
for withdrawal of the complaint but was denied by the
Ombudsman-Visayas. The Ombudsman-Visayas dismissed the
case of sexual harassment against Quimbo but finding him guilty
of oppression. When the case reached the Court of Appeals, it
reversed the ruling of the Ombudsman-Visayas and denied the
motion for intervention of the latter.

ISSUE:

Does the Ombudsman possess the requisite legal interest to

intervene in the proceedings where its decision is in question?

RULING:

Yes. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the

Ombudsman may validly intervene in the said proceedings as its
legal interest on the matter is beyond cavil. The Court elucidated
in Ombudsman v. De Chavez, thus:

The Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in the

inquiry into whether respondent committed acts constituting
grave misconduct, an offense punishable under the Uniform Rules
in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was in keeping with
its duty to act as a champion of the people and preserve the
integrity of public service that petitioner had to be given the
opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its authority.

The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested

and neutral specially when defending its decisions.

Moreover, in administrative cases against government personnel,

the offense is committed against the government and public
interest. What further proof of a direct constitutional and legal