X.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, Article VIII

A. Judicial Power

JUDICIAL POWER

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Implications:
1. Judicial power is also vested in such lower courts but these lower courts are created by law. The Supreme Court is created
by the Constitution. The SC does not owe its creation to Congress, unlike other courts. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the SC
cannot be decreased by Congress. It can be increased but upon the advice and concurrence of the SC.

The 1987 Constitution has prospective application. There was a law enacted prior to the 1987 Constitution granting
jurisdiction to the SC which is not found in the 1987 Constitution. That is still within the jurisdiction of the SC because the
1987 Constitution is not given retroactive effect.

2. There is only one Supreme Court. All other courts are lower than the SC. There can be no two SCs nor another court with
equal power as that the SC. Otherwise, there would be no end to controversy. So as far as issues and controversies are
concerned, the SC is the court of last resort.

3. The SC’s main power is judicial power but judicial power is also exercised by lower courts. What is judicial power? It is
the power to interpret laws. There must be an applicable law to interpret. Under judicial power, there are three important
powers.

1. Adjudicatory Powers – to settle disputes/controversy over cases

a. Involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable;
b. Affecting ambassadors, consuls, public ministers;
c. Electoral Tribunal (PET) = SC

1. Adjudicatory power
Adjudicatory powers – to settle disputes and controversies by interpreting the applicable law. What are these disputes and
controversies can they settle?
i. those involving rights legally enforceable and demandable – the right must be derived from law. Example: right of a wife to be
supported by the husband; right of support of children by the parents. Example of a right which is non-demandable? Plus
5 for perfect attendance because it is not derived from law.

ii. disputes affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls.

iii. sole judge in all questions involving elections, qualifications and returns of the President and Vice President.
Prior to the 1987 Constitution, there was this law which has not yet been repealed creating the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal. And it says there that it should be the sole judge for President and VP. It was questioned in the case of Macalintal
v PET. The SC held that the SC and PET are one and the same. The chairman of the PET is the Chief Justice and the members
are the Associate Justices so it is also the SC. The change in the name is only a change in the nomenclature in order to
emphasize the singularity and importance of their functions as PET. But it is the same SC. What does that imply? That once
PET has decided on it, that is final and executory.

2. Judicial Review – power to test the validity of the acts of any branch of government
a. Judicial Department – final judgments or order of lower courts
i. Constitutionality or validity of:
i.1 Treaty, International or Executive Agreements
i.2 Presidential Decrees, Proclamation, Order, Instruction, Ordinance, Regulations, Memoranda
i.3 Law (statute)

ii. Legality of
ii.1 Tax, impost, assessment, toll and
ii.2 Penalty thereto
 iii. Penalty Imposed (reclusion perpetua or higher)

iv. Pure Question of Law

v. Jurisdictional issue
v.1 lack or excess of jurisdiction
v.2 grave abuse of discretion

b. Executive Department
i. Presidential Decrees, Proclamation, Order, Instruction, Ordinance, Regulations, Memoranda
ii. Grave Abuse of Discretion
iii. Art. VII, Sec. 18: “The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding led by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.”
[Sui Generis]

c. Legislative Department
i. Laws (statute)
ii. Grave abuse of discretion

d. Constitutional Commissions
Art. IXA Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.

2. Judicial Review

Judicial Review – this power is controversial because it gives the courts the power to review the acts of other departments
which may be a violation of the separation of powers and touches on the political question issue. But this is an expanded
power given by the Constitution so that there may be no abuse in the exercise of power.

Judicial power is the power to test the validity of the acts of any branch of government.

Ministerial act – the discharge of function is imperative or necessary which requires no judgment or discretion on the part
of the public officer.
Discretion acts – those imposed upon a public officer who has the right to decide how and when the duty shall be
performed.

Judgment vs. Discretion

Judgment – is a judicial function. Only courts give judgment. This is the determination of a question of law. In judgment,
there is only one way to be right and that must be in accordance with the law.

Discretion is a judicial or administrative function by which a decision may be made either way and still be right.
Grave abuse of discretion – such capricious, whimsical exercise of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Must be patent, gross, despotic and arbitrary.

Question of law vs. Question of fact

Question of law – when the doubt or controversy concerns the application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts.
The truth or falsehood of such facts are admitted.

Question of fact – the issue calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented. The truth or falsehood
of the facts are disputed.

Limitations on the power of judicial review:

1. There must be a majority of members who actually took part in the deliberations of the issue in the case and voted
thereon.
“shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.”
 2. A law (executive or legislative act) must be sustained unless clearly repugnant to the Constitution in view of
presumption of validity of laws.
If there are two possible interpretations: one is valid and the other is not valid, it should be declared valid.

3. The question of wisdom, propriety or necessity of a law or an act is not open to determination of courts (political
question).
Political questions are generally addressed to the other departments (executive or legislative) or to the people
themselves.
Not all non-justiciable are political questions. Example: religious question.

Requisites of Judicial Review:

1. Actual case or controversy
a. Justiciable
b. Not moot and academic
XPNs: (even if moot and academic, the SC will still decide the case)
1. If there’s a grave violation of the constitution;
2. It is of transcendental importance or paramount consideration;
3. To guide the bench and the bar;
4. It is capable of repetition yet evading review
c. Ripe for judicial review
2. Issue must be raised by the proper party (legal standing/locus standi)
Locus standi – right to appear in a court of justice on a given question. The question to be resolved must be one
where you will benefit or injured by the judgment in the suit (real party in interest).
KINDS of Legal Standing:
a. Voter standing – interest in the validity of election laws (must be a voter)
b. Citizen standing – direct and personal interest over the case; there must be actual or imminent injury to you
(must be injury in fact)
c. Associational standing – there must be injury to the association and the association must have legal personality
to sue and be sued
d. Taxpayer – must involve expenditure of public money (attach your ITR)
e. Legislative standing – there is an act of the executive that injures Congress as an institution.
f. Governmental standing – this is to assert the authority of the government under the Constitution. Example is
when the government files an action on behalf of marginalized and underprivileged group under the doctrine
of parens patriae.
g. Intergenerational standing – when it comes to environmental cases.
h. Epistolary jurisdiction
3. The constitutional issue must be raised at the earliest opportunity
XPNs:
In civil cases, the constitutional issue may be raised for the first time on appeal if the determination of the question
is necessary to the decision in a criminal case.
In criminal cases, the constitutional issue may be raised anytime upon the sound discretion of the court.
Jurisdiction issue may be raised anytime. XPN: estoppel
4. Necessity of deciding the constitutional issue (lis mota)
The constitutional issue must be the crux of the controversy. The issue must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the constitution.

Three functions of judicial review:

1. Checking – is it contrary to the constitution?
2. Legitimating – does it uphold the law?
3. Symbolic – does it guide the bench and the bar?

There must be direct injury (locus standi). This is called as-applied challenge. You can question the validity of the law
even if it’s not applied to you, you can challenge it on its face (facial challenge) if it involves fundamental rights
(religion, speech and expression, privacy).

As-applied vs. facial challenge:

In an applied challenge, the petitioner who claims violation of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground
– absence of due process, etc. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statue only if he asserts a violation of his
own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the statue based solely on the violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court.

In facial challenge, a petitioner may challenge the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own
rights under the assailed statute where it involved free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The
rationale for this is to counter the chilling effect on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person
who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself
from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbreadth or vague law thus chills him into silence.

What kind of facial challenge?

1. Void-for-vagueness challenge – the law is vague and therefore void. When a statute which either forbids or
requires an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning
and differ as to its interpretation.
2. Overbreadth doctrine – a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be
achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected speech.

3. Incidental powers - powers necessary to discharge its functions

a. Cite contempt
b. Issue subpoena/orders
c. Grant/deny motions
d. Order arrest

B. Rule-Making Powers, Article VIII, Section 6 (5)

RULE-MAKING POWERS – to promulgate rules concerning:

a. The protection and enforcement of constitutional rights;
i. Writ of Amparo – remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
ii. Writ of Habeas Data – remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, honor and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
iii. Writ of Kalikasan – remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people’s
organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with
any government agency, on behalf of persons whose right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated,
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act of omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
iv. Writ of Continuing Mandamus - When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or
regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto
supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the
judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious
neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations.
v. Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) - A legal action filed to harass, vex, exert undue
pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any person, institution or the government has taken or may take
in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental
rights shall be treated as a SLAPP. In a SLAPP filed against a person involved in the enforcement of
environmental laws, protection of the environment, or assertion of environmental rights, the defendant
may file an answer interposing as a defense that the case is a SLAPP
 b. Pleading, practice, procedure in all courts;
c. Admission to the practice of law
d. IBP
e. Legal assistance to the underprivileged

C. Auxiliary Administrative Powers

AUXILIARY ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS

a. Detailing of lower courts judges
b. Change of venue or place of trial
c. Power of appointment (officials and employees of the judiciary)
d. Administrative supervision of all courts and court personnel
e. Fiscal autonomy
- In order to maintain the independence of the Judiciary.
The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically
and regularly released. (Art. VIII, Sec. 3)
f. Annual report
g. Supervision of JBC
(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members,
a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall
serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of
the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its
proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such
other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

Supreme Court Court of Appeals Regional Trial Court Metropolitan Trial Sandiganbayan
Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court
Natural born citizen of the Philippines
A judge of a A judge of a lower Has been engaged in Has been engaged in Has been a judge of a
lower court of court of engaged in the practice of law in the the practice of law in the court of record or been
engaged in the the practice of law Philippines or has held Philippines or has held engaged in the practice of
practice of law in the Philippines a public office in the a public office in the law in the Philippines or
in the for fifteen (15) years Philippines requiring Philippines requiring has held office requiring
Philippines for or more.* admission to the admission to the admission to the bar as a
fifteen (15) years practice of law as an practice of law as an pre-requisite for at least
or more. *Same indispensable requisite indispensable requisite ten (10) years.
qualifications as for at least ten (10) for at least five (5) years.
provided in the years.
1987 Constitution
for Justices of the
Supreme Court.
(Sec. 7, Ch. 1, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129)
At least 40 years of age At least 35 years of age At least 30 years of age At least 40 years of age

Qualifications:
 (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have
been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge
thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

How they will operationalize “must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence”?
The JBC has the power to formulate rules in measuring these qualifications provided those rules are published in
the Official Gazette and a copy is given to the ONAR.

The power to appoint belongs to the President. The only limitation when it comes to judiciary is that the appointee
must come from the nominees shortlisted by the JBC.

h. Plenary powers over the Bar

Bar – is the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorney of the SC.

i. Supervisory power over the IBP

IBP – national official organization of all lawyers in the Philippines. It is created by law, RA 6397, pursuant to
Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution. The rules governing the IBP is made by the SC, Rule 139-A.
Why the need to integrate?
a. To elevate the standard of the legal profession;
b. To improve the administration of justice;
c. To enable to bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Trobela vs. Robles, A.C. No. 11550, June 04, 2018:

The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the respondents' performance or discharge of official duties as prosecutors
of the Department of Justice. Hence, the authority to discipline respondents Robles, Obuñgen, Ang and Arellano exclusively
pertained to their superior, the Secretary of Justice. In the case of Secretary De Lima, the authority to discipline pertained
to the President. In either case, the authority may also pertain to the Office of the Ombudsman, which similarly exercises
disciplinary jurisdiction over them as public officials pursuant to Section 15, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989). Indeed, the accountability of respondents as officials performing or discharging their official
duties as lawyers of the Government is always to be differentiated from their accountability as members of the
Philippine Bar. The IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate them as such lawyers.

The IBP has no jurisdiction over government lawyers who are charged with administrative offenses involving
their official duties.

Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint Against Associate Justice Pizarro, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018
Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints against judges of regular courts and special courts as well as justices
of the CA and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted: (1) by the Supreme Court motu proprio; (2) upon a verified complaint,
supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the judiciary must be accompanied by
supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of flimsy and virtually unsubstantiated charges against them.

In this case, the anonymous complaint accused Justice Pizarro of selling favorable decisions, having a mistress, and
habitually playing in casinos; and essentially charging him of dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Law, immorality, and unbecoming conduct. These accusations, however, with the only exception of gambling in
casinos, are not supported by any evidence or by any public record of indubitable integrity. Thus, the bare allegations of
corruption and immorality do not deserve any consideration. For this reason, the charges of corruption and immorality
against Justice Pizarro must be dismissed for lack of merit.

Domingo vs. Revilla, A.C. No. 5473, January 23, 2018

A disbarred lawyer who is found to have committed an offense that constitutes another ground prior to his eventual
disbarment may be heavily fined therefor. The Court does not lose its exclusive jurisdiction over his other disbarrable act
or actuation committed while he was still a member of the Law Profession.
D. Concepts, definitions, distinctions
1. Political v Justiciable Question
Case: Ocampo v Enriquez, GR 225973, Nov 8, 2016
2. Ministerial v Discretionary Functions
3. Judgment v Discretion
4. Substantive v Procedural Law
Case: People v Teng Moner y Adam, GR 202206, Mar 5, 2018
5. Substantive v Procedural Rights
6. Facial Challenge v As Applied Challenge
a. Void for Vagueness Doctrine
b. Overbroad Doctrine
Cases:
- Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v Anti-Terrorism Council. 632
SCRA 146 (2010)
- Estrada v Sandigabnayan, GR 148560, Nov 19, 2001

There must be direct injury (locus standi). This is called as-applied challenge. You can question the validity of the law
even if it’s not applied to you, you can challenge it on its face (facial challenge) if it involves fundamental rights
(religion, speech and expression, privacy).

What kind of facial challenge?

1. Void-for-vagueness challenge – the law is vague and therefore void. When a statute which either forbids or
requires an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning
and differ as to its interpretation.
2. Overbreadth doctrine

E. Effects of declaration of unconstitutionality of law / act

1. Orthodox v Modern View
2. Operative Fact Doctrine
Case: Araullo v Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1 (2014) and 749 SCRA 284 (2015)

Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality:

1. Orthodox view – an unconstitutional act is not a law. It confers no rights. It imposes no duties. It affords no
protection. It creates no office. It is inoperative as if it had never been passed. It is void ab initio.
2. Modern view (Doctrine of Operative Fact): When a law is declared unconstitutional, the effect is recognized
especially if it will create an injustice or inequity.
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to
the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.

This doctrine is applicable in the adoption and implementation of DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from
equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or
could no longer be undone. But the doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be
undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors,
proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the
proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.

F. Modes of review and other judicial actions

G. Jurisdiction and Organization of courts

1. SC: en banc v division cases
2. General v Limited jurisdiction
3. Original v Appellate jurisdiction
4. Exclusive v Concurrent jurisdiction
5. Criminal v Civil jurisdiction
6. Regular v Special courts; Quasi-judicial bodies

H. Additional functions and powers for the Chief Justice

 a. Presiding officer in the Impeachment court, Article XI, Section 3 (6)
b. Chair, Judicial and Bar Council, Article VIII, Section 8
c. Chair, Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Article VII, Section 4
d. Supervisory powers over all Justices and Judges, Article VIII, Section 6
e. Control & supervision over all officials & employees of Judiciary, Article VIII, Section 6

I. Safeguards of Judicial Independence

1) The SC is a constitutional body; it may not be abolished by the legislature;

2) The members of the SC are removable only by impeachment;
3) The SC may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction may not be
increased without its advice and concurrence;
4) The SC has administrative supervision of all inferior courts and personnel;
5) The SC has the exclusive power to discipline judges/justices of inferior courts;
6) The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure;
7) The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions;
8) Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy.

- Re: COA Opinion on the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased for the retired Chief/Associate
Justices of SC, 678 SCRA 1 (2012)

COA’s Argument: There was underpayment in the purchase of retired SC Justices from the SC of the personal properties
assigned to them during their incumbency. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of
the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the
COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the
Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA
Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998.

Held: The Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme
Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel.

By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired
Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege
and a benefit. This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized.
The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can
grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative
authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judiciary’s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle
and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and by its own grants.

Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc
determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges,
court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions
and restrictions of the grant as grantor.

In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the
Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can
be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not
only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and
privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.

- Re: Request for Guidance/Clarification on Section 7, Rule 111, RA 10154 requiring

government employees to secure a clearance of pendency/non-pendency of cases
from CSC, 706 SCRA 502 (2013)

Is the subject provision applicable to members of Judiciary? No.

The requirement for retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC – should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem
it otherwise would disregard the Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel.
Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement
contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154.

- Re: Save the SC Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v Abolition of
Judiciary development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy UDK-15143, Jan 21, 2015

J. Appointments to the Judiciary

Cases”
- Chavez v JBC, 676 SCRA 579 (2012 and 696 SCRA 496 (2013)
- Jardeleza v Sereno, 733 SCRA 279 (2014) and Resolution, GR 213181, Jan 21, 2015
- Villanueva v JBC, GR 211833, Apr 7, 2015
Issue: Whether or not the qualification imposed by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before one can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional?

Held: Yes. As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and selecting applicants relative
to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to determine how best to perform such
constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be observed
in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond
to existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is
shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those judges with
five years of experience was an exercise of discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however, should have been
informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare for and comply with them.

Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of
the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and
differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven
competence which may be measured by experience, among other factors.

The classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test. The foregoing shows that substantial
distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience and those with less than five years of experience,
like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose.
The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable
classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said policy is valid and
constitutional.

K. Judicial Privilege
Case: Re: Petition for recognition of the exemption of the GSIS from payment of legal fees,
612 SCRA 193 (2010)
May Congress exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal fees?

No.

The Rules of Court was promulgated in the exercise of the Court’s rule-making power. It is essentially procedural in nature
as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Corollarily, Rule 141 is basically procedural. It does
not create or take away a right but simply operates as a means to implement an existing right. In particular, it functions to
regulate the procedure of exercising a right of action and enforcing a cause of action. In particular, it pertains to the
procedural requirement of paying the prescribed legal fees in the filing of a pleading or any application that initiates an
action or proceeding.

Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules promulgated
by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part
of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s
institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive
domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive
XI. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES/AGENCIES

A. CSC, COA, COMELEC, Article IX, A, B, C, D

The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall:
1. establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service.
2. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
3. integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
4. institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and
the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

The Commission on Audit (COA) is the central auditing agency of the government.
Functions:
1. to examine and audit all forms of government revenues;
2. to examine and audit all forms of government expenses;
3. to settle government accounts;
4. to promulgate accounting and auditing rules (including those for the prevention and disallowance of expenses
which are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant and unconscionable expenditures)
5. Quasi-judicial function: to decide administrative cases involving expenditures of public funds.

If the government agency has internal auditing system, COA has no power to pre-audit.
Pre-audit – examination of financial transactions before the consumption of payment. The purpose of pre-audit is to
determine if the proposed expenditure complies with the appropriation law, if there are sufficient funds from the
government, if the proposed expense is not unreasonable, extravagant, unconscionable or if the transaction is duly-
approved by proper authorities.

Subject to post-audit:
1. Constitutional bodies with fiscal autonomy;
2. Autonomous colleges and state universities;
3. Government-owned and controlled corporations;
4. NGOs which receive subsidy or equity from the government.

The COMELEC is the central election agency of the government.

Function:
1. To enforce election laws
a. Can declare a failure of election;
b. Can call for holding of special elections;
c. Can order manual recount of votes;
d. Can deny due course and cancel certificate of candidacy;
e. Can correct manifest errors in the election returns or certificate of canvass;
f. Decide for the annulment of plebiscite results.

2. Decide administrative questions affecting elections EXCEPT the right to vote. The COMELEC has no
jurisdiction if the issue is the right to vote.
a. Can file a petition for inclusion or exclusion of voters
b. Can prosecute election law violators;
c. Can recommend pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of service of sentence for violation of election laws
(one of the limitations of the President’s power to pardon)
No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.

3. Can deputize election law enforcement agencies and recommend their removal
4. Can register political parties, organizations and coalitions
5. Can accredit citizens-arms (NAMFREL)
6. Can regulate public utilities and media of information
7. Quasi-judicial function: Decide election contests and cases
 Election Contest Jurisdiction
Brgy. Officials MTC
Municipal officials RTC
Regional COMELEC
Provincial
City Officials
Members of House of Representatives HRET
Senators SET
President and Vice President PET

The COMELEC has administrative functions, quasi-judicial functions and quasi-legislative functions.

En Banc Division
Exercise of administrative powers 1. All election cases including pre-
a. Violation of election laws proclamation controversies;
b. Correction of errors from election returns 2. Petition to cancel COC;
(ER) to statement of votes (Board of 3. Cases appealed from RTC/MTC
Canvassers)

If the decision of the MTC or RTC is affirmed by the COMELEC Division (in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction), it goes to the COMELEC En Banc by MR. In case of tie in the votes of the En Banc, the decision of
the COMELEC Division is affirmed.

If the decision of the COMELEC Division is in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, it goes to the COMELEC
En Banc by MR. In case of tie, there would be a re-hearing of the case to break the tie. In case the votes remain
equal, the decision of the COMELEC Division is affirmed (the MR is denied). The Supreme Court will not
entertain cases coming from COMELEC En Banc unless there is a re-hearing of the case.

Legal basis: Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. - When the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in
appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the
petition or motion shall be denied.

1. Powers and Functions

2. Qualifications and Disqualifications
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ON COMMISSION ON
COMMISSION ELECTIONS AUIDIT
Composition 1 Chairman 1 Chairman 1 Chairman
2 Commissioners 6 Commissioners 2 Commissioners
Common Qualifications a. Natural born a. Natural born a. Natural born
citizens; citizens; citizens;
b. At least 35 years at b. At least 35 years at b. At least 35 years at
the time of the the time of the the time of the
appointment; appointment; appointment;
c. Not candidates for c. Not candidates for c. Not candidates for
any elective any elective any elective
position in the position in the position in the
election election election
immediately immediately immediately
preceding preceding preceding
appointment appointment appointment
d. Cannot be d. Cannot be d. Cannot be
appointed within appointed within appointed within
 one year after one year after one year after
election (whether election (whether election (whether
candidate/s or not) candidate/s or not) candidate/s or not)
e. Must not be related e. Must not be related e. Must not be related
within the fourth within the fourth within the fourth
degree of degree of degree of
consanguinity or consanguinity or consanguinity or
affinity to the affinity to the affinity to the
President including President including President including
the spouse (under the spouse (under the spouse (under
RA 6730, included RA 6730, included RA 6730, included
are bilas, balae and are bilas, balae and are bilas, balae and
inso) inso) inso)

Additional qualifications f. With proven f. Holders of College f. Certified Public

capacity for public Degrees Accountant with at
administration least 10 years of
N.B.: Majority, auditing experience
including the or a lawyer who
Chairman, must be practiced law for at
members of the least 10 years
Philippine Bar and
practiced law for at N.B.: At no time shall all
least 10 years. Members of the
Commission belong to the
same profession
Appointments Needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
Disqualifications 1. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any
other office or employment.
2. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or
3. in the active management or control of any business which in any way be
affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested,
directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege
granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.

Term of Office 7 years without reappointment

Removal from Office Impeachment

3. Jurisdiction
4. Appointment and Terms of Office
5. Prohibited offices and interests
6. Salary
7. Removal
8. Fiscal Autonomy

The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released.

8. Submission of Reports
A. COMELEC

1. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
Nuisance candidate – no serious intention to win in the election maybe because he does not have the financial or the
organizational ability to run an honest to goodness campaign.
Notice and hearing is required for proper disqualification of a nuisance candidate.

2. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

3. Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, or recall.

B. CSC
Annual report on personnel programs.

C. COA
The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual report
covering the financial condition and operation of the Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and non-governmental entities subject
to its audit, and recommend measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such
other reports as may be required by law.

Compare Art. IX D Sec 2(1) duty to examine: government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters
vs. Sec. 4 annual report on government-owned or controlled corporations.

CSC: Art. IX B Sec. 2(1) jurisdiction of CSC: government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters

Ombudsman: Art. XI Sec. 22. Jurisdiction on investigations: government-owned or controlled corporations

vs. Sec. 13(2) government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters

Limitations and prohibitions in the Civil Service:

1. Appointment of lameducks
No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office
in the Government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

2. Appointment of elective officials

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.

3. Appointment of appointive officials

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

4. Prohibition on Double-compensation and Foreign Gift

No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation,
unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument,
office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

5. Standardization of pay
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account
the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions.

6. Ban on partisan political activities

No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.
 No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote.
(Art. XVI, Section 5(3))

7. Removal or suspension only for a cause

No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.

If you are in the career service, you have security of tenure. You cannot just be removed unless there is valid
cause and due process. You cannot be a permanent government employee unless you have a civil service
eligibility. How is it determined? Through competitive examination (merit and fitness rule).

Three kinds of competitive examinations:

1. Non-professional – rank and file
2. Professional
3. Career Executive Service Officer Eligibility

If you do not have eligibility, you can still be appointed but in a temporary capacity. Normally it is limited to
12 months but one can stay in the office because of the hold-over principle. But if the law has a fixed term for a
certain position, it is implied that it prohibits the application of the hold-over principle.

If you do not have a civil service eligibility but you were appointed temporarily, you will never become
permanent unless you possess the necessary eligibility. But once you become eligible, it does not automatically
mean that you will become permanent. It requires a new appointment.

A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session, takes effect only after confirmation by
the COA, and once approved, continues until the end of the term of the appointee.

An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in session, takes effect immediately, but
ceases to be valid if disapproved by the COA or upon the next adjournment of Congress.
Different ways to be terminated from service:
1. Resignation - voluntary
2. Removal – involuntary and form of a penalty for commission of an offense
3. Retirement – separation from service by operation of law because of age limit
4. Recall – local elective official
5. Abandonment – voluntary relinquishment of office by the holder with intention to terminate the possession and
control of his position but without approval
6. Death
7. Permanent incapacity
8. End of term
Term is fixed by law. Tenure, it varies. It depends how long you occupy the position.
9. Abolition of the office or reorganization
RAC: The president has the power to continuously reorganize the executive department for efficiency, effectivity
and simplicity.
10. Failure to assume office – for a person who was elected and proclaimed but fails to assume office within 6 months
from proclamation
11. Conviction of a crime where the accessory penalty is disqualification to hold public office
See Monsanto vs. Factoran:
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason
of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to
that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise
removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her
conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her
offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once
again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
 former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.

Public officers must take an oath of office before assumption.

The CSC must attest to the appointment.

Under the Local Government Code, local executives (governor and mayor) have the power to appoint officials in the local
government unit. But when it comes to money (provincial or city treasurer), the local chief executives merely nominate
three nominees, the one who will appoint is the Secretary of Finance. Same with local budget officers. Local chief
executives merely nominate and the Secretary of DBM will choose from the nominees. The Secretaries cannot appoint
someone not on the list.

Automatic reversion rule - All appointments involve in the chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously for
Civil Service Commission for approval and the disapproval of the appointment of the person proposed to the higher
position, if invalidated, it would also invalidate the promotions of those in the lower positions and automatically returns
all of them in the previous position.
Requisites:
1. There is a series of promotions;
2. The promotional appointments are simultaneously submitted to the CSC;
3. The CSC disapproves the appointment to a higher position.

 Transfer requires consent. Otherwise, it violates security of tenure.

 Detail is temporary in nature.
 Reassignment is a management prerogative. It is presumed to be regular. Must have a definite duration. If there is
no definite duration, it is tantamount to a clothing (?) assignment and therefore, a diminution in rank and status.
 If the person has no CESO eligibility, he will not become permanent CESO.
 A person who has reached a compulsory retirement may be appointed to a government position provided it is co-
terminous on a primarily confidential position.
 Resignation must be accepted by competent authority expressly or impliedly. Voluntariness is an element of
resignation so there is no such thing as “courtesy or forced resignation” for lack of voluntariness. The effectivity
date of resignation is the date specified in the letter of resignation. If there is not date specified, the date of effectivity
is on the day the notice of acceptance was received, not the date of the acceptance.
 Preventive suspension is not a penalty. Its purpose is to avoid the government official from influencing the case.
For example, a person was put under preventive suspension and it turns out that he is not guilty of the offense
charged, he is not entitled to back pay. However, if such person was put under preventive suspension and he was
found guilty; but when he appealed the case (while pending appeal, he was still under preventive suspension), he
was exonerated in the appeal, such person is entitled to backpay [during the appeal period] because the preventive
suspension already has the character of a penalty (it becomes punitive in character).

 Grounds for termination:

1. Dishonesty – disposition to lie, to cheat, deceive or defraud (the false statement must be intentionally be made
in any material fact). Mere misdeclaration of SALN is not automatic dishonesty. There must be manifest
disproportion between his salary and his accumulated wealth.
2. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service (administrative offense) – example: grave misconduct –
implies a wrongful intention, not mere error in judgment (bribery, corruption)
3. Unsatisfactory conduct – incompetence; inefficiency; poor performance
4. Gross negligence for want of even the slightest care; tantamount to intentional or willful (example: habitual
absenteeism)

 Abandonment is an informal resignation.

Rule-Making powers
11. Review of final orders, resolutions and decisions
a. Rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions
b. Rendered in the exercise of administrative functions
Cases:
- Funa v Villar, 670 SCRA 579 (2012)
Facts:
President Arroyo appointed Guillermo N. Carague as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7)
years, pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008.
Meanwhile, she appointed Reynaldo A. Villar as the third member of the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting February
2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar
was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar
was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment
papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in
this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as
COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of
office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to
that position.

Issue:

Whether or not Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served for four (4) years
of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid? And if valid, for how long can he serve?

Held:

No. Although promotional appointment (Commissioner to Chairman) is not prohibited, Villar’s appointment is still not
valid. Sec 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment.
x x x Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. x x x

Accordingly, the promotional appointment as COA Chairman of Villar for a stated fixed term of less than seven (7) years
is void for violating a clear, but mandatory constitutional prescription. There can be no denying that the vacancy in the
position of COA chairman when Carague stepped down in February 2, 2008 resulted from the expiration of his 7-year term.
Hence, the appointment to the vacancy thus created ought to have been one for seven (7) years in line with the verbal legis
approach of interpreting the Constitution. However, Villar cannot be appointment to a full 7-year term because of the rule
against one serving the commission for an aggregate term of more than seven (7) years.

Rules:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of
office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period
is void and unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this
will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for
the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as
this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who
served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees
in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to
the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered
by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired
period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position
of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
"reappointment" found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to
Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position
or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a
reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

- Funa v Duque III, 742 SCRA 166

Facts:

President Gloria Arroyo appointed Francisco Duque as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. Subsequently, President
Arroyo issued EO 864 designating Duque, Chairman of the CSC, as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees in an ex
officio capacity of the (a) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); (b) Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PHILHEALTH), (c) the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF).

Issue:

Whether or not the designation of the CSC Chairman in an ex officio capacity as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC
and HDMF is unconstitutional?

Held:

Yes.

No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall
he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way may
be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with,
or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as "independent."Although their respective functions are essentially
executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions.

To safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others, imposes under Section 2,
Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen
their integrity, to wit:
(a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;
(b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
(c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his
office; and
(d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the
Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government- owned or – controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers and functions to
carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated with appointments,
compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government
officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and
functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried
out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman
sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and
functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing interest on unpaid or
unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers, or approving restructuring
proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. The Court also notes that Duque’s designation as member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional
compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the
proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex
officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.

Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s designation as member of the governing
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC.
PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health
and the Department of Labor, respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of the President.
The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised through their governing Boards, members
of which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
and the members of their respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman
cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the independence
vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.

Note:
Constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 was upheld.
[that the Chairman of the CSC shall bea member of the Board of Directors or of other governing bodies of government entities whose
functions affect the career development, employment, status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, such
as the Government Service Insurance System, Foreign Service Board, Foreign Trade Service Board, National Board for Teachers, and such
other similar boards as may be created by law]

This provision is clear that the CSC Chairman’s membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the
functions of the government entity where he will sit as its Board member must affect the career development, employment
status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees. Based on this, the Court finds no irregularity
in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters affecting the career development, rights and welfare
of government employees are among the primary functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its
Chairman. The CSC Chairman’s membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his position as such.
Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.

- Dela Llana v Chairman, COA, 665 SCRA 176 (2012)

The Commission on Audit issued Circular No. 89-299 which lifted the pre-audit of government transactions of national
government. It provided that the pre-audit activities retained by the COA as therein outlined shall no longer be a
pre-requisite to the implementation or prosecution of projects and the payment of claims. The COA aimed to henceforth
focus its efforts on the post-audit of financial accounts and transactions, as well as on the assessment and evaluation of the
adequacy and effectivity of the agency’s fiscal control process.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the said circular contending that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be
lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution.

Held:

The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenues and expenditures and the use of public funds and property, including the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination; to establish the techniques and methods for the review; and to
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Its exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of COA includes the duty to conduct pre-audit.A pre-audit is an examination
of financial transactions before their consumption or payment. It seeks to determine whether the following conditions are
present: (1) the proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority; (2) sufficient
funds are available for the purpose; (3) the proposed expenditure is not unreasonable or extravagant, and the unexpended
balance of appropriations to which it will be charged is sufficient to cover the entire amount of the expenditure; and (4) the
transaction is approved by the proper authority and the claim is duly supported by authentic underlying evidence. It could,
among others, identify government agency transactions that are suspicious on their face prior to their implementation and
prior to the disbursement of funds. Petitioner anchors his argument on Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.

There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for
all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which
provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only
when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures,
including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion
on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of
its audit and examination.

- Capablanca v CSC, GR 179370, Nov 19, 2009

Facts:

The PNP-Regional Office appointed petitioner Eugenio S. Capablanca into the PNP service with the rank of Police Officer
1 (PO1) with a temporary status and was assigned at the PNP Station in Butuan City. Petitioner took the PNP Entrance
Examination conducted by the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and passed the same. He also took the Career
Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and
likewise passed the same. Thereafter, the Regional Director of Police Regional Office XIII conferred upon petitioner the
permanent status as PO1.

The CSC Caraga Regional Office XIII (CSC Caraga) through its Regional Director Lourdes Clavite-Vidal informed PO1
Capablanca about certain alleged irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT which he took on July 28, 2000. According to the
CSC, the "person in the picture pasted in the Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the person whose picture is attached
in the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)" and that the signature appearing in the PS-P was different from the signature affixed to
the PDS. The CSC further informed petitioner that such findings of alleged examination irregularities constituted the offense
of dishonesty if prima facie evidence was established.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the proceedings arguing that it is the NAPOLCOM which has sole authority to conduct
entrance and promotional examinations for police officers to the exclusion of the CSC. Thus, the CSP-CAT conducted was
void. Moreover, he alleged that the administrative discipline over police officers falls under the jurisdiction of the PNP
and/or NAPOLCOM.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the CSC Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible administrative
case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP examination irregularity?

Held:

Yes.

The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen the
merit and rewards system, and to adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. The civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Specifically, Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6975
(1990) or the "Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990" provides that the "Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department," to which herein petitioner belongs.

Section 12 of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 or the "Administrative Code of 1987," enumerates the powers and functions of
the CSC, to wit:

SEC. 12. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks in the
Civil Service;
x xxx
(7) Control, supervise and coordinate Civil Service examinations. x x x
x xxx
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. x x x
In addition, Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers upon the CSC the
authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected with the examinations, thus:
Sec. 28. The Commission shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its officials and employees and over all cases
involving civil service examination anomalies or irregularities.
To carry out this mandate, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, empowering its Regional Offices to take cognizance of cases involving CSC examination anomalies:
SECTION 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. - The Civil Service Commission Regional Offices shall have
jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Complaints initiated by, or brought before, the Civil Service Commission Regional Offices provided that the alleged acts
or omissions were committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Office, including Civil Service examination anomalies
or irregularities and the persons complained of are employees of agencies, local or national, within said geographical areas;
x xxx
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary
investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity committed by the petitioner.

(2) Petitioner argues that the CSC does not have the authority to conduct an initiatory investigation of the case, but it only
has appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of any of the disciplining authorities.

Held:

The appellate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed against erring employees
is in connection with the duties and functions of their office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from
cheating in the civil service examinations.

It is true that Section 47 (2), Title I (A), Book V of EO No. 292 gives the heads of government offices original disciplinary
jurisdiction over their own subordinates. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not
more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days’ salary. It is only when the penalty imposed exceeds
the aforementioned penalties that an appeal may be brought before the Civil Service Commission which has appellate
jurisdiction over the same in accordance with Section 47 (1) Title I(A), Book V of EO No. 292, thus:

SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. – (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’
salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. x x x

The present case, however, partakes of an act by petitioner to protect the integrity of the civil service system, and does not
fall under the provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on
administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil
service system and protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list of
eligibles those who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to
discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the law or the rules of the
service.

B. Economic Agencies
1. BSP, Article XII, Sections 20, 21

Sec. 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the members of whose governing board
must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall come from
the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The
authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have supervision over the
operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be provided by law over the operations of finance
companies and other institutions performing similar functions.

Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority.
Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public.

2. NEDA, Article XII, Sections 9, 10

Sec. 9. The Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency headed by the President, which shall,
after consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units, recommend
to Congress, and implement continuing integrated and coordinated programs and policies for national development.

Until the Congress provides otherwise, the National Economic and Development Authority shall function as the
independent planning agency of the government.

Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest
dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress
shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.

C. National Commissions
1. Commission on Human Rights (CHR), Article XIII, Sections 17-19

There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the
Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.

Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with
the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human
rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims
of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government’s compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence
is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

2. National Language Commission (Komisyon ng Wikang Pambansa), Article XIV, Section 9

The Congress shall establish a national language commission composed of representatives of various regions and
disciplines which shall undertake, coordinate, and promote researches for the development, propagation, and preservation
of Filipino and other languages.

3. National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Article XVI, Section 6

- RA 6975 – Establishing PNP under DILG

The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their
jurisdiction shall be provided by law.

4. National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP), Article XII, Section 5; Article XIV,
Section 17, Article XVI, Section 12
The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their
cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.

The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities,
the majority of the members of which shall come from such communities.

- RA 8371 – Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples - refer to a group of people or homogenous societies identified by
self-ascription and ascription by other, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded
and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed customs,
tradition and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of
colonization, non-indigenous religions and culture, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos.
ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations
which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions
and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural
and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled
outside their ancestral domains

D. Anti-Graft Bodies
1. Sandiganbayan, Article XI, Section 4

The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.

- PD 1606, Section 4 – Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

2. Ombudsman, PD 1630 (1979); RA 6770 (1989)

The Office of the Ombudsman shall include the Office of the Overall Deputy, the Office of the Deputy for Luzon, the
Office of the Deputy for the Visayas, the Office of the Deputy for Mindanao, the Office of the Deputy for the Armed
Forces, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The President may appoint other Deputies as the necessity for it may
arise, as recommended by the Ombudsman.

Appointment:
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least twenty-one (21) nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three (3) nominees for each
vacancy thereafter, which shall be filled within three (3) months after it occurs, each of which list shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.

In the organization of the Office of the Ombudsman for filling up of positions therein, regional, cultural or ethnic
considerations shall be taken into account to the end that the Office shall be as much as possible representative of the
regional, ethnic and cultural make-up of the Filipino nation.

Qualifications:
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, at
least forty (40) years old, of recognized probity and independence, members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been
candidates for any elective national or local office in the immediately preceding election whether regular or special. The
Ombudsman must have, for ten (10) years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

Term of Office:
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall serve for a term of seven (7) years without
reappointment.
Jurisdiction:
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints led in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken
and the result thereof.

Powers and Functions:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to
perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, ne, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement
or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to
examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make
recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law.

Case: Caoibes v Ombudsman, GR 132177, Jul 19, 2001

Facts:

Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainant’s
eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. Respondent alleged therein that on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the
third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he requested petitioner to return the executive table he borrowed from
respondent; that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner
blurted "Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was
thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable; and that respondent had the incident blottered with the Las Piñas
Police Station. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner, Jose F. Caoibes, Jr.,
Presiding Judge of Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City.

Subsequently, Alumbres lodged another Complaint against petitioner, this time and administrative case with the Supreme
Court, docketed as Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ, praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of
grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. Said complaint is based on the same facts as those in the
complaint filed earlier with the office of the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," praying
that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation in abeyance, and refer the same to the Supreme Court which,
through the Office of the Court Administrator, is already investigating what transpired on May 20, 1997. Petitioner
contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary
determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are
under its exclusive supervision and control.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ombudsman should defer action on a criminal complaint against a judge, or a court employee where
the same arises from their administrative duties, and refer the same to the Supreme Court?
Held:

Yes.

It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises
over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested
with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman
cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an
administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it,
referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule
should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the
Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this
matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the
Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative
liabilities but also other administrative concerns