Enrico vs.

Heirs
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007

FACTS:

The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that
Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June 1962 and begot seven children, herein
respondents. On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married
petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the requisite of a
marriage license. Eulogio passed away six months later. They argued that Article 34 of the
Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at
least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not
applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to
Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004,
which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.
Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack
of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its
performance impossible.

In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and
wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She further contended that the marriage ceremony
was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by
the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on
the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

ISSUES:

Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Eulogio and Lolita

RULING:

No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14, 2003, covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of
petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on August 26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of
the order. The order declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. But it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity,
but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
 G.R. No. 135830 – 471 SCRA 266 – Civil Law – Family Code – Annulment of
Marriage – Proper Party

Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each had three
parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived
by his wife Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death,
two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August
1995, Carlos commenced an action for the annulment of the marriage between Teofilo
and Felicidad. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late
brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor
the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such
certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.

ISSUE: Who may file an action for annulment of marriage?

HELD: A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during
the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the
marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition forannulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior
to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule
extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988.

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a
nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to
deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean
that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They
can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage
of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the
Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003
is prospective in its application.

Carlos commenced the nullity of marriage case against Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern
depends upon when the marriage took place.

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration
of nullity of marriage?

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Ninal v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects
their successional rights.
 ISIDRO ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010

DOCTRINE:

The plaintiff must be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest”
can file the action.

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for
the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January
9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized
without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties
acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest;
and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the
marriage being void ab initio.

On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that petition is filed
out of time and that petitioner is not a party to marriage. Motion for

reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal order of the RTC on the ground that the action must be filed by the proper party,
which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest inthe action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother?

HELD:

Yes. The applicable law when marriage was contracted between Cresenciano and Leonila
on December 26, 1949, is the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having
the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. The case was reinstated and
its records returned to RTC for further proceedings.
 AURELIO V. AURELIO

G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011]

FACTS:

Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on
March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition,
respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of
performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition,
respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even
during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. It alleged among others that
said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the
husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The
husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods
alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the
maintenance of the family.

On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and
freely. Her feelings change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending
on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was
emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay
to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence
lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship.
Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to
the breakdown of their marriage.

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner

principally argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to
meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation
of Article 36 of the Family Code.

RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void?

HELD:

Petition denied. Marriage is null and void.

RATIO:
First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of
psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the
manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and
respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological
incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same
as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a
nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from
Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to
perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied
with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition,
respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that “the
husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.”
 Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals and De Quintos
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012

Facts: Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of
Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas hysterectomy following her second
miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalinas
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to
the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
After conducting an investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and
Catalina. Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty
arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping
with neighbors instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by
gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in
1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of Catalina constitute psychological incapacity.

Held: No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community
of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and
duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological illness.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family
Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion
that may arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we then laid
down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, viz:

 The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
 The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical.
 The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
 Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
 Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts”
cannot be accepted as root causes.
 The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
 Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
 The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state.

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by
separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding
on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of
his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a
basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.
Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. No. 157854, November 12, 2012
Facts: Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza got married while Arabelle was eight months
pregnant. They lived together but depended on their parents for financial support.
Arabelle had different jobs to support the needs of the family. When Dominic got
employed for Toyota in Bel-Air Makati in 1994, he spent his first salary celebrating with
his friends. September of the same year, Arabelle found out of Dominic’s illicit relationship
with Zaida, his co-employee. Communication between them became rare and they
started sleeping in separate rooms. In November 1995, Dominic gave her a car as a
birthday present only to find out that he did not pay for it, forcing her to rely on her father-
in-law for the payment of the car. Dominic eventually got fired from his job because of he
ran away with P164,000 belonging to his employer. He was charged with estafa.
Petitioner also found out that he swindled many of his clients some of them threatening
her and their family. On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode
because petitioner asked him for “time and space to think things over.” A month later, she
refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. She and
her family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him. On
August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of
her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity which
are gravity, antecedence and incurability, were attendant, establishing Dominic’s
psychological incapacity. The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no
showing that Dominic’s personality traits either constituted psychological incapacity
existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of
the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the
court, and that the real reason for the parties’ separation had been their frequent quarrels
over financial matters and the criminal cases brought against Dominic. CA reversed the
decision of RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N psychological incapacity of Dominic was established

HELD: No. Findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself
subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert. He also did not
participate in the proceedings. And that the findings and conclusions on his psychological
profile by her expert were solely based the testimonies of the petitioner.
FACTS: Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of
entry of marriage in the CivilRegistry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. Thepetition was later amended and
captioned as a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.The petition
alleged, among others, that:Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese
national named YOSHIDO MINORO;Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in
Japan and after due proceeding, a divorce decreewas rendered by the Japanese Court;The trial
court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo
in Japanshould not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code,
the Philippine law “does notafford Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in the
country or living abroad, if they are married toFilipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated
their marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and thatunless Filipinos “are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over
issuesrelated to Filipino family rights and duties, together with determination of their
condition and legal capacity toenter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages”.On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code ofthe Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who
filed for divorce against her Japanesehusband because the decree they obtained makes the
latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him toremarry. Conformably with Navarro, et
al. v. Exec. Secretary, et al. [663 Phil. 546 (2011)] ruling that the meaningof the law should be
based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26,
itwould be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national,
who, in turn, is nolonger married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was
Manalo who filed the divorce case isinconsequential.
ISSUES:Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtained a favorable judgmentagainst his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry,
has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26(2) of the Family
Code.RULING:Yes.Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validl y
obtained abroad by the alien spousecapacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a
clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should.
Tenchavez vs Escano
TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got
married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer
before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of
the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their
match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San
Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to
renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating
the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her
parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for
the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and
issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada
and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint
against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her
husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on
foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the
Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce
in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough
grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and
Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to
recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the
desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount
of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his
wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Van Dorn vs Romillo
Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was
married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2
children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with
Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s
business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein
that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator
of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada
is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before
the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to
be served.
Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then
filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on
January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
E D. QUITA, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,
respondents
December 22, 1998

Facts:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May
18, 1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner
obtained a final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16,
1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition
with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in
favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan,
opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and
petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between
private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated during the
existence of his previousmarriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the case
to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issues:

1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

Held:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitledunder the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner
herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective
hereditary shares.

Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous
marriage considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her
not a surviving spouse.
 LORENZO LLORENTE, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. NO. 124371. November 23, 2000

FACTS:

Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as “Paula”) were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the
outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in
the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate
of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court,
Southern District of New York. Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua as “Crisologo Llorente,” with the certificate stating that the child was
not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank.

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with
the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On
November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San
Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.[11]

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. On December 4, 1952, the divorce
decree became final. In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. Lorenzo
married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage
or cohabitation.

Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public
Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting
witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children.

Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the
probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia
be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.

Paula filed with the same court a petition*22+ for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
estate in her favor.

RTC: considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. CA
Affirmed

ISSUE:
Who are entitled to inherit?

RULING:

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.”

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects
of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to
the determination of the trial court. “Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,
and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed. Will is valid. SC reversed the decision.
 GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian

citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was
issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12,
1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their applicationfor a marriage license, respondent was
declared as “single” and “Filipino.”

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on

the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married her. On his Answer, Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly
dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from
a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on
the ground that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there
was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

RULING:

1st issue:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s
marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between
respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Republic vs Orbecido
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer
and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and
learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a
certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a
Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry under Philippine law.
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married
Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to
work commitments. He returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to find out
Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a
divorce that took effect on January 2006.

Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the
Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian
divorce decree but was denied considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be recognized
judicially by the Philippine court.

Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of

foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and
according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the
remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of

the foreign divorce decree

HELD:

The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of
Filipino spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the
clarification of the marital status of the Filipino spouse.

However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree
as it is a conclusive presumption of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce
decree with confirmity to the alien's national law.

The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign
divorce decree without judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still
deemed to be void.
 LLAVE V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

FACTS:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently,
under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s
wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest
of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano
for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31,
1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD:

Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage
was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is
void ab initio.
FUJIKI VS MARINAY

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon
City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3]
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.[4] On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;[5] and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of
the Family Code of the Philippines[11] on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition
by Philippine courts.[12]
Issues:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must...
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in
private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of
such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground
of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully... consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void
from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese
Family Court judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
Digest

PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGO No. 27972 October 31, 1927

FACTS:
On November 23, 1926, herein appellant Felipe Santiago raped Felicita Masilang, his wife’s
niece, in an uninhabited place
across a river in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. After the deed, he took her to the house of his brother,
Agaton Satiago, who in turn fetched a protestant minister who there and then officiated the
ceremony of their marriage. After having given money by Felipe, Felicita proceeded home to her
father and told what had just occurred.

ISSUE:Whether or not the marriage executed by the protestant minister is of legal effect.

HELD: The marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant hoped to escape from
the criminal consequence of his act. It shows that he had no bona fide intention of making her his
wife and the ceremony cannot be considered binding on
her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and it suppli
es no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer
Montanez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012
FACTS: On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On January
24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married
Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa a
Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of
the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family
Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of
respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and
executory on October 13, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda
Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with the
MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent.
Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first marriage was already declared void
ab initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her
marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. The prosecution argued that the
crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her
petition for declaration of nullity. RTC ruled in favor of respondent on the
ground that both wedding were governed by the Civil Code, and not the
Family Code, hence, no judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition
precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage in

2003 justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.

HELD: NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of

any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason
is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. In the case at bar, the respondent’s clear intent was to
obtain judicial declaration of nullity to escape from the bigamy charges
against her.
CASTILLO VS CASTILLO

Facts:

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista
(Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A.
Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting
marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that her
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license therefor,
and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing
officer belonged.

RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio
on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she
married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus
rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need
not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists,
the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also said that even if respondent
eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the
first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled,
since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista
before contracting her second marriage with Renato.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the
parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were
solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the
time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA
ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.

Issue: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a

marriage.

Ruling: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.

The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the
invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage
license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab
initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a
requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC
declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion
that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
1. People v. Edgardo Odtuhan
G.R. No. 191566July 17, 2013
Facts:
On 1980, Edgardo Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina. On 1993, respondent married Eleanor A.
Alagon. Sometime in 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. The
RTC of Pasig City
granted respondent’s petition and declared
his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. On 2003,Alagon
died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of
respondent’s previous marriage with Modina.
She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy. On 2005, Odtuhan was
indicted in an Information for Bigamy. He filed an Omnibus Motion praying that his motion to
quash be granted on the grounds, to wit: (1)that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy;
and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished The RTC denied
respondent’s Omnibus Motion
and held that the facts alleged in the information
–
that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage
having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon
–
constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be
quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been
extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of
extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent’s
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. The CA granted the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
WON the information for Bigamy may be quashed.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
 Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, et.al. v. Ma. Lourdes Belen
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
Perez, J.

FACTS

Petitioner Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and Ma. Lourdes Belen, who
are common-law partners. When Eliseo died instestate, Elise through her mother filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC, claiming that she is a natural child
of Eliseo having conceived at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry
each other. Filiation was proven by her Birth Certificate signed by Eliseo. Insisting on the
legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to
Amelia Garcia-Quiazon by claiming it was bigamous.

Respondent Amelia opposed the issuance of the letters of administration asserting that
the venue of the petition was improperly laid. However, the RTC rendered its decision in
favor of Elise. On appeal, the deicison was affirmed. Hence, the petition was filbed before
the SC raising the argument that Elise has not shown any interest in the petition for letters
of administration and that the CA erred in declaring that Eliseo and Amelia were no legally
married because Elise has no cause of action on it.

ISSUE

Whether or not Elise has a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage despite
the death of his father, hence cannot be deemed as an interested party.

RULING

Yes, Elise has a cause of action. The Court ruled that in a void marriage, no marriage has
taken place and it cannot be the source of right, such that any interested party may attach
the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond
the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Having successional rights that would be
prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, Elise may without a doubt impugn the
existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be
questioned by filing an action attaching its validity, or collaterally by raising it as an issue
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse. As a compulsory
heir, Elise has a cause of action for the declaration of nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo
and Amelia.

Likewise, Elise who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate is deemed
to be an interested part. An interested part is one who would be benefited in the estate.
Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party.

RULING

Petition is denied for lack of merit.

Domingo vs CA
Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously
married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter
filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-
month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been
disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because
their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and
superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the
purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties
acquired during the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.

HELD:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it
is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or
her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being
charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply
be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence,
the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime
of property relations governing them.
 REPUBLIC V. GALANG

G.R. No. 168335, [June 6, 2011]

DOCTRINE:

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence;

and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.”

FACTS:

In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga and thereafter they
resided in the house of the Nestor’s father. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator while
Juvy stayed at home. They had one child, Christopher.

In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that
Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage,
as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler; that Juvy suffers from “mental deficiency,
innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection
[towards him and their] child.” He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely serious”
and “appears to be incurable.”

Having found no collusion between the parties, the case was set for trial. In his testimony,
Nestor alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not
want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors’ care; and Christopher
almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there. He added that Juvy stole
his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing Nestor’s father’s
pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing “mahjong” and “kuwaho” three
(3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the
pretense that their son was confined in a hospital.

Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a
psychological test on Nestor. In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the
following findings:

Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured

individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major
irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a little
ability to endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions which
resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained
emotional tensions caused by his wife’s behavior.

The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife:
(1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and doesn’t manifest any sense of responsibility;
(2) her involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an
estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her neglect and
show no care attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and
rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable
to perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family.
There are just few reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated
mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.

The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The RTC
Judge, relying on the Santos Case, stated in the decision that the psychological incapacity
of respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage can be
characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary
duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary
circumstances of life

and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to the
history of the subject before marriage although its overt manifestations appear over after
the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary means or
subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject – are all obtaining in
this case.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether there is basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage to Juvy on the ground that at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity
that prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations.

HELD:

None. The Supreme Court held that the totality of Nestor’s evidence – his testimonies and
the psychologist, and the psychological report and evaluation – insufficient to prove
Juvy’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
 Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner vs. Cesar Encelan, Respondent
G.R. No. 170022; January 09, 2013

Facts: Cesar Married Lolita, and they had two children. To support the family, Cesar
went abroad and worked as an OFW in Saudi Arabia. After two years of working abroad,
Cesar learned that Lolita is having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez, and thereafter, left
the conjugal dwelling together with the two children. But even with such circumstances,
Cesar never failed to send financial support for the family. On June 1995, Cesar filed a
petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s
psychological incapacity. Cesar, during a hearing even presented a psychological
evaluation report on Lolita with the finding that “Lolita was not suffering from any form
of psychiatric illness, but had been unable to provide the expectations expected of her for
a good and lasting marital relationship.... and her transferring from one job to another
depicts some interpersonal problem with co-workers as well as her impatience in
attaining her ambitions .... and her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her
reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship...” Cesar found ally in RTC
as it gave him a favourable decision which declared his marriage to Lolita null and void.
The court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of RTC, and thereafter, the case was
elevated to the Supreme Court, thus, this case.

Issue: Whether or not psychological incapacity is indeed present in the person of Lolita
as to nullify a valid marriage.

Ruling: No. Marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the State and any
doubt should be resolved in favour of its existence and continuation against its
dissolution and nullity. In this case, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds
for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
actually prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations,
which the court found not present in the person of Lolita.
 CAMACHO- REYES V. REYES

G.R. No. 185286, [August 18, 2010]

FACTS:

Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University
of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old.
The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.

At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of
cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.

Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB

Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year,
and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.

In 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her father’s death, petitioner and
respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and
employed at the Population Center Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the
respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All livingexpenses were shouldered by
respondent’s parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their
personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00
from his salary. When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties
started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the
monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no
longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask
the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to
slow advancement within the family business. Respondent’s game plan was to venture
into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including
the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his
young family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the
set up, hoping that the situation will change. To prod respondent into assuming more
responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However,
the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner
struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondent’s
business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was
similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding
the family’s financial woes and further straining the parties’ relationship was the
indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business took him away
from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain
in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.

After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved
in with petitioner’s mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In
fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of
supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.

In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third
son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health
of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrivedin Manila, acting
nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the
hospital bills were settled.

In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business stopped operations.

Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work
for the family business. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital

affair. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially
for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful
to her and their family.

One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical
operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be
operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the
newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she
was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had
enough of respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to
leave the recovery room.

Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a
marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder
couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not
improve the parties’ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.

In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological

assessment to “determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning.” As with all
other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical
psychologist’s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner,
with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of their house.
Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner. With the de facto separation, the
relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children.

Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill
the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was

psychologically incapacitated. After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical
psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas,
were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage
between the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The CA
reversed. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES/HELD:

Whether the respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. –YES.

Whether the marriage should be declared null and void under Art. 36. –YES.

RATIO:

Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological

incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the
pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the
assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on
the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between
the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed “psychological incapacity”
which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally,
intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to
mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support,
(Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological
constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason
to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the
respondent.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE and
MANOLITO SAN JOSE

517 SCRA 123 (2007)

Being jobless and a drug user is not a state or condition or attitude shown to be a
malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological
condition.

Repondents Manolito San Jose and Laila Tanyag-San Jose got married. Thereafter Laila
gave birth to two children. Laila, then left Manolito for being jobless and hooked into
gambling and drugs.

Laila then filed a Petition for Declartion of Nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.

Dr. Nedy Tayag found that Manolito was psychologically incapacitated based on the
testimony of Laila. Dr. Tayag further said that he suffers from anti-social
personality disorder because of the following overt manipulations: the presence of drug,
the absence of remourse, the constant incapacity in terms of maintaining the marital
relationship, the lack of concern to his family, and his self-centeredness.

The RTC denied Laila‘s petition on the ground that it is not enough to prove that one failed
to perform his marital duty, it is essential that it must be shown that the other party is
incapable of doing so due to psychological incapacity not physical illness. Laila appealed
to Court of Appeals (CA). The CA held that Manolito was psychologically incapacitated
hence their marriage is void ab Initio. The CA concluded that the deficiency of Manolito
was so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bondone is about to assume.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Manolito is psychologically incapacitated

HELD:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of marriage, has been succinctly

expounded in the recent case of Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris(Ferraris), the
term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.

As the earlier-quoted Report of Dr. Tayag shows, her conclusion about Manolito‘s
psychological incapacity was based on the information supplied by Laila which she found
to be ―factual.‖ Undoubtedly, the doctor‘s conclusion is hearsay. It is ―unscientific and
unreliable,‖ so this Court declared in Choa v. Choa where the assessment of the therein
party sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated was based merely on the
information communicated to the doctor by the therein respondent-spouse. In this case,
Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely
been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and
secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be
dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.

Parenthetically, Dr. Tayag’s Psychological Report does not even show that the alleged
anti-social personality disorder of Manolito was already present at the inception of the
marriage or that it is incurable. Neither does it explain the incapacitating nature of the
alleged disorder nor identify its root

cause. It merely states that “such disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply
immersed within the system and continues to influence the individual until the later stage
of life.”

Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on his being jobless and a
drug user, as well as his inability to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Manolito’s state or condition or attitude
has not been shown, however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating
or debilitating psychological condition.
 INCENT MERCADO, petitioner vs. MA.CONSUELO TAN, defendant
G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000

FACTS:

The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in
a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976. Despite the prior marriage he got
married to complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On October 5, 1992, a letter-
complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the
City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the
present case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1,
1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than a
month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu
City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. Despite this, the Trial Court charged
Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still subsisting at the time he had
contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court. The petitioner then filed a case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage necessary for remarriage?

RULING:

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.’ But here, the final judgment declaring null and void accused’s
previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when
the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the
crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage
‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved.

It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.