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Confucius
YONG HUANG
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Preface ix
Notes 151
References 163
Index 169
with good and return evil with uprightness. From the Christian
viewpoint, the attitude that Jesus recommends is certainly more
ideal and noble than Confucius’s. Defenders of Confucius, in turn,
often argue that Jesus’s teaching is too idealistic to be practical,
while Confucius was a moral realist. In this chapter, I argue that
this is a misunderstanding. The main reason Confucius is against
returning evil with a good turn is that it is not conducive to making
the wrongdoer cease to be a wrongdoer, if it does not encourage
the person to commit further wrongdoings. In Confucius’s view, an
upright person is one who is also inclined to make others upright.
So when he asks us to return evil with uprightness, he is asking us
to do what can make the wrongdoer cease to be a wrongdoer.
In Chapter 3, I discuss Confucius’s answer to the question “why
be moral (or virtuous)?” by exploring his view that one ought to
love virtue as one loves sex. In Confucius’s view, to be virtuous is
a joyful thing. Of course, a person who asks the question “why be
moral?,” normally an egoist, may state that he or she cannot fi nd
joy, but instead can only fi nd pain, in being moral. Confucius’s
response is that this is because they lack the relevant virtuous
knowledge (not knowledge about virtue). Such knowledge requires
not only the intellectual part of what is called xin ㉒ in Chinese
(normally translated as heart-mind) but also its affective part, so
that anyone who possesses such knowledge will be inclined to be
moral and thus can take delight in being moral. The egoist may
further ask: even if I can fi nd joy in being moral, why do I have to
fi nd joy in being moral, as I can also fi nd joy in being immoral?
Confucius’s answer is that being virtuous is a distinguishing mark
of being human, and so anyone who is not virtuous is a defective
human being.
In Chapter 4, I discuss the Socratic problem of whether virtue
can be taught. Confucius’s ethics is often regarded as a virtue eth-
ics. However, one unique feature of Confucian virtue ethics, in
comparison to virtue ethics familiar in the Western philosophical
tradition, is that it avoids what Kantian critics call self-centered-
ness. For example, Aristotle makes it clear that a virtuous person
is a genuine self-lover, a lover for his or her internal character, vir-
tue, which is in contrast to the self-lover in a vulgar sense, a lover
for his or her external well-being. While a virtuous person is con-
cerned with both his or her own well-being and that of others, his
or her own well-being in question is internal, while that of others