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Defining Moral Values - Intercollegiate

Studies Institute: Think. Live Free.
By ISI Archive

6-7 minutos

The following is excerpted from Andreas Kinneging’s

excellent book The Geography of Good and Evil.

There is much ado about “values,” But the debate has

neither been lucid nor deep. Many of us feel that
something is the matter, that something is wrong with
our values, but we can rarely put into words exactly
what it is.

To begin by delimiting our terms, when we speak of

“values,” what we have in mind is moral values. Not all
values belong to this category. A beautiful painting, for
example, is undoubtedly valuable from an economic and
aesthetic perspective, but it does not have a moral
value in and of itself.

Are moral values perhaps the same as moral norms?

(Not all norms are moral norms. The grades that
measure students’ achievements in the field of
mathematics are certainly norms, but they are not
moral norms.) Are moral values and moral norms
different terms for the same thing? At first glance, that
might seem plausible. Yet they are not. Values and
norms are two clearly distinct concepts that should not
be used interchangeably.

For one thing, moral norms are set and then externally
imposed. Moral values are something in and of man
himself. Man has moral values. They are part of him.
Second, moral norms are rules. They are commands or
interdictions. “Thou shalt not lie” is an example of a
moral norm. Moral values are principles, not rules.
Honesty is an example of a moral value.

Moral values and moral norms correspond in a specific

manner. Every moral norm is based on a moral value.
The norm “Thou shalt not lie” is based on the value of
honesty. Logically, moral values precede moral norms.
Norms are the expression of values. (Pedagogically, the
reverse is often true. Norms commonly precede values.
From that perspective, values are generally interiorized,
acquired norms.) Moral value, then, is the more
fundamental notion. We should therefore begin by
taking a closer look at this concept.

As we just determined, not all values are moral

values. Beauty, as a characterization of a woman, for
example, is also a value, but it definitely does not
qualify as a moral value. It is an aesthetic value.
There is also such a thing as economic value—the value
of an item used in trade. Yet another category
comprises what are sometimes called vital values: life,
consciousness, activity, strength, power, happiness, and
the like. One further type is made up of religious values.
In that connection, we might think of faith and the hope
that one day, we will fully understand the wherefore and
the why of our mysterious presence on this earth. The
religious value par excellence is holiness.
What is the differentia specifica of moral values? How
do they differ from the other value categories? The full
answer to that question is not so simple. Nevertheless,
we can all name examples of moral values: justice,
charity, bravery, fidelity, modesty, sincerity, kindness,
etc. Let
us take this as our starting point.

When we ponder those values and try to formulate a

definition of what typifies them as moral values, we
must conclude that this is to be found in the following
two essential characteristics. Unlike the other values,
moral values are purely personal values, in the sense
that they are values that pertain only to a person’s acts
or his character. We refer to an honest deed, for
instance, and to an honest person. Does this also apply
to justice? Do we not refer to a just society? Yes, but
only in a metaphorical sense. A just society is merely a
society of just persons or, at any rate, a society in which
persons act justly.

Secondly, moral values usually are not the object of

concrete actions. They are reflected in the manner in
which we carry out those actions. Donating money
reflects the values of generosity and charity. Rescuing a
drowning child at the risk of one’s own life reflects
courage. Resisting the temptation to take a second
helping of food reflects self-control. Moral values, then,
do not guide our actions directly—as goals—
but indirectly. They must, somehow, already be present
in a person before actions are performed, in order to
guide those actions in a morally appropriate direction.

How? Ideally, as the voice of conscience. Failing that, in

our sense of shame.

Andreas Kinneging, a professor of legal philosophy at

the University of Leiden (Netherlands), was awarded the
Socrates prize in 2006 for the best Dutch book in the
field of philosophy.

Complement with Daniel Mahoney on “soft”

totalitarianism, Doug Bandow on the tension between
freedom and virtue, and R. J. Snell on how to flourish at
college and beyond. 

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